Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in
her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and
Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from
the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the firstnamed plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael
and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of
the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the
cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to
recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty
pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both
parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought
by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize
Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of
twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed
of a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of
a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In
the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken
on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and
amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of
Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her
hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as
follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a
trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia
showing a paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to
keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be
strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all
necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend
Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization
of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during
confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to
a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in
regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by
Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to
show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another
woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child,
the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above,
in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves
an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil
Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is
sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a
bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet
unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the
recognition of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the
recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources
of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect
the particular individual intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings
before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This
contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to
the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was
expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby
came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia,
Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that
might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the
defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters

were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good
appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few
days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and
of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of
the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one document,
of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the
opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than
one document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions
made in another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to
the padreand the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried
by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed
to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding
that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child,
justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this
case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of
the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of
the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the
case that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken
in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from
the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived
together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia
became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning
her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the
status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince the father's
resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child
shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of
article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever,
but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to
the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give
damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such
promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features
necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the
maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely
point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify
the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar
Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the
merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of
plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special
division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who
rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent,
and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again
became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and
the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and
P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos,
Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of
P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza
la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho"
(Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having
rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf
of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that
recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F.

Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the
editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation
of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not
expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of
the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion,
the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by
the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it
that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his
wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the
administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in
favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the
beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it.
But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio
Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-24332 January 31, 1978
RAMON RALLOS, Administrator of the Estate of CONCEPCION RALLOS, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for petitioner.
Ramon Duterte for private respondent.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:

This is a case of an attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos, who after of his death of his principal, Concepcion Rallos, sold
the latter's undivided share in a parcel of land pursuant to a power of attorney which the principal had executed in
favor. The administrator of the estate of the went to court to have the sale declared uneanforceable and to recover
the disposed share. The trial court granted the relief prayed for, but upon appeal the Court of Appeals uphold the
validity of the sale and the complaint.
Hence, this Petition for Review on certiorari.
The following facts are not disputed. Concepcion and Gerundia both surnamed Rallos were sisters and registered coowners of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 11116 of the Registry of Cebu. On April 21, 1954, the sisters executed a special power of attorney in favor of
their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to sell for and in their behalf lot 5983. On March 3, 1955, Concepcion
Rallos died. On September 12, 1955, Simeon Rallos sold the undivided shares of his sisters Concepcion and
Gerundia in lot 5983 to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation for the sum of P10,686.90. The deed of sale was
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Cebu, TCT No. 11118 was cancelled, and a new transfer certificate of Title No.
12989 was issued in the named of the vendee.
On May 18, 1956 Ramon Rallos as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Concepcion Rallos filed a complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. R-4530 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, praying (1) that the sale of the undivided
share of the deceased Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 be d unenforceable, and said share be reconveyed to her
estate; (2) that the Certificate of 'title issued in the name of Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation be cancelled
and another title be issued in the names of the corporation and the "Intestate estate of Concepcion Rallos" in equal
undivided and (3) that plaintiff be indemnified by way of attorney's fees and payment of costs of suit. Named party
defendants were Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation, Simeon Rallos, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu, but
subsequently, the latter was dropped from the complaint. The complaint was amended twice; defendant Corporation's
Answer contained a crossclaim against its co-defendant, Simon Rallos while the latter filed third-party complaint
against his sister, Gerundia Rallos While the case was pending in the trial court, both Simon and his sister Gerundia
died and they were substituted by the respective administrators of their estates.
After trial the court a quo rendered judgment with the following dispositive portion:
A. On Plaintiffs Complaint
(1) Declaring the deed of sale, Exh. "C", null and void insofar as the one-half proindiviso share of Concepcion Rallos in the property in question, Lot 5983 of
the Cadastral Survey of Cebu is concerned;
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 12989 covering Lot 5983 and to issue in lieu thereof another in the
names of FELIX GO CHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and the Estate of
Concepcion Rallos in the proportion of one-half (1/2) share each pro-indiviso;
(3) Ordering Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation to deliver the possession
of an undivided one-half (1/2) share of Lot 5983 to the herein plaintiff;
(4) Sentencing the defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of
Simeon Rallos, to pay to plaintiff in concept of reasonable attorney's fees the
sum of P1,000.00; and
(5) Ordering both defendants to pay the costs jointly and severally.

B. On GO CHANTS Cross-Claim:
(1) Sentencing the co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of
Simeon Rallos, to pay to defendant Felix Co Chan & Sons Realty Corporation the
sum of P5,343.45, representing the price of one-half (1/2) share of lot 5983;
(2) Ordering co-defendant Juan T. Borromeo, administrator of the Estate of
Simeon Rallos, to pay in concept of reasonable attorney's fees to Felix Go Chan
& Sons Realty Corporation the sum of P500.00.
C. On Third-Party Complaint of defendant Juan T. Borromeo administrator of Estate of Simeon
Rallos, against Josefina Rallos special administratrix of the Estate of Gerundia Rallos:
(1) Dismissing the third-party complaint without prejudice to filing either a complaint against the
regular administrator of the Estate of Gerundia Rallos or a claim in the Intestate-Estate of Cerundia
Rallos, covering the same subject-matter of the third-party complaint, at bar. (pp. 98-100, Record
on Appeal)
Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation appealed in due time to the Court of Appeals from the foregoing judgment
insofar as it set aside the sale of the one-half (1/2) share of Concepcion Rallos. The appellate tribunal, as adverted to
earlier, resolved the appeal on November 20, 1964 in favor of the appellant corporation sustaining the sale in
question. 1 The appellee administrator, Ramon Rallos, moved for a reconsider of the decision but the same

was denied in a resolution of March 4, 1965.

What is the legal effect of an act performed by an agent after the death of his principal? Applied more particularly to
the instant case, We have the query. is the sale of the undivided share of Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 valid
although it was executed by the agent after the death of his principal? What is the law in this jurisdiction as to the
effect of the death of the principal on the authority of the agent to act for and in behalf of the latter? Is the fact of
knowledge of the death of the principal a material factor in determining the legal effect of an act performed after such
death?
Before proceedings to the issues, We shall briefly restate certain principles of law relevant to the matter tinder
consideration.
1. It is a basic axiom in civil law embodied in our Civil Code that no one may contract in the name of another without
being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him. 3 A contract entered into in the

name of another by one who has no authority or the legal representation or who has acted beyond his
powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf
it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party. 4 Article 1403 (1) of the same
Code also provides:
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are justified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who hi - been given no authority or
legal representation or who has acted beyond his powers; ...
Out of the above given principles, sprung the creation and acceptance of the relationship of agency whereby one
party, caged the principal (mandante), authorizes another, called the agent (mandatario), to act for and in his behalf in
transactions with third persons. The essential elements of agency are: (1) there is consent, express or implied of the
parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the
agents acts as a representative and not for himself, and (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. 5

Agency is basically personal representative, and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to act emanates from
the powers granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the
authority. Qui facit per alium facit se. "He who acts through another acts himself". 6
2. There are various ways of extinguishing agency, 7 but her We are concerned only with one cause death of

the principal Paragraph 3 of Art. 1919 of the Civil Code which was taken from Art. 1709 of the Spanish
Civil Code provides:
ART. 1919. Agency is extinguished.
xxx xxx xxx
3. By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent; ...
(Emphasis supplied)
By reason of the very nature of the relationship between Principal and agent, agency is extinguished by the death of
the principal or the agent. This is the law in this jurisdiction. 8
Manresa commenting on Art. 1709 of the Spanish Civil Code explains that the rationale for the law is found in the
juridical basis of agency which is representation Them being an in. integration of the personality of the principal
integration that of the agent it is not possible for the representation to continue to exist once the death of either is
establish. Pothier agrees with Manresa that by reason of the nature of agency, death is a necessary cause for its
extinction. Laurent says that the juridical tie between the principal and the agent is severed ipso jure upon the death
of either without necessity for the heirs of the fact to notify the agent of the fact of death of the former. 9
The same rule prevails at common law the death of the principal effects instantaneous and absolute revocation of
the authority of the agent unless the Power be coupled with an interest. 10 This is the prevalent rule in American

Jurisprudence where it is well-settled that a power without an interest confer. red upon an agent is
dissolved by the principal's death, and any attempted execution of the power afterward is not binding on
the heirs or representatives of the deceased. 11
3. Is the general rule provided for in Article 1919 that the death of the principal or of the agent extinguishes the
agency, subject to any exception, and if so, is the instant case within that exception? That is the determinative point in
issue in this litigation. It is the contention of respondent corporation which was sustained by respondent court that
notwithstanding the death of the principal Concepcion Rallos the act of the attorney-in-fact, Simeon Rallos in selling
the former's sham in the property is valid and enforceable inasmuch as the corporation acted in good faith in buying
the property in question.
Articles 1930 and 1931 of the Civil Code provide the exceptions to the general rule afore-mentioned.
ART. 1930. The agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of the principal, if it
has been constituted in the common interest of the latter and of the agent, or in the interest of a
third person who has accepted the stipulation in his favor.
ART. 1931. Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the principal or of any
other cause which extinguishes the agency, is valid and shall be fully effective with respect to third
persons who may have contracted with him in good. faith.
Article 1930 is not involved because admittedly the special power of attorney executed in favor of Simeon Rallos was
not coupled with an interest.

Article 1931 is the applicable law. Under this provision, an act done by the agent after the death of his principal is
valid and effective only under two conditions, viz: (1) that the agent acted without knowledge of the death of the
principal and (2) that the third person who contracted with the agent himself acted in good faith. Good faith here
means that the third person was not aware of the death of the principal at the time he contracted with said agent.
These two requisites must concur the absence of one will render the act of the agent invalid and unenforceable.
In the instant case, it cannot be questioned that the agent, Simeon Rallos, knew of the death of his principal at the
time he sold the latter's share in Lot No. 5983 to respondent corporation. The knowledge of the death is clearly to be
inferred from the pleadings filed by Simon Rallos before the trial court. 12 That Simeon Rallos knew of the death

of his sister Concepcion is also a finding of fact of the court a quo 13 and of respondent appellate court
when the latter stated that Simon Rallos 'must have known of the death of his sister, and yet he
proceeded with the sale of the lot in the name of both his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos without
informing appellant (the realty corporation) of the death of the former. 14
On the basis of the established knowledge of Simon Rallos concerning the death of his principal Concepcion
Rallos, Article 1931 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. The law expressly requires for its application lack of knowledge
on the part of the agent of the death of his principal; it is not enough that the third person acted in good faith. Thus in
Buason & Reyes v. Panuyas, the Court applying Article 1738 of the old Civil rode now Art. 1931 of the new Civil Code
sustained the validity , of a sale made after the death of the principal because it was not shown that the agent knew
of his principal's demise. 15 To the same effect is the case of Herrera, et al., v. Luy Kim Guan, et al., 1961,

where in the words of Justice Jesus Barrera the Court stated:

... even granting arguemendo that Luis Herrera did die in 1936, plaintiffs presented no proof and
there is no indication in the record, that the agent Luy Kim Guan was aware of the death of his
principal at the time he sold the property. The death 6f the principal does not render the act of an
agent unenforceable, where the latter had no knowledge of such extinguishment of the agency. (1
SCRA 406, 412)
4. In sustaining the validity of the sale to respondent consideration the Court of Appeals reasoned out that there is no
provision in the Code which provides that whatever is done by an agent having knowledge of the death of his
principal is void even with respect to third persons who may have contracted with him in good faith and without
knowledge of the death of the principal. 16
We cannot see the merits of the foregoing argument as it ignores the existence of the general rule enunciated in
Article 1919 that the death of the principal extinguishes the agency. That being the general rule it follows a fortiorithat
any act of an agent after the death of his principal is void ab initio unless the same fags under the exception provided
for in the aforementioned Articles 1930 and 1931. Article 1931, being an exception to the general rule, is to be strictly
construed, it is not to be given an interpretation or application beyond the clear import of its terms for otherwise the
courts will be involved in a process of legislation outside of their judicial function.
5. Another argument advanced by respondent court is that the vendee acting in good faith relied on the power of
attorney which was duly registered on the original certificate of title recorded in the Register of Deeds of the province
of Cebu, that no notice of the death was aver annotated on said certificate of title by the heirs of the principal and
accordingly they must suffer the consequences of such omission. 17
To support such argument reference is made to a portion in Manresa's Commentaries which We quote:
If the agency has been granted for the purpose of contracting with certain persons, the revocation
must be made known to them. But if the agency is general iii nature, without reference to particular
person with whom the agent is to contract, it is sufficient that the principal exercise due diligence to
make the revocation of the agency publicity known.

In case of a general power which does not specify the persons to whom represents' on should be
made, it is the general opinion that all acts, executed with third persons who contracted in good
faith, Without knowledge of the revocation, are valid. In such case, the principal may exercise his
right against the agent, who, knowing of the revocation, continued to assume a personality which
he no longer had. (Manresa Vol. 11, pp. 561 and 575; pp. 15-16, rollo)
The above discourse however, treats of revocation by an act of the principal as a mode of terminating an agency
which is to be distinguished from revocation by operation of law such as death of the principal which obtains in this
case. On page six of this Opinion We stressed that by reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal
and agent, agency is extinguished ipso jure upon the death of either principal or agent. Although a revocation of a
power of attorney to be effective must be communicated to the parties concerned, 18 yet a revocation by operation

of law, such as by death of the principal is, as a rule, instantaneously effective inasmuch as "by legal
fiction the agent's exercise of authority is regarded as an execution of the principal's continuing
will. 19 With death, the principal's will ceases or is the of authority is extinguished.
The Civil Code does not impose a duty on the heirs to notify the agent of the death of the principal What the Code
provides in Article 1932 is that, if the agent die his heirs must notify the principal thereof, and in the meantime adopt
such measures as the circumstances may demand in the interest of the latter. Hence, the fact that no notice of the
death of the principal was registered on the certificate of title of the property in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is
not fatal to the cause of the estate of the principal
6. Holding that the good faith of a third person in said with an agent affords the former sufficient protection,
respondent court drew a "parallel" between the instant case and that of an innocent purchaser for value of a land,
stating that if a person purchases a registered land from one who acquired it in bad faith even to the extent of
foregoing or falsifying the deed of sale in his favor the registered owner has no recourse against such innocent
purchaser for value but only against the forger. 20
To support the correctness of this respondent corporation, in its brief, cites the case of Blondeau, et al., v. Nano and
Vallejo, 61 Phil. 625. We quote from the brief:
In the case of Angel Blondeau et al. v. Agustin Nano et al., 61 Phil. 630, one Vallejo was a co-owner
of lands with Agustin Nano. The latter had a power of attorney supposedly executed by Vallejo
Nano in his favor. Vallejo delivered to Nano his land titles. The power was registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds. When the lawyer-husband of Angela Blondeau went to that Office, he found
all in order including the power of attorney. But Vallejo denied having executed the power The lower
court sustained Vallejo and the plaintiff Blondeau appealed. Reversing the decision of the court a
quo, the Supreme Court, quoting the ruling in the case of Eliason v. Wilborn, 261 U.S. 457, held:
But there is a narrower ground on which the defenses of the defendant- appellee
must be overruled. Agustin Nano had possession of Jose Vallejo's title papers.
Without those title papers handed over to Nano with the acquiescence of Vallejo,
a fraud could not have been perpetuated. When Fernando de la Canters, a
member of the Philippine Bar and the husband of Angela Blondeau, the principal
plaintiff, searched the registration record, he found them in due form including the
power of attorney of Vallajo in favor of Nano. If this had not been so and if
thereafter the proper notation of the encumbrance could not have been made,
Angela Blondeau would not have sent P12,000.00 to the defendant Vallejo.' An
executed transfer of registered lands placed by the registered owner thereof in
the hands of another operates as a representation to a third party that the holder
of the transfer is authorized to deal with the land.

As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of
a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of coincidence bear the
loss. (pp. 19-21)
The Blondeau decision, however, is not on all fours with the case before Us because here We are confronted with
one who admittedly was an agent of his sister and who sold the property of the latter after her death with full
knowledge of such death. The situation is expressly covered by a provision of law on agency the terms of which are
clear and unmistakable leaving no room for an interpretation contrary to its tenor, in the same manner that the ruling
in Blondeau and the cases cited therein found a basis in Section 55 of the Land Registration Law which in part
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented
for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to
enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such
instruments, and the new certificate or memorandum Shall be binding upon the registered owner
and upon all persons claiming under him in favor of every purchaser for value and in good
faith: Provided however, That in all cases of registration provided by fraud, the owner may pursue
all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to
the right, of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. ... (Act No. 496 as amended)
7. One last point raised by respondent corporation in support of the appealed decision is an 1842 ruling of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Cassiday v. McKenzie wherein payments made to an agent after the death of the
principal were held to be "good", "the parties being ignorant of the death". Let us take note that the Opinion of Justice
Rogers was premised on the statement that the parties were ignorant of the death of the principal. We quote from
that decision the following:
... Here the precise point is, whether a payment to an agent when the Parties are ignorant of the
death is a good payment. in addition to the case in Campbell before cited, the same judge Lord
Ellenboruogh, has decided in 5 Esp. 117, the general question that a payment after the death of
principal is not good. Thus, a payment of sailor's wages to a person having a power of attorney to
receive them, has been held void when the principal was dead at the time of the payment. If, by this
case, it is meant merely to decide the general proposition that by operation of law the death of the
principal is a revocation of the powers of the attorney, no objection can be taken to it. But if it
intended to say that his principle applies where there was 110 notice of death, or opportunity of
twice I must be permitted to dissent from it.
... That a payment may be good today, or bad tomorrow, from the accident circumstance of the
death of the principal, which he did not know, and which by no possibility could he know? It would
be unjust to the agent and unjust to the debtor. In the civil law, the acts of the agent, done bona fide
in ignorance of the death of his principal are held valid and binding upon the heirs of the latter. The
same rule holds in the Scottish law, and I cannot believe the common law is so unreasonable... (39
Am. Dec. 76, 80, 81; emphasis supplied)
To avoid any wrong impression which the Opinion in Cassiday v. McKenzie may evoke, mention may be made that
the above represents the minority view in American jurisprudence. Thus in Clayton v. Merrett, the Court said.
There are several cases which seem to hold that although, as a general principle, death revokes an
agency and renders null every act of the agent thereafter performed, yet that where a payment has
been made in ignorance of the death, such payment will be good. The leading case so holding is
that of Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & S. (Pa) 282, 39 Am. 76, where, in an elaborate opinion,
this view ii broadly announced. It is referred to, and seems to have been followed, in the case

of Dick v. Page,17 Mo. 234, 57 AmD 267; but in this latter case it appeared that the estate of the
deceased principal had received the benefit of the money paid, and therefore the representative of
the estate might well have been held to be estopped from suing for it again. . . . These cases, in so
far, at least, as they announce the doctrine under discussion, are exceptional. The Pennsylvania
Case, supra (Cassiday v. McKenzie 4 Watts & S. 282, 39 AmD 76), is believed to stand almost, if
not quite, alone in announcing the principle in its broadest scope. (52, Misc. 353, 357, cited in 2
C.J. 549)
So also in Travers v. Crane, speaking of Cassiday v. McKenzie, and pointing out that the opinion, except so far as it
related to the particular facts, was a mere dictum, Baldwin J. said:
The opinion, therefore, of the learned Judge may be regarded more as an extrajudicial indication of
his views on the general subject, than as the adjudication of the Court upon the point in question.
But accordingly all power weight to this opinion, as the judgment of a of great respectability, it
stands alone among common law authorities and is opposed by an array too formidable to permit
us to following it. (15 Cal. 12,17, cited in 2 C.J. 549)
Whatever conflict of legal opinion was generated by Cassiday v. McKenzie in American jurisprudence, no such
conflict exists in our own for the simple reason that our statute, the Civil Code, expressly provides for two exceptions
to the general rule that death of the principal revokes ipso jure the agency, to wit: (1) that the agency is coupled with
an interest (Art 1930), and (2) that the act of the agent was executed without knowledge of the death of the principal
and the third person who contracted with the agent acted also in good faith (Art. 1931). Exception No. 2 is the
doctrine followed in Cassiday, and again We stress the indispensable requirement that the agent acted without
knowledge or notice of the death of the principal In the case before Us the agent Ramon Rallos executed the sale
notwithstanding notice of the death of his principal Accordingly, the agent's act is unenforceable against the estate of
his principal.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We set aside the decision of respondent appellate court, and We affirm en toto
the judgment rendered by then Hon. Amador E. Gomez of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, quoted in pages 2 and
3 of this Opinion, with costs against respondent realty corporation at all instances.
So Ordered.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30538 January 31, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO TIROL and CIRIACO BALDESCO, defendants-appellants.

PER CURIAM:
Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch III, in Criminal Case No.
360, dated March 31, 1969, imposing on Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldesco the death penalty for
each of the seven (7) murders and an indeterminate sentence for each of the two (2) frustrated
murders.
The following facts appear uncontroverted.
In the evening of December 4, 1965, while Kosain Manibpol was sleeping with his family in their
house at Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato, he was awakened by the barking of their dogs. When
he got up to investigate, he saw two persons outside their house who had already come up. They
were Beatingco, Jr. and Julian Casian He asked them what they came for, and they answered that

they wanted to borrow part of his land, to which he consented. After he gave his consent, Kulas Bati
suddenly arrived, flashed his flashlight on his face and boxed him. When he fell to the floor, the rest
of his assailant's companions, numbering more than ten, who were afl armed with bladed weapons
and firearms, also came and hacked or boloed him, his wife and his seven children, resulting in the
death of his wife, Kadidia Kalangtongan and his six children, namely, Daduman Malaguianon
Locaydal Pinangcong, Baingkong and Abdul Rakman all surnamed Kusain He and one of his
daughters, Undang Kosain who was about six years old, survived although wounded. They were
able to run to the houses of their neighbors, and were later brought to the municipal building where
they reported to the police and were given medical attention.
For the death of Kosains wife and his six children, as well as for the wounding of himself and his
daughter Undang, fourteen (14) persons were charged (p. 3, Vol. II, rec with multiple murder and
double frustrated murder by the Matalam Chief of Police, and these were: Nicolas Bate, Beatingco
Junior, Ruperto Diosma Pablo Diosma Lorenzo Canio Durico Sugang Teofilo Baldesco, Ciriaco
Baldesco, Julian Casiag Nick Bunque a certain Miestizo Sofring Romualdo, and Bonifacio Bautista
[later amended to Bonifacio Tirol p. 29, Vol. 11, record of the fourteen, only Ciriaco Baldesco and
Bonifacio Tirol were apprehended, while the rest remain at large.
On February 17, 1966, after the second stage of prehn iinary investigation was waived by accused
Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol, the acting Provincial Fiscal of Cotabato filed the following
information (p. 37, Vol. II, rec.) against the two:

INFORMATION
The undersigned Acting Provincial Fiscal accuses Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco
Baldisco of the crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about December 4, 1965, in Kobalangasan Barrio Lampayan, Matalam,
Province of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, in company with Nicolas Bate, Beatingco Junior, Ruperto Diosma
Pablo Diosma Lorenzo Canio Durico Sugang Teofilo Baldesco, Julian Casiag Nick
Bunque Miestizo Sopring Romualdo and Bonifacio Bautista who are still at large,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
bladed weapons and firearms did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kilt taking advantage of
the cover of the night, attack, stab and shoot Kadidia Kalangtogan Duaduman Kosain
Malaguianon Kosain Locayda Kosain Penangcong Ko Biacong Kosain and Abdul
Rakman Kosain who as a result thereof, sustained mortal wounds which directly
caused their death and Kosain Manibpol and Undang Kosain sustained serious
wounds which ordinarily would have caused their death, thus performing all acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of double murder as a
consequence thereof, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is by the timely and able medical

assistance rendered to said Kosain Manibpol and Undang Kosain which prevented
their death.
Contrary to law, especially Articles 248 and 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution relied mainly on the testimonies of the two survivors, Kosain Manibpol and his
daughter Undang Kosain to prove the guilt of the accused. The only other witness presented by the
prosecution was the municipal health officer who issued the death certificates of the deceased and
the medical certificate of Kosain.
Kosain Manibpol 33 years old, widower and resident of Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato, declared
on direct examination that at about 8:00 P.M. on December 4, 1965, more than ten (10) persons, all
armed, entered his house in Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato. Two persons, Beatingco Junior and
Julian Casian came ahead, immediately after he got up from his sleep to check what was causing
the barking of their dogs which awakened him. When he asked why they were there, the two
answered that they wanted to borrow his land, to which he consented. Suddenly, Kulas Bate arrived,
flashed his flashlight on his face and boxed him. When he fell to the floor, the rest of the armed men
came and hacked or boloed not only him but also Ws wife and seven children. Among the assailants
he recognized aside from the three above-named, were Bonifacio Tirol, Ciriaco Baldesco, Ruperto
Diosma Florencio Cafio Dorico whose family name he forgot, Teofilo Baldesco, a certain mestizo and
Sopring Romualdo. He actually saw Ciriaco Baldesco hacking his wife with a bolo, and the "bungi"
harelipped Bonifacio Tirol hacking his eldest daughter. He had known Bonifacio Tirol for two years
before the incident and Ciriaco Baldesco for a longer period. His wife and six of his children died as
a result of the sudden attack. He himself was wounded at the outer part of his right arm, at the back
of his right wrist and on his forehead, and his chest was badly beaten; but he survived because he
was able to run to the house of a neighbor named Angcogan (t.s.n., pp. 1-10, Vol. III, rec.).
On cross-examination, Kosain testified that when he was investigated by the police, he was not sure
of the surname of accused Bonifacio, so he stated that it may be Bautista. He learned later that the
surname was Tirol He admitted that he was confused when he stated earlier that he had known
Bonifacio Bautista for one year and Bonifacio Tirol for two years. Bonifacio Bautista and Bonifacio
Tirol are one and the same person. He further declared that after he had fallen down as a result of
the blow by Kulas Bate, Sopring immediately hacked him. It was after he fell that he was able to
observe the stabbing and slashing of his family, because his assailants must have thought him dead.
He later fled to the house of Angcogan who ran away because of fear, but returned afterwards with
companions and went to their house to verify what happened (pp. 10-24, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
On questioning by the court, Kosain testified that on the night of December 4, 1965 he slept with a
petroleum fight burning in their house as in fact they always slept with their house righted because
their youngest child would cry if there was no light. When he was attacked he was not able to shout
for help because he was caught unaware. His eldest daughter, Danonan (Daduman) was the one
who pleaded with their assailants not to hack them as they had no fault, but she was also hacked
and hit at the abdomen. At this stage he interchanged the assailants of his wife and children by
saying that Bonifacio Tirol hacked his wife and Ciriaco Baldesco hacked his eldest child (p. 29, t s. n
Vol. III, rec.).

Undang Kosain about 6 years old, resident of Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato, corroborated the
testimony of her father, Kosain Manibpol that she and her father are the only two in the family now,
after her mother, sisters and brother had been killed by more than ten armed men who entered their
house and attacked their family. Among their more than ten assailants, she knows only three,
namely, Kulas Bati, Ciriaco Baldesco and another person whom she remembers only as "bungi"
(harelipped). Of the three she knows only two were in court, namely Ciriaco Baldesco and the
"bungi" Bonifacio Tirol She Identified them by touching the shoulders of Baldesco and Tirol (p. 65,
t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.). She remembers Tirol distinctly because of his appearance as "bungi." She did
not see who hacked her mother, but she saw "bungi" hack his younger brother and sister. Her elder
sisters were hacked by Baldesco. She herself was hacked at her back by Kulas Bati She showed in
court her scar at the back of her left shoulder going diagonally to the spinal column and measuring
about 6 inches long and 3/4 of an inch wide, which appear to have scars of stiches. Afterwards, she
went to the house of a neighbor named Antalig.
In answer to the court's questions, Undang declared that she had three older sisters, two younger
sisters and one younger brother. Her elder sisters were Danonang (Daduman), Maguianon
(Malaguianan) and Lakaida (Locayda). Her younger sisters were Inangkong (Penangkong) and
Bayangkong (Benangkong), and her younger brother was Abdul Rakman They all died when more
than ten men went inside their house wle they were lying down on the mat. She did not see who
hacked their father, but she saw Bonifacio Tirol hacking her three elder sisters, and Ciriaco Baldesco
hacking his younger brother. They used kalsido or bolo. The other men were also armed with boloes,
and one of them, Kulas Bati was with a firearm. There was light inside their house at that time.
Besides, it was moonlight night. Before the night of the hacking incident, she used to see Bonifacio
Tirol passing by their house in going to the house of Kulas Bati which is near their house. She has
not seen Ciriaco Baldesco before (t.s.n., pp. 69-75, Vol. III, rec.).
On cross-examination, Undang testified that she used to see Ciriaco Baldesco at their store where
her family buys things. The house of Baldesco is near the schools of her elder sisters. She
sometimes went with them to school. Her oldest sister was hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen. Her
two other elder sisters were likewise hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen. Her younger brother was
hacked by Bonifacio Tirol Their house was lighted at that time, aside from the fact that it was bright
because of the round moon. The accused Baldesco and Tirol were dressed in white and dark
clothes. The color of the dark clothes was black, She does not know of any trouble between Ciriaco
Baldesco or Bonifacio Tirol and her father (t.s.n., PP79-85, Vol. III, rec.).
The defense of both accused is alibi, and neither of them disputed the facts established by the
prosecution except to deny involvement in the crimes alluded to them.
Accused Ciriaco Baldesco, 48 years old, married and residing at Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato,
testifying on his own behalf, declared that on December 4, 1965, he went home at about 6:00 P.M.
after pasturing his carabao. He took his supper at 6:00 P.M. and listened to the radio up to 9:00 P.M..
Thereafter, he went to sleep (t.s.n., pp. 125- 130, Vol. Ill, rec.).
To bolster his alibi, Baldesco presented Demetrio Riparip 25 years old, single, a former teacher at
Kabalangasan Elementary School and boarder in the house of Baldesco, who declared that he took

his supper with the latter at his house at about 6:00 P.M. on December 4, 1965. Then he went to
sleep at 7:00 P.M.. He did not wake up till the following morning (t.s.n., pp. 96-112, Vol. III, rec.).
A daughter of Baldesco, Teofista Baldesco, 21 years old, married, housekeeper and residing at
Lampayan, Matalam, Cotabato, likewise corroborated Baldesco's testimony that family, consisting of
her father, mother, brother, and sister took supper in their house after 6.00 P.M., then listened to the
radio up to 9:00 P.M.. They went to sleep at 9:00 P.M. (t.s.n., pp. 115-117, Vol. III, rec.).
Accused Bonifacio Tirol, 31 years old, married and residing at Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato,
likewise testified on his own behalf. He declared that he was in Salat, a part of Kabacan Cotabato,
from December 2 to 7, 1965, seeking employment as a laborer in the logging firm of Felipe Tan. He
left Kabalangasan at 10:00 A.M., took a motorboat and arrived in Salat at 5:00 P.M. He did not see
the manager, Felipe Tan, of the logging firm until December 6, 1965, and so he was able to return to
Kabalangasan only on December 7, 1965. While in Salat, he stayed in the camp where his friend
Rufino Duan was staying. When he returned to Kabalangasan his family had already evacuated out
of fear for revenge, because of the massacre of the fimily of Kosain He went to Malamaing another
barrio of Matalam, where he found his family. In Malamaing they stayed in the house of a Cebuano
named Kulas. They never went back to Kabalangasan because they were afraid that Kosains family
might take revenge on them (t.s.n., pp. 131-142, Vol. III, rec.).
His wife Nicolasa Tirol, 30 years old and residing at Paco, Kidapawan, Cotabato, confirmed Tirol's
absence from Matalam from December 2 to 7, 1965 while he was looking for a job in Salat. She also
stated that she evacuated her family because she was warned that the family of Kosain might take
revenge on them (t.s.n., pp. 145-151, Vol. III, rec.).
A friend from the logging company, Rufino Duan 23 years old, single and residing at Paco,
Kidapawan, Cotabato, likewise corroborated Tirol's testimony that he was in Salat from December 2
to 7. 1965. The said accused stayed with him in the camp he is occupying while he was at Salat for
seven (7) days, looking for work. In order to go to Salat froni Kabalangasan one has to take a ride on
a truck (t.s.n., pp. 1 18122, Vol. III, rec.).
After trial, the trial court rendered its decision (pp. 6-28, Vol. I, rec.) dated March 31, 1969, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the herein accused, Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco
Baldesco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder of seven (,7)
persons, namely: Daduman Klantongan Kosain [also written in the transcript of
steno-type notes as Danonan and Dananong Baingkong Kosain [also written in the
transcript as Bai Ingkong]; Abdul Kalatogan Kosain [also written in the transcript as
Abdul Rakman Kadidia Kalantongan Malaguianon Kosain Locayda Kosain [also
written Lokaidal Pinangkong Kosain [also written Maningdongi and Binangkong and
of the crime of Frustrated Murder of Kosain Manibpol [also written as Kusain
Manedpoll and Undang Kosain and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
supreme penalty of death for each of the seven murders of the seven deceased, and
to an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS for each of the two Frustra Murders of the two wounded persons and to

indenuiify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the seven deceased with the sum
of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) for each of the seven deceased, or FORTYTWO THOUSAND PESOS (P42,000.00) in all, and pay the costs, fifty-fifty.
It appearing that the accused have been detained, they each should be credited onehalf (1/2) of their preventive imprisonment in the cases of two frustrated murders.
The penalty herein imposed for each of the seven murders being the maximum
death the records of this case are hereby automatically elevated to the Supreme
Court.
Let copy of this Judgment be furnished the Philippine Constabulary and the NBI at
Cotabato City, and the Police Department of Matalam, Cotabato, so that they may
exert efforts to apprehend the other culprits who committed the crimes herein dealt
with.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, accused Baldesco and Tirol, contend in their joint brief:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR:
The lower court erred in admitting in the death certificates issued by the doctor who
did not personally view and examine the victims, but whose findings therein were
based upon the sketch prepared by the police.
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR:
The lower court erred in disregarding the testimony of both accused despite the
convincingly strong evidence showing that they were not at the scene of the crime on
4 December 1965, and therefore their non-participation in the crime charged.
THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR:
The lower court erred in not granting new trial even as the complaining witness
himself made a voluntary extra-judicial admission by means of a sworn statement
(affidavit) that he merely involved accused Baldesco for a consideration.
FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR:
The evidence failed to establish conspiracy among the accused.
FIFTH ASSIGNED ERROR:
The decision is contrary to law. (p. 98, Vol. I, rec.)

During the pendency of this appeal, or on October 23, 1977, appellant Baldesco died in the New
Bilibid Prison Hospital (p. 192, Vol. I, rec.) so that on January 28, 1978, We resolved to dismiss this
case insofar as the criminal liability of the said appellant is concerned. Following the doctrine in
People vs. Sendaydiego (81 SCRA 124, 134), this appeal will bd resolved insofar as Baldesco is
concerned only for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil
liability for which his estate may be liable.
Appellants would like the court to reject the death certificates of the victims on the ground that they
are hearsay evidence, since the doctor who issued them did so on the strength of the sketch
furnished by the police, without personally examining the bodies of the victims.
WE find no error in the admission of said exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses" (p. 9,
Vol. I and p. 95, Vol. III, rec.). The fact of death of the victims is not in issue. The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that the victims died because of stab wounds inflicted by the armed men who
entered their residence on the night of December 4, 1965 remain uncontroverted. That death came
to the deceased by foul means is a moral and legal certainty. Their death certificates therefore are
only corroborative of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Appellants would likewise have the Court give credence to their defense of alibi, alleging that they
have presented convincingly strong evidence showing that they were not at the scene of the crime
on December 4, 1965. This contention is devoid of merit. The rule is well settled, to the point of being
trite that the defense of alibi, which is easy to concoct, must be received with utmost caution, for it is
one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused (People vs. Castafieda, 93
SCRA 58, 69; People vs. Cortez, 57 SCRA 208).
Moreover, the alibi of both appellants cannot prevail over the positive Identification of the prosecution
witnesses Identifying and pointing to the accused as among the group of armed men which
massacred the victims (People vs. Tabion, 93 SCRA 566, 570; People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 433).
The two survivors, Kosain and his 6-year old daughter positively Identified both accused as two of
the more than ten persons who entered their house on December 4, 1965 and participated in the
hacking and boloing of their family. Accused Tirol was even more distinctly and positively recognized
as the "bungi" harelipped who hacked some of the victims. The credibility of these two prosecution
witnesses was never successfully assailed. The inconsistencies attributed to Kosain Manibpol refer
to minor details (i.e., about the length of time he had had known one of the two persons who first
came up to his residence on the pretext of borrowing his lot pp. 15-16, Vol. III, rec., in relation to
Exhibits "I" and "2", pp. 5 & 17, Vol. II, rec.), which do not affect his credibility. The apparent
inconsistency in his testimony as well as that of 6-year old Undang Kosain whose credibility was
never questioned, as to who among the armed men hacked or attacked which victim is likewise
insufficient to destroy their credibility, considering that the presence of a number of armed men
simultaneously participating in the unlawful aggression could really be confusing. As noted by the
trial court, it would be unnatural if the witnesses who were themselves victims of the horrible deed
were not confused during that terrifying massacre committed together by more than ten persons (p.
27, Vol. I, rec.). What is important is the positive Identification of the two accused appellants as
having been in that group and who participated in the concerted attack on the hapless victims. "Alibi
is unavailing once the accused is positively Identified by one without motive to charge falsely said

accused, specially with a grave offense that could bring death by execution on the culprit" (People
vs. Estante, 92 SCRA 122).
The weakness of appellant Baldesco's defense lies in the fact that his house where he purportedly
stayed from 6:00 P.M. of December 4, 1965 to the following day is only about one kilometer from
the house of the victims, the scene of the crime, according to his own daughter and witness, Teofista
Baldesco (p. 116, Vol. III, rec.). And although Baldesco himself testified that the victims' house is
more than three (3) kilometers from his, it still does not belie the fact that he could easily go there if
he wanted to, considering that both residences are within the same barrio of Kabalangasan.
So also is the house of Tirol located in the same barrio. According to him, his house is about 11/2
kilometers from that of the victim. He wants to impress upon this Court, however, that he was not in
his house when the incident occurred but in another town looking for a job in a logging company. The
trial court correctly rejected this theory because of the inconsistencies noted in Tirol's evidence. Said
the trial court:
The alibi of Bonifacio Tirol is unbelievable. His witness Rufino Duan testified that
from Kabalangasan where Bonifacio Tirol lived to Salat where Bonifacio was
supposed to be on December 4, 1965, people would take a truck ride of the PTC but
Bonifacio Tirol declared that he went to Salat by speedboat, and went home to
Kabalangasan by banca. Duan testified that Salat is very far from Kabalangasan
because it takes one day to reach it from there; but Bonifacio Tirol declared that he
started at Kabalangasan by motorboat at 10:00 A.M., and arrived at Salat at 5:00
P.M. or seven hours only. He modified this afterwards, in the cross-examination, by
testifying that from his house in Kabalangasan to the log pond where he took the
speedboat, he had to walk from 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 A.M. or for 3 hours; fixing the time
from his home to Salat at 10 hours, But this testimony about the log pond cannot be
believed. He testified he did not know where the log pond was located; that was the
first time he went there. How he located a long pond at a place he did not know is
certainly beyond belief. Of course, he said, Rufino told him where to pass, but that
was a long time ago. Bonifacio Tirol further testified that when he went home to
Kabalangasan he took a banca at Salat at 3:00 dawn and arrived in his house at
Kabalangasan at 9:00 in the morning, or 6 hours. He changed the time of arrival to
10:00 A.M. when questioned by the Court about it. When asked by the Court why the
difference in the period of time of travel he reasoned out that the motorboat in going
to Salat was going upstream, and the paddled banca in going to Kabalangasan was
going downstream. Even, if that were so, the difference cannot be three or four
hours.
xxx xxx xxx
But even granting that Bonifacio really went to Salat on the 2nd to look for work,
there was no physical impossibility for him to be in Kabalangasan on the evening of
the 4th which was a Saturday. The testimony of Duan that he saw Bonifacio of the
4th in the evening cannot be believed because of his interest and its improbability.

Why should Bonifacio wait for the manager on a Saturday evening when the next day
was a Sunday, therefore not a work day? (pp. 2425, Vol. I, rec.).
It is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable, it must be shown that the place where the
accused was alleged to when the offense was committed must be located at such a distance that it
is well nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime (People vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No. L30912, April 30, 1980; People vs. Mercado, et al., L- 39511-13, April 28,1980; People vs. Malibay, 63
SCRA 421).
As to appellant Baldesco, the testimonies of his witnesses do not at all bolster his alibi. Demetrio
Riparip stated that he took supper with Baldesco at 6:00 P.M. on December 4, 1965, after which he
slept at 7:00 P.M. and did not wake up until the next morning (p. 109, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.). Baldesco's
daughter, Teofista, on the other hand, testified that she took supper at 6:00 P.M. with her father,
mother, brother and sister (p. 116, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.), without mentioning the presence of Riparip in
their house; then she listended to the radio with her father, mother, brother and sister up to 9:00 P.M.
and went to sleep afterwards. These testimonies do not rule out the possibility that he could have left
the house that same evening while the rest of his family were sound asleep and returned late that
night or early the following morning.
The third assigned error is likewise bereft of merit. Counsel for appellants contends that the trial
court erred in not granting a new trial even as the complaining witness himself made a voluntary
extrajudicial admission by means of sworn statement (affidavit) that he merely involved accused
Baldesco for a consideration. The trial court rejected the motion for new trial on the -round that it was
filed out of time (p. 97, Vol. II rec.).
Section 9, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court requires that in all cases in which the death penalty is impo
the records should be forwarded to this Court within twenty (20) days but not less than fifteen (15)
days from rendition of judgment. This 20-day period is not rigid or absolute nor jurisdictional, and
may be shortened or extended (People vs. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398). However, the extension of period is
for the purpose of enabling the lower court to comply with the mandatory requirement of elevating
the records for review, and not to lengthen the minimum period within which trial courts may modify
or alter their decision. As enunciated in People vs. Bocar, supra, the reason for the 15-day minimum
requirement is such that within that period, the trial court may on its own motion with the consent of
the defendant, grant a new trial. Within that period the trial court may modify its judgment by
reducing the penalty or fine, or even set it aside altogether and acquit the accused.
In the case at bar, the motion for new trial was filed on April 28,1969 (pp. 92-94, Vol. II, rec.) or
twenty-eight days after rendition of the judgment on March 31, 1969 (p. 90, Vol. II, rec.). Although a
15-day extension from April 21, 1969 was granted to the lower court within which to forward the
record of this case (p. 30, Vol. I, rec.), that extension did not affect the 15-day period for filing a
motion for new trial.
But even granting that the said motion were filed on time, the -game does not merit a favorable
action. The ground relied on is an alleged newly-discovered evidence, referring to a sworn statement
(p. 94, Vol. II, rec.) executed on April 17, 1969 by a certain Romualdo Diosma barrio captain of barrio
Lampayan, Matalam, Cotabato. In the said affidavit, the affiant declared that he was shocked to

learn that the accused were sentenced to death; that Kosain Manibpol the principal witness, had
confided to him that he was only interested in commercializing or making money out of his case,
which is why he implicated the accused Baldesco; that Kosain Manibpol had persuaded him to
convince Feliciano Codoy, a son-in-law of Baldesco, to give him Kosain one carabao so that he wili
drop the case; that Kosain Manibpol also personally demanded from Codoy one carabao so that he
Will not testify against Baldesco; that he (affiant) even went with Kosain to see Codoy in November,
1967 to persuade him to give a carabao to Kosain but Codoy refused; and that Kosain realizing the
wrong he had done, was willing to tell the truth regarding the non-involvement and non-participation
of Baldesco in the crime charged, but it was too late to tell the court because the case was already
submitted for decision; and that it was a common knowledge in their barrio that Baldesco was not
among the band that killed Kosains family.
This so-called "extra-judicial admission," referring to Diosmas sworn statement is not the kind of
newly-discovered evidence contemplated in Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. Well-settled is
the rule that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly- discovered evidence, it must
be shown that: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence
is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and (d) it must be to the merits as
ought to produce a different result, if admitted [Jose vs. CA, 70 SCRA 258].
The very affidavit of Diosma indicates that the so-called extra-judicial admission of Kosain was
already available during the trial, otherwise, he would not have demanded from Feliciano Codoy
personally one carabao so that he will not testify against accused Baldesco.
For how could he have offered not to testify against Baldesco if the trial was already concluded?
Codoy should have been presented as a defense witness if such was the fact, together with some
other barrio residents who had knowledge, as was allegedly "public knowledge in our barrio," that
Baldesco was not involved in the crime. The purported extrajudicial admission is a last-minute
concoction.
Appellants also point out as error that the evidence failed to establish conspiracy. While it has been
held that conspiracy must be established by positive evidence, direct proof is not essential to show
it, since by its very nature it is planned in utmost secrecy (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 760).
In the rase of People vs. Madai Santalani (93 SCRA 316, 330), We held: "Conspiracy implies concert
of design and not participation in every detail of the execution. If it is proved that two or more
persons aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of some unlawful object each doing a part so
that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy may be inferred
although no actual meeting between them to conspire is proved, for the prosecution need not
establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail in the execution of the crime or that they
were actually together at all stages of the conspiracy" (see also People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285).
In this case under review, it has been clearly established that the appellants and their cohorts acted
in unison when they went up the house of Kosain Manibpol and attacked their victims in a manner

showing singleness of purpose the massacre of the entire family of Kosain The fact that two
survived is of no moment. The intention to kill all of them was most patent.
Thus, the fifth assigned error, i.e., that the decision is contrary to law, need not be considered
separately. The prosecution evidence has clearly established the guilt of the accused appellants. In
addition, there are more incriminating evidence that emanate from the appellants themselves. The
trial court had taken judicial notice of the escape of accused Baldesco from police custody on
December 15, 1965, (p. 27, Vol. II, rec.), and his subsequent re-arrest while en route to Davao (p.
28, Vol. II, rec.). On the other hand, accused Tirol himself had testified that after coming from Salat,
he left his house and never returned, for the reason that the members of his family were afraid of
some vendetta because of the massacre of Ko Manibpols family (pp. 141-142, Vol. II, rec.). The trial
court noted that this fear was entertained even before the chief of police could file a complaint and
before a warrant of arrest could be issued. These actuations could only indicate a sense of guilt. As
the trial court pointed out, fear of reprisal or retaliation could only haunt one who is aware of his
wrong doing (p. 26, Vol. I, rec.).
The trial court did not err in finding the accused guilty of murder of seven (7) persons, qualified by
treachery, and of two frustrated murders. There was treachery because the accused and their
companions made a deliberate surprise attack on the victims. They perpetrated the killings in such a
manner that there was no risk to themselves. Treachery has absorbed the circumstance of nighttime,
taking advantage of superior strength, employing means to weaken the defense, and that the crime
was committed by a band.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not proven, hence it may not be
appreciated.
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the crime having been committed in the dwelling place of
the victims who had not given any provocation, likewise can be appreciated.
Considering that there is no mitigating circumstance, the trial court did not err in imposing the
maximum penalty provided for in Article 248.
Since the penal liability of appellant Ciriaco Baldesco had been extinguished by his death on
October 23, 1977, only his civil liability remains to be determined which can be recovered from his
estate.
The civil liability of both appellants for each of the seven victims of the seven murders is hereby
raised to P12,000.00 and their civil liability for each of the two victims of the two frustrated murders is
hereby increased to P8,000.00. The civil liability arising from the crime of 2 or more accused is
solidary.
WHEREFORE APPELLANTS BONIFACIO TIROL AND CIRIACO BALDESCO ARE HEREBY
SENTENCED TO (1) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY KOSAIN MANIBPOL AND UNDANG
KOSAIN AS THE ONLY SURVIVING HEIRS OF THE SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS IN THE SUM OF
TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS FOR EACH OF THE SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS; AND
(2) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY KOSAIN MANIBPOL IN THE SUM OF EIGHT

THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS AND UNDANG KOSAIN ALSO IN THE SUM OF EIGHT
THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS AS THE TWO VICTIMS OF THE TWO FRUSTRATED
MURDERS.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.