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1.Anselm,
Kant,andthevirtuesofshallowness
The OntologicalArgument,and Anselm'sversionin particular,has
long held a fascinationfor philosophers,but not usuallybecausethey
havefoundit convincing.On the contrary,mosthaveconsideredthe
argumentto be unquestionablyfallacious,no doubt often on the
groundthatit is just'too good to be true',purportingto demonstrate
the existenceof God fromwhatlooks like a meredefinition.Butthe
argumentnevertheless
remainsintriguingbecausedespitethe effortsof
many notable philosophersover the centuriesit has provedto be
extremelydifficultto pinpointexactlywherethefallacylies.Manydiagnoseshaveof coursebeenproposed,andone of these,namelythe Kantiandoctrinethat'existenceis not a predicate'(especially
whenfortified
by the Fregeanquantificational
treatmentof existence)hasfor mostof
the last centuryassumedthe statusof orthodoxy.But eventhis most
popularobjectionto the argumenthasnot stoodup entirelyconvincinglyundercriticalscrutiny,partlybecauseit hasneverbeenfullysatisfactorily elucidated and defended, but also partly because its
implicationsfor the argumentareanywayratherobscure:supposewe
Mind,Vol. 113 . 451 . July2004
Millican 2004
438 PeterMillican
TheOneFatalFlawinAnselmsArgument439
grateful
translation,
like
if it existed
solely
mind
potentially
an artefact
none,
fn
requiring
the
also:
even
Broadie
instead
'For
from
(1993)
greatness
way
(1970)
must
correct
the
to exist
of the
insertion
emphasises.
in the
Lewis
logic
later
on
be relativized
translation
of this
of the same
sentence.
thing's
in reality
also,
which
argument,
but
fortunately
of commas
into
Anselm's
Moreover
preferred
p. 178,
idea
Charlesworth's
being
(thought)
greater
Such
a reading
that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought]
be thought
the
the
for the
relies
if it [namely,
it can
sentence
26 below).
that
others)
complicate
deriving
as Anscombe
understood
(see
in reality
in the
would
to Alexander
most
herea
unaware
it seems
and
of the
to possible
that
was
it is unwarranted,
original
Anselm's
given
no
hint
mistranslation,
worlds)
exists
is greater.'
implicitly
which
correspondent
of any
takes
ruling
Gaunilo
objection
Anselm's
out
being
contained
to this
logic
the 'Gaunilo'
as
440 PeterMillican
is that-than-which-a-greaterwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
can-be-thought.Butthis is obviouslyimpossible.Thereforethereis
absolutelyno doubtthat something-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thoughtexistsbothin themindandin reality.
is clearlyintendedto establish(atleast)thatsomethingThisparagraph
exists in reality.Whether
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
Anselmsawthis as equivalentto establishingthat Godexists(as suggestedby the chapter'stitle) is debatable-Campbell, for example,
arguesquite persuasivelythat the definiteidentificationof God as
be-thought is not achieved
something-than-which-a-greater-cannotof ChapterIII.3Butit is anywayevidentthat
untilthe secondparagraph
Anselm'strain of thought continuesinto that chapter,going on to
deducean importantcorollaryregardingGod'sspecialmodeof existence ('thatGod cannotbe thoughtnot to exist')usingan argument
andPlantingahave
suchasMalcolm,Hartshorne,
whichcommentators
eventhoughtto constitutethe coreof his entirechainof reasoning.4
it is possiblehereto ignoreexegeticalquestionsaboutthe
Fortunately
preciserelationshipbetweenAnselm'schapters,becausealthoughI
shallbe examiningonlyChapterII,the'fatalflaw'referredto in mytitle
concernsthe keyphrasewhichis commonto both chapters,andso it
ChapterIIIalso,evenif
willinevitablyinfecttheargumentof Proslogion
thatargumentis supposedcapableof standingentirelyalone.ForsimidebateaboutAnselm's
larreasons,I shallalsoignorethe interpretative
motivesin presentinghis 'OntologicalArgument',and will takefor
grantedthathe intendedit as a contributionto naturaltheology,rather
thana vehicleformysticalilluminationor a workof Konklusionstheologie (theinferringof one articleof faithfromanother).5Myaimhereis
logicalratherthantheological to get to the bottomof a puzzlethat
interpretationof his key phrasewhich will prove of significancelater (cf. fn. 41 below). Lewisultimatelyexploitsthis to drawa characteristicmoral, that the seductivefallaciousnessof the OntologicalArgumentgoes hand in hand with a prejudicefor the actual.
3 See Campbell (1976) pp. 12-28, who acknowledges here the prior influence of Stolz (1933)
pp. 198-206.
4 For defence of Anselm'ssupposed 'second'OntologicalArgumentin ProslogionIII, see for example Malcolm (1960), Hartshorne(1967),and Plantinga(1974)Ch. lo. Henry (1967)pp. 142-50
provides a detailed and illuminating discussion of the logical relation between ProslogionII and
III.
5 For a discussion of this issue, which came to prominence with Barth (1931),see especially
McGill(1967)pp. 51-68.Also pertinentare Charlesworth(1965)pp. 40-8, Henry (1967)pp. 148-50,
Barnes(1972)pp. 6-8, and Campbell(1976)pp. 172-8.
Hence something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
existsatleastin theFool'smind.
(6) Thereforesomething-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thoug
mustexistbothin theFool'smindandin realityalso.
Giventhat it occupiesonly a singleshortparagraph,Anselm'sarguvarietyof criticisms,butthesummary
menthasprovokeda remarkable
abovecanhelpus to situatethe mostimportantof thesein termsof the
stepswith whichtheytakeissue.Someof theseobjectionsareclosely
theyhaveoftenbeenconflatedwith
interrelated,and understandably
eachotherin the literature,but I havetriedbelowto disentanglethem
6This premissis implicit in Anselm'stext ratherthan explicitlystated;for discussionrelevantto
its interpretation,see especiallyfns 2 and 26.
442 PeterMillican
difficulty
(d) Thecomparison
Thereseemsto be somethinglogicallyodd aboutpurportingto comparesomethingthatexistsonly 'in the mind'with somethingexisting
in reality.ThereforeAnselm'spremiss(3),whichcruciallydependson
the possibilityof doingso, is dubious.10
(e) Theuniquereferentproblem
Anselmseemsto equivocatebetweenthe indefinite'something-thanmorespecific
andtheapparently
which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'
also
(he
'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' combines
ending'-than-which-aboth'something'and'that'withthe alternative
butthisvariationseemsto be logicallyinsiggreater-cannot-be-thought',
nificant).His introductionof the phrase'that-than-which-nothingis
in movingfromstep(2) to step(4),moreover,
greater-can-be-thought'
thatthereis one
unlesshe hasalreadyestablished
illegitimate
presumably
andonlyonethingto whichthisphrasecanrefer,andhecando thisonly
provingtheexistenceof God.l1
byantecedently
is nota predicate')
(f) TheKantiandogma('existence
As Kantfamouslyargued(anticipatedto a significantextentby Gasexistence
sendiandHume),l2it seemsdubiousto considersomething's
can conthat
factor
as
a
it, andhence
as a propertythatcharacterizes
tributeto the assessmentof its greatness.Rather,its existenceseemsto
if it is to haveanypropertiesat all.Sowhen
be somethingpresupposed
greatBeing,butour
we thinkof God,we thinkof an existingsupremely
abilityto thinkof Him in thiswayis quiteindependentof whetheror
not He reallyexists,or evenof whetheror not we believeHimto exist.
If Goddoesnot exist,therefore,thisin no wayimpliesthatthe concept
great
of Godfailson thataccountto be theconceptof an unsurpassably
Being.SoAnselm'sstep(3) is incoherent,andstep(4) fallacious.13
' Both Broad (1953) p. 181and Charlesworth(1965) pp. 63-65 press this point, relating it to
what I call below the 'KantianDogma'.
i l Barnes(1972) pp. 13, 80 sees this assumptionof singularityas the main flawin Anselm'sargument. Russell(1905) p. 54 appealsto his theory of descriptionsin attacking,on similargrounds,a
Cartesianversion of the argumentstarting'The most perfectBeinghas all perfections'.
12
Gassendi(1641) pp. 224-6, Hume (1739) pp. 66-7, Kant (1781) pp. 500-7.
13 No doubt influencedby Frege(1884, para53) and Russell(e.g. 19l9, p. 203), it soon became almost routine for analyticphilosophersto recitethe Kantianmantraas though it were an immediate and complete refutation, e.g. Ryle (1935) p. 251 and Kneale (1936) pp. 154-6. This dismissive
attitudeto the argumentcontinued to be the norm for severaldecades(as typifiedby Flew (1966)
444 PeterMillican
(g) Theseparaterealmsprinciple
Kantroundsoff his discussionof the OntologicalArgumentby stating
the principle'Whatever,
therefore,andhowevermuch,our conceptof
an objectmaycontain,we mustgo outsideit, if we areto ascribeexistenceto the object'.(Kant1781p. 506).Thisimpliesa gulfbetweenthe
realmof conceptsandtherealmof realthings:no matterwhatconcepts
we devise,it is alwaysa furtherquestionwhetheror not theyarerealised or instantiatedin reality.l4
So evenif we includeexistence,under
the guiseof 'greatness',
withinourconceptof God,thisin no wayguaranteesthattheremustbe somethingrealcorrespondingto that concept.As appliedto Anselm'sargument,the SeparateRealmsPrinciple
takesissuewiththe stepsfrom(1)to (4) by facinghim witha dilemma
overthe realmwithinwhichtheyareto be interpreted.If, on the one
hand,(2) and(4) areto be interpreted
aspropositionswithintherealm
of concepts(thatis, concerningonlythe contentof the Fool'sconception),then(2) canindeedbe inferredfrom(1)butstep(4) failsbecause
externalexistenceis irrelevantto thatrealm(Mackie1982 p. 52 putsthe
point nicely:the non-existenceof a supremebeingoutsidethe mind
doesnot implythatthe Foolhaswithinhis mindtheself-contradictory
conceptionof a-not-really-existing-being-than-which-nothing-greatercan-be-conceived).
If,on the otherhand,(2) iS to be interpreted
in such
a waythatone can only 'think'aboutsomethingthatexistsin reality,
thentheatheistcansimplyrefuseto acceptit asa legitimateimplication
from(1).l5
(h) TheAquinasrebuttal
Aquinasseemsto suggest,in his SummaContraGentiles,thatthereis
no contradictionas claimedin step (5), becauseunlessthe realexistence of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
is already
presupposed,
therecannotbe a contradiction
in ourthinkingof'somethinggreater... thananythinggivenin realityor in the intellect'.16
The
precisereasoningbehindAquinas'srebuttalis unclear(andwasabbre-
p. 80), but has noticeablydeclinedmore recently,in line with the relativetoleranceof 'Meinongianism'alludedto in the final paragraphof this paper.
14 Mackie (1982) focuses on this objection, applying it first against Descartes (pp. 48-9) and
then againstAnselm (pp. 51-5).
15 Oppy
(1995)pp. 114-8proposes the SeparateRealmsPrinciple(throughthe kind of dilemma
describedhere) as 'The GeneralObjection'to all ontological arguments,and the main part of his
substantial book consists in applying this type of objection to a wide range of such arguments
from the vast OntologicalArgumentliterature(cf. fn. 36 below).
446 PeterMillican
suspectconceptualbasis,whileat the other,the IntentionalObjectFallacy,the UniqueReferentProblem,andthe AquinasRebuttalall concern specificlogical moves. Most of the remainingobjections(the
MentalEntityConfusion,the ComparisonDifficulty,the Kantian
Dogma,andthe SeparateRealmsPrinciple)combineboth conceptual
makeno attemptto identify
andlogicalaspects,but Gauniloreductios
anyspecificerrorandsimplychallengethe argumentas a whole:somethingmustbe wrongwithits premissesor withits logic,if parallelreasoningcanleadto suchmanifestlyabsurdconclusions.
It is no coincidencethatthe one purelyconceptualobjection(a) is
dubialsotheweakest,forevenif it is truethatAnselmis presupposing
for
ous neo-Platonicconcepts,thenunlessthishasadverseimplications
the detailedlogic of his reasoning,anyobjectionabledependenceis
likelyto be remediableby the simpleexpedientof substitutingappropriatelydefinedalternativeconcepts(as we shallsee later).Farmore
andpart-logicalMentalEntityConfuseriousis the part-conceptual
sion (b), whichtogetherwiththe associatedIntentionalObjectFallacy
(c) highlightsthe needfora muchdeeperrethinkingof the conceptual
frameworkif Anselm'sargumentis to appearplausible on pain of
andothersimilarproblems,the Fool'sunderstanding
Gauniloreductios
be takento implythe existof anyphrasejustcannotstraightforwardly
properties,andit is simplynot
enceof someentitywithcorresponding
in generalvalidto inferfrom'I amthinkingof anX to 'Thereis someX
Tocircumventthesedifficultiesit willbe necesof whichI'mthinking'.
sary to sketch (at least) a suitabletheory of mental or intentional
objects,and this, as we shallsee, is by no meanstrivial.Toprovidea
versionof Anselm'sargufoundationfor anynon-question-begging
ment it must obviouslycountenancethe ascriptionof propertiesto
'entities'thatarenot alreadyknownto be actual,andmustalsolicense
the drawingof inferencesabout other propertiesof those entities
(including,potentially,theirrealexistence).As terminologyfor these
entities,the most appropriatechoiceseemsto
existence-independent
be thelanguageof'natures'whichis usedbybothAnselmandGaunilo,
and alsoby Descarteswhenpresentingand discussinghis own OntologicalArgument.l8
Theaimof thefollowingsection,therefore,willbe to developa rudimentarytheoryof naturesthatcanas faras possiblesanctionthe relevantstepsof Anselm'sargumentwhileavoidingboththe MentalEntity
Confusionandthe IntentionalObjectFallacy.If we areableto develop
18 For example Anselm (1077-8) p. 117;Gaunilo (1078) pp. 157, 163; Descartes (1641) pp. 44-5, 48,
83-5, 117, 263-
wascoinedbyAlston(1960)p. 103.
Theterm'realarchetype'
448 PeterMillican
theoryof natures
5. Outlineof an 'Anselmian'
suffito sketcha theoryof 'natures'
Theaimof thissectionis accordingly
andto identiffsome
reasoning,
cientto do justiceto thelogicof Anselm's
in thedevelopment
thatmustbe addressed
difficulties
of thefundamental
of anysuchtheory.Here,however,it willbe developedonlyso faras is
argument
withinwhichAnselm's
to providealogicalframework
necessary
is intended
asclearlyaspossible,andno commitment
canbe represented
eitherto thetheory'sultimatecogencyor its completeness-thuspotennatureswill
issuessuchasindividualandhigher-order
tiallytroublesome
quicklybe putto one side,andsomerelatedtopics,notablyAristotelian
bypassedentirely.Giventhisdissociationof'natures'from
essentialism,
essences,thetheorythatemergescannotpretendto beonethat
traditional
Anselmhimselfwouldhaveendorsedin detail,butwe can ignorethis
herebecausethedistinctionbetweengenuineessencesand
complication
of his
playsno rolein thelogicalprogression
'natures'
arbitrary
relatively
benefitsto be gainedfrom
Indeedtherearesomesignificant
argument.22
not
background,
of anyAristotelian
thetheoryindependently
presenting
illustrative
leastthatthis greatlysimplifiesthe devisingof appropriate
natures).
in thecaseof non-instantiated
examples(especially
thecenreasoning,
forAnselm's
framework
Toprovidean appropriate
to be madeto
of ourtheorymustbe to enablereference
tralrequirement
eitherits existenceor its
an 'entity)(suchas God)withoutpresupposing
non-existence as explainedabove,we shallreferto suchan existenceif it
entityasa 'nature,andspeakof a natureas'instantiated'
independent
hasat leastone realarchetype(thatis, if suchan entity'reallyexists').
on thetheory,forrefconstraint
impliesa significant
thisalready
However
in someway,
thatitbe identified
requires
erenceto anynaturepresumably
thenthis
itsinstantiation,
withoutpresupposing
andif it is to beidentified
('That
identification
causal
or
direct
appearsto ruleout demonstrative
2' Descartes'sappealto the distinctionbetween 'true and immutablenatures'and those 'which
areinventedand put togetherby the intellect'(1641,p. 83) seems to be an entirelyad hocmethod of
avoiding Gaunilo reductios,since he provides no clear account of the basis of the distinction, no
criterionof discrimination,no proof that the nature'God' is true and immutableratherthan invented, and most crucially, no explanation of why one kind of nature should be capable of
grounding an OntologicalArgumentwhile the other is not (that is, why 'truth and immutability'
should be supposed to have any relevantinferentialrole). Other defendersof the OntologicalArgument (e.g. Leibnizin section 44 of his Monadology)have followedDescartesin claimingthat the
natureof God is somehow special,with essence including existence in His case alone, so that His
existencecan be provedwhile Gaunilo reductiosare blocked. But such a claim is clearlyquestionbegging the alleged coincidence of God's essence and existence is more appropriateas the intended conclnsion of an OntologicalArgumentratherthan as a premiss,and if it is indeed a premiss, then if the argument is to serve any useful purpose this premiss requiresnot mere dogmatic
assertionbut independentjustification,with a clearexplanationof its logical role in the argument
which makesclearhow Gaunilo reductiosare to be avoided.
450 PeterMillican
by
causedthisto happen,etc.),leavingreference
'Whatever
entitythere',
be
well
might
This
alternative.23
obvious
only
the
as
meansof a description
a seriousdifficultyforanytheoryof naturesthataspiredto givean adequategeneraltreatmentof the existenceandnon-existenceof concrete
wecanrestcontentwitha
forpresentpurposes
butfortunately
individuals,
treatsnaturesascharacterizatheorywhichaccordingly
purelydescriptive
is probably
Sucha restriction
tionsonlyof kindsratherthanof individuals.
anywaymorefaithfulto Anselm,becausealthoughhe sometimesseemsto
astheindividspeakof ithat-that-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'
ualnatureor essenceof God,thisin itselfgiveslittlegroundforsupposing
foressencesof species
preference
thathe is heredeviatingfromAristotle's
when
is onlyto beexpected
sincesuchlanguage
ratherthanof individuals,
thenaturein questionis of suchevidentmagnitudeasto permitat most
oneinstantiation.24
natures,thenit
descriptive
Ifwe do restrictourselvesto non-indexical
to giveanoutlineof howtheymightbe
straightforward
becomesrelatively
Onesimpleoptionis to enclosethe relevantdescription(s)
represented.
of
withinanglebrackets here,forexample,arepossiblespecifications
significant
more
the
of
some
to
respectively
fournaturesthatcorrespond
thetelevi'Lyka'],
of theRussianspacedogLaika[pronounced
properties
sion dog Lassie,andthe ancientBritishheroesKingAlfredand King
Arthur:25
rescuesvictims,starof filmand
dog, catchesviSlains,
televisionz
23 As explained earlier,I am treatingAnselm'sargument as naturaltheology, intended to provide a reason for any readerto accept the existence of God, ratherthan merely an elucidation of
the natureof God's existenceaimed only at the religiousbeliever.The believer,unlike the atheist,
might indeed take himself to have had direct demonstrativeor causal experience of God, and if
then he might
this seemed to revealGod as something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought,
III to drawthe conclusion thatGodexistsnecessarily.
be persuadedby the argumentof Proslogion
II argument seems peculiarly futile if interpretedin this sort of wayHowever the Proslogion
Hisnaturemanifestlylearns nothing
someone who starts from the premiss thatGodhasrevealed
whateverfrom the conclusion merelythatGodexists.
IV,when explicatingthe
24 Anselm appeals to his formula as the essence of God in Proslogion
III), and contrastsense in which God cannot be thought not to exist (as maintainedin Proslogion
II).
ing this with the sense in which God canbe thought not to exist (as by the Fool of Proslogion
He arguesin detail for the uniquenessof the supremebeing in ChaptersI to IV of his Monologion
(1076).
25 Other more detailednaturescould of course be defined,adding descriptionsof furtherproperties of each of these four individuals (cf. fn. 28 below), but for presentpurposes the ones given
here will do. Formally,each natureis to be understoodas an unorderedset of properties,but any
technicalimplicationsof this can be ignored here.
Boethius>
theDanes,translated
defeated
<Alfred>: King of England,
452 PeterMillican
fournaturesspecifiedabove,thoughtherelative
ordering
of theotherswill
dependuponthehistorical
questionasto whether<Arthur>is,or is not,
instantiated.27
Iftherereallywasa saintlyandheroickingwhokepta court
of knightsandsoughtthe HolyGrail,thenit is reasonable
to expectthat
Arthur> willbe greaterthan<Alfred>,whosecharacteristic
properties,
thoughno doubtimpressive,
seemsomewhatlessdemanding.If,on the
otherhand,thenatureArthur> in facthasno realarchetype,
thennot
onlyAlfred) butalso<Laika>
willbe greater
thanit.
Assuming for present purposes that Arthurz is not in fact
instantiated thattherewasno suchking we canillustrate
therelation
betweengreatness,
instantiation,
andtheothermaingreatness-conferring
properties
asfollows:
Scaleof increasingpower/wisdom/goodness
=
t:
..s
Laika)
<Lassie>
AIfred
Poh
wo
BS,
2w_
cArthur>
Scaleofincreasinggreatness
.XXty'
+'X"'-'"W
Lssie
Xt_
Arthur
laik>
AIfred
by significantly
Hencealthoughthe nature<Arthur>is characterized
more impressive qualities of power, wisdom and goodness than
since<Arthur)is not instantiated
<Alfred)and<Laika>,nevertheless
whereasthey are,both Alfred) and Laika> areto be accordeda
higherplacein the scaleof greatness.
Godlikenatures,let us considerthe folTurningnowto recognizably
for
is usedas an abbreviation
lowing(in whichthe word'omniperfect'
'omnipotent,omniscient,andperfectlygood'):
<God>:
Presumably
<God>is a natureof somesignificantgreatnessevenif it is
not instantiated its characteristicpropertieswould make it far
greater,for example,than <Lassie>,<Arthur>or any other noninstantiated
natureof a mereanimalor human.Butif <God>is in fact
instantiated(thatis, if thereis indeedan omniperfectcreator)then it
The
seemsto reacha levelof greatnesswhichis almostunsurpassable.28
will see <God> as a natureof supremegreatness,
theist,accordingly,
whereasthe atheistwill see it as a natureof onlylimitedgreatness,less
nature.
greatthan<Alfred>,<Laika>or anyotherinstantiated
Supposenow that,heedlessof Kantianscruples,we allowrealexistpropertiesof a nature,and
enceto featureas one of the characteristic
accordingly
specifythe following:
EGod>:
28 I say 'almostunsurpassable'since as we shall see below <God> as defined here lacks at least
one characteristic property that contributes to Anselmian greatness, namely necessary existence. Moreoverif there is indeed a God, presumablywith additional particularqualities some of
which may be greatness-conferring, then it may be possible to specify other greater natures
whose characteristic properties include those of <God> plus these additional qualities (for
example, <omniperfect, creatorof the universe, eternal, inspirer of prophets>). This last point
illustratesa general implication of our theory of natures:any really existing being will instantiate a potentially infinite number of increasingly specific natures, and it may be that the full
greatness of any real individual (for example, King Alfred) cannot be capturedby any descriptive nature that has only a finite number of characteristicproperties.Considerationsof this kind
might motivate postulation of the limiting case of a nature that is characterizedby all the descriptive properties of some particular individual this, if accepted, would provide a sort of
Leibnizianindividual nature.
454 PeterMillican
<omniperfect,
creatorof the universe,necessarily
existing)
Hierarchy
te y g * :+:
+
"
X> r
:'rrwi [
!.4s.,.>
sig
of
e.
jo
.A:i j\j>>
grerness
;
rs
0.,
_+forr*
av
t.v.
;,
if ofa;
reatness
*:>
if t ,.t.N.O.
0 V.
p:W
3 >;-;3,
ig=mrarch
l:
1-%!M.j}
tr
)/i:
:s.s
'
'h't
'
:p.a,
w*:
thereis no omniperfect
creator
God>
ALassie) <Arthur)
NGod)
ALaika) <Alfred)
EGod
*
thereIsa contingent
omniperfectcreator
Ts
"
R:
'
IA,
'8;
God
Lassie> <Arthgr><NGod><Latka) AAIfred>
fIleraKhy
ofgreatnesw
lf
thereisa necrsry
omrziperfect
creator
tr
; ..,.
Ab;v....t
..
...
*#s-Dwra
ggg}
. e
Ksg@@s
0
<w-<4s>x
;
3-
Vw
j5
<God
aLicz
EG d
<NGod
Thereis animportantthoughunsurprising
lessonhere:thegreatnessof
a naturedepends,in general,not only on its characteristic
properties
butalso,crucially,
on whetheror not it happensto be instantiated.
And
it is preciselybecauseinstantiationcontributesso significantlyto the
greatnessof a naturethatAnselmfeelsableto concludethatthegreatest
of allnaturesmustindeedbe instantiated.
Thepointsmadeso faronlypartiallydeterminethe interpretation
of
our reformulated
Anselmiannotionof greatness,but theymayalready
providea sufficientbasisfor the analysisand evaluationof Anselm's
argument.Leavingasideall modalcomplications,greatnessas understoodhereinvolvesfourpositivecriteria,namelypower,wisdom,goodness and instantiation,with the last of thesebeingdominantoverall
the others.30
Beyondthatit has beenleft indeterminate
whatthe relation mightbe betweenthe threelessercriteria whetherfor example
they also fall into some dominancehierarchy(with anydifferencein
power,say,alwaysoutweighinganydifferencein wisdom),or whether
30 The simplest way of taking account of whetherthe instantiationis necessaryor contingent is
probably to count a nature's modality of instantiation as a fifth, subordinate criterion (a 'tiebreaker',so to speak). This avoids the inappropriatenessof having numbers or other purely abstractentities deemed greaterthan a contingent God, and fits neatlywith modality'sbeing an allor-nothing affair.
456 PeterMillican
footing(for
theycontributeon a moreor lesscomparable
alternatively
example,so that for anygivensuperiorityin power,it will alwaysbe
in wisdomthatwould
inferiority
possibleto findsomecorresponding
superficial
exactlycompensate).Forthisreason(aswellastherelatively
any
objective
on
criterion
each
individual
of
assessing
butrealdifficulty
and unifiedscale)it remainsin generalindeterminatewhichworldly
naturesaregreaterthanothers,butjudgingon the authorityof Edward
Gibbon,perhapsthe RomanemperorMarcusAureliusAntoninusis as
good a candidateas anyfor the accoladeof supremegreatnesswithin
takehim as an examplein what
the naturalorder I shallaccordingly
ceasesto be a problem
thissortof indeterminacy
follows.3lFortunately
in the divinesphereas traditionallyunderstood,becauseif indeedit
makessenseto speakof an infinitelypowerful,infinitelywise,andperfectlygood being,then this omniperfectnature,if instantiated,will
greatand,if not instantiated,will at leastbe
clearlybe unsurpassably
So althoughour
nature.32
by anyothernon-instantiated
unsurpassable
it is
treatmentof greatnesshasnot beenby anymeanscomprehensive,
forthepurposesof Anselmsargument.
at anyratequitesuflScient
Beforereturningto the detailsof thatargument,however,thereis
one moreratherthornyquestionin the theoryof naturesthatdeserves
to
at leasta mention.Namely,whetherit is legitimateto makereference
nature.
a
that
characterize
naturesthemselves,withinthe descriptions
naturessuchas
Arewe,forexample,permittedto specify'higher-order'
the following?
Greatest>: greatest of allnatures>
Mystronginclinationis to say'no',for at leastfourreasons.First,the
theoryof natureshasbeenintroducedherefor one specificpurposereferenceto kindsof thing-and a
to facilitateexistence-independent
naturesuchas <Greatest>givesno clearcharacterization
higher-order
andhistimethat'hislifewasthenoblestcommentary
3'Gibboncommentsof MarcusAurelius
on thepreceptsof Zerlo[thatis, Stoicism].Hewassevereto himself,indulgentto the imperfecto allmankind. . . If a manwerecalledto fixtheperiodin the
tionsof others,justandbeneficent
historyof theworld,duringwhichtheconditionof thehumanracewasmosthappyandprospernamethatwhichelapsedfromthedeathof Domitianto theacous,he would,withouthesitation,
cessionof Commodus.Thevastextentof the Romanempirewasgovernedby absolutepower,
raritywithwhich
undertheguidanceof virtueandwisdom.'(1776,pp.77-8).Giventheregrettable
hasfewcompetiprobably
suchdegreesof power,MarcusAurelius
virtueaccompanies
significant
torson thehumanscaleof greatness.
I ignoremodalityandthe othercomplicationsin notez8
39 Againfor the sakeof simplicity
than'neednot be a totallyorderedrelationto be
aboveThepointmadehereshowsthat'greater
argument(asseemsto be claimedbyBroad(1953)pp.177-g).Forthisrole
usablewithinAnselm's
it doesnot matterif somenaturesareneithergreaternorlesserthansomeothers,aslongas there
willheat leastasgreatasanyother.
is one (ormore)supremenaturewhich,if instantiated,
6. Anselm'sargumentreconsidered
The theoryof naturesthathaslbeendevelopedabove,thoughadmit(andquitepossiblysubjectto variousobjections),is
tedlyrudimentary
to enableus to assesshowAnselm'sargumentwillfare
at leastsuhScient
theoreticalcontextthanit is usuallyperwithina farmoresympathetic
mitted. The steps of that argumentcan be fairlystraightforwardly
translatedfromthe mentalisticidiomin whichhe presentsit into the
languageof natures,as follows:
(1') The phrase 'a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-bethought' is clearlyunderstoodby the Fool, and apparently
makessense.
33 To takejust two very simple examples,considerthe paradoxicalpotentialof allowingsuch ineliminablyhigher-ordernaturesas: (a) <GreaterStill>,characterizedas <that naturewhich is even
greaterthan <Greatest>>;or (b) <Self-Refer>,characterizedas <the nature<Self-Refer>>.Many
familiarparadoxesare likelyto have analogueswithin a theory that is permissiveenough to countenancethese sorts of constructions,inevitablycastingdoubt on argumentsthat areframedwithin
it.
458 PeterMillican
(2')
(6') Thereforea-nature-ian-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-though
in reality.
mustindeedbe instantiated
It is, I believe,veryclearthatthis argumentis essentiallythe sameas
Anselm's thereis a step-by-stepcorrespondencebetweenthe two,
parallel.
andthelogicbywhichtheconclusionis reachedis structurally
Andyet, I claim,this translatedversionof the argumentis resistantto
at leasteightof the ninestandardobjectionsthatwereitemizedearlier.
Tostartwithconceptualmatters,anysupposedrelianceon somedubious Neo-PlatonicPresupposition(a) hasbeen removedby our reformulation of the Anselmiannotion of greatness,which has made
comparisonsof greatnessdependentonly on fourveryexplicitnonPlatoniccriteria,and in doingso hasensuredthatsuchcomparisons
areas well-definedanddeterminateas is necessaryforthe purposesat
hand.Thatthesecomparisonsnow all unambiguouslyrelatepairsof
natures (rather than a mixture of existing individuals and nonexistents)completelyavoidsthe ComparisonDifficulty(d), whilethe
substitutionof existenceby instantiationas the dominantcriterionfor
greatnesshasleftthe KantianDogma(f) withouta target by confin34 Though Anselm believed that there was only one supreme nature, he seems to have taken
careto presenthis argumentin such a way that its logic could still succeedif therewere more than
one, each as greatas the other (for example,(God> and <EGod>). Hence I have renderedhis formula using the indefinite article ('a-nature . . .') ratherthan the definite article ('the-nature. . . ),
which conformsto his own use of something... ratherthan that ... when introducingthe formula.
(Howeverfor simplicityI retainthe same formulathroughout,though Anselm'susagewould suggest a switch from 'a-nature ...' to 'that-nature...' in step (4'), as explainedin fn. 19 above.) Accordingly, I employ the word 'denoting' in the manner of the first paragraphof Russell's 'On
Denoting' (1905),to covernot only the use of a definite description,but also indeterminate'reference' by means of an indefinitedescription.
ing ourtheoryto the domainof descriptivenatures,andthussidestepping the problems associatedwith individual 'essences',we have
ensuredthatinstantiationemergesas an apparentlycoherentandcertainlynon-vacuousproperty(andone, moreover,whichconformsto
Fregeanorthodoxyto the extentof being an implicitquantification
natures,ratherthanbeingitselfa
characterized
involvingpredicatively
predicateof concreteindividuals).
Turningnowto thelogicof the argument,the stepfrom(1') to (2' ) iS
entirelyfreeof mentalisticobjectification,and so retainsno traceof
eitherthe MentalEntityConfusion(b) or the IntentionalObjectFallacy (c). In proceedingforwardfrom step (2'), the UniqueReferent
between
Problem(e) is alsoavoided,sincethereis nowno equivocation
of
'something'and'that'withinthe keyphrase,andno presupposition
a uniquerealinstantiator.Moreoverthe AquinasRebuttal(h) seems
in thoughtthatemergesat step(4')
inapplicable
to thecontradiction
in this translatedargument'a-nature-than-which-no-greater-natureas a description(ratherthan
functionsunequivocally
can-be-thought'
of the naturein question,andhencethe contraas a characterization)
imposdictionallegedin step(5') seemsto be genuine:it is presumably
sible to think of a greater nature than one that is correctly so
described.35
Finally,the argumentas a wholeseemsto violatethe SeparateRealmsPrinciple(g) as anysuccessfulOntologicalArgument
must butforreasonsrelatedto thosejustgivenin responseto (e) and
(h), this 'Principle'suggestsno clearpoint of objection:on the one
hand the referenceto a natureat step (2') does not presupposethe
existenceof a realarchetypeandso is not obviouslyquestion-begging,
be
at (4') cannotapparently
whileon the otherhand,the contradiction
confinedwithinthe realmof thoughts.36
Theonlytypeof standardobjectionthathasnot yet beendealtwith
is the Gauniloreductio(i), andherethe situationis indeedlesspromisargumentdoesat leasthavethemeritof
ing.Howeverourreformulated
thanis Anselm's
appearingsomewhatmoreresistantto suchreductios
35 Within our theory the key formulamust be interpretedas a descriptionratherthan a characterization, given that higher-ordercharacterizationsare not permitted. See fn. 19 above for evidence that this is also faithfulto Anselm'sown intentions.
36 The most comprehensivediscussionof the SeparateRealmsPrinciple,by Oppy (1995),seems
to overlook this subtle logic which has always made Anselm's Ontological Argument so much
more intriguing and puzzling than the Cartesian-style versions. Instead of addressing the
ProslogionII argumentitself, Oppy focuses (pp. 108-11)on three very simplified'interpretations'
of that argument,two of which are so distant from Anselm'swords as to be virtuallyunrecognizable, while the other dubbed the conceptualinterpretation-plays into the hands of his 'General
Objection'both by the simple way in which it is representedand also by being phrasedentirelyin
terms of conceivingand conceivability.
460 PeterMillican
>
39 An asymmetrybetween goodness and evilness has been claimed (for example,by Augustine
and Aquinas in the context of the Problem of Evil) on the ground that goodness is positive and
evilness merelynegative.But even if evilness is understood negativelyas a privation of goodness,
this provides no basis for a relevant objection to the parody argument,for if a scale of goodness
can be set up then a scale of evilness can be defined straightforwardlyas its inverse,and if good-
462 PeterMillican
ness has a determinatelimiting value then it is hard to see why evilness should not have one too,
even if that value is different(and for the purposesof this argumenta zero limit would do just as
well as an infinite limit).
40
one
refutationforeverypossibleGauniloreductio,
pliedan appropriate
is likelyto be left feelingthatthe Anselmian'srepliesarefrustratingly
besidethe point, andthatthe essentiallysimplelessonof the parody
arguments thatthe principlesusedwithinAnselm'sown reasoning
wouldsanctionparallelinferencesthat areplainlyinvalid has been
lost amid the scholasticdiscussionof the particularcase. To move
beyondthis frustratingstandoffwe mustresistthe temptationto add
yet moreepicyclesto the reductiodialectic,andinsteadget to the bottom of whatis reallywrongwithAnselm'sargument.
7. Thefatalflaw
So farthe positiveconclusionsof our analysisof Anselm'sargument
seemrathermeagre,thoughwe haveplentyof negativeresultsto show.
Namely,thatwhentranslatedinto the languageof naturesthe Anselmianargumentavoidseightof the nine standardobjectionsthatwere
outlinedearlier,andalthoughGauniloreductioscontinueto castvery
do nothingto showus
seriousdoubton its validity,theyunfortunately
wherethe logicalerroris to be found.Theobviouswayforward,then,
is to examinethe translatedargumentin detailwithinits propercontextof the theoryof natures,and see whatlogicaltricksit mightconceal.
Theargumentbeginsby pointingout thatthephrase'a-nature-thanmakessense,andthen goes
which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought'
on to inferthatwe can legitimatelytakethis as successfullydenoting
somespecificnature.Butwhichnature,exactly?If we takeforgranted
that MarcusAureliusembodiedthe greatestcombinationof power,
wisdomandmoralgoodnessto be foundin the non-divineworld,and
conignore,bothhereandin subsequentdiscussion,all complications
properties(notably
cerningadditionalsupposedgreatness-conferring
modalitiesof existencesuchas necessityandeternality),thenthe best
twocontendersareas follows:
Aurelius>: <absoluteEmperorof the RomanEmpire,wise,
just,beneficent>
<God>:
464 PeterMillican
enceof an omniperfectbeing,andaskfromthatperspectivewhichof
as 'a-nature-thanthe two naturesabovemightbe correctlydescribable
which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought'.
The most straightforwardanswer,perhapssurprisingly,is that
simplyin virtueof being(fromthe atheist
aAurelius)is so describable,
thegreatestnaturethereis.
pointof viewthatwe areherepresupposing)
Forif Aurelius) is indeedthe greatestnaturethereis, then it is not
possible to think of any naturethat is (in fact) greater,and hence
aAurelius)canbe accuratelydescribedas 'a-nature-so-great-that-nowhichseemsa fairlyplausinature-that-is-greater-can-be-thought-of',
Obviouslythis answer
ble interpretationof the Anselmianformula.41
will not satisfythe Anselmianhimself,however,becauseif his formula
onlyto whichevernatureis infactunsurpassis understoodas referring
ablygreat(for example,<Aurelius>if thereis no divinebeing),then
the conclusionof his OntologicalArgument,thatsucha natureis really
will failto provideanysupportwhateverforthe existence
instantiated,
yieldsa soundargument(whichit
of God.So evenif thisinterpretation
of his
interpretation
does),theAnselmianmustinsiston an alternative
keyphrase.42
suggestsitself,becauseit seemsin a way
immediately
Onealternative
to be quiteeasyto thinkof a greaternaturethan<Aurelius>,simplyby
thinking of the nature <God> as instantiated.When we think of
<God) as instantiated,we areindeedthinkingof this natureas being
so greatthatno naturecouldbe thoughtgreater,andin thissense,the
describedas 'a-nature-which-cannature<God>canbe appropriately
So here
be-thought-so-great-that-no-nature-can-be-thought-greater'.
of theAnselmianformula,and
we havea secondpossibleinterpretation
to theAnselmianthanthefirst
onewhichis likelyto be moreacceptable
becauseit at leastenableshis OntologicalArgumentto get underway
Andwith this interpretawith a recognisablytheisticsubject-matter.
41 Here 'can-be-thought'in the originalphrasehas been takento mean simply'can-be-thoughtof', and so becomes more or less equivalentto 'exists'.Howeverthe term 'exists'may conjure up
misleadingideas about non-existent natures,so under this interpretationa more straightforward
Gaunilouses
way of expressingthe key phraseis just 'a-nature-so-great-that-no-nature-is-greater'.
the formulae'somethinggreaterthan everythingthat can be thought of' and 'thatwhich is greater
than everything'(e.g. Gaunilo 1078,p. 161),and he accordinglyseems to be interpretingAnselm's
phrasein this sort of way (albeithe confusedlytakesthe relevantrelationto be 'greaterthan'when
it should be 'at least as great as'). But in his responseAnselm takes issue with Gaunilo for using
forms of words inadequateto the subtletiesof his argument(1078,p. 179).
42 In securinga sound argumenthere, a significantrole is playedby our simplifyingassumption
that instantiation 'trumps' the other criteria for greatness (cf. fn. 26 above). If a nature
(e.g. <God>) could be greaterthan <Aurelius> without being instantiated,then clearlyAnselm
would have no right to suppose even that the actuallygreatestnaturemust be instantiated.
43 An alternative
hybridis 'a-nature-which-can-be-thought-so-great-that-no-nature-thatis-greater-can-be-thought-of',
but this simply combinesthe weaknessesratherthan the
strengthsof thefirsttwointerpretations
(moreoverif thereis no divinebeingthedenotationof
thephrasewillbe radicallyindeterminate,
sinceit willbe satisfiedbyanyof thecountlessuninstantiatednatureswhosecharacteristics
of power,wisdomandgoodnessareat leastas impressive as those of <Aurelius>).Yetmoreinterpretationsbecomeavailableif the argumentis
situatedwithin the sort of possibleworldsframeworkenvisagedby Lewis(1970,cf. fn. 2
above), includingtwo (p. 180)which might be paraphrasedas 'a-nature-which-must-bethought-so-great-that-no-nature-can-be-thought-greater',
and 'a-nature-which-cannot-bethought-to-be-less-great-that-any-nature'.
But suchinterpretationsseem ratherartificialas
construalsof Anselm'swords,andanywayprovideno assistanceto his argument.
466 PeterMillican
which
Anature
50 great
thatnonature
canbethought
\reater
canbethought
1S soune,outproVeS the
instantiof thegreatest
instantiation
Aureliuss
atednaturehence it fiils to prove
ofGced.
theexistence
The redllstioatStep(')fails,
can-be-thoughtso
Anaturewhich
to
becauseit is not contradictc)ry
great that no nature can-be- AGod>
supposethatthenatureill question
greater
t71ought
in actualgreatllese7.
is exceedecl
becauseif
A naturewhichis so greatthatno thereis ncgsuchnature(unlessStep(z') is unwarranted,
no Godexists,thenno natureis ill
greater Godexists)
naturecwn-be-thought
factgreatenoughto satisfythekey
so it failsto denoteW
phrase7
natureerhichis so greatthat no
nature is greater (i. e. no greclter
rlaturecat7be thoughtof)
ftrgumerlt
greater-can-be-thought
andGod.Likewisethedenotationfailurewhich
is the onlyreallogicalfaultin the argumentunderthe thirdinterpretation has gonelargelyunnoticed the UniqueReferentProblemis no
doubtsomewhatanalogous,butthatinvolvesthecrudefailureof referenceto a particularexistentratherthanthe relativelysubtlefailureto
denoteanynature.(Thevitalpoint herebeingthatevenif in a perhapsextravagantly
Meinongianspirit we allowanyarbitraryset of
descriptionsto characterize
a nature,it can still remainthe casethat
thereis in factno nature,howevercharacterized,
thatsatisfiesAnselm's
description.)In viewof all this,it is perhapsnot surprisinghow many
commentatorshavetendedto assumethatAnselm'sargumentcanbe
keptat bayonlyby rejectingthe implicittheoryof natureson whichit
builds:they simplyhavenot seen the fundamentalambiguitywhich
standsout fromthe backgroundconfusiononlywhenthe argumentis
consideredwithina favourable
theoreticalcontext.Howeverthisambiguity,onceidentified,canbe recognizedandspeltout quiteindependentlyof the detailedtheoryof natureswithinwhichit hasemerged,as I
shallnowillustrate.
8. Thefatalflawrestatedandgeneralized
Anselmuseshis keyphrasewith the aim of denotingsomenature(or
type of thing, or concept),identifiedby its supremegreatnesswhen
comparedwith all others.Butsinceinstantiation(or actuality,or real
existence)is a crucialcomponentof his notion of greatness,he then
goeson to concludethatthis supremelygreatnature(or type,or concept)mustindeedbe instantiated
(or actual,or reallyexistent).
Unfortunatelythereis a doubleambiguityin Anselm'skeyphrase,
introducedby the overtonesof modalityin his words'canbe thought'
andby thepotentialapplicationof thismodalitynot onlyto theparticularnature(ortype,or concept)thathe intendsto pickout,butalsoto
theotherswithwhichhe favourably
comparesit. In short,it is leftindeterminatewhetherthesecomparisons
arebeingmadein termsof actual
greatness
or thoughtgreatness,
andhencewhetherthe natures(or types,
or concepts)arebeingcomparedin termsof theiractualor hypotheticalqualities.
If all comparisonsconcernactualgreatness,then it is clearthat
Anselm'sargumentcanat bestprovethe existenceof somethingthatis
actuallyunsurpassedby anycompetitor for the atheist,this will be
quite insufficientto elevateit to any sort of divine status.If, on the
other hand, all comparisonsconcernhypotheticalgreatness,then
468 PeterMillican
470 PeterMillican
A naturewhich/
\in
includinginstantiation
possessionof allperfections
canbe thought
9. Conclusion,anda moral
Therefutationdevelopedaboveis, in the end,gratifyingly
simple,and
conformsnicelywiththe preferenceexpressedat the beginningof this
paperfor 'shallow'as opposedto 'deep'refutations.If I am right,then
Descartes'sversionof the argumenttradeson an ambiguitybetween
realperfectionandthoughtperfection,whileAnselm'sversioncontains
two instancesof the sameambiguity,with the doublyindeterminate
scopeof 'canbe thought'cleverlycamouflaged
insidehis keyformula.
Anselm'sargumentcanthusbe addedto whatis alreadya distinguished
listof implicitscopefallacies,including(arguably)
suchclassicalexamplesasAquinas's
'ThirdWay',Aristotle's,
Hobbes'sandMill'sarguments
fora primarygood or standardof value,Berkeley's
inferenceto an allperceivingspirit,andvariousothernotableargumentsgivenbyphilosophersfrom Platoto Spinozato contemporariessuch as Ayer.45
Of
coursethe scholarlyidentificationof suchshallowfallacieswithinan
author'sworkcanbe verycontroversial,
but if substantiated,
it brings
theconsiderable
benefitof deliveringa logicalverdictthatwillstandthe
testof time.WhereasconvictingAnselmof treatingexistenceas a predicatestillleavesit obscurewhetherthis supposederroris in factdisastrousforhisargument(sinceit mightturnout not to be an errorat all),
convictinghim of a shallowscope fallacyleavesno such room for
doubt.
The long-standingassumptionthat the fallacyin the Ontological
Argumentis deep ratherthan shallowmay have had a significant
impacton the developmentof twentieth-century
logicandphilosophy.
Russell'sflirtationwith Hegelianismwas apparentlybased on his
acceptanceof a formof the argument(as evidencedbothby his essays
atthetimeandbya letterof 19llto OttolineMorrell),andalthoughit is
unclearhow farexplicitconsiderationof the argumentmotivatedhis
subsequent
work,thecloselyrelatedtopicof existence(andthestatusof
non-existents)figuredprominently
bothin his discussionswithMoore
in the 1890S and in the thinkingthat led ultimatelyto his theoryof
45 All of these philosophershave been accused of committing the most familiarform of scope
fallacy,known as the 'quantifiershift' fallacy.For this accusationagainst Plato,Aristotle,Spinoza
and Berkeley,see Geach (1958)pp. 2-5; against Hobbes and Mill, see O'Neill (1998),p. 194 fn. so
and pp. 122-3;againstAquinas,see Davies (1982)p. 42; againstAyer,see Anscombe (1967)p. 138.
472 PeterMillican
which takes
48 An engagingattempt to answersuch scepticismis providedby Jacquette(2000),
the form of an explicit 'confession'to what is generallyreckonedto be a philosophicalsin. He develops his own position most thoroughlyin Jacquette(1996).
Schoolof Philosophy
Universityof Leeds
Leeds)LS29JT
p.j.r.millican@leeds.
ac.uk
PETER MILLICAN
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