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Mind Association

The One Fatal Flaw in Anselm's Argument


Author(s): Peter Millican
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 113, No. 451 (Jul., 2004), pp. 437-476
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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The One FatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument


PETER
MILLICAN

Anselm'sOntologicalArgumentfails,but not for anyof the variousreasonscommonlyadduced.In particular,


its failurehasnothingto do withviolatingdeepKantianprinciplesbytreating'exists'asa predicate
or makingreference
to 'Meinongian'
entities.Itsone fatalflaw,so farfrombeingmetaphysically
deep,is in factlogically
shallow,derivingfroma subtlescopeambiguityin Anselm'skeyphrase.Ifwe avoid
thisambiguity,
andtheindeterminacy
of reference
to whichit givesrise,thenhis argumentis blockedevenif his supposedMeinongianextravagances
arepermitted.
Moreoverit is blockedin a waywhichis straightforward
andcompelling(bycontrastwiththe Kantianobjections),andwhichgeneralizes
easilyto otherversionsof
the OntologicalArgument.A significantmoralfollows.Fearof Anselm'sargument
hasbeenhugelyinfluentialin motivatingontologicalfastidiousness
andwidespread
reluctance
to countenance
talkof potentiallynon-existingentities.Butif thispaper
is correct,thentheOntological
Argument
cannotproperlyprovideanysuchmotivation. Someof the mostinfluentialcontributions
to ontology,fromKantto Russell
andbeyond,reston a mistake.

1.Anselm,
Kant,andthevirtuesofshallowness
The OntologicalArgument,and Anselm'sversionin particular,has
long held a fascinationfor philosophers,but not usuallybecausethey
havefoundit convincing.On the contrary,mosthaveconsideredthe
argumentto be unquestionablyfallacious,no doubt often on the
groundthatit is just'too good to be true',purportingto demonstrate
the existenceof God fromwhatlooks like a meredefinition.Butthe
argumentnevertheless
remainsintriguingbecausedespitethe effortsof
many notable philosophersover the centuriesit has provedto be
extremelydifficultto pinpointexactlywherethefallacylies.Manydiagnoseshaveof coursebeenproposed,andone of these,namelythe Kantiandoctrinethat'existenceis not a predicate'(especially
whenfortified
by the Fregeanquantificational
treatmentof existence)hasfor mostof
the last centuryassumedthe statusof orthodoxy.But eventhis most
popularobjectionto the argumenthasnot stoodup entirelyconvincinglyundercriticalscrutiny,partlybecauseit hasneverbeenfullysatisfactorily elucidated and defended, but also partly because its
implicationsfor the argumentareanywayratherobscure:supposewe
Mind,Vol. 113 . 451 . July2004

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Millican 2004

438 PeterMillican

acceptthat'exists'is not 'logically'a predicate how exactly doesthis


undermineAnselm'sreasoning:whichparticularstep in it failsto go
through,andwhatrighthavewe to presumethatit cannotbe reformuThesequestionsof detail
'predication'?
latedwithoutthe objectionable
duringtheheydayof theKantianslogan,
weretypicallyleftunanswered
which was commonlyassumedto demolishthe foundationsof the
argumentso completelyas to renderit unworthyof furtherdiscussion.
endowan
Howeverthis sort of dismissiveattitudecan,paradoxically,
argumentwith morestatusthanit wouldotherwiseenjoy.Forif it is
frameattackedonly by meansof a generalassaulton the metaphysical
workwithinwhichit functions,thenthe impressionmaybe giventhat
Andthe historyof philosophical
it standsor fallswiththatframework.
debateindicatesthatfundamentalobjectionsto metaphysicalframeArgument's
worksareseldombeyonddispute,so thatif theOntological
validitywerethoughtto dependexclusively on whetheror not 'exists'is
a predicate,then this wouldbe likelyto encouragethe viewthatperhapstheargumentmightindeedbe worthtakingseriously.Becauseit is
surelynot, afterall,so very obviousthat'exists'can never functionas a
genuinepredicate(consider,for example,the questionof whether
RobinHoodreallyexisted).l
In myviewa farbettermethodof refutinga philosophicalargument
is, wherepossible,to challengeit at thelevelof detail,takingforgranted
its fundamentalframeworkbut then showingthatit failsevenon its
sucha refutationcan
owntermsto establishitsconclusion.If successful,
founthanan attackon an argument's
be farmoresolidandpersuasive
dations,if onlybecauseit is so mucheasierto be confidentaboutshaltheories.This,then,is
lowlogicaldetailsthanaboutdeepphilosophical
Argument,develtheapproachthatI shalltaketo Anselm'sOntological
opingon his behalfa radicallynon-Kantiantheoryof existence-independent'natures'withinwhichhis argumentcan be framedso as to
resistthe standardobjections,but thengoingon to identifya hitherto
flawin his reasoningwhichnot onlyinvalidatesthe arguunremarked
mentin its originalform,butwhichalso,unlikethosestandardobjections, operatesat a levelwhichmakesit ineradicableby anyplausible
Argument,in otherwords,failsto prove
HisOntological
reformulation.
the existenceof God even at the relativelysuperficiallevel of logical
reason,namely,that
straightforward
detail.Andit failsfora refreshingly
of its
two
interpretations
(at
least)
between
it tradeson anequivocation
centralconcept:one underwhichit providesan invalidargumentfor
' Indeed the Kantiandoctrine can and has been challengedmore generally,as recentlyfor example by McGinn (2000, Ch. 2), who advancesa number of strong argumentsagainstit.

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TheOneFatalFlawinAnselmsArgument439

God'sexistence,and anotherunderwhich it is valid- and indeed


sound butfailsto provethe existenceof God.
2. Anselm'stext
AnselmsOntologicalArgumentis presentedin his Proslogion, starting
with ChapterII)thoughwherethe argumentendsis morecontroversial.Hereis theentiretextof ChapterII,entitled'ThatGodtrulyexists',
generallyfollowing with one footnotedexception the deliberately
literaltranslation
by Charlesworth
(Anselm(1077-8)p.117):
II Wellthen,Lord,Youwhogiveunderstanding
to faith)grantme thatI
mayunderstand,as muchas Yousee fit, thatYouexistas we believe
Youto exist,andthatYouarewhatwe believeYouto be. Nowwe believe that Youare somethingthan which nothing greatercan be
thought.Orcanit be thata thingof sucha naturedoesnot exist,since
'theFoolhassaidin hisheart,thereis no God'?[Anselmherealludesto
Psalms13:1and 52:1 in the Vulgatgwhichare Psalms14:1and 53:1 in
Hebrewand moderneditionsof the Bible.] But surely,whenthissame

Fool hearswhat I am speakingabout)namely)'something-thanwhich-nothing-greater-can-be-thought',


he understandswhat he
hears,arldwhathe understands
is in his mind,evenif he doesnot understandthatit actuallyexists.Forit is one thingforan objectto exist
in the mind,andanotherthingto understandthatan objectactually
exists.Thus,whena painterplansbeforehand
whathe is goingto execute}he has [thepicture]in his mind,buthe doesnot yetthinkthatit
actuallyexistsbecausehe has not yet executedit. However,whenhe
has actuallypaintedit, then he both has it in his mind and understandsthatit existsbecausehe hasnow madeit. Eventhe Fool,then,
is forcedto agreethatsomething-than-which-nothing-greater-canbe-thoughtexistsin the mind, since he understandsthis when he
hearsit) andwhateveris understoodis in the mind.Andsurelythatthan-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
cannotexistin the mind
alone.Forif it existssolelyin the mind}somethingthatis greatercan
be thoughtto existin realityalso.2If thenthat-than-which-a-greatercannot-be-thoughtexistsin the mind aloneathis samethat-thanI am

grateful

translation,

like

if it existed
solely

mind

potentially

an artefact
none,

fn

requiring

the

also:
even

Broadie
instead

'For

from
(1993)

greatness

way

(1970)
must

correct
the

to exist
of the

insertion

emphasises.
in the

Lewis

logic

later

on

be relativized

translation

of this

of the same

sentence.

thing's

in reality

also,

which

argument,

but

fortunately

of commas

into

Anselm's

Moreover
preferred

p. 178,

idea

Charlesworth's

being

(thought)

greater

Such

a reading

that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought]

be thought
the

the

for the
relies

if it [namely,

it can

sentence

26 below).
that

others)

complicate

deriving

as Anscombe

understood
(see

in reality

in the

would

to Alexander
most

herea

unaware

it seems
and
of the

to possible

that

was

it is unwarranted,
original

Anselm's

given

no

hint

mistranslation,
worlds)

exists

is greater.'

implicitly

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which

correspondent
of any
takes
ruling

Gaunilo

objection
Anselm's
out

being
contained

to this
logic

the 'Gaunilo'

as

440 PeterMillican

is that-than-which-a-greaterwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
can-be-thought.Butthis is obviouslyimpossible.Thereforethereis
absolutelyno doubtthat something-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thoughtexistsbothin themindandin reality.

is clearlyintendedto establish(atleast)thatsomethingThisparagraph
exists in reality.Whether
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
Anselmsawthis as equivalentto establishingthat Godexists(as suggestedby the chapter'stitle) is debatable-Campbell, for example,
arguesquite persuasivelythat the definiteidentificationof God as
be-thought is not achieved
something-than-which-a-greater-cannotof ChapterIII.3Butit is anywayevidentthat
untilthe secondparagraph
Anselm'strain of thought continuesinto that chapter,going on to
deducean importantcorollaryregardingGod'sspecialmodeof existence ('thatGod cannotbe thoughtnot to exist')usingan argument
andPlantingahave
suchasMalcolm,Hartshorne,
whichcommentators
eventhoughtto constitutethe coreof his entirechainof reasoning.4
it is possiblehereto ignoreexegeticalquestionsaboutthe
Fortunately
preciserelationshipbetweenAnselm'schapters,becausealthoughI
shallbe examiningonlyChapterII,the'fatalflaw'referredto in mytitle
concernsthe keyphrasewhichis commonto both chapters,andso it
ChapterIIIalso,evenif
willinevitablyinfecttheargumentof Proslogion
thatargumentis supposedcapableof standingentirelyalone.ForsimidebateaboutAnselm's
larreasons,I shallalsoignorethe interpretative
motivesin presentinghis 'OntologicalArgument',and will takefor
grantedthathe intendedit as a contributionto naturaltheology,rather
thana vehicleformysticalilluminationor a workof Konklusionstheologie (theinferringof one articleof faithfromanother).5Myaimhereis
logicalratherthantheological to get to the bottomof a puzzlethat

interpretationof his key phrasewhich will prove of significancelater (cf. fn. 41 below). Lewisultimatelyexploitsthis to drawa characteristicmoral, that the seductivefallaciousnessof the OntologicalArgumentgoes hand in hand with a prejudicefor the actual.
3 See Campbell (1976) pp. 12-28, who acknowledges here the prior influence of Stolz (1933)
pp. 198-206.
4 For defence of Anselm'ssupposed 'second'OntologicalArgumentin ProslogionIII, see for example Malcolm (1960), Hartshorne(1967),and Plantinga(1974)Ch. lo. Henry (1967)pp. 142-50
provides a detailed and illuminating discussion of the logical relation between ProslogionII and
III.
5 For a discussion of this issue, which came to prominence with Barth (1931),see especially
McGill(1967)pp. 51-68.Also pertinentare Charlesworth(1965)pp. 40-8, Henry (1967)pp. 148-50,
Barnes(1972)pp. 6-8, and Campbell(1976)pp. 172-8.

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TheOneFatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument 441

hasperplexedphilosophersformanyyears andin pursuingthisaim,


my analysiswillbringto lighta crucialambiguitywhichis highlyrelevantwhateverAnselm'smotivesmighthavebeen.Moreovertheupshot
of all this will be that the traditionalinterpretationof ChapterII of
Proslogionis by farthe mostinteresting.Readas mysticalillumination
it wouldbe trivial,but as
it wouldbe confused,as Konklusionstheologie
naturaltheology,thoughultimatelyflawed,it turnsout to be not only
fascinating,but farmoresubtleandresistantto criticismthanmostof
havesupposed.
its commentators

3. Thestructureof Anselm'sargument,andnine standard


objections
Theessentialstructureof Anselm'sProslogionII argumentseemsto be
as follows:
(1) The Fool understandsthe phrase:'something-than-which-be-thought'
nothing-greater-can
(2)

Hence something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
existsatleastin theFool'smind.

(3) It is greaterto existin realitythanto existin the mindalone.6


existed
(4) So if that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
only in the Fool'smind,then it wouldbe possibleto thinkof
somethinggreater(thatis, somethingexistingin realityalso).
sinceit is obviouslyimpossi(5) Butthiswouldbe a contradiction,
ble to thinkof somethinggreaterthanthat-than-which-nothcan-be-thought.
ing-greater-

(6) Thereforesomething-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thoug
mustexistbothin theFool'smindandin realityalso.
Giventhat it occupiesonly a singleshortparagraph,Anselm'sarguvarietyof criticisms,butthesummary
menthasprovokeda remarkable
abovecanhelpus to situatethe mostimportantof thesein termsof the
stepswith whichtheytakeissue.Someof theseobjectionsareclosely
theyhaveoftenbeenconflatedwith
interrelated,and understandably
eachotherin the literature,but I havetriedbelowto disentanglethem
6This premissis implicit in Anselm'stext ratherthan explicitlystated;for discussionrelevantto
its interpretation,see especiallyfns 2 and 26.

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442 PeterMillican

so thatas faras possibleeachconcernsjustone veryspecificpoint)and


giveneacha nicknameto facilitatereferenceto themin whatfollows.
(a) Theneo-Platonic
presupposition
Anselm'snotionof (greatness',
andalsohis specificjudgementsof relative greatness)presupposea neo-Platonicbackgroundof'degreesof
existence)andmetaphysical
Cperfections'
whichwouldnowbe generally
rejected.Withoutit, his keyphrase'something-than-which-nothinggreater-can-be-thought',
andhencehis entireargument,cannotmake
sense.7
(b) Thementalentityconfusion
In movingfrom step (1) to step (2) Anselmtreatsthe mentalexistence of something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
as
involvingmereunderstandingof the phrase)whereasin movingon
from step (2) he treatsthis mental'existent'as an entity in its own
right. This is a confusion, since something that merely 'exists in
the mind) in the sense of being understood,conceivedor thought
about,need not therebyreallyexistas such at all-it is not a genuine entity with propertiesthan can be assessedand comparedwith
those of otherthings.8
intentional
objectfallacy
Evenif the notionof mentalentitiesthatgenuinely'existin the mind'
canbe madesenseof in someway,it still seemsquestionableto infer
from(1) 'TheFoolunderstands
thephrase"something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought"'
the apparentlyfarmoresignificantexistential claim (2) 'Something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-bethoughtexistsin theFool'smind'Thisinferenceseemsanalogousto the
well-knownfallacyof moving from 'I am conceivingof an X' (for
example,a unicorn,anunconceived
tree)to 'Thereis anX of whichI'm
conceiving'.9
(c) rhe

7See Charlesworth(1965)pp. 60-62


8

for criticismalong these lines.

Cargile(1975)pp. 75-6 advancesthis objection to Anselm particularlyclearly.

9 Berkeley's argument that it is a contradiction to conceive of an unconceived tree (1710,


para23) iS perhapsthe most familiarexamplehere (though Berkeley'swordsmaybeara less objectionable interpretation).Prior (1976)pp. 60-3 identiSesthis fallacyas Anselm'sprincipalerror,as
does Parsons(1980)p. 215,who describesit as an illicit switch from a de dictoto a de re readingof
the key phrase.

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The OneFatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument 443

difficulty
(d) Thecomparison
Thereseemsto be somethinglogicallyodd aboutpurportingto comparesomethingthatexistsonly 'in the mind'with somethingexisting
in reality.ThereforeAnselm'spremiss(3),whichcruciallydependson
the possibilityof doingso, is dubious.10
(e) Theuniquereferentproblem
Anselmseemsto equivocatebetweenthe indefinite'something-thanmorespecific
andtheapparently
which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'
also
(he
'that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought' combines
ending'-than-which-aboth'something'and'that'withthe alternative
butthisvariationseemsto be logicallyinsiggreater-cannot-be-thought',
nificant).His introductionof the phrase'that-than-which-nothingis
in movingfromstep(2) to step(4),moreover,
greater-can-be-thought'
thatthereis one
unlesshe hasalreadyestablished
illegitimate
presumably
andonlyonethingto whichthisphrasecanrefer,andhecando thisonly
provingtheexistenceof God.l1
byantecedently
is nota predicate')
(f) TheKantiandogma('existence
As Kantfamouslyargued(anticipatedto a significantextentby Gasexistence
sendiandHume),l2it seemsdubiousto considersomething's
can conthat
factor
as
a
it, andhence
as a propertythatcharacterizes
tributeto the assessmentof its greatness.Rather,its existenceseemsto
if it is to haveanypropertiesat all.Sowhen
be somethingpresupposed
greatBeing,butour
we thinkof God,we thinkof an existingsupremely
abilityto thinkof Him in thiswayis quiteindependentof whetheror
not He reallyexists,or evenof whetheror not we believeHimto exist.
If Goddoesnot exist,therefore,thisin no wayimpliesthatthe concept
great
of Godfailson thataccountto be theconceptof an unsurpassably
Being.SoAnselm'sstep(3) is incoherent,andstep(4) fallacious.13

' Both Broad (1953) p. 181and Charlesworth(1965) pp. 63-65 press this point, relating it to
what I call below the 'KantianDogma'.
i l Barnes(1972) pp. 13, 80 sees this assumptionof singularityas the main flawin Anselm'sargument. Russell(1905) p. 54 appealsto his theory of descriptionsin attacking,on similargrounds,a
Cartesianversion of the argumentstarting'The most perfectBeinghas all perfections'.
12

Gassendi(1641) pp. 224-6, Hume (1739) pp. 66-7, Kant (1781) pp. 500-7.

13 No doubt influencedby Frege(1884, para53) and Russell(e.g. 19l9, p. 203), it soon became almost routine for analyticphilosophersto recitethe Kantianmantraas though it were an immediate and complete refutation, e.g. Ryle (1935) p. 251 and Kneale (1936) pp. 154-6. This dismissive
attitudeto the argumentcontinued to be the norm for severaldecades(as typifiedby Flew (1966)

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444 PeterMillican

(g) Theseparaterealmsprinciple
Kantroundsoff his discussionof the OntologicalArgumentby stating
the principle'Whatever,
therefore,andhowevermuch,our conceptof
an objectmaycontain,we mustgo outsideit, if we areto ascribeexistenceto the object'.(Kant1781p. 506).Thisimpliesa gulfbetweenthe
realmof conceptsandtherealmof realthings:no matterwhatconcepts
we devise,it is alwaysa furtherquestionwhetheror not theyarerealised or instantiatedin reality.l4
So evenif we includeexistence,under
the guiseof 'greatness',
withinourconceptof God,thisin no wayguaranteesthattheremustbe somethingrealcorrespondingto that concept.As appliedto Anselm'sargument,the SeparateRealmsPrinciple
takesissuewiththe stepsfrom(1)to (4) by facinghim witha dilemma
overthe realmwithinwhichtheyareto be interpreted.If, on the one
hand,(2) and(4) areto be interpreted
aspropositionswithintherealm
of concepts(thatis, concerningonlythe contentof the Fool'sconception),then(2) canindeedbe inferredfrom(1)butstep(4) failsbecause
externalexistenceis irrelevantto thatrealm(Mackie1982 p. 52 putsthe
point nicely:the non-existenceof a supremebeingoutsidethe mind
doesnot implythatthe Foolhaswithinhis mindtheself-contradictory
conceptionof a-not-really-existing-being-than-which-nothing-greatercan-be-conceived).
If,on the otherhand,(2) iS to be interpreted
in such
a waythatone can only 'think'aboutsomethingthatexistsin reality,
thentheatheistcansimplyrefuseto acceptit asa legitimateimplication
from(1).l5
(h) TheAquinasrebuttal
Aquinasseemsto suggest,in his SummaContraGentiles,thatthereis
no contradictionas claimedin step (5), becauseunlessthe realexistence of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
is already
presupposed,
therecannotbe a contradiction
in ourthinkingof'somethinggreater... thananythinggivenin realityor in the intellect'.16
The
precisereasoningbehindAquinas'srebuttalis unclear(andwasabbre-

p. 80), but has noticeablydeclinedmore recently,in line with the relativetoleranceof 'Meinongianism'alludedto in the final paragraphof this paper.
14 Mackie (1982) focuses on this objection, applying it first against Descartes (pp. 48-9) and
then againstAnselm (pp. 51-5).
15 Oppy
(1995)pp. 114-8proposes the SeparateRealmsPrinciple(throughthe kind of dilemma
describedhere) as 'The GeneralObjection'to all ontological arguments,and the main part of his
substantial book consists in applying this type of objection to a wide range of such arguments
from the vast OntologicalArgumentliterature(cf. fn. 36 below).

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The OneFatalFlaw in Anselm'sArgument 445

but his ideamaybe


viatedstillfurtherin his laterSummaTheologiae),
does not
that if that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
reallyexistoutsidethe mind,then its greatnessis actuallymuchless
than Anselmsupposes hencethereis a sense in whichthat-thanwillthenfailto be something
which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived
thanwhichnothinggreatercanbe conceived.
(i) Gauniloreductios
If Anselm'sargumentwereindeedsound,then it wouldbe hardto see
whyequivalentargumentscouldnot be constructedto provethe existence of a supremelyexcellentisland,a perfectPegasus,an Antigod
whose evil is unsurpassablyeffective, and so on; but it is grossly
to suggestthatthesethingsdo exist,or evenif theydid,that
implausible
theirexistencecouldbe provedin thisa priorimanner.Therearemany
varietiesof this sort of attemptedreductioad absurdumof Anselm's
argument,but it seemsappropriateto call them 'Gauniloreductios'
afterthemonkwhofamouslyrespondedin thiswayto Anselm'sProslogionwhenit firstappeared,andwhoseReplyon Behalfof theFoolwas
thenincludedat Anselm'srequest(alongwithAnselm'sresponseto it)
published.17
wassubsequently
whentheProslogion

4. Theneedfor a theoryof 'natures'


ThesenineobjectionsattackAnselm'sargumentin a varietyof ways.At
focuseson its allegedly
one extreme,the Neo-PlatonicPresupposition
'6'Now,from the fact that that which is indicatedby the name Godis conceivedby the mind, it
does not follow that God exists saveonly in the intellect.Hence, that than which a greatercannot
be thought will likewisenot haveto exist saveonly in the intellect.Fromthis it does not follow that
there exists in reality something than which a greatercannot be thought. No difficulty, consequently, befalls anyone who posits that God does not exist. For that something greater can be
thought than anythinggiven in realityor in the intellectis a difficultyonly to him who admitsthat
there is something than which a greatercannot be thought in reality.'Aquinas (1259)1.11.1,p. 82.
Aquinas'srelativelycursorycomments in the SummaTheologiaeare more frequentlyquoted (for
example, in Plantinga1965,pp. 28-30), and perhaps in part for this reason some commentators
takehim to have missed the point of Anselm'sargument.Davies (1992)p. 24 n., for example,comments that '[in so far as] Aquinas'streatmentof the OntologicalArgumentdoes not seem to engage fully with the argument as found in Anselm ... the reason might lie in the fact that the
version of the argumentdiscussedby Aquinaswas not so much Anselm'sas a version of Anselm's
argument current in the 13thcentury and offered by writers such as Alexanderof Hales (C.11861245).'Charlesworth(1965,pp. 58-9) is also ratherdismissiveof Aquinas'scriticismsthough for differentreasons.It is ironic, therefore,that of all the specificlogical objectionsto Anselm itemised
here, the AquinasRebuttalturns out, as we shall see, to be arguablythe most on target
pp. 163-5,
17 lSheexampleof the supremelyexcellentisland is in paragraph6 of Gaunilo (1078)
the perfectPegasusvariantis from Gassendi(1641)pp. 225-6, and the Antigodthan which nothing
more effectivelyevil can be conceivedis from Millican(1989)p. 196.

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446 PeterMillican

suspectconceptualbasis,whileat the other,the IntentionalObjectFallacy,the UniqueReferentProblem,andthe AquinasRebuttalall concern specificlogical moves. Most of the remainingobjections(the
MentalEntityConfusion,the ComparisonDifficulty,the Kantian
Dogma,andthe SeparateRealmsPrinciple)combineboth conceptual
makeno attemptto identify
andlogicalaspects,but Gauniloreductios
anyspecificerrorandsimplychallengethe argumentas a whole:somethingmustbe wrongwithits premissesor withits logic,if parallelreasoningcanleadto suchmanifestlyabsurdconclusions.
It is no coincidencethatthe one purelyconceptualobjection(a) is
dubialsotheweakest,forevenif it is truethatAnselmis presupposing
for
ous neo-Platonicconcepts,thenunlessthishasadverseimplications
the detailedlogic of his reasoning,anyobjectionabledependenceis
likelyto be remediableby the simpleexpedientof substitutingappropriatelydefinedalternativeconcepts(as we shallsee later).Farmore
andpart-logicalMentalEntityConfuseriousis the part-conceptual
sion (b), whichtogetherwiththe associatedIntentionalObjectFallacy
(c) highlightsthe needfora muchdeeperrethinkingof the conceptual
frameworkif Anselm'sargumentis to appearplausible on pain of
andothersimilarproblems,the Fool'sunderstanding
Gauniloreductios
be takento implythe existof anyphrasejustcannotstraightforwardly
properties,andit is simplynot
enceof someentitywithcorresponding
in generalvalidto inferfrom'I amthinkingof anX to 'Thereis someX
Tocircumventthesedifficultiesit willbe necesof whichI'mthinking'.
sary to sketch (at least) a suitabletheory of mental or intentional
objects,and this, as we shallsee, is by no meanstrivial.Toprovidea
versionof Anselm'sargufoundationfor anynon-question-begging
ment it must obviouslycountenancethe ascriptionof propertiesto
'entities'thatarenot alreadyknownto be actual,andmustalsolicense
the drawingof inferencesabout other propertiesof those entities
(including,potentially,theirrealexistence).As terminologyfor these
entities,the most appropriatechoiceseemsto
existence-independent
be thelanguageof'natures'whichis usedbybothAnselmandGaunilo,
and alsoby Descarteswhenpresentingand discussinghis own OntologicalArgument.l8
Theaimof thefollowingsection,therefore,willbe to developa rudimentarytheoryof naturesthatcanas faras possiblesanctionthe relevantstepsof Anselm'sargumentwhileavoidingboththe MentalEntity
Confusionandthe IntentionalObjectFallacy.If we areableto develop
18 For example Anselm (1077-8) p. 117;Gaunilo (1078) pp. 157, 163; Descartes (1641) pp. 44-5, 48,
83-5, 117, 263-

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TheOne FatalFlawin AnselmsArgument 447

such a theory, moreover,then the ComparisonDifficulty(d), the


UniqueReferentProblem(e), the KantianDogma(f ) andthe Separate
for
RealmsPrinciple(g) mightwellproverelativelyeasyto circumvent,
may
seem
questionathat
allof thesederiveforcefrompresuppositions
ble givena theoryof naturesso understood.Totakethe UniqueReferent Problemfirst,if it is possibleto makesense of something-thanas denotinga legitimatenature,
which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
then it is hardto see why referringbackto this samenatureas 'thatshouldraise
something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'
any additionaldifficulties,or why the 'something'within this last
phraseshouldnot then be omittedwithoutanyloss of coherence.In
otherwords,Anselm'sreplacementof'something'by 'that'withinthe
stylisticbutnevmainbodyof his argumentmayproveto be essentially
whatever,
erthelesswellmotivated,involvingno logicalsleight-of-hand
but merelyhavingthe pointof emphasisinghowhis keyphraseis consistentlybeing used to makereferenceto a specificnature,with an
unambiguouslydenotinguse which might howeverrun the risk of
if the phrasewerealwaysto be presentedas startbeingmisunderstood
Thereneedbe no illicitassumping with the indefinite'something'.19
tion of a uniquerealreferenthere,for if talkof existence-independent
naturesmakesany sense at all, then it should be unproblematicto
speakof a particularnaturewithoutpresupposingthatit is uniquely
exemplified
in reality.
In a verysimilarmannerthe ComparisonDifficultywouldceaseto
be a majorproblemin the contextof an acceptabletheoryof natures,
for if talkof naturesis to serveanyusefulpurpose,then this mustbe
becausesomenaturescorrespondto reallyexistingthingsin theworld
(let us say that they are 'instantiated'or have a 'real archetype'),
whereasothersdo not.20Andif naturesaretrulyexistence-independent
formulato be
and'that'in Anselm's
19 Barnes
(1972)p. 5 takestheswitchesbetween'something'
whileat theoppositeextremeCampbell(1976)pp.32-4sees
arbitrary
andlogicallyunmotivated,
witha roleanalogousto thesubbutlogicallyrequired,
themasbeingnot merelywell-motivated
ruleof
bymeansof thestandard
calculuswhenreasoning
stitutionsthattakeplacein thepredicate
Anselmis delibername').Onthelatterinterpretation
existential
elimination(usingan 'arbitrary
atelyusingan indefinitereferencein his initialpremissthatsomething-than-which-nothingexistsin the Fool'smind,andalsowhenstatinghis conclusionthatsome
greater-can-be-thought
suchthingexistsin reality.Butbetweenthe premissandthe conclusion,his use of the formula
is morethanmerelya variationof styleor empha'that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought'
aboutthispreviously
idensis,sinceit is neededto indicatethathe is herespeakinganaphorically
accountis logicallyelegantandfitsthevariationsin the text;it also
tifiedsomething.
Campbell's
thatAnselm'suseof his formulamustbe intendedas a descriptive
hasthe importantimplication
to
whichfitswellwiththeinterpretation
identification
of a natureratherthana 'characterization',
be developedhere(cf.fn.35belowandits context).
20

wascoinedbyAlston(1960)p. 103.
Theterm'realarchetype'

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448 PeterMillican

in this way,then in comparinginstantiatedwith non-instantiated


natureswe aregenuinelycomparinglikewith like (albeitwe arein an
indirectsensecomparingexistentwith non-existent'typesof thing').
TheKantianDogmawouldalsobe defusedin this context,becauseif
naturesindeedforma coherentandwell-defineddomain,andwe can
drawa legitimatedistinctionwithinthatdomainbetweenthosenatures
andthosethatarenot, thenthe notionof instantithatareinstantiated
rangingoverthisdomain,
'predicate'
ationwillprovidean appropriate
perfectlywell without
expressed
to
be
argument
Anselm's
to enable
havingto invokethe troublesomegeneralconcept of existence.If,
moreover,his argumentprovesvalidwhenso expressed,thenthe SeparateRealmsPrinciplewill havebeenovercomethroughthe use of this
notion whichhasone foot in eachrealm connectingnaturesin the
thatinstantiatethem.
conceptualrealmwiththe realarchetypes
It is harderto anticipatein advancewhatimplicationsa theoryof
naturesmighthavefor the forceof the AquinasRebuttal(h) and the
(i), thoughif anythingsucha theorycanonly
variousGauniloreductios
strengthenAnselm'sargumentin theserespects.Anselm'sstep (5) is
in thought',but as the
basedon convictingthe Foolof a 'contradiction
AquinasRebuttalillustrates,such apparentcontradictionsprovidea
veryslipperybasison which to relywhen prescribinglimits on our
thinking.Anselmhimselfis awarethat it is possibleto 'thinkof the
(1078,p. 189),andone of the logicalexamplescollected
inconceivable'
by Paulof Venicein the fifteenthcenturyemphasisesthatif I graspa
propositionthat refersto 'somethingI am not thinkingabout'(for
example,'Heis thinkingaboutsomethingI am not thinkingabout'),I
am evenableto thinkaboutwhatI am not thinkingabout(1499,ff. 178).2lSo ordinarylanguagecanbe extremelymisleadingin this sortof
context,and a theoryof naturesthat forcesclearerdistinctionsto be
drawnbetweendifferenttypes of object of thought, both real and
intentional,is likelyto renderanygenuinecontradictionthatmaybe
presentin theFool'sthoughtbothmoreexplicitandeasierto pin down.
Forthis veryreasonthereis evensome groundfor optimismthatthe
maybe reduced,becauseif genuine
scopeof possibleGauniloreductios
fromthe merelyapparbecomeclearlydistinguishable
contradictions
ent, and if the form of Anselm'sreasoningis in fact legitimate,then
appropriateboundariesshouldemergeregardingwhatcan, and cannot, be provedto existbysuchmethods.

2' I owe this referenceto PeterGeach.

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TheOneFatalFlaw in Anselm'sArgument 449

theoryof natures
5. Outlineof an 'Anselmian'
suffito sketcha theoryof 'natures'
Theaimof thissectionis accordingly
andto identiffsome
reasoning,
cientto do justiceto thelogicof Anselm's
in thedevelopment
thatmustbe addressed
difficulties
of thefundamental
of anysuchtheory.Here,however,it willbe developedonlyso faras is
argument
withinwhichAnselm's
to providealogicalframework
necessary
is intended
asclearlyaspossible,andno commitment
canbe represented
eitherto thetheory'sultimatecogencyor its completeness-thuspotennatureswill
issuessuchasindividualandhigher-order
tiallytroublesome
quicklybe putto one side,andsomerelatedtopics,notablyAristotelian
bypassedentirely.Giventhisdissociationof'natures'from
essentialism,
essences,thetheorythatemergescannotpretendto beonethat
traditional
Anselmhimselfwouldhaveendorsedin detail,butwe can ignorethis
herebecausethedistinctionbetweengenuineessencesand
complication
of his
playsno rolein thelogicalprogression
'natures'
arbitrary
relatively
benefitsto be gainedfrom
Indeedtherearesomesignificant
argument.22
not
background,
of anyAristotelian
thetheoryindependently
presenting
illustrative
leastthatthis greatlysimplifiesthe devisingof appropriate
natures).
in thecaseof non-instantiated
examples(especially
thecenreasoning,
forAnselm's
framework
Toprovidean appropriate
to be madeto
of ourtheorymustbe to enablereference
tralrequirement
eitherits existenceor its
an 'entity)(suchas God)withoutpresupposing
non-existence as explainedabove,we shallreferto suchan existenceif it
entityasa 'nature,andspeakof a natureas'instantiated'
independent
hasat leastone realarchetype(thatis, if suchan entity'reallyexists').
on thetheory,forrefconstraint
impliesa significant
thisalready
However
in someway,
thatitbe identified
requires
erenceto anynaturepresumably
thenthis
itsinstantiation,
withoutpresupposing
andif it is to beidentified
('That
identification
causal
or
direct
appearsto ruleout demonstrative
2' Descartes'sappealto the distinctionbetween 'true and immutablenatures'and those 'which
areinventedand put togetherby the intellect'(1641,p. 83) seems to be an entirelyad hocmethod of
avoiding Gaunilo reductios,since he provides no clear account of the basis of the distinction, no
criterionof discrimination,no proof that the nature'God' is true and immutableratherthan invented, and most crucially, no explanation of why one kind of nature should be capable of
grounding an OntologicalArgumentwhile the other is not (that is, why 'truth and immutability'
should be supposed to have any relevantinferentialrole). Other defendersof the OntologicalArgument (e.g. Leibnizin section 44 of his Monadology)have followedDescartesin claimingthat the
natureof God is somehow special,with essence including existence in His case alone, so that His
existencecan be provedwhile Gaunilo reductiosare blocked. But such a claim is clearlyquestionbegging the alleged coincidence of God's essence and existence is more appropriateas the intended conclnsion of an OntologicalArgumentratherthan as a premiss,and if it is indeed a premiss, then if the argument is to serve any useful purpose this premiss requiresnot mere dogmatic
assertionbut independentjustification,with a clearexplanationof its logical role in the argument
which makesclearhow Gaunilo reductiosare to be avoided.

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450 PeterMillican

by
causedthisto happen,etc.),leavingreference
'Whatever
entitythere',
be
well
might
This
alternative.23
obvious
only
the
as
meansof a description
a seriousdifficultyforanytheoryof naturesthataspiredto givean adequategeneraltreatmentof the existenceandnon-existenceof concrete
wecanrestcontentwitha
forpresentpurposes
butfortunately
individuals,
treatsnaturesascharacterizatheorywhichaccordingly
purelydescriptive
is probably
Sucha restriction
tionsonlyof kindsratherthanof individuals.
anywaymorefaithfulto Anselm,becausealthoughhe sometimesseemsto
astheindividspeakof ithat-that-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought'
ualnatureor essenceof God,thisin itselfgiveslittlegroundforsupposing
foressencesof species
preference
thathe is heredeviatingfromAristotle's
when
is onlyto beexpected
sincesuchlanguage
ratherthanof individuals,
thenaturein questionis of suchevidentmagnitudeasto permitat most
oneinstantiation.24
natures,thenit
descriptive
Ifwe do restrictourselvesto non-indexical
to giveanoutlineof howtheymightbe
straightforward
becomesrelatively
Onesimpleoptionis to enclosethe relevantdescription(s)
represented.
of
withinanglebrackets here,forexample,arepossiblespecifications
significant
more
the
of
some
to
respectively
fournaturesthatcorrespond
thetelevi'Lyka'],
of theRussianspacedogLaika[pronounced
properties
sion dog Lassie,andthe ancientBritishheroesKingAlfredand King
Arthur:25

<Lai1ca>: <firstdogto besentintospace>


Lassie>:

rescuesvictims,starof filmand
dog, catchesviSlains,
televisionz

23 As explained earlier,I am treatingAnselm'sargument as naturaltheology, intended to provide a reason for any readerto accept the existence of God, ratherthan merely an elucidation of
the natureof God's existenceaimed only at the religiousbeliever.The believer,unlike the atheist,
might indeed take himself to have had direct demonstrativeor causal experience of God, and if
then he might
this seemed to revealGod as something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought,
III to drawthe conclusion thatGodexistsnecessarily.
be persuadedby the argumentof Proslogion
II argument seems peculiarly futile if interpretedin this sort of wayHowever the Proslogion
Hisnaturemanifestlylearns nothing
someone who starts from the premiss thatGodhasrevealed
whateverfrom the conclusion merelythatGodexists.

IV,when explicatingthe
24 Anselm appeals to his formula as the essence of God in Proslogion
III), and contrastsense in which God cannot be thought not to exist (as maintainedin Proslogion
II).
ing this with the sense in which God canbe thought not to exist (as by the Fool of Proslogion
He arguesin detail for the uniquenessof the supremebeing in ChaptersI to IV of his Monologion
(1076).
25 Other more detailednaturescould of course be defined,adding descriptionsof furtherproperties of each of these four individuals (cf. fn. 28 below), but for presentpurposes the ones given
here will do. Formally,each natureis to be understoodas an unorderedset of properties,but any
technicalimplicationsof this can be ignored here.

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TheOneFatalFlaw in Anselm'sArgument 451

Boethius>
theDanes,translated
defeated
<Alfred>: King of England,

<Arthur>: <Saintlyandheroicking,kepta courtof knights,sought


theHolyGrail)
we herereferto thesefournaturesbythelabels
Althoughforconvenience
(andincludesuchproper
'<Alfred>'
and'<Arthur>'
'<Laika>,
'<Lassie>',
characterizaand'Boethius'withintheirdescriptive
namesas 'England'
only the
tions),it shouldbe bornein mindthatthissyntaxis shorthand
realor imagined
natureshaveno essentialconnectionto anyparticular
propertiesthat
individual,andareconstitutedpurelyby the descriptive
properties').
characterize
them(letus callthesetheir'characteristic
notionof
Wearenowin a positionto introducethecrucialAnselmian
'greatness',
whichthoughrathervaguelyexplicatedin Anselm'swritings,
godlyqualitiesof power,wisdom,
presumably
involvestheparadigmatic
andgoodness,but also,notably,realexistence(or strictlyinstantiation,
of naturesrather
greatness
asa qualityprimarily
sincewe areconsidering
of greatness
seemfairlystraightforSomejudgements
thanof individuals).
ward,forexample,that<Alfred>is greaterthan<Laika>andaArthur)
as
greater
than<Lassie)(giventhatthehumanis in eachcasecharacterized
beingvastlygreaterin bothpowerandwisdomthananydog),butothers
aremoretricky.<Laika>,for example,is a naturewhichinvolvesno
of thisnature,the
remarkable
caninequalities to be therealarchetype
dogLaikahadonlyto allowherselfto be placedwithinSputnik2 before
byunublastoff.<Lassie>,bycontrast,is a naturewhichis characterized
andwouldno
bravery,
andevenmoraldiscrimination,
sualintelligence,
measure
if onlyitwerefortunate
doubtoutscore<Laika)on everyrelevant
Butsinceit doesn't,therelativegreatness
enoughto havea realarchetype.
of thetwonaturesis indeterminatenothingthatAnselmsaysmakesclear
in otherrespects,if any,aresufficientto outweighthe
whatadvantages
on a naturewhichis instantithatis conferred
additional
shareof greatness
withonewhichis not.
atedin realityascompared
streamline
ourdiscussionif
it willconsiderably
Atthispoint,therefore,
we makea simplifyingassumptionwhich,thoughnot unquestionably
Anselmian,at leasthasthe authorityof havingbeenstatedby his correspondentGaunilowithoutbeingcontestedbyhim.Namely,thatamong
forgreatness
(power,wisdom,goodnessetc.),realexistthevariouscriteria
howence'trumps'
allothers,so thatanynaturewhichhasa realarchetype,
maybe,willon thataccountalonebe
properties
everlowlyitscharacteristic
whichdoes
characterized,
greaterthananynature,howeverimpressively
theleastgreatof the
that<Lassie>is certainly
not.26
This,then,determines

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452 PeterMillican

fournaturesspecifiedabove,thoughtherelative
ordering
of theotherswill
dependuponthehistorical
questionasto whether<Arthur>is,or is not,
instantiated.27
Iftherereallywasa saintlyandheroickingwhokepta court
of knightsandsoughtthe HolyGrail,thenit is reasonable
to expectthat
Arthur> willbe greaterthan<Alfred>,whosecharacteristic
properties,
thoughno doubtimpressive,
seemsomewhatlessdemanding.If,on the
otherhand,thenatureArthur> in facthasno realarchetype,
thennot
onlyAlfred) butalso<Laika>
willbe greater
thanit.
Assuming for present purposes that Arthurz is not in fact
instantiated thattherewasno suchking we canillustrate
therelation
betweengreatness,
instantiation,
andtheothermaingreatness-conferring
properties
asfollows:
Scaleof increasingpower/wisdom/goodness
=

t:
..s

Laika)

<Lassie>

AIfred

Poh

wo

BS,

2w_

cArthur>

Scaleofincreasinggreatness

.XXty'

+'X"'-'"W

Lssie

Xt_

Arthur

laik>

AIfred

26 In the first paragraphof his Replyos l Behalfof the Fool,Gaulinoparaphrases


what he takesto
to be Anselm'sview that 'if this same being exists in the mind alone, anythingthat existed also in
realitywould be greaterthan this being' (Gaunilo1078,p. 157).Anselmhimself is neverquite so explicit, but gives no indication of disagreementwith Gaunilo on the point. As we shall see later
(fn. 42), the logic of Anselm'sargument could not possibly be strengthened (and might well be
weakened) if instead we were to assume that some significantsuperiorityin power,wisdom and
goodness can outweigh an inferiorityin existentialstatuswhen assessinga nature'sgreatness,and
this would also make the illustrationof the theory'simplicationsfar more cumbersome.
27 'Is' rather than 'was' because (again for the sake of simplicity) I assume here that all
judgementsof greatnessare time-independent,and thereforetreatthe instantiationof naturesas
timeless.Nothing of significancefor Anselm'sargumenthangs on this assumption

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TheOneFatalFlaw in Anselm'sArgument 453

by significantly
Hencealthoughthe nature<Arthur>is characterized
more impressive qualities of power, wisdom and goodness than
since<Arthur)is not instantiated
<Alfred)and<Laika>,nevertheless
whereasthey are,both Alfred) and Laika> areto be accordeda
higherplacein the scaleof greatness.
Godlikenatures,let us considerthe folTurningnowto recognizably
for
is usedas an abbreviation
lowing(in whichthe word'omniperfect'
'omnipotent,omniscient,andperfectlygood'):
<God>:

ornniperfect,creatorof the universe>

Presumably
<God>is a natureof somesignificantgreatnessevenif it is
not instantiated its characteristicpropertieswould make it far
greater,for example,than <Lassie>,<Arthur>or any other noninstantiated
natureof a mereanimalor human.Butif <God>is in fact
instantiated(thatis, if thereis indeedan omniperfectcreator)then it
The
seemsto reacha levelof greatnesswhichis almostunsurpassable.28
will see <God> as a natureof supremegreatness,
theist,accordingly,
whereasthe atheistwill see it as a natureof onlylimitedgreatness,less
nature.
greatthan<Alfred>,<Laika>or anyotherinstantiated
Supposenow that,heedlessof Kantianscruples,we allowrealexistpropertiesof a nature,and
enceto featureas one of the characteristic
accordingly
specifythe following:
EGod>:

omniperfect, creatorof the universe,reallyexisting)

28 I say 'almostunsurpassable'since as we shall see below <God> as defined here lacks at least
one characteristic property that contributes to Anselmian greatness, namely necessary existence. Moreoverif there is indeed a God, presumablywith additional particularqualities some of
which may be greatness-conferring, then it may be possible to specify other greater natures
whose characteristic properties include those of <God> plus these additional qualities (for
example, <omniperfect, creatorof the universe, eternal, inspirer of prophets>). This last point
illustratesa general implication of our theory of natures:any really existing being will instantiate a potentially infinite number of increasingly specific natures, and it may be that the full
greatness of any real individual (for example, King Alfred) cannot be capturedby any descriptive nature that has only a finite number of characteristicproperties.Considerationsof this kind
might motivate postulation of the limiting case of a nature that is characterizedby all the descriptive properties of some particular individual this, if accepted, would provide a sort of
Leibnizianindividual nature.

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454 PeterMillican

Howgreatis thisnature?Againthe answermustdependon whetheror


not it is instantiated:
if thereis in facta reallyexistingomniperfectcreator,then <EGod>will presumably like God> possessalmost
unsurpassable
greatness,whereasif thereis in factno suchbeing,then
EGod> will againlikeGod> enjoya relatively
modestdegreeof
greatness,somewherebetweenthat of aArthur>and aLaika>.It is
temptingto suggest,therefore,that as far as greatnessis concerned
EGod> and God> are in exactlythe same boat: the addition of
'reallyexisting'to a nature'scharacteristic
propertiesmakesno differencewhatever.
Butthisneednot requireus to insist,withKant,thatreal
existenceis illegitimateas a characteristic
property;it is sufficientto
agreeherewithHume,thatas a characteristic
propertyexistenceis just
peculiarlyempty.29
Thecasewith necessaryexistence,however,is verydifferent,because
the nature:
NGod>:

<omniperfect,
creatorof the universe,necessarily
existing)

cancertainlydifferin greatnessfrom<God>,moststrikinglyif thereis


indeedan omniperfectcreatorbut one who is merelycontingent(in
whichcase<God) is almostsupremelygreatwhereas<NGod>,being
non-instantiated,
is lessgreateventhan<Laika>).In anyothercircumstance,by contrast,Anselmianprincipleswouldseemto requirethat
<NGod) is greaterthan<God) in virtueof its moreimpressivecharacteristicproperties:both Anselm'smainargumentin ProslogionIII,
anda numberof otherpointsthathe makesin his responseto Gaunilo,
explicitlyhingeon theprinciplethatnecessaryexistenceis greaterthan
merecontingentexistence.
Puttingall this togetherwe can now spellout, fromthreediSerent
pointsof view,the hierarchy
of greatnessamongthe sevennaturesthat

29'Toreflecton any thing simply,and to reflecton it as existent,arenothing differentfrom each


other. That idea [of existence], when conjoin'dwith the idea of any object, makes no addition to
it.' (Hume 1739,pp. 66-7). Our discussionhighlightsa distinctionbetween real existence as an 'internal'characteristicpropertyof a natureand instantiation as an 'external'propertyof that nature,
which is similar in spirit to Meinong'sdistinction between 'being existent' and 'existing' (cf. Simons (1988),pp. 178,181;as Simons shows, Meinong'sown theory is far more subtle and tenable
than its better-knownRusselliancaricature).The KantianDogma is perhapsbest seen as a somewhat obscure statementof the correctpoint that instantiationis not a purelyinternalcharacteristic property,but concernsa nature'srelationto the world.

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Hierarchy
te y g * :+:
+

"

X> r

:'rrwi [

!.4s.,.>

sig

of

e.

jo

.A:i j\j>>

grerness
;

rs

0.,

_+forr*

av

t.v.

;,

if ofa;
reatness
*:>
if t ,.t.N.O.
0 V.
p:W
3 >;-;3,

ig=mrarch
l:

1-%!M.j}

tr

)/i:

:s.s

'

'h't

'

:p.a,
w*:

TheOne FatalFlaw in Anselm'sArgument 455

we havediscussed,dependingon whatwe taketo be the existentialand


modalstatusof an omniperfectcreator:
Scaleof increasinggreatness

thereis no omniperfect
creator

God>
ALassie) <Arthur)

NGod)

ALaika) <Alfred)

EGod
*

thereIsa contingent
omniperfectcreator

Ts

"

R:

'

IA,

'8;

God
Lassie> <Arthgr><NGod><Latka) AAIfred>

fIleraKhy
ofgreatnesw
lf
thereisa necrsry
omrziperfect
creator

tr

; ..,.

Ab;v....t

..

...

*#s-Dwra

ggg}
. e

Ksg@@s

0
<w-<4s>x

;
3-

Vw

j5

<God
aLicz

Arthurz <Lalkaz AIfred

EG d

<NGod

Thereis animportantthoughunsurprising
lessonhere:thegreatnessof
a naturedepends,in general,not only on its characteristic
properties
butalso,crucially,
on whetheror not it happensto be instantiated.
And
it is preciselybecauseinstantiationcontributesso significantlyto the
greatnessof a naturethatAnselmfeelsableto concludethatthegreatest
of allnaturesmustindeedbe instantiated.
Thepointsmadeso faronlypartiallydeterminethe interpretation
of
our reformulated
Anselmiannotionof greatness,but theymayalready
providea sufficientbasisfor the analysisand evaluationof Anselm's
argument.Leavingasideall modalcomplications,greatnessas understoodhereinvolvesfourpositivecriteria,namelypower,wisdom,goodness and instantiation,with the last of thesebeingdominantoverall
the others.30
Beyondthatit has beenleft indeterminate
whatthe relation mightbe betweenthe threelessercriteria whetherfor example
they also fall into some dominancehierarchy(with anydifferencein
power,say,alwaysoutweighinganydifferencein wisdom),or whether
30 The simplest way of taking account of whetherthe instantiationis necessaryor contingent is
probably to count a nature's modality of instantiation as a fifth, subordinate criterion (a 'tiebreaker',so to speak). This avoids the inappropriatenessof having numbers or other purely abstractentities deemed greaterthan a contingent God, and fits neatlywith modality'sbeing an allor-nothing affair.

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456 PeterMillican

footing(for
theycontributeon a moreor lesscomparable
alternatively
example,so that for anygivensuperiorityin power,it will alwaysbe
in wisdomthatwould
inferiority
possibleto findsomecorresponding
superficial
exactlycompensate).Forthisreason(aswellastherelatively
any
objective
on
criterion
each
individual
of
assessing
butrealdifficulty
and unifiedscale)it remainsin generalindeterminatewhichworldly
naturesaregreaterthanothers,butjudgingon the authorityof Edward
Gibbon,perhapsthe RomanemperorMarcusAureliusAntoninusis as
good a candidateas anyfor the accoladeof supremegreatnesswithin
takehim as an examplein what
the naturalorder I shallaccordingly
ceasesto be a problem
thissortof indeterminacy
follows.3lFortunately
in the divinesphereas traditionallyunderstood,becauseif indeedit
makessenseto speakof an infinitelypowerful,infinitelywise,andperfectlygood being,then this omniperfectnature,if instantiated,will
greatand,if not instantiated,will at leastbe
clearlybe unsurpassably
So althoughour
nature.32
by anyothernon-instantiated
unsurpassable
it is
treatmentof greatnesshasnot beenby anymeanscomprehensive,
forthepurposesof Anselmsargument.
at anyratequitesuflScient
Beforereturningto the detailsof thatargument,however,thereis
one moreratherthornyquestionin the theoryof naturesthatdeserves
to
at leasta mention.Namely,whetherit is legitimateto makereference
nature.
a
that
characterize
naturesthemselves,withinthe descriptions
naturessuchas
Arewe,forexample,permittedto specify'higher-order'
the following?
Greatest>: greatest of allnatures>
Mystronginclinationis to say'no',for at leastfourreasons.First,the
theoryof natureshasbeenintroducedherefor one specificpurposereferenceto kindsof thing-and a
to facilitateexistence-independent
naturesuchas <Greatest>givesno clearcharacterization
higher-order
andhistimethat'hislifewasthenoblestcommentary
3'Gibboncommentsof MarcusAurelius
on thepreceptsof Zerlo[thatis, Stoicism].Hewassevereto himself,indulgentto the imperfecto allmankind. . . If a manwerecalledto fixtheperiodin the
tionsof others,justandbeneficent
historyof theworld,duringwhichtheconditionof thehumanracewasmosthappyandprospernamethatwhichelapsedfromthedeathof Domitianto theacous,he would,withouthesitation,
cessionof Commodus.Thevastextentof the Romanempirewasgovernedby absolutepower,
raritywithwhich
undertheguidanceof virtueandwisdom.'(1776,pp.77-8).Giventheregrettable
hasfewcompetiprobably
suchdegreesof power,MarcusAurelius
virtueaccompanies
significant
torson thehumanscaleof greatness.
I ignoremodalityandthe othercomplicationsin notez8
39 Againfor the sakeof simplicity
than'neednot be a totallyorderedrelationto be
aboveThepointmadehereshowsthat'greater
argument(asseemsto be claimedbyBroad(1953)pp.177-g).Forthisrole
usablewithinAnselm's
it doesnot matterif somenaturesareneithergreaternorlesserthansomeothers,aslongas there
willheat leastasgreatasanyother.
is one (ormore)supremenaturewhich,if instantiated,

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TheOneFatalFlaw in Anselm'sArgument 457

of a kindof thing.Secondly,andrelatedto this, higher-ordernatures


can seempeculiarlyindeterminateor vacuous(in a waythatis highly
sentences),
or truth-teller-paradoxical
reminiscentof liar-paradoxical
characandeventhosethatdo succeedin providingsomedeterminate
terizationdo so only at second-hand in suchcasesit seemsbest to
replacethese higher-ordernaturesthrough'translation'into a firsthigher-order
orderequivalent.Thirdly,if we permitany'ineliminably'
natures(wheresuchtranslationis not possible),then thiswill almost
certainlyopen the door to paradox.33Finally,and clinchinglyfor
natureswouldnot in
presentpurposes,the admissionof higher-order
factassistAnselm'sargumentat all,butwouldonlymakeits analysisfar
more complicatedand murky.And as we shallsee, the fundamental
objectionto Anselm'sreasoningis in anycasequiteindependentof this
issue, so that even if the admissionof higher-ordernatureswereto
proveafterall to be well-motivatedandconsistent,theirintroduction
wouldstill do nothingto help remedythe fatalambiguitythatI shall
shortlyidentify.

6. Anselm'sargumentreconsidered
The theoryof naturesthathaslbeendevelopedabove,thoughadmit(andquitepossiblysubjectto variousobjections),is
tedlyrudimentary
to enableus to assesshowAnselm'sargumentwillfare
at leastsuhScient
theoreticalcontextthanit is usuallyperwithina farmoresympathetic
mitted. The steps of that argumentcan be fairlystraightforwardly
translatedfromthe mentalisticidiomin whichhe presentsit into the
languageof natures,as follows:
(1') The phrase 'a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-bethought' is clearlyunderstoodby the Fool, and apparently
makessense.

33 To takejust two very simple examples,considerthe paradoxicalpotentialof allowingsuch ineliminablyhigher-ordernaturesas: (a) <GreaterStill>,characterizedas <that naturewhich is even
greaterthan <Greatest>>;or (b) <Self-Refer>,characterizedas <the nature<Self-Refer>>.Many
familiarparadoxesare likelyto have analogueswithin a theory that is permissiveenough to countenancethese sorts of constructions,inevitablycastingdoubt on argumentsthat areframedwithin
it.

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458 PeterMillican

(2')

Hencewe can takethe phrase'a-nature-than-which-no-greatdenotingsomespecias successfully


er-nature-can-be-thought'
ficnature.34

(3') A naturewhich is instantiatedin realityis greaterthan one


whichis not.
(4') So if a-nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought
werenot instantiatedin reality,then it would be possibleto
thinkof a naturethatis greater(forexample,anynaturethatis
in reality).
in factinstantiated
sinceit is obviouslyimpossi(5') Butthiswouldbe a contradiction,
ble to think of a naturethat is greaterthan a-nature-thanwhich-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought.

(6') Thereforea-nature-ian-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-though
in reality.
mustindeedbe instantiated
It is, I believe,veryclearthatthis argumentis essentiallythe sameas
Anselm's thereis a step-by-stepcorrespondencebetweenthe two,
parallel.
andthelogicbywhichtheconclusionis reachedis structurally
Andyet, I claim,this translatedversionof the argumentis resistantto
at leasteightof the ninestandardobjectionsthatwereitemizedearlier.
Tostartwithconceptualmatters,anysupposedrelianceon somedubious Neo-PlatonicPresupposition(a) hasbeen removedby our reformulation of the Anselmiannotion of greatness,which has made
comparisonsof greatnessdependentonly on fourveryexplicitnonPlatoniccriteria,and in doingso hasensuredthatsuchcomparisons
areas well-definedanddeterminateas is necessaryforthe purposesat
hand.Thatthesecomparisonsnow all unambiguouslyrelatepairsof
natures (rather than a mixture of existing individuals and nonexistents)completelyavoidsthe ComparisonDifficulty(d), whilethe
substitutionof existenceby instantiationas the dominantcriterionfor
greatnesshasleftthe KantianDogma(f) withouta target by confin34 Though Anselm believed that there was only one supreme nature, he seems to have taken
careto presenthis argumentin such a way that its logic could still succeedif therewere more than
one, each as greatas the other (for example,(God> and <EGod>). Hence I have renderedhis formula using the indefinite article ('a-nature . . .') ratherthan the definite article ('the-nature. . . ),
which conformsto his own use of something... ratherthan that ... when introducingthe formula.
(Howeverfor simplicityI retainthe same formulathroughout,though Anselm'susagewould suggest a switch from 'a-nature ...' to 'that-nature...' in step (4'), as explainedin fn. 19 above.) Accordingly, I employ the word 'denoting' in the manner of the first paragraphof Russell's 'On
Denoting' (1905),to covernot only the use of a definite description,but also indeterminate'reference' by means of an indefinitedescription.

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TheOne FatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument 459

ing ourtheoryto the domainof descriptivenatures,andthussidestepping the problems associatedwith individual 'essences',we have
ensuredthatinstantiationemergesas an apparentlycoherentandcertainlynon-vacuousproperty(andone, moreover,whichconformsto
Fregeanorthodoxyto the extentof being an implicitquantification
natures,ratherthanbeingitselfa
characterized
involvingpredicatively
predicateof concreteindividuals).
Turningnowto thelogicof the argument,the stepfrom(1') to (2' ) iS
entirelyfreeof mentalisticobjectification,and so retainsno traceof
eitherthe MentalEntityConfusion(b) or the IntentionalObjectFallacy (c). In proceedingforwardfrom step (2'), the UniqueReferent
between
Problem(e) is alsoavoided,sincethereis nowno equivocation
of
'something'and'that'withinthe keyphrase,andno presupposition
a uniquerealinstantiator.Moreoverthe AquinasRebuttal(h) seems
in thoughtthatemergesat step(4')
inapplicable
to thecontradiction
in this translatedargument'a-nature-than-which-no-greater-natureas a description(ratherthan
functionsunequivocally
can-be-thought'
of the naturein question,andhencethe contraas a characterization)
imposdictionallegedin step(5') seemsto be genuine:it is presumably
sible to think of a greater nature than one that is correctly so
described.35
Finally,the argumentas a wholeseemsto violatethe SeparateRealmsPrinciple(g) as anysuccessfulOntologicalArgument
must butforreasonsrelatedto thosejustgivenin responseto (e) and
(h), this 'Principle'suggestsno clearpoint of objection:on the one
hand the referenceto a natureat step (2') does not presupposethe
existenceof a realarchetypeandso is not obviouslyquestion-begging,
be
at (4') cannotapparently
whileon the otherhand,the contradiction
confinedwithinthe realmof thoughts.36
Theonlytypeof standardobjectionthathasnot yet beendealtwith
is the Gauniloreductio(i), andherethe situationis indeedlesspromisargumentdoesat leasthavethemeritof
ing.Howeverourreformulated
thanis Anselm's
appearingsomewhatmoreresistantto suchreductios
35 Within our theory the key formulamust be interpretedas a descriptionratherthan a characterization, given that higher-ordercharacterizationsare not permitted. See fn. 19 above for evidence that this is also faithfulto Anselm'sown intentions.
36 The most comprehensivediscussionof the SeparateRealmsPrinciple,by Oppy (1995),seems
to overlook this subtle logic which has always made Anselm's Ontological Argument so much
more intriguing and puzzling than the Cartesian-style versions. Instead of addressing the
ProslogionII argumentitself, Oppy focuses (pp. 108-11)on three very simplified'interpretations'
of that argument,two of which are so distant from Anselm'swords as to be virtuallyunrecognizable, while the other dubbed the conceptualinterpretation-plays into the hands of his 'General
Objection'both by the simple way in which it is representedand also by being phrasedentirelyin
terms of conceivingand conceivability.

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460 PeterMillican

original,as we can see if we attemptto starta parallelargumentusing


Gaunilo'sown (mostexcellentisland'example:
(lg) Thephrase'a-nature-of-an-island-than-which-no-more-excelis clearlyunderstoodbythe Fool,andaplent-can-be-thought'
parentlymakessense.
(2g) Hence we can take the phrase 'a-nature-of-an-island-thanas successfullydewhich-no-more-excellent-can-be-thought'
notingsomespecificnature.(etc.)
The advantageof the reformulationis to makeexplicit something
which in Anselm'soriginal is maskedby his apparentIntentional
ObjectFallacy(andalsoobscuredbyhis failureto distinguishexplicitly
a natureand referringto one)-namely, that
betweencharacterizing
logicalgapbetween
evenif thefallacyis avoidedthereis an ineradicable
the firststepof the argumentandthe second,betweenthe mereunderstandingof a phrasethatpurportsto denotea nature,andtherebeing
in fact some specificnaturewhichthat phrasesuccessfullydenotes.
canbe blockedby denyGaunilo'sown attemptedreductio
Accordingly
ing the transitionfrom(lg) to (2g),on the basisthattheresimplyis no
suchnatureas a-nature-of-an-island-tllan-which-no-more-excellentplausiMoreoversucha blockingmoveis particularly
can-be-thought.
ble here,becausejustas thereis no suchnatureas a-nature-of-an-inteso it maywell be thatthe
ger-than-which-no-larger-can-be-thought,
excellenceof islands,likethe magnitudeof integers)can neverevenin
limit:howeverexcellentan
principlereacha particularunsurpassable
islandmightbe, therecouldalwaysremainroomforpossibleimprovement.
of course,will not be contentto
Anyatheistworthhis saltpetre,37
Anselm'sown transitionfrom
will
challenge
but
leavethe matterhere,
(1') to (2t) on similargrounds:perhapsthereis no suchnatureas 'aAnd this sort
nature-than-which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought'.
of questionmighteasilyleadinto traditionaldebatesaboutthe coherence of the conceptof God do omnipotence)omniscienceandperHowever
fectgoodnessmakesense,andaretheymutuallycompatible?
the atheistis betteradvisedto steerclearof all this and insteadstay
strategy.Grantto
faithfulto the straightforwardGauniloreductao
thatinfinitepower,infinitewisdom,andperfect
Anselmhis premisses)
goodnessareindividuallycoherentandmutuallycompatible,but then
37Aturn of phraseborrowedfrom Cargile(1975)p. 79.

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TheOneFatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument 461

thatis as closeas possiblea parodyof Anselm'sorigiframea reductio


in themoraldimension,
nal.Onesuchparodyis a simplemirror-image
whichcopiesthe Anselmianpatternalmostexactlyin otherrespects.
spadeworkto definethe notion
Justas thatrequiredsomepreliminary
power,W1S1ntermsot tourposltlvecr1terza1nstantlatlon,
0tgreatness
dom, andmoralgoodness),so similarworkcanbe doneto definethe
in termsof the samecriteria,exceptthatin
evilness
notionof effective
this casemoralgoodnesscountsnegativelyratherthanpositively(or,
comesto muchthe samething,moralevilnesstakes
whichpresumably
the placeof moralgoodnessas a fourthpositivecriterion).Theresult,
substitutions,will be an argumentbeginningsomeafterappropriate
thinglikethis:
P

>

(1e) The phrase'a-nature-than-which-no-more-effectively-evil-nais clearlyunderstoodby the Fool,andapture-can-be-thought'


parentlymakessense.
(2e) Hencewe cantakethe phrase'a-nature-than-which-no-moredenoting
as successfully
effectively-evil-nature-can-be-thought'
somespec1ncnature.
.

And we are alreadyapparentlywell on the wayto 'proving'the real


effectiveevilness,whomwe might
existenceof a beingof unsurpassably
name'Antigod'.38
appropriately
Not only doesthis antitheisticargumenthavea conclusionwhichis
to thetheistthanis Gaunilo'sisland
evenmoremanifestlyunacceptable
(becausetwo suchdifferentbeingsclearlycannotbothhaveunlimited
power),butalso,its structuralsimilarityto theAnselmianoriginalradicallyreducesthe scopefor findinganylogicallyrelevantasymmetry
betweenthem.In the absenceof anyplausiblebasisforclaiminga relebetweenmoralgoodnessand evilnessin themselves,
vant asymmetry
hasno recoursebutto appealto a differAnselm'sdefenderapparently
encein theirrelationto the othercriteriainvolved,notablyGod'sand
Theobviouswayof developing
Antigod'ssupposedinfinitewisdom.39
thisideais to maintainthatmoralgoodnesscan(orevenmust)accompany infinitewisdom whereasevilness cannot, for exampleon the
38

An argumentpresentedin Millican(1989)p. 196.

39 An asymmetrybetween goodness and evilness has been claimed (for example,by Augustine
and Aquinas in the context of the Problem of Evil) on the ground that goodness is positive and
evilness merelynegative.But even if evilness is understood negativelyas a privation of goodness,
this provides no basis for a relevant objection to the parody argument,for if a scale of goodness
can be set up then a scale of evilness can be defined straightforwardlyas its inverse,and if good-

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462 PeterMillican

groundthat objectivemoralvaluesare intrinsicallymotivatingfor


thosewho fullygraspthemandwouldthereforebe knownas suchby
anyinfinitelywisebeing.4Butevenif sucha manoeuvre(andthequestionablemoralmetaphysicsthatunderliesit) wereto be accepted,the
opponentof Anselmcouldrespondquitesimply,by droppingthe wisdom criterionfromhis definitionof'eSectiveevilness'andthusmodifying his parodyargumentinto one with a less ambitiousbut still
antitheisticconclusion,namelytheexistenceof a beingwho is infinitely
powerfuland maximallyevil (but not necessarilyinfinitelywise). To
blockthis less ambitious and thereforelogicallymore resilientargument,theAnselmianmustestablisha necessaryantipathybetween
infinitepowerand maximalevil, and without fallingbackon some
placeof goodness
aboutthe fundamental
Neo-PlatonicPresupposition
a
tall
order.
looks
this
universe)
in the
Althoughthe dialecticof the last few paragraphshas made some
as at leasta
the Gauniloreductio
progress,andhascertainlyestablished
versionof Anselm'sargument,
majorobstacleevenforthereformulated
impressionof inconcluit neverthelessleavesa ratherunsatisfactory
Perhapsthisshouldcomeas no surprise,
sivenessandevenirrelevance.
becausea similarimpressionis typicalof discussionsof the Gaunilo
strategy(forexample,Devine1975),probablyforthe followingreason.
The greatstrengthof this methodof opposingthe OntologicalArgumentis its generality if thereis anyflawin Anselm'spremissesor in
his reasoning,thensomeparodyargumentis likelyto be ableto exploit
it, no matterwhatthat flawmaybe. Butthis strengthentailsa correspondingweakness,becausetheverygeneralityof the methodmakesit
totallynon-specificandhenceill-suitedforidentifyingtheflawin questendto
tion. HencedebatesthatarecentredaroundGauniloreductios
withparodyargumentsbeingproposedby one
be ratherdirectionless,
side,and then opposedby the otheron groundswhichoftenseemto
haveverylittleto do withthelogicof the argumentitself anymethod
of obstructingthe reductiois embraced,evenif thismeansappealingto
principles(suchas the objectiveprescriptivityof moralvalues)that
playedno rolewhateverin the originalargument.Unlessone believes
supharmonywherebyGodhasprovidentially
in somepre-established

ness has a determinatelimiting value then it is hard to see why evilness should not have one too,
even if that value is different(and for the purposesof this argumenta zero limit would do just as
well as an infinite limit).
40

Such a claim is made in Ch. 11of Swinburne(1977).

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TheOne FatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument 463

one
refutationforeverypossibleGauniloreductio,
pliedan appropriate
is likelyto be left feelingthatthe Anselmian'srepliesarefrustratingly
besidethe point, andthatthe essentiallysimplelessonof the parody
arguments thatthe principlesusedwithinAnselm'sown reasoning
wouldsanctionparallelinferencesthat areplainlyinvalid has been
lost amid the scholasticdiscussionof the particularcase. To move
beyondthis frustratingstandoffwe mustresistthe temptationto add
yet moreepicyclesto the reductiodialectic,andinsteadget to the bottom of whatis reallywrongwithAnselm'sargument.

7. Thefatalflaw
So farthe positiveconclusionsof our analysisof Anselm'sargument
seemrathermeagre,thoughwe haveplentyof negativeresultsto show.
Namely,thatwhentranslatedinto the languageof naturesthe Anselmianargumentavoidseightof the nine standardobjectionsthatwere
outlinedearlier,andalthoughGauniloreductioscontinueto castvery
do nothingto showus
seriousdoubton its validity,theyunfortunately
wherethe logicalerroris to be found.Theobviouswayforward,then,
is to examinethe translatedargumentin detailwithinits propercontextof the theoryof natures,and see whatlogicaltricksit mightconceal.
Theargumentbeginsby pointingout thatthephrase'a-nature-thanmakessense,andthen goes
which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought'
on to inferthatwe can legitimatelytakethis as successfullydenoting
somespecificnature.Butwhichnature,exactly?If we takeforgranted
that MarcusAureliusembodiedthe greatestcombinationof power,
wisdomandmoralgoodnessto be foundin the non-divineworld,and
conignore,bothhereandin subsequentdiscussion,all complications
properties(notably
cerningadditionalsupposedgreatness-conferring
modalitiesof existencesuchas necessityandeternality),thenthe best
twocontendersareas follows:
Aurelius>: <absoluteEmperorof the RomanEmpire,wise,
just,beneficent>
<God>:

omniperfect, creatorof the universez

Sincethe argumentpurportsto provea contradictionin the denialof


God'sexistence,the bestwayto identifyanylogicalflawsis to takeup
can
the atheistpointof viewandthenseewhethersucha contradiction
presupposethe non-existbe forceduponus. Solet us nowaccordingly

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464 PeterMillican

enceof an omniperfectbeing,andaskfromthatperspectivewhichof
as 'a-nature-thanthe two naturesabovemightbe correctlydescribable
which-no-greater-nature-can-be-thought'.
The most straightforwardanswer,perhapssurprisingly,is that
simplyin virtueof being(fromthe atheist
aAurelius)is so describable,
thegreatestnaturethereis.
pointof viewthatwe areherepresupposing)
Forif Aurelius) is indeedthe greatestnaturethereis, then it is not
possible to think of any naturethat is (in fact) greater,and hence
aAurelius)canbe accuratelydescribedas 'a-nature-so-great-that-nowhichseemsa fairlyplausinature-that-is-greater-can-be-thought-of',
Obviouslythis answer
ble interpretationof the Anselmianformula.41
will not satisfythe Anselmianhimself,however,becauseif his formula
onlyto whichevernatureis infactunsurpassis understoodas referring
ablygreat(for example,<Aurelius>if thereis no divinebeing),then
the conclusionof his OntologicalArgument,thatsucha natureis really
will failto provideanysupportwhateverforthe existence
instantiated,
yieldsa soundargument(whichit
of God.So evenif thisinterpretation
of his
interpretation
does),theAnselmianmustinsiston an alternative
keyphrase.42
suggestsitself,becauseit seemsin a way
immediately
Onealternative
to be quiteeasyto thinkof a greaternaturethan<Aurelius>,simplyby
thinking of the nature <God> as instantiated.When we think of
<God) as instantiated,we areindeedthinkingof this natureas being
so greatthatno naturecouldbe thoughtgreater,andin thissense,the
describedas 'a-nature-which-cannature<God>canbe appropriately
So here
be-thought-so-great-that-no-nature-can-be-thought-greater'.
of theAnselmianformula,and
we havea secondpossibleinterpretation
to theAnselmianthanthefirst
onewhichis likelyto be moreacceptable
becauseit at leastenableshis OntologicalArgumentto get underway
Andwith this interpretawith a recognisablytheisticsubject-matter.
41 Here 'can-be-thought'in the originalphrasehas been takento mean simply'can-be-thoughtof', and so becomes more or less equivalentto 'exists'.Howeverthe term 'exists'may conjure up
misleadingideas about non-existent natures,so under this interpretationa more straightforward
Gaunilouses
way of expressingthe key phraseis just 'a-nature-so-great-that-no-nature-is-greater'.
the formulae'somethinggreaterthan everythingthat can be thought of' and 'thatwhich is greater
than everything'(e.g. Gaunilo 1078,p. 161),and he accordinglyseems to be interpretingAnselm's
phrasein this sort of way (albeithe confusedlytakesthe relevantrelationto be 'greaterthan'when
it should be 'at least as great as'). But in his responseAnselm takes issue with Gaunilo for using
forms of words inadequateto the subtletiesof his argument(1078,p. 179).
42 In securinga sound argumenthere, a significantrole is playedby our simplifyingassumption
that instantiation 'trumps' the other criteria for greatness (cf. fn. 26 above). If a nature
(e.g. <God>) could be greaterthan <Aurelius> without being instantiated,then clearlyAnselm
would have no right to suppose even that the actuallygreatestnaturemust be instantiated.

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TheOneFatalFlaw in Anselm'sArgument 465

tion, the argumentcan proceedquite smoothly as far as step (4').


Unfortunately,however,it then falls down completelyat step (5'),
because if the key phrase is interpreted in this way, as meaning
a-nature-which-can-be-thoughtso-great-that-no-nature-can-bethought-greater,
thenthe atheistwill see no contradiction
whateverin
thinkingof a naturethatis infactgreater.Forwhileit remainstruethat
the natureGod) can be thoughtto be so greatthat no naturecould
possiblybe greater,if infactit is not instantiated,
then<God>is not in
factthatgreat.
Havingfoundone interpretation
whichensuresa soundargument,
andanotherwhichgivesit a recognizably
theisticsubject,theAnselmian
mightbe temptedto try a hybridof the two,andstipulatethathis key
phrasebe understoodas meaning'a-nature-so-great-that-no-naturecan-be-thought-greater'.43
If the atheistacceptsthis as denotingsome
naturethen he will indeedbe forcedinto a contradiction,but this is
hardlysurprising,
becauseto acceptthatsomenatureis (in fact)so great
thatno naturecanevenbe thoughtto begreateris alreadyto acceptthat
some natureis as greatas any naturecould possiblybe, or in other
words,that<God>is instantiated.
So no atheistworthhis saltpetrewill
acceptthatunderthisinterpretation
thekeyphrasesucceedsin denoting
anynatureat all-as farashe is concerned,thereis nonaturethatgreat.
So noneof theseinterpretations
of 'a-nature-than-which-no-greaternature-can-be-thought'is able to fulfil all of the roles that Anselm
requiresof it withinhis argument,andhencethe crucialproblemwith
thatargumentturnsout to be nothingwhateverto do withdeepphilosophicalcomplexitiesregardinghis talkof mentalentities,existenceindependentnatures,predications
of greatnessandso forth,butsimply
resultsfroma relativelyshallow(thoughveryseductive)ambiguityin
his keyphrase.This is somethinglike an ambiguityof scope,which
arisesfroman indeterminacyoverwhat extentof the phraseis gov-

43 An alternative
hybridis 'a-nature-which-can-be-thought-so-great-that-no-nature-thatis-greater-can-be-thought-of',
but this simply combinesthe weaknessesratherthan the
strengthsof thefirsttwointerpretations
(moreoverif thereis no divinebeingthedenotationof
thephrasewillbe radicallyindeterminate,
sinceit willbe satisfiedbyanyof thecountlessuninstantiatednatureswhosecharacteristics
of power,wisdomandgoodnessareat leastas impressive as those of <Aurelius>).Yetmoreinterpretationsbecomeavailableif the argumentis
situatedwithin the sort of possibleworldsframeworkenvisagedby Lewis(1970,cf. fn. 2
above), includingtwo (p. 180)which might be paraphrasedas 'a-nature-which-must-bethought-so-great-that-no-nature-can-be-thought-greater',
and 'a-nature-which-cannot-bethought-to-be-less-great-that-any-nature'.
But suchinterpretationsseem ratherartificialas
construalsof Anselm'swords,andanywayprovideno assistanceto his argument.

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466 PeterMillican

operator,andwe can accordinglyscheernedby the 'can-be-thought'


as follows:
matizethe differentinterpretations

which
Anature

50 great
thatnonature

canbethought

\reater

canbethought

Withtwopossiblereadingsat eachof twopoints,we havefourpossible


interpretationsaltogether,whose significancefor the cogency of
Anselm'sargumentcanbe tabulatedas follows:

1S soune,outproVeS the
instantiof thegreatest
instantiation
Aureliuss
atednaturehence it fiils to prove
ofGced.
theexistence
The redllstioatStep(')fails,
can-be-thoughtso
Anaturewhich
to
becauseit is not contradictc)ry
great that no nature can-be- AGod>
supposethatthenatureill question
greater
t71ought
in actualgreatllese7.
is exceedecl
becauseif
A naturewhichis so greatthatno thereis ncgsuchnature(unlessStep(z') is unwarranted,
no Godexists,thenno natureis ill
greater Godexists)
naturecwn-be-thought
factgreatenoughto satisfythekey
so it failsto denoteW
phrase7

natureerhichis so greatthat no
nature is greater (i. e. no greclter
rlaturecat7be thoughtof)

ftrgumerlt

therearemanysuchnatures,A rexluctio at Step (5' ) fails,


Thenaturewhichcarl-be-thought
to
so greatthatno natureis greater frclmAurelius to aGod> hecauseit is not contradictory
supposethatsucha natureshould
be exctededin actualgreat:ness.

to notethatof thestandardobjectionsto thelogicof the


Itis interesting
argumentitemizedearlier,onlytheAquinasRebuttal,whichblocksthe
inferencefrom (4') to (5') underthe secondinterpretationand the
fourth,has beenvindicatedas relativelyclearlyon target.As for the
other genuinefaultsin the argumentin its variousinterpretations,
the possibilityof a
none of the standardobjectionsevenacknowledges
sound argumentunderthe firstinterpretation(wherebysomethingis indeedprovedto exist);
than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
none thereforegets closeto identifyingthe logicalgapthatopensup
underthis interpretationbetweensomething-than-which-nothing-

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TheOne FatalFlaw in Anselm'sArgument 467

greater-can-be-thought
andGod.Likewisethedenotationfailurewhich
is the onlyreallogicalfaultin the argumentunderthe thirdinterpretation has gonelargelyunnoticed the UniqueReferentProblemis no
doubtsomewhatanalogous,butthatinvolvesthecrudefailureof referenceto a particularexistentratherthanthe relativelysubtlefailureto
denoteanynature.(Thevitalpoint herebeingthatevenif in a perhapsextravagantly
Meinongianspirit we allowanyarbitraryset of
descriptionsto characterize
a nature,it can still remainthe casethat
thereis in factno nature,howevercharacterized,
thatsatisfiesAnselm's
description.)In viewof all this,it is perhapsnot surprisinghow many
commentatorshavetendedto assumethatAnselm'sargumentcanbe
keptat bayonlyby rejectingthe implicittheoryof natureson whichit
builds:they simplyhavenot seen the fundamentalambiguitywhich
standsout fromthe backgroundconfusiononlywhenthe argumentis
consideredwithina favourable
theoreticalcontext.Howeverthisambiguity,onceidentified,canbe recognizedandspeltout quiteindependentlyof the detailedtheoryof natureswithinwhichit hasemerged,as I
shallnowillustrate.

8. Thefatalflawrestatedandgeneralized
Anselmuseshis keyphrasewith the aim of denotingsomenature(or
type of thing, or concept),identifiedby its supremegreatnesswhen
comparedwith all others.Butsinceinstantiation(or actuality,or real
existence)is a crucialcomponentof his notion of greatness,he then
goeson to concludethatthis supremelygreatnature(or type,or concept)mustindeedbe instantiated
(or actual,or reallyexistent).
Unfortunatelythereis a doubleambiguityin Anselm'skeyphrase,
introducedby the overtonesof modalityin his words'canbe thought'
andby thepotentialapplicationof thismodalitynot onlyto theparticularnature(ortype,or concept)thathe intendsto pickout,butalsoto
theotherswithwhichhe favourably
comparesit. In short,it is leftindeterminatewhetherthesecomparisons
arebeingmadein termsof actual
greatness
or thoughtgreatness,
andhencewhetherthe natures(or types,
or concepts)arebeingcomparedin termsof theiractualor hypotheticalqualities.
If all comparisonsconcernactualgreatness,then it is clearthat
Anselm'sargumentcanat bestprovethe existenceof somethingthatis
actuallyunsurpassedby anycompetitor for the atheist,this will be
quite insufficientto elevateit to any sort of divine status.If, on the
other hand, all comparisonsconcernhypotheticalgreatness,then

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468 PeterMillican

althoughthe atheistmayconcedethatthereis somepotentiallydivine


contenderin the frame (namelythe nature,type or concept of an
omniperfectcreator),the argumentwill do nothingto showthatthis
contenderis anythingmorethanhypothetically
supreme:if somethingthan-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought
can satisfythis description purelyin virtueof beingthoughtsupremelygreat,thenclearlyits
satisfactionof the descriptionprovidesno groundforgoingon to concludethat it is actuallysupremelygreat.Anselm'sargumentprobably
derivesmuchof its slipperyseductivenessfroma third,hybrid,interpretationwherebythe comparisons
aremadebetweenthe actualgreatness of his key nature (or type, or concept) and the hypothetical
greatnessof its competitors:
in effect,we areinvitedto contemplate
the
existentialstatusof something-which-is-actually-so-great-that-nothingcan-be-thought-greater.
But once madeexplicitit becomesclearthat
this simplybegsthe questionagainstthe atheist:to acceptthatthe key
phrase,so interpreted,
denotesanything evena natureor conceptis alreadyto concedethe realexistenceof a beingthanwhichno greater
canevenbe imagined.Nothingin Anselm'sargumentgivesthe slightest
groundforsupposingthatsucha beingexists,or henceforthe atheist's
concedingthat this phrase,when thus interpreted,can successfully
denote.
Thereis herethe basisof a generalmethodof criticismwhichcanbe
appliedto otherversionsof the OntologicalArgumentandwhich,once
stated,seemsrationallycompelling.Suchargumentstypicallyproceed
by referringto or specifyingsome 'entity'(nature,type, concept,or
whatever)whose'reality'(instantiation,actuality,existence,or whatever) is to be proved.The means of referenceor specificationwill
involvesome suitablygodlikedescriptionwhosecontentis then supposedto providea meansof demonstrating
the realityof the entityin
question.Forsimplicity,supposethatthe descriptionusedis 'theG',in
whichcasethe argumentwillproceedby usingthisdescriptionto identify the entityin questionandthen unpackingthe descriptivecontent
withtheaimof showingthattheGmustreallyexist.Tocountersuchan
argumentI recommendthatthe atheistshouldfaceits proponentwith
a simpledilemmathroughthe followingquestion:'Is it necessary,in
orderto satisfythe description"theG"thatan entityreallypossessthe
propertiesthatqualifyit as the denotationof thatdescription,or is it
sufficientthatit bethoughtofaspossessingthe relevantproperties?'
Ifit
is necessarythattheG reallyhavethoseproperties,thenthe atheistcan
reasonablyquestionwhether'the G'succeedsin denotinganygodlike
entityin the firstplace;if it is not necessarythattheG reallyhavethose

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TheOne FatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument 469

properties,then the theistcannothope to provethat anyentitythus


denotedmustthereforereallyexistwiththoseproperties.44
Wehavealreadyseenhowthehornsof thisdilemmaimpaleAnselm's
OntologicalArgument:
his keyphrasecanbe interpretedin a waythat
guaranteessuccessfuldenotationonly by relaxingeitherthe requirementof divinity(thesensein whichit mightdenoteMarcusAurelius)
or the requirement
of reality(thesensein whichit candenotea divine
entityevenif thatentityis merelyhypothetical).
ButAnselm'sfailureto
evadeimpalementshouldnot surpriseus, forit is an obvioustautology
thatthe realityof a divinebeingcanbe inferredfromhis keyphrase's
successfuldenotationonlyif thatphraseis usedin a sensethatprevents
it fromdenotingsuccessfullyunlessa divinebeingreallyexists.So in
usingthe phrasewiththe presumptionthatit doessuccessfully
denote
something,andthenarguingbackthatit canonlysuccessfully
denotea
realdivineentity,Anselmis surreptitiously
tryingto havehis cakeand
eatit.
As an illustrationof the widerrelevanceof thiskindof dilemma,we
can applyit to the versionof the OntologicalArgumentpresentedin
DescartessMeditations,
the essentialpointsof whicharecontainedin
the followingshortquotation(Descartes1641pp. 45-6, followingthe
wordingof the Frenchedition):
[The]ideaof God)or a supremelyperfectbeing,is one whichI findwithin
mejustas surelyasthe ideaof anyshapeandnumber.Andmyunderstandingthatactualandeternalexistencebelongsto hisnatureis no lessclearand
distinctthanis the casewhenI proveof any shapeor numberthatsome
propertybelongsto itsnature. . . it isjustasmuchof a contradiction
to think
of God(thatis, a supremely
perfectbeing)lackingexistence(thatis)lacking
a perfection),asit is to thinkof a mountainwithouta valley.

HereDescartespurportsto makereferenceto somethought-of'beinge


whichis characterized
as possessingallperfections.
Hetheninfersfrom
the natureof this beingthatexistenceis one of the perfectionsthatit
possesses,andhencethatit mustreallyexist.Translated
intothe termi44 The dilemma is posed in terms of something's'really'possessingpropertiesratherthan 'actually' possessing them, to accommodatemodal argumentssuch as Plantinga's(1974>pp. 213-6), in
which it is claimedthat some entity in a possibleworld (ratherthan a mere object of thought) has
a 'world-indexed'propertywhich carriesimplications for the actualworld also. Here the appropriate target of the dilemma is the supposition that there really is such a possible entity; for as
Plantingahimself points out (p. 218),the exemplificationof this kind of world-indexedproperty
ean only be either necessaryor impossible hence acceptingthe realpossibilityof such an entity
cannot reasonablybe expectedeven of an agnostic, let alone an atheist.The question-beggingnature of Plantinga'sargumentbecauseclearerif it is translatedout of the idiom of possible worlds,
which seems to invest possibiliawith so much more 'reality'than mere thoughts or fictions. Thus
translated,Plantinga'sclaim is in effect:'The following property essentialomniperfectionwhich
if possiblyexemplifiedis necessarilyexemplified-is possiblyexemplified.'

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470 PeterMillican

nologythatwe haveusedto analyseAnselm'sargument,we canseediasimplerversiontradeson thesamekind


howDescartes's
grammatically
of ambiguity,albeitwithonlyone instanceof theambiguityratherthan
two:

A naturewhich/

\in

includinginstantiation
possessionof allperfections

canbe thought

Howeverthe fataldilemmacanbe posedto Descarteswithoutrelying


as follows:
on anysuchtranslation,
Whenyou referto 'God',you arepurportingto speakaboutsome
perfectbeing but it is not clearwhether,in orderto qualifyas the
referentof thisterm,a beingneedsto be perfectin reality,or whether
it is sufficientthatthe beingbe merelythoughtof as perfect.If your
term'God'candenoteonlya beingthatis perfectin reality,thenyou
havegivenno reasonto supposethatthe termsucceedsin referring,
becauseyourmerelyhavingthe ideaof a perfectbeingshowsat best
thatsomebeingis thoughtof byyou as perfect,not thatthereexists
somereallyperfectbeingfor 'God'to denote.If on the otherhanda
beingcanqualifyas the referentof yourterm'God'justin virtueof
beingthoughtof as perfect,thenevenif 'God'succeedsin referring,
thebeingthus
you clearlycannotarguethaton painof contradiction
denotedmustbe perfectin reality.Eitherway,yourargumentdoes
nothingto establishthe realexistenceof a perfectbeing.
As comparedwith the standardobjectionsto the OntologicalArgumentsurveyedearlier,thismethodof refutationhasa numberof major
advantages.First,it presupposesno sophisticatedtheoreticalbackgroundor terminology,foras we haveseenit canbe posedto Anselm
or Descartes,or indeedto anyotherproponentof a similarform of
argument,in the sametermsthathe useshimself.Secondly,becauseof
this terminologicalmodestythe objectioncanbe urgedin a waythat
remainsontologicallyand metaphysicallyneutral,sidesteppingany
debateon the statusof mental,intentionalor otherpotentiallycontroversialtypesof 'entity'evenif theseareexplicitlyemployedin the criticized argument.Thirdly,the avoidanceof such metaphysicalred
herringsleavesthe thrustof the objectionclearand straightforward,
directlytargetingthe logicof the presentedargumentandhighlighting
plainlywherethe reallogicalgaparises.Finally,andmostimportantly,

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TheOne FatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument 471

this simpleand directattacksucceedswhereso manyof the familiar


standardobjectionsfailor areat bestinconclusive:
Anselm'sOntologicalArgument,andthatof Descartes,areindeeddecisivelyrefuted.

9. Conclusion,anda moral
Therefutationdevelopedaboveis, in the end,gratifyingly
simple,and
conformsnicelywiththe preferenceexpressedat the beginningof this
paperfor 'shallow'as opposedto 'deep'refutations.If I am right,then
Descartes'sversionof the argumenttradeson an ambiguitybetween
realperfectionandthoughtperfection,whileAnselm'sversioncontains
two instancesof the sameambiguity,with the doublyindeterminate
scopeof 'canbe thought'cleverlycamouflaged
insidehis keyformula.
Anselm'sargumentcanthusbe addedto whatis alreadya distinguished
listof implicitscopefallacies,including(arguably)
suchclassicalexamplesasAquinas's
'ThirdWay',Aristotle's,
Hobbes'sandMill'sarguments
fora primarygood or standardof value,Berkeley's
inferenceto an allperceivingspirit,andvariousothernotableargumentsgivenbyphilosophersfrom Platoto Spinozato contemporariessuch as Ayer.45
Of
coursethe scholarlyidentificationof suchshallowfallacieswithinan
author'sworkcanbe verycontroversial,
but if substantiated,
it brings
theconsiderable
benefitof deliveringa logicalverdictthatwillstandthe
testof time.WhereasconvictingAnselmof treatingexistenceas a predicatestillleavesit obscurewhetherthis supposederroris in factdisastrousforhisargument(sinceit mightturnout not to be an errorat all),
convictinghim of a shallowscope fallacyleavesno such room for
doubt.
The long-standingassumptionthat the fallacyin the Ontological
Argumentis deep ratherthan shallowmay have had a significant
impacton the developmentof twentieth-century
logicandphilosophy.
Russell'sflirtationwith Hegelianismwas apparentlybased on his
acceptanceof a formof the argument(as evidencedbothby his essays
atthetimeandbya letterof 19llto OttolineMorrell),andalthoughit is
unclearhow farexplicitconsiderationof the argumentmotivatedhis
subsequent
work,thecloselyrelatedtopicof existence(andthestatusof
non-existents)figuredprominently
bothin his discussionswithMoore
in the 1890S and in the thinkingthat led ultimatelyto his theoryof
45 All of these philosophershave been accused of committing the most familiarform of scope
fallacy,known as the 'quantifiershift' fallacy.For this accusationagainst Plato,Aristotle,Spinoza
and Berkeley,see Geach (1958)pp. 2-5; against Hobbes and Mill, see O'Neill (1998),p. 194 fn. so
and pp. 122-3;againstAquinas,see Davies (1982)p. 42; againstAyer,see Anscombe (1967)p. 138.

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472 PeterMillican

In 1911he wasstillviewingthe OntologicalArguin 1905.46


descriptions
ment as the rationalbasis for the Hegelianismthat he had since so
disowned;henceit seemsverylikelythatthe prospectof
emphatically
underminingit wouldhaveprovidedat leastsome of the motivation
forhis intenseinterestin theselogicalissues.Overthenextfewdecades
the OntologicalArgumentand the conceptof existencewerewidely
seenas intimatelyentwined,not onlybecausethe argumentwasstandardly'refuted'byappealto theKantianDogmaandthequantificational
of existence(as for exampleby Frege,Russell,Ryle,and
interpretation
Kneale),butalsobecause-just asit haddoneforKant theargument
continuedto playa majorrolein discussionsof the natureof existence
talkof 'natures'
wouldinevitablydiscourage
Sucha background
itself.47
or of entitiesthatmightor mightnot exist,for if all thatwaswrong
with the OntologicalArgumentwas its treatmentof existenceas a
propertywhichsuchentitiesmighthaveor lack,then admittingsuch
discoursewouldriskopeningthedoorto the
entitiesintophilosophical
a host of others(suchas the Gaunilodoubt
and
no
Anselmianfallacy
theoriesbecamewidelyneglectedand
styleparodies).So 'Meinongian'
evenridiculed'asthe supremeexampleof a philosophicalreductioad
(Passmore1985,p. 127),eventuallymakinga modestcomeabsurdum'
backonly in the 1970SafterKripke'sseminalNamingand Necessity
(1972)had madetalkof possibleworldsandtheiroccupantsrespectawakea numberof suchtheoriesweresoon developed,
ble. In Kripke's
for exampleby Castaneda(1974),Rapaport(1978),Routley(1979),and
deepsuspiParsons(1980),but amongthe generalrunof philosophers
Perhapsthis suspicioncanbe significantlyallayed
cion still remains.48
by showingthatthe fundamentalflawwiththe OntologicalArgument
is not itstreatmentof existencewhichso provokedKantandhis successors, but insteada relativelyshallowambiguitywhich,if expunged,
blocksthe inferenceevenif Anselm'ssupposedMeinongianextravatheory
withinan appropriate
gancesarepermitted.Whenreformulated
46 See Griffin(1991)pp. 70-8 for the influenceof the OntologicalArgumentin Russell'sconversion to Hegelianismand pp. 296-304 on his discussions with Moore. See Simons (1988)for Russell's later correspondencewith Meinong (and with Frege)which played such a large part in the
developmentof his theory of descriptionsas firstpresentedin Russell(1905).
47 For example, the 1936symposium between Kneale and Moore on the topic 'Is Existence a
Predicate?' perhapsthe best-known such discussion startsfrom Descartes'sversion of the argument, and the argumentalso featuresprominentlyin numerousarticleson 'Existence'or 'Being'
in philosophicaldictionariesand encyclopaediasthroughoutthe twentiethcentury.

which takes
48 An engagingattempt to answersuch scepticismis providedby Jacquette(2000),
the form of an explicit 'confession'to what is generallyreckonedto be a philosophicalsin. He develops his own position most thoroughlyin Jacquette(1996).

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TheOne FatalFlawin Anselm'sArgument 473

of(natures', the one fatal objection to the argument is this ambiguity.


Hence as long as such ambiguities are assiduously avoided, we have
seen no reason to suppose that even the relatively crude theory of
naturessketchedabovewill sanction any such objectionableinferences.
If this is right) then the analysisof what is reallywrong with Anselm's
ancient enigma may yet hold a valuable lesson for contemporary
philosophy.49

Schoolof Philosophy
Universityof Leeds
Leeds)LS29JT
p.j.r.millican@leeds.
ac.uk

PETER MILLICAN

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