special article

Exclusionary Urbanisation in Asia:

A Macro Overview
Amitabh Kundu

Studies on internal migration are constrained by the fact

that no international organisation systematically collects
or tabulates even the basic demographic information on
internal migration in a cross-sectionally and temporally
comparable manner. Researchers have surprisingly
concluded that internal migration within Asian countries
is high and increasing over time. This alarmist
perspective could be attributed to the projection of
urban population made by the Population Division of
the United Nations and other national and international
agencies. This has guided governments of several
countries, leading to measures to control inflow of
people for security concerns or to reduce pressure on
limited amenities in the destination regions. In this
context, the paper examines the proposition that
rural-urban migration has accelerated over the recent
decades in the Asian countries, particularly during the
1990s, incorporating the history, social fabric and
political environment in the explanatory framework.

This is a revised and abridged version of the unpublished report

prepared for UNDP as a background paper for the Human Development
Report 2009. Kind permission for its publication in EPW is
acknowledged.
Amitabh Kundu (amit0304@mail.jnu.ac.in) is at the Centre for the Study
of Regional Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

48

1Introduction

n overview of the contemporary literature on population

mobility in Asia suggests that despite widely different
trends and patterns, alternate policy frameworks and
varying ideological dispositions of the policymakers and
researchers, the dominant perspective is that the continent is
currently experiencing rapid urbanisation and that this would
continue in future years. The past decade and a half has been
considered to be a period of a progressive shift of the epicentre of
urbanisation from the predominantly northern latitudes of developed countries to the southern ones of developing countries
and one where the mean latitude of global urban population has
been steadily moving south (Mohan and Dasgupta 2005). Several countries in Asia are noted to be experiencing acceleration in
the growth in rural-urban (RU) migrants since the late 1970s and
as a result, the continent currently accounts for about one half of
the worlds urban population. Projections have been made that
the pace of urbanisation would go up in the next few decades
which would double Asias urban population during 2000-2030,
its share in global urban population going up from 48% to 54%.1
The proponents of market and governance oriented perspective believe that the strategy of globalisation and structural reform
is responsible for the acceleration in RU migration, giving boost to
the pace of urbanisation. The latter is attributed to pull factors
operating through the cities and towns and much of the investment and consequent increase in employment is taking place
within or around the existing urban centres. This rapid pace of urbanisation is promoted by the scale of production, particularly in
manufacturing, information asymmetries contributing to agglomeration economies, technological developments in transport and
building sectors and substitution of capital for land. Even when
the industrial units get located in inland rural settlements or virgin
coastal areas, in a few years, the latter acquire urban status.
This perspective and the proposed package of solutions have
not gone unchallenged. It is argued that the pace of migration
and urban development in Asia is associated with accentuation of
regional and interpersonal inequality, resulting in increased
poverty.2 Furthermore, employment generation in the formal
urban economy is not high due to capital-intensive nature of
industrialisation. A low rate of infrastructural investment in public sector necessary for keeping budgetary deficits low is
resulting in deceleration of agricultural growth. This, coupled
with an open trade policy is responsible for a contraction of
purchasing power and destabilisation of the agrarian economy,
causing high unemployment and exodus from rural areas. All
november 28, 2009 vol xliv no 48 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

special article

these are leading to rapid growth in urban population in several

countries, with most of the migrants being absorbed in the informal economy. The protagonists as also the critics of globalisation, thus, converge on the proposition that urban growth in

the post-liberalisation phase would be high. An analysis of the

trend and process of urbanisation in Asia, however, gives reasons
for questioning its validity. It would be important to begin the
analysis of demographic trend by examining the empirical

Table 1: Urbanisation Scenario in Major Regions of the World and Countries in Asia

Percentage of Urban to Total Population

1950

World
29.06
Africa
14.51
Sub-Saharan Africa
11.06
Europe
5
1.21
Latin Ame & Carri
41.35
Central America
42.74
South America
39.24
North America
63.90
Australia/New Zealand 76.16
Asia without China
16.77
Asia
19.22
Eastern Asia
16.47
China
13.00
Hong Kong, China
85.21
Macao, China
97.37
DPR Korea
31.00
Japan
34.85
Mongolia
19.97
Republic of Korea
21.35
South-Central Asia
16.44
Afghanistan
5.80
Bangladesh
4.28
Bhutan
2.38
India
17.04
Iran
27.55
Kazakhstan
36.36
Kyrgyzstan
26.49
Maldives
10.98
Nepal
2.67
Pakistan
17.52
Sri Lanka
15.33
Tajikistan
29.37
Turkmenistan
44.92
Uzbekistan
31.42
South-Eastern Asia
15.44
Brunei Darussalam
27.08
Cambodia
10.19
Indonesia
12.40
Lao PDR
7.22
Malaysia
20.36
Myanmar
16.16
Philippines
27.14
Singapore
99.41
Thailand
16.48
Timor-Leste
9.93
Vietnam
11.64
Western Asia
28.64
Armenia
42.54
Azerbaijan
42.47
Bahrain
63.79
Cyprus
28.34
Georgia
37.31
Iraq
35.13
Israel
70.99
Jordan
37.08
Kuwait
6
1.84
Lebanon
32.02
Palestine
37.31
Oman
8.55
Qatar
80.00
Saudi Arabia
21.31
Syrian Arab Republic
30.63
Turkey
24.77
United Arab Emirates
54.29
Yemen
5.79

1970

36.01
23.60
19.52
62.77
57.01
59.68
53.81
73.80
84.51
22.66
26.00
22.81
17.40
87.72
96.85
54.20
53.20
45.06
40.71
20.45
11.03
7.59
6.04
19.76
41.21
50.24
37.48
11.57
3.96
24.82
19.52
36.88
47.78
36.72
21.45
61.54
15.97
17.07
9.64
33.46
22.83
32.98
100.00
20.89
12.91
18.30
44.60
59.89
50.00
83.64
40.81
47.48
56.15
84.20
55.95
85.75
59.48
54.29
29.59
88.29
48.67
43.34
38.24
77.78
13.30

1990

2000

42.96 46.60
32.00 35.95
28.22 32.76
70.53 71.42
70.64 75.35
74.49 68.69
64.99 79.46
75.43 79.14
85.29 86.91
31.91 37.72
34.45 37.05
33.00 40.42
27.40 35.78
99.53 100.00
99.73 100.00
58.38 60.18
63.09 65.22
57.04 56.56
73.84 79.62
27.21 29.46
18.32 21.28
19.81 23.59
16.45 25.40
25.55 27.66
56.33 64.20
56.27 56.28
37.77 35.40
25.93 27.84
8.85 13.43
30.58 33.17
17.20 15.71
31.66 26.50
45.07 45.85
40.12 37.26
31.63 39.75
65.76 71.17
12.60 16.91
30.58 42.00
15.43 21.98
49.79 61.97
24.87 28.03
48.78 58.55
100.00 100.00
29.42 31.14
20.81 24.30
20.25 24.28
61.04 63.75
67.45 65.09
53.74 51.20
88.03 88.31
66.67 68.70
55.05 52.67
69.71 67.83
90.36 91.44
72.22 78.25
97.99 98.20
83.12 86.00
67.87 71.48
66.09 71.57
92.29 94.98
76.58 79.85
48.93 51.63
59.20 64.74
79.06 77.83
20.93 26.27

Urban Rural Growth Differential

2005

48.58
37.89
35.00
71.92
77.52
81.78
70.16
80.73
87.86
39.74
39.41
44.48
40.42
100.00
100.00
61.59
65.96
56.72
80.79
30.63
22.90
25.67
30.93
28.70
66.94
57.10
35.80
33.90
15.76
34.88
15.14
26.40
47.32
36.68
44.09
73.53
19.73
48.14
27.38
67.61
30.65
62.71
100.00
32.30
26.05
26.41
65.04
64.05
51.53
88.41
69.38
52.47
66.90
91.62
78.30
98.30
86.59
71.58
71.48
95.48
80.98
53.19
67.28
77.73
28.93

2025

57.23
47.19
45.20
76.21
83.51
87.39
76.17
85.67
90.87
51.06
48.54
59.20
56.87
100.00
100.00
70.15
71.09
63.14
85.24
39.65
32.74
37.35
52.26
37.17
76.03
64.47
42.85
56.69
27.15
46.25
18.84
31.07
57.43
42.87
58.74
80.99
33.21
65.90
48.96
80.51
44.64
74.58
100.00
42.24
36.40
38.08
70.74
66.95
57.34
90.02
74.66
57.59
68.60
92.60
80.78
98.65
89.36
75.58
74.71
96.73
85.24
61.38
75.91
81.24
41.69

Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 28, 2009 vol xliv no 48

2030

1950-70

1970-90

59.69
50.02
48.17
77.84
84.65
77.71
88.29
86.68
91.47
51.53
54.13
62.40
60.33
100.00
100.00
72.36
72.98
65.67
86.26
43.02
36.23
41.04
56.17
40.60
77.86
66.84
46.16
60.83
30.61
49.80
21.40
34.12
60.43
46.15
61.84
82.35
36.98
68.94
53.08
82.21
48.39
76.69
100.00
45.77
39.89
41.77
72.51
69.06
60.05
90.63
76.42
60.18
70.48
93.06
81.97
98.71
90.05
77.23
76.35
96.90
86.24
63.99
77.73
82.45
45.35

1.59
2.99
3.34
2.37
3.16
2.95
3.42
2.32
2.68
1.95
1.87
2.02
1.72
1.08
-0.93
4.84
3.77
5.95
4.64
1.33
3.50
3.04
4.85
0.91
3.06
2.85
2.54
0.30
2.03
2.20
1.46
1.70
0.58
1.18
2.01
7.30
2.58
1.87
1.58
3.38
2.14
1.39
3.57
1.46
1.48
2.65
3.48
3.51
1.52
5.33
2.78
2.09
4.30
3.89
3.84
6.56
5.68
3.45
7.51
3.17
6.27
2.75
3.16
5.40
4.57

1.46
1.47
1.51
1.74
1.80
2.10
1.76
1.73
1.91
1.98
2.42
2.15
2.10
2.13
2.18
1.75
0.43
0.46
1.12
1.26
2.98
2.39
2.40
1.92
1.88
2.33
1.67
1.58
1.54
1.57
3.40
2.81
2.87
2.17
2.07
0.43
2.12
2.07
1.78
1.76
0.30
1.36
1.48
1.59
1.57
2.01
1.42
1.42
1.86
1.97
2.35
2.28
2.28
2.29
2.33
2.56
3.20
3.24
2.97
2.91
2.92
3.89
3.91
3.32
3.23
16.91
12.45
0.85
0.74
0.89
1.91
1.96
2.04
0.92
0.84
1.19
1.33
2.41
-0.20
-0.09
1.34
1.51
7.07
3.25
2.66
1.59
1.60
1.87
1.10
1.11
1.99
2.15
2.96
1.87
1.87
2.47
2.59
5.50
2.23
2.23
2.73
2.80
5.60
5.48
5.48
4.47
4.21
1.66
1.08
1.06
1.93
2.12
3.05
3.29
3.00
2.25
2.21
1.21
0.00
0.23
1.55
1.66
0.06
-1.02
-0.57
1.48
1.72
4.92
0.97
2.55
4.69
4.43
4.29
4.69
4.37
3.45
3.43
1.44
1.20
1.30
2.37
2.47
-0.78
-1.08
-1.01
1.32
1.69
-1.16
-2.51
-1.71
1.14
1.47
-0.55
0.31
0.60
2.03
2.12
0.72
-1.21
-0.97
1.29
1.57
2.64
3.55
3.56
2.95
2.88
0.91
2.51
2.46
2.14
2.08
-1.38
3.45
3.56
3.52
3.48
3.80
4.97
4.97
3.67
3.49
2.68
4.34
4.84
4.67
4.39
3.40
4.97
4.96
3.41
3.18
0.56
1.62
1.92
3.01
3.01
3.30
3.94
3.79
2.78
2.68
1.87
2.87
2.41
0.83
0.74
2.28
0.81
0.90
2.13
2.28
2.86
2.00
1.95
2.43
2.53
0.63
2.33
2.30
2.69
2.77
3.33
1.15
1.14
1.31
1.40
1.64
-1.06
-1.01
0.64
0.90
0.75
-1.02
-0.59
1.17
1.38
1.82
0.26
0.24
0.84
0.95
5.32
0.93
0.83
1.31
1.43
1.52
-0.96
-0.69
1.04
1.26
2.93
-0.87
-0.86
0.39
0.67
2.83
1.30
1.02
0.68
0.82
3.58
3.25
2.19
0.76
0.93
10.47
1.13
1.11
1.17
1.14
6.05
2.21
1.80
1.32
1.35
2.88
1.71
1.17
1.03
1.19
7.67
2.56
1.68
0.82
1.01
2.31
4.57
3.78
1.69
1.57
6.19
1.92
1.76
1.53
1.55
1.13
1.08
1.14
1.68
1.79
4.26
2.35
2.33
2.13
2.12
0.38
-0.73
-0.52
1.08
1.19
2.73
2.97
2.87
2.81
2.85

1990-2000

1990-05

2005-25

2005-30

2000-30

1.76
1.93
2.15
1.14
1.97
1.54
2.22
1.80
1.60
1.88
2.32
2.98
3.35

1.83
1.22
1.28
1.58
1.97
2.48
2.71
4.42
1.94
2.24
1.49
1.49
4.64
3.48
2.31
1.26
1.21
1.97
1.22
3.00
2.12
3.53
3.73
4.64
3.47
2.93
2.82
0.86
2.08
2.42
2.68
1.35
0.60
1.20
0.83
1.30
1.02
0.41
0.76
0.78
1.13
1.29
1.01
0.83
1.68
1.53
1.70
2.14
0.97
2.82

49

speciAl article

validity of the proposition of rapid RU migration and unprecedented urban growth.3

The present paper overviews the urbanisation process across
Asian countries and regions since the 1950s including the projections made till 2030 and is organised as follows: Section 2
examines the thesis of southward movement of urbanisation and
urban explosion. Section 3 overviews the changing structure of
urban population across different size categories, shift of growth
dy namics from large to second order cities and stagnation of
small towns in different regions of Asia. Possibility of decomposing incremental urban population into natural growth, new
towns, expansion of urban boundaries and RU migration has
been considered in the context of non-availability of data on
internal migration from standard international sources in Section 4. It also speculates on the change in the share of each of
these components based on fragmented statistical evidence from
different countries, as also the policies and programmes launched
at the national, regional and city levels. Section 5 attempts to understand the dynamics of urbanisation in a historical and socio-
cultural context and explores if that can justify the projection of
urban future made by the United Nations (UN) agencies. The
major findings of the study and reflections on the future urban
scenario of Asia based on these are presented in the last section.

URGD (which has continued throughout the half century) as is

the case of South America (a region within Latin America). It has
been argued that Asia now will replicate the experience of
these continents.
The growth rates in urban population and URGD in Asia are
reasonably high but have fluctuated over the past decades
(Table 1). The rates were above that of the world average, both
when China is included and excluded in the calculations, during
the entire second half of the last century. Understandably, these
were higher than that of Europe and North America mainly because, in the latter two regions, the rural population base, from
where migrants come to cities and towns, was very low due to the
high percentage of urban population. The Asian rates have, nonetheless, been consistently below that of South America and SubSaharan Africa. More importantly, these were less than that of
Latin America and whole of Africa until the mid-1970s (Kundu
and Kundu 2009). The rates have declined since the late 1960s.
The real acceleration in urban growth and URGD came during the
second half of the 1970s, the rates being higher than that of Africa
and about the same as Latin America during 1975-90. The Asian
URGD declined once again from 2.35% during 1970-90 to 2.28%
during 1990-2000, the latter being less than that of Latin America and has remained so during the entire period 1990-2005, for
which data are available.

2An Overview of Trend and Pattern of Urbanisation

The demographic weight of Asia, accounting for over 60% of
world population, is so overwhelming that researchers, planners
and administrators often derive their perspectives on urbanisation
based on the absolute magnitudes or the changes in these in relation to corresponding global figures. The fact that the share of Asia
in world urban population has gone up from 32% in 1950 to 44%
in 1970 and then to about 50% in 2005 has often been quoted to
support an over-optimistic or alarmist view of urbanisation. That
Asia claimed about half of the worlds urban population in 20084
and that it would exceed the global figure by 16% in 2030 are simple milestones and not significant landmarks or major achievements in history. The large share of Asia in the total number of
migrants or in the incremental urban population reflects the
impact of its large rural and urban population base and the high
growth therein. Similarly, the number (or its share in global total)
of cities above a certain cut-off point (say a million or five million)
increasing dramatically in the recent past simply implies that a
large number of cities existed just below that point in Asia; and the
population growth here, which is largely due to natural and socio
cultural factors, is higher than their counterparts in developed
countries. These milestones would have been achieved in a decade or so, even if the urban rural growth differential (URGD, taken
here as the difference between the annual exponential growth rate
of population in urban and rural areas) was below that of the rest
of the world, simply because of Asias higher population growth.
A glance at Table 1 (p 49) reveals that the speed of urbanisation
in Latin America including the Caribbean during the second half
of the last century was spectacular, which led the percentage of
urban population to go up from 41% to 75%. Africa, too, registered
similar urban growth during 1950-70, the rate slowing down
thereaf ter. Sub-Saharan Africa has recorded an even higher

50

2.1Regional and Cross Country Variation

Asian urbanisation trends are characterised by wide diversity
across countries which can only partially be explained in terms
of their levels of economic development and disparity in growth.
The context of history, social fabric and political environment
will have to be considered as important determinants of the explanatory framework.
Analysing variations within the regions, the differential urban
growth across the countries in west Asia can easily be attributed
to their macroeconomic development. Most of these countries
show a decline in their URGD, from the first period (1950-70), to
the second period (1970-90), and then to the third period (19902005). Focusing on what is popularly known as the central Asia
region, one observes that several countries have reported significant decline in urban growth and a negative URGD during 19902005, implying that rural growth was higher than that for urban
areas. The complete disruption of an otherwise integrated system
has led to destabilisation of the economies in the region. The
Soviet system with its emphasis on development of urban infrastructure was no longer in existence to attract the rural population into urban centres. On the other hand, the disarray in the
economy affected the process of industrial growth adversely.
Understandably, the withdrawal or weakening of the federal support that had sustained their growth in the 1950s and 1960s
dwindled the economic base of their cities.
Unfortunately, most of the other countries in the region belonging to the west Asia are experiencing a similar pattern, although a
few of these could carry forward their urban growth dynamics of
the first period in to the second period, before registering a decline
in the third.5 This can be linked to the boom in urban economy due
to their oil-linked earnings and phenomenal growth in construction
november 28, 2009 vol xliv no 48 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

special article

industry, creating commercial and business space for the global

actors. The cities in the region understandably collapsed with the
withdrawal of commercial and financial capital, as their growth
was not rooted in a strong industrial base. The significant deceleration in the growth rate of foreign migrants compared to the preceding three decades and a net outmigration during the 1990s
(Kundu 2009) can be attributed to the economic meltdown in the
countries which affected their cities adversely.
The fastest growing region in Asia is west Asia which has recorded an urban growth rate between 4% and 5% and URGD
between 3% and 4% during 1950-90 (Table 1). The subsequent
decline, however, is very dramatic, coming down from 4.5% in
the 1980s to 1.1% in the 1990s and in the subsequent years. The
scenario in south-east Asia in some sense contrasts with that of
west Asia. The former has shown greater stability in its urban
growth and the URGD has ranged between 2.01 and 3.6. The other

region to record moderate to high urban growth was east Asia

during the entire second half of the last century. The URGD, taking the five-yearly growth rates as given in World Urbanisation
Prospects (WUP) (United Nations 2009) fluctuated between 2.2%
and 3.9%, except the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s,
when it sunk below 1%, largely because of a slump in Chinas urbanisation, just before launching of the reform measures. Southcentral Asia, which includes India, has shown modest to low
growth. Here, the rate has risen from 1.1% in the 1950s to 2.2% in
the 1980s, after which it has declined.
The temporal fluctuation in urban growth figures in east Asia
can largely be attributed to the developments in China, as mentioned above, which accommodates over 86% of the population in
the region. India, which accounts for about 70% of the population
of south-central Asia and 17% of the worlds population, showed a
decline in URGD in recent years. This led to a corresponding decline

Table 2: Urban Centres and Their Shares in Total Urban Population in Different Size Categories
World, Region and Size Class

World
5 million or more

1 to 5 million

500,000 to 1 million

Below 500,000
Asia
5 million or more

1 to 5 million

500,000 to 1 million

Below 500,000
Eastern Asia
5 million or more

1 to 5 million

500,000 to 1 million

Below 500,000
South-Central Asia
5 million or more

1 to 5 million

500,000 to 1 million

Below 500,000
Region and Size Class
South-Eastern Asia
5 million or more

1 to 5 million

500,000 to 1 million

Below 500,000
Western Asia
5 million or more

1 to 5 million

500,000 to 1 million

Below 500,000

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Percentage of urban population

18
11.2
163
20.9
237
11
56.9

24
12.6
196
21
258
10.3
56.1

28
13
223
21
297
10.3
55.7

30
12.9
267
22.2
328
9.9
55.1

34
13.2
296
22.4
365
10
54.4

44
14.9
334
22.3
399
9.7
53.1

49
15.4
361
22.5
446
9.9
52.3

53
15.5
414
23.5
477
9.5
51.5

59
16
460
23.8
488
8.9
51.3

67
16.6
495
23.6
521
8.7
51.2

75
17
524
23.1
551
8.5
51.3

Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Percentage of urban population

7
12.4
73
25.6
93
11.5
50.5

13
16
84
22.5
110
11.1
50.3

16
16.6
98
21.5
128
10.7
51.2

18
16.4
125
22.4
145
9.9
51.3

20
16.3
145
22.8
166
9.8
51.1

26
18.1
166
22.4
192
9.8
49.8

28
18
182
22.5
223
10.1
49.5

30
17.8
216
23.6
239
9.5
49.1

34
18.3
245
23.9
247
8.8
49

38
18.7
274
24.1
262
8.3
49

41
18.8
291
23.7
275
8.1
49.4

Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Percentage of urban population

5
22.1
42
28.5
53
14.8
34.5

6
21.8
50
28.2
54
12.8
37.2

7
20.8
57
27.4
66
12.9
38.9

7
18.3
72
29
79
12.3
40.3

9
18.7
82
28.7
93
12.4
40.2

11
19.8
92
29.1
110
12.9
38.2

11
18.4
101
29.4
118
12.5
39.6

11
17.4
117
31
124
11.8
39.8

13
17.8
131
31.5
123
10.7
40

14
17.6
148
32.6
113
9.1
40.6

16
18
158
32.4
108
8.2
41.4

Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Percentage of urban population

2
7.7
14
17.4
28
9.6
65.3

5
14
12
11.3
45
13
61.7

5
13.6
18
13.8
49
12.1
60.5

7
16.9
29
14.7
44
9.2
59.3

7
16.7
35
16.4
48
8.9
58

10
20.6
42
15.5
50
8
55.9

11
21.8
49
16.8
63
8.7
52.7

13
23.3
58
17
68
8.1
51.6

13
22.6
65
17.9
76
8.1
51.4

15
23.5
73
17.5
92
8.3
50.6

15
22.9
79
17.9
105
8.6
50.6

Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Percentage of urban population

0
0
9
34.4
6
5.9
59.7

2
13
10
24.8
6
4.4
57.8

3
16.9
10
18.4
8
4.6
60.1

3
15.8
11
17.4
9
4.3
62.5

3
14
12
16.1
12
4.6
65.3

3
11.9
14
15.4
14
4.4
68.2

4
12.7
13
12.1
17
4.9
70.3

4
11.9
17
13
23
5.5
69.6

5
13.1
21
12.8
22
4.6
69.5

6
14.2
23
12
28
5
68.7

7
15.2
22
10.5
31
5.3
68.9

Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Number of agglomerations
Percentage of urban population
Percentage of urban population

0
0
8
28.9
6
9.7
61.4

0
0
12
34.5
5
5.7
59.8

1
7
13
27.5
5
4.3
61.2

1
7
13
26.2
13
9.2
57.6

1
7.1
16
28.2
13
8.7
56

2
11.4
18
26.4
18
10
52.3

2
10.9
19
27.6
25
12.8
48.7

2
10.6
24
31.3
24
11.1
46.9

3
13.5
28
31
26
10.3
45.1

3
13.2
30
31.8
29
10.5
44.5

3
12.7
32
32.4
31
10.5
44.4

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51

speciAl article

in urban growth and URGD in the region and whole of Asia. Southeastern Asia stands alone in recording reasonably high URGD during the entire period, the average figure going up from 2.5% during 1950-90 to 3.5% during 1990-2000. The immigration rate of
foreign nationals can be seen as high during the 1990s. It may be
noted that economic growth in most of the countries6 in the region
was not adversely affected, despite the economic crisis during the
1990s which explains their high URGD.

3Changing Structure of Urbanisation across Cities

The cities and towns in different size categories have been growing at different rates, altering the size composition of urban population. The share of urban centres with population below half a
million (BHM) has remained stable at 50% in Asia over the past 30
years while the global figure has come down from a much higher
level to this level during this period (Table 2, p 51). The variation
in the figure across continents and regions, however, works out to
be high. The developed regions like North America, Central
America, Australia and New Zealand, for example, record figures
much below 50%. Contrastingly, all the regions in Europe report
figures between 60% and 70%. One would stipulate that in
countries where the process of urban industrial development
has a long history, urban structure tends to be more balanced
and broad based as compared to the new continents where the
process has taken roots in recent times. In case of the latter,
development impulses get concentrated in and around a few
large cities.
The degree of population concentration in large cities in Asia
emerges clearly from the fact that the percentage of people living
in cities with five million plus population is 18 as compared to the
figure of 15 at the global level. This indeed is a manifestation of
top-heavy urbanisation. The 10 million plus Asian cities, however, have recorded no increase in their number and barely a 1.7%
population growth per annum, which is much below that of cities
between five and ten million people during 2000-07. And yet, the
growth rates of the latter both in number as also population
during 1990-2005 are much below that of the previous decades.
The growth dynamics seem to have shifted to cities between one
and five million. These second level cities are projected to grow
faster than the five or 10 million plus cities during 2005-25, as
seen in Table 2. These cities are likely to attract much of financial
as also industrial capital in future years, resulting in their rapid
population growth. Interestingly, the number of one million plus
cities has increased from 143 in 1990 to 192 in 2000 and further
to 246 in 2005. The number of these cities in China has gone up
from 63 in 1990 to 87 in 2000 and 94 in 2005. The other country
to record an increase in the number of these cities is India, the
figure going up from 23 to 32 and then to 40.
The importance of the BHM cities and towns in the urban system, and their population shares vary significantly across regions
within Asia, despite its percentage share for Asia as a whole
remaining stable at 50% over time (Table 2). East Asia, for example,
has less than 40% urbanites living here7 while the corresponding
figure for south-eastern Asia is over 70%. The shares of south-
central Asia and western Asia lie in between the two limits at
53% and 49%, respectively.

52

The direction of change in the size composition of urban

population, too, differ considerably across the regions. South-
central and western Asia report a decline in the share of BHM
urban centres, the percentage figure going down from 65 and 62
in 1975 to 53 and 49 in 2005 respectively. This declining trend is
projected to continue in the next couple of decades. One would
argue that the thrust of migration would shift from mega cities to
the middle and lower order cities. Unfortunately, the towns with
population of less than a hundred thousand do not seem to be
receiving many migrants. Also, the emergence of new towns
through rural urban transformation is not adding to the demographic weight of this category.
As opposed to this, east Asia and south-east Asia have registered an increase in the shares of BHM urban centres from 34% to
40% and from 60% to 70%, respectively, during this period
(Table 2). It is projected that five million plus cities would not
claim larger shares in total/urban population over the next couple of decades in east Asia. This could be because of the change in
the strategy of urban industrial development and a policy shift in
favour of middle level cities, particularly in China. South-east
Asia shows a rise in the share of the BHM towns in the 1980s and
1990s, but stabilises subsequently, possibly because of the economic crisis of the 1990s that had slowed down migration towards the large metropolises. One may argue that the urban
structure here has become less top-heavy over time which may
have a healthy impact on the urban system in the long run.
The maximum top heaviness in the urban structure is noted in
south-central Asia which has over 22% of urban population in the
five million plus cities, followed by east Asia for which the figure is
18% (Table 2). The latter has 42% of urban population in cities
between half million to five million, compared to 25% in southcentral Asia, which creates a somewhat broader base in the former.
Furthermore, the increase in the population share of half million
plus cities has been dramatic in south-cental Asia, from 35% to
47% during 1975-2005. A similar increase has been recorded in
west Asia as well. The only difference is that in the latter, one to
five million cities predominate as opposed to 10 million plus cities
in the former. South-central Asia may therefore be considered to
be slightly more unbalanced compared to even west Asia.
It is a matter of anxiety that cities at the third level, with population between half to a million, that had witnessed acceleration in
growth during 1990-2005, would report low growth in future
years. More importantly, the towns at the lowest end of the urban
hierarchy, which have recorded low population growth throughout
the period under consideration,8 would experience growth much
below that of the million plus cities in the next couple of decades. One
would argue that not only is the population growth in these towns
low, there has not been any reasonable increase in their number
through RU transformation.9 This emerges as a major area of concern
for the continent in the context of balanced regional development.

4 Decomposition of Urban Growth and Estimation of

Internal Migration
Studies on internal migration are seriously constrained by the
fact that no international organisation systematically collects or
tabulates even the basic demographic information on internal
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special article

migration in a cross-sectionally and temporally comparable manner. Whether this is because of the low priority attached to it or
difficulties in gathering the information due to inherent reporting bias, the outcome has tragically been that the subject has received little importance in research agenda and policymaking.
Despite the number of persons moving within the countries being much larger than any other type of movement in Asia, it has
not figured in mainstream reports on development, such as the
Human Development or the World Development Report. There
has been an upsurge of interest in international migration and of
late, an enormous amount of literature has come up. And yet,
migration within countries, particularly that linked to search
for livelihood, has failed to motivate the researchers and
policymakers to generate robust data sets and undertake rigorous empirical studies, which may be held responsible for the
lack of integration of spatial mobility of labour with mainstream
development economics.
The data problems on mobility of persons have been quite constraining in research and yet this does not explain the continued
lack of attention to this phenomenon over the years (Haan 2005).
Information available from national statistical agencies in most
Asian countries are indeed inadequate in capturing temporary
movements. Consequently, the scholars working on internal mobility have chosen to work with field data. Micro level studies focused on a region, a sector or an issue, understandably, have limitations in putting forward a macro perspective. Researchers
nonetheless have attempted to combine the national statistics
with information and impressions gathered through field studies
for developing a macro perspective on migration and its correlates, which have often turned out to be a bit nave and even dangerous. Governmental interest in internal migration, surfacing
sporadically, has to a great extent been politically driven more
often guided by an alarmist framework. Understandably, this
has led to measures to control inflow of people for security concerns or to reduce pressure on limited amenities in the destination regions/cities. In the absence of rigorous data on the subject, this negative perspective has often guided not only the
research framework but also data generation process and
empirical findings.
Researchers regretting the inadequacies in the official statis
tical system10 and non-comparability of information collected
through micro studies have surprisingly come around to the conclusion that internal migration within Asian countries is high and
increasing over time. Probing data availability in some detail and
overviewing the research studies in four Asian countries India,
China, Indonesia and Vietnam, Deshingkar (2006) argues that
there is persuasive evidence from locations across Asia that population mobility has increased at an unprecedented rate in the
last two decades, the proposition getting endorsement of the
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2006) as well. The studies
on Vietnam (Guest 1998; Djamba et al 1999) underline the problem of seasonal and temporary migrants into urban areas and
rapidly industrialising zones that are not captured in the census.
The scholars, nonetheless, are happy to stipulate that given the
current development patterns and future projections on
urbanisation, the growth of manufacturing and agricultural
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 28, 2009 vol xliv no 48

development, it is very likely that internal migration, both temporary and permanent, will persist and grow. A similar perspective dominates the urban development scene in Pakistan despite
research studies revealing that that there are blind spots in the
data and that rural populations are less able to fill the demand in
urban labour markets resulting in a reduction in out-migration
from rural areas (Rolfe 2008).

4.1Exploring an Unfounded Alarmist Perspective

The alarmist perspective regarding internal migration could possibly be attributed to the projection of urban population made by
the Population Division of the United Nations (UNPD 2005; 2009)
and other national and international agencies. These are distinctly on a higher side. The policy perspective of controlling RU
migration and slowing down the growth of large cities has motivated administrators and policymakers to readily accept such
propositions as these provide a rationale for imposing restrictions
on population mobility. The opposition to the anti migration initiatives, too, have been guided by humanistic appeal, anecdotal
evidences, and mobilisation by media or non-governmental
organisation (NGO) groups around specific issues, rather than by
strong empirical evidence.
Given the data related problems, a few researchers11 have
attempted to estimate the number of RU migrants through
indirect methods, using the population figures from population
census. Based on a simple identity, the incremental urban
population during a decade has been decomposed into four
segments: (a) natural increase, (b) new towns less declassified
towns, (c) merging of towns and jurisdictional changes in
agglomerations, and (d) RU migration. In the absence of reliable
data, the number in the last category can be estimated as a residual factor, which should be free from the bias of under-reporting.
In the Indian case, the contribution of RU migration in total incremental urban population through this framework has been estimated as 21% during the 1990s. It should be possible to use this
framework for working out the figures for all countries for which
the migration data are suspects. Importantly, in the Indian case,
this figure works out to be almost identical to that of lifetime migrants, reported in the population Census of 2001.
It is crucial to examine the proposition that RU migration has
accelerated over the recent decades in the Asian countries, particularly during the 1990s. The decline in the rate of growth in
urban population in most of these countries understandably is
due to decline in natural growth. One can, however, isolate the
impact of this natural growth by focusing on URGD, assuming
that the decline in rural and urban areas would be similar in
magnitude. Now, it may be seen in Table 1 that URGD has gone
down for Asia at the macro level as also in 36 out of 50 countries12
during the 1990s compared to the preceding two decades. The
deceleration in urban growth must, therefore, be explained in
terms of factors other than natural growth in population.
Can the deceleration in the pace of urbanisation be attributed
to the second factor growth dynamics becoming weak at the
lower category of settlements, particularly slowing down of RU
transformation, as globalisation tends to promote growth in large
cities? It is difficult to answer this question with definite evidence

53

speciAl article

as information on small towns is not available from any inter

national source. Understandably, the definition of urban centres
varies across countries, which would affect the data base for
smaller towns, clouding the understanding of classification/
declassification and RU transformation. In the absence of the firm
and comparable data at the country level, it would be worthwhile
to tie up fragmented evidence from different regions and speculate on the trend of this factor, based on the proposed policies of
government intervention.
The regional strategies followed in several Asian countries to
contain metropolitan expansion include development of satellite
towns. Without trying to be exhaustive, certain country/city specific cases may be cited in this context. In case of Seoul, 10 satellite towns were established, which absorbed most of the lowskilled and poorly educated youth away from the metropolis
(Yeung 1986). Similar programmes have been adopted in and
around other metro cities in most east Asian countries. The citystates of Hong Kong and Singapore, too, have used satellite towns
to decentralise population and economic activities from congested core areas since the early 1960s, although on a smaller
scale. Attempts to redistribute population away from primate
cities of Bangkok and Jakarta have also had considerable success
(Yeung 1995). Even in less developed countries such as Mongolia
and Cambodia, the national strategies have focused on developing secondary cities to act as growth poles. In fact, growth centre approach happens to be a part of the urbanisation strategies
in the entire south-east region.
India has avowedly tried to promote the growth of small and
medium towns through infrastructural provisions and incentives to
private entrepreneurs. Besides, there have been regional plans,
launched for major metropolises with the objective of diverting migrants to peripheral townships. In China, the thrust on accelerated
urbanisation remains in force (Fan 2008) but the emphasis in the
Eleventh Five-Year Plan has shifted to small and medium towns
(urban areas with 50,000-2,50,000 population) that are known as
workhorses of Chinese urbanisation. Programmes have also been
launched in west Asia for controlling excessive concentration in
large cities and diverting investments and prospective migrants
into neighbouring small towns and intermediate cities, supplemented by creation of new towns (Sheikh 2007).
Understandably, several new towns have emerged on the
urban scene in Asia, thanks to such endeavours. Given the policy
of globalisation and thrust on global cities, most of these towns,
however, have come up around the metropolitan cities. While the
smaller towns, particularly those in remote areas at a distance
from the major metropolises, have not attracted national and global investors, the latter have sought locations in close proximity of
the first and second order cities. This has led to the emergence and
rapid growth of new towns in the immediate hinterland of large
cities. It may, therefore, be erroneous to hold that the contribution of new towns in incremental urban population would go
down significantly in coming years.
Overviewing the process of urbanisation in Asia, Webster
(2004) underlines the importance of the third component of
urban growth peripheral development around metro cities,
resulting in the expansion of their boundaries, as noted above.

54

He argues that peri-urban areas in the hinterland have experienced rapid economic growth as that is the easiest environment
in which new communities and manufacturing structures can be
built, absorbing large number of migrants. In addition, large
segments of the existing poor living in urban cores are being
pushed to the periphery by land market forces or drawn there by
employment opportunities. Informal activities of the poor along
with other pollutant industries are being shifted out to the
degenerated periphery. All these have led to the expansion in
the boundaries of agglomerations and merging of old and new
towns with the central city. This phenomenon has become conspicuous around the global cities in China, India and in many
other countries in this continent. Much of urbanisation in Indonesia is noted to be occurring through outward spread of large
cities enveloping rural communities because of the extremely
high rural densities. This has been noted to be an important factor in the rice growing areas of Vietnam and Thailand as well
(Webster 2004). In case of Seoul, most of the environmentally
hazardous industries are getting relocated in its periphery. Istanbul, too, has serious problems of degenerated periphery largely
because of in-migration of people from the south-east of Turkey,
particularly Anatolia, searching for employment. There seems to
be thus no reason why the expansion of city boundaries, the third
component in the decomposition model, would have declined in
the recent past or would do so in the near future.

4.2 Declining Rural-Urban Migration:

A Policy Consequence
Based on the overview, it would be difficult to attribute the fall in
URGD during the 1990s to the declining contribution of new
towns or that of expansion in urban boundaries. The explanation
then could possibly be sought in terms of a decline in RU migration. The data available on migration from a few of the large
countries can be examined for this purpose. One may begin by
discussing internal migration in China, which is the most discussed and disputed subject among quantitative demographers.
The fourth population census of China which considers persons
who have stayed in the enumeration areas for more than one year
during the period from 1 July 1985 to 1 July 1990 as migrants, reports their number to be 34 million in 1990 while the National
Population Sample Survey covering the period during 1990-95,
reports the figure to be only 36 million in 1995, implying an
annual growth of migrants by 1.1% only. Importantly, a survey
conducted by the State Family Planning Commission in 1992 and
a study by the ODI (2006) suggest the migration rate to be much
higher. Understandably, the information from these sources do
not tally, reflecting unresolved conceptual and methodological
issues and non-comparability of data. The number of migrant
rural workers was reported to be 130 million as per the second
agriculture census conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, which was 60 million more than that reported a decade earlier, giving an annual growth rate over 7%. Given these widely
different figures, one cannot be definitive that migration would
accelerate in future years, as there is no consistent criterion for
collecting data on mobile population who continue to remain
statistically invisible (Fang 2000).
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special article

The government policies and programmes to strengthen the

rural economy are likely to slow down RU migration. The state
council has issued a policy document in 2008 vowing to set up a
permanent mechanism for closing urban-rural gaps. The government has boosted investment in the countryside, slashed fees and
taxes for farmers, rolled out favourable medical care schemes
and strengthened protection of farmers land rights. As per Chen
Xiwen, the director of the office of the central leading group on
rural work, the central government is raising its rural budget by
about a third compared to that of last year. Significantly, last
years budget too represented a record-high increase of 17% over
the previous year. Correspondingly, the local governments in cities have adopted policies that aim at reducing competition from
rural migrant workers through a series of discriminatory policies.
The Bureau release in February 2008 reveals that the number of
rural people engaged in agriculture shrank by more than 80 million between 1996 and 2006. Further, 70.8% of rural workers
were engaged in some type of agriculture at the end of 2006
which is 5 percentage points less than that of 1996. On the other
hand, a nationwide survey had reported the floating population
to have gone up from 70 million in 1993 to 140 million in 2003
(Chan and Hu 2003). Westendoff (2008) estimates the size of the
floating population in the range of 150-200 million. The majority
of these migrants are circular migrants who retain strong links
with their rural family.13 Given all these, one may hold that while
sectoral diversification will shift workers from agriculture to
industries and business, the state would not allow large-scale
immigration for avoiding pressure on urban infrastructures and
social security system. These people would then shuttle between
rural and urban areas and consequently, the share of migrants in
incremental urban population will not go up significantly.
Indonesia, like China, has policies restricting internal migration, though the system is less rigid. The government here has
taken several measures to discourage the prospective migrants
from entering the large cities and redirect them to rural areas or
provinces which have labour shortages (Munir 2001). Interestingly, a field study by Hugo has noted widespread prevalence of
circular migration and commutation from rural to urban areas,
as in the case of China, as early as in the 1970s, which slowed
down permanent migration. A resurvey conducted in 1992-93
further confirms this kind of mobility since only 20% of households reported dependence on agriculture for their livelihood
(Hugo 2003). A comprehensive longitudinal study (Collier et al
1993) of 37 villages in Java carried out over the period 1967-91
further corroborates this finding. Besides, many city level initiatives have made it difficult for the migrants to become legal residents. For example, in Jakarta,14 under the closed city policy,
migrants are required to show evidence of employment and housing for obtaining a residence permit. Reducing Jakartas population growth has been taken up as a national goal and the government is desperately trying to promote reverse migration.
Vietnam had an elaborate and complex system of controlling
migration flows, especially to large cities, through migration
policies and household registration system (ho khau), similar to
that of China which made spontaneous migration a costly affair
(Anh 2003). Although the economic reform measures (Doi Moi)
Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 28, 2009 vol xliv no 48

officially launched in 1986 have abolished much of that, giving

increased economic opportunities and avenues for mobility to
rural labour (Dang 1999), the apprehension of rural poor flooding the cities has resulted in several policy initiatives to control
migration. In view of the limited success of these initiatives, a
disincentive system has been introduced under which a person
not registered in the district of birth is entitled to all government
facilities (Anh 2003).
The data on migration from rural to urban areas in India too has
serious problems of comparability. The scope and coverage of data
compilation have varied significantly from one census to the other
and over different rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS).
The data problems pertain not only to the distribution of migrants
across different streams within and across the districts and
states, due to not-too-infrequent reorganisation of state and district boundaries, but also their duration of stay in the city. Despite
these problems, however, the data on the total number of migrants are fairly robust and comparable over time (Kundu 2009)
and reveal that the percentage of rural migrants in urban areas
arriving during 1991-2001 is marginally less than that noted in the
previous decade. This would be in line with the proposition of increasing immobility of the Indian population (Kundu 2006). One
may add that even the percentage of lifetime migrants, which in
2001 was slightly above that of 1991, is significantly below that of
1961 and 1971. The data from NSS too, confirm the declining trend
of migration in urban centres when one considers the period from
1983 to 1999-2000. The general conclusion, thus, emerges unmistakably that RU mobility in India, particularly of men, which
is often linked to the strategy of seeking livelihood (as opposed to
family-linked migration for women), has gone down systematically over the past few decades.15 This can be attributed to the
process of urbanisation under globalisation, making the cities
unaffordable to the poor, besides the regular slum clearance programmes whereby development authorities or municipal corporations bulldoze unauthorised structures, often at the initiative
of elite and middle class-based resident associations. Thus, it is
not so much the reactionary policies of the state that are restricting migration in India. The functioning of the market for land
and basic services, combined with a sense of otherness among
urbanites, has become the major barrier.
Based on evidence available from the existing literature, as
attempted above, there is no reason to believe that RU migration
accelerated or that it makes a larger contribution to urban growth
in Asian countries. There have been specific years, regions and
cities wherein high in-migration is recorded but these do not
provide a basis for macro-level generalisation. The perspective of
rapid and unprecedented RU migration is linked more to the
elitist apprehension of urban collapse due to infrastructure deficiencies, legitimisation of the harsh initiatives for evicting slums,
or deterring future migrants.

5 Historical Context of Urbanisation and Migration

The last few decades of the 20th century emerged as exhilarating
for the urbanisation process in modern history in more than one
sense. This period is marked by the culmination of a prolonged
cold war into the disintegration of the second world and leaving

55

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many smaller countries in the block completely disoriented and

disillusioned. The collapse of the Soviet system has also been associated with the undermining of the importance of institutions
at international levels and a curtailment of states welfare
oriented interventions. It would, therefore, be important to look
at the declining trend of migration and urbanisation, not merely
as an outcome of individual decision-making based on economic
rationality, characterising the Harris-Todaro (1970) model, but in
the context of wider social, political and economic change.
Migration needs to be viewed not as a dependent but largely
an independent variable16 since many of the countries, regions
and their citizens have developed a negative attitude towards inmigrants, despite benefiting from the supply of low cost labour
through them. This attitude has got reinforced through growing
regionalism and concerns about foreigners interfering in local
political process, threatening internal socio-economic stability,
having an adverse impact on culture, norms and values, etc. Economic opportunities at the micro level, therefore, may not be the
key determinants of internal (also international) migration since
it is state policies and social environment that currently determine whether people would be allowed to leave their place of origin and be welcomed at their destinations. While the role of the
individuals decision cannot be dismissed, the latter is not guided
purely by economic benefits accruing to the person. This perspective would get a theoretical underpinning from the security/stability
framework (SSF), as expounded by Myron Weiner (1990).
It is important to look at the changing migration streams in
Asian countries in reference to the historical legacy of both the
colonial and the pre-colonial era. Globalisation, which is signified by the movement of capital across national borders, is not a
new phenomenon in Asia. Since the 16th century, the Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, English, French and more recently the Japanese17 have been important players in the regional arena. The
logic of surplus generation within the colonial framework had
made deployment of workforce from one part of the empire to
another relatively easy in the early decades of the last century.18
It is in the colonies where plantation and mining activities came
up in a big way, that labourers were recruited, from outside as
well as inside their erstwhile political boundaries. Transmigration was also carried out in an effort to remove the potential for
political instability.19 While colonisation made trans-border or
even transoceanic migration of population possible, it also paradoxically led to the creation of national and regional identities,
which prompted the independent nations at a later period to
tighten their policy regimes to control migration. For example,
the pre-colonial migration of population in the south-central Asia
or east Asia had completely different dynamics than noted during
the colonisation process or in more recent years.
Importantly, the east and west Asian countries witnessed an
induced process of urbanisation in the post-war phase during the
cold war period, initiated largely by the developed countries in
the west, particularly the United States. The trend and pattern of
urbanisation here was very different from the model of urban
development, backed by indigenous industrialisation and
modernisation, as propagated by the neoclassical economists. It
is argued that this process of urbanisation could not have

56

c ontinued for long which explains the deceleration in urban

growth in the 1990s. The birth of the Association of South-East
Asian Nations is often attributed to the western apprehension
about the political orientation of east Asian countries.20 Indeed,
the collapse of the overarching Soviet system in east and central
Asia could be behind the dilution of political interest of the
western powers to strengthen capitalistic development process in
the two regions. Furthermore, with the socialistic goals of common good becoming illusory in the era of globalisation, racial
and regional prejudices came up in the forefront resulting in
tensions and conflicts, making the environment for the migrant
population in cities and towns inhospitable. It is, thus, not a coincidence that the end of the cold war is associated with deceleration in the rates of urbanisation and internal migration in several
Asian countries.
Economic disparities existing and accentuated in the process of
restructuring of global capitalism forced the skilled labour in less
developed regions to migrate not only to developed countries but
also to a few large cities within the country. Many of the governments encouraged and supported international and inter-regional
migration of workers with a view to reduce unemployment in
backward areas as also to enable the latter to increase their economic well-being through remittances. The cities and developed
regions, however, resented the large-scale influx of people and
adopted restrictive measures to avoid problems of social unrest
and increased pressure on infrastructure. Their perceptions of the
problems were often based on political and security considerations than economic efficiency. Ethnic and racial factors within
and across the countries in Asia have in recent years created serious labour market tensions constraining movement of people, despite growing disparities in the levels of economic development.
The thesis of over-urbanisation and the alarmist view on ruralurban migration have dictated policy perspective in many countries in Asia. This is a carry-over from the colonial period. Unfortunately, this has weighed down heavily on demographers and
urban planners in making projections of urban population. The
view received empirical backing of sorts from the acceleration in
urban growth during the late 1970s and 1980s. Notwithstanding
the fact that the rate declined subsequently, most of the official
projections of urban population for Asia have been made under
the shadow of this thesis and have consequently erred on the
higher side.
The method for projecting the urban population by the UNPD
for less developed countries is based on a simple logistic model.
By focusing on the trends in URGD, it tries to separate out the
impact of population growth and capture the dynamics of internal migration, as noted above. Its basic assumption is that the
countries with less than half the population living, in urban centres, would experience an increase in their URGD till that limit of
urbanisation is reached.21 It would be important to analytically
examine the empirical validity of this assumption and its deve
lopmental implications as also of the modifications that have
been proposed in the model to deal with its lacunae. Unfortunately, the model, which in a way incorporates the apprehension
of hy per-urbanisation in its projections, was adopted by several
other international agencies as also national governments,
november 28, 2009 vol xliv no 48 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

special article

without any rigorous examination during the 1970s and 1980s.

Given the discrepancies between the projected and actual values,
the UNPD subsequently came up with a procedure for estimating
the URGD based on a regression equation (estimate from 113 countries), which allowed it to decline even before attaining the 50%
level. However, the gaps between the projected and actual
figures, obtained through this alternate model, still worked out
to be high. This made the UNPD propose yet another modification, allowing the actual URGD for the latest period to be the
starting point which incrementally is stipulated to move towards
the normative value within a time frame.
The variations in URGD and growth rates of urban population
across regions and countries in Asia cannot be explained in terms
of the level of urbanisation. Contrary to the stipulations of the
model and its variants, these depend on a host of region and
country specific factors. In most countries, the rates are noted to
be declining sharply much more than stipulated in the models.
Unfortunately, the latter have no provision for bringing in the
country specific socio-economic factors as explanatory variables
within the predictive framework.
Are there then enough grounds for projecting Asia to record
the highest URGD during 2000-30 (Table 1), the rate going up systematically after 2015, as has been done by the UNPD? The question becomes critical because the present URGD works out to be
less than that of several continents, the figure computed by excluding China being less than that of the world. More particularly, there has been a significant decline in this during the past
decade and a half. It would be extremely important to question
the empirical basis of this over ambitious and optimistic urban
scenario and of the view that Asia would experience unprecedented migration and urban growth,22 much higher than other
continents in future years.

6Reflections on the Urbanisation Experience in Asia

Based on an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature
on the subject as also the statistical analysis carried out in the
study, one would tend to agree with Ellerman (2003) that the
current policy perspective happens to be somewhat over-
optimistic regarding the impact of migration and urbanisation on
development, although the policy debate on their mutual interdependencies remains unsettled. This was the conclusion also arrived at by Sorensen et al (2003) analysing more recent studies
on the subject (Papademetriou and Martin 1991; Appleyard 1991;
Sorensen et al 2003).
A large majority of the countries belonging to different geographical regions of Asia have recorded deceleration in urban
growth and migration in recent years that cannot be fully explained in terms of decline in natural growth, declassification of
towns and definitional or boundary adjustment factors. One can
Notes
1 As per this projected figure (United Nations
2005), the implicit annual growth rate of urban
population works out to be 2.3% per annum. United Nations (2007) predicts that urban population
would double between 2007 and 2050. This
apparently impressive urban scenario implies that
the growth rate would be only 1.6% per annum,

postulate a thesis of exclusionary urban growth, stipulating that

the negative policy perspective on migration and increased
unaffordability of land and basic amenities by the rural poor have
led to deceleration in urban growth. Asia thus would not go the
way of Latin America as also many African countries in terms of
its model of urbanisation.
The impetus of urban growth in Asia has shifted from large
metropolises, from five million plus cities, to those having population between one and five million or even less. Despite this
downward shift of urban dynamics, a large number of small and
medium towns with less than one hundred thousand population
have reported economic stagnation and deceleration in population growth in a majority of Asian countries. The emergence of
new towns has been few and far between, resulting in top heavy
urbanisation, except in south-east Asia.
Several countries have launched programmes for improving
governance and infrastructural facilities in a few large cities, attracting private investors from within as well as outside the country. Land for them has been made available through the market
as also state supported schemes which have pushed out squatter
settlements and several informal sector businesses, along with
large pollutant industries to the city peripheries, which have poor
quality of micro environment. The income level and quality of
basic amenities in these cities, as a result, has gone up but that
has been associated with an increased intra-city disparity and
creation of degenerated periphery.
Several governments have taken major initiatives to promote
rural development, creating satellite towns for slowing down RU
migration and reducing pressure on infrastructure, particularly
in the globalising cities. These regional development measures,
in a sense, have been complementary to the city-level interventions that have encouraged only selective migration into central
areas and sanitisation of the cities. All this questions the proposition that the urban dynamics would shift to Asia in the next few
decades, notwithstanding the magnitude of absolute figures of
increment due to pure demographic weight of the continent.
The pace of urbanisation in the next few decades is likely to be
rapid only in the less urbanised and less developed countries. The
relatively developed and larger countries in the continent would
limit migration in order to have more orderly urbanisation and
well governed cities, reflecting elite capture of the process of
urbanisation. This would be in sharp contrast with the experience of the Latin American countries. The governments in many
Asian countries are likely to push reform measures in land, capital and labour market, giving greater freedom to global and national actors. This would manifest in policies and programmes
adopted by the state and city governments to restrict the entry of
poor and unskilled migrants from rural areas, strengthening the
process of exclusionary urban growth.

which is not very high as per the historical

records.
2 The Worlds poor once huddled largely in rural areas. In the modern world they have gravitated to
the cities (Piel 1997). In a similar vein Anna Tibbaijuka, executive director UN-HABITAT, in her
keynote address at the opening ceremony of the
FIG Working Week 2008 argues that 95% of this

Economic & Political Weekly EPW november 28, 2009 vol xliv no 48

urban expansion is taking place in those cities

least equipped to negotiate the urban transition
the secondary cities of Africa and Asia. As a result
we are witnessing the urbanisation of poverty.
3 This phenomenon of such rapid urbanisation is
indeed unprecedented and it has changed human
geography beyond recognition, Rakesh Mohan
and Dasgupta (2005).

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speciAl article
4 This event is a consequence of rapid urbanisation
in the last decades, especially in less developed
regions United Nations (2008).
5 Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Cyprus, Turkey and Lebanon may be mentioned as illustrative cases.
6 Indonesia, Thailand and Timor-Leste are the exceptions. Indonesia did not even record a high
rate of international migration during the 1990s.
7 This can be explained in terms of the rapid growth
in the number and population in large cities in
China occurring as a result of the governments emphasis on urban development at higher end after
1949, and the reform measures adopted since mid1970s. Understandably, the 22 most populous cities
had a total of 47.5 million people or about 12% of
the countrys total urban population in 1985.
8 A recent study (Webster 2004) focusing on South
East Asian countries, particularly China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Philippines, Vietnam and Mongolia reports the annual population growth rate in
many of the small towns as very low and even
negative. In case of Mongolia, the rate has been
noted to be negative, with virtually all dynamism focusing on Ulaan Baatar. In Philippines,
only natural growth and migration have been
considered as factors behind urban growth with
exclusion of the contribution of new towns.
9 In India, these towns are finding it difficult to
finance any of their development projects through
internal resources or borrowings from the capital
market in the era of globalisation. The fiscal discipline imposed by the government, credit rating
agencies and other financial intermediaries, make
it impossible for these even to maintain the level
of services. As a consequence, the absolute
number of these (Census) towns have gone down
in 2001, the first time in the century.
10 Rogaly et al (2001) hold that while in Vietnam
and China, the formal registration system is likely
to miss out migrants employed in the grey economy, in India where such registration system does
not exist, short duration rural-rural migration is
likely to be under-recorded.
11 East West Centre, Kundu (2003).
12 If the south-east Asian region (with 11 countries)
is excluded, the number goes down to 25 only.
13 Besides these, researchers have projected as early
as 1994, that China had a surplus of approximately
200 million agricultural workers, and the number
was expected to increase to 300 million in the early
21st century. Current projections suggest that between 12 and 13 million migrants will move to
urban areas each year over the next two decades.
This will be over and above the existing 103 million
urban migrants, as officially reported (Fang 2000).
14 Indonesian government had declared Jakarta a
special metropolitan district in 1966, which had
attracted a huge inflow of population, resulting in
Jakarta urban agglomeration growing into the
adjacent province of West Java, known as Jabotabek. The population of Jabotabek region was
about 25 million in 2000 despite the government
adopting strong measures to control the growth
of population, launched in early 1970s by prohibiting the entry of unemployed migrants.
15 In case of women, the percentage of migrants has
gone up marginally as this is determined by sociocultural factors that respond slowly with time.
16 This argument finds support in the works of
Weiner (1990).
17 During the Japanese occupation (1942-44), Indonesian workers were forcefully sent to Singapore
and Thailand to be used in the construction of
railroads and airports (Kurosawa 1993).
18 Tirtosudarmo (1997) holds that the geographical
stretch for labour migration was very extensive
before the advent of colonialism, particularly in
south-east Asia, as there were no rigid national
state borders as is the case today.
19 The Dutch, for example, recruited people from
the island of Java during the colonial period to
work as plantation workers in the coastal areas of
East Sumatra, in New Caledonia in the south

58

Pacific, and also in Vietnam (see Breman 1997;

Suparlan 1995; Adam 1994).
20 Tirtosudarmo (1997) believes that the fall of
Soekarno and the collapse of Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 provided the momentum for the
west to influence the political reorientation of Indonesia, which occupies a unique geopolitical
position in Asia.
21 In case of Asia, for example, the URGD has been
taken to be increasing consistently from 2.26 during 2005-15 to 2.46 during 2025-30 (Table 1) and
in fact even beyond that.
22 UN Habitat report for 2008-09 informs of the
phenomenon of shrinkage of cities resulting in a
loss of 13 million people in 143 global cities during
1990-2000, about 70% of which is confined to
Asian cities. The Chinese cities, that have been
projected by the UNPD to maintain their population growth rates, are worst affected, accounting
for about 75% of this population loss in Asia, as
per this report. Furthermore, the UNPD has to
revise downwards the projections of urban population for Asia and Asian cities in its successive
WUPs (United Nations 2005 and 2009).

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