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Cambridge Journal of Economics 2008, 32, 203218

doi:10.1093/cje/bem038
Advance Access publication 27 October, 2007

Mario da Grac
xa Moura and Nuno Martins*
Methodological comments on critical realism in economics have proliferated over
the past decadetypically focusing on Tony Lawsons Economics and Reality and
Reorienting Economics, which constitute the core of this project. In the present paper
we select a series of important, mostly very recent arguments against critical realism
in economics and assess their merits and demerits.
Key words: Economic Methodology, Critical Realism in Economics, Ontology
JEL classifications: B41

1. Introduction
Over the past decade or so, the visibility of critical realism in economics has steadily
increased. Correspondingly, the project has attracted a wide range of (welcome)
methodological criticism. Several leading economic methodologists have chosen to
comment on critical realism. For the most part, they have focused on Tony Lawson, whose
writingsespecially Economics and Reality (Lawson 1997A) and Reorienting Economics
(Lawson 2003A)constitute the core of critical realism in economics. Occasionally, there
have been detailed replies by Lawson (see Lawson, 1998, 1999C, 2003A, ch. 3).
In this paper, we consider various comments on critical realism in economicsor on
Lawsons workfrom a somewhat different angle. Rather than discussing any contribution
as a whole, including aspects that it may share with critical realism, we are concerned only
with particular arguments put forward against critical realism in economics. Because these
argumentsor at least the most interesting of themultimately turn on a limited number
of issues, it is possible to succinctly present and assess them in a single paper.
Section 2 draws heavily on Lawson (1997A, 2003A) to provide a concise exposition of
critical realism in economics, intended to present its central arguments and basic
terminology only. Details are subsequently offered when necessary. Section 3 classifies
the arguments against critical realism in economics that we have selectedmostly very
recent onesand assesses their merits and demerits. This section is divided into four parts,
Manuscript received 25 September 2006; final version received 28 June 2007.
Address for correspondence: Nuno Martins, Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Faculdade de Economia e
Gestao, Rua Diogo Botelho 1327, 4169-005 Porto, Portugal; email: nmartins@porto.ucp.pt
* Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, and Centro de Estudos Macroeconomicos e Previsao
(CEMPRE); and Faculdade de Economia e Gestao, Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, and Centro de
Estudos em Gestao e Economia (CEGE), respectively. CEMPRE and CEGE are supported by the Fundac
xao
para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, Portugal, through the Programa Operacional Ciencia e Inovac
xao (POCI),
which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds. For very helpful comments, the authors are most
grateful to Geoff Hodgson, John Latsis, Tony Lawson, Stephen Pratten and three anonymous referees.
The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society.
All rights reserved.

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On some criticisms of critical realism in


economics

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each of which is concerned with a particular strand of criticism and our response to the
questions raised by critics. Brief concluding comments are provided in Section 4.

2. Critical realism in economics

1
Or, more precisely, regularities of the stated form where events stand in a relation of causal sequence, so
that x is in the causal history of y. It is to this type of event regularities that we refer throughout this paper.

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At the core of critical realism as presented by Lawson (1997A, 2003A) is a very simple
message: the nature of objects of study bears upon the ways in which they can be
investigated. As a result, specific methods are appropriate to the analysis only of certain
sorts of objects. It is an error to universalise any specific mode of explanation a priori.
The selection of a method implicitly presupposes a theory of knowledge, or epistemologya theory to the effect that this method is appropriate to illuminate the object of study.
In turn, as this very formulation suggests, a theory of knowledge presupposes an ontology,
i.e. a theory of the nature, constitution and structure of the objects of study. To use any
method, then, is to presuppose a particular world view. If a method is selected a priori,
independently of sustained reflection on the nature of things, similarities between this world
view and the existing, or even a possible, world can arise only as a result of a lucky accident.
Critical realism in economics has been concerned both with the investigation of the
ontological presuppositions of specific methods and with the explicit formulation of
a conception of the nature of social reality. The purpose of both these efforts is to facilitate
a reorientation of economics. According to critical realism, the commonly noted problems
of modern mainstream economicsnotably its perceived irrelevance to the solution of
practical problemsare ultimately attributable to a mismatch between the ontological
presuppositions of its methods and the nature of the social world.
Modern mainstream economics is actually characterised not so much by its subjectmatter as by its commitment to a particular mode of explanation, which critical realism
terms deductivism. This mode of explanation rests upon the identification of strict
regularities of the form whenever event x then event y (or their stochastic near
equivalents).1 To explain a phenomenon is to deduce it from a law of the form whenever
event x then event y, given a set of initial and boundary conditions, whereas prediction is
symmetrical to explanation.
As is apparent, then, deductivism has a close affinity with the empiricist conception that
reality is constituted by experience and the objects of direct experience. Under this
conception, the possibility of general knowledge rests upon the identification of constant
conjunctions of events as they are experienced, i.e. upon regularities of the whenever event
x then event y type. However, deductivism does not have to imply an acceptance of the
empiricist world view. In mainstream economics, regularities need not hold in actual fact,
and events may be fictitious. In fact, spontaneous occurrences of strict event regularities
are hardly pervasive in the social world, yet the deductivist form of explanation remains
unchallenged because it facilitates formal modelling, which in turn is presumed essential to
the scientific character of economics.
But is it? Natural science is frequently invoked in this context, for event regularities do
come about in laboratory experiments. However, experimental results are successfully
applied in situations where the event regularities experimentally obtained are not
empirically manifest. This situationwhich has no analogue in economicsis puzzling
from the deductivist standpoint. Furthermore, to the extent that event regularities are
restricted to experimental conditions, deductivism seems to suggest that natural science is

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205

1
More specifically: reality is composed of complex entities, with underlying structures that endow them
with certain powers or capacities. Mechanisms denote the mode of operation of structures, whereas tendencies
are forces triggered by the operation of specific mechanisms. Structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies
are all conditions of possibility of phenomena. The conception that reality consists not just of events and
experiences but also of underlying causal factors (structures, powers, mechanisms, tendencies) is sometimes
labelled transcendental realism.

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isolated from the empirical world, and indeed that the laws of nature depend on the
intervention of scientists. How can this be?
Systems wherein strict regularities of the form whenever event x then event y
necessarily occur are termed closed. If, in contrast, the natural world is viewed as structured
and open, in the sense that various, possibly countervailing forces govern, but are
irreducible to, empirical phenomenaso that event regularities do not typically obtain
then experimental activity becomes intelligible. Rather than constituting a law, a laboratory
experiment can be interpreted as an intervention designed to insulate, and so facilitate the
empirical identification of, a causal mechanism at work both in the closed system that
scientists attempt to engineer in their experiment and in the open natural world.
In other words, the analysis of experimental activity enables us to infer the existence of
structures that are causally efficacious independently of the conditions under which their
empirical identification occurs. Beyond experience and the objects of direct experience,
there exist underlying causal factors (structures, powers, etc.) which coproduce events and
which are not reducible (and may not be straightforwardly accessible) to perception. In
critical realist terminology, causal mechanisms are said to act transfactually, in that they
produce effects even if they are not precisely actualised; or, alternatively, to act as
tendencies, where a statement of tendency is a statement of natural necessity, not a statement
of logical necessity subject to a ceteris paribus proviso.1
What emerges as essential in science, then, is not the framing of event regularities but
rather the movement from observations on specific phenomena to hypotheses about their
underlying causesa movement termed retroduction. A special case of the retroductive
argument is the transcendental argument, i.e. the form of reasoning that moves from
widespread features of experience, including conceptions of generalised human practices,
to their conditions of possibility. Critical realism resorts to this type of argument not just to
establish the existence of causal structures in the natural world but also to initiate the
formulation of an ontology of the social world.
The conception that human beings make choices is certainly widespread. Clearly, choice
presupposes that the social world is open in the sense that events could have been different.
It presupposes, moreover, that human beings are intentional, that they have some
conception of their activity. Intentional behaviour, in turn, demands knowledge of the
conditions that render purposeful action possible; and knowledge requires that its object be
relatively enduring. In the absence of constant conjunctions of events, the relatively
enduring objects of (possibly tacit) knowledge must lie at the level of structureswhich
facilitate and constrain, but do not predetermine, intentional action. In as much as they are
social, these structures are in turn dependent upon human agency.
In sum, choice presupposes that the social world is open and structured, and the
reproduction and transformation of the social structures presupposed by the exercise of
choice is in turn dependent upon the choices actually made. Critical realism conceptualises
social reality as intrinsically dynamic: as a process.
Explanation of this process can broadly be divided into two types. Pure (or abstract, or
theoretical) explanation consists, in the first instance, in the identification of social rules,

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3. Some criticisms of critical realism in economics


In this section, we classify, and assess, a series of arguments against critical realism in
economics. Section 3.1, focusing on the existence, or non-existence, of event regularities
or on predictabilitydiscusses criticisms by Roger Backhouse (1998) and Mark Blaug
(2003). Section 3.2 is concerned with deductivism and its connection with empiricism and
with mathematics, and covers arguments by Wade Hands (1999) and Geoffrey Hodgson
(2004, 2006). Section 3.3, on social structure and human agency, assesses comments by
Patrick Baert (1996) and, once again, Geoffrey Hodgson (2002). Finally, Section 3.4
considers criticisms that turn on the relationship between ontology and science, or on the
allegedly top-down (or the dogmatic) nature of the critical realist project. The
arguments discussed are by Francesco Guala (2006), David Ruccio (2005), Jack Vromen
(2004) and Jeroen Van Bouwel (2005).

3.1 On event regularities and prediction


A recurrent topic in discussions on critical realism in economics turns on the existence, or
non-existence, of event regularities and, relatedly, on predictability. Roger Backhouse
(1998) and Mark Blaug (2003) are representative of this strand of criticism. Backhouse
(1998) suggests that Lawson rules out event regularities a priori. And, in his words, [i]t
would seem absurd to expect that an a priori philosophical argument would establish either
the existence or non-existence of stable relationships between economic variables
(Backhouse 1998, p. 383). Moreover, he points out that critical realism is contradictory
in that the existence of a certain type of regularitiesdemi-regularitiesis conceded:
[O]ne is left with the strong impression that he [Lawson] is having things both ways: arguing that
event regularities are in principle unobtainable and cannot be used as the basis for economic
theorising, and at the same time using certain types of regularity [demi-regularities] as the basis
for his own work. He claims that contrastive demi-regs are inadequate to the needs of orthodox
economics, but the basis for any sharp distinction between types of regularity does not seem to
have been made. (Backhouse, 1998, pp. 3834)

Blaug (2003) states that the existence of demi-regularities is conceded only reluctantly,
and he accuses critical realism of rejecting any (suitable) notion of predictability in
economics:
Lawson (1997[A], 2889) denies that there are any constant-event regularities in the social
sphere and hence denies that prediction is possible in a subject like economics. He agrees,
however, that there are demi-regularities in time and space as tendencies or patterns, and his
own applied work on the poor growth performance of the UK economy reported in his book
clearly implies the ability to predict general patterns of behavior. His strictures against
predictability in economics are entirely grounded on an unstated belief that economic theories
result in exact, unconditional predictions, as if he had never heard of the pound of ceteris paribus

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codes, etc. that facilitate and constrain human activities; a second aim will be to understand
the emergence of rules, as well as their reproduction and transformation. In turn, applied
(or concrete or practical) explanation draws upon previous knowledge of social structures
to investigate their contribution to the production of a specific phenomenon.
In any event, explanation will always be context-dependent and fallible. For critical
realism, objects of knowledge exist, at least in part, independently of our knowledge of
them, but they can be known only under particular descriptions. This epistemological
relativism entails, of course, the transient nature of critical realism itself.

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or the gap between theories and real-world data . . . To pretend to explain in some significant
sense, as Lawson does, while at the same time rejecting any notion of predictability in economics,
conceding only reluctantly that perhaps there are some demi-regularities in economic life, is to
give up the fight against postmodernists before it has even begun. (Blaug, 2003, pp. 479)

[I]n weaker versions, the symmetry thesis asserts quite correctly that any satisfactory explanation
of a phenomenon invokes a generalization of some sort, whether statistical or historical, of which
the phenomenon being explained is a particular instance. It follows that a crucial test of such
a satisfactory explanation is our ability to predict similar phenomena with the aid of that
generalization before they have actually occurred. (Blaug, 2003: 48)
1
Recall that it is to this type of event regularities (essential to deductivist explanation) that we refer
throughout this papernot to regularities where events stand in a relation of concomitance (i.e., they are
correlated, but neither causally conditions the other).

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Now, the ontologically concerned nature of the critical realist project is incompatible
with simply postulating closure (or openness). Whether (strict) event regularities come
about or not is an empirical question, the answer to which can be given only a posteriori.
And a posteriori it appears to be the case that constant conjunctions of events of the form
whenever event x then event ywhere x and y stand in a relation of causal sequenceare
hardly ubiquitous. Perhaps Backhouse (1998) disagrees with this assessment. If so,
however, it is he who needs to provide examples of interesting event regularities (of the
causal sequence sort).1
In short, strict event regularities, where x is part of the causal history of y, can most
certainly obtain. But they seem to be rather rare. Nor are they required for science, as has
been explained in Section 2. What is essential in science is the movement from
observations on specific phenomena to hypotheses about underlying causal factors
(structures, powers, etc.).
How are these causal factors to be detected, though? In particular, how can social
structure be known if the world is an open system? In the social realm, clearly, mechanisms
cannot be insulated under controlled experimental conditions. However, it may be the case
that certain structures and mechanisms are reproduced in a given spacetime setting and
prevail over other structures and mechanisms to the extent that rough-and-ready, partial
event regularities come about. In critical realism, patterns of this kind are termed demiregularities. Ex ante, it is conceivable that they would not come about at all. Ex post, they
are widely in evidence, and they help to initiate and direct social scientific research. The
identification of social structures makes good use of contrastive demi-regularities, i.e.,
unexpected, more or less systematic differences at the level of actual outcomes in prima
facie similar types of activities. Such contrasting patterns demand explanation, and may
reveal the operation of particular causal mechanisms (see Lawson, 1997A, pp. 2059,
2003A, pp. 1057).
A posteriori, then, demi-regularities turn out to be pervasive; a posteriori also, strict event
regularitiesregularities of the form presupposed by deductivismare found to be rare. It
is difficult to see how these two empirical results are supposed to involve having things
both ways, as Backhouse (1998) puts itespecially since strict regularities are a special
case of demi-regularities. And it is equally unclear in what sense the existence of demiregularities is conceded only reluctantly, as Blaug (2003) writesespecially as the
absence of discernible patterns would, from a critical realist standpoint, effectively block
social scientific research.
As to prediction, Blaug (2003) suggests that it is essential to science, and he invokes
a version of the symmetry thesis in this connection:

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3.2 On empiricism, deductivism and mathematical formalism


According to critical realism, as we have noted, mainstream economics is best characterised by a commitment to a deductivist mode of explanation. In a deductivist framework,
a phenomenon is explained if, and only if, it is deduced from a law of the form whenever
event x then event y, given a set of initial and boundary conditions. Deductivism, in turn,
has a close affinity with the empiricist conception that reality is constituted by experience
and the objects of direct experience, a conception entailing that the possibility of scientific
knowledge rests upon the identification of constant conjunctions of events.
The connection between deductivism and mainstream economics, on the one hand, and
deductivism and empiricism, on the other, has given rise to much controversy. In
particular, critical realism is often accused of wrongly assuming that mainstream
economists are empiricists (or empirical realists). Wade Hands (1999) offers perhaps the
strongest argument of this type. Not only does he argue that neoclassical economics is not
in any sense the empirical realist-inspired inquiry that Lawson makes it out to be (Hands,
1999, p. 170), he adds that it actually seems broadly consistent with critical realism:1
[W]hile it may not be clear exactly what mainstream neoclassical theory is, it most clearly is not an
exercise in empirical realism . . . We find ourselves at the end of [Arrow and Hahns] Chapter 3 and
we did not encounter a single event regularity, or even anything that might strictly be considered
1
For a comprehensive critique of Hands (1999) paper and its various claims, see Lawson (1999C), whose
logic we follow. There are, of course, other arguments along the same lines as Hands (1999)in fact, they
keep turning up in verbal discussionbut none is so clearly developed. Patrick Baert (1996, p. 519), for
instance, claims that [c]ontrary to what realists may assume, sophisticated forms of rational choice theory do
not merely refer to regularity conjunctions. Knowingly or unwittingly, economists or sociologists who use the
rational model invoke mechanisms or powers as well . . . in the context of the social sciences CR [critical
realism] appears like a Don Quixote fighting his own imaginings. See also Hands (2001, p. 323, footnote 35).

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The notion that explanation invokes a generalisation of some sort is hardly controversial.
But it is unclear why generalisation means the identification of constant conjunctions of
events, as Blaug (2003) seems to imply.
As has been remarked, interesting conjunctions of this sort turn out to be empirically
rare. In order to preserve Blaugs (2003) notion of generalisation, then, it is necessary to
leave the empirical world. It is necessary to construct regularities of the form whenever x
then y, where y follows from x only under a set of non-empirical conditions z (the ceteris
paribus conditions). Predictions are thus possible, conditional upon z.
Why, though, should this sort of prediction be essential to science? In his short
comment, Blaug (2003) does not elaborate. Critical realists, however, question the value of
predictions subject to ceteris paribus conditions when the latter turn out to be fictitious or
impossible. The statement that y follows from x given z is interesting only if z represents
a real possibility (see Lawson, 1997A, pp. 2857). In mainstream economics, ceteris paribus
predictions do not usually satisfy this criterion.
In any event, it is hardly correct to state that critical realism rejects (any notion of)
predictability in economics. In order to highlight this, let us retrieve the notion that
generalisation is involved in explaining. For critical realism, this is so in that explanation of
specific social phenomena draws upon antecedent, more general knowledge of social
structures. As has been remarked in Section 2, these structuressocial rules, etc.operate
transfactually, in the sense that they generally produce effects in a given spacetime setting,
even if they are not precisely manifest in action. For this spacetime setting, then, predictions can be made. However, they are predictions of tendencies, not predictions of events:
predictions that those structures or rules are operating, and generally affect observable events.

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209

observable . . . Chapters 11 and 12 are about stability, that (clearly) transcendental realist concept
of a tendency to equilibrium . . . It seems impossible to conceive of a theoretical construction that
is less directly inspired by the Humean radical empiricist view of scientific knowledge than
Walrasian general equilibrium theory . . . [N]ot only do we see that contemporary mainstream
economics is not driven by the philosophy of empirical realism, it is driven by roughly the same
Millian tendency law vision that Lawson advocates. (Hands, 1999, pp. 170, 1778, 181)

Lawson . . . expects that mathematical and econometric tools will be illegitimate except under
seemingly rare conditions. (Hodgson, 2006, p. 117)
I argue here that there is a place for mathematics in economics, even when conditions of closure
are absent or fail to be approximated. (Hodgson, 2006, p. 132)
[A]pplications of formalism include . . . heuristics . . . The purpose of a heuristic is to identify
possible causal mechanisms that form part of a more complex and inevitably open system.
Heuristics can be useful without necessarily making adequate predictions or closely matching
existing data. Their purpose is to establish a plausible segment of a whole causal story, without
necessarily giving an adequate or complete explanation of the phenomena to which they relate.
(Hodgson, 2006, p. 124)

Now, critical realism establishes that the deductivist mode of explanation constitutive of
mainstream economics is unsuitable as a general mode of explanation of open systems.

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The propositions of general equilibrium theory are clearly not empirical, and the claim
that contemporary mainstream economics is not driven by the philosophy of empirical
realism is correct. But is this sufficient to accept Hands (1999) point that critical realism
misinterprets the nature of the mainstream project? We think not.
To begin with, observe that empirical realism and deductivism are, from a formal point of
view, equivalent. In assuming that reality is constituted by the objects of direct experience
and our experience of them, empirical realism implies that theories must have a specific
form or structure: they must be based upon constant conjunctions of events of the form
whenever x then y. In due course, as is well known, empirical realism has lost ground as an
ontological, or philosophical, position. But its form or structure of explanation
a deductivist mode of explanationhas survived.
It is very likely that mainstream economists would not accept the outmoded ontology of
empirical realism, and quite possible that their world view is not dissimilar to critical
realism. It may even be that they are prepared to talk about powers and capacities, or
about tendencies, in discursive expositions of their models. In their formal theorising,
however, any powers and capacities are conflated, or confused, with their exercise, so that x
always implies y; and statements of tendency are (conditional) statements of logical
necessity, not (unconditional) statements of natural necessity.
To sum up, the critical realist claim that mainstream economics is uncritically
committed to deductivism should not be taken to mean that it consists in framing
empirical regularities. In the expression whenever event x then event y, x and y need not
actually happen. Implicitly, though, an empirical realistor deductivistform of explanation is followed in mainstream economics in that the distinction between a power and its
exercise disappears in formal modelling.
Geoffrey Hodgson (2004, 2006) also attacks the critical realist diagnosis of mainstream
economics, but he does so from a different standpoint. In a paper of which a revised version
has appeared in his 2006 book, he argues that Lawson has an extreme position on the use
of mathematical methods in economics. In particular, Hodgson (2004, 2006) points out
that mathematical models can be heuristically useful, specifying that the purpose of
a heuristic is to identify causal mechanisms in an open system:

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Given that theory cannot embrace and describe every facet and causal mechanism, much will
always be excluded. Consequently, some degree of closure is inevitable in any theory. As noted
above, Lawson tries to get round this problem with his attempted distinction between isolation
and abstraction. However, his idea of abstraction involving leaving something (temporarily) out
of focus would not exclude a formal model published with the caveat that it is a temporary
simplification or heuristic, to which excluded features or mechanisms will be added later. I claim
that closed models can be of value in helping us to understand real causal mechanisms and
processes in open systems. (Hodgson, 2006, p. 128)
[I]f abstraction is necessary, and it involves the limitation of the sphere of consideration and the
exclusion of additional relations or disturbing forces, then doesnt this too imply the assumption
of a closed system? (Hodgson, 2006, p. 119)

But these statements are somewhat ambiguous. Abstractionunlike isolationdoes not


entail the exclusion of disturbing forces, if this means that disturbing forces are assumed
irrelevant. Abstraction involves the limitation of the sphere of considerationi.e., a focus
on certain aspects or features over a given range of space and timewithout presupposing
that disturbing forces are not at play. Crucially, this entails that no closed system is
constructed when abstracting in the context of an open social world. No setting is created
so that constant conjunctions of events obtain. Nor is it clear why this should be done, as

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Deductivism facilitates mathematical modelling. It does not follow that mathematical


modelling is rejected outright by critical realism. It is not mathematics per se that is
questioned, but the fact that deductivist modelling draws upon branches of mathematics
presupposing closure. If the variants of mathematics used in mainstream economics can
deliver successful explanation only where closure obtains, they are not expected to yield
generally interesting results in an open world.
Why, then, does Hodgson (2004, 2006) insist on the heuristic usefulness of deductivist
modelling? For him, as we have seen, a mathematical model can serve to establish, or work
out, a segment of a (more complex) causal story: it is a first, heuristic step along the road
towards an adequate causal explanation. Eventually, though, the model must fit within the
whole causal story. This means that the structure of the causal storyi.e., the form of the
causal relationships that constitute itmust match the structure of the mathematical
model used to work out a segment of that story. In an open system, however, the story does
not have a deductivist structure. Why should a deductivist model be heuristically useful?
The issue here, clearly, is how to focus on a specific causal mechanism in the context of
an open world; and in this regard critical realists distinguish abstraction and isolation (see
Lawson, 1997A, pp. 127ff., 227ff.). Abstraction means focusing on some aspect(s) or
feature(s) without supposing that aspects or features not focused on are irrelevant.
Isolation, on the other hand, assumes that aspects or features not focused on do not play
a relevant role: it is as if these aspects or features do not exist.
If a mechanism is isolated from all others, a constant conjunction of events will, of
course, obtainwhich facilitates deductivist modelling. Hodgsons (2004, 2006) heuristics are isolations in this sense. But, as Lawson (1997A, p. 129) explains, isolation is useful
only when the isolated causal factors are real and combine mechanically with other such
factors (i.e., they must operate in isolation as they do in combination). As this is practically
never the case in the social realm, Hodgsons (2004, 2006) defence of deductivist models
must be considered unsuccessful.
However, Hodgson (2004, 2006) goes on to suggest that the distinction between
abstraction and isolation is not well founded in as much as closureor some degree of
closureis always involved in theorising:

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211

has been shown above. It is because abstraction does not imply closurebecause not
focused upon does not mean irrelevant or non-existentthat it is a suitable epistemological procedure in an open social world.

What I do find problematic . . . is the critical realist presupposition that one should rely upon the
history of the natural sciences in order to establish normative criteria for the Geisteswissenschaften,
especially given that CR [critical realism] rightly insists on the distinctiveness of the social realm.
(Baert, 1996, p. 518)

As a matter of fact, the possibility of social science can beand indeed has been (see
Lawson, 2003A, ch. 2)established without reference to natural science: critical realism
does not rely on the history of the latter. However, as Lawson (1997A, pp. 534) notes,
there is no a priori reason why the workings of natural science should be ignored. Even if the
possibility of social science must be established on the basis of a study of the social domain, it
may be that social and natural sciences share some similarities, in which case an analysis of
the latter could be useful. There is no reason why this possibility should not be contemplated.
As observed in Section 2, the analysis of experimental activity allows us to infer the
existence of natural structures as a condition of possibility of the success of natural science.
For the activity of social scientists to be scientific in the same sense as natural science is, it
must consist in the uncovering of (social) structures. Clearly, it does not follow that
structures are of the same kind in both domains. Social structures are conditions of
possibility of human agency, and they are continuously reproduced and transformed by
individual action which, in turn, draws upon social structures; they will not endure in the
same sense as natural structures do.
In other words, critical realism underlines the difference between natural and social
structures, and accordingly the specificity of social scienceas indeed Baert (1996, pp.
51617) recognises. However, he goes on to claim that critical realism does not adequately
conceptualise the transformation of social structures. Relying upon a recursive model of
social action, he writes, the critical realist transformational model of social activity
is well-placed to explain the reproduction of structures, not their transformation. This ties in with
the tendency on the part of critical realists to focus upon tacit knowledge, and not to take into
account peoples ability to develop discursive, theoretical knowledge and to reflect upon the
underlying structures. The ability to develop discursive knowledge . . . tends only to be recognised
in so far as it is an attribute of the social scientist, but not of the people under investigation.
(Baert, 1996, p. 521)

But is there an ontological asymmetry between reproduction and transformation? As


Lawson (1997A, pp. 1701) observes, the reproduction of social structures in time always
involves some degree of transformation and, in turn, structural transformation cannot be
conceived as total. Acknowledging this, critical realism sees no reason to prioritise
transformation over reproduction or vice versa. In drawing attention to tacit (or practical)
1
To repeat, the caveat that a formal model is a temporary simplification or heuristic, to which excluded
features or mechanisms will be added later is insufficient to legitimise a closed model in the context of an
open social worldunless it happens to refer to a real causal mechanism that interacts mechanically with
other such mechanisms.

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3.3 On social structure and human agency


Critical realism is sometimes criticised for illegitimately drawing on the natural sciences to
provide (inadequate) prescriptions for the social sciences. Patrick Baert (1996) is
representative of this stream of criticism:

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an approach building on the earlier instinct-habit psychology of James, Dewey and others offers
a way out of this dilemma. Instead of associating agency exclusively with reason, the mind is itself
conceived as a layered entity, with different levels of consciousness and deliberation . . . All reason
and deliberation makes use of previously acquired habits of categorisation, inference and
calculation. (Hodgson, 2002, p. 172)

In our view, however, Hodgson (2002) is not that distant from critical realism. The
conception of the human mind as a layered entity with different levels of consciousness is
recognised in critical realism. So is the dependence of discursive reflection on tacit or
practical consciousness:
[H]uman action is governed by reasons so that it is always directed by some beliefs, or knowledge,
and towards some end(s). It warrants emphasis, however, that this pursuit of ends and drawing
upon of beliefs cannot be understood as some simple, unitary, always reflected upon, discursive
affair . . . if the monitoring of conduct is, or can be, a continuous flow it must be largely tacitly
carried out, i.e. performed at a subconscious level, a level of practical consciousness. (Lawson,
1997A, p. 177)
Discursive reflection . . . is not carried out instead of (i.e. alternately with, or as a substitute for)
a reliance on practical consciousness, other capacities, dispositions, tendencies, habits and the like,
but presupposes them. If I am reflecting on the subject at hand while engaged in discussion, these
other capacities and habits are in play simultaneously, thus allowing me to speak grammatically,
stay upright, walk around without bumping into things, etc., all in one go. (Lawson, 2003A, p. 48)

In short, dispositions, habits, etc., are conditions of possibility of discursive consciousness.


Furthermore, discursive as well as practical consciousness are supported by underlying
neurophysiological and neurobiological mechanisms; yet reason has causal powers
irreducible to the processes from which they emerge:
We all, it seems, have subjective, first person, or inner, experiences we call (or attribute to)
consciousness. These clearly have their conditions of possibility, presumably including processes in
the brain. But the subjective aspects appear irreducible to any neurobiological activity, suggesting
that we are talking here of emergent powers, i.e. powers which emerge out of certain lower-level
principles and depend upon, but are nevertheless irreducible to, them. (Lawson, 2003A, p. 46)

Critical realism, then, does not reduce reason to dispositions, habits or any neurophysiological, neurobiological or psychological structures. But it does not neglect the role of the
latter either.

3.4 On ontology, science and pluralism


As we have seen, critical realism resorts to transcendental inference in formulating
a conception of the nature of social reality. The movement from widespread features of

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knowledge, critical realism aims to underline that human beings possess capacities which
enable and facilitate continuous action, without engaging in reflection upon their doings.
Clearly, this does not preclude the recognition of the capacity to reflect upon ones course
of actiona capacity which may be exercised or notor in any way entail an insufficient
attention to discursive knowledge. The relative importance of either type of knowledge is,
of course, an empirical matter.
Interestingly, critical realism is criticised not just for not paying attention to discursive
knowledge, as in Baert (1996), but also for being exclusively concerned with conscious
reasoning, taking no notice of other causes for action. Thus, Geoffrey Hodgson (2002, p.
171) remarks that in critical realism [i]t is simply assumed that all actions are motivated by
reason, and so the role of acquired habits, as well as the physiological and psychological
mechanisms that cause the emergence of reason, are neglected. In his opinion,

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213

experience, including conceptions of generalised human practices, to their conditions of


possibility is questioned by Francesco Guala (2006) and David Ruccio (2005), amongst
others. They specifically challenge the premises of the critical realist argument. Guala
(2006, pp. F31920) writes:

Interestingly, however, critical realism is not just criticised for not taking science into
account. David Ruccio (2005, p. 42) remarks:
[I]nstead of putting reality at the forefront, it is scienceand a specific understanding of
sciencethat governs everything else. The ontological turn is, in the way I read it, actually a turn
to science. The emphasis on reality is further undermined by Lawsons frequent references to
a kind of common sense as the warrant for his assertions about reality . . . [I]f we want to place
reality at the center of our work, then why must the protocols of science dictate the rules reality
must follow? Why should reality behave in a manner that fits a so-called scientific method? If
reality looks differentif it doesnt seem to match the particular model or concepts we are using,
if there is something left over or unaccounted forthen why not change the science? In the end,
thats precisely the argument Lawson uses to rule out mainstream economics. . .

In short, there is no consensus as to the role that science playsor at least as to the role that
science should playin the critical realist argument.
In our culture, the ultimate authority concerning the nature of reality is science, and this
authority stems in large measure from the success of the natural sciences. When discussing
the natural realm, critical realism takes scientific practices as a point of departure precisely
because natural science is successfuland goes on to infer that a structured natural world
is a condition of possibility of this success.
Economics, however, is not as successful as the natural sciences. Many of its practices
are controversial. But it is less controversial that human beings are quite successful in
negotiating their way through the social realm (see Lawson, 2003A, pp. 35ff.), and this
stylised fact presupposes a degree of stability, which is (plausibly) provided by social
structure. Social structure, then, facilitates or constrains human practices to which,
however, it is not reducible. Human beings may choose not to follow social rules or codes,
and yet their knowledge of those rules or codes still conditions their practice. Critical
realism in economics takes (conceptions of) generalised human practices, rather than
specific practices of economists, as initiating premises because the former, but not the
latter, are (widely regarded as) successfuland goes on to infer that a structured social
world is a condition of possibility of these generalised human practices.1
1
But are these practices really successful? There is, of course, no single criterion to measure success.
Success of generalised human practices means that human beings formulate broadly defined plans and
typically manage to act and interact in accordance with these (broadly defined) plans, a stylised fact that
leads us to infer the existence of social structure as its (most plausible) condition of possibility. Jack Vromen
(2004) notes that [on] sufficiently demanding (and perhaps even conventional) criteria we could perhaps as
well agree that many people are not successful (and many firms go bankrupt, for example). Indeed we could.
However, the criteria used in the critical realist argument are not so demanding.

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In our culture the ultimate authority concerning the nature and structure of reality is science. So,
is there room for a non-scientific, or extra-scientific theory of what there is? . . . The premises of
the transcendental argument are conceptions of generalised human practices or, more
prosaically, folk social science. Below the jargon, the transcendental argument looks a lot like
a search for the most likely explanation of some evident features of social reality (we seem to
make free choices, we are constrained by social norms), informed by our commonsensical
understanding of the world. But is it wise to take commonsense as our point of departure? . . . At
best, our commonsensical understanding of the social world should be backed up by a good deal
of empirical evidence.

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transcendental deductions either border on vacuity or on invalidity. Either they do not produce
interesting new insights, but merely paraphrase what is assumed. Or the transcendental
deductions do not stand up to serious scrutiny. If capacities are not understood in such a way
that they are presupposed by definition, then it is hard if not impossible to demonstrate that
without certain capacities in place, social reality could not possibly have existed . . . It is hard to
avoid the impression that Lawsons social ontology is a renewed attempt at prima philosophia. It is
an attempt to identify the basic and essential building blocks of social reality without taking
recourse to, and even without being informed by empirical science and empirical research.
(Vromen, 2004)

However, the purpose of transcendental arguments is to scrutinise and revise potentially


flawed ontological conceptions, with a view to rendering them compatible with widespread
features of experience. Accordingly, a transcendental argument succeeds in producing new
knowledge when the transformation or clarification of previously held ontological
conceptions leads to a better understanding of the widespread features of experience that
initiated the explanatory endeavour.
Clearly, then, empirical evidencethough perhaps not case studiesdoes play a central
role in (fallibly) establishing the basic nature of social reality. That is to say, as Guala (2006)
and Vromen (2004) demand, the critical realist ontology is backed up by empirical evidence,
albeit of a more general nature than the evidence required to back up a scientific theory.
Conceptions of generalised human practices are generalisations made on the basis of widely
accepted empirical observations. As noted earlier, Guala (2006) as well as Vromen (2004)
are in fact assessing a (basic) ontological conception as if it were a (full-fledged) scientific
theory. And yet, as Guala (2006, pp. F31920) recognises, ontological research is
[n]ot perhaps in direct competition with science, because the ontologist is concerned with very
general claims such as the social world is open and structured at different levels, individual
beings are influenced by and simultaneously influence social structures, and so on; Lawson is
right to say that claims like these are often presupposed rather than justified by scientific research.

To conclude: Vromen (2004) wants to temper overdrawn hopes fostered by Lawson as to


what ontology in general (not just Lawsons own ontology) can do for us; whereas Guala
(2006, p. F320) submits that there is a continuum, rather than a sharp divide, between
ontological (but we might as well just say theoretical) speculation and empirical

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Contrary to Ruccio (2005), then, critical realism does not rely on the protocols of
science to infer the nature of reality. The criterion for choosing human practices, whether
scientific or not, as the premises of transcendental arguments is the success of those
practices. The aim of critical realism is not to preserve the unsuccessful conception of
science that tends to prevail in economics but to transform it.
As for Guala (2006), his point seems to be that critical realism is on the same level as
science when it starts making descriptive empirical claims about the way the world is
(Guala, 2006, pp. F319, F320). For him, there is ultimately no room for an extra-scientific
theory that makes claims about the nature of the social world. He assesses the social
ontology proposed by critical realism as if it were a scientific theory, and accordingly
requests (detailed) empirical evidence. His argument turns out to be a variant of the line of
criticism that accuses critical realism of assessing economics on the basis of an ultimately
top-down perspectiveas Jack Vromen (2004) forcefully does. [W]here does Lawson get
his own specific ontology from (and how does he derive it)? Vromen (2004) asks. [T]o
what does Lawsons ontology owe its authority in matters of assessing the merits and
demerits of specific economic theories?. In his view,

Criticisms of critical realism

215

The way in which Lawson develops guidelines for explanatory praxis and his rejection of the
covering law model, give a good illustration of what form of pluralism Lawson is defending. By
presenting mainstream economics as a monolithic unity as is done by Lawson, he invites critics to
reject it en bloc . . . Lawsons quest for heterodox economics is not so much focusing on elaborating
compatibility and complementarity with mainstream (or neo-classical) economics, but rather
creating his own alternative, that would be the new (monist) standard. (Van Bouwel, 2005)

Pluralism is certainly an issue of the utmost importance. Critical realism recognises that
explanation is always partial, situated and fallible. Accordingly, to oppose pluralism would
ultimately amount to constraining the progress of knowledge. Contrary to Van Bouwel
(2005), however, the critical realist critique of mainstream economics is actually
a consequence of its pluralist character, not evidence of the converse.
Critical realism recognises that mainstream economics is, in many respects, not
monolithic. Despite its substantive variety, however, there is a degree of uniformity at
the level of method. It is this uniformity that explains why mainstream economists are often
found to refer to what they dobut not to what heterodox economists doas economics
or economic theory. In this sense, mainstream economics is best interpreted from
a methodological viewpoint, as an a priori commitment to deductivism.
As has been explained, however, specific methods are suited only for objects of a specific
sort or nature. It is an error to universalise any specific mode of explanation a priori. Surely
an a priori belief that deductivist (or other specific) methods are essential qualifies as antipluralist. Exposing and correcting this view is evidence of a commitment to pluralism.
Instead of being imposed a priori, particular methods are admissible (or not) depending on
the nature of the objects that they are supposed to illuminate. It follows that mainstream
economics is a useful source of knowledge whenever the deductivist methods it employs
match its subject-matter.

4. Concluding comments
This paper has attempted to assess a series of criticisms of critical realism in economics. To
a large extent, these criticisms turn out to rest on some kind of misunderstanding. Thus,
the argument that critical realism denies the existence of event regularities, or the
possibility of prediction, fails to note the a posteriori nature of the critical realist argument.
Contrary to some critics, mainstream economics is characterised by critical realism as an
a priori (hence anti-pluralist) commitment to a deductivist form of explanationnot as
a philosophical commitment to empiricism. The claim that critical realism is radically antimathematics is likewise unsuccessful. The critical realist message is that specific methods

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research, and one can hardly proceed without the other. We see no serious disagreement
here. To be sure, ontology cannot compete with, or replace, science, but that is not its
purpose either. The task of ontology is to scrutinise the nature of entities like social rule,
whereas the task of science is to study how specific social rules contribute to the production
of given events or states of affairs. Both activities are, of course, closely related: ontological
analysis must build on insights gained through more concrete analyses. And whatever the
level of analysis, empirical evidence always matters. In short, ontology and substantive
theorising are complementary endeavours.
A question that naturally follows is which substantive theories are complementary to the
critical realist ontologyan issue with which Jeroen Van Bouwel (2005) is concerned. He
submits that critical realism is not pluralist enoughor only strategically soin as much
as mainstream economics is completely rejected:

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