Republic Act No.

9522

March 10, 2009

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the
Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows:

Basepoint Station
Number
Name

Location

World Geodetic System of 1984 Distance

(WGS 84)
Coordinates
to
next
basepoint
(M)
Latitude (N)

Longitude (E)

PAB-01

Amianan Is.

21657.73"

1215727.71"

70.08

PAB-02

Balintang Is.

195738.19"

122946.32"

99.17

PAB-04

Bigan Pt.

181835.30"

1222019.07"

71.83

PAB-05A

Ditolong Pt.

17716.30"

1223128.34"

1.05

PAB-05B

Ditolong Pt.

17614.79"

1223143.84"

0.39

PAB-05

Ditolong Pt.

17551.31"

1223142.66"

3.29

PAB-06

Spires Is.

17236.91"

122313.28"

9.74

PAB-06B

Digollorin Pt.

165918.03"

1222756.61"

3.51

PAB-06C

Digollorin Rk.

164956.11"

1222650.78"

2.40

10

PAB-07

Divimisa Pt.

164738.86"

122264.40"

30.94

11

PAB-08

Dinoban Pt.

161844.33"

1221406.69"

116.26

12

PAB-10A

Tinaga Is.

142954.43"

1225751.15"

80.29

13

PAB-11

Horodaba Rk.

146.29.91"

1241659.21"

0.54

14

PAB-12

Matulin Rk.

146.10.40"

1241726.28"

96.04

15

PAB-13

Atalaya Pt.

12416.37"

125353.71"

6.79

16

PAB-13A

Bacan Is.

123618.41"

125850.19"

5.52

17

PAB-14

Finch Rk.

1232.33.62"

1251259.70"

0.80

18

PAB-14A

Cube Rk.

1231.57.45"

1251332.37"

4.90

19

PAB-14D

NW Manjud Pt.

122836.42"

1251712.32"

1.30

20

PAB-15

SE Manjud Pt.

122737.51"

125185.23"

7.09

21

PAB-16A

S Sorz Cay

122141.64"

125237.41"

5.68

22

PAB-16B

Panablihon

121727.17"

125270.12"

5.21

23

PAB-16C

Alugon

121321.95"

1253019.47"

1.94

24

PAB-16D

N Bunga Pt.

121148.16"

1253130.88"

0.54

25

PAB-17

E Bunga Pt.

121120.67"

1253148.29"

5.71

26

PAB-18A

SE Tobabao Is.

1267.00"

1253411.94"

83.94

27

PAB-19C

Suluan Is.

104516.70"

125588.78"

56.28

28

PAB-19D

N Tuason Pt.

94959.58"

126106.39"

57.44

29

PAB-20A

Arangasa Is.

85316.62"

1262048.81"

40.69

30

PAB-21B

Sanco Pt.

81311.53"

1262853.25"

30.80

31

PAB-22

Bagoso Is

74245.02"

1263429.08"

12.95

32

PAB-22C

Languyan

72949.47"

1263559.24"

0.54

33

PAB-23

Languyan

72916.93"

1263559.50"

0.76

34

PAB-23B

Languyan

72830.97"

1263557.30"

1.2

35

PAB-23C

N Baculin Pt.

72729.42"

1263551.31"

10.12

36

PAB-24

Pusan Pt.

71719.80"

1263618.26"

1.14

37

PAB-24A

S Pusan Pt.

71614.43"

1263557.20"

63.28

38

PAB-25B

Cape San Agustin

61714.73"

1261214.40"

1.28

39

PAB-25

Cape San Agustin

6168.35"

1261135.06"

67.65

40

PAB-26

SE Sarangani Is.

52334.20"

1252842.11"

0.43

41

PAB-27

Pangil Bato Pt.

52321.80"

1252819.59"

3.44

42

PAB-28

Tapundo Pt.

62155.66"

1262511.21"

3.31

43

PAB-29

W Calia Pt.

52158.48"

1252152.03"

0.87

44

PAB-30

Manamil Is.

5222.91"

1252059.73"

1.79

45

PAB-31

Marampog Pt.

52320.18"

1251944.29"

78.42

46

PAB-32

Pola Pt.

698.44"

1241542.81"

122.88

47

PAB-33A

Kantuan Is

62647.22"

12213.34.50"

29.44

48

PAB-34A

Tongguil Is.

6233.77"

1215636.20"

2.38

49

PAB-35

Tongquil Is

618.51"

1215441.45"

1.72

50

PAB-35A

Tongquil Is.

6017.88"

1216311.17"

85.94

51

PAB-38A

Kirapusan Is

512.8.70"

1204138.14"

55.24

52

PAB-39

Manuk Manka Is.

44739.24"

1195158.08"

43.44

53

PAB-40

Frances Reef

42453.84"

1191450.71

0.61

54

PAB-40A

Frances Reef

4253.83"

1191415.15"

15.48

55

PAB-41A

Bajapa Reef

436"9.01"

119322.75"

6.88

56

PAB-42A

Paguan Is.

44252.07"

119144.04"

8.40

57

PAB-43

Alice Reef

44555.25"

119315.19"

2.28

58

PAB-44

Alice Reef

4475.36"

119512.94"

18.60

59

PAB-45

Omapoy Rk.

45510.45"

119221.30

23.37

60

PAB-46

Bukut Lapis Pt.

5223.73"

1194418.14"

44.20

61

PAB-47

Pearl Bank

54635.15"

1193951.77"

75.17

62

PAB-48

Bagnan Is.

6558.41"

1182657.30"

8.54

63

PAB-48A

Taganak Is

6414.08"

1181833.33"

13.46

64

PAB-49

Great Bakkungaan Is.

6114.65"

118654.15"

3.97

65

PAB-50

Libiman Is.

61339.90"

118352.09"

5.53

66

PAB-51

Sibaung Is.

61743.99"

11805.44"

41.60

67

PAB-52

Muligi Is.

65214.53"

1182340.49"

75.06

68

PAB-53

South Mangsee Is.

73026.05"

1171833.75"

26.00

69

PAB-54

Balabac Is.

74830.69"

1165939.18"

6.08

70

PAB-54A

Balabac Great Reef

75127.17"

1165417.19"

1.18

71

PAB-54B

Balabac Great Reef

75219.86"

1165328.73"

2.27

72

PAB-55

Balabac Great Reef

75436.35"

1165316.64"

5.42

73

PAB-60

Ada Reef

820.26"

1165410.04"

10.85

74

PAB.61

Secam Is.

81118.36"

1165951.87"

30.88

75

PAB-62

Latua Pt.

88756.37"

1171551.23"

7.91

76

PAB-63

SW Tatub Pt.

84417.40"

1172039.37"

11.89

77

PAB-63A

W Sicud Pt.

85332.20"

1172815.78"

13.20

78

PAB-64

Tarumpitao Pt.

92.57.47"

1173738.88"

81.12

79

PAB.64B

Dry Is.

95922.54"

1183653.61"

82.76

80

PAB-65C

Sinangcolan Pt.

111319.82"

1191517.74"

74.65

81

PAB-67

Pinnacle Rk.

121935.22"

1195056.00

93.88

82

PAB-68

Cabra Is

135324.45"

12015.86"

115.69

83

PAB-71

Hermana Mayor Is.

154843.61"

1194656.09"

9.30

84

PAB-72

Tambobo Pt.

155761.67"

1194455.32"

12.06

85

PAB-72B

Rena Pt.

16957.90"

11945.15.76"

0.25

86

PAB-73

Rena Pt.

161012.42"

1194511.95"

6.43

87

PAB-74

Rocky Ledge

161634.46"

1194619.50"

0.65

88

PAB-74A

Piedra Pt.

163712.70"

1194628.62"

1.30

89

PAB-75

Piedra Pt.

161829.49"

1194644.94"

1.04

90

PAB-75C

Piedra Pt.

161928.20"

119477.69"

0.63

91

PAB-75D

Piedra Pt.

16204.38"

1194720.48"

80.60

92

PAB-76

Dile Pt.

173424.94"

1202033.36"

6.86

93

PAB-77

Pinget Is.

174117.56"

120212.20"

14.15

94

PAB-78

Baboc Is.

17554.13"

1202440.56"

35.40

95

PAB-79

Cape Bojeador

182932.42"

1203342.41"

1.77

96

PAB-79B

Bobon

183052.88"

1203455.35"

58.23

97

PAB-80

Calagangan Pt.

191014.78"

1211252.64"

98.07

98

PAB-82

Itbayat Is.

204315.74"

1214657.80"

25.63

99

PAB-83

Amianan Is

21717.47"

1215643.85"

0.08

100

PAB-84

Amianan Is.

21718.41"

1215648.79"

0.25

101

PAB-85

Amianan Is.

21712.04"

121573.65"

0.44

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction
shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all
portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without
limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines,
shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and publish
charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this
Act.

Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budyet or
included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.
Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions
hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2)
newspaper of general circulation.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State
pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was
amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied
with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as
regime of islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of
States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic
waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis
continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to
forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.
total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

of

the

Philippines
COURT

G.R. No. 158290

October 23, 2006
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES,
ENRIQUE
BELO
HENARES,
and
CRISTINA
BELO
HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: The petitioners challenged the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to LTFRB and DOTC to require the
public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use the compressed natural gas (CNG) as an alternative fuel instead of gasoline and
diesel. The petitioners cite the different statistics and studies from renowned institutions that show the bane of air
pollution and related environmental hazards. The petitioners alleged that the particulate matters (PM) have caused
detrimental effects on health, productivity and the overall quality of life. This PM constitutes complex mixture of dust,
dirt, smoke and liquid droplets composed of harmful elements which are emitted into the air from engine combustions.
Studies from the Philippine Environment Monitor in 2002 shows that over 2,000 die prematurely, 9,000 people suffer
from chronic bronchitis and 51 million cases of respiratory symptoms in Metro Manila alone. The petitioners proposed the
use of CNG to counter the effects. CNG is known to be the cleanest fossil fuel and 90 percent less CO emissions and cuts
hydrocarbon emission by half. The petitioners assert their right to clean air as stipulated in Sec. 4 of R. A. 8749 known as
Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999 and Sec. 16 Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Solicitor General, in his

comments for LTFRB and DOTC, said that nothing in the Philippine Clean Air Act prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel
by motor vehicle owners, and more sadly, the said act does not include CNG as an alternative fuel. Further, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is the agency tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use
and tasked to develop an action plan.
ISSUE:

1. Whether the petitioners have the personality to bring the petition to the Supreme Court.
2. Should mandamus be issued against LTFRB and DOTC to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel.
HELD:
Yes, the petitioners have the personality to bring the petition to the Supreme Court as in the case of Oposa vs
Factoran. Sec. 16 of Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a
healthy environment. The implementation of this policy is articulated in Sec. 4 of R.A. 8749. As in the decision of the
Court in Oposa case, the case is an inter-generational responsibility and for inter-generational justice. The petition
focuses on the legal right of the petitioners for their right to clean air. The issue concerned is not only important to the
petitioners but also of public concern.
On the other issue, mandamus cannot be issued to LTFRB and DOTC because it not within the mandate of the
agencies to impose the use of CNG. Their mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement
the emission standards for motor vehicles. The DENR is the agency tasked to set the emission standards, and that the
legislature should first provide the specific statutory remedy to the complex problems bared by the petitioners before any
judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
DECISION: The petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is dismissed for lack of merit.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a
taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR).
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and
have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside
the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one

fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of
the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among
many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code
of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the
Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and
to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause
must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani
Cruz
v.
Dept.
of
G.R.
No.
135385,

Energy
and
December

Natural
6,

Resources,
2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the
ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law
violate
the
rights
of
private
landowners.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

the

IPRA

law

is

unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again
and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC vs RAMOS Case Digest

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGBDENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in
the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on
March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation
organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or
financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides
for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully foreign
owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
The same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such
omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the
countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of
extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter.
The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of
the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the
nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just
like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the
mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40%
capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or
financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize
and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same
agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it
aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

G.R.

No.

98332

January

16,

1995

Facts

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO
No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development
and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR
Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration,
development,

and

utilization

of

mineral

resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all
existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be
converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and
Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing
Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
holders,

to

file

the

instant

petition

assailing

their

validity

and

constitutionality

before

this

Court.

Issue

Are

the

two

Department

Administrative

Orders

valid?

Ruling

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the
acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development,
and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license,
concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of
the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order
No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In
other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall
continue

in

force

and

effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the
State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through
a

reasonable

exercise

of

the

police

power

of

the

State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional
restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive
with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of
Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to
carry

into

effect

the

mandate

of

Article

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

XII,

Section

of

the

1987

Constitution.

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.

Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an
IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of
PICOP even as thelatter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43,
asamended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the
trialcourt is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos, to
enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Issue:

Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which thegovernment may be
bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purviewof the nonimpairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus berevoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected bythe due process clause of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No lawimpairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed
as a contractual undertaking assuringPICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an
interpretation wouldresult in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control
andsupervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

Republic v. Pagadian City Timber]

License agreements arenot contracts within the purview of the due process and thenon-impairment of contracts clauses
enshrined in theConstitution.A timber license is not a contract withinthe purview of the dueprocess clause it is only a
license or a privilege, which can bevalidly withdrawnwhenever dictated by public interest or publicwelfare.

Republic v. PagadianFacts:

The Republic of the Philippines, through the DENR, executed an Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA), with
Pagadian City Timber, for the former to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares
located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the
production of timber and other forest products subject to a production-sharing scheme.
The Pagadians

required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) wasapproved by the DENR. But, the Subanen
Tribe complained that respondents failed to implement the CDMP,disrespected their rights as indigenous people and
employed armed men. This prompted DENR to issue anorder creating a regional team to evaluate and assess the IFMA.
The DENR requested for a representative of Pagadian to appear before them, upon compliance with which, a conference
was held between the parties andthey found inventoried various equipment, seedlings, infrastructures, etc. and found that
the area coveredwas beyond that stipulated in the IFMA. An evaluation team was dispatched to the area concerned
forinspection and assessment, in the presence of the IFMA holder, representatives, laborers and other personnelon the
area. In the conduct of the same, the team found that the mango seedlings are not satisfactory and theyhad failed to
develop the area. Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer, and theIFMA holder where the
tentative and general findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-out andpresented to the body. On the basis of
their findings, the team required Pagadian to explain why they failed tocomply with the CDMP. But, because of the influx
of more complaints from the locals, DENR issued notice of cancellation to Pagadian because of their failure to comply
with the agreement. This was objected to byrespondent and appeal was made to the Office of the President. The order of
cancellation was affirmed by theOP, but was reversed by the CA.

Issues:

W/N the IFMA is a privilege granted by the State, which may be revoked without violating the non-impairment clause.

Held:
Yes. The IFMA is a timber license, and as such, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked in thepresent case. Timber
licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which theState regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right
to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive whennational interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause. Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an

agreement, we agreewith the Office of the Solicitor General that the alleged property rights that may have arisen from it
are not absolute. All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under
Section 16,[29] Article II of the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain fromimpairing the
environment, particularly our diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right isan express policy of the
State.The DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is "the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and properuse of the country's environment and natural
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may beprovided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Thus, private rights must yield when
they come in conflict with this public policy and common interest. They must give way to the police or regulatory power
of theState, in this case through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and conditions of existing laws, rules andregulations,
and the IFMA itself are strictly and faithfully complied with. The CA decision is reversed and set aside, and the decision
of the Office of the President is reinstated.

Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. (2006)

Facts:The case involves the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area (Diwalwal), a rich tract of mineral landlocated inside the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve in Davao del Norte and Davao Oriental. Sincethe early 1980s, Diwalwal has been
stormed by conflicts brought about by numerous mining claims over it.On March 10, 1986, Marcopper Mining
Corporation (MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit(EP 133) by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG). A
long battle ensued between Apex andMMC with the latter seeking the cancellation of the mining claims of Apex on the
ground that suchmining claims were within a forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) and thus
theacquisition on mining rights should have been through an application for a permit to prospect with theBFD and not
through registration of a DOL with the BMG. When it reached the SC in 1991, the Courtruled against Apex holding that
the area is a forest reserve and thus it should have applied for a permit to prospect with the BFD.On February 16 1994,
MMC assigned all its rights to EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao GoldMining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation
which is alleged to be a 100%-owned subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG registered SEMs Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA)application and the Deed of Assignment. Several oppositions were filed. The Panel of
Arbitrators created by the DENR upheld the validity of EP 133.
During the pendency of the case, DENR AO No. 2002-18 was issued declaring anemergency situation in the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area and ordering the stoppage of all miningoperations therein.
Issues:
1. W/N EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM is valid.2.

W/N the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729 hectares of the areascovered by the AgusanDavao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale mining purposes.3.
Who (among petitioners Apex and Balite) has priority right over Diwalwal?Held/Ratio:1.
INVALID. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: That this permit shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized agents and shall be used for mineral exploration purposes
only and for no other purpose. While it may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, there is no
showing that the former is the duly authorizedagent of the latter. As such, the assignment is null and void as it directly
contravenes the term sand conditions of the grant of EP 133.a.
The Deed of Assignment was a total abdication of MMCs rights over the permit.
It is not amere grant of authority to SEM as agent. b.
Reason for the stipulation.
Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake
mining operations. Without such acondition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent the strict
requirementsunder the law by the simple expediency of acquiring the permit from the original permittee.c.
Separate personality.
The fact that SEM is a 100% subsidiary of MMC does notautomatically make it an agent of MMC. A corporation is an
artificial being invested by lawwith a personality separate and distinct from persons composing it as well as from that of
anyother legal entity to which it may be related. Absent any clear proof to the contrary, SEM is aseparate and distinct
entity from MMC.d.
Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil inapplicable.
Only in cases where the corporatefiction was used as a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity may the veil be pierced
andremoved. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot therefore be used as a vehicle tocommit prohibited acts.
The assignment of the permit in favor of SEM is utilized tocircumvent the condition of nontransferability of the
exploration permit. To allow SEM to
avail itself of this doctrine and to approve the validity of the assignment is tantamount tosanctioning an illegal act which is
what the doctrine precisely seeks to forestall.e. PD 463 requires approval of Secretary of DENR.
Also, PD 463 (Mineral ResourcesDevelopment Decree), which is the governing law when the assignment was
executed,explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of mining rights, including the right toexplore a mining area,
must be with the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Such is not present in this case.f.
EP 133 expired by non-renewal.
Although EP 133 was extended for 12 months until July 6,1994, MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its
expiration.With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994, MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold RushArea. SEM, on
the other hand, has not acquired any right to the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence,
both MMC and SEM have not acquired any vested rightover the area covered by EP 133.2.
NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest reserves. Such power is vested with the
President. The DENR Secretary may only recommend to the Presidentwhich forest reservations are to be withdrawn from
the coverage thereof. Thus, DAO No. 66 isnull and void for having been issued in excess of the DENR Secretarys
authority.3.
(Since its been held that neither MMC nor SEM has any right over Diwalwal, it is thusnecessary to make a
Determination of the existing right of the remaining claimants, petitioners Apex and Balite, in the dispute.)
The issue on who has priority right over Diwalwal is deemedovertaken by the issuance of Proclamation 297 and DAO
No. 2002-18, both beingconstitutionally-sanctioned acts of the Executive Branch

. Mining operations in the DiwalwalMineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of the State through
theexecutive branch.
Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can either: (1) directly undertake theexploration, development and utilization of
the area or (2) opt to award mining operations in themineral reservation to private entities including petitioners Apex and
Balite, if it wishes. Theexercise of this prerogative lies with the Executive Department over which courts will notinterfere.