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WUKETITS
1. INTRODUCTION
"In the future I see open fields for ... important researches. Psychology will
be securely based on the foundation already well laid by Mr. Herbert Spencer,
that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by
gradation." Thus Charles Darwin wrote in On the Origin of Species;! in the
sequel he announced: "Much light will be thrown on the origin of man and
his history."2 And Thomas Henry Huxley, Darwin's famous advocate,
predicted that Darwin's own work, "if you take it as the embodiment of a
hypothesis ... is destined to be the guide of biological and psychological
speculation for the next three or four generations." 3 Since Darwin, much
light has indeed been thrown on the origin of man, his history and his place
in nature, and Huxley's prediction has proved to be true.
Darwin's work was, of course, a corner-stone in the history of the biological sciences. But what has it really meant for psychology? In what way
has it been a guide of 'psychological speculation'? Initially we may answer
thus: Darwin's studies of man's nature at least meant a plea for intensifying
theoretical and empirical work in evolutionary psychology. Unfortunately
it is not yet common knowledge that - as M. T. Ghiselin has pointed out 4
- Darwin devoted a considerable part of his studies to the behaviour of
organisms and therefore to psychology in its widest sense. As to human
F. M. Wuketits (ed.), Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, 1-33.
1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
behaviour in his The Descent of Man (1871) Darwin worked out some evolutionary principles in relation to man's mental abilities, e.g. self-consciousness,
language and morality. It is true that in some passages of this book he relied
heavily on Herbert Spencer's evolutionary conceptions. However, his evolutionist view of psychological phenomena has, on the whole, been an original
contribution to psychology, for, unlike Spencer's approach, it was founded
on a mass of empirical evidence and did not lack scientific rigour. In general,
this view means "that subhuman animals too can have a mental life, that
ideation is a bodily process, and that it is subject to natural selection just
like any other biofunction". 5
The evolutionary view of the human mind, proposed by Spencer and then
elaborated by Darwin, consequently included an attempt to understand man's
faculties of cognition and knowledge by means of evolutionary theory and
particularly the theory of natural selection. Evolutionary psychology in the
nineteenth century was therefore the overture to evolutionary epistemology.
In short, evolutionary epistemology is an epistemological system which is
based upon the conjecture that cognitive activities are a product of evolution
and selection and that, vice versa, evolution itself is a cognition and knowledge process. According to D. T. Campbell "an evolutionary epistemology
would be at minimum an epistemology taking cognizance of and compatible
with man's status as a product of biological and social evolution".6
In this essay I shall outline some of the basic postulates of the evolutionary
view in epistemology and the systematic position of such a view in science
and philosophy. Furthermore, I shall, implicitly, give a brief account of the
history of evolutionary epistemology. Thus the reader may take his bearings
on the different approaches to an evolutionary theory of knowledge and
become aware of the interdisciplinary nexus of this theory. I also hope
that the following sections will make clearer the coherence of the different
contributions to the present volume.
2. THE NOTION OF THE INNATE - IMMANUEL KANT
AND BEYOND
abstract ideas
axioms of logic
idola tribus (e.g. form perception)
instincts
rust principles (e.g. man's own existence)
essential truths of mathematics and logic;
intellectual ideas (e.g. substance)
the 'causes' for the 'forms of intuition'
(Anschauungs[ormen) and categories
'ideation of space' (three-dimensionality
of space)
elementary patterns of behaviour; 'forms
of intuition' and categories
'norms of reaction'; elementary structures
of perception
archetypes (e.g. anima)
(ethnical) 'structures' (e.g. marriage types,
structures of kinship)
generative grammar
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
between patterns of the external world and patterns of our thought is determined by pre-existing, i.e. a priori structures, the 'categories' and 'forms
of intuition' (Anschauungsformen), of any subject which experiences them.
Kant's epistemological doctrine was certainly a consistent philosophical
system and a refreshing outlook. After Kant, however, one problem remained;
this was the question: 'Where do a priori structures come from?' Yet in the
framework of Kant's system of thought this question was not, and is not,
a matter for discussion. But beyond this system and especially with regard
to an evolutionary interpretation of man this is an intriguing question. Since
Kant science and philosophy - except for the 'idealistic philosophy' have been confronted again and again by the relativity of categories. Here
we can find a connection between Kant and modern evolutionary theory,
between Kant's 'apriorism' and the evolutionary explanation of epistemic
phenomena. Evolutionary epistemology is mainly an attempt to explain
a priori structures of our knowledge via evolution and to 'dynamize' these
structures.
Does this mean that evolutionary epistemology is a reversed Kantian
philosophy? Let us, first of all, take a look at two very recent evolutionary
attempts to explain man's cognitive faculties: the conceptions of Konrad
Lorenz and Rupert Riedl. 8 The approach of Lorenz has been an ethological
one, whereas Riedl's view primarily relies upon comparative biology and
was the result of a theory concerned with the order in living systems, i.e. a
systems approach to organismic evolution. 9 In both cases Kant's categories
of thought and intuition can be seen as evolutionary products.
Lorenz has argued that evolution is a cognition process and that life is,
in general, a process of learning; and he has exposed the innate teaching
mechanisms which are prerequisites for the surival of any species. In his own
words, "one has to postulate the existence of innate teaching mechanisms in
order to explain why the majority of learning processes serve to enhance the
organism' fitness for survival"; 10 furthermore, "these mechanisms ... meet
the Kantian definition of the a priori: they were there before all learning,
and must be there in order for learning to be possible." 11 Riedl summarizes
his view as:
Among all cognitive methods possible, the one which recognizes the environment most
efficiently and reliably had to be selected ... The prerequisites of human thinking,
though a priori for each individual in the sense of Kant, are a posteriori for the chain
of his pedigree. 12
These have been biological approaches to the relativity of the a priori. But
Thus, Popper advocates, as Campbell had already deomonstrated,!6 a 'naturalselection epistemology' or, a 'natural-selection methodology'.
The basic idea underlying these evolutionist conceptions (K. Lorenz,
R. Riedl, K. R. Popper) is that
(i) cognition, be it in the subhuman or in the human world, cannot start
from nothing and that, therefore,
(ii) the existence of inborn mechanisms is very probable. So the first
postulate 0/ evolutionary epistemology can be firmly stated as follows:
All organisms are equipped with a system o/innate dispositions; no individual
living system is initially a 'clean slate' or tabula rasa.
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
EVOLUTION
mental
level
psychic
level
organic
level
Fig. 1.
epistemology. But is it not evident that science, scientific inquiry since its
inception three or four thousand years ago, has undergone many changes
and intricate developmental processes? It certainly is evident: history of
science means evolution of science. However, this proposition is not new;
since the term 'evolution' has been extended to phenomena beyond the
biological world, many philosophers of science have taken an evolutionary
view. I shall confine myself in this treatment to some historical notes, for a
model of the evolution of scientific method is discussed in more detail in
the present volume by E. Oeser. 33
One of the first to deal with this question was the English philosopher
and scientist William Whewell. In his On the Philosophy of Discovery (1860)
Whewell argued that "there are powers and faculties which do thus seem
fitted to endure and not fitted to terminate and be exstinguished";34 and
he also wrote:
The mind is capable of accepting and appropriating, through the action of its own
Ideas, every step in sciene which has ever been made - every step which shall hereafter
be made ... Can we suppose that the wonderful powers which carry man on, generation
by generation, from the contemplation of one great and striking truth to another, are
buried with each generation?35
10
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
In other words: scientific thought is not yet, and, presumably it will never
be, completely free from man's inborn teaching mechanisms; but this should
be obvious.
These statements are true of epistemic activities in toto: the message of
evolutionary epistemology, as revealed by our insights into innate mechanisms, is that evolution has set bounds to the realization of human power.
Consequently, the cognizance of man's own limitations, I am sure, will have
to be an element of a new image of man (see section 5).
3. PATTERNS OF NATURE AND THE NATURE OF COGNITION
OR, 'WHY THE EYE IS ATTUNED TO THE SUN'
The questions discussed in the foregoing section require some further explanations. We have just stated the biological relativity of mental capacities and
11
suggested the natural boundaries of these capacities. I now state the following
thesis: the analogy between highly sophisticated episternic systems, like
science and episternic activities on the 'sub rational' , i.e. ratiomorphic 41 level
is not a coincidence, but is based on isomorphic principles, that is to say
structural and functional principles and/or laws common to all levels of
organization. 42 This thesis is a fundamental assertion of the systems theoretic
view which replaces the ontological notions of the 'scale of nature'.
Classical ontology had, nevertheless, one advantage: the cognizance of
the hierarchical organization of reality. Nicolai Hartman, who was perhaps
the most eminent representative of the 'ontology of nature' in the twentieth
century,43 specified four levels of increasing complexity in the hierarchically
organized structure of the world:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
inorganic level
organic level
psychic level
mental level
Hartmann's view, however, like that of his precursors, was a rather static
one, whereas the modern systems theoretic approach to understanding the
texture of the world corresponds to the above-mentioned 'dynamization'
of our world picture. Furthermore, systems theory in the sense of von
Bertalanffy has contributed much to the improvement of our image of a
dynamically organized universe. Each of the levels of reality (see Table II)
describes a certain stage of complexity, arranged by interacting elements.
TABLE II
S'
8
00
.~
~
.5
elementary particles
atoms
molecules
organic molecules
cells
organs
multi-cellular living systems
psychological phenomena and mind
social systems
cultural systems
12
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
13
R
A N ISM
perception
-------,
_-+_+-____~....... R1
informationprocessing
:
I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..1I
Fig. 2.
What we experience is indeed a real image of reality - albeit an extremely simple one,
only just sufficing for our own practical purposes; we have developed 'organs' only
for those aspects of reality of which, in the interest of survival, it was imperative for
our species to take account, so that selection pressure produced this partial cognitive
apparatus. 48
But we must not forget that an organism itself is part of reality, and by
'reality' in this context we mean the external world of an organism.
When we consider the partial representation of reality by the perceiving
apparatus, we arrive at the following conclusions:
(i) The range of perception varies from one species to another, i.e. different species perceive different parts of reality, since they are adapted
to and live in changing environmental conditions. This is as clear, as that
the perceiving apparatus of lower animals, as opposed to that of higher
organized living systems, allows only the representation fo a small part of
reality. Of course, the perceiving apparatus of, for instance a unicellular
animal is much more primitive than that of a primate. Hence it follows that
the 'world picture' of unicellular animals is completely different from that of
mammals, and that, for example, the 'world picture' of fishes is different
from that of birds, and so on. Von Uexkiill anticipated these conclusions in
his Umweltlehre: 49 According to von Uexkiill any organism shows its own
specific 'ambient'. I think that this concept expresses a notion closely resembling what, in evolutionary epistemology, we call 'world picture'.
(ii) The most complex perceiving apparatus and thus the most sophisticated 'world picture' among all living systems is that of man. Man's
facuIties of cognition do not depend on the ratiomorphic apparatus only,
for this apparatus in human beings is 'built over' by a system which is
14
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
The postulate of the objectivity of nature, without ifs and buts, is the basic
precondition to scientific research. If nature were not real, it never could be
observed. Any naturalist has to take, therefore, a realistic view. The opposite
opinion could lead to a ridiculous solipsism. (But I do not believe that a
scientist or a philosopher nowadays might seriously advocate a solipsistic
position.) Certainly, to take the view of hypothetical realism does not mean
that man is capable of recognizing the 'world in itself. Here again we have to
realize. the natural boundaries to cognition and knowledge. In Popper's words
we can epitomize these assertions in the following way:
The thing in itself is unknowable: we can only know its appearances which are to be
understood (as pointed out by Kant) as resulting from the thing in itself and from our
15
own perceiving apparatus. Thus the appearances result from a kind of interaction between
the things in themselves and ourselves. This is why one thing may appear to us in
different forms, according to our different ways of perceiving it - of observing it, and of
interacting with it. We try to catch, as it were, the thing in itself, but we never succeed:
we can only find appearances in our traps. 52
16
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
forth. The conclusion of these studies is that, as already seen in the course of
evolution living systems increasingly accumulated information about their
environment, so that evolution itself can also be described as informationprocessing, i.e. a universal process of learning and cognition.
(ii) The second level is the psychological one. Psychology of development
is concerned with the display of the inborn capacities and the modification
of these capacities by learning during man's individual life. In a way this
means that developmental psychology is the application of fundamental
evolutionary principles to the psychological and mental development (ontogenesis) of man. The evolutionary perspective, certainly, is required whether
psychology refers to innate capacities per se or to individual modifications
of the innate:
evolution
<
<
innate capacities
~
modifications by learning
evolutionary biology
genetic psychology
developmental psychology
I turn now to Piaget's conception of genetic epistemology, i.e. the ontogenetical approach to the development of psychic and mental abilities in human
systems.
Piaget was convinced that epistemology must be based on results from
scientific investigations into the nature of knowledge. This has proved to be
17
the right way, and such a conviction, of course, underlies the intentions of
evolutionary epistemology. A good deal of Piaget's studies is devoted to the
development of cognitive functions in children. Piaget suggested examining
this development like a mental 'embryogenesis' in order to fmd a fullyfledged biological theory of cognition. Between 1920 and 1970 he constantly
studied the development of the child's mental abilities, e.g. conceptual
thought, perception, representation of the external world, language, moral
judgments, and so on. This search to understand the child's 'mental world'
dynamically, was expressed in a psychogenetic or, more precisely, psychontogenetic conception. Piaget's genetical psychology and, in a wider sense, his
genetical epistemology 56 have been the theoretical connection between the
areas of psychological and biological research. That connection constitutes a
corner-stone in the scientific foundation of epistemology, and Piaget
endeavoured to establish epistemology as a scientific discipline. 57 Apart from
these methodological consequences Piaget's conception had a positive impact
on the notion of the innate, in the sense that inborn 'norms of reaction'
(mentioned above; see Table I) become visible. Such 'norms of reaction' are
natural, i.e. innate limitations to the development of organisms; according to
Piaget they are to be characterized as the totality of phenotypes, which
potentially are produced by one genotype.
What we fmd elaborated in Piaget's work is the importance of understanding biological and psychological preconditions to mental capabilities like
speech. (In what follows I use the terms 'speech' and 'language' in the same
sense.) During the last decades some authors, biologists as well as psychologists,
have, like Piaget, presented a conceptual scheme which amounts to biopsychological explanations and prompts us to a better understanding of this
fascinating phenomenon. It is common knowledge that the emergence of
mind and the origin of speech are inseparably related to each other. Human
language is the expression of human mind and vice versa. When we explain
mind as a systems property of sophisticated human brain functions - and I
do not see any justification for explaining mind via metaphysical notions the search for understanding man's language means the search for its biological
elements. 58 By making such assertions, however, we do not need to behave
like reductionists: Human language, undoubtedly, depends upon cultural and
social circumstances as well and can be fully understood only in regard to all
these components. However, the preconditions to the emergence of speech,
whether phylogenetically or ontogenetically, have been biological agencies set
up by brain mechanisms, vocal organs, etc. As to the evolutionary origin of
language, admittedly, there are still many queries. But it might stimulate
18
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
19
psychic level
{mental level)
innate cognitive
abilities
genetic programs
stabilized in the
course of evolution
by natural selection
patterns of cultural
and social organization common to
different systems
('structures')
human world
EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY
human world
subhuman and
human world
genetic program
of grammar
mental level
human world
------------
-- - - ---
structure of language
in human systems
LINGUISTICS
ANTHROPOLOGY
----------- - - - -
development of
behaviour of individual human
systems
evolution of living
systems
------------
DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY
EVOLUTIONARY
BIOLOGY
(I)
....
'"
....,
[g
::>'0
"
e:
(I)
....
,,' 0
':' ....,
a-
g" ta ~
::s
....,
0
(I)
e:
goa
.... '"
(I)
'"
r6.s:.
i
I
>
I:C
....
........
tr1
t""'
>-l
tv
::J
CIl
tr1
>-l
l"':
:ec::
a:
>
'Il
:;tI
21
.~
.s '"
psychology
....
evolutionary
epistemology
~
anthropology
Fig. 3.
I shall now set out some consequences which might be deduced from the
foregoing items and which might also point to fields open for both scientific
(empirical) research and philosophical contemplation.
5. THE CHALLENGE TO SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
22
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
23
finds itself in greater danger than ever before", 73 writes Lorenz and he seems
to confirm this apprehension. But note his ensuing statement: " ... the
modes of thought that belong to the realm of natural science have, for the
first time in world history, given us the power to ward off the forces that
have destroyed all earlier civilizations." 74 In other words: we can still master
our situation, iff we make use of human reason, iffwe make use of objective
knowledge, which, in the last resort, we can obtain by the means of evolutionary epistemology. At any rate, a re-orientation is necessary.
(b) Towards Rationality and Objective Knowledge
In section 3 I mentioned that evolutionary epistemology is apt to meet the
standards of objectivity in scientific research. Campbell also came to the
conclusion that evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary perspective
in general "is fully compatible with an advocacy of the goals of realism
and objectivity in science" 75 . This recalls our attitude towards hypothetic
realism, I think that Popper has already proved this assertion in his works.76
Moreover, I should say that evolutionary epistemology does not only conform
to scientific objectivity, but that it has also provided the foundations of
objective knowledge, for within the framework of an evolutionary theory
of knowledge the phylogenetic preconditions of human reason 77 have been
made clear, so that the following relations are given:
human reason
(rationality)
ratiomorphic
mechanisms
evolutionary
- - - - - epistemology
objective
knowledge
Man's innate teaching mechanisms indeed have set bounds to his development as a biological species; but man as the animal rationale has transgressed
his status as mere animal and, as it were, has opened completely new dimensions. Thus it is true that we are not influenced by ratiomorphic structures
only - these structures yet continue man's status quo ante, but the animal
rationale by definition is endowed with reason, too. Therefore, we have
24
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
to use reason and to act rationally. When we do so, we have the adventure
of objective knowledge, we have scientific enterprise, and for the first time
a living being is able to investigate the sphere 'behind the scenes' of its own
existence. This has been the great evolutionary novelty.
25
~ elementary
epistemology
-----~
common-sense
scientific
knowledge -----~ knowledge
elementary
epistemology
philosophy
.. of science
26
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
27
12
28
FRANZ M. WUKETITS
others) see again D. T. Campbell,op. cit. Furthermore, the reader will fmd some aspects
of the evolution of science in H. Mohr (1977), R. Riedl (1980), F. M. Wuketits (1978b)
and in the collection of papers edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (1970); last, but
not least remember T. S. Kuhn (1962).
39 Cf. K. R. Popper (1972) and K. R. Popper and J. C. Eccles (1977).
40 1. G. Roederer (1979), p. 103.
41 The term 'ratiomorphic' was introduced by E. Brunswik (1955) to characterize
cognitive faculties similar to but not identical with rational structures and mechanisms.
Cf. K. Lorenz (1973), R. Riedl (1980).
42 I presented this thesis at the 'Fifth European Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems
Research' 1980; cf. F. M. Wuketits (1982); see, furthermore, especially E. and W. LeinfelIner (1978).
43 Cf. N. Hartmann (e.g. 1964).
44 For details see M. Eigen and R. Winkler, op. cit.
45 See R. Kaspar (1980), K. Lorenz (1973), R. Riedl (1980), F. M. Wuketits (1978b,
1981).
46 cr. L. von Bertalanffy (1967) and K. Lorenz (1961, 1973, 1974).
47 Cf. e.g. B. Rensch, op. cit., R. Riedl (1975, 1976, 1980), W. Strombach (1968),
F. M. Wuketits (1978a, b; 1981), and others.
48 K. Lorenz (1973), cf. 1977 edition of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 7.
49 Cf. J. von Uexkiill, op. cit.
50 See G. Vollmer, op. cit. and in this volume, pp. 69-121.
51 On this 'system of hypotheses' see R. Riedl (1980) and in the present volume,
pp.40-1.
52 K. R. Popper (1959), p. 453. On hypothetical realism see, furthermore, e.g. B.
Kanitscheider (1979), K. Lorenz, op. cit., R. Riedl,op. cit., and G. Vollmer, op. cit.
53 H. Albert (1978), p. 215.
54 Ibid.
55 J. Piaget (1973), p. 32. On the interdependence of general psychology and the
evolutionary perspective, see also e.g. M. H. Bickhard (1979).
56 See Piaget's book of the same title (1970) and e.g. his Biologie et connaissance
(1967).
57 A recent discussion of this problem is B. BlaZek (1979).
58 For a brilliant presentation of the biological aspects of language see E. Lenneberg,
op. cit.
59 C. D Hockett (1960), p. 96.
60 Ibid., p. 91 (italics not in the original text). For more details see especially E. Lenneberg, op. cit.
61 Cf. N. Chomsky, op. cit.
62 See e.g. L. von Bertalanffy's review in his General System Theory (1968).
63 See B. L. Whorf (1956).
64 When I use the term 'evolution' in a cultural context, this does not mean that I
reduce culture to biological entities. What should be expressed by the concept 'cultural
evolution' is the fact that cultures, like other systems, undergo changes.
6S M. 1. Herskovits, quoted after D. Bidney (1953), p. 423. (Note Bidney's critique of
this view.)
66 It is worthwhile to mention here Paul Watzlawick's distinction between 'flIst-order
29
reality' (= physical reality) and 'second-order reality' (= reality due to cultural and/or
social conventions); see P. Watzlawick (1977). On the social relativity of episternic
structures see especially P. 1. Berger and T. Luckmann (1966).
67 Cf. e.g. G. Radnitzky (1981).
68 In his Anthropologie structurale (1958) and in later works. However, Levi-Strauss
had already developed his structuralist view in the 1930s and 19405.
69 G. Radnitzky (1980), p. 315 (my italics).
70 See e.g. the interesting study by E. Topitsch (1979).
71 Cf. R. Riedl (1980).
72 cr. R. Riedl (1978/79) and F. M. Wuketits (1981).
73 K. Lorenz (1973), see 1977 edition of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 245.
74 Ibid.
7S D. T. Campbell, op. cit., p. 451.
76 Particularly in his Objective Knowledge (1972).
77 cr. R. Kaspar (1981) and R. Riedl (1980).
78 Cf. W. Leinfellner (1980) and G. Vollmer, op. cit.
79 See E. Oeser (1976), particularly vol. II and in the present volume, pp. 154-7.
Oeser's information-theoretical approach corresponds to model-theoretical accounts for
epistemological problems; see e.g. H. Stachowiak (1980).
80 Cf. K. R. Popper (1972).
81 Cf. E. Oeser, op. cit.
82 It is not possible to discuss here the philosophical as well as psychological problem
'rationality vs. irrationality in the history of science' (cf. I Lakatos and A. Musgrave,
op. cit.). Scientific research (discovery), certainly, often has been based upon irrational
components and we must not neglect such factors as 'intuition'. But science would be
rather a chaos of theories, statements, predictions, and so forth, if it were not put into
a 'rational framework'. Therefore, on the whole, scientific research means (and it must
mean) always a decisive step towards rationality. How else should we master the objective world and our own situation?
83 H. Mohr (1977), p. 21.
84 I do not want to withhold the critique of evolutionary epistemology from the reader,
for this volume should stimulate further discussions of the problems in question. Therefore, when preparing the volume, I invited Reinhard Low to present his critical standpoint; see Low's essay, pp. 209-31.
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FRANZ M. WUKETITS
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