Landingin vs. Republic, GR No.

164948, June 27, 2006, digested

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors,
natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that
when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to
Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the
time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were
being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her
children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove
that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if
known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent
of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed,
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights
and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed
at the time of adoption.

Oropesa vs. Oropesa (G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012)

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, JPetitioner: Nilo OropesaRespondent: Cirilo OropesaFacts:Petitioner claimed
that the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years and was
observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment. Due to respondents
condition, he cannot manage his property wisely without the help of others and has become an easyprey for
deceit from his girlfriend, Luisa Agamata.On January 23, 2004, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), a petition for him and his
companion to be appointed as guardians over the respondents property. RTC dismissed the petitiondue to
lack of evidence, and later on the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.
Issue:WON respondent is considered an incompetent person and should be placed under guardianship
Held:NO. respondent is not incompetent and should not be placed under guardianship and therefore the
petition was denied.
Ratio :According to the respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial
evidence. The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs.
On the contrary, Respondent pointed out in the petitioners evidence which includes aNeuropsychological
Screening Report stating that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that
were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The
Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities
in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and
able .It is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not
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be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect,
and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record." We
therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of
respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
CASE TITLE :G.R. No. 169482
January 29, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by
EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
FACTS: This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the
C.A.where the petition for habeas corpus was denied.
The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental
health and deteriorating cognitive abilities filed for habeas corpus after demanding the return of Eufemia from
her adopted daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents
(the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to
establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated
February 2, 2005, the C.A. denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.7 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit
itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty and that there is no need to
consider legal custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under
the legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally
deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the
court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse,
Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia,
not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other
household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was appointed as administrator of the properties of
Eufemia and her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants
and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only
compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the
properties entrusted to petitioner. His failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa. Consequently, and by
reason of their mothers deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11,
2005. She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the
illegality of respondents action.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING: Petition Denied. ApplicationL: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being
prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1)
deprivation of a persons liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of
the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose
behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed
In this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she
was not.
Petition was DENIED.

RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Development Corp. and Luz R. Bakunawa, G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012
Facts: Millan paid the spouses Bakunawa P1,019,514.29 as down payment for the purchase of six
(6) lots with the Spouses Bakunawa giving Millan the Owners Copies of TCTs of said lots. Due to
some obstacles, the sale did not push through; so Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and
offered to return to Millan her down. However, Millan refused to accept back the down payment.
Consequently, the Spouses Bakunawa, through their company, Hi-Tri took out on October 28,
1991, a Managers Check from RCBC-Ermita in the amount of P 1,019,514.29, payable to Millans
company Rosmil and used this as one of their basis for a complaint against Millan. The Spouses
Bakunawa retained custody of RCBC Managers Check and refrained from cancelling or
negotiating it. Millan was also informed that the Managers Check was available for her
withdrawal, she being the payee. On January 31, 2003, without the knowledge of Spouses
Bakunawa, RCBC reported the "P 1,019,514.29-credit existing in favor of Rosmil to the Bureau of
Treasury as among its "unclaimed balances" as of January 31, 2003. On December 14, 2006, the
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the RTC the action for
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Escheat. On April 30, 2008, Spouses Bakunawa settled amicably their dispute with Millan.
Spouses Bakunawa tried to recover the P1,019,514.29 under Managers Check but they were
informed that the amount was already subject of the escheat proceedings before the RTC. The
trial court ordered the deposit of the escheated balances with the Treasurer and credited in favor
of the Republic. Respondents claim that they were not able to participate in the trial, as they were
not informed of the ongoing escheat proceedings. Later motion for reconsideration was denied.
CA reversed the RTC ruling. CA pronounced that RTC Clerk of Court failed to issue individual
notices directed to all persons claiming interest in the unclaimed balances. CA held that the
Decision and Order of the RTC were void for want of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic
Held: There are sufficient grounds to affirm the CA on the exclusion of the funds allocated for the
payment of the Managers Check in the escheat proceedings. An ordinary check refers to a bill of
exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee), requesting the latter to pay a
person named therein (payee) or to the order of the payee or to the bearer, a named sum of
money. The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an assignment of any part of the
funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank becomes liable only after it accepts
or certifies the check. After the check is accepted for payment, the bank would then debit the
amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the account of the depositor-drawer. There are
checks of a special type called managers or cashiers checks. These are bills of exchange drawn
by the banks manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself. Typically, a
managers or a cashiers check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of
funds to be debited from the depositors account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank
the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with itself as the
drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary
obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand.
Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a managers check does not ipso facto work as an automatic
transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the managers or cashiers
check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to
make an effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the
Negotiable Instruments Law applicable: Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed.
Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards
a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be
made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as
the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a
special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But
where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all
parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the
instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and
intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. Petitioner acknowledges that
the Managers Check was procured by respondents, and that the amount to be paid for the check
would be sourced from the deposit account of Hi-Tri. When Rosmil did not accept the Managers
Check offered by respondents, the latter retained custody of the instrument instead of cancelling
it. As the Managers Check neither went to the hands of Rosmil nor was it further negotiated to
other persons, the instrument remained undelivered. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that
respondents retained custody of the instrument. Since there was no delivery, presentment of the
check to the bank for payment did not occur. An order to debit the account of respondents was
never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the Managers Check was never negotiated or
presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the allocated fund is still held by the bank.
As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured
the Managers Check. The doctrine that the deposit represented by a managers check
automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the instrument although accepted in
advance remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit
had been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat
proceedings if left unclaimed.
SOLEDAD CAEZO vs. CONCEPCION ROJASG.R. No. 148788, November 23, 2007 NACHURA, J.
FACTS: The subject property is an unregistered land with an area of 4,169 square meters situated at Naval, Biliran. In a
complaint on 1997, petitioner Soledad Caezo alleged that she bought such parcel of land in 1939 from
Crisogono Limpiado, although the sale was not reduced into writi ng. Therea fter, s he i mme diat el y took
poss ess ion of the pr opert y. I n 1948, she and her husband left for Mindanao and entrusted the said land
to
her
father,
Crispulo
Rojas,
who
took p o s s e s s i o n o f , a n d c u l t i v a t e d t h e p r o p e r t y. I n 1 9 8 0 , s h e f o u n d o u t t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t
, Concepcion Rojas, her stepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating thesame. She also
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discovered that the tax declaration over the property was already in the name of his father. Respondent
asserted that it was her husband who bought the property from Limpiado, which accounts for the tax declaration
being in Crispulos name. After the hearing, MTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, making her the real and
lawful owner of the land. Respondent appealed to the RTC of Naval, Biliran, which
reversedt h e M T C d e c i s i o n o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e a c t i o n h a d a l r e a d y p r e s c r i b e d a n d a c q u i s i t i
v e prescription had set in. However, acting on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC amended its
original decision and held that the action had not yet prescribed considering that the petitioner merely entrusted the
property to her father. The ten-year prescriptive period for the re cover y of a pr ope rt y held in tr ust woul d
c omme nc e to run onl y fr om the ti me the tr uste e repudiates the trust. The RTC found no evidence on
record showing that Crispulo Rojas ever ousted the petitioner from the property. Petitioner filed a petition for
review with the CA, which reversed the amended decision of the RTC. The CA held that, assuming that there
was a trust between the petitioner and her f a t h e r o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y, h e r r i g h t o f a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r
t h e s a m e w o u l d s t i l l b e b a r r e d b y prescription since 49 years had already lapsed since Crispulo
adversely possessed the contested property in 1948.Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:Whet her or not ther e is an exi ste nce of trust over the propert y expre ss or i mpli ed between
the petitioner and her father
HELD: N O N E . A t r u s t i s t h e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n o n e p e r s o n h a v i n g a n e q u i t a b l e own
ership of property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the
former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. Trusts
are either express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or bywords evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts
are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or,
independently, of the particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced on the transaction by operation of law
basically by reason of equity.
AGUSTIN v CA
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday
on November 10, 1999The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arne l
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support
despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel
also denied having fathered the childArnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he
impregnated Fe Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in
the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status
as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964July
23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE:
WON DNA testing is self-incriminatory and violates privacy of person
HELD:
NO Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal issue the court examines the history of DNA testing
The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of
Appeals In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained
clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned thatthe purpose of DNA testing (was) to
ascertain whether an association exist(ed)between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
samples collected(were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile The right against
self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence. right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into
the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common
good. where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. No evidence to show this If criminal can be
subject to it at expense of death, what more in a civil case for paternity?
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR
C. ARRIOLA, Respondent.[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts:

Page 4 of 9

Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John NaborArriola (respondent) ,his son with his first
wife , and Vilma G.Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola(petitioners).On Feb. 16,
2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering thepartition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714
(84191)left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs JohnNabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola inequal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to therights of creditors or
mortgagees thereon, if any.However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the abovementioned property
and so the respondent proposed to sell itthough public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refusedto
include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed an
Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court
but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC,
therespondent elevated the case to the CA with a petition forcertiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push
through with theauction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CAgranted the petition and
ordered the public auction sale of thesubject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed amotion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion.Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition
Ruling: The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered bythe judgment of partition but in view of
the suspendedproscription imposed under Article 159 of the family code, thesubject house immediately
partitioned to the heirs.Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husbandand the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwellinghouse where they and their family reside, and the land on which itis
situated.Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on ahouse and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence
. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family
homecontinues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale orattachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, applying these concepts,
the subject house as well as thespecific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemedconstituted
as a family home by the deceased and petitionerVilma from the moment they began occupying the same as
afamily residence 20 years back.Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a
minorbeneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unlessthe court finds compelling reasons therefor.
This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
(Emphasis supplied.)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG)
G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011
FACTS:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson
C o s e t e n g M a g p a y o ( r e s p o n d e n t ) i s t h e s o n o f F u l v i o M . M a g p a y o J r. a n d A n n a
Dominique
MarquezL i m C o s e t e n g w h o , a s r e s p o n d e n t s c e r t i f i c a t e o f l i v e b i r t h s h o w s , contr
acted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally
married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
The petition, d o c k e t e d a s S P P N o . Q - 0 8 6 3 0 5 8 , w a s e n t i t l e d " I N R E P E T I T I O N
FOR
CHANGE
OF
NAME
OF JU LI AN E DWARD EME RSON COSE TE NG MAG PAYO TO JU LI AN E DWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the
National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear
i n i t s N a t i o n a l I n d i c e s o f M a r r i a g e . R e s p o n d e n t a l s o s u b m i t t e d h i s a c a d e m i c
records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the sur
n a m e "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as
his surname.
In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon
Citys 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." O n o r d e r o f B r a n c h 7 7 o f t h e
Q u e z o n C i t y R T C , r e s p o n d e n t a m e n d e d h i s petition by alleging therein compliance with
the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was
published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November
6 , 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.
Page 5 of 9

And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No opposition
to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial
court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte By Decision
of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondents petition and directed the Civil
Registrar of Makati City to:1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE
OF MARRIAGEOF PARTIES" [in herein respondents Certificate of live Birth]; 2. Correct the entry
"MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG"; 3. Delete the
entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and 4. Delete the entry
"Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present
petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.
ISSUE:
1.Whether
or not the petition for change of
name
i n v o l v i n g c h a n g e o f c i v i l status should be made through appropriate adversarial
proceedings.
2. Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed
t h e deletion of the name of respondents father from his birth certificate.
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic)
1.A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME)
using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c)when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of a l i e n p a r e n t a g e ; ( e ) a s i n c e r e d e s i r e t o a d o p t a
Filipino
name
to
erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.* * *
In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in
respondents petition goes so far as to a f f e c t h i s l e g a l s t a t u s i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s
p a r e n t s . I t s e e k s t o c h a n g e h i s legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would
not suffice to grant respondents supplication. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds
that
"changes
which
may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate
are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after
appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."
Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which h a s b e e n r e c o r d e d i n t h e c i v i l
r e g i s t e r, m a y f i l e a v e r i f i e d p e t i t i o n f o r the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC.3.
Parties.When
cancellation
or
correction
of
an
entry
in
the
c i v i l r e g i s t e r i s s o u g h t , t h e c i v i l r e g i s t r a r a n d a l l p e r s o n s w h o h a v e o r claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4.Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the c o u r t s h a l l , b y a n o r d e r,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
n o t i c e t h e r e o f t o b e g i v e n t o t h e p e r s o n s named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
2.Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status
should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and "all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby "should be made parties
to the proceeding. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati
where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. A n d a s t h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d t i t l e o f t h e p e t i t i o n f i l e d b y r e s p o n d e n t before the RTC shows, neither
the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
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Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he
failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents
in the case.
"A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have
any interest that would be affected thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first
notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is
through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors.
That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by
the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two
periods
(for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from
notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is
to
bind
the
whole
world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision
would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were
inadvertently left out.
REPUBLIC
OF
THEPHILIPPINES
vs
NISAIDA
SUMERA
NISHINA,G.R. No. 186053November 15, 2010Facts: Nisaida was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her F
ilipino motherZenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina. Her father later died and so her mother marriedanother
Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, respondents
mother caused the l ate registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her mothers second husband, Hakamada.
Later on, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name
NisaidaSumeraNishina. Hence, she filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for
cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos,Bulacan, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 106-M-2007. After hearing the petition, RTC granted respondents petition and directed the Local Civil
Registry of Malolos to cancel the second birth record of NisaidaSumeraHakamada issued in 1993 and to change
particularly thesurname of respondent from Nishina to Watanabe.A copy of the Order was received on by theOSG which
filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal. Before the Court of Appeals,respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode ofappeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:WON filing of a record on appeal is necessary in this case.
Held: No. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedin
gs which may be the subject of an appeal. It contemplatesmultiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A
record on appeal in addition tothe notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case
should remainwith the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate anddistinct issue is
resolved by said court and held to be final.In the present case, the filing of arecord on appeal was not necessary since no
other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order
granting respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

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EN BANC, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, EDGARDO NAVIA,[1] RUBEN DIO,[2] AND
ANDREW BUISING, PETITIONERS, VS. VIRGINIA PARDICO, FOR AND IN BEHALF AND IN
REPRESENTATION OF BENHUR V. PARDICO RESPONDENT.
Virginia filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo against Edgardo, Ruben, and Andrew,
security officers and security guards assigned to a subdivision, where Lolita, her son Bong, and
Benhur also live. According to her, her husband and Lolong were fetched by the respondents from
Lolitas house upon complaint of a homeowner that they they stole electric wires and lamps in the
subdivision. Lolita accompanied them to the security department of the subdivision. Thereat, they
were informed that the complainant is not interested in participating in the investigation, so the
three respondents informed them that they will just release Bong (the son) and Ben. Bong signed
a statement to the effect that he was released unharmed. Lolita also signed an entry where it was
stated that she will never again entertain or harbour Ben in her house. Ben was left behind
because Edgardo the supervisor was still talking to him. Later, Ruben and Andrew went back to
the house to make Lolita sign another entry to attest that Ben was released unharmed, which she
signed. Ben was not seen thereafter. Virginia, his wife then filed the petition for writ of amparo,
alleging that the security personnel were responsible for the enforced disappearance of Ben. The
Regional Trial Court granted the writ of amparo hence Edgardo, Ruben and Andrew filed the
petition before the Supreme Court to question the propriety of the issuance of the writ of amparo.
XXX, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after Congress
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851[48] on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines
enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:
(g) Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons means the arrest, detention, or abduction
of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
xxx
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following
elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
xxx
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a
hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as
responsible or accountable persons.
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