The science of protecting people s feelings: why we pretend all opinions are equal

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By Chris Mooney March 10
OJO+
It s both the coolest
ver.

and also in some ways the most depressing

psychology study e

Indeed, it s so cool (and so depressing) that the name of its chief finding
the Du
nning-Kruger effect has at least halfway filtered into public consciousness. In
the classic 1999 paper, Cornell researchers David Dunning and Justin Kruger foun
d that the less competent people were in three domains humor, logic, and grammar
the less likely they were to be able to recognize that. Or as the researchers p
ut it:
We propose that those with limited knowledge in a domain suffer from a dual burd
en: Not only do they reach mistaken conclusions and make regrettable errors, but
their incompetence robs them of the ability to realize it.
Dunning and Kruger didn t directly apply this insight to our debates about science
. But I would argue that the effect named after them certainly helps to explain
phenomena like vaccine denial, in which medical authorities have voiced a very s
trong opinion, but some parents just keep on thinking that, somehow, they re in a
position to challenge or ignore this view.
So why do I bring this classic study up now?
The reason is that an important successor to the Dunning-Kruger paper has just b
een come out and it, too, is pretty depressing (at least for those of us who bel
ieve that domain expertise is a thing to be respected and, indeed, treasured). T
his time around, psychologists have not uncovered an endless spiral of incompete
nce and the inability to perceive it. Rather, they ve shown that people have an equ
ality bias when it comes to competence or expertise, such that even when it s very
clear that one person in a group is more skilled, expert, or competent (and the
other less), they are nonetheless inclined to seek out a middle ground in determ
ining how correct different viewpoints are.
Yes, that s right

we re all right, nobody s wrong, and nobody gets hurt feelings.

The new study, just published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Scie
nces, is by Ali Mahmoodi of the University of Tehran and a long list of colleagu
es from universities in the UK, Germany, China, Denmark, and the United States.
And no wonder: The research was transnational, and the same experiment
with the
same basic results was carried out across cultures in China, Denmark, and Iran.
In the experiment (described in further detail in this previous paper), two sepa
rate people view two successive images, which are almost exactly the same, but n
ot quite. In one of the images, there is an oddball target that looks slightly dif
ferent. The images flash by very fast, and the two individuals have to decide wh
ich one, the first or the second, contained the target.
Sounds simple enough but the two individuals didn t merely have to identify the ta
rget. They also had to agree. Each member of the pair
the scientists wonkily cal
l it a dyad
separately indicated which of the images contained the target, and how
confident they were about that. Then, if there was a disagreement, one individu
al was chosen at random to decide what the right answer was
and thus, who was ri
ght and who was wrong. And then, both individuals learned the truth about whethe
r their group decision had been the correct one or not.
This went on for 256 intervals, so the two individuals got to know each other qu

ite well
and to know one another s accuracy and skill quite well. Thus, if one mem
ber of the group was better than the other, both would pretty clearly notice. An
d a rational decision, you might think, would be for the less accurate group mem
ber to begin to favor the views of the more accurate one and for the accurate on
e to favor his or her own assessments.
But that s not what happened. Instead, report the study authors, the worse members
of each dyad underweighted their partner s opinion (i.e., assigned less weight to
their partner s opinion than recommended by the optimal model), whereas the better
members of each dyad overweighted their partner s opinion. Or to put it more blunt
ly, individuals tended to act as if they were as good or as bad as their partner
e
ven when they quite obviously weren t.
The researchers tried several variations on the experiment, and this equality bia
s didn t go away. In one case, a running score reminded both members of the pair who
was faring better (and who worse) at identifying the target
just in case it wasn t
obvious enough already. In another case, the task became much more difficult fo
r one group member than the other, leading to a bigger gap in scores accentuatin
g differences in performance. And finally, in a third variant, actual money was
offered for getting it right.
None of this did away with the equality bias.
So why do we do this? The authors, not surprisingly, point to the incredible pow
er of human groups, and our dependence upon being good standing members of them:
By confirming themselves more often than they should have, the inferior member o
f each dyad may have tried to stay relevant and socially included. Conversely, t
he better performing member may have been trying to avoid ignoring their partner
.
Great instincts in general
e.

except, of course, when facts and reality are at stak

Nobody s saying we ought to be mean to people, or put them down when they re wrong
r even that experts always get it right. They don t.
Still, I think it s pretty obvious that human groups (especially in the United Sta
tes) err much more in the direction of giving everybody a say than in the direct
ion of deferring too much to experts. And that s quite obviously harmful on any nu
mber of issues, especially in science, where what experts know really matters an
d lives or the world depend on it like vaccinations or climate change.
The new research underscores this conclusion that we need to recognize experts m
ore, respect them, and listen to them. But it also shows how our evolution in so
cial groups binds us powerfully together and enforces collective norms, but can
go haywire when it comes to recognizing and accepting inconvenient truths.