Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill: A Case Study For Disaster Risk Reduction & Mitigation

Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill: A Case Study for Disaster Risk Reduction & Mitigation
By: Brandy Henry
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction..........................................................................................................................................3
II. Impacts & Risks..................................................................................................................................4
Mental Health...............................................................................................................................4
Livelihoods....................................................................................................................................5
Environment.................................................................................................................................5
III. Existing Strategies of Disaster Risk Reduction...............................................................................6
Existing Policy & Disaster Reduction Plan................................................................................6
IV. Existing Strategies of Disaster Risk Mitigation...............................................................................9
Environmental Risk Mitigation..................................................................................................9
Industry Investment in Social Protection Funds.....................................................................10
Federal Social Protection Programs.........................................................................................12
V. Recommendations..............................................................................................................................13
Disaster Risk Reduction.............................................................................................................13
Technology Recommendations......................................................................................13
Policy Recommendations...............................................................................................13
Cultural Recommendations...........................................................................................14
Research Recommendations..........................................................................................15
Increased Public Involvement.......................................................................................15
Disaster Risk Mitigation............................................................................................................16
Environmental................................................................................................................16
Social Protection.............................................................................................................16
VI. Conclusion........................................................................................................................................17
VII. References.......................................................................................................................................19
I. INTRODUCTION
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill of April 20, 2010 is the largest oil spill to date (Grattan et al,
2011). This rapid onset man made disaster had wide reaching effects, which are still not fully
understood. The disaster occurred in the Gulf of Mexico and impacted both the United States (US) and
Mexico. Within the US, those states most severely impacted were Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and
Florida. The Deepwater Horizon is an offshore drilling rig owned by British Petroleum (BP). This rig
sits on top of the Maconda oil well which is 5,000 feet below the surface of the ocean and another
13,000 feet below the ocean floor. Due to its depth, the oil is under extreme pressure. If this pressure
is not adequately regulated by the rig, as the oil is extracted, then there is a risk of a blowout. The
Deepwater Horizon disaster was caused by a blowout of this nature (Latham, 2011). The blowout on
the rig then led to an explosion and fire that killed 11 employees and seriously injured 17 more (Houck,
2010). The explosion also ruptured the exploratory well in multiple locations. This caused the oil and
gas leak which released approximately 40,000-62,000 barrels of oil a day for 87 days (Baram, 2010),
(Monroe, 2011). This oil contaminated large regions of the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in severe impacts
to the people and natural environment of the Gulf Coast and as far away as Mexico. Livelihoods
impacted included tourism and commercial fishing. Additionally, adverse mental health effects have
been cited (Grattan et al, 2011).
The aim of this paper is to explore this disaster as a case study from which to better understand
how to integrate disaster risk reduction and mitigation into offshore oil drilling in the future. First the
impacts of the disaster will be outlined in order to better understand what risks exist from offshore
drilling. Next risk reduction and mitigation strategies employed in the Deepwater Horizon case will be
explored in order to determine best practices and areas where change is recommended. Finally,
recommendations will be made in how to improve the risk reduction and mitigation strategies going
forward in offshore drilling and whether continued offshore drilling is worth the inherent risks.
II. IMPACTS & RISKS
Impacts from offshore drilling disasters stem mainly from accidental blowouts which cause
explosions and fires. Typical impacts from these explosions and fires include physical and emotional
harm to workers and potential oil spills (Baram, 2010). In the case of the Deepwater Horizon spill the
direct effects of the explosion on workers was severe and resulted in 11 deaths. However, the impacts
of the spilled oil impacted a far greater number of people and caused billions of dollars worth of
unrepairable damage to the environment. Oil spills impact the regional residents through negative
impacts to their mental health and the economy, especially economic activities relating to the natural
environment such as tourism and fishing. Additionally, oil spills contaminate the surrounding natural
environment, which in turn can significantly impact residents through reduced ecosystem services
(Baram, 2010).
Mental Health
There is a well documented history of significant mental health effects on people who have
been both directly and indirectly exposed to oil spills (Grattan et al, 2011). Direct exposure includes
those people who actually come into contact with the spilled oil either through cleanup efforts or direct
contamination of their shores. On the contrary, people who are indirectly exposed to an oil spill may
live in areas near the spill and prepare for the oil's arrival on their shores or have an impact to their
livelihoods, even though they never actually come into contact with the oil spill. Documented
psychological symptoms in both directly and indirectly exposed people include depression, anxiety and
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The single most significant factor in predicting significant
psychological symptoms in these situations is a severe loss of economic resources. After the
Deepwater Horizon spill Grattan et al, found clinically significant increases in depression and anxiety
in residents of the Gulf Coast regardless of whether they were directly or indirectly affect or if they had
sustained a severe loss of economic resources. However, those who experienced income loss had more
severe symptoms and were less resilient (Grattan et al, 2011).
Livelihoods
The main livelihoods impacted by the Deepwater Horizon disaster were fishing and tourism.
Short term impacts to the fishing industry resulted from mandated closure of water space due to
concerns of seafood contamination and death to fishery stocks. Two weeks after the blowout 37% of
the Gulf of Mexico was closed to fishing and approximately 50% of the oyster population had been
killed, resulting in massive income losses to fisherman, seafood processors, wholesalers and retail
businesses. In 2008, the Gulf of Mexico fishing industry was estimated to support approximately
213,000 jobs, with a total revenue of $5.5 billion. Additionally, the recreational fishing industry, which
comprises many tourism activities, earned an estimated $12.5 billion (Upton, 2011). Estimates
reported approximate losses of $2.5 billion just to the Louisiana fishing industry and another $3 billion
to the Florida tourism industry (Walsh, 2010). As of February 2011, BP paid $862 million in damages
to the fishing industry. In addition to drastic losses in supply due to the disaster, the seafood market
also experienced a drastic decrease in demand. This is most likely due to a perception by consumers
that seafood from the region is unsafe due to contamination by oil and dispersents. Long term impacts
to the fishing industry are not fully understood. However, there are concerns over potential damages to
Gulf Coast estuaries and wetlands which are vital to the reproductive health of the fisheries (Upton,
2011).
Environment
According to testimony given before congress regarding the Deepwater Horizon disaster, there
are significant data gaps in understanding the long term and delayed environmental impacts of oil
spills on the environment (Mitchelmore, 2010). However, it is known that thousands of animals were
killed, including many endangered species. Additionally, the Deepwater Horizon disaster increased the
region's future disaster risk, due to climate change by negatively impacting the natural environment.
The ecosystem services affected include damages to coastal marshes and open water systems, which
sequester carbon and provide protection from hurricanes (Costanza et al, 2010). As climate change
worsens natural disasters will continue to come with more frequency and greater severity. Without
protection from healthy wetlands the Gulf Coast's risk of flooding from hurricanes is much greater.
Additionally, open water systems which sequester less carbon will not continue to offset the rate at
which the climate changes, thus causing even more frequent and severe natural disasters. The overall
value of the delta as a resource has been estimated at $330 billion-$1.3 trillion, as compared to BP
before the disaster which was valued at $189 billion. The estimated value in damages to the ecosystem
are between $34-$670 billion (Costanza et al, 2010).
III. EXISTING STRAGIES OF DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
The Deepwater Horizon disaster did not occur due to a lack of an existing risk reduction
strategy. In fact multiple previous disasters like the Exxon Valdez spill in 1988 and the Amoco
platform blowout spill in 1969, informed legislators to enact policies to prevent the worst case scenario
(Baram, 2010). These policies included legislation, government agency oversight and industry
partnerships. In addition to existing policies, technological fail safes were also in place to prevent the
disaster from occurring. Yet somehow these fail safes and policies failed to prevent the Deepwater
Horizon spill. This section will be focused on understanding what those existing policies were and
how they failed.
Existing Policy & Disaster Reduction Plan
There are three main pieces of legislation that regulate the offshore oil industry: the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act (OCSLA), and the Oil
Pollution Act (OPA). All three of these Acts mandate that the worst case scenario be either considered
or specifically planned for in order to reduce the risk of disaster (Houck, 2010). The former Minerals
Management Service (MMS) and Coast Guard were responsible for overseeing this government
regulation of offshore drilling; after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill MMS was replaced by Congress
with the new Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). However, these agencies
tended to rely on industry partnerships which allowed the oil industry to internally regulate itself. The
primary industrial organization charged with safety was the American Petroleum Institute (API)
(Baram, 2010).
In order to address the risk of a worst case scenario, oil rigs are required to have blowout
preventers. Blowout preventers are designed to readjust the pressure after an accidental deregulation
of the well pressure. These devices are generally considered to be fail safe. However, even before
the failure of the blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon, the oil industry and US government
were aware of the shortcomings of blowout preventers. In 1999 a study commissioned by the MMS
found numerous safety-critical failures in oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico. These results were
presented at an oil industry meeting (Latham, 2011). Therefore, the US government had done its due
diligence in requiring a fail safe backup device to prevent disaster and had commissioned studies to
determine the effectiveness of this device. In addition the oil industry was aware of the shortcomings
of their current disaster risk reduction strategy. The question then is, why weren't the shortcomings of
the blowout preventers addressed, and why did existing policies fail?
One major reason that the shortcomings of blowout preventers was not addressed prior to the
Deepwater Horizon disaster was that blowout prevention technology lagged behind the overall
development of deepwater drilling technological advances (Latham, 2011). Reasons for why this lag
exists are not well understood. It could be due to the lack of a safety minded culture within the oil
industry. Another reason could also be a fundamental inability to develop safety devices for drilling
technology that does not yet exist.
However, it was not just a technological failure that caused the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
which is generally considered the worst case scenario in offshore drilling. The government policies of
NEPA, OPA and OCSLA failed also to cultivate a culture of safety or a check and balance system to
balance safety with profits. When enacted these policies were stringent safety focused policies. Had
they maintained this same potency they may have prevented the Deepwater Horizon disaster. When
created NEPA was clearer and more comprehensive than it was at the time of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. The changes in NEPA happened in the 1980's when there was intense pressure from the oil
industry to change the language specifying that the worst case scenario must be considered. The oil
industry reported that this was unreasonable and difficult to predict. The language was eventually
changed to considerations of reasonably foreseeable impacts. The effects of weakening NEPA was
that it removed the foundation on which OCSLA and OPA stood. This resulted in the vague standards
and lack of clear authority that shifted the responsibility of regulation from government agencies to
industry organizations (Houck, 2010).
After NEPA, OCSLA and OPA were weakened, no new legislation was passed to reenact stricter
safety standards. According to Baram, a main reason for this is that the necessary information needed
to develop effective laws and regulations to prevent a future similar disaster was not available. Over
the last nearly 25 years the oil industry has largely regulated itself. Industry information on accidents
and safety risks is not transparently provided to government agencies or the public. Additionally, this
lack of complete information is also due unclear regulations and a lack of authority of the MMS and
Coast Guard. This results in their poor data collection (Baram, 2010). However, the relationship
between government and industry officials was also marred by corruption and scandals. Reports
indicate that personal moved between government and oil industry positions. Kickbacks to government
officials to look the other way were also reported (Houck, 2010). This likely added to the
government's inability to maintain strong regulations and served as a motivator to obscure data on
actual safety risks. Overall, the culture within both the government and oil companies was a culture of
complacency. This culture routinely minimized the risks of offshore drilling and failed to take
warnings seriously. Both the government and oil industries were well aware of the potential risks,
however they failed to take them seriously. In fact, according to an MMS report, prior to the
Deepwater Horizon spill there were 44 notable blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in a total of
79 deaths. Many of these blowouts were described as perilously close to worst case disasters.
However, on the record both government and oil company officials routinely stated that there had not
been a major blowout in 37 years of offshore drilling in the Gulf (Houck, 2010).
This culture that encouraged the minimization of the risks likely caused the lack of availability
of necessary information to create effective risk reduction legislation. However, it appears that it was
not an absolute lack of information, but rather a calculated minimization of the facts by top level
officials inside of the oil industry. Had government and industry officials been transparent in their risk
assessments, legislators may have had access to the information necessary to create effective more
potent policy. Additionally, more clear government regulations and a more proactive government
approach, rather than a reliance on industry self regulation, may have helped to prevent this disaster.
This is supported by a study of the Wall Street Journal which showed that as compared to Europe, the
United States had more offshore drilling accident worker fatalities and injuries per drilling activity.
This difference has been attributed to the reliance of the United States on industrial organizations to
regulate safety and the overall lack of a safety culture within the US oil industry (Baram, 2010).
IV. EXISTING STRAGIES OF DISASTER RISK MITIGATION
Even before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, policies and procedures existed to mitigate the
effects of disasters from oil spills. After the Deepwater Horizon disaster, these policies and procedures
were implemented in the form of a risk mitigation plan to reduce the impact of the disaster. This plan
included aspects aimed at reducing both environmental and human impacts.
Environmental Risk Mitigation
10
Once the oil was spilled it became apparent that the fragile coastal ecosystems were at risk of
severe contamination from oil. A decision was made to mitigate this risk to the coastal ecosystems of
the Gulf Coast. The main strategy employed to do this was to deploy 1.8 million gallons of dispersents
at the site of the disaster (Upton, 2011). Dispersents are mixtures of chemicals which are designed to
reduce the surface oil slick to tiny droplets which will sink into the water column. The dispersents do
not remove the oil, but rather alter its properties so that it will primarily affect the deep water
ecosystems surrounding the leak, rather than the fragile coastal ecosystems. As previously discussed
the coastal ecosystems of the Gulf of Mexico are extremely valuable due to both the ecosystem services
that they provide and the livelihoods that they foster. In general the use of dispersents has been
believed to have less severe environmental impacts than would otherwise have been expected.
However, the long term effects of their use is poorly understood and continues to be monitored.
Additionally, the benefits of the decision to save the coastal ecosystems at the expense of those in
deepwater will likely never be known. This is due to the fact that very little information exists about
these deepwater ecosystems (Mitchelmore, 2010).
In addition to the use of dispersents, fresh water from the Mississippi River was also released to
push the oil back. However, this had the unintended consequence of drastically reducing the salinity in
oyster beds surrounding the delta. The drop in salinity was above the lethal threshold for the oysters
and nearly 50% of the stock was killed (Upton, 2011). While this mitigation strategy may have
reduced the damage to wetlands and coastal estuaries, the negative unintended consequences to the
oyster population were severe. For this reason, studies into the negative consequences of mitigation
efforts is crucial to continuing to create effective risk mitigation strategies for oil spills. Other risk
mitigation strategies included the burning of oil slicks and the direct clean up of oil through culling.
Wildlife rescue was also conducted. Despite these mitigation efforts the coastal ecosystems were still
contaminated and as previously outlined, experienced severe, possibly unrepairable, damage.
11
Industry Investment in Social Protection Funds

The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) also enacted a system for compensation of claims resulting from
damages from oil spills. In the event that the party responsible for the spill does not pay the claimant
within 90 days of the request, then a claim can be made to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Upton,
2011). In order to comply with OPA, the Obama administration required that BP develop a trust fund
to compensate people affected by the disaster. Such common asset trusts and assurance bonds have
been shown to be effective tools in shifting risk incentives and reducing the risk of disaster. By
requiring private companies to have up front costs to reduce the risk of disaster, the incentives to
mitigate that disaster will be increased.
The previous system of dealing with risk was through the liability system which assesses
damages after the risk has already occurred. However, this system places the burden on the public to
prove that the damages were caused by a particular industry, assess and claim damages and fund the
legal costs throughout the judicial process. This system has been shown to be inadequate and does not
provide an incentive to companies to mitigate risk. The lure of high short term profits often results in
companies cutting costs to reduce risk and gambling with the public resources due to the fact that even
when they have been found liable it is only after a long period of time has elapsed and the damages
paid are much less than the damages assessed (Costanza et al, 2010).
The public asset funds financed by BP were awarded to individuals and businesses in the form
of grants which can be claimed up to 3 years after the disaster (Upton, 2011). However, this time frame
may be inadequate due to the fact that even now, 2 years after the disaster, the full effects are still
unknown. Many individuals effected have waited to file claims due to this inability to properly assess
damages. However, many low income individuals did not have the ability to delay filling claims and
opted to file short term claims. These claims are capped at $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for
businesses. Those people who file short or long term claims to access the BP grants, must waive their
12
right to future litigation against BP (Upton, 2011). While the BP grants did provide quick economic
relief to those people whose livelihoods were impacted by the disaster, they likely did not fully cover
all costs that people faced from the disaster. Additionally, those people most vulnerable to the risk of
lost income were pressured into signing away their right of future litigation in order to file short term
claims which likely underpaid them for their losses. The fact that claims were administered by BP was
also criticized for its potential conflict of interest.
Also financed by BP were two other programs aimed to maintain the fishing industry. The first
program's goal was to keep boat captains working throughout the fishing moratorium. This program,
known as Vessels to Opportunity, employed boat captains and their employees to assist with wildlife
rescue and oil cleanup activities. $594 million was paid to these workers throughout the duration of the
program. The second program provided $48 million to Louisiana to assist with seafood safety testing
and marketing. This program's goal was to assist in repairing the damages to the fishing market
(Upton, 2011).
The Vessels to Opportunity program did assist in maintaining an income for some livelihoods
effected by the disaster. However, it mainly assisted those people least at risk. Boat captains generally
have access to more capital than those people who work in seafood packing plants or retail
establishments. Additionally, they also tend to be able bodied males. While a good start, the Vessels of
Opportunity program did not adequately assess and address the needs of the most vulnerable residents.
Federal Social Protection Programs
Under the 1976 Maguson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA),
states where fisheries are declared to have failed are eligible for financial assistance. A month after the
disaster, the Secretary of Commerce declared that the fisheries in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi
and Alabama had failed; Florida was added to that list a month later. This economic assistance
provided approximately $33 million of federal and state funding to support the fishery of the Gulf. The
13
bulk of this funding was directed to a marketing campaign to assist in increasing demand for seafood
from the Gulf. The remaining funding went directly to people whose livelihoods were dependent on
the fishing industry. Apart from the MFCMA funding to individuals, the Small Business Association
also provided economic injury disaster loans and some loan forgiveness for existing debt (Upton,
2011).
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Disaster Risk Reduction
Without major changes in technology, policy and culture it is likely that serious disasters will
continue to occur due to offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. Even now, 2 years after the disaster
the effects continue to be felt and are not fully understood. In addition to changes in the disaster risk
reduction plan by industry and government, more research also needs to be conducted in order to fully
understand the impacts of the disaster. Without understanding these impacts a comprehensive risk
reduction plan cannot be developed. Finally, increased public involvement should occur in order to
increase accountability and preparation.
Technology Recommendations
Investment in better blowout preventer technology should be mandated. Expansion in
deepwater oil drilling should also be slowed so that blowout prevention technology can keep a more
even pace with advancements in overall drilling technology. Without adequate blowout preventers
deepwater oil drilling will continue to have severe disasters and with time could ruin the entire Gulf
Coast ecosystem and economy. If this technology cannot be developed then the risks from continued
serious disasters may not be worth the economic gains from drilling.
Policy Recommendations
The first step in implementing effective policy in protecting the resources of the Gulf of Mexico
is to start with an accurate assessment of the value of all public natural capital assets. This
14
recommendation was also made by President Obama (Constanza et al, 2010). Without an
understanding of the full value of resources a proper risk assessment cannot be conducted. Secondly,
the worst case scenario language should be reincorporated into risk reduction strategy, because as
learned from the Deepwater Horizon, the worst case scenario can and will happen. The public should
also not be responsible for the burden of proof in demonstrating damages (Constanza et al, 2010). This
can be adjusted through increasing private industry incentives to risk reduction through mandating
direct investment in trust funds or other social asset protection. Additionally, clearer more
comprehensive legislation should be enacted and a balance and check system on industry power should
be created.
Increased costs are often cited as a reason why stricter regulation is not feasible. However,
according to estimates, even with increased regulation, deepwater drilling will continue to be
profitable. Costs of more stringent US regulations of deepwater drilling are estimated to increase the
overall costs of drilling by 10-20% . While this seems high, the effects on the market price of oil are
relatively low due to the large scale of the market. Therefore, policy makers should not be deterred in
considering implementing more stringent regulations out of a concern for the potential price shock to
the price of oil (Brown, 2010).
Cultural Recommendations
Overall a major cause of the Deepwater Horizon disaster was a lack of a safety culture within
both government agencies and the oil industry. Without a shift in this culture, private interests will
continue to gamble with public assets. In order to shift this culture greater oversight is needed to
prevent corruption in both the government and private industry. The reliance on industry self
regulation should also be reduced, as the oil industry demonstrated through this disaster that they are
not able to adequately self regulate. This reliance on industry self regulation should be replaced with a
more proactive government approach. This will also increase transparency of information in order to
15
better inform policy makers.

Research Recommendations
Continued studies on the long term mental health, economic and environmental impacts should
be conducted. Losses in days of work or years of life, due to disability from mental illness resulting
from the disaster is still unknown. Also, long term mental health impacts such as inter-generational
transmission of trauma should be studied. Evidenced based treatments for mental health symptoms
should also be documented in order to improve future risk mitigation strategies. Long term economic
impacts should also be investigated. The damages to estuaries and how fishery stocks will be impacted
has yet to be demonstrated. Long term impacts on demand for seafood from the Gulf Coast markets
should continue to be researched and the effectiveness of market restoration programs should continue
to be evaluated. Finally, the damages to ecosystem services is still not understood, nor is the damage to
deepwater ecosystems due to the leaked oil and use of dispersents. Additionally, increased non-profit
investment should be made in this research. Much of the current funding to study these impacts has
come from BP and the federal government agencies who have been implicated in contributing to the
disaster through their culture of complacency and risk minimization. By increasing the breadth of
research funding, accuracy in data collection can be improved.
Increased Public Involvement
Public involvement in the planning of disaster risk reduction should also be increased.
Environmental and human rights watchdog groups should also get involved to serve as an additional
check to the government and oil industry regulation. Additionally, as evidenced by the Deepwater
Horizon disaster, offshore oil drilling poses international risks as well. Therefore, international
governmental and non-governmental partnerships should be established to prepare cross national
disaster risk reduction and mitigation plans. Vertical linkages should also be made to local government
and grassroots groups in order to facilitate adequate needs assessments, transparency of information
16
and buy in.

Disaster Risk Mitigation
Environmental
As previously mentioned increased research is needed to fully understand the effectiveness of
the use of dispersents and the overall environmental mitigation plan used in the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. However, at this point it continues to appear that the use of dispersents is generally the lesser
of two evils. Continued research should be conducted to better understand the long term impacts.
Another lesson in environmental risk mitigation from the Deepwater Horizon disaster are the dangers
of the use of fresh water release to push contaminants away from the coast. This strategy may have
caused more harm than good due to the fact that it decimated oyster populations.
Social Protection
The social protection strategies employed to mitigate risk in the Deepwater Horizon disaster
could be improved. In general the programs implemented made livelihoods the main priority, which
did seem to be effective in many ways. However, their main shortcoming seemed to be inadequate
compensation for the most vulnerable people and a lack of compensation for long term damages.
Additionally, mental health issues were not addressed by mitigation programs.
Livelihoods were addressed through funding to restore the seafood market. However, less
funding was made available to restoration of the tourism industry. Future disaster mitigation efforts
focused on livelihoods would benefit from more complete assessments of markets affected and more
equitable efforts at restoration. Grants, credit and debt forgiveness were also offered to individuals and
businesses within both the fishing and tourism industries. While these programs seemed to mitigate
risks to a certain degree, they could have been improved through an extended filing deadline (past 3
years) and a higher compensation cap for short term claims. This would reduce some of the effects that
forced victims into accepting less compensation than the damages that they suffered. Finally, one of
17
the greatest shortcomings of the livelihood risk mitigation programs was that the most vulnerable
populations were not assessed or addressed. For example, the Vessels to Opportunity program mainly
assisted those victims who already had access to capital such as motor boats and required that
participants undergo training. This program may have shut out many non-English speakers and did not
focus on those people with the least amount of economic capital. In fact no major programs
specifically focused on the most vulnerable populations such as women, the elderly the disabled and
the undocumented. Future disaster mitigation strategies should better assess population vulnerabilities
prior to a disaster therefore mitigation strategies can be tailored to the actual needs of the victims.
Finally, the actual needs of the population run deeper than just economic losses and encompass mental
health issues as well. These issues were not addressed by social protection programs after the
Deepwater Horizon disaster.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Deepwater Horizon disaster should serve as a wake up call to everyone that the worst case
disasters in deepwater oil drilling can and will occur. Technology has not made us invulnerable to
accidents. Additionally, it is everyone's responsibility to prioritize safety. Voters must demand
effective safety promoting legislation from their elected officials and those officials must be
accountable to their constituents instead of corporate influences. International, national and local
governments need to take their role as protectors of public assets seriously. In addition grass roots and
international NGOs need to collaborate to serve as government and industry watchdogs. The lesson of
the dangers of a culture of complacency from the top officials to the local residents must be learned.
A second important lesson that should be learned from the Deepwater Horizon disaster is the
importance of planning and assessment prior to disasters. Without increased research and assessment
into the value of natural resources as well as the vulnerabilities in technology and the population, the
real risks cannot be known. If the risks are not known, then they cannot possibly be adequately
18
planned for. A main problem in the Deepwater Horizon disaster was lack of knowledge, which
stemmed from a lack of transparency. Through addressing the culture of safety at large, policies and
research priorities can be changed. Finally, it is important not to be persuaded by fear mongering about
the increases in oil prices if regulations are increased. Deepwater oil drilling can be financially viable
with increased regulations. However, without increased oversight it cannot be sustainable. Repeated
disasters would only decimate the natural environment and leave the entire region vulnerable to natural
disasters of increasing magnitude. It is in everyone's best interest to learn the lessons of the Deepwater
Horizon disaster and begin to make safety a priority to ensure the sustainability of our future.
BARTA, DISATER FINAL

VII. REFERENCES
Baram, M. (2010). Preventing Accidents in Offshore Oil and Gas Operations: the US Approach
and Some Contrasting Features of the Norwegian Approach. Deepwater Horizon Study
Group Working Paper.
Brown, S. (2010). Some Implications of Tightening Regulation of U.S. Deepwater Drilling.
Resources for the Future.
Costanza,R., Batker, D., Day, J., Feagin, R., Martinez, L., and Roman, J. (2010). The Perfect
Spill: Solutions for Averting the Next Deepwater Horizon. The Solutions Journal.
Grattan, L., Roberts, S., Mahan W., McLaughlin, P., Otwell, S., and Morris G. (2011). The Early
Psychological Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Florida and Alabama
Communities. Environmental Health Perspectives. Vol. 119, No. 6 pp. 838-843
Houck, O. (2010). Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to Be a Law.
Environmental Law Institute.
Latham, M. (2011). The BP Deepwater Horizon: A Cautionary Tale for CCS, Hydrofracking,
Geoengineering and other Emerging Technologies with Environmental and Human
Health Risks. William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. 36: 31-79.
Mitchelmore, C. (2010). Hearing entitled Our Natural Resources At Risk: The Short And Long
Term Impacts Of The deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Before the House of Representatives
Subcommittee On Insular affairs, Oceans And Wildlife Oversight. (Part 3 Of 7-part
Series).
Monroe, L. (2011). Restructure and Reform: Post-BP Deepwater Horizon Proposals to Improve
Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities. Golden Gate University Environmental
Law Journal. 5:1, 4.
Perry, R. (2011). The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability. Washington
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BARTA, DISATER FINAL
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Law Review Association. 86:1.

Steinzor, R. (2011). Lessons from the North Sea: Should "Safety Cases" Come to America? Boston
College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 38: 10.
Upton, H. (2011). The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Gulf of Mexico Fishing Industry.
Congressional Research Service.
Walsh, B. (2010). Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: No End in Sight for Eco-Disaster. Time. Retrieved: 201206-08.

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BARTA, DISATER FINAL

BARTA, DISATER FINAL

Law Review Association. 86:1.

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