SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 142565

July 29, 2003
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NESTOR G. SORIANO alias "Boy," Appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
WHAT STARTED OUT AS AN ORDINARY LOVERS QUARREL turned out to be a nightmarish inferno for the residents of Datu Abing Street,
Calinan, Davao City. The unmitigated passion and impulses incessantly burning in the heat of the moment ignited the series of events that
resulted in the conflagration of 18 September 1998 mercilessly destroying the houses along its path. The age-old forewarning that "he who plays
close to the fire shall ultimately be consumed by its flames" fits literally and figuratively into this tragic tale of lust, love, betrayal and isolation. After
the smoke had dissipated and the heat simmered down, Nestor G. Soriano found himself charged before the RTC of Davao City with and later
convicted of Destructive Arson penalized under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 10, par. 1, RA 7659, and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.1
The factual backdrop: About midnight of 17 September onto the early dawn of 18 September 1998 accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano was
having an argument with his live-in partner Honey Rosario Cimagala concerning their son Nestor, Jr., nicknamed "Otoy." Honey worked as Guest
Relations Officer (GRO) in a Metro Manila beer house. The disagreement stemmed from the fact that Honeys brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their
child out without the consent of accused-appellant who wanted both Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. But Honey refused. As
their discussion wore on accused-appellant intimated to Honey his desire to have sex with her, which he vigorously pursued the night before with
much success. This time Honey did not relent to the baser instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her stern rebuke to his sexual
importuning.
Incensed by her negative response, Nestor nastily retorted: "[S]he is now arrogant and proud of her brother who now supported (sic) her and her
children."2 He added that since he returned from Manila, the house had become "unlucky," referring to that belonging to her aunt Fe Cimagila then
occupied by Honey located at Datu Abing Street, Calinan, Davao City.3
In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead. "You are hurting me," she snapped back, "just like what you did to me in Manila." 4
Nestor then moved away as he muttered: "It is better that I burn this house," 5 and then took a match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette
and set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of Honeys room.6
With her naked body precariously draped in a towel, Honey instinctively took off her covering and doused off the flame with it. Then she rushed to
her cabinet in the room to get a T-shirt and put it on. But Nestor did his worst; he went to Honeys room and set on fire her clothes in the cabinet.
Honey fled to the ground floor; Nestor followed her. As the conflagration was now engulfing the second story of the house, Honey frantically
shouted to her uncle Simplicio Cabrera, who was residing next door, "Boy is setting the house on fire," referring to Nestor. 7
On the ground floor Nestor grappled with Honey and choked her as he dragged her towards the kitchen. She told him that it would be better for
him to kill her than to set the house on fire as it would endanger the neighboring houses. After initially pointing a knife at Honey, Nestor finally laid
down his knife and hurriedly went back to the second floor only to see the entire area in flames. They had no choice but to leave as the fire
spread rapidly to the neighboring houses. As a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally burned together with five (5) neighboring
houses8 owned individually by Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braa, Simplicio Cabrera and Perla Clerigo.9
Subsequently, on 21 September 1998 an Information was filed against accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano alias "Boy" for Arson. 10 On 30
October 1998, the Information was amended to specify the charge as Destructive Arson 11 under Art. 320, Sec. 10, as amended by RA 7659 and
PD 1613. Again on 18 January 1999,12 upon prior motion of accused through counsel for reinvestigation, the prosecution filed a second Amended
Information charging the accused with the same crime of arson but "under Art. 320, Sec. 10 as amended by RA 7659 and PD 1744," and adding
the phrase "motivated by spite or hatred towards the occupant of the property," as a special aggravating circumstance, further including the name
of "Orlando Braa" whose house worth P1,000,000.00 was also burned.
In the trial, Honey Rosario Cimagala, Oscar Cimagala, Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braa, Simplicio Cabrera and Perla Clerigo,
among others, were presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
Accused-appellant was the lone witness for his defense.
On 3 September 1999, the RTC of Davao City, Branch 17, found Nestor G. Soriano alias Boy guilty of Destructive Arson as charged pursuant to
RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1, as amended, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The court a quo also ordered him to pay the complainants
whose houses were likewise burned together with that of Fe Cimagala in the following manner: Fructuosa Jambo, Simplicio Cabrera, Perla
Clerigo, Orlando Braa and Oscar Cimagala P1,000,000.00 each as estimated value of their respective houses, including another amount
ofP100,000.00 each as moral damages and P50,000.00 each by way of exemplary damages, and the costs of suit.
Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613, Arson is classified into two
kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of arson (PD 1613). This classification is based on the kind, character and location of
the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group
of persons.13 The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of
properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence,

the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into
consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and,
the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This
decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659,
and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations,
airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. 14 Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires
and other crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability of the nation, PD
1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of
punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
Under Sec. 4 of PD 1613, if special aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of Simple Arson, the penalty under Sec. 3 shall be
imposed in its maximum period: (a) If committed with intent to gain; (b) If committed for the benefit of another; (c) If the offender is motivated by
spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned; and, (d) If committed by a syndicate, or group of three (3) or more persons.
If by reason, or on the occasion of Simple Arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one
intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to
produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. 15If there is an eyewitness to the crime of Arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused.
When this is done the only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness. 16 In the crime of Arson, the prosecution may describe the theatre of
the crime and the conditions and circumstances surrounding it. Evidence of this type is part of the res gestae.17
It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the factual findings of the court a quo as well as the conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are generally
not disturbed. We have no cogent reason to deviate from this rule in the case at bar.
On the basis of the categorical testimony of Honey Rosario Cimagala positively identifying accused-appellant as the one responsible for the
burning of the house of Fe Cimagala in the early morning of 18 September 1998, the trial court found the accused Nestor G. Soriano guilty as
charged.
The accuseds denial of the crime cannot be an adequate defense against the charge. In People v. Mahinay18 we held that mere denial by
witnesses particularly when not corroborated or substantiated by clear and evidencing evidence cannot prevail over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial being in the nature of negative and self-serving evidence is seldom given weight in law.
Positive and forthright declarations of witnesses are even held to be worthier of credence than a self-serving denial.
We agree with the court a quo that the quantum of proof required to convict an accused in a criminal case has been satisfied in the present
dispute. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.19
The legal basis of the trial court for convicting accused-appellant is Art. 320, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, Sec.
10, par. 1. Under this provision, a person found guilty of Destructive Arson is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death where the burning affects
one (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or
different occasions.
However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, 20 which imposes a penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly
refer to the structures as housesrather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not
Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly
against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited
house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts
committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society."21 On
the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the
law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established
to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on

impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. 22 Nothing can be worse
than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus,
accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited
house or dwelling.
In addition, we find that there exists a mitigating circumstance that should have been appreciated by the trial court in determining the penalty to
be imposed on the accused-appellant: a circumstance similar and analogous to passion and obfuscation. 23 An impulse of invidious or resentful
feelings contemplates a situation akin to passion and obfuscation. This circumstance is mitigating since, like passion and obfuscation, the
accused who acts with these feelings suffers a diminution of his intelligence and intent, a reduction in his mental and rational faculties.
It has been satisfactorily shown by the court a quo that the lovers quarrel between Nestor Soriano and Honey Rosario Cimagala ignited the chain
of events that led to the conflagration that occurred in the early dawn of 18 September 1998. Passions were inflamed in the evening of 17
September 1998 due to the impending return of Soriano to Manila the following day with the prospect of leaving behind in Davao his son Otoy
who bears his namesake "Nestor Jr." But reason, unfortunately, did not prevail; emotions took control of the events that were to unfold. His efforts
went to naught; his attempts to win back his forbidden love were likewise thwarted. Verily, the resentment accused-appellant felt came from the
realization that he may never see his son again once he left Davao; that his utter frustration in trying to convince Honey Rosario Cimagala to
return to Manila with their son brought with it a reduction of his rational faculties within that moment in time. Although emanating from lawful
sentiments, the actuations of accused-appellant led to his criminal act of burning the Cimagala home, and other neighboring houses. In other
words, accused-appellant was in a state of extreme emotional stress.
Mr. Justice Adam C. Carson, in his concurring opinion in United States v. Butardo,24 gives his view on the graduation of penalties for the crime of
Arson under the Spanish Penal Code. In the old law on which The Revised Penal Code is based, he comments that the authors clearly had in
mind certain considerations in imposing penalties of exceptional severity in the various cases of arson. The observations of Mr. Justice Carson in
Butardo are thus still relevant in our contemporary interpretation of criminal law:
The authors of the Spanish Penal Code, in imposing penalties of exceptional severity in certain cases of arson, clearly had in mind:
First. The extreme danger to which human lives may be exposed by the malicious burning of dwelling houses and the like;
Second. The danger to property resulting from widespread conflagrations;
Third. The fact that it is extremely difficult to adopt precautions against the commission of the crime, and to discover the perpetrators after its
commission.
Formerly, where these elements marked the commission of the crime, the single penalty prescribed by law was that of death, but this severity
was finally relaxed, and while exceptionally severe penalties are still imposed in such cases, the authors of the Penal Code appear to have
endeavored to graduate these penalties in accordance with the degree of danger to life and property, resulting from the commission of the crime.
To this end the severest penalties are prescribed for the malicious burning of edifies in which large numbers of persons are assembled. Less
harsh, but still very severe penalties are imposed on those setting fire to dwelling houses and other buildings more or less permanently occupied.
Less severe penalties on those guilty of burning unoccupied dwellings, the penalty being more or less severe as the house appeared to be
situated so as to make a widespread conflagration more or less probable. And finally, sufficient, but not notably harsh penalties are prescribed in
cases where the property of others is set on fire under conditions which do not suggest special danger to human life or the likelihood of
considerable destruction of property.
In a concurring opinion, this time in U.S. v. Burns, Mr. Justice Ignacio Villamor explains the rationale behind the penalties for Arson:25
In the opinion of Groizard, one of the most famous commentators on the Spanish Penal Code, of which ours is but a copy, "it is the potential
damage that is considered here in fixing the grave penalty of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. The risk which a person runs who may be
found in a place that is burned, whether it be a building, a farm-house, a hut or shelter, or a vessel in port, is what constitutes the gravity which is
the object of this crime; just as the damaging intent of the agent, manifested by his setting fire to a place where he knows there is one or more
persons, gives an idea of his subjective perversity."
The same author adds: "In the classification of the crime attention must be given to the intention of the author. When fire is used with the intent to
kill a determined person who may be in a shelter, and that object is secured, the crime committed is not that defined herein, but that of murder,
penalized in article 418 (art. 403 of the Penal Code of the Philippines), with the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to death"
(Groizard, Vol. 8, p. 45).
Accused-appellant is undoubtedly responsible for the fire that occurred in the wee hours of 18 September 1998 that razed to the ground the
Cimagala home and a number of other houses in the vicinity. Still, we believe that the record shows that the elements discussed by Mr. Justice
Carson in his separate concurring opinion in Butardo are wanting. We are therefore not adequately convinced that imposing the exceptionally
severe penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper in the case at bar.
First. There appears to be no reckless disregard for human lives indicative of a cold, calculating, wicked and perverse intention to burn the
Cimagala home. The action of accused-appellant was the result of a lovers tiff between him and Honey over their son, Otoy, and concerning the
future of their unbridled relationship. His spontaneous, albeit criminal, act was carried out without any intention to exterminate human lives. His
purpose in going to Davao was to convince his lover to move back with him to Manila and bringing along their son Otoy.
Second. Neither was there any reckless disregard for the rights of the neighboring property owners.1wphi1 The criminal act of burning the
Cimagala home was carried out by accused-appellant in a diminished emotional state, which mitigates his criminal liability to a lesser degree of
criminality.
Third. The testimony of Honey clearly points to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. However, the conduct of accused-appellant
after he consummated the crime, i.e., when he set fire to the clothes of Honey, is material in determining the severity of the penalty to be

imposed. After his impulsive act of setting fire to both the plastic partition of the room and Honeys clothes, he attempted to mend his ways
immediately by attempting to put out the flames although it was too late. His act of burning Honeys clothes set in motion a chain of events that
spun out of control and led to the blaze that destroyed houses in its path. However, despite the mayhem caused by accused-appellant, he never
fled the scene of the crime; in fact, he watched helplessly as the flames consumed the Cimagala home and the neighboring houses. He did not
resist the police authorities when he was invited for questioning at the police station to shed light on the incident.
Thus, applying Mr. Justice Carsons exceptional severity standard as regards the imposition of penalties for the crime of Arson, the degree of
criminality involved in the accused-appellants act is lessened by the fact that he acted on an impulse that diminished his reasoning faculties, thus
mitigating the punishment to be imposed. The proper penalty to be imposed should therefore take into consideration the analogous mitigating
circumstance to passion and obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, as discussed above, in relation to Art. 64, par. 2, of The Revised Penal Code. 26
Under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, in relation to Art. 64, par. 2, of The Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree to the imposable penalty is prision mayor the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years in any of its periods. Under the circumstances, it is believed that an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years four (4) months
and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen (14) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of the minimum of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua as maximum may be imposed on the accused.
As to the award of damages, this Court has consistently held that proof is required to determine the reasonable amount of damages that may be
awarded to the victims of conflagration. As a rule, therefore, actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely alleged. We
believe that the records do not adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. The court a
quo granted the award solely on the bare assertions of the complaining witnesses. Moral damages cannot be awarded in this case, as there is no
evidentiary basis to justify it. However, accused-appellants civil liability is beyond cavil; what needs to be resolved is the amount of indemnity he
should pay to the owners of the burned houses for the damage caused. In lieu thereof, this Court may award temperate or moderate damages to
the victims of the conflagration in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the records evince that the victims suffered some
pecuniary loss although the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. Consequently, temperate damages in the amount of P250,000.00
which is considered reasonable under the circumstances should be awarded to each of the complaining witnesses or their heirs as the case may
be.
Exemplary or corrective damages should likewise be awarded as a way to correct future conduct of this nature and preserve the public good.
Such damages are designed to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequences. 27 Hence, exemplary or corrective damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for each of the above-mentioned complaining witnesses or their heirs is fair and just under the premises.
It must be noted that accused-appellant became an unwitting victim of his own extra-marital indiscretions. His flawed emotional disposition
coupled with a lapse in judgment became his own undoing as he now languishes in jail for choosing the road to perdition. Although he has no one
to blame but himself for his vicissitudes, we believe that the lessons to be learned from this sad and miserable chapter of his life are more than
adequate from which he can gain insight and wisdom, while he sits patiently in his prison cell waiting for the day when he can once again breathe
the invigorating air of freedom.
WHEREFORE, Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City finding accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano guilty of Destructive Arson is
MODIFIED to Simple Arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and the penalty imposed on him REDUCED to an indeterminate prison term of six
(6) years four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen (14) years two (2) months and ten (10) days
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. Temperate damages in the amount of P250,000.00 and exemplary damages ofP50,000.00
are AWARDED to each of complaining witnesses Fructuosa L. Jambo, Simplicio B. Cabrera, Francisco Clerigo, Orlando Braa and Oscar T.
Cimagala. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
___________
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 104942-43 November 25, 1993
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON SUBINGSUBING, accused-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
Accused-appellant Napoleon Subingsubing was charged with the crime of rape in three (3) separate informations reading thus:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 772
That on or about noontime of November 28, 1989 at Barangay Fiangtin, Barlig, Mountain Province and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force, threat and intimidation by poking his garand rifle and then boxing the belly of the
complainant, MARY JANE S. ESPILAN, which rendered the latter unconscious, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the complainant, against her will and without her consent.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 773
That on or about the afternoon of November 30, 1989, at Barangay Fiangtin, Barlig, Mountain Province and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, threat and intimidation by putting over the nose of the victim handkerchief soaked
with chemical which rendered the latter unconscious did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
complainant, against her will and without her consent.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 774

That on or about noontime of November 25, 1989, at Barangay Fiangtin, Barlig, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force, threat and intimidation by poking his garand rifle and then boxing the belly of the
complainant, MARY JANE S. ESPILAN, which rendered the latter unconscious, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the complainant, against her will and without her consent.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered pleas of not guilty to the three (3) criminal informations which were then consolidated and tried jointly to
expedite proceedings.
After trial on the merits, the trial court found the case meritorious for the prosecution in Criminal Case Nos. 772 and 774 in view mainly of the
testimony of the complainant which was found credible. Accused-appellant was, therefore, convicted for rape in said cases. However, insofar as
Criminal Case No. 773 was concerned, the trial court found the testimony of the complainant therein inadequate to sustain conviction and
"surmised that perhaps out of her bitterness, the said complainant wanted to ensure that the accused be meted out the highest penalty possible."
Accused was accordingly acquitted in said Criminal Case No. 773.
Hence, this appeal in Criminal Case Nos. 772 and 774, docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 104942-104943.
The case for the prosecution, anchored mainly on the testimony of the complainant Mary Jane Espilan, was summarized by the trial court 1 the
pertinent portion of which states:
The complainant Mary Jane Espilan in all of these actions is sixteen years old, unmarried and resident of Philex Mines, Baguio. For the past three
years immediately preceding 1990, she continuously lived with her grandmother at the latter's house at Bo. Fiangtin, Barlig, Mountain Province
while her parents were residing in Baguio. At that time she was a high school student. The accused Napoleon Subingsubing is the complainant's
uncle, the brother of her mother and the son of her grandmother. Said accused was then living with his mother and his niece in the same house
as mentioned. On Nov. 25, 1989, at 1:00 P.M., Mary Jane and Napoleon were alone in the house, the grandmother having gone to the fields.
When Mary Jane was about to go out to attend her afternoon classes in school, Napoleon forcibly pulled her to the bedroom of the grandmother,
pointed his Garand rifle at her, then punched her in the stomach as a result of which the former lost consciousness. When the complainant
regained her senses, she noticed that she was en dishabille and her vagina was bloody. She felt pain in her private parts and is quite certain she
was raped or abused. The accused who was then standing outside the room warned the complainant not to tell anybody what happened or else
he will kill her. Hence Mary Jane did not report the incident to her grandmother or to anyone for that matter. In the morning of November 28, 1989,
at 10:30 o' clock A.M., Mary Jane arrived from school and Napoleon was alone in the house. The latter again leveled his Garand Rifle at the
former and pushed her into her bedroom. The complainant tried to get out of the house but the accused held unto her. Inside the room, the said
accused pulled down the skirt of Mary Jane, pushed her down on the floor, stripped her of her panties and laid down on top of her with the zipper
of his pants open. Forcing the complainant's legs apart, the accused abused or took advantage of the former second time around. All the while,
Napoleon was holding unto his rifle and Mary Jane was afraid to scream for he might squeeze the trigger. Immediately thereafter, the complainant
gathered up all her clothes and went to their own family house at Bo. Pat-tog, Barlig which is less than a kilometer away from her grandmother's
residence. She wanted to get away from her uncle, hence she stayed alone in the house until November 30, 1989 in the morning when the
accused followed her. She was then cleaning the ceiling of their house when Napoleon sneaked up behind her, and when the former tried to
scream, the accused placed a piece of cloth with some sort of chemical over the nose of the complainant and the latter fainted. When she awoke,
Mary Jane found herself lying on the floor stark naked. She felt that she had again been sexually molested. The accused who was outside the
house menacingly ordered the complainant to pack her clothes and go back home with him. The afternoon of the same day, Mary Jane and
Napoleon went back to the house of the former's grandmother. The complainant did not reveal to anybody the things that happened to her for fear
that the accused might really kill her as the accused had threatened to do. Months later, when she was with her parents in Baguio, Mary Jane
finally divulged everything to her mother Rosita Espilan. They went back to Barlig and reported the incidents to the police station where the
statement of the complainant was taken (Exhs. "A," Crim. Case No. 772, pp. 4-5; Crim. Cases Nos. 773-774, pp. 2-3). Thereafter, she had herself
physically examined at the Barlig hospital by a government physician and was found pregnant (Exh. "C"; p. 6, Crim. Case No. 772). On August
29, 1990 in Baguio, the complainant delivered a baby boy. The latter before all these things happened to her was a virgin with no prior sexual
experience. She did not even have a boyfriend. In open court, Mary Jane Espilan singled out the accused Napoleon Subingsubing as the culprit
in all of the incidents she earlier testified to.
xxx xxx xxx
At the trial, the accused Napoleon Subingsubing denied the charge of rape as narrated above and proferred a different story. Interposing consent
on the part of the complainant as a defense, he testified 2 that at around 10:00 o' clock in the morning of 25 November 1989, he arrived at his
mother's house at Bo. Fiangtin, Barlig, Mountain Province after fetching wood. Shortly thereafter, the complainant arrived from school, massaged
the back of the accused and then prepared their lunch. After eating, the accused went to his room to rest but was followed by the complainant
who laid down beside him, placed her hand on the accused's stomach, and then the pair embraced. They both removed their clothes and then
had sexual intercourse. At this time, the complainant was smiling, tightly embracing the accused. After the intercourse, the complainant put on her
clothes, went to her room to change and then went back to school. That evening, the accused brought the complainant to attend a wake. The
accused also professed that the incident on 25 November 1989 was the only occasion when he had sexual intercourse with the complainant.
On 28 November 1989, the complainant asked him to help clean their house located at Pat-tog, Barlig, Mountain Province, as witnessed by a
neighbor's child. The accused denied that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant on 28 November and 30 November 1989.
To bolster the claim of the accused, his mother, Rufina Subingsubing, who is also the grandmother of the complainant, testified, 3 among others,
that the three (3) of them were living in one house and that their relationship was happy, even after the month of November 1989; that the
complainant left her house in March 1990 for a vacation and was fetched by her mother; that the only thing she observed about the complainant

was that her breasts were becoming bigger; that the complainant and the accused got food for the pigs on Saturdays and that when the latter
would receive his monthly salary, the complainant would ask him to take her to the movies.
Three (3) other witnesses for the defense were presented who corroborated the story of the accused and testified that indeed, the complainant
and the accused were seen going out together and sharing happy moments months after November 1989 (when the alleged rapes were
committed).
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the prosecution has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused, as a
consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat, that is, he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. This is especially
significant in rape cases for, generally, in the prosecution thereof, the only two (2) parties who can testify as to the occurrence are the complainant
and the accused. Very often, their respective testimonies are diametrically contradictory as to what really happened. 4
A careful perusal of the records of the present case reveals, even if were to assume arguendo that the defense of consent on the part of the
complainant was not sufficiently established, that the evidence for the prosecution cannot, on its own, stand and suffice to establish the guilt of
the accused for the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Although the general rule is that this Court by and large respects the factual findings of the trial court because of its better position in assessing
the credibility of witnesses through close scrutiny of their demeanor, mannerism and attitude, the present case falls short of convincing us that it
falls under such general rule.
A perusal of the records and the testimony of the complainant discloses contradictions and inconsistencies on vital details which lead one to
seriously doubt the veracity of her story.
On 05 March 1991, during her direct examination, complainant described the incidents when the accused allegedly raped her, as follows: 5
Q: Will you tell this Honorable Court what was the incident?
A: When I was about to leave for school (this was on 25 November 1989) and was almost to go out, my uncle pulled me and when I resisted
trying to go out, he poked his gun at me and boxed me on my stomach and I was unconscious. When I woke up, I was conscious already.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied).
Q: When you regain (sic) consciousness miss witness, what was your position?
A: I was naked, sir.
Q: When you say were naked, you mean to say that your panty was removed?
A: Yes.
Q: Your shirt, underwear, and even your panty were removed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But before the accused boxed you, do you remember if you were wearing all your clothings?
A: I was wearing my school uniform?
Q: And when you regained consciousness, you noticed that your clothings were removed?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you know who removed your clothings?
A: Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: You said that when the accused was on top of (you) you don't (sic) have any underwear?
A: When he was on top of me I was forcing myself to get out.
Q: But you don't (sic) have your panty?
A: He removed my panty.
Q: About him how did he look?
A: Only the zipper of his pant was down.
Q: And when he went on top of you?
A: Yes and I forced to get out but he was strong.
Q: When he was on top of you, you forced yourself to get out, that was all?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else happened?
A: He did again what he did to me.
Q: And what is that he did to you?
A: He abused me again, sir.
Q: And what do you mean by abuse?
A: He took advantage again of me for the second time.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you not shout for help?
A: I tried, sir, but his gun was poked to (sic) me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you anything?
A: Yes, he said that if I will scream, he will kill me.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And when you went to your house at Barangay Pat-tog, what happened there, if any?
A: When I went to our house at Pat-tog I did not know that he still followed me there, that was on the 30th of November, 1989.
Q: He followed you at Barangay Pat-tog on November 30, 1989?
A: Yes.
Q: And when he followed you there, what happened?
A: While I was cleaning the ceiling of our house, I did not know that he entered the second floor of the house.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: When I was about to shout, he immediately came to me and put a piece of cloth with chemical on my nose then I felt unconscious already.
Q: And were you able to regain consciousness?
A: I regained consciousness after all the thing happened to me.
Q: And when you regained consciousness, what did you notice?
A: I was lying on the floor naked, sir.
Q: And what do you think happened to you?
ATTY. DOMALSIN:
The witness will be incompetent to answer what happened to her because she was made unconscious.
COURT:
Being the person herself she is competent to feel what happened to her.
Q: After you regained consciousness, you stated that you were lying on the floor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you feel at that time?
A: I felt uneasy.
Q: That was all?
A: Yes.
Q: You did not feel what happened to any part of your body?
A: I felt. He did again what he has done to me for the third time.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you remember miss witness if during those times when you said the accused boxed you and you felt unconscious. . . .?
A: I did not feel anything when I felt unconscious.
Q: When he threatened you telling you that will kill you if you tell anybody what happened, what did you say?
A: I just kept quiet.
Q: Do you have neighbors?
A: We have neighbors but they were out that time.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: On March (November) 28, 1989, do you remember where were you?
A: I was in the same house of my grandmother.
Q: And what were you were doing at that time?
A: I just arrived from school, sir.
Q: And when you arrived from school, what happened?
A: When I was in the house, he poked his gun at me and stripped my shirt.
Q: Who poked the garand rifle at you?
A: My uncle, sir.
Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court what happened ?
A: At about 11:30 P.M., I entered the house and my uncle poked his gun at me. I don't know why he poked his gun at me then he did again what
he did to me.
Q: When he poked his gun at you, what did you do?
A: I forced my way out.
Q: And were you able to go out?
A: No, sir because he was strong.
Q: What did he tell you, if any?
A: The same threat as the first.
Q: After he poked his gun at you, what did you do next?
A: He took advantage of me again, sir.
Q: Will you be more specific, miss witness. When you said he took advantage of you, what do you mean?
A: He did the same thing that he did to me.
Q: What is that thing that he did to you?
A: He again abused my dignity as a woman.
Q: When he poked his gun at you, were you wearing clothes?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after that what did he do?
A: He removed my panty.
Q: And after removing your panty, what did he do next?
A: He did it again.
Q: When he removed your panty, what was your position?
A: I was standing and I was forcing to leave when he forced me to remove my panty while his gun was poked at me.
Q: And after he removed your panty, you said you were standing?
A: Yes.
Q: Then what did he do next?
A: He pushed me down the floor.
Q: And after that what did he do next?
A: He did the same thing to me.
Q: When he pushed you down to the floor, what else happened?
A: He was on top of me.
Q: When he was on top of you, was he wearing clothes at that time.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He did not remove any of his clothes.
A: He removed his pants.
Q: What else did he do?
A: He put down the zipper of his pant.
Q: And after he put down the zipper of his pant, what happened next?
A: I tried to get out but he was strong.
Q: And after he removed the zipper of his pant, what did he do?
A: He abused the dignity of my woman (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Miss witness you said a while back that the accused poked a gun to (sic) you then removed your panty and then after that he pushed you
down the floor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Aside from that he also removed the zipper of his pant then went on top of you?
A: I was unconscious.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Q: Aside from going on top of you, what else did he do?
A: He poked his gun at me.
Q: Then what else?
A: He did the same thing.
Q: The specific thing?
A: He raped me again, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the complainant on 05 March 1991 testified that on 25 November 1989 and 28 November 1989, the accused employed force and
threats which rendered her unconscious and unable to feel anything when ravished by the accused. However, when recalled to the witness stand
on 02 April 1991, the same complainant Mary Jane Espilan testified: 6
Q: Miss Witness, you declared during the prior examination that the accused, Napoleon Subingsubing raped, abused your dignity or
"pinagsamantalahan ka" and that was on March (November) 28, my question is what do you mean when you said he abused your dignity on
March (November) 28, 1991?
A: He pointed his gun to (at) me, then pushed me to my lola's room, let me down trying to separate my legs and then he placed his penis into my
vagina.
COURT:
Q: When you said that the accused pointed a gun at you, what kind of gun?
A. Rifle, M-14, sir.
Q. When he pushed you down, was he still holding his gun?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When he was doing the act, was he still holdng his gun?
A. Yes.
Q. You did not resist.
A. I resisted but he was stronger than me.
Q. The second time he did the sme, was he still holding the gun?
A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

The complainant's theory of force and intimidation manifested in her sworn statement and her testimony on 05 March 1991, and which rendered
her "unconscious," is belied by her own testimony on 02 April 1991. Complaint speaks of resistance, intimidation, and loss of consciousness
attributed to accused's violence and threats. However, and this must be carefully noted, the complainant's testimony on 02 April 1991 gave a
detailed description of what transpired during those incidents.
The Court also cannot help but question the conduct of the complainant after the alleged incidents of rape. The complainant did not reveal tghe
incidents to her randmother allegedly because the accused told her not to and that he would kill the complainant and her grandmother if she told
anyone. Neither did she tell her mother upon the latter's arrival at barlig on 28 April 1990 or soon after the complainant was brought by her mother
to Philex Mines in Baguio City. The mother was told of the alleged incidents only on 15 May 1990. It is quite unnatural for a girl not to reveal such
assaults on her virtue (if indeed they occurred) immediately after they happened or when the alleged threat on her life and her grandmother's had
ceased, as in this case, when complainant had gone to Baguio. The complainant likewise admitted that after the alleged incidents in November
1989, she still went out with the accused to watch betamax movies or get food for the pigs in the ricefields. Such behaviour directly contradicts the
normal or expected behaviour of a rape victim. There is no way she could possibly forgive, to say the least; and yet, complainant interacted
immediately with her assailant. Viewed in its entirety, such behaviour of the complainant appears to be inconsistent with her charge of rape.
The accused, on the other hand, while admitting that indeed he had sexual intercourse with the complainant on 25 November 1989, set up the
defense that the latter consented to such act. The Two (2) succeeding incidents were however denied by the accused. While we find such
defenses weak, we nevertheless stress once more the time-honored principle that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence rather
than on the weakness of the defense.
Appellant's exculpation from the offense of rape does not mean, however, that his responsibility is merely moral and not penal in character. If that
were so, considering the facts of this case, it may be cause for right-thinking men and women to discern a gap or fissure in the legal order, one
that cries moreover to be bridged. 7
As things stand, for failing to meet the exacting test of moral certainty, it is incumbent upon us to set aside the trial court's judgments of conviction
for rape. However, the Court must state that it finds conclusive evidence (no less than the accused-appellant's admission) that on 25 November
1989, the accused Napoleon Subingsubing had sexual intercourse with Mary Jane Espilan when she was only 16 years of age. The complainant
and the accused were living in the same house. The accused is the uncle of the complainant, brother of her own mother.
Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18 years of age and committed by any of the persons
enumerated in Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: any person in public authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or
any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education and custody of the woman seduced. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying
circumstance in the offense. Notably, among the persons who can commit qualified seduction is a "domestic". And a "domestic," for purposes of
said legal provision, has been interpreted judicially as
. . . Upon the word domestic being employed in said legal provision segregating it from that of a servant, the term is applied to persons usually
living under the same roof, pertaining to the same house, and constituting, in the sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the term servant
whereby a person serving another on a salary is designated; in this manner, it has been properly used. 8
Under the circumstances of the case at bench, we hold that a conviction for qualified seduction is proper in Criminal Case No. 774. The verified
complaint for rape contains allegations, sans averment on the use of force, which impute the crime of qualified seduction. Any deficiency in the
complaint is supplied by the supporting affidavit, 9 where complainant averred that the accused Napoleon Subingsubing, her uncle, 10 who was
living in the same house as the complainant, 11 had sexual intercourse with her. The accused took advantage of his moral ascendancy if not
dominance over the complainant. She was presumably a virgin. As already stated, the accused was a domestic in relation to the complainant
within the meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 104943, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 774 is hereby MODIFIED by convicting the accused of
the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION instead of RAPE. The accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of ARRESTO MAYOR, as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as maximum. Accused
is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P30,000.00 and to support the child of the complainant. Costs against accusedappellant.
The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED in G.R. No. 104942 (Criminal Case No. 772) based on reasonable doubt.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for the sole purpose of determining the amount of
support to which the child in Criminal Case No. 774 is entitled. 12
SO ORDERED.
_____________
EN
BANC
[G.R.
PEOPLE
DECISION

No.
OF

THE

139181.
PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

October
v.

JIMMY

27,
AQUINO

2003.]
VIOLA, Appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us on automatic review is the 7 June 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No.
1310-M-98 convicting appellant Jimmy Aquino of the crime of statutory rape and sentencing him to the penalty of death. 1chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
The Information under which Jimmy was charged reads:
That on or about the 24th day of May 1996, in the municipality of San Miguel, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed instrument, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs, by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of the said Analyn dela Cruz y Viola, 11 years of age, against her will. 2
Upon his arraignment, Jimmy pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 3 Pre-trial ensued, followed by the trial on the merits of the case.
The evidence for the prosecution, culled from the testimonies of the victim Analyn de la Cruz and her mother Lolita Viola de la Cruz, is as follows:
Analyn was 10 years and 11 months old on the day of the alleged rape, having been born on 23 June 1985. She filed the complaint with the
assistance of her mother, Lolita, who is Jimmys first cousin. Prior to the filing of this case and the assumption of custody by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development, Analyn lived with her grandmother in Sta. Ines, San Miguel, Bulacan; while her mother lived with her second
husband in another house within the same barangay. 4
At around 9:00 a.m. of 24 May 1996, while Analyn was playing with her friend near the house of Jimmys sister Nini in Sta. Ines, San Miguel,
Bulacan, Jimmy, who was staying in Ninis house during the day, called out Analyn to buy cooking oil for him from the store nearby. He gave her
P5.00 and a glass for the cooking oil. When she returned to Ninis house, Jimmy asked her to get the feeding bottle of his niece near the bed,
which was in a slightly elevated portion of the house. She then went to get the bottle. Jimmy followed her and, producing a knife, ordered Analyn
to remove her shorts and underwear. Fearing for her safety, Analyn acceded. Jimmy then proceeded to remove his clothes and force himself on
top of her. With a knife in his right hand pressed against her left palm, he began to have sexual intercourse with her. Once during the ordeal, he
applied to her genitals the cooking oil she bought. Jimmy stopped his assault only after two hours, or at around 11:00 a.m., when he heard the
voice of his brother-in-law outside the house. He forthwith ordered Analyn to get dressed and get out of the house. Analyn went home and
reported the rape to her grandmother. 5
Later in the afternoon, Analyn went to the poultry farm where her mother worked and told her that "Tio Imi" had raped her. 6 Lolita went to the
Barangay Council of Sta. Ines and reported the rape. Councilman Ismael Julian asked Barangay Tanod Rolando Viola to fetch Jimmy. Under
interrogation by Ismael, Jimmy admitted to having asked Analyn to undress. The councilman prepared a statement, 7 which was signed by him,
Jimmy and Lolita, wherein it was stated that the nature of the complaint was that Jimmy had asked Analyn to remove her clothes because he
wanted to see what her vagina looked like. Even if the statement did not mention rape, Lolita signed it thinking it would merely be used as
evidence
that
she
had
made
a
complaint.
8
Analyn was also sent for, and though she testified to having signed a document upon the request of the barangay tanods, she did not know what
document she signed. 9 Analyns signature does not appear in the statement signed by her mother and Jimmy.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
According to Lolita, she was frustrated by the lack of action by the Barangay officials. She attributed it to the fact that Jimmy was a relative of
many of them, and that they wanted her to settle the case with him. Thinking that Jimmy had fled, she did not pursue the complaint. It was only on
20 August 1997, Jimmys birthday, that she spotted Jimmy in the house of his grandmother. Her rage renewed. she tried to go to the police in San
Miguel, Bulacan, but the policemen refused to help her because Jimmy was the nephew of the incumbent barangay captain at that time. 10
With the help of her friend Celia Manese, she, together with Analyn, filed on 10 November 1997 a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of San Miguel, Bulacan. The next day, Analyn was examined at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Malolos, Bulacan. 11 The
examining physician, Dr. Manuel Aves, found old healed hymenal lacerations, which the parties admitted. 12
For his defense, Jimmy interposed a basic denial. His version of the events is that on 24 May 1996, he was in the house of his sister Nini where
he usually stayed during the day, sometimes to take care of his niece. Around two meters away was Antonio Clemente, a first cousin of Jimmy
and Lolita and a carpenter by profession, who was hired by Nini to put up a fence in the back of the house. 13
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Analyn arrived and watched television with Jimmy. Sometime between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., Antonio got hungry and
asked Jimmy for merienda. Because none was available, Antonio gave Jimmy P5.00 to buy ice and some cooking oil to fry camote (sweet
potatoes). Jimmy, in turn, gave Analyn the money and bid her to buy the items in a store nearby. She returned with the cooking oil worth P3.00 but
without the ice, and gave the P2.00 to Jimmy. 14
At one point while the camote was being fried, Jimmy became curious about the rumors he had heard about the beautiful appearance of Analyns
private organ. To see it for himself, he asked Analyn to pull down her shorts. The latter agreed. When Analyns shorts were down, a group of
children entered the house and laughed when they saw Analyn. Among this group were Analyns younger brother Jonathan Duklayan, and
Antonios son Jervy Clemente. Antonio also looked in to see what was happening. He saw Analyn with her shorts around her knees and her
underwear exposed. The children then asked whether they could have some of the camote being fried. Antonio playfully asked them to also pull
down
their
shorts
as
a
condition
to
giving
them
any.
15
Late that same afternoon, Rolando Viola, a barangay tanod, came and informed him that Lolita was making a complaint against him (Jimmy) with
the barangay councilor. He (Jimmy) went to where Ismael Julian and Lolita were and, when confronted, admitted to having asked Analyn to pull

down her shorts because he was curious about her. He signed a statement made by Ismael that was in question-and-answer form, and both he
and Lolita were made to sign the same document. The issue of rape was not discussed during that confrontation, and he had no idea of the
charge until he was arrested in his house on 12 November 1997 and brought to the provincial jail. 16
Antonio Clemente, a first cousin of both Jimmy and Lolita, corroborated Jimmys story. He testified that on the day of the alleged rape, he was
fixing the fence in the back of Ninis house. He could see into the house of Nini because the back wall was almost non-existent. At around 10:00
a.m. he asked Jimmy for food and gave him money to buy cooking oil and ice. Afterwards, he heard children laughing and he saw Analyn with her
shorts around her knees. He even jokingly asked the children to do the same so that they could eat some of the camote. 17
Rolando Viola, a barangay tanod and an uncle of both the appellant and the victims mother, testified to having seen Antonio fix the house.
Sometime before 10:00 a.m., he went looking for Antonio because he wanted to have his roof fixed. While he was conferring with Antonio, he saw
Analyn and Jimmy watching television inside Ninis house. He also testified that the state of Ninis house at that time was such that although he
was at the back, he could see into the house and out into the street and at passers-by because the front and back walls were dilapidated and
almost non-existent. 18
He also testified that he was present when Lolita reported to Barangay Councilman Ismael Julian that Analyn was ordered by the appellant to take
off her lower apparel. He was even the one who fetched the appellant from his house to be investigated. He was likewise present during the
investigation. 19 This testimony was corroborated by Ismael Julian. 20
Alberto Viola, uncle of Jimmy and granduncle of Analyn, declared that he had been taking care of Jimmy ever since the latter was 10 years old,
after Jimmys father died. He testified that at around 10:30 a.m. of 24 May 1996, while he was cooking lunch in his house, he heard children
laughing. From his kitchen in the back of the house, he had a view of the front of Ninis house, where he saw children. Noticing nothing
extraordinary, he continued cooking. At around noon, Jimmy came over and ate with him. 21
Teresita Bacuan, another cousin of Analyn and a close friend, testified that at 11:00 a.m. of 24 May 1996, Analyn came by her house to tell her
that "Tio Imi" had almost succeeded in raping her (Analyn). Teresita was worried that a rape had in fact been committed and asked Analyn
whether the latter was just ashamed to admit it. Analyn assured her that nothing happened because of the timely arrival of one Jervy and other
small children. Teresita confronted Jervy Clemente, who then denied having witnessed any attempt at rape. Teresitas testimony also included
revelations from Analyn that sometime in April of 1997, Analyn was having sexual intercourse with her boyfriend named Ryan Ramos. 22
The witnesses for the appellant denied Jimmys flight. They testified that they had seen him working in the field or in a construction, 23 watching
television in Ninis house, or buying something in the store, and sometimes in the company of Analyn. 24
The defense put forward several motives for Lolita to have constrained Analyn to accuse him of rape. One was for the money that Lolita was
claiming to settle the case. After the case was filed, she wanted P10,000 to settle the case, and later, according to her neighbor Lerma, she
wanted P50,000. 25 The second was because of a land dispute over the inheritance between Lolitas father Edilberto and Jimmys uncle Alberto.
26 The third was revenge in that Jimmys sister Lala was instrumental in putting in jail the father of Lolitas friend Celia Manese for raping his
stepdaughter. 27
After trial, the trial court rendered the decision now on review. Convinced of the overall veracity of Analyns claim, the trial court gave no weight to
the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense because of their relation to Jimmy. Reasoning that lust is not a respecter of time and place, it
found inconsequential the testimonies of the witnesses that the house where the rape was allegedly committed was located near a store or
artesian well. It could find no reason why either Analyn or her mother Lolita would fabricate a story of rape when to do so would subject Analyn to
an emotional ordeal and humiliation. On Analyns claim that Jimmy raped her for two hours, the court attributed this to Jimmys youth and strong
physical condition as a probable "sexual athlete," or else to a condition called satyriasis, which describes excessive sexual desire.

Taking into account the totality of the evidence presented, we cannot sustain the conviction of the appellant for the crime of rape.
The main issue in this case is whether on the day of 24 May 1996, Jimmy Aquino had carnal knowledge of Analyn de la Cruz. Because Analyn
was under 12 years old, her age takes the place of force and intimidation in vitiating her consent, and only an evidence of carnal knowledge is
necessary.
30
The
presence
of
a
deadly
weapon
only
qualifies
the
offense.
31
Excluding the peripheral motives and actuations of the secondary players in this drama, we are once again tasked with the duty of weighing the
testimony of the victim as against the appellant. As a general rule the trial courts findings as to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
weight and should largely remain undisturbed. 32 On review, an appellate court may reverse these findings when there appears on record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or misinterpreted that could. affect the result of a case. 33 It is on this
ground that we find that the trial court committed a reversible error in completely disregarding all other evidence contrary to what was deemed as
the
irrefutable
testimony
of
the
complainant.

Finding, therefore, that rape was committed and that the accused used a deadly weapon in its commission, the trial court declared:
As to the penalty to be imposed, the law provides that for Statutory Rape, the penalty is Reclusion Perpetua: whereas if committed with the use of
a deadly weapon, it should be Reclusion Perpetua to Death. Inasmuch as the circumstance of using of the fan knife which is a deadly weapon,
was established, it is hereby deemed to be one that aggravated the commission of the offense. Accordingly, Accused Jimmy V. Aquino is hereby
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.
Further, he is hereby ordered to indemnify Analyn dela Cruz the sum of P75,000.00 (in line with the case of People v. Victor, G.R. No. 127903,
July 9, 1998) and to pay moral damages of P100,000.00.
With costs against the accused.
\SO ORDERED. 28
The records were elevated to us.
In his Appellants Brief, Jimmy contends that the trial court erred in (1) holding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are direct and
credible, and (2) ignoring the truth and credibility of the witnesses for the defense. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General,
representing the People of the Philippines, agrees with the trial court in giving full faith and credence to Analyns narration of the facts that
warranted
the
conviction
of
the
accused.

The trial court found Analyns demeanor while she testified to the rape as frank, straightforward, sincere, and unshaken despite the rigid crossexamination. True, the positive testimony of a credible complainant is sufficient basis for the conviction of rape, for jurisprudence recognizes that
a victim who cries rape, more so if she is a minor, almost always says all that are needed to signify that the crime has been committed. 34 It is
also true that a woman would not make a charge of rape for reasons other than to seek justice for what is the truth. 35 We must consider,
however, a principle equally fundamental: that evidence to be worthy of credit must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition,
be credible in itself. 36 In this regard, the probability of the testimony of Analyn is suspect in light of the totality of the evidence presented for and
against the Appellant.
Analyn was unyielding on the point that Jimmy did the pumping motion while on top of her for two hours, from 9:00 to 11:00 a.m. of 24 May 1996.
37 Ordinarily, this improbability would be attributable to confusion or perhaps a failure to communicate her sense of time or the sequence of
events, especially when accounting for Analyns age. The trial judge, therefore, disregarded this improbability by factoring in the probability of
Jimmys sexual prowess. However, the adamancy of Analyn as to the continuity of the rape, when confronted with the presence of children in the
same cramped one-room house, as well as the declarations of the other witnesses who saw Analyn and Jimmy at intervals during that time,
creates an uncertainty as to whether a rape could have occurred during that time.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The accused presented Antonio Clemente and Rolando Viola who testified to having seen Analyn and Jimmy between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.
watching television. They also testified as to the arrival or the presence of children in the house of Nini sometime before 10:00 a.m. until 11:00
a.m. Even Analyns mother, Lolita, claimed that her son Jonathan had seen the rape and was the first to report it to her. Lolitas statement is
hearsay, but it indicates, at the very least, Jonathans presence in Ninis house during that time. Moreover, the statement signed by Jimmy and
Lolita mentions the presence of Jonathan and other children, who laughed at Analyn after seeing her in a state of undress. 38 Independent is the
testimony of Teresita Bacuan that Analyn mentioned the appearance of Jervy Clemente in Ninis house as the reason why Jimmy was unable to
consummate the rape. It is unfortunate that none of the children could be made to testify. Both parties show that their presence or absence would
have been material. Although the statements of the children cannot be used for being hearsay, the fact that several witnesses acknowledged their
presence during the time of the rape is noteworthy.
It is also significant to note that both Barangay Councilman Ismael Julian and Barangay Tanod Rolando Viola testified that what Analyns mother,
Lolita, reported to them was that Jimmy ordered Analyn to undress or in the dialect, "pinaghubo." 39 There is nothing in the record of such
investigation that indicates that she or her mother complained of rape. The record of the investigation, which bears the signatures of Ismael,
Jimmy, and Lolita and was identified and marked as Exhibit "1" during the trial, reflects Jimmys admission to having asked Analyn to undress.
Lolita, who had finished grade six, 40 testified during her cross-examination that she knew the contents of the record before she affixed her
signature therein. 41 If what Analyn had reported to her mother was one of rape, the latter would have been so enraged that she would not sign
that document and would have, instead, insisted that the complaint for rape be likewise reflected in the record. Moreover, it is undisputed that
Analyn was present during the investigation. 42 Analyn would have also seized the opportunity to give her side that what happened was rape, not
just "undressing."cralaw virtua1aw library
Furthermore, it was only one-and-a-half years after the incident, or in November 1997, that a complaint for rape was filed by Analyn and her
mother before the MTC of San Miguel, Bulacan. We find her reasons for the delay to be unsatisfactory.
We cannot subscribe to the conclusion of the trial court that the witnesses of the appellant should be discredited or otherwise disregarded
because they are his relatives. It must be remembered that the witnesses presented were as much related to the complainant as they were to the
appellant. On the one hand, a bias in favor of the appellant does not, on its face, exist. On the other hand, a bias against the complainant cannot
be explained on the mere recognition that society treats with scorn a non-virgin who is deflowered against her will, 43 as declared by the trial
court. There was no malice or favor exhibited by any of the witnesses in favor of the appellant or against the complainant. Neither was there an
indication in the record as to any wish to discredit Analyns character. Even the allegation that she had sexual experiences with her boyfriend at
the
age
of
12
years
was
only
to
explain
the
old
healed
hymenal
lacerations.

In reviewing rape cases, three guiding principles must be borne in mind: (1) an accusation for rape may be made with facility, for it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where two persons are
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 29

In view of the consistency and credibility of the witnesses presented by the defense, who equally withstood strict scrutiny during trial, we must
give weight to the evidence for the defense and make room for the uncertainty that arises out of it. At most is what has been admitted by the
appellant that he asked Analyn to undress on 24 May 1996. Whether it was a prelude to sexual intercourse or to truly satisfy his curiosity is
debatable. Whether this event continued into the consummation of the sexual act remains uncertain

From the consistent and credible evidence of the defense, we find that the scales have to be tipped again, if not in favor of the appellant, then to
balance the scales and to reaffirm the precept that when inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, such evidence would not meet the test of moral certainty and would not support a conviction.
44
However, while the appellant cannot be held guilty of the charge of rape on the ground of reasonable doubt, we find that his act of directing
Analyn to remove her lower apparel constitutes an act of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 4, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes, in cases of variance between the offense charged and that proved, the conviction of an accused
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in that which is proved. In People v.
Caralipio, 45 we ruled that although an accused is charged in the information with the crime of rape, he can be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness, which is included in rape.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are as follows:
1. The offender commits an act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. The act is done (a) by using force or intimidation, (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
offended
party
is
under
12
years
of
age;
and
3. The offended party is another person of either sex. 46
These elements are present in the case at bar. From the environmental circumstance under which the act was done, lewd design can be imputed
to Jimmy. He was alone with Analyn when he ordered her to remove her drawers. He claimed that his purpose was to see her private organ
because of the alleged rumors that it (Analyns genitalia) was "beautiful and big." 47 Such act was not out of sheer curiosity but rather out of
lascivious curiosity. Notably, on cross-examination, he testified that he never tried "to peep to see the private organs" of his sisters to confirm
whether they were big and beautiful. He also acknowledged that it is "very immoral for a man to look and stare at the private organ of a lady." 48
In any event, the appellant cannot escape liability for his act of ordering Analyn to undress for him to see her private part. Such was an act of
lewdness perpetrated against Analyn, who at the time was only 10 years and 11 months old, having been born on 23 June 1985 as evidenced by
her Certificate of Live Birth. 49 For such act of lasciviousness, Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes as penalty prision correctional,
whose duration is from 6 months and day to 6 years. There being no modifying circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period, which ranges from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
appellant should be made to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years of prision
correctional, as maximum
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 1310-M-98 finding appellant Jimmy
Aquino guilty of the crime of rape is hereby modified. As modified, said appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of
prision correctional, as maximum. If he has already served that sentence, his immediate release from custody is hereby ordered unless he is
being held for other legal grounds.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
____________
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991
EDUARDO
ARROYO,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 96715 November 19, 1991
RUBY
VERA-NERI, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:p
In G.R. No. 96602, the Court summarized the facts of the case in this manner:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera
Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio.
Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery as defined under Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code.
The essential facts of the case, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
... On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to
Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then
proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at
the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master's bedroom where accused
Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went

upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About forty-five minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come
down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium. (Court of Appeals Decision, p. 4) 1
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or
a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complain ant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later
con traded marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 96602) dated 8 February 1991 which this court denied in a Resolution dated 24 April 1991.
In the meantime, petitioner Neri filed a separate Petition for Review (G.R. No. 96715) dated 19 February 1991.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration dated 1 May 1991 and a motion dated 23 May 1991 for consolidation o G.R. No. 96602 with
G.R. No. 96715.
On 3 June 1991, G.R. No. 96715 was consolidated with G.R No. 96602 in the Third Division in accordance with long-stand ing practice of the
Court.
On 29 July 1991, the Third Division deliberated upon the case which was then assigned to the ponente for the writing of the Court's Resolution. 2
On 26 August 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation, dated 14 May 1991, 3 praying that the case against petitioners be dismissed as he had "tacitly
consented" to his wife's infidelity. 4
Petitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the dismissal or for the granting of new trial of the case claiming a basis for their motions
Dr. Neri's manifestation. The Solicitor General was then asked to comment on the manifestation; hi comment was filed with this Court on 18
October 1991. 5
In October 1991, the consolidated cases were, again in accordance with long-standing practice of the Court, assigned to the First Division upon
the assignment of the ponente to that division. On 4 November 1991, the consolidated cases were re deliberated upon by the members of the
First Division who reached the same conclusion as the members of the Third Division of the Court.
In his Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602, petitioner Arroyo made the following contentions:
1. Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance which states that the case was filed out of "pure misunderstanding' raises questions as to the truth of the
alleged admission made by Mrs. Neri;
2. The other prosecution witnesses' corroborative testimonies merely proved the existence of an illicit affair but not that adultery was committed
on the date and place in question;
3. Mrs. Neri's separate petition for review raised the issue of Dr. Neri's alleged subsequent marriage to another woman which, if proven would
preclude either of the spouses from filing charges of adultery or concubinage against each other.
In G.R. No. 96715, petitioner Neri imputes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not granting the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the petitioner;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred by violating the constitutional rights of petitioner against self-incrimination;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in failing to take into consideration the material inconsistencies of the testimony of the complaining
witness; and
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in discarding medical testimony as to the physical impossibility of the petitioner to have
committed the crime charged. 6
The issues in the consolidated cases may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether or not Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his credibility;
2. Whether or not Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been violated;
3. Whether or not Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto; and
4. Whether or not Dr. Neri's manifestation is sufficient basis for the granting of a new trial.
Deliberating on the:
1. Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602, the Court believes that petitioner Arroyo has failed to show any ground that would warrant the
Court reversing its Resolution dated 24 April 1991; and on the
2. Petition for Review docketed as G.R. No. 96715, the Court considers that petitioner Ruby Vera Neri has failed to show reversible error on the
part of the Court of Appeals in issuing its Decision dated 21 May 1990 and its Resolution, dated 18 December 1990.
Petitioner Arroyo did not convince this Court in G.R. No. 96602 to dismiss the criminal case on the basis of Dr. Neri's pardon. He, together with
petitioner Neri, now cites the same affidavit in the effort to cast doubts on the credibility of Dr. Neri's testimony given before the trial court.
However, in the Court's Resolution, dated 24 April 1991, dismissing the Petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 96602, the Court held that:
It has been our constant holding that:
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 45, the findings of fact of the lower court as well itsconclusions on credibility of witnesses are generally not
disturbed, the question before the court being limited to questions of law (Rule 45, Sec. 2). Specifically, the conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are given considerable weight, since said court is in the best position to observe the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
witnesses at the trial. (Aguirre v. People, 155 SCRA 337 [1987]; emphasis supplied)
Thus, the claim that Dr. Neri's testimony is incredible is unavailing at this stage. Besides, the Court does not believe that such an admission by an
unfaithful wife was inherently improbable or impossible.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court, in the said Resolution of 24 April 1991, had likewise ruled on the claim that Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination
had been disregarded when her admission to her husband in the privacy of their conjugal home that she had indeed lain with petitioner Arroyo
was taken into account by the trial court, to wit:

Dr. Jorge Neri was also presented as a witness and he testified that sometime in December of 1982, he surprised his wife while she was looking
at some photographs in their bedroom in their house in Dasmarias Village, Makati. Accused Ruby Vera Neri then turned pale and started for the
door. Struck by this unusual behavior, Dr. Neri started looking around the dressing room and he came upon a Kodak envelope with film negatives
inside. He took the negatives for printing and a few days later, armed with the photographs which showed his wife in intimate bedroom poses with
another man, confronted Ruby Vera Neri. It was at this point that Ruby Vera Neri admitted to her husband that Eduardo Arroyo was her lover and
that they went to bed in Baguio on 2 and 3 November 1982.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the constitutional issue, we held in Gamboa v. Cruz (162 SCRA 642 [1988]) that:
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when theinvestigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confession or admissions from respondent-accused.(emphasis supplied)
In the present case, Dr. Neri was not a peace officer nor an investigating officer conducting a custodial interrogation, hence, petitioner cannot now
claim that Mrs. Neri's admission should have been rejected.
In the case of Aballe v. People (183 SCRA 196 [1990]), the Court held:
The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him.
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to substance of what he heard
if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.
Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim.
We also note that the husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying against his wife in criminal cases for a crime committed
by one against the other (Section 22, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court).
In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting Dr. Neri's testimony as he was a competent witness. Neither was said
testimony rendered inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the right to counsel of a "person under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Petitioner next claims that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the failure of Ruby Vera Neri to take the witness stand. In People
v. Gargoles (83 SCRA 282 [1978]), it was held that:
We have held that an accused has the right to decline to testify at the trial without having any inference of guilt drawn from his failure to go on the
witness stand. Thus, a verdict of conviction on the basis, solely or mainly, of the failure or refusal of the accused to take the witness stand to deny
the charges against him is a judicial heresy which cannot be countenanced. Invariably, any such verdict deserves to be reserved.
Such situation does not obtain, however, in the case at bar. For while the trial court took note of the failure of defendant to take the witness
stand to deny the charge against him,the same was not the main reason, much less the sole basis, of the trial court in holding, as credible the
testimony of complainant, and in ultimately concluding that the crime of rape had been committed by the accused-appellant. (Emphasis supplied)
Examination of the trial court decision here shows that said failure to testify was not the sole nor the main basis of the conviction. Aside from
accused's failure to deny Dr. Neri's testimony, the trial court also considered the testimonies of Dr. Neri and other prosecution witnesses and the
photographs of the two accused in intimate poses (and three of which showed them half naked in bed). 8 (Emphasis supplied)
We turn to the contention that pari-delicto "is a valid defense to a prosecution for adultery and concubinage and that in such a case "it would be
only a hypocritical pretense for such spouse to appear in court as the offended spouse." 9
In the first place, the case cited does not support petitioner Neri's position. In the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband,
by entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only
about a year after discovering his wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused,
and he is, therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings." In fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari
delicto but to consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no such acquiescence can be implied: the
accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons; and Dr. Neri promptly filed his
complaint after discovering the illicit affair.
Moreover, the concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that
Article 1411 of the Civil Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration.10 The case at bar does not involve any illegal contract which
either of the contracting parties is now seeking to enforce.
Petitioners also contend that Dr. Neri's manifestation which reads:
2. Even before I filed the complaint in court and before the pardon that I had extended to my wife and her co-accused, I was in reality aware of
what was going on between and therefore, tacitly consented to my wife's infidelity, ...
should result in the dismissal of the case or, at the very least, in the remand of the case for new trial claiming that in People v. Camara 11 it was
held that "the consent of the spouse is valid defense to a prosecution for adultery and/or concubinage." 12
Dr. Neri's manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted recantation of testimony given by him before the trial court. It is settled that not all
recantations by witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial. 13 In People v. Follantes and Jacinto, 14 it was held that:
... [R]ecantation by witnesses called on behalf of the prosecution does not necessarily entitle defendant to a new trial. The question whether a
new trial shall be granted on this ground depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the testimony of the witnesses submitted on the
motion for the new trial. Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not
satisfied that such testimony is true. ... 15 (Emphasis supplied)

Succinctly put, the Court doubts the truthfulness and reliability of Dr. Neri's belated recantation. Dr. Neri had two (2) previous occasions to make
the claim contained in his manifestation: first, in the compromise agreement 16 dated 16 February 1989 submitted before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 149 in relation to Civil Case No. M-001; and second, his affidavit 17 dated 23 November 1988 submitted to the Court of
Appeals. Instead, however, these two (2) documents merely stated that Dr. Neri had pardoned petitioners 18and the complaint was filed out of
"pure misunderstanding" 19 without hinting that Dr. Neri knew of the adulterous relations. It appears to the Court that Dr. Neri's manifestation was
so worded as to attempt to cure the deficiency noted by the Court in the two (2) previous documents in the disposition of the petition in G.R. No.
96602:
Petitioner will find no solace in the cases he cites, in support of his prayer to dismiss the case based on Dr. Neri's pardon. People v. Camara (100
Phil. 1098 (1957) is inapplicable as the affidavit there expressly stated that the wife had consented to the illicit relationship. In Gomez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (135 SCRA 620 [1985]) a case involving estafa, the criminal case was dismissed as the affidavit of desistance
specifically stated that the accused had nothing to do whatsoever with the crime charged. In the present case, the pardon did not state that Dr.
Neri had consented to the illicit relationship petitioner and Mrs. Neri. Neither did it state that the case was filed against the wrong parties. 20
Moreover, while the manifestation is dated 14 May 1991, which incidentally is also the date of petitioner Arroyo's motion for reconsideration, it was
subscribed to only on 23 August 1991.
Petitioner Neri also contends that Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance and the compromise agreement operate as a pardon meriting a new trial. The
Court notes that the cases of People v. Camara (supra) and Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (supra) were the very same cases which
petitioner Arroyo cited in G.R. No. 96602 which the Court has already held to be inapplicable in the present case.
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 344. ... The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall
have consented or pardoned the offenders.
xxx xxx xxx
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon
is given after the illicit affair, 21 nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint. 22 In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement was
executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Dr. Neri's manifestation is both dated and signed after issuance of our Resolution in G.R. No. 96602 on 24 April
1991.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the
offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. 23 Enforcement of our
law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter
merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and
the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect find strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution ...
The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code o the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the ration, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family
relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
In U.S. v. Topio, 24 the Court held that:
... The husband being the head of the family and the only person who could institute the prosecution and control its effects, it is quite clear that
the principal object in penalizing the offense by the state was to protect the purity of the family and the honor of the husband, but now the conduct
of the prosecution, after it is once commenced by the husband, and the enforcement of the penalties imposed is also a matter of public policy in
which the Government is vitally interested to the extent of preserving the public peace and providing for the general welfare of the
community. ... 25 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the claim that it was impossible for petitioner Neri to engage in sexual intercourse a month after her ceasarian operation, the Court agrees
with the Solicitor General that this is a question of fact which cannot be raised at this stage. In any case, we find no reason to overturn the Court
of Appeals' finding that "a woman who has the staying power to volley tennis bags for fifteen minutes at the [John Hay] tennis court would not be
incapable of doing the sexual act" which ball play was followed, as noted by the Court of Appeals "by a picture taking of both accused in different
intimate poses." 26
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and this denial is FINAL. The Petition for
Review in G.R. No. 96715 is hereby similarly DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
Let a copy of this Resolution and of Dr. Neri's Manifestation and Motion subscribed on 23 August 1991 be forwarded to the Department of Justice
for inquiry into the possible liability of Dr. Neri for perjury.

MALACAANG
Manila
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1613
AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON
WHEREAS, findings of the police and intelligence agencies of the government reveal that fires and other
crimes involving destruction in Metro Manila and other urban centers in the country are being perpetrated
by criminal syndicates, some of which have foreign connections;
WHEREAS, the current law on arson suffers from certain inadequacies that impede the successful
enforcement and prosecution of arsonists;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction be
prevented to protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability of the
country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land, the following:
Section 1. Arson. Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be punished by
Prision Mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under circumstances
which expose to danger the life or property of another.
Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion
Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishment where explosives, inflammable or combustible
materials are stored.
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture, education or social
services.
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble.
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of persons or
property
4. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or other official
proceedings.
5. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public or private
market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building.
6. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
4. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
5. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
Section 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. The penalty in any case of arson shall be
imposed in its maximum period;

1. If committed with intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate.
The offense is committed by a syndicate if its is planned or carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons.
Section 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death results,
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death shall be imposed.
Section 6. Prima Facie evidence of Arson. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie
evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the building note
necessary in the business of the offender nor for household us.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or materials soaked
therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or electronic contrivance
designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are found in the ruins or premises of the
burned building or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the time of the
issuance of the policy.
4. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have occurred in the
same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or insured.
5. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a building or property
had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of business.
6. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in exchange for the
desistance of the offender or for the safety of the person or property of the victim.
Section 7. Conspiracy to commit Arson. Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by Prision Mayor
in its minimum period.
Section 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. The building which is the object of arson including the land on
which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove
that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his
part.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. The provisions of Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised Penal Code and all
laws, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
Decree are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Section 10. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately upon publication thereof at least once in
a newspaper of general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 7th day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventynine.

.R. No. 145956. May 29, 2002]

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. DR. JAIME F. LAYA, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision, promulgated on August 16, 2000, and the resolution, promulgated on November 14, 2000, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 45688.
The facts of the case, as stated in the appellate courts decision, are as follows:
On May 3, 1991, herein respondent Dr. Jaime F. Laya, a medical practitioner, was bound for San Francisco via a first class booking with
Northwest Airlines (NWA) where, being a frequent passenger, he was a member of the World Perks Club. After his luggage passed, and was
cleared, through the x-ray machine of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), Dr. Laya proceeded to NWAs check-in counter and was
issued a boarding pass. However, while on his way to the first class waiting lounge, Dr. Laya was approached by a NWA employee who
requested him to proceed to a long table where passengers were lined up. There, the passengers Samsonite hand-carried attach cases were
being subjected to further inspection. Since he noticed that he was carrying an attach case similar to those being inspected, Dr. Laya acceded
to the request. However, in the course of the inspection, Dr. Laya noticed that his attach case was treated differently. While the other
passengers were eventually allowed to carry their cases on board the plane, Dr. Laya was asked to place his attach case in a black garbage bag
and he was given two (2) paper envelopes where he could put its contents.
Since Dr. Laya felt that he was singled out for this extraordinary treatment, he requested that he be allowed to talk with the manager to discuss
his situation, and a certain Mr. Barreto approached him. While Dr. Laya was explaining his plight, Mr. Rommel Evangelista, NWAs assistant
manager, told him that even if you are the President of the Philippines or the President of the United States we are going to do the same.
Dr. Layas situation was aggravated when the two (2) paper envelopes proved to be too fragile for the contents of his attach case. The
envelopes were eventually torn. Dr. Laya asked for a replacement and was provided with a used Duty-Free bag.
Upon his arrival at San Francisco, Dr. Laya was accorded VIP[1] treatment by NWAs ground personnel. Two (2) ground stewardesses asked for
his travel documents and declarations and they took care of his clearance and admission papers. Dr. Laya was spared the trouble of having to
fall in line to have his papers processed. When he proceeded to the baggage claim area, his check-in luggage and his Samsonite attach case
were already ready for pick up.
On May 25, 1991, Dr. Laya wrote to NWA and reported the rude treatment accorded him by its personnel. An exchange of communication
ensued but NWA did not heed his complaint. On October 9, 1991, Dr. Layas counsel sent a demand letter to NWA. NWA responded by
apologizing for whatever inconvenience Dr. Laya suffered but it refused Dr. Layas demand for indemnity. Instead, on October 31, 1991, the NWA
Customer Relations Office sent Dr. Laya a letter with a transportation credit voucher worth US$100.00. Dr. Laya refused to accept the voucher
but kept it for evidentiary purposes, and he promptly filed a complaint for damages against NWA before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 84.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Dr. Laya, and against NWA, as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE ENTIRE RECORD, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay unto plaintiff:
1. moral damages in the sum of P1Million;
2. exemplary damages of P500,000.00; and
3. attorneys fees of P50,000.00, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Both parties appealed the decision. NWA appealed the unfavorable ruling against it while Dr. Laya appealed the award in his favor of
only P1,000,000.00 moral damages and P500,000.00 exemplary damages.
In its decision, promulgated on August 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modifications by reducing the award
of moral damages to P500,000.00 and the exemplary damages toP250,000.00.[3]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, NWA came to this Court for relief, alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT UNITED STATES
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) SECURITY DIRECTIVE NO. 91-11 IS UNREASONABLE AND DID NOT COINCIDE WITH THE
CARRIERS PROMISE OF POLITE AND GRACIOUS SERVICE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY (ERRED) IN AWARDING RESPONDENT MORAL DAMAGES OF P500,000.00, AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES OF P250,000.00 AND IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES OF P50,000.00 AND PAYMENT OF COSTS. THE
DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS TO RESPONDENT ARE EXORBITANT AND CONSTITUTE IMPERMISSIBLE UNJUST
ENRICHMENT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT AWARDING NORTHWEST EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND
EXPENSES OF LITIGATION AS PRAYED FOR.[4]
The tragic event that unfolded on September 11, 2001 underscored, more than ever, that airport and airline personnel could not afford any lapse
in the implementation of security measures meant to ensure the safety of airplane crew and passengers. Airline carriers hold the lives of
passengers in their hands and they must at all times be vigilant on matters affecting their safety.

After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the security procedures adopted by NWA was only the result of a directive
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of which NWA, being a U.S. carrier, is subject to. FAA Security Directive No. 91-11, which
was in effect at the time of the incident, states:
Threat Information:
A. SD 91-06 provided the following information: FAA has received information stating that two-man terrorist teams have been trained in the use
of briefcase bombs. The bombs are concealed in brown Samsonite briefcases which contain a total of two (2) kilograms of high explosives
concealed throughout the briefcase under the liner. The devise is armed by attaching a battery to a nine-volt battery connector concealed behind
the briefcases combination lock.
Several members of the teams are Middle Easterners in their 20s selected due to their athletic ability, and were either well-travelled or had
business experience. The teams may be targeting areas in Asia, Africa, and possibly Western Europe.
B. SC 91-09 provided additional information which indicated that there were at least two additional devices which might be used in terrorist
attacks. The additional devices also contain two kilograms of high explosives in the briefcase liners.
- A second bomb may be concealed in a black Samsonite briefcase. Detonation of the explosive concealed in this device requires the use of a
timer, blasting cap, and power supply.
- A third type of bomb is concealed in a burgundy Samsonite briefcase. This configuration has an ANTI-DISTURBANCE type device which is
activated by pulling an arming pin concealed either near the briefcase handle or one of the lock latches. Once the pin is pulled, the bomb arms
after a short delay. The duration of the delay was not specified.
xxx
Action required by U.S. Air Carriers:
A.
The following procedures shall be applied to all hardshell black, brown, or burgundy Samsonite briefcases by all U.S. air carriers on
flights departing Asia, Africa and Europe.
1. If the briefcase is discovered unattended in an airport or in the terminal area, isolate the briefcase, ensure that the briefcase is not moved or
opened, and immediately notify local police/security authorities, proving them with the information in this Directive.
2. All black, brown, or burgundy Samsonite briefcases shall only be transported as checked baggage. All such briefcases shall be externally
examined for signs of alteration. If at any time during this initial examination the briefcase is suspected of having been altered or appears to
conceal a battery, blasting cap, or electrical component, isolate the briefcase, ensure that the briefcase is not moved or opened, and immediately
notify local police/security authorities, providing them with the information in this Directive.
3. Briefcases which exhibit no signs of alteration shall be x-rayed. The briefcase shall then be emptied, all batteries (C, D, AA, AAA, 9v and 6v
lantern) shall be removed, the empty briefcase shall be internally examined for signs of alteration and excess weight, and the empty briefcase
shall be subjected to a two-lane x-ray examination. If at any time during this inspection process the briefcase is suspected of having been altered
or appear to conceal a battery, blasting cap, or electrical component, isolate the briefcase and immediately notify local police/security authorities,
providing them with the information in this directive.
4. The air carrier shall deny the passenger any access to the briefcase after it has been tendered until the briefcase is claimed by the passenger
upon arrival at destination. Following the application of the procedures above, the briefcase shall be transported as checked baggage. However,
the contents of the briefcase may be returned to the passenger for personal use aboard the flight. [5]
It may be true that Dr. Laya was greatly inconvenienced by the act of NWA when his attach case was subjected to further inspection and he was
not allowed to bring it on board the plane. However, it does not appear that he was singled out and discriminated by the employees of
NWA. According to Dr. Laya himself, other Caucasians and Asian passengers carrying attach case similar to his were also required to undergo
further inspection.[6]
The Court disagrees with both the trial court and the appellate court that the letter of NWA to Dr. Laya was an admission of guilt as there was
nothing in the tenor of the letter that would support such conclusion. The letter read:
Dear Dr. Laya:
Thank you for your letter to Northwest Airlines. I am terribly sorry it has taken me longer than I had hoped to personally reply to your
correspondence.
Our goal at Northwest is to be the carrier of distinct preference, and feedback like yours is critical to our success. Customer observations,
suggestions, and experiences form the basis for improved operations. With that in mind, I have shared your comments with my colleagues in the
responsible departments.
We hope to have another chance to show that we can provide the high quality of service our customers expect and deserve. As a gesture of
goodwill, I am enclosing transportation credit which may be applied to travel on our airline within twelve months from the date of issue.
We recognize that travelers have a choice of airlines, and we deeply appreciate those who choose Northwest. We hope to have the privilege of
serving your future travel needs.
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) Erin P. Dunn
Manager
Customer Relations[7]
Indeed, the credit voucher appears nothing more than a gesture of goodwill rather than an acknowledgment of guilt.
Nevertheless, while the protection of passengers must take precedence over convenience, the implementation of security measures must be
attended by basic courtesies. The Court is inclined to believe the testimony of Dr. Laya that the personnel who examined his attach case were

rude, brusque, arrogant and domineering[8] and that the manager who attended to him answered his queries in a reprehensible manner, [9] thus
causing him humiliation as the other passengers were already looking at him.[10] Hence:
ATTY. ERMITAO:
Q. Now, who removed the contents as you claimed that the contents of black Samsonite attach case was ransacked by whom?
A. Well, they said, they were employees of the Northwest Airlines and they said there was an instruction to examine my luggage which I readily
consented. For I believed, it's for security reason.
ATTY. ERMITAO:
Q. How was the examination conducted?
A. That's precisely, the problem, Sir, its the manner it was conducted.
COURT:
Q. How?
A. They were rude to me, brusque, arrogant and they were domineering, they don't even like to listen to what I was saying and they were
autocratic.
ATTY. ERMITAO:
Q. Why do you say that they were domineering and autocratic?
A. Because I wanted these things (my personal effects) to be placed in the briefcase after thorough examination, but they said in a loud voice No. That's an order they said and you cannot go against them and everything I say or explain they say no.
ATTY. ERMITAO:
Q. In what tone of voice was this reply "no" made to you?
A. Well, in a loud voice attracting other passengers while others were looking at them with dismay and I was so embarrassed because as I said,
I was singled out. The others I saw did not have the same experience before me.
xxx
ATTY. ERMITAO:
Q. So you said that the contents of your attach case were placed in these two (2) paper envelopes which are now quite torn was this in the
same condition at the time that the contents of your attach case was placed in the envelopes or in the different condition?
A. No, it looks brand new when it was first given to me but when they put the contents (my personal effects) and it was bulging I have to carry it
on my breast on my way to the VIP room that's why it started a little bit one by one falling apart. That's why I have to call the attention of the lady
in waiting there in the VIP room so that I could talk to the manager.
Q. Was the manager as requested by you attended to you?
A. No, it was not the manager but the assistant managers by the name of Barreto and Evangelista one after the other in that order.
COURT:
Q. Manager of whom?
A. Manager of Northwest Airlines.
ATTY. ERMITAO:
Q. How do you know that they were officers of the Northwest Airlines?
A. Because they were called by the lady on the World Perk Club room upon my request. And when I told Barreto about the incident he cannot
answer and suddenly Evangelista barged in who was arrogant, brusque and rude.
Q. What transpired, if any, between you and Evangelista?
A. Well, that's where again I was so infuriated because I was explaining to him what happened and I was trying to show that bulging bag that I
placed in one corner of the VIP room while the other passengers were watching it. While I was continuously explaining to him what happened, he
told me, look, Dr. Laya even if you are the president of the Philippines or president of the United States you are going to undergo the same.
Q. In what tone of voice made by Mr. Evangelista?
A. It's exactly a loud voice with unwarranted pride. It's a reprehensible way of talking.
ATTY. ERMITAO:
Q. At that particular instance of conversation was going on between you and Evangelista defendant corporation, did you notice, if any, what the
other passengers were doing in the lounge?
A. Precisely, Sir, they were watching me and some of them are trying to hold his head this way. (Witness turning his head from one to the
other). And I don't know what that mean. Anyway, they were just curious looking and no one was smiling. They were turning their head this way
with a facial expression of pity. Some of them were busy arranging their personal effects on their respective briefcases.
x x x.[11]
On this score, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals in saying that (a)ny security measure must coincide with the passengers
right to be treated by the carrier with kindness, respect and utmost consideration in all matters relative to their trip. [12] The Court is satisfied that
Dr. Laya suffered mental anguish and serious anxiety because of his experience with NWA personnel for which he should be awarded moral
damages. Dr. Laya is also entitled to exemplary damages by way of correction to the NWA for the public good [13] and in view of the malevolent
manner by which the NWA personnel treated Dr. Laya.
Still, the Court wishes to reiterate that damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. [14] Hence, we are further
reducing the award of moral damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00 and the amount of exemplary damages is reduced from P250,000.00
to P50,000.00. The Court, likewise, awards the attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00.[15]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED by ordering Northwest Airlines to pay Dr. Jaime F. Laya the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P25,000.00 representing attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 155550

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

STEVEN P. CHIONG,
Respondent.

January 31, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 50308[2]which affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision[3] holding petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc.
(Northwest) liable for breach of contract of carriage.
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean
Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOceans vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port.
Under the service crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary of US$440.00 and a monthly overtime pay of
US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one year.
Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOceans agent at the San
Diego Port, confirming Chiongs arrival thereat in time to board the M/V Elbia which was set to sail on April 1, 1989 (California, United
States time). For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket forSan Diego, California with a departure date of April 1,
1989 from Manila. Ten (10) days before his scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire family from Samar and brought them toManila to see
him off at the airport.
On April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport[4] (MIA), at about 6:30 a.m., three (3) hours before the scheduled time of
departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimares Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) Counter to present Chiongs seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiongs passport was duly stamped, after complying
with government requirements for departing seafarers.
Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest check-in counter. When it was Chiongs turn, the
Northwest personnel[5] informed him that his name did not appear in the computers list of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was then
directed to speak to a man in barong standing outside Northwests counters from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass.
Posthaste, Chiong approached the man in barong who demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor. Without the said amount, and anxious to
board the plane, Chiong queued a number of times at Northwests Check-in Counter and presented his ticket. However, the Northwest personnel
at the counter told him to simply wait and that he was being a pest.

Frustrated, Chiong went to Calvo at the PCG counter and inquired if she had money so he could obtain a boarding pass from the man
in barong. Calvo, who already saw that something was amiss, insisted that Chiongs plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he could check-in
smoothly and board the plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a boarding pass. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight
No. 24 bound for San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989 (California,U.S.A. time).
It appears that Chiongs name was crossed out and substituted with W. Costine in Northwests Air Passenger Manifest. [6]
In a letter dated April 3, 1989, Chiongs counsel demanded as recompense: (1) the amount equivalent to Chiongs salary under the latters
Crew Agreement[7] with TransOcean; (2)P15,000.00 for Chiongs expenses in fetching and bringing his family from Samar to Manila;
(3) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P500,000.00 as legal fees.[8]
Northwest demurred. Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the RTC. Northwest filed a
Motion to Dismiss[9] the complaint citing the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but the trial court denied the same.

5)

P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, for and as attorneys fees, plus costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. Identical to the RTCs findings, those of the CA were as follows: on April 1, 1989, Chiong
was at the MIA three hours before the 10:15 a.m. departure time for Northwest Flight No. 24. Contrary to Northwests claim that Chiong was a
no-show passenger, the CA likewise concluded, as the RTC did, that Chiong was not allowed to check-in and was not issued a boarding pass at
the Northwest check-in counter to accommodate a certain W. Costine. As for Northwests defense that Chiong had left the country after April 1,
1989 and worked for M/V Elbia, the CA ruled that Northwests failure to raise this defense in its Answer or Motion to Dismiss is equivalent to a
waiver thereof. The CA declared that, in any event, Northwest failed to present any evidence to prove that Chiong had worked under the original
crew agreement.

[10]

Hence, this recourse.

In its Answer,[11] Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong had no cause
of action against it because per its records, Chiong was a no-show passenger for Northwest Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989.

Northwest ascribes grievous errors to the CA when the appellate court ruled that: (1) Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong
who was present at the MIA on April 1, 1989 to board Northwests Flight No. 24; (2) As a result of the breach, Northwest is liable to Chiong for
compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit; and (3) Northwests Exhibits 2 and 3, the Flight
Manifest and the Passenger Name Record, respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought to be excluded from the records.

In the RTCs Pre-trial Order[12] based on the parties respective Pre-trial Briefs,[13] the triable issues were limited to the following:
(a)
(b)
how much.

Whether [Chiong] was bumped-off by [Northwest] from Flight NW 24 or whether [Chiong] no-showed for said flight.
If defendant is found guilty of having breached its contract of carriage with plaintiff, what damages are awardable to plaintiff and

In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990, filed a separate criminal complaint for False Testimony [14] against Chiong
based on the latters testimony that he did not leave the Philippines after April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his seaman service record book
that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on October 5 of the same year. Chiong did not participate in the preliminary
investigation; thus, on December 14, 1990, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information against Chiong with the RTC Manila, Branch 54,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-89722.
In the meantime, after a flurry of motions filed by Northwest in the civil case were denied by the RTC, Northwest filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.[15] Correlatively, Northwest moved for a suspension of the proceedings
before the trial court. However, both the Petition for Certiorari and Motion for Suspension of the proceedings were denied by the CA and RTC,
respectively.[16]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for breach of contract
of carriage. The RTC ruled that the evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was deliberately prevented from
checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an American passenger by the name of W. Costine.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

The petition must fail.

We are in complete accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong, and as
such, he is entitled to compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Northwest contends that Chiong, as a no-show passenger on April 1, 1989, already defaulted in his obligation to abide by the terms and
conditions of the contract of carriage;[18]and thus, Northwest could not have been in breach of its reciprocal obligation to transport Chiong. In sum,
Northwest insists that Chiongs testimony is a complete fabrication, supposedly demonstrated by the following: (1) Chiongs seaman service
record book reflects that he left the Philippines after April 1, 1989, specifically on April 17, 1989, to board the M/V Elbia, and was discharged
therefrom upon his personal request; (2) the Information filed against Chiong for False Testimony; and (3) the Flight Manifest and the Passenger
Name Record both indicate that he was a no-show passenger.
We are not convinced.
The records reveal that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of proof required in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of
evidence. Section 1 of Rule 133 provides:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court
may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant liable to plaintiff
in damages by reason of the latters inability to take defendants NW Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, for the following amounts:
1)
U.S.$8,447.00[17] or its peso equivalent at the time of finality of this judgment with legal interests until fully paid, representing
compensatory damages due to plaintiffs loss of income for one (1) year as a direct result of defendants breach of contract of carriage;
2)
P15,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing plaintiffs actual incurred damages as a consequence of his failure to avail of defendants
Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989;
3)
P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing moral damages suffered and sustained by the plaintiff as a result of defendants breach of
contract of carriage;
4)
P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing exemplary or punitive damages due to plaintiff from defendant, owing to the latters
breach of contract of carriage with malice and fraud; and

In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiongs evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989 Flight No.
24, Chiongs passport and seaman service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez, [19] and
Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified the signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiongs
passport.
We have scoured the records, and found no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that factual findings of the lower courts deserve the
utmost respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal.[20] Indeed, Chiongs Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, coupled with the
PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he was present at MIA on said date as he intended to fly to
the United States on board that flight. As testified to by POEA personnel and officers, the PCG stamp indicates that a departing seaman has
passed through the PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied with government requirements for departing seafarers.
Calvo, Philimares liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at the airport, corroborated Chiongs testimony on the latters presence at the MIA and
his check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further testified that she purposely stayed at the PCG counter to confirm that Chiong was
able to board the plane, as it was part of her duties as Philimares liaison officer, to confirm with their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the

seafarer had left the country and commenced travel to the designated port where the vessel is docked. [21] Thus, she had observed that Chiong
was unable to check-in and board Northwest Flight No. 24, and was actually being given the run-around by Northwest personnel.
It is of no moment that Chiongs witnesses who all corroborated his testimony on his presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April
1, 1989, and that he was subsequently bumped-off are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an interest in the outcome of this
case. We intoned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[22] thus:
(T)his Court has repeatedly held that a witness relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. While
this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness
relationship with a party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the quantum of evidence required is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where the quantum of evidence is only
preponderance of evidence.
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, amply establish the fact that Chiong was present at MIA on April 1, 1989,
passed through the PCG counter without delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but when he presented his confirmed ticket thereat,
he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 on that day.
In stark contrast is Northwests bare-faced claim that Chiong was a no-show passenger, and was scheduled to leave the country only
on April 17, 1989. As previously discussed, the records belie this assertion. It is also noteworthy that Northwest did not present any evidence to
support its belated defense that Chiong departed from the Philippines on April 17, 1989to work as Third Engineer on board M/V Elbia under the
original crew agreement.
It is true that Chiongs passport and seaman service record book indicate that he had left the country on April 17, 1989 and come back on
October 5 of the same year. However, this evidence fails to debunk the facts established to have transpired on April 1, 1989, more particularly,
Chiongs presence at the airport and his subsequent bumping-off by Northwest despite a confirmed ticket. Although initially, the burden of proof
was with Chiong to prove that there was a breach of contract of carriage, the burden of evidence shifted to Northwest when Chiong adduced
sufficient evidence to prove the facts he had alleged. At that point, Northwest had the burden of going forward [23] to controvert Chiongs prima
facie case. As the party asserting that Chiong was a no-show passenger, Northwest then had the burden of evidence to establish its claim.
Regrettably, Northwest failed to do so.
Furthermore, it has not escaped our attention that Northwest, despite the declaration in its Pre-Trial Brief, did not present as a witness their
check-in agent on that contentious date.[24] This omission was detrimental to Northwests case considering its claim that Chiong did not check-in at
their counters on said date. It simply insisted that Chiong was a no-show passenger and totally relied on the Flight Manifest, which, curiously,
showed a horizontal line drawn across Chiongs name, and the name W. Costine written above it. The reason for the insertion, or for Chiongs
allegedly being a no-show passenger, is not even recorded on the remarks column of the Flight Manifest beside the Passenger Name column.
Clearly, the categorical declaration of Chiong and his other witnesses, coupled with the PCG stamp on his passport and seaman service record
book, prevails over Northwests evidence, particularly the Flight Manifest. Thus, we are perplexed why, despite the evidence presented by
Chiong, and the RTCs specific order to Northwests counsel to present the person(s) who prepared the Flight Manifest and Passenger Name
Record for a proper identification of, and to testify on, those documents, Northwest still insisted on presenting Gonofredo Mendoza and Amelia
Meris who were, admittedly, not competent to testify thereon.[25]
In its desperate attempt to evade liability for the breach, Northwest claims that Chiong worked at M/V Elbia when he left
the Philippines on April 17, 1989. The argument was not only belatedly raised, as we have repeatedly stated, but is off-tangent.
On this point, we uphold the RTCs and CAs ruling that the failure of Northwest to raise the foregoing defense in its Motion to Dismiss or
Answer constituted a waiver thereof. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Moreover, Northwest paints a scenario that ostensibly transpired on a different date. Even if Chiong left the Philippines on April 17, 1989, it
would not necessarily prove that Chiong was a no-show on April 1, 1989. Neither does it negate the already established fact that Chiong had a
confirmed ticket for April 1, 1989, and first passed through the PCG counter without delay, then reached and was at the Northwest check-in
counters on time for the scheduled flight.
Essentially, Northwest argues that Chiong was a no-show passenger on two (2) separate occasions, March 28 and April 1, 1989 because
he was actually scheduled to depart for the US on April 17, 1989 as ostensibly evidenced by his passport and seaman record book. Had this new
matter alleged been proven by Northwest, it would prevent or bar recovery by Chiong. Unfortunately, Northwest was unsuccessful in proving not
only the no-show claim, but that Chiong, likewise, worked under the original crew agreement.
Northwest likewise insists now that there is a pending criminal case for False Testimony against Chiong that a falsified part of Chiongs
testimony would indicate the falsity of his entire testimony, consistent with the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus[26] doctrine. Following Northwests
flawed logic, this would invariably lead to the conclusion that the corroborating testimonies of Chiongs witnesses are also false.
The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive rule of law and is not strictly applied in this
jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. The
principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the
records show that Chiongs testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even attempted to
explain or impugn the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, and that his passport was accordingly stamped,
obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.
As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final determination, as yet, of Chiongs guilt by the courts. But even if Chiong is adjudged
guilty, it will have little effect on the outcome of this case. As we held in Leyson v. Lawa:[27]
The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not
to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything
stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.
It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified by his
answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. The doctrine deals only with the
weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal application. The testimony of a witness can
be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others:
xxxx
Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:
It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose
fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others, it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility,
because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of
words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has
become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in themselves.
From the foregoing disquisition, the ineluctable conclusion is that Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong.

SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis supplied)

Time and again, we have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case, air transport, is primarily intended to serve the traveling public
and thus, imbued with public interest. The law governing common carriers consequently imposes an exacting standard of conduct. As the
aggrieved party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by Northwest, as carrier, in order to be
awarded compensatory and actual damages.

Similarly, Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

We reiterate that Northwest failed to prove its claim that Chiong worked on M/V Elbia from April 17 to October 5, 1989 under the original
crew agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the lower courts finding on Chiongs entitlement to actual and compensatory damages.

SECTION 8. Omnibus Motion. Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.

We, likewise, uphold the findings of both courts on Northwests liability for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an award of moral damages, in breaches of contract, is in order upon a showing that
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. [28] It imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.[29] It means breach of a known duty through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes
of the nature of fraud.[30] Bad faith is in essence a question of intention.[31]
In the case at bench, the courts carefully examined the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts of Northwest indicative of its inward
motive. It is borne out by the records that Chiong was given the run-around at the Northwest check-in counter, instructed to deal with a man
in barong to obtain a boarding pass, and eventually barred from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 to accommodate an American, W. Costine,
whose name was merely inserted in the Flight Manifest, and did not even personally check-in at the counter.[32]
Under the foregoing circumstances, the award of exemplary damages is also correct given the evidence that Northwest acted in an
oppressive manner towards Chiong.[33]
As for the award of attorneys fees, while we recognize that it is sound policy not to set a premium on the right to litigate,[34] we sustain the
lower courts award thereof.
Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest, [35] or where the defendant
acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.[36] In the case at bench,
Northwest deliberately breached its contract of carriage with Chiong and then repeatedly refused to satisfy Chiongs valid, just and demandable
claim. This unjustified refusal constrained Chiong to not only lose income under the crew agreement, but to further incur expenses and exert
effort for almost two (2) decades in order to protect his interests and vindicate his right. Therefore, this Court deems it just and equitable to grant
Chiong P200,000.00 as attorneys fees. The award is reasonable in view of the time it has taken for this case to be resolved. [37]
Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwests Exhibits 2 and 3 need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that the RTC and CA
correctly excluded these documents as hearsay evidence. We quote with favor the CAs holding thereon, thus:
As a rule, entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in
a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity
or in the performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. [Rule 130, Section 43, Revised Rules of Court]
Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is necessary that: (a) the person who made the entry
must be dead or unable to testify; (b) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (c) the entrant was in a
position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (e) the
entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere hearsay evidence. While there is no necessity
to bring into court all the employees who individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person who supervised them while they were making
the entries testify that the account was prepared under his supervision and that the entries were regularly entered in the ordinary course of
business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal knowledge of the entries in the
manifest since he did not supervise the preparation thereof. More importantly, no evidence was presented to prove that the employee who made
the entries was dead nor did the defendant-appellant set forth the circumstances that would show the employees inability to testify. [38]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50308 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SULPICIO LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 157009

Present:

-versus -

DOMINGO E. CURSO,
LUCIA E. CURSO,
MELECIO E. CURSO, SEGUNDO E. CURSO,

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

VIRGILIO E. CURSO, DIOSDADA E. CURSO, and CECILIA E. CURSO,

Respondents.

Promulgated:
March 17, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Are the surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks during a voyage entitled to recover moral damages from the
vessel owner as common carrier?
This is the question presented in the appeal taken by the common carrier from the reversal by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the complaint for various damages filed by the surviving brothers and sisters of the late
Dr. Cenon E. Curso upon a finding that force majeure had caused the sinking. The CA awarded moral and other damages to the surviving
brothers and sisters.
Antecedents
On October 23, 1988, Dr. Curso boarded at the port of Manila the MV Doa Marilyn, an inter-island vessel owned and operated by
petitioner Sulpicio Lines, Inc., bound forTacloban City. Unfortunately, the MV Doa Marilyn sank in the afternoon of October 24, 1988 while at sea
due to the inclement sea and weather conditions brought about by TyphoonUnsang. The body of Dr. Curso was not recovered, along with
hundreds of other passengers of the ill-fated vessel. At the time of his death, Dr. Curso was 48 years old, and employed as a resident physician at
the Naval District Hospital in Naval, Biliran. He had a basic monthly salary of P3,940.00, and would have retired from government service
by December 20, 2004 at the age of 65.
On January 21, 1993, the respondents, allegedly the surviving brothers and sisters of Dr. Curso, sued the petitioner in the RTC in
Naval, Biliran to claim damages based on breach of contract of carriage by sea, averring that the petitioner had acted negligently in transporting
Dr. Curso and the other passengers. They stated, among others, that their parents had predeceased Dr. Curso, who died single and without
issue; and that, as such, they were Dr. Cursos surviving heirs and successors in interest entitled to recover moral and other damages. [1] They
prayed for judgment, as follows: (a) compensatory damages of P1,924,809.00; (b) moral damages of P100,000.00; (c) exemplary or corrective
damages in the amount deemed proper and just; (d) expenses of litigation of at least P50,000.00; (e) attorneys fees of P50,000.00; and (f) costs
of suit.
The petitioner denied liability, insisting that the sinking of the vessel was due to force majeure (i.e., Typhoon Unsang), which exempted a
common carrier from liability. It averred that the MV Doa Marilyn was seaworthy in all respects, and was in fact cleared by the Philippine Coast
Guard for the voyage; and that after the accident it conducted intensive search and rescue operations and extended assistance and aid to the
victims and their families.
Ruling of the RTC
On July 28, 1995, the RTC dismissed the complaint upon its finding that the sinking of the vessel was due to force majeure. The RTC
concluded that the officers of the MV DoaMarilyn had acted with the diligence required of a common carrier; that the sinking of the vessel and
the death of its passengers, including Dr. Curso, could not have been avoided; that there was no basis to consider the MV Doa Marilyn not
seaworthy at the time of the voyage; that the findings of the Special Board of Marine Inquiry (SBMI) constituted to investigate the disaster
absolved the petitioner, its officers, and crew of any negligence and administrative liability; and that the respondents failed to prove their claim for
damages.
Ruling of the CA
The respondents appealed to the CA, contending that the RTC erred: (a) in considering itself barred from entertaining the case by the
findings of fact of the SBMI in SBMI-ADM Case No. 08-88; (b) in not holding that the petitioner was negligent and did not exercise the required
diligence and care in conducting Dr. Curso to his destination; (c) in not finding that theMV Doa Marilyn was unseaworthy at the time of its
sinking; and (d) in not awarding damages to them.[2]

In its decision dated September 16, 2002,[3] the CA held and disposed:
Ruling
Based on the events described by the appellees witness, the Court found inadequate proof to show that Sulpicio Lines, Inc., or its officers
and crew, had exercised the required degree of diligence to acquit the appellee of liability.
In the first place, the court finds inadequate explanation why the officers of the M.V. Doa Marilyn had not apprised themselves of the
weather reports on the approach of typhoon Unsang which had the power of a signal no. 3 cyclone, bearing upon the general direction of the
path of the M.V. Doa Marilyn. If the officers and crew of the Doa Marilyn had indeed been adequately monitoring the strength and direction of
the typhoon, and had acted promptly and competently to avoid the same, then such a mishap would not have occurred.
Furthermore, there was no account of the acts and decision of the crew of the ill-fated ship from 8:00 PM on October 23, 1988 when the
Chief Mate left his post until 4:00 AM the next day when he resumed duty. It does not appear what occurred during that time, or what weather
reports were received and acted upon by the ship captain. What happened during such time is important in determining what information about
the typhoon was gathered and how the ship officers reached their decision to just change course, and not take shelter while a strong typhoon was
approaching.
Furthermore, the Court doubts the fitness of the ship for the voyage, since at the first sign of bad weather, the ships hydraulic system failed
and had to be repaired mid-voyage, making the vessel a virtual derelict amidst a raging storm at sea. It is part of the appellees extraordinary
diligence as a common carrier to make sure that its ships can withstand the forces that bear upon them during a voyage, whether they be the
ordinary stress of the sea during a calm voyage or the rage of a storm. The fact that the stud bolts in the ships hydraulic system gave way while
the ship was at sea discredits the theory that the appellee exercised due diligence in maintaining the seaworthy condition of the
M.V. Doa Marilyn. xxx.[4]
xxx
Aside from these, the defendant must compensate the plaintiffs for moral damages that they suffered as a result of the negligence attending
the loss of the M.V. Doa Marilyn. Plaintiffs, have established that they took great pains to recover, in vain, the body of their brother, at their own
cost, while suffering great grief due to the loss of a loved one. Furthermore, Plaintiffs were unable to recover the body of their brother. Moral
damages worth P100,000.00 is proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of the RTC of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, rendered in Civil Case No. B-0851, is
hereby SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the defendant-appellee Sulpicio Lines, Inc, to have been negligent in
transporting the deceased Cenon E. Curso who was on board the ill-fated M.V. Doa Marilyn, resulting in his untimely death. Defendantappellee is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs heirs of Cenon E. Curso the following:
(1) Death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00;

The petition is meritorious.

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract, unless there is fraud or
bad faith.[8] As an exception, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger,
[9]
in accordance with Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3), of the Civil Code, which provide:
Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages.
Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter;
such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.
The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to moral damages. The omission from Article 2206 (3) of the brothers and
sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the legislative intent to exclude them from the recovery of moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.[10] The solemn power and duty of the courts to interpret and apply the law
do not include the power to correct the law by reading into it what is not written therein.[11] Thus, the CA erred in awarding moral damages to the
respondents.
The petitioner has correctly relied on the holding in Receiver for North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. v. Ybaez,[12] to the effect that in case
of death caused by quasi-delict, the brother of the deceased was not entitled to the award of moral damages based on Article 2206 of the Civil
Code.

(2) Loss of Earning Capacity in the amount of P504,241.20;

(3) Moral Damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
(4) Costs of the suit.[5]
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioner insists that the CA committed grievous errors in holding that the respondents were entitled to
moral damages as the brothers and sisters of the late Dr. Curso; that the CA thereby disregarded Article 1764 and Article 2206 of the Civil
Code, and the ruling in Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Ybaez,[6] whereby the Supreme Court disallowed the award of moral
damages in favor of the brothers and sisters of a deceased passenger in an action upon breach of a contract of carriage. [7]

Essentially, the purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, that is, to enable the injured party to obtain the means, diversions, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the tragic event. According to Villanueva v. Salvador,
[13]
the conditions for awarding moral damages are: (a) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological, clearly substantiated
by the claimant; (b) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (c) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (d) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code.
To be entitled to moral damages, the respondents must have a right based upon law. It is true that under Article 1003 [14] of the Civil Code they
succeeded to the entire estate of the late Dr. Curso in the absence of the latters descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, and surviving
spouse. However, they were not included among the persons entitled to recover moral damages, as enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, viz:

Issues
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
The petitioner raises the following issues:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
ARE THE BROTHERS AND SISTERS OF A DECEASED PASSENGER IN A CASE OF BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE ENTITLED TO
AN AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AGAINST THE CARRIER?
ASSUMING (THAT) THEY ARE ENTITLED TO CLAIM MORAL DAMAGES, SHOULD THE AWARD BE GRANTED OR GIVEN TO THE
BROTHER OR SISTER NOTWITHSTANDING (THE) LACK OF EVIDENCE AS REGARDS HIS OR HER PERSONAL SUFFERING?

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

in near the entrance.[2] Since they arrived three hours early for their 6:05 p.m. flight (Flight No. 972M), the Heshans whiled away the time at a
nearby coffee shop. At 5:15 p.m. when the check-in counter opened, Edward took to the line where he was second in the queue. When his turn
came and presented the tickets to petitioners customer service agent Ken Carns (Carns) to get the boarding passes, he was asked to step aside
and wait to be called again.[3]

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

After all the other departing passengers were given their boarding passes, the Heshans were told to board the plane without any boarding pass
given to them and to just occupy open seats therein. Inside the plane, the Heshans noticed that only one vacant passenger seat was available,
which was offered to Dara, while Edward and Nelia were directed to occupy two folding seats located at the rear portion of the plane. To
respondents, the two folding seats were crew seats intended for the stewardesses. [4]

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
Article 2219 circumscribes the instances in which moral damages may be awarded. The provision does not include succession in the collateral
line as a source of the right to recover moral damages. The usage of the phrase analogous cases in the provision means simply that the situation
must be held similar to those expressly enumerated in the law in question[15]following the ejusdem generis rule. Hence, Article 1003 of the Civil
Code is not concerned with recovery of moral damages.
In fine, moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only when: (a) where death of a passenger
results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result.[16] Article 2206 of the Civil Code entitles
the descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, and surviving spouse of the deceased passenger to demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted, and the award made to the respondents in the decision dated September 16,
2002 of the Court of Appeals of moral damages amounting to P100,000.00 is deleted and set aside.
SO ORDERED.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 179117

Present:

- versus SPOUSES EDWARD J. HESHAN AND NELIA L. HESHAN AND DARA

GANESSA L. HESHAN, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS EDWARD
AND NELIA HESHAN,
Respondents.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
NACHURA,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Upset that there were not enough passenger seats for them, the Heshans complained to the cabin crew about the matter but were told that if they
did not like to occupy the seats, they were free to disembark from the plane. And disembark they did, complaining thereafter to Carns about their
situation. Petitioners plane then departed for Memphis without respondents onboard.[5]
The Heshans were later endorsed to and carried by Trans World Airways to Los Angeles. Respondents arrived in Los Angeles at 10:30 p.m. of
the same day but had to wait for three hours at the airport to retrieve their luggage from petitioners Flight No. 972M. [6] Respondents stayed for
five days more in the U.S. before going back home to Manila.[7]
On September 24, 1998, respondents sent a letter to petitioner to demand indemnification for the breach of contract of carriage. [8] Via letter
of December 4, 1998, petitioner replied that respondents were prohibited to board Flight No. 972M for verbally abus[ing] [the] flight crew. [9]
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.[10]
From the depositions of petitioners employees Carns, Mylan Brown (Brown) and Melissa Seipel (Seipel), the following version is gathered:
The Heshans did not have reservations for particular seats on the flight. When they requested that they be seated together, Carns denied the
request and explained that other passengers had pre-selected seats and that the computerized seating system did not reflect that the request
could be accommodated at the time. Carns nonetheless assured the Heshans that they would be able to board the plane and be seated
accordingly, as he in fact instructed them ten minutes before the planes departure, to board the plane even without boarding passes and to
occupy open seats therein.[11]
By Seipels claim, as the Heshans were upset upon learning that they were not seated together on the plane, she told them that she would
request other passengers to switch places to accommodate their demand; that she never had a chance to try to carry out their demand, however,
as she first had to find space for their bags in the overhead compartment; and that the Heshans cursed her which compelled her to seek
assistance from Brown in dealing with them.[12]
Brown averred that she went to the back portion of the plane to help out but she was brushed aside by Nelia who was cursing them as she
stormed out of the plane followed by Edward and Dara.[13]
Petitioner denied that the Heshans (hereafter respondents) were told to occupy folding seats or crew seats since [Federal Aviation Authority]
regulations say no passengers are to sit there.[14] As for respondents not having been given boarding passes, petitioner asserted that that does
not in itself mean that the flight was overbooked, for

Promulgated:
February 3, 2010

[t]his is done on last minute boarding when flights are full and in order to get passengers on their way and to get the plane out on time. This is
acceptable procedure.[15]

x--------------------------------------------------x
Branch 96 of the RTC, by Decision[16] of August 20, 2002, rendered judgment in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In July 1998, Edward Heshan (Edward) purchased three (3) roundtrip tickets from Northwest Airlines, Inc. (petitioner) for him, his wife Nelia
Heshan (Nelia) and daughter Dara Ganessa Heshan (Dara) for their trip from Manila to St. Louis, Missouri, USA and back to attend an ice skating
competition where then seven yearold Dara was to participate.[1]
When Daras participation in the ice skating event ended on August 7, 1998, the Heshans proceeded to the airport to take the connecting flight
from St. Louis to Memphis on their way to Los Angeles. At the airport, the Heshans first checked-in their luggage at the airports curbside check-

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering [petitioner] Northwest Airlines, Inc. to pay [respondents] Edward J. Heshan, Nelia L. Heshan and
Dara Ganessa L. Heshan the following:
1.

P3,000,000.00, as moral damages;

2.

P500,000.00, as exemplary damages;

3.

A sum equivalent of 20% of the foregoing amounts, as attorneys fees; and,

4.

Costs of suit.

conclusion; that the appellate court made several inferences which were manifestly mistaken and absurd; and that the appellate court exercised
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts.[22]

SO ORDERED.[17]

Petitioner maintains that it did not violate the contract of carriage since respondents were eventually transported from Memphis to Los Angeles,
albeit via another airline, and that respondents made no claim of having sustained injury during the carriage. [23]

In finding for respondents, the trial court noted:

Petitioner goes on to posit that if indeed crew seats were offered to respondents, its crew would have had nowhere to sit and the plane would not
have been able to depart,[24] and that in reality, respondents voluntarily disembarked from the aircraft because they were not willing to wait to be
seated together.[25]

[T]hat the [respondents] held confirmed reservations for the St Louis-Memphis leg of their return trip to the Philippines is not disputed. As such,
they were entitled as of right under their contract to be accommodated in the flight, regardless of whether they had selected their seats in advance
or not. They had arrived at the airport early to make sure of their seating together, and, in fact, Edward was second in the queue for boarding
passes. Yet, Edward was unceremoniously sidelined and curtly told to wait without any explanations why. His concerned seeking for
explanations was repeatedlyrebuffed by the airline employees. When, at last, they were told to board the aircraft although they had not yet been
issued boarding passes, which they thought to be highly unusual, they soon discovered, to their dismay, that the plane was fully booked, with only
one seat left for the 3 of them. Edward and Nelia rejected the offer [to take] the crew seats. [Respondents] were thus forced to
disembark. (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At all events, petitioner finds the amount of damages imposed by the appellate court excessive and unprecedented and needing substantial
reduction.[26]
In their Comment, respondents counter that since the petition is predicated on questions of facts and the appellate court affirmed the trial
courts factual findings, these are entitled to great weight and respect.[27]
Respondents thus maintain that petitioner was guilty of breach of contract. They cite Singapore Airlines v. Fernandez,[28] which ruled:

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision[18] of June 22, 2007, sustained the trial courts findings but reduced the award of moral and
exemplary damages to P2 million andP300,000, respectively.[19] In affirming the findings of the trial court, the appellate court held:
[I]t is clear that the only instances [sic] when the [petitioner] and its agents allow its passengers to board the plane without any boarding pass is
when the flights are full and the plane is running late. Taking into account the fact that the [respondents] arrived at the airport early, checked-in
their baggage before hand and were in fact at the gates of the boarding area on time, thus, it could not be said that they can fall under the
exceptional circumstance [sic]. It bears stressing at this juncture that it becomes a highly irregular situation that despite the fact that the
[respondents] showed up on time at the boarding area[,] they were made to go in last and sans any boarding passes. Thus, We hold that it can
be logically inferred that the reason why no boarding passes were immediately issued to the [respondents] is because Flight 972 from St.
Louis to Memphis is full and the [respondents] were bumped off from their flight. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court,[20] petitioner filed the present petition for review upon the issues of whether the
appellate court
I
. . . ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES

[W]hen an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger
then has every right to expect that he be transported onthat flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a
breach of contract of carriage.
The petition fails.
As has repeatedly been underscored, in petitions for review on certiorari, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the
parties and passed upon by the Court.[29] Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on the Court, especially when in complete
accord with the findings of the trial court, as in the present case, save for some recognized exceptions.[30]
The issues raised by petitioner are predicated on the appreciation of factual issues. In weighing the evidence of the parties, the trial court found
respondents more credible.
An examination of the evidence presented by petitioner shows that it consisted only of depositions of its witnesses. It had in its possession and
disposition pertinent documents such as the flight manifest and the planes actual seating capacity and layout which could have clearly refuted
respondents claims that there were not enough passenger seats available for them. It inexplicably failed to offer even a single piece of
documentary evidence. The Court thus believes that if at least the cited documentary evidence had been produced, it would have been adverse
to petitioners case.[31]

II
. . . ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

More. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain why it did not issue boarding passes to respondents who were confirmed passengers, even after
they had checked-in their luggage three hours earlier. That respondents did not reserve seats prior to checking-in did not excuse the nonissuance of boarding passes.

III
From Carns following testimony, viz:
. . . ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
Q.

Now you mentioned open seats, Mr. Carns, can you tell us what the phrase or term open seats mean?

IV
. . .ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES, [ERRED IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE
DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS] .
V
. . . ERRED IN NOT FINDING FOR [IT] ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM. [21]
To petitioner, the present petition offers compelling reasons to again review the congruent factual findings of the lower courts which, to it, are
contrary to the evidence on record; that the lower courts disregarded vital testimonies of its witnesses; that the appellate court premised its
decision on a misapprehension of facts and failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly taken into account, will justify a different

A.
Well, about 10 minutes before boarding time when we cancel those who do not take reserve seats, we know how many passengers
are on the plane and we just tell the other passengers to take whatever seat is available at that time,[32]
it is gathered that respondents were made to wait for last-minute cancellations before they were accommodated onto the plane. This, coupled
with petitioners failure to issue respondents their boarding passes and the eleventh-hour directive for them to embark, reinforces the impression
that the flight was overbooked.
Petitioners assertion that respondents disembarked from the plane when their request to be seated together was ignored does not impress. The
observation of the appellate court, viz:

x x x x [T]he fact that the Appellees still boarded the plane ten (10) minutes prior to the departure time, despite knowing that they would be seated
apart, is a clear manifestation of the Appellees willingness to abandon their request and just board the plane in order to catch their flight. But as it
turns out, there were not enough seats for the three of them as aptly found by the Court a quo, to which We subscribed [sic]. x x x x,[33]
merits the Courts concurrence.
Nonetheless, the petition is in part meritorious. There is a need to substantially reduce the moral damages awarded by the appellate court. While
courts are given discretion to determine the amount of damages to be awarded, it is limited by the principle that the amount awarded should not
be palpably and scandalously excessive.[34]
Moral damages are neither intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, nor to enrich the claimant. Taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances attendant to the case, an award to respondents of P500,000, instead of P2,000,000, as moral damages is to the Court reasonable.
[35]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages
is reduced to P500,000. In all other respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-11037. December 29, 1960.]
EDGARDO CARIAGA, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, v. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, defendant and appellant. MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY, defendant and appellee.
Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo for defendant and Appellant.
E.A. Fernandez and L.H. Fernandez for plaintiffs and appellants.

DIZON, J.:

At about 1:00 p.m. on June 18, 1952, Bus No. 133 of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Company hereinafter referred to as the LTB driven by Alfredo
Moncada, left its station at Azcarraga St., Manila for Lilio, Laguna, with Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth-year medical student of the University of Santo
Tomas, as one of it passengers. At about 3:00 p.m., as the bus reached that part of the poblacin of Bay, Laguna, where the national highway
crossed a railroad track, it bumped against the engine of a train then passing by with such terrific force that the first six wheels of the latter were
derailed, the engine and front part of the body of the bus were wrecked, the driver of the bus died instantly, while many of its passengers,
Edgardo among them, were severely injured. Edgardo was first confined at the San Pablo City Hospital from 5:00 p.m., June 18, 1952, to 8:25
a.m., June 20 of the same year when he was taken to the De los Santos Clinic, Quezon City. He left that clinic on October 14 to be transferred to
the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where he stayed up to November 15. On this last date he was taken back to the De los Santos Clinic
where he stayed until January 15, 1953. He was unconscious during the first 35 days after the accident: at the De los Santos Clinic Dr. Gustilo
removed the fractured bones which lacerated the right frontal lobe of his brain and at the University of Santo Tomas Hospital Dr. Gustilo
performed another operation to cover a big hole on the right frontal part of the head with a tantalum plate.
The LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for all the hospital, medical and miscellaneous expenses incurred from June 18, 1952 to April 1953. From
January 15, 1953 up to April of the same year Edgardo stayed in a private house in Quezon City, the LTB having agreed to give him a
subsistence allowance of P10.00 daily during his convalescence, having spent in this connection the total sum of P775.30 in addition to the
amount already referred to.
On April 24, 1953 the present action was filed to recover for Edgardo Cariaga, from the LTB and the MRR Co., the total sum of P312,000.00 as
actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and for his parents, the sum of P18,000.00 in the same concepts. The LTB disclaimed
liability claiming that the accident was due to the negligence of it s co-defendant, the Manila Railroad Company, for not providing a crossing bar at
the point where the national highway crossed the railway track, and for this reason filed the corresponding cross-claim against the latter company
to recover the total sum of P18,194.75 representing the expenses paid to Edgardo Cariaga. The Manila Railroad Company, in turn, denied liability
upon the complaint and cross-claim, alleging that it was the reckless negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident.
The lower court held that it was the negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident and, as a result, rendered judgment sentencing the LTB
to pay Edgardo Cariaga the sum of P10,490.00 as compensatory damages, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint, and
dismissing the cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company. From this decision the Cariagas and the LTB appealed.

Govt Corp. Counsel A. Padilla and Atty. F.A. Umali for Appellee.

The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred: in awarding only P10,490. as compensatory damages to Edgardo; in not awarding them actual and
moral damages, and in not sentencing appellant LTB to pay attorneys fees.

SYLLABUS

On the other hand, the LTBs principal contention in this appeal is that the trial court should have held that the collision was due to the fault of both
the locomotive driver and the bus driver and erred, as a consequence, in not holding the Manila Railroad Company liable upon the cross-claim
filed against it.

1. DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; RECOVERABLE ONLY IN INSTANCES ENUMERATED IN ART. 2219 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Article 2219
of the Civil Code enumerated the instances when moral damages may be recovered. Plaintiffs claim for moral damages not falling under any one
of them, the same cannot be granted.
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN RECOVERABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER ART. 2220 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Neither could defendant LTB be
held liable to pay moral damages to plaintiffs under Art. 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because said
defendant did not act fraudulently or in bad faith in connection therewith.
3. ID.; ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; ONLY PARTIES TO CONTRACTS BREACHED ARE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES RESULTING THEREFROM. Since the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage and plaintiffs parents were
not a party thereto and were not themselves injured as a result of the collision, their claim for actual and compensatory damages is without merit.
4. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ATTORNEYS FEES; CASE NOT FALLING UNDER ANY OF THE INSTANCES ENUMERATED IN ART. 2208 OF THE
CIVIL CODE. The present case not falling under any of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover attorneys fees.

DECISION

We shall first dispose of the appeal of the bus company. Its first contention is that the driver of the train locomotive, like the bus driver, violated the
law, first, in sounding the whistle only when the collision was about to take place instead of at a distance at least 300 meters from the crossing,
and second, in not ringing that locomotive bell at all. Both contentions are without merits.
After considering the evidence presented by both parties the lower court expressly found:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . While the train was approximately 300 meters from the crossing, the engineer sounded two long and two short whistles and upon reaching a
point about 100 meters from the highway, he sounded a long whistle which lasted up to the time the train was about to cross it. The bus
proceeded on its way without slackening its speed and it bumped against the train engine, causing the first six wheels of the latter to be
derailed."cralaw virtua1aw library
x
x
x
". . . that the train whistle had been sounded several times before it reached the crossing. All witnesses for the plaintiffs and the defendants are
uniform in stating that they heard the train whistle sometime before the impact and considering that some of them were in the bus at the time, the
driver thereof must have heard it because he was seated on the left front part of the bus and its was his duty and concern to observe such fact in
connection with the safe operation of the vehicle. The other L.T.B. bus which arrived ahead at the crossing, heeded the warning by stopping and
allowing the train to pass and so nothing happened to said vehicle. On the other hand, the driver of the bus No. 133 totally ignored the whistle and
noise produced by the approaching train and instead he tried to make the bus pass the crossing before the train by not stopping a few meters
from the railway track and in proceeding ahead."cralaw virtua1aw library

enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above findings of the lower court are predicated mainly upon the testimony of Gregorio Ilusondo, a witness for the Manila Railroad Company.
Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the LTB to assail his credibility, we do no find in the record any fact or circumstance sufficient to discredit
his testimony. We have, therefore, no other alternative but to accept the findings of the trial court to the effect, firstly, that the whistle of the
locomotive was sounded four times two long and two short "as the train was approximately 300 meters from the crossing" ; secondly, that
another LTB bus which arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo Cariaga was a passenger, paid heed to the warning and stopped
before the "crossing", while as the LTB itself now admits (Brief p. 5) the driver of the bus in question totally disregarded the warning.
But to charge the MRR Co. with contributory negligence, the LTB claims that the engineer of the locomotive failed to ring the bell altogether, in
violation of section 91 of Article 1459, incorporated in the charter of the said MRR Co. This contention as is obvious is the very foundation of
the cross-claim interposed by the LTB against its co-defendant. The former, therefore, had the burden to proving it affirmatively because a
violation of law is never presumed. The record discloses that this burden has not been satisfactorily discharged.

We agree with the trial court and, to the reasons given above, we add those given by this Court in Cachero v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. (101
Phil., 523, 530, 533):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A mere perusal of plaintiffs complaint will show that his action against the defendant is predicated on an alleged breach of contract of carriage,
i.e., the failure of the defendant to bring him safely and without mishaps to his destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of defendants
taxicab that plaintiff used when be received the injuries involved herein, Gregorio Mira, had not even been made a party defendant to this case.
"Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiffs action in this case, is he entitled to compensation for moral damages? Article 2219 of the Civil
Code says the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Cariagas, as appellants, claim that the award of P10,000.00 compensatory damages to Edgardo is inadequate considering the nature and
the after effects of the physical injuries suffered by him. After a careful consideration of the evidence on this point we find their contention to be
well founded.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

From the deposition of Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a neurosurgeon, it appears that, as a result of the injuries suffered by Edgardo, his right forehead was
fractured necessitating the removal of practically all of the right frontal lobe of his brain. From the testimony of Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, a
psychiatrist, it may be gathered that, because of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo, his mentality has been so reduced that he can no
longer finish his studies as a medical student; that he has become completely misfit for any kind of work; that he can hardly walk around without
someone helping him, and has to use a brace on his left leg and feet.

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

Upon the whole evidence on the matter, the lower court found that the removal of the right frontal lobe of the brain of Edgardo reduced his
intelligence by about 50%; that due to the replacement of the right frontal bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a quite and
retired life because "if the tantalum plate is pressed in or dented it would cause his death."cralaw virtua1aw library

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

The impression one gathers from this evidence is that, as a result of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo Cariaga, he is now in a helpless
condition, virtually an invalid, both physically and mentally.
Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but who acted in
good faith, is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could
have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted, provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of the same Code, have
been duly proved. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo Cariaga consisting of medical, hospital and other
expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75 are within this category. We are of the opinion, however, that the income which Edgardo Cariaga could
earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category
because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB. At
that time he was already a fourth-year student in medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic record may not be first rate (Exhibits 4, 4A to 4-C), it is, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have finished the course and would have passed the board test in
due time. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for
the LTB, the amount of P300.00 could easily be expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he finished his studies.
Upon consideration of all the facts mentioned heretofore, this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the compensatory damages awarded to
Edgardo Cariaga should be increased to P25,000.00.
Edgardo Cariagas claim for moral damages and attorneys fees was denied by the trial court, the pertinent portion of its decision reading as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Plaintiffs claim for moral damages cannot also be granted. Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerated the instances when moral damages may
be covered and the case under consideration does not fall under any one of them. The present action cannot come under paragraph 2 of said
article because it is not one of the quasi-delict and cannot be considered as such because of the pre-existing contractual relations between the
Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Edgardo Cariaga. Neither could defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company be held liable to pay moral
damages to Edgardo Cariaga under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because said defendant did not
act fraudulently or in bad faith in connection therewith. Defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection with the discharge of their duties and so it must be considered an
obligor in good faith.
"The plaintiff Edgardo Cariaga is also not entitled to recover for attorneys fees, because this case does not fall under any of the instances

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
x
x
x
"Of the cases enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the first two may have any bearing on the case at bar. We find, however, with
regard to the first that the defendant herein has not committed in connection with this case any criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. The
one that committed the offense against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been already prosecuted and punished therefor. Altho
(a) owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are likewise liable for damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned task (Article 218 of the Civil Code); and (c) employers and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry are subsidiary civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties
(Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain this action under the provisions of any of the articles of the codes just
mentioned and against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused, but as a result of an admitted breach of contract of carriage
and against the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article
2219 of the Civil Code.
"The present complaint is not based either on a quasi-delict causing physical injuries (Art. 2219, par. 2, of the Civil Code). From the report of the
Code Commission on the new Civil Code. We copy the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After a careful deliberation, it was agreed to use the term quasi-delict for those
obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi- contracts, or criminal offenses. They are known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, culpa-extra-contractual or quasi- delitos. The phrase culpa-extra contractual or its translation extra-contractual-fault was eliminated
because it did not exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations.Aquilian fault might have been selected, but it was thought inadvisable to refer
to so ancient a law as the Lex Aquilia. So quasi-delict was chosen, which more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law classification of
obligations, and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of liability.

The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting the word "tort" from Anglo-American law. But "tort" under that system is much broader
than the Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence.Tort in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not
only negligence, but also intentional criminal act, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine
legal system, intentional and malicious acts are governed by the Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in the Project. (Report of the
Code Commission, pp. 161-162).
"In the case of Cangco, v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We established the distinction between obligation derived from negligence and obligation
as a result of a breach of contract. Thus, we said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the
damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due case in
its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially in the legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility
for the negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise
of due care in their selection of supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising EX CONTRACTU, but only to extra- contractual
obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to CULPA AQUILIANA. and not to CULPA CONTRACTURAL.
"The decisions in the cases of Castro v. Acro Taxicab Co., (82 Phil., 359; 46 Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 2023); Lilius Et. Al. v. Manila Railroad, 59 Phil.,
758) and others, wherein moral damages were awarded to the plaintiffs, are not applicable to the case at bar because said decisions were
rendered before the effectivity of the new Civil Code (August 30, 1950) and for the further reason that the complaints filed therein were based on
different causes of action.
"In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral damages by the trial court has to be eliminated, for under the law it is not a
compensation awardable in a case like the one at bar."cralaw virtua1aw library
What has been said heretofore relative to the moral damages claimed by Edgardo Cariaga obviously applies with greater force to a similar claim
(4th assignment of error) made by his parents.
The claim made by said spouses for actual and compensatory damages is likewise without merits. As held by the trial court, in so far as the LTB
is concerned, the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage to which said spouses were not a party, and neither can they
premise their claim upon the negligence or quasi- delict of the LTB for the simple reason that they were not themselves injured as a result of the
collision between the LTB bus and the train owned by the Manila Railroad Company.
Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against appellant LTB.
[G.R. No. 119995. November 18, 1997]
CARLOS SINGSON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, INC., respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest, common carriers are required by law to carry passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. [1] A
contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this because its business is mainly
with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty.[2] Failure of the carrier to observe this high degree of care and extraordinary diligence renders it liable for any
damage that may be sustained by its passengers.
The instant case is an illustration of the exacting standard demanded by the law of common carriers: On 24 May 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and
his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), at its Metro Manila ticket outlet two (2) open-dated,
identically routed, round trip plane tickets for the purpose of spending their vacation in the United States. Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight
coupons corresponding to this itinerary: flight coupon no. 1 - Manila to Hongkong; flight coupon no. 2 - Hongkong to San Francisco; flight coupon
no. 3 - San Francisco to Los Angeles; flight coupon no. 4 - Los Angeles back to San Francisco; flight coupon no. 5 - San Francisco to Hongkong;
and, finally, flight coupon no. 6 - Hongkong to Manila. The procedure was that at the start of each leg of the trip a flight coupon corresponding to
the particular sector of the travel would be removed from the ticket booklet so that at the end of the trip no more coupon would be left in the ticket
booklet.
On 6 June 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and Crescentino Tiongson left Manila on board CATHAYs Flight No. 902. They arrived safely in Los
Angeles and after staying there for about three (3) weeks they decided to return to the Philippines. On 30 June 1988 they arranged for their
return flight at CATHAYs Los Angeles Office and chose 1 July 1988, a Friday, for their departure. While Tiongson easily got a booking for the
flight, SINGSON was not as lucky. It was discovered that his ticket booklet did not have flight coupon no. 5 corresponding to the San FranciscoHongkong leg of the trip. Instead, what was in his ticket was flight coupon no. 3 - San Francisco to Los Angeles - which was supposed to have
been used and removed from the ticket booklet. It was not until 6 July 1988 that CATHAY was finally able to arrange for his return flight to Manila.

On 26 August 1988 SINGSON commenced an action for damages against CATHAY before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. [3] He
claimed that he insisted on CATHAYs confirmation of his return flight reservation because of very important and urgent business engagements in
the Philippines. But CATHAY allegedly shrugged off his protestations and arrogantly directed him to go to San Francisco himself and do some
investigations on the matter or purchase a new ticket subject to refund if it turned out that the missing coupon was still unused or subsisting. He
remonstrated that it was the airlines agent/representative who must have committed the mistake of tearing off the wrong flight coupon; that he did
not have enough money to buy new tickets; and, CATHAY could conclude the investigation in a matter of minutes because of its
facilities. CATHAY, allegedly in scornful insolence, simply dismissed him like an impertinent "brown pest." Thus he and his cousin Tiongson, who
deferred his own flight to accompany him, were forced to leave for San Francisco on the night of 1 July 1988 to verify the missing ticket.
CATHAY denied these allegations and averred that since petitioner was holding an "open-dated" ticket, which meant that he was not booked on a
specific flight on a particular date, there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that CATHAYs refusal to immediately book him could not be
construed as breach of contract of carriage. Moreover, the coupon had been missing for almost a month hence CATHAY must first verify its
status, i.e., whether the ticket was still valid and outstanding, before it could issue a replacement ticket to petitioner. For that purpose, it sent a
request by telex on the same day, 1 July 1988, to its Hongkong Headquarters where such information could be retrieved. [4] However, due to the
time difference between Los Angeles and Hongkong, no response from the Hongkong office was immediately received. Besides, since 2 and 3
July 1988 were a Saturday and a Sunday, respectively, and 4 July 1988 was an official holiday being U.S. Independence Day, the telex response
of CATHAY Hongkong was not read until 5 July 1988. Lastly, CATHAY denied having required SINGSON to make a trip back to San Francisco;
on the other hand, it was the latter who informed CATHAY that he was making a side trip to San Francisco. Hence, CATHAY advised him that the
response of Hongkong would be copied in San Francisco so that he could conveniently verify thereat should he wish to.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty of gross negligence amounting to malice and bad
faith for which it was adjudged to pay petitionerP20,000.00 for actual damages with interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from 26 August 1988 when the complaint was filed until fully paid, P500,000.00 for moral damages,P400,000.00 for exemplary
damages, P100,000.00 for attorneys fees, and, to pay the costs.
On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts finding that there was gross negligence amounting to bad faith or fraud and,
accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages, and the attorneys fees as well. Reproduced
hereunder are the pertinent portions of the decision of the appellate court[5] There is enough merit in this appeal to strike down the trial courts award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees x x x x In this
material respect, the appellant correctly underscores the fact that the appellee held an open dated ticket for his return flight from San Francisco to
Manila via Hongkong and that, as a consequence, the latter was not actually confirmed on the July 1, 1988 flight or, for that matter, any of the
appellants flights x x x x The appellant certainly committed no breach of contract of carriage when it refused the appellee the booking he
requested on the said July 1, 1988 flight. As a "chance passenger," the latter had no automatic right to fly on that flight and on that date.
Even assuming arguendo that a breach of contract of carriage may be attributed the appellant, the appellees travails were directly traceable to
the mistake in detaching the San Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon of his plane ticket which led to the appellants refusal to honor his plane
ticket. While that may constitute negligence on the part of the air carrier, the same cannot serve as basis for an award of moral damages. The
rule is that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where (a) the mishap results in
the death of a passenger and (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death does not result x x x x In disallowing
the trial courts award of moral damages, the Court takes appropriate note of the necessity for the appellants verification of the status of the
missing flight coupon as well as the justifiable delay thereto attendant x x x x Contrary to the appellees allegation that he was peremptorily
refused confirmation of his flight, and arrogantly told to verify the missing flight coupon on his own, the record shows that the appellant adopted
such measures as were reasonably required under the circumstances. Even the testimonies offered by the appellee and his witnesses
collectively show no trace of fraud or bad faith as would justify the trial courts award of moral damages.
The basis for the award of moral damages discounted, there exists little or no reason to allow the exemplary damages and attorneys fees
adjudicated in favor of the appellee.
Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit and for being pro forma he came to us for review. He
claims that the trial court found CATHAY guilty of gross negligence amounting to malice and bad faith in: (a) detaching the wrong coupon; (b)
using that error to deny confirmation of his return flight; and, (c) directing petitioner to prematurely return to San Francisco to verify his missing
coupon. He also underscores the scornful and demeaning posture of CATHAYs employees toward him. He argues that since findings of fact of
the trial court are entitled to the highest degree of respect from the appellate courts, especially when they were supported by evidence, it was
erroneous for the Court of Appeals to strike out the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees allegedly for lack of basis.
In its Comment, CATHAY firmly maintains that it did not breach its contract of carriage with petitioner. It argues that it is only when a passenger is
confirmed on a particular flight and on a particular date specifically stated in his ticket that its refusal to board the passenger will result in a breach
of contract. And even assuming that there was breach of contract, there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of CATHAY as to justify the award
of moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees in favor of petitioner.
There are two (2) main issues that confront the Court: first, whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the
booking of petitioner for its 1 July 1988 flight; and, second, whether the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but also for moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees for failing to book petitioner on his return flight to the Philippines.
We find merit in the petition. CATHAY undoubtedly committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm petitioner's flight reservation back
to the Philippines on account of his missing flight coupon. Its contention that there was no contract of carriage that was breached because
petitioners ticket was open-dated is untenable. To begin with, the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete

written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of
the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via San
Francisco and Hongkong back to the Philippines, and the carriers acceptance to bring him to his destination and then back home; (b) cause or
consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket; and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger
from the place of departure to the place of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket. [6] In fact, the contract of carriage in the instant
case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los
Angeles. Only the performance of the other half of the contract - which was to transport the passenger back to the Philippines - was left to be
done Moreover, Timothy Remedios, CATHAYs reservation and ticketing agent, unequivocally testified that petitioner indeed had reservations
booked for travel Q: Were you able to grant what they wanted, if not, please state why?
A: I was able to obtain a record of Mr. Singsons computer profile from my flight reservations computer. I verified that Mr. Singson did indeed
have reservations booked for travel: Los Angeles to San Francisco, San Francisco to Hongkong to Manila. I then proceeded to revalidate their
tickets but was surprised to observe that Mr. Singsons ticket did not contain a flight coupon for San Francisco to Hongkong. His ticket did,
however, contain a flight coupon for San Francisco to Los Angeles which was supposed to have been utilized already, that is, supposed to have
been removed by U.S. Air when he checked in San Francisco for his flight from San Francisco to Los Angeles [7] (underscoring supplied).
Clearly therefore petitioner was not a mere "chance passenger with no superior right to be boarded on a specific flight," as erroneously claimed
by CATHAY and sustained by the appellate court.
Interestingly, it appears that CATHAY was responsible for the loss of the ticket. One of two (2) things may be surmised from the circumstances of
this case: first, US Air (CATHAYs agent) had mistakenly detached the San Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon thinking that it was the San
Francisco-Los Angeles portion; or, second, petitioners booklet of tickets did not from issuance include a San Francisco-Hongkong flight
coupon. In either case, the loss of the coupon was attributable to the negligence of CATHAYs agents and was the proximate cause of the nonconfirmation of petitioner's return flight on 1 July 1988. It virtually prevented petitioner from demanding the fulfillment of the carriers obligations
under the contract. Had CATHAYs agents been diligent in double checking the coupons they were supposed to detach from the passengers
tickets, there would have been no reason for CATHAY not to confirm petitioners booking as exemplified in the case of his cousin and flight
companion Tiongson whose ticket booklet was found to be in order. Hence, to hold that no contractual breach was committed by CATHAY and
totally absolve it from any liability would in effect put a premium on the negligence of its agents, contrary to the policy of the law requiring common
carriers to exercise extraordinary diligence.
With regard to the second issue, we are of the firm view that the appellate court seriously erred in disallowing moral and exemplary
damages. Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where
the mishap results in the death of a passenger,[8] or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,[9]there are situations where the negligence of
the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith, in which case, the passenger likewise becomes entitled to recover moral
damages.[10]
In the instant case, the following circumstances attended the breach of contract by CATHAY, to wit: First, as heretofore discussed, the ticket
coupon corresponding to the San Francisco-Hongkong flight was missing either due to the negligence of CATHAYs agents in improperly
detaching petitioners flight coupons or failing to issue the flight coupon for San Francisco-Hongkong in the ticket booklet; second, petitioner and
his cousin presented their respective ticket booklets bearing identical itineraries to prove that there had been a mistake in removing the coupons
of petitioner. Furthermore, CATHAY's Timothy Remedios testified that he was able to ascertain from his flight reservations computer that
petitioner indeed had reservations booked for travel on their return flight, but CATHAY apparently ignored the clear evidential import of these facts
and peremptorily refused to confirm petitioners flight - while ready to confirm his traveling companions identically routed plane ticket - on the
lame and flimsy excuse that the existence and validity of the missing ticket must first be verified; third, petitioner was directed by CATHAY to go
to its San Francisco office and make the necessary verification concerning the lost coupon himself. This, notwithstanding the fact that CATHAY
was responsible for the loss of the ticket and had all the necessary equipment, e.g., computers, fax and telex machines and telephones which
could facilitate the verification right there at its Los Angeles Office.
CATHAYs allegation that it never required petitioner to go to San Francisco is unpersuasive. Petitioner categorically testified that a lady
employee of CATHAY in Los Angeles "insisted that we take the matter (up) with their office in San Francisco." [11] In fact, it even appeared from the
evidence that it was the San Francisco office which arranged for his return flight to the Philippines and not the Los Angeles office. [12] Moreover,
due deference must be accorded the trial courts finding that petitioner was indeed sent by CATHAY to its San Francisco office to verify. For good
and sound reasons, this Court has consistently affirmed that review of the findings of fact of the trial court is not a function that appellate courts
ordinarily undertake, such findings being as a rule binding and conclusive. [13] It is true that certain exceptions have become familiar. However,
nothing in the records warrants a review based on any of these well-recognized exceptions; and, fourth,private respondent endeavored to show
that it undertook the verification of the lost coupon by sending a telex to its Hongkong Office. It likewise tried to justify the five (5) days delay in
completing the verification process, claiming that it was due to the time difference between Hongkong and Los Angeles and the coinciding nonworking days in the United States. The following dialogue between Consul Cortez and Cathay's reservation and ticketing agent Timothy
Remedios can be enlightening Q: What official action did you in turn take?
A: While Mr. Singson was still in my office I sent a telex out at approximately 10:00 a.m. on 30 June 1988 to Hongkong Accounting Office and
copied San Francisco ticket office since Mr. Singson advised he might not be able to return to my office but would be going to San
Francisco. 10:00 a.m. on 30 June 1988 in Los Angeles is however 2:00 a.m. on 1 July 1988 in Hongkong and since office hours start at 9:00 a.m.

in Hongkong, no reply was instantly sent back to me. The response was sent out from Hongkong on 2 July 1988 at approximately 12:00 noon
(Hongkong time) and was received immediately by the Los Angeles telex machine. However, 12:00 noon 2 July 1988 Hongkong time was 8:00
p.m. 1 July 1988 in Los Angeles where office hours close at 5:00 p.m. The Los Angeles office was closed on 2 and 3 July 1988 being Saturday
and Sunday and also closed 4 July 1988 for a public holiday (Independence day) so the reply from Hongkong was not read until 5 July 1988, 8:30
Los Angeles time.[14]
But far from helping private respondents cause, the foregoing testimony only betrayed another act of negligence committed by its employees in
Hongkong. It will be observed that CATHAYs Hongkong Office received the telex from Los Angeles on 1 July 1988 at approximately 2:00 a.m.
(Hongkong time) and sent out their response only on 2 July 1988 at 12:00 noon. In spite of the fact that they had access to all records and
facilities that would enable them to verify in a matter of minutes, it strangely took them more than twenty-four (24) hours to complete the
verification process and to send their reply to Los Angeles. The inevitable conclusion is that CATHAYs Hongkong personnel never acted
promptly and timely on the request for verification.
Besides, to be stranded for five (5) days in a foreign land because of an air carriers negligence is too exasperating an experience for a plane
passenger. For sure, petitioner underwent profound distress and anxiety, not to mention the worries brought about by the thought that he did not
have enough money to sustain himself, and the embarrassment of having been forced to seek the generosity of relatives and friends.
Anent the accusation that private respondents personnel were rude and arrogant, petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate
his claim. Nonetheless, such fact will not in any manner affect the disposition of this case. Private respondents mistake in removing the wrong
coupon was compounded by several other independent acts of negligence above-enumerated. Taken together, they indubitably signify more than
ordinary inadvertence or inattention and thus constitute a radical departure from the extraordinary standard of care required of common
carriers. Put differently, these circumstances reflect the carriers utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its passengers, clearly
constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of the rights of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no different from
fraud, malice and bad faith. As the rule now stands, where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is shown to have acted
fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages, in addition to actual damages, is proper. [15]
However, the P500,000.00 moral damages and P400,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the trial court have to be reduced. The wellentrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages depends upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case.
[16]
This discretion is limited by the principle that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" as to indicate that it
was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.[17] Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable
action.[18] There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed
by its own peculiar facts.
In the instant case, the injury suffered by petitioner is not so serious or extensive as to warrant an award amounting to P900,000.00. The
assessment of P200,000.00 as moral damages andP50,000.00 as exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.
On the issue of actual damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of P20,000.00 granted by the trial court to petitioner should
not be disturbed. Petitioner categorically testified that he incurred the amount during the period of his delay in departing from the United States Q: Will you kindly tell the Court what expenses if any did you incur for these x x x days from July 1 until you were able to leave on July 6, 1988?
A: Well, it is true we stayed in the house of my nephew but still we had to spend for our food and I left him some around five hundred dollars for
our stay for around five days.
Q: How about your meals?
A: For our meals, we have to eat outside.
Q: Will you tell, more or less, how much you spent for your meals?
xxxx
A: For every meal we spend around thirty dollars each.
Q: And this is for how many days?
A: From July 1, up to the 6th in the morning, sir.
Q: So more or less how many in pesos did you spend for this period of waiting from July 1 to 6?
A: Twenty thousand pesos, sir [19]
In the absence of any countervailing evidence from private respondent, and in view of the negligence attributable to it, the foregoing testimony
suffices as basis for actual damages as determined by the court a quo.
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest. It was therefore erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award made by the trial court;
consequently, petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and the amount of P25,000.00, instead ofP100,000.00 earlier awarded, may
be considered rational, fair and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the 14 July 1994 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. Private respondent is ordered to
pay petitioner P20,000.00 for actual damages as fixed by the trial court, plus P200,000.00 for moral damages, P50,000.00 for exemplary
damages and P25,000.00 for attorney's fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 150843. March 14, 2003]
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES DANIEL VAZQUEZ and MARIA LUISA MADRIGAL VAZQUEZ, respondents.
DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Is an involuntary upgrading of an airline passengers accommodation from one class to a more superior class at no extra cost a breach of contract
of carriage that would entitle the passenger to an award of damages? This is a novel question that has to be resolved in this case.
The facts in this case, as found by the Court of Appeals and adopted by petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., (hereinafter Cathay) are as
follows:
Cathay is a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting passengers and goods by air. Among the many routes it services is the
Manila-Hongkong-Manila course. As part of its marketing strategy, Cathay accords its frequent flyers membership in its Marco Polo Club. The
members enjoy several privileges, such as priority for upgrading of booking without any extra charge whenever an opportunity arises. Thus, a
frequent flyer booked in the Business Class has priority for upgrading to First Class if the Business Class Section is fully booked.
Respondents-spouses Dr. Daniel Earnshaw Vazquez and Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez are frequent flyers of Cathay and are Gold Card
members of its Marco Polo Club. On 24 September 1996, the Vazquezes, together with their maid and two friends Pacita Cruz and Josefina
Vergel de Dios, went to Hongkong for pleasure and business.
For their return flight to Manila on 28 September 1996, they were booked on Cathays Flight CX-905, with departure time at 9:20 p.m. Two hours
before their time of departure, the Vazquezes and their companions checked in their luggage at Cathays check-in counter at Kai Tak Airport and
were given their respective boarding passes, to wit, Business Class boarding passes for the Vazquezes and their two friends, and Economy Class
for their maid. They then proceeded to the Business Class passenger lounge.
When boarding time was announced, the Vazquezes and their two friends went to Departure Gate No. 28, which was designated for Business
Class passengers. Dr. Vazquez presented his boarding pass to the ground stewardess, who in turn inserted it into an electronic machine reader
or computer at the gate. The ground stewardess was assisted by a ground attendant by the name of Clara Lai Han Chiu. When Ms. Chiu glanced
at the computer monitor, she saw a message that there was a seat change from Business Class to First Class for the Vazquezes.
Ms. Chiu approached Dr. Vazquez and told him that the Vazquezes accommodations were upgraded to First Class. Dr. Vazquez refused the
upgrade, reasoning that it would not look nice for them as hosts to travel in First Class and their guests, in the Business Class; and moreover,
they were going to discuss business matters during the flight. He also told Ms. Chiu that she could have other passengers instead transferred to
the First Class Section. Taken aback by the refusal for upgrading, Ms. Chiu consulted her supervisor, who told her to handle the situation and
convince the Vazquezes to accept the upgrading. Ms. Chiu informed the latter that the Business Class was fully booked, and that since they were
Marco Polo Club members they had the priority to be upgraded to the First Class. Dr. Vazquez continued to refuse, so Ms. Chiu told them that if
they would not avail themselves of the privilege, they would not be allowed to take the flight. Eventually, after talking to his two friends, Dr.
Vazquez gave in. He and Mrs. Vazquez then proceeded to the First Class Cabin.
Upon their return to Manila, the Vazquezes, in a letter of 2 October 1996 addressed to Cathays Country Manager, demanded that they be
indemnified in the amount of P1million for the humiliation and embarrassment caused by its employees. They also demanded a written apology
from the management of Cathay, preferably a responsible person with a rank of no less than the Country Manager, as well as the apology from
Ms. Chiu within fifteen days from receipt of the letter.
In his reply of 14 October 1996, Mr. Larry Yuen, the assistant to Cathays Country Manager Argus Guy Robson, informed the Vazquezes that
Cathay would investigate the incident and get back to them within a weeks time.
On 8 November 1996, after Cathays failure to give them any feedback within its self-imposed deadline, the Vazquezes instituted before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City an action for damages against Cathay, praying for the payment to each of them the amounts of P250,000 as
temperate damages; P500,000 as moral damages; P500,000 as exemplary or corrective damages; and P250,000 as attorneys fees.
In their complaint, the Vazquezes alleged that when they informed Ms. Chiu that they preferred to stay in Business Class, Ms. Chiu obstinately,
uncompromisingly and in a loud, discourteous and harsh voice threatened that they could not board and leave with the flight unless they go to
First Class, since the Business Class was overbooked. Ms. Chius loud and stringent shouting annoyed, embarrassed, and humiliated them
because the incident was witnessed by all the other passengers waiting for boarding. They also claimed that they were unjustifiably delayed to
board the plane, and when they were finally permitted to get into the aircraft, the forward storage compartment was already full. A flight
stewardess instructed Dr. Vazquez to put his roll-on luggage in the overhead storage compartment. Because he was not assisted by any of the
crew in putting up his luggage, his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was aggravated, causing him extreme pain on his arm and wrist. The
Vazquezes also averred that they belong to the uppermost and absolutely top elite of both Philippine Society and the Philippine financial
community, [and that] they were among the wealthiest persons in the Philippine[s].
In its answer, Cathay alleged that it is a practice among commercial airlines to upgrade passengers to the next better class of accommodation,
whenever an opportunity arises, such as when a certain section is fully booked. Priority in upgrading is given to its frequent flyers, who are
considered favored passengers like the Vazquezes. Thus, when the Business Class Section of Flight CX-905 was fully booked, Cathays
computer sorted out the names of favored passengers for involuntary upgrading to First Class. When Ms. Chiu informed the Vazquezes that they
were upgraded to First Class, Dr. Vazquez refused. He then stood at the entrance of the boarding apron, blocking the queue of passengers from
boarding the plane, which inconvenienced other passengers. He shouted that it was impossible for him and his wife to be upgraded without his
two friends who were traveling with them. Because of Dr. Vazquezs outburst, Ms. Chiu thought of upgrading the traveling companions of the
Vazquezes. But when she checked the computer, she learned that the Vazquezes companions did not have priority for upgrading. She then
tried to book the Vazquezes again to their original seats. However, since the Business Class Section was already fully booked, she politely
informed Dr. Vazquez of such fact and explained that the upgrading was in recognition of their status as Cathays valued passengers. Finally, after
talking to their guests, the Vazquezes eventually decided to take the First Class accommodation.

Cathay also asserted that its employees at the Hong Kong airport acted in good faith in dealing with the Vazquezes; none of them shouted,
humiliated, embarrassed, or committed any act of disrespect against them (the Vazquezes). Assuming that there was indeed a breach of
contractual obligation, Cathay acted in good faith, which negates any basis for their claim for temperate, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Hence, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for payment of P100,000 for exemplary damages and P300,000 as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
During the trial, Dr. Vazquez testified to support the allegations in the complaint. His testimony was corroborated by his two friends who were with
him at the time of the incident, namely, Pacita G. Cruz and Josefina Vergel de Dios.
For its part, Cathay presented documentary evidence and the testimonies of Mr. Yuen; Ms. Chiu; Norma Barrientos, Comptroller of its retained
counsel; and Mr. Robson. Yuen and Robson testified on Cathays policy of upgrading the seat accommodation of its Marco Polo Club members
when an opportunity arises. The upgrading of the Vazquezes to First Class was done in good faith; in fact, the First Class Section is definitely
much better than the Business Class in terms of comfort, quality of food, and service from the cabin crew. They also testified that overbooking is
a widely accepted practice in the airline industry and is in accordance with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations. Airlines
overbook because a lot of passengers do not show up for their flight. With respect to Flight CX-905, there was no overall overbooking to a
degree that a passenger was bumped off or downgraded. Yuen and Robson also stated that the demand letter of the Vazquezes was
immediately acted upon. Reports were gathered from their office in Hong Kong and immediately forwarded to their counsel Atty. Remollo for legal
advice. However, Atty. Remollo begged off because his services were likewise retained by the Vazquezes; nonetheless, he undertook to solve the
problem in behalf of Cathay. But nothing happened until Cathay received a copy of the complaint in this case. For her part, Ms. Chiu denied that
she shouted or used foul or impolite language against the Vazquezes. Ms. Barrientos testified on the amount of attorneys fees and other
litigation expenses, such as those for the taking of the depositions of Yuen and Chiu.
In its decision[1] of 19 October 1998, the trial court found for the Vazquezes and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence to sustain the instant complaint, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Vazquez
spouses and against defendant Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., ordering the latter to pay each plaintiff the following:
a)
Nominal damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for each plaintiff;
b)
Moral damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00 for each plaintiff;
c)
Exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00 for each plaintiff;
d)
Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of P1,000,000.00 for each plaintiff; and
e)
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
According to the trial court, Cathay offers various classes of seats from which passengers are allowed to choose regardless of their reasons or
motives, whether it be due to budgetary constraints or whim. The choice imposes a clear obligation on Cathay to transport the passengers in the
class chosen by them. The carrier cannot, without exposing itself to liability, force a passenger to involuntarily change his choice. The upgrading
of the Vazquezes accommodation over and above their vehement objections was due to the overbooking of the Business Class. It was a pretext
to pack as many passengers as possible into the plane to maximize Cathays revenues. Cathays actuations in this case displayed deceit, gross
negligence, and bad faith, which entitled the Vazquezes to awards for damages.
On appeal by the petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of 24 July 2001, [2] deleted the award for exemplary damages; and it reduced the
awards for moral and nominal damages for each of the Vazquezes to P250,000 and P50,000, respectively, and the attorneys fees and litigation
expenses to P50,000 for both of them.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated that by upgrading the Vazquezes to First Class, Cathay novated the contract of carriage without the formers
consent. There was a breach of contract not because Cathay overbooked the Business Class Section of Flight CX-905 but because the latter
pushed through with the upgrading despite the objections of the Vazquezes.
However, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that Ms. Chiu shouted at, or meant to be discourteous to, Dr. Vazquez, although it might
seemed that way to the latter, who was a member of the elite in Philippine society and was not therefore used to being harangued by anybody.
Ms. Chiu was a Hong Kong Chinese whose fractured Chinese was difficult to understand and whose manner of speaking might sound harsh or
shrill to Filipinos because of cultural differences. But the Court of Appeals did not find her to have acted with deliberate malice, deceit, gross
negligence, or bad faith. If at all, she was negligent in not offering the First Class accommodations to other passengers. Neither can the flight
stewardess in the First Class Cabin be said to have been in bad faith when she failed to assist Dr. Vazquez in lifting his baggage into the
overhead storage bin. There is no proof that he asked for help and was refused even after saying that he was suffering from bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome. Anent the delay of Yuen in responding to the demand letter of the Vazquezes, the Court of Appeals found it to have been
sufficiently explained.
The Vazquezes and Cathay separately filed motions for a reconsideration of the decision, both of which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Cathay seasonably filed with us this petition in this case. Cathay maintains that the award for moral damages has no basis, since the Court of
Appeals found that there was no wanton, fraudulent, reckless and oppressive display of manners on the part of its personnel; and that the
breach of contract was not attended by fraud, malice, or bad faith. If any damage had been suffered by the Vazquezes, it was damnum absque
injuria, which is damage without injury, damage or injury inflicted without injustice, loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong
done to a man for which the law provides no remedy. Cathay also invokes our decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[3] where we
recognized that, in accordance with the Civil Aeronautics Boards Economic Regulation No. 7, as amended, an overbooking that does not exceed
ten percent cannot be considered deliberate and done in bad faith. We thus deleted in that case the awards for moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorneys fees, for lack of proof of overbooking exceeding ten percent or of bad faith on the part of the airline carrier.

On the other hand, the Vazquezes assert that the Court of Appeals was correct in granting awards for moral and nominal damages and attorneys
fees in view of the breach of contract committed by Cathay for transferring them from the Business Class to First Class Section without prior
notice or consent and over their vigorous objection. They likewise argue that the issuance of passenger tickets more than the seating capacity of
each section of the plane is in itself fraudulent, malicious and tainted with bad faith.
The key issues for our consideration are whether (1) by upgrading the seat accommodation of the Vazquezes from Business Class to First Class
Cathay breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes; (2) the upgrading was tainted with fraud or bad faith; and (3) the Vazquezes are
entitled to damages.
We resolve the first issue in the affirmative.
A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one agrees to give something or render some service to another for a
consideration. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) an object certain which is the
subject of the contract; and (3) the cause of the obligation which is established. [4] Undoubtedly, a contract of carriage existed between Cathay and
the Vazquezes. They voluntarily and freely gave their consent to an agreement whose object was the transportation of the Vazquezes from Manila
to Hong Kong and back to Manila, with seats in the Business Class Section of the aircraft, and whose cause or consideration was the fare paid by
the Vazquezes to Cathay.
The only problem is the legal effect of the upgrading of the seat accommodation of the Vazquezes. Did it constitute a breach of contract?
Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. [5] It is also defined as the [f]ailure,
without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract.[6]
In previous cases, the breach of contract of carriage consisted in either the bumping off of a passenger with confirmed reservation or the
downgrading of a passengers seat accommodation from one class to a lower class. In this case, what happened was the reverse. The contract
between the parties was for Cathay to transport the Vazquezes to Manila on a Business Class accommodation in Flight CX-905. After checkingin their luggage at the Kai Tak Airport in Hong Kong, the Vazquezes were given boarding cards indicating their seat assignments in the Business
Class Section. However, during the boarding time, when the Vazquezes presented their boarding passes, they were informed that they had a seat
change from Business Class to First Class. It turned out that the Business Class was overbooked in that there were more passengers than the
number of seats. Thus, the seat assignments of the Vazquezes were given to waitlisted passengers, and the Vazquezes, being members of the
Marco Polo Club, were upgraded from Business Class to First Class.
We note that in all their pleadings, the Vazquezes never denied that they were members of Cathays Marco Polo Club. They knew that as
members of the Club, they had priority for upgrading of their seat accommodation at no extra cost when an opportunity arises. But, just like other
privileges, such priority could be waived. The Vazquezes should have been consulted first whether they wanted to avail themselves of the
privilege or would consent to a change of seat accommodation before their seat assignments were given to other passengers. Normally, one
would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for it would mean a better accommodation. But, whatever their reason was and however odd it might
be, the Vazquezes had every right to decline the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they had booked for and which was
designated in their boarding passes. They clearly waived their priority or preference when they asked that other passengers be given the
upgrade. It should not have been imposed on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of
carriage with the Vazquezes.
We are not, however, convinced that the upgrading or the breach of contract was attended by fraud or bad faith. Thus, we resolve the second
issue in the negative.
Bad faith and fraud are allegations of fact that demand clear and convincing proof. They are serious accusations that can be so conveniently and
casually invoked, and that is why they are never presumed. They amount to mere slogans or mudslinging unless convincingly substantiated by
whoever is alleging them.
Fraud has been defined to include an inducement through insidious machination. Insidious machination refers to a deceitful scheme or plot with
an evil or devious purpose. Deceit exists where the party, with intent to deceive, conceals or omits to state material facts and, by reason of such
omission or concealment, the other party was induced to give consent that would not otherwise have been given.[7]
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. [8]
We find no persuasive proof of fraud or bad faith in this case. The Vazquezes were not induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious
words or deceitful machination or through willful concealment of material facts. Upon boarding, Ms. Chiu told the Vazquezes that their
accommodations were upgraded to First Class in view of their being Gold Card members of Cathays Marco Polo Club. She was honest in telling
them that their seats were already given to other passengers and the Business Class Section was fully booked. Ms. Chiu might have failed to
consider the remedy of offering the First Class seats to other passengers. But, we find no bad faith in her failure to do so, even if that amounted to
an exercise of poor judgment.
Neither was the transfer of the Vazquezes effected for some evil or devious purpose. As testified to by Mr. Robson, the First Class Section is
better than the Business Class Section in terms of comfort, quality of food, and service from the cabin crew; thus, the difference in fare between
the First Class and Business Class at that time was $250.[9] Needless to state, an upgrading is for the better condition and, definitely, for the
benefit of the passenger.
We are not persuaded by the Vazquezes argument that the overbooking of the Business Class Section constituted bad faith on the part of
Cathay. Section 3 of the Economic Regulation No. 7 of the Civil Aeronautics Board, as amended, provides:
Sec 3. Scope. This regulation shall apply to every Philippine and foreign air carrier with respect to its operation of flights or portions of flights
originating from or terminating at, or serving a point within the territory of the Republic of the Philippines insofar as it denies boarding to a

passenger on a flight, or portion of a flight inside or outside the Philippines, for which he holds confirmed reserved space. Furthermore, this
Regulation is designed to cover only honest mistakes on the part of the carriers and excludes deliberate and willful acts of non-accommodation.
Provided, however, that overbooking not exceeding 10% of the seating capacity of the aircraft shall not be considered as a deliberate and willful
act of non-accommodation.
It is clear from this section that an overbooking that does not exceed ten percent is not considered deliberate and therefore does not amount to
bad faith.[10] Here, while there was admittedly an overbooking of the Business Class, there was no evidence of overbooking of the plane beyond
ten percent, and no passenger was ever bumped off or was refused to board the aircraft.
Now we come to the third issue on damages.
The Court of Appeals awarded each of the Vazquezes moral damages in the amount of P250,000. Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendants wrongful act or omission.[11] Thus, case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there must be
an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether physical, mental or psychological; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award for
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. [12]
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad
faith or where the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger.[13] Where in breaching the contract of carriage the airline is not shown to have
acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation which
the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the liability does not include moral and exemplary damages.[14]
In this case, we have ruled that the breach of contract of carriage, which consisted in the involuntary upgrading of the Vazquezes seat
accommodation, was not attended by fraud or bad faith. The Court of Appeals award of moral damages has, therefore, no leg to stand on.
The deletion of the award for exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is correct. It is a requisite in the grant of exemplary damages that the
act of the offender must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner.[15] Such requisite is absent in this case.
Moreover, to be entitled thereto the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages. [16] Since the Vazquezes
are not entitled to any of these damages, the award for exemplary damages has no legal basis. And where the awards for moral and exemplary
damages are eliminated, so must the award for attorneys fees.[17]
The most that can be adjudged in favor of the Vazquezes for Cathays breach of contract is an award for nominal damages under Article 2221 of
the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
Article 2221 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Worth noting is the fact that in Cathays Memorandum filed with this Court, it prayed only for the deletion of the award for moral damages. It
deferred to the Court of Appeals discretion in awarding nominal damages; thus:
As far as the award of nominal damages is concerned, petitioner respectfully defers to the Honorable Court of Appeals discretion. Aware as it is
that somehow, due to the resistance of respondents-spouses to the normally-appreciated gesture of petitioner to upgrade their accommodations,
petitioner may have disturbed the respondents-spouses wish to be with their companions (who traveled to Hong Kong with them) at the Business
Class on their flight to Manila. Petitioner regrets that in its desire to provide the respondents-spouses with additional amenities for the one and
one-half (1 1/2) hour flight to Manila, unintended tension ensued.[18]
Nonetheless, considering that the breach was intended to give more benefit and advantage to the Vazquezes by upgrading their Business Class
accommodation to First Class because of their valued status as Marco Polo members, we reduce the award for nominal damages to P5,000.
Before writing finis to this decision, we find it well-worth to quote the apt observation of the Court of Appeals regarding the awards adjudged by
the trial court:
We are not amused but alarmed at the lower courts unbelievable alacrity, bordering on the scandalous, to award excessive amounts as
damages. In their complaint, appellees asked for P1 million as moral damages but the lower court awarded P4 million; they asked
for P500,000.00 as exemplary damages but the lower court cavalierly awarded a whooping P10 million; they asked for P250,000.00 as attorneys
fees but were awarded P2 million; they did not ask for nominal damages but were awarded P200,000.00. It is as if the lower court went on a
rampage, and why it acted that way is beyond all tests of reason. In fact the excessiveness of the total award invites the suspicion that it was the
result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
The presiding judge of the lower court is enjoined to hearken to the Supreme Courts admonition in Singson vs. CA (282 SCRA 149
[1997]), where it said:
The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages depends upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each
case. This discretion is limited by the principle that the amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it
was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
and in Alitalia Airways vs. CA (187 SCRA 763 [1990], where it was held:
Nonetheless, we agree with the injunction expressed by the Court of Appeals that passengers must not prey on international airlines for damage
awards, like trophies in a safari. After all neither the social standing nor prestige of the passenger should determine the extent to which he

would suffer because of a wrong done, since the dignity affronted in the individual is a quality inherent in him and not conferred by these social
indicators. [19]
We adopt as our own this observation of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby partly GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 24 July 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 63339 is
hereby MODIFIED, and as modified, the awards for moral damages and attorneys fees are set aside and deleted, and the award for nominal
damages is reduced to P5,000.

No pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.