Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical

Association
Review
Author(s): Jonathan Sperber
Review by: Jonathan Sperber
Source: Central European History, Vol. 44, No. 2 (JUNE 2011), pp. 347-349
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Conference Group for Central European
History of the American Historical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41238438
Accessed: 17-05-2015 22:51 UTC

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BOOK REVIEWS

347

andchangesovertimein thethinking
of
opinionamongthepeoplementioned,
eachofthesepeople(andtheonesmentioned
herearenotthefullcastofcharacters).
The bookdeserves
a widereadership,
from
toadvanced
researchers.
undergraduates
Lora Wildenthal
Rice University
doi:10.1017/S000893891
1000100

The Berlin-Baghdad
Bid for
Express:The OttomanEmpireand Germany's

World
Power.
MA: HarvardUniversity
By SeanMcMeekin.Cambridge,
Press.2010.Pp. xv + 461. Cloth$29.95.ISBN 978-1846143236.
ofWorldWarI willincludea reference
to theBerlin
Anyaccountoftheorigins
to Baghdadrailwayand to Germanstrategic
and economicinterest
in the
OttomanEmpire.At theveryleastsinceFritzFischer'sGriff
nachderWeltmacht,
historians
haveknownaboutwartime
Germancovertoperations
aimedatinciting
MoslemsubjectsoftheBritish
In viewofthisresearch
one
Empireto rebellion.
SeanMcMeekin'sworkbreaksnewscholarly
mightwonderwhether
groundor
- occasionally
well-knownmaterial.
A vivid
florid
just dramatically
portrays
suchas "the reallinguafrancaof the Orient:
style,completewithcomments
superiorforce"(p. 19), mightlead readersto concludethe latter,or even to
whackthebook withtheircopiesof Said's Orientalism.
Such a response
would
be shortsighted.
in German,Turkish,and Russian
Thoroughlyresearched
theworkis an intriguing
investiarchives,
ablybuildingon existing
scholarship,
and a contribution
to thestudyof
gationof WorldWar I as a globalstruggle
relations
betweenEuropeanand Islamiccivilizations
in the modernera. One
doesnothaveto agreewiththeauthor'sconclusions
or withhismoreepisodic
- anda good deal ofreading
thananalytical
approachto drawintellectual
profit
pleasure fromThe Berlin-Baghdad
Express.

McMeekinbeginswiththegrowing
in theOttoman
pre-1914Germaninterest
Wilhelm
II's
celebrated
state
visit
of
1889.
He
considers
atsome
Empire,
showcasing
lengththejourneysof Max von Oppenheim.Scionof theprominent
Cologne
traveled
theMiddleEast,dressing
inindigbanking
family,
Oppenheim
throughout
enousclothing
andpurchasing
slaveconcubines,
British
thathe
drawing
suspicions
wasa spy- whichhewas,ina sense.Withthepersonal
of
Wilhelm
II,he
patronage
sentbackendless
volumes
ofreports
totheAuswrtiges
Amt.Chiefpractical
exemplar
ofGerman
interest
intheOttomans'
realmwastheBerlintoBaghdadrailway,
actuin Constantinople
as an extension
ofexisting
Balkanrailways,
then
allybeginning
Anatolia,acrossthe Taurusand Amanusmountains,
running
through
through
to terminate
at Basra,on thePersianGulf.Buildingtherailroad
Mesopotamia,

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348

BOOK REVIEWS

wealthto economicdevelopment,
butthe
wouldopen up theregion'smineral
and
more
mountain
stretches
considerable
engineering
challenges required
posed
fundsthantheGermancapitalmarket
couldeasilyprovide,
so thatconstruction
in fitsandstarts
before1914.
onlyproceeded
Alltheseinitiatives,
atthewar'soutbreak.
McMeekinargues,cameto fruition
was
set
in
a
bureau.
He devisedan
Berlin
to
run
covert
Oppenheim
up
operations
for
a
the
British
and
French
by
appeal
jihadagainst
Empires,
promptly
proclaimed
theSultanin hisroleas defender
of thefaith.Germanagentsfannedout from
and largebundlesof cash.A
Sudanto Afghanistan,
bearingtheproclamation
callto an Islamicholywar,pennedbya Germanof CatholicandJewishbackground, proclaimedby an Ottoman governmentrun by the secular
in
nationalist
Young Turks,was verymucha postmodernist
spectacle.Interest
sucha warprovedto be modestat best.(Followingalongthelinesof Suzanne
Marchand'srecenthistory
of GermanOrientalism,
the authorshowsthatthe
in
service
were
far
more
of thewhole
Orientalists
German
scholarly
skeptical
of
businessthanamateurenthusiasts
suchas Oppenheim.)The onlyadherents
the
of
were
of
the
Wahabbi tribesmen centralArabia,
jihad,
opponents
secularist
Ottomangovernment
and generally
alignedwith Britishimperial
interests.
Even had therebeen greater
enthusiasm
forthiscause,therewas no
to potentialanti-British
sincetherailroad
wayto getwarmateriel
insurgents,
was not finished.
continuedat an
Workon the difficult
mountainstretches
accelerated
pace duringthewar,but thetrackswerenot completeduntilthe
war'send.
Conventional
weremoresignificant
thanclandestine
entermilitary
operations
both familiar
such as the failedOttoman
efforts,
prises.McMeekindiscusses
on theStraits,
to seizetheSuez CanalandthefailedFranco-British
assault
attempt
in Anatolia,
as wellas thelesswell-known
Russianoffensives
which,theauthor
onlyby the
argues,werea seriousthreatto the Ottomans'realm,terminated
Bolshevik
Revolution.
McMeekin'saccountofthedeportation
andmurder
ofthe
In linewith
fromhisportrayal
Armenians
follows
ofRussianmilitary
operations.
a RussianTurkish
he arguesthatcounterinsurgency
measures
against
scholarship,
Armenian
insurrection
ofTurkish
suspisponsored
gotoutofhand.Hisconnection
oftheBaghdadrailway
is
cionsofArmenian
subversion
to perceived
vulnerabilities
oftheArmenians
ofeastern
lessthanconvincing,
sincethemassacres
anddeportations
occurred
hundreds
ofkilometers
Anatolia
awayfromtherailline.
A number
One concerns
ofquestions
ariseaboutthework'sbasicpropositions.
oftheOttomanEmpireas
theauthor's
assertion
ofpersistent
Germanperception
concenthekeyto a bidforworldpower.WilhelmII wasincapableofsustained
of
tration
on anything,
andMcMeekinshowsverywellthatpre-1914proponents
to theOttomanEmpire,suchas Oppenheim,were
a closeGermanconnection
in thediplomatic
service.German
eccentric
deniedregular
outsiders,
positions
andvariable;
inandinfluence
overtheOttomans
before1914wereerratic
interest

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BOOK REVIEWS

349

one of the strengths

of the book is the author'sanalysisof theway thatthe
Ottomangovernment
playedoffthe EuropeanGreatPowersagainsteach
other.The strategic
ofMiddleEasternoil is self-evident
today;itis
significance
much less clear if thiswas the case before1914, when oil productionin
Austrian
Galiciafarexceededthatin theregion.
theauthor'saccountofbumbling
Germancovertoperations
makes
Although
fordelightful
does
consider
virtues.
he
not
these
reading,
strategic
operations'
Witha smalluse ofmanpower
andmodestexpenditure
offunds(atleastbythe
standards
ofa totalwar),Germany
diverted
a significant
numberofAlliedsoldiers
if
from
thecrucialbattlefields
ofnorthern
Even
Europe.
planstowinWorldWarI
were
thediversionan
Islamic
the
British
fantasies,
by
uprising
destroying
Empire
in
effects
of
the
Middle
East
have
been
ary
peripheral
operations
may
quiteuseful
to theCentralPowers.
Finally,one does have to wonderabout the author'slinkageof German
noticewithcontemporary
Islamicism,
plansfora Moslemuprising
particularly
ablein theneo-conservative
polemicsofthebook'sepilogue.Iftheincitement
to holy war was roundlyignoredbetween1914 and 1918, as the author
showsin convincing
and comicdetail,whyshouldit havehad anylong-lasting
effects
afterWorldWar I was over?The cautionsaboutmakingconnections
and Islamicism
Herfnotesin
betweenGermanmilitary
thatJeffrey
propaganda
his book on thistopic duringWorld War II are absentfromMcMeekin's
account. In all these respects,The BerlinBaghdadExpressis enjoyable,
and illuminating,
butperhapsraisesmorequestionsthanit
thought
provoking,
answers.
provides
JonathanSperber
Universityof Missouri
doi:10.1017/S000893891
1000112

Youthin theFatherless
Land: WarPedagogy,
andAuthority
in
Nationalism,

94-98. By AndrewDonson. Cambridge,MA, and

Germany
London: HarvardUniversityPress. 2010. Pp. xii+ 329. Cloth
$49.95.ISBN 978-0-674-04983-3.
AndrewDonson has writtenan excellenthistory
of youthpolicyand youth
in
World
War
I.
on territory
during
Althoughoperating
experience Germany
thathas alreadybeen well reconnoitered,
Donson uncoversnew findings
and
in
above
all
the
between
insights,
authority,
martiality,
complexrelationships
and new freedoms.
As a resulthe has something
to contribute
to threemajor
- whetherWorldWar I represented
history
questionsaboutmodernGermany

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