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International Journal of Ethics.
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Discussions.
89
DISCUSSION
ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM " MOTIVE,
go
InternationalY7ournalof Ethics.
JiscissiZons.
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International-ournal of Ethics.
DiscUssZons.
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Mill seems to me quite right (he is certainlyquite in accordance withAristotleas well as with ordinaryusage) in identifying" character"with " habitual disposition." Character is
certainlymuch more than natural (inherited)temperament;
but that natural temperamentis part of the materialout of
which character is formed,and that habit becomes a sort of
"second nature," Mr. Alexander would, I fancy,be among
the last to deny. When we speak of a person acting from
motives of ambition, of religious sentiment,of familyaffection,etc.,these motives are only in part due to temperament
or disposition,in any sense in which that can be distinguished
fromcharacter: in all cases they are largely due to the character which the man has formed,-i.e., the course of conduct
he has habituallyfollowed. So that Mill seems rightin saying that motives throwlight on character. As to Mill's denial that they should affectour judgment of acts, may I make
the followingsuggestion towards obviatingthe apparentcontradictioninvolvedin his abstractdistinctionbetween "act"
and " agent" ? Afterall, we can in an intelligiblesense speak
of a good man doing a wrong action fromgood motives.
When we are pronouncingan ethicaljudgment on an act, we
are generallyconsideringan act ofsuch a kind,-the act in its
general aspects; forthat is all that,as a rule, we are able to
consider. A man saves another's life: we call it a good
action, meaningthat acts of such a kind are acts of which we
approve. A man kills another: we call it a bad action,meaning that acts of such a kind are acts of which we disapprove.
It may happen in a particularcase that a man may save a
life owing to meaner motives(e.g.,hope of reward)than those
which lead another man-say, a sincere and disinterested
patriot-to kill a tyrant. Motives being identical with the
spiritin which an act is done are, it seems to me, ideally,the
true subject of moral judgment; but, in practice,it is well to
confessthat motivescould be known in their fulnessonly to
an omniscient judge, and forhuman beings it is wiser on the
whole to pronouncejudgment on acts in their general aspect.
The individual cannotknow even his own motivesadequately.
In the long run,but only in the long run and on the whole,
94
" ON HUMAN
OXFORD.
MARRIAGE )-A
REPLY
TO
DR.
C. N. STARCKE.