PEOPLE v.

ABON
G.R. No. 169245
February 15, 2008
FACTS:
An information for qualified rape was filed against Nelson Abon for the alleged rape of
his own 13-year old daughter on or about last week of May 1995 in Pangasinan.
When arraigned, Abon pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial, he
interposed the defense of denial and alibi and averred that he was working in Binangonan, Rizal
when the alleged rape happened. He further stated that the victim filed the case against him for
the reason that he used to whip her very hard on the buttocks with a piece of wood.
On June 23, 1998, The RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan found him guilty of the crime
charged and was sentenced to death. Due to the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to
the Supreme Court for automatic review. However, in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Mateo, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for immediate review.
The CA affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction, but it modified the award for
damages. It upheld the credibility of the victim. It also observed that Abon failed to show any
inconsistency in the victims testimony, and neither did he prove any ill-motive which would
prompt her to concoct her incest rape story. The appellate court dismissed accused-appellants
defenses of denial and alibi as these were not supported by trustworthy evidence. Hence, this
automatic review by the Supreme Court of CAs decision.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court.
HELD: No. An appeal is undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher
court authority. It is not a right but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedures provides that where the
penalty imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal is made
directly to the SC by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. On the other hand,
a case where the penalty imposed is death will be automatically reviewed by the Court without a
need for filing a notice of appeal.
However, Mateo modified these rules by providing an intermediate review of the cases
by the CA where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death.
Pursuant to the Mateo ruling, the Court issued A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC 2004-10-12, amending the
pertinent rules governing review of death penalty cases
Also, under Sec. 2 of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty
in the Philippines, which took effect on June 29, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty is
prohibited. In lieu thereof, it imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); or life
imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the RPC. Consequently, in the provisions of the Rules of Court on appeals, death penalty cases
are no longer operational.
A review of the records of the case shows that the RTC and the CA had carefully
considered the questions of facts raised, and their decisions are both sufficiently supported by
evidence. A great weight is given to an accusation a child directs against her father as it brings
unspeakable trauma and social stigma on the child and the entire family.

Cases on Rule 122 APPEAL

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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

QUIDET v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 170289
April 8, 2010
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet and two others (Taban and Tubo) were
charged with homicide for the death of Jimmy Tagarda. On the same date, the same accused
were charged with frustrated homicide for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmys cousin,
Andrew.
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in the crime of frustated
homicide. Meanwhile, in the crime of homicide, Taban pleaded guilty, while Quidet and Tubo
maintained their innocence. Accordingly, partial judgment was rendered by the trial court and
found Taban guilty of homicide. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
The RTC found Quidet and Tubo guilty of homicide and all three accused (petitioner,
Taban and Tubo) guilty of frustrated homicide. It found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew
was previously planned by the accused. The active participation of all three accused proved
conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
The CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC. It found the accused guilty
of homicide for the death of Jimmy as conspiracy was duly established, shown by their
concerted acts in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy.
However, the CA disagreed with the RTCs finding that the accused are liable for
frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by Andrew. According to the CA, the
crime committed was merely attempted homicide. It found that the accused failed to inflict
mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter successfully deflected the attack, and that the
victim suffered only minor injuries.
Before the Supreme Court, Quidet insists that he cannot be said to have the same
criminal purpose and design as Taban and Tubo. He avers that his participation was not
necessary to the completion of the criminal acts because by the time he boxed Andrew and
Jimmy, the stabbing had already taken place. He also maintained that he was unarmed,
negating his intent to kill.
ISSUE: Whether or not CAs decision finding Quidet in conspiracy with Taban and Tubo is
proper
HELD:
No. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action
and purpose. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to
evaluate the testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by the Supreme Court. But where the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which can affect the result of the case, the SC is duty-bound to correct this palpable
error.
The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner conspired with
Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide. It ratiocinated
that:
First, there is no evidence that petitioner, Taban or Tubo had any grudge or
enmity against Jimmy or Andrew.

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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

Second, the stabbing incident appears to have arisen from a purely accidental
encounter between Tabans and Andrews groups with both having had a drinking
session.
Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, petitioner was unarmed during the incident, thus,
negating his intent to kill the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor indispensable
to the commission of the crimes as they were done after the stabbing. Thus, petitioners
act of boxing the victims can be interpreted as a mere show of sympathy to or
camaraderie with his two co- accused.
In both cases of homicide and frustrated homicide, the Supreme Court found Quidet
guilty only of slight physical injuries. Meanwhile, Taban and Tubo were found guilty of homicide
and of attempted homicide. The case for frustrated homicide was correctly downgraded by the
CA to attempted homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not lifethreatening.
Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, CAs judgment of guilt in the
crime of attempted and not frustrated homicide is favorable to them. The rule is that an appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

DEUS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 178405
October 15, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Deus was charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act for the alleged sale of 0.01 gram of shabu in a buy-bust
operation. During trial, the accused interposed the defense of denial and alibi, contending that
the members of the police entered his house at that night of the incident and that he was forcibly
taken into a vehicle which took him to the Drug Enforcement Unit office of the Makati City Police
Station.
The RTC found Deus guilty of illegal sale of shabu and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400,000.
Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, filed a very urgent motion for reconsideration which
was denied. Still unassisted by counsel, Deus filed a petition for certiorari as well as a motion to
litigate as pauper before the Court of Appeals. He raised as issue the failure of the trial court
judge to comply with Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure requiring that the pre-trial
order be signed by the accused and his counsel. Accordingly, the appellate court appointed the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as counsel de officio for Deus.
The PAO filed its Notice of Appearance. Then, the appellate court furnished the PAO a
copy of the petition and ordered the latter to file the appropriate pleading within ten days from
notice.
The PAOs counsel filed two manifestations with motion for extension of 30 days each,
within which to comply with the CAs resolution. The appellate court granted the manifestations
with motions. After failing to file the appropriate pleading within the third extended period,
on March 9, 2007, the PAO filed a motion to admit the petition for certiorari attached thereto.
The CA dismissed the petition. As the assailed decision was rendered by the Makati
RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the proper remedy should have been an ordinary appeal
pursuant to Sections 3 and 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended.
The CA took notice of the fact that instead of filing an appeal within 15 days from notice
of the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the subject decision on June 24, 2006, Deus
resorted to the instant petition for certiorari which the Court cannot treat as an appeal for having
been filed on August 24, 2006 or way beyond the period to appeal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied, hence, this petition for
review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Deus petition for certiorari questioning his
judgment of conviction by the lower court
HELD:
Yes. The mode of appeal in cases decided by the regional trial court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction is by a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment appealed
from.
However, the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or
where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error.
Since the judgment of conviction had not been appealed within the time and in the
manner prescribed by the rules, it became final and executory upon the lapse of the
reglementary appeal period.
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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

Petitioner likewise erred in contending that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
prohibits the dismissal of the certiorari petition when appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio. First, said provision only refers to dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to
prosecute. Second, the dismissal of the appeal is conditioned on the appellants failure to file a
brief. An appellants brief is a pleading filed in an ordinary appeal. Clearly, Section 8
contemplates an ordinary appeal filed before the Court of Appeals.
Nonetheless, the CA should have treated the certiorari petition as an appeal. Petitioner
was not represented by counsel when he filed the petition for certiorari before the CA. Thus, he
cannot be presumed to know the legal remedies to take in pursuing his appeal. Moreover, his
right to liberty is at stake. These should have spurred the appellate court to relax the rules of
procedure in the interest of substantial justice. It should have extended the same liberality it
evinced in granting the two motions for extension filed by petitioner.
The CA should be directed to resolve the petition, treated as an ordinary appeal, on the
merits.

Cases on Rule 122 APPEAL

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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

TAMAYO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 174698
July 28, 2008
FACTS:
An information was filed before the RTC charging petitioner Aurora Tamayo and her
friend, Erlinda Anicas, with estafa for allegedly misappropriating the P120,000 extended to them
by Mr. and Mrs. Pedro Sotto. It was alleged that Tamayo and Anicas pretended to be
assemblers of passenger jeepney. They were able to convince the spouses Sotto to pay them
the amount in exchange of one unit of passenger jeepney. However, the two failed to comply
with their obligation and despite repeated demands, they failed and refused to return the
amount.
Petitioner was apprehended but Anicas remained at large. Upon arraignment, Tamayo
pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued and after which, the RTC of Tarlac found her guilty
of the crime charged.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On April 22, 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the decision appealed from. Later on, the CA issued a resolution declaring its
decision final and executor and ordered the same to be entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment. This was In view of the report of the Courts Judicial Records Division dated
November 21, 2005 that no motion for reconsideration before the CA nor petition before the
Supreme Court have been filed despite appellants receipt of copy of the CAs on May 14, 2004.
The RTC then issued an order directing Tamayo to serve the penalty imposed in its
decision. However, petitioner filed a Manifestation before the RTC alleging that while the instant
case was pending with the Court of Appeals, she and Pedro had settled their disputes in a
compromise agreement. She prayed that the implementation of the RTC Order be cancelled.
She further filed a Motion to Suspend the Writ of Execution of the RTC Order on the ground that
supervening facts had occurred making the execution of the said Order unjust.
The RTC denied the petitioners motion on the ground that the CAs decision being final
and executory, it had nothing to do but to execute it.
Thus, this petitin by the Tamayo before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the petitioners conviction for
estafa after having been declared as final and executory, can be modified or set aside in light of
a compromise agreement between petitioner and Pedro.
HELD: No.
It is clear that petitioner did not appeal the Decision of April 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals despite her, or her former counsels, receipt of the same. Consequently, the decision
has already attained finality. As such, it cannot be modified or set aside anymore in accordance
with Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures. Nothing further can be
done to a final judgment except to execute it.
The petitioners claim for compromise between her and the private offended party cannot
affect the decision. It is a hornbook doctrine in criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is
not affected by a compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished
by the government on its own motion. Since a criminal offense like estafa is committed against
the State, the private offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the
law imposes for the commission of the crime.
With regard to the effect of the alleged compromise on petitioners civil liability, it is true
that a compromise extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability of an accused. However, such rule
cannot be applied in favor of petitioner as she failed to prove that she and Pedro had really
entered into a compromise. Petition denied.
Cases on Rule 122 APPEAL
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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

PEOPLE v. TARUC
G.R. No. 185202
February 18, 2009
FACTS:
Francisco Taruc was charged with the crime of murder in connection with the death of
Emelito Sualog. It was alleged that he shot Sualog on the different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which caused his death.
Upon arraignment, Taruc pleaded not guilty. However, before the prosecution witness
Randy Espina could be cross-examined, Taruc escaped from the Bataan Provincial Jail on
August 23, 2002. Thus, the RTC considered the act of the accused as a waiver to crossexamine said witness. Thereafter, the trial court promulgated a judgment of conviction while
accused-appellant was at large.
Upon automatic review before the CA, while Taruc was still at large, the petitioner
through the PAO filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file Appellants brief on January 13,
2006.
Considering that the Notice to File Brief addressed to Taruc was returned to the
appellate court with postal notation moved out, the CA directed Tarucs counsel to furnish it with
the present and complete address of his client within five days from notice.
In compliance, the PAO lawyer informed the CA that accused-appellant escaped from
prison. Said PAO lawyer claimed that he had no means of knowing the current whereabouts of
Taruc. Thereupon, the PAO lawyer asked the CA to direct the Warden of the Provincial Jail in
Balanga, Bataan, to file a certification as to Tarucs escape.
The CA required the Warden of the Bataan Provincial Jail to comment. The OIC Warden
conveyed to the CA that Taruc was indeed committed to said jail on November 10, 2000 but
escaped on August 23, 2002.
Notwithstanding Tarucs escape from prison, the CA granted PAOs Motion for Extension
of Time to File Appellants Brief, in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v.
Flores, making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The period of extension granted
had lapsed without filing his brief; thus, the CA required the PAO to show cause why the latter
should not be held in contempt for failing to file the same. The CA found the explanation valid,
and accepted the briefs of both the appellant and the appellee, and considered the case
submitted for decision.
The CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC. It
modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

On March 13, 2008,Taruc, still represented by the PAO, filed a Notice of Appeal stating
that he was appealing the Decision of the CA to the SC on questions of law and fact.
On April 29, 2008, the CA gave due course to Tarucs appeal and directed its Records
Division to forward the rollo and records of the case to the SC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant has lost its right to appeal when he escaped from
jail
HELD: Yes.
An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of the
judgment in a criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the trial court, promulgation of
judgment shall be made in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, if the judgment is for conviction and the
failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Also, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows the Court of Appeals,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant
who eludes the jurisdiction of the courts over his person. Although Rule 124, Section 8,
particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the Supreme Court by Rule
125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In brief, the accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to
have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his
standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court.

Cases on Rule 122 APPEAL

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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

RODRIGUEZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192799
October 24, 2012
FACTS:
After being convicted by the RTC of unfair competition, petitioner Rolex Rodriguez filed a
motion for reconsideration before the RTC on the 15th or the last day of the reglementary period
to appeal.
On January 19, 2009, Rodriguez received the RTCs order of denial of his motion for
reconsideration. On February 2, 2009, or 14 days after receipt of the RTC Order, petitioner filed
his Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals.
His Notice of Appeal was dismissed on the ground of its being filed out of time under
Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that:
An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed
until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his
counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
Before the RTC, the CA and before the Supreme Court, petitioner asserts the
applicability of the "fresh period rule" as laid down in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "fresh period rule" is applicable to appeals from conviction in criminal
cases governed by Sec. 6 of Rule 122
HELD: Yes.
The rationale of the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases. With this, the Court deems
it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Cases on Rule 122 APPEAL
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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

RTCs, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. This shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the CA; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the SC.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
or partial) or any final order or resolution.
A close scrutiny of the rules shows that the fresh period rule is not applicable in Rule
42, 43, and 45. It is explicit in the mentioned rules that the appellant or petitioner is accorded a
fresh period of 15 days from the notice of the decision, award, judgment, final order or resolution
or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed.
While Neypes was silent on the applicability of the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases,
the issue was squarely addressed in Yu v. Tatad, which expanded the scope of the doctrine in
Neypes to criminal cases in appeals of conviction under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure .
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court held that petitioner seasonably filed his
notice of appeal on February 2, 2009, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from January
19, 2009, the date of receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration. The
petition is granted and the RTC is directed to elevate the records of the case to the SC for the
review of the petitioners appeal.
YU v. SAMSON-TATAD
G.R. No. 170979
February 9, 2011
FACTS:
An information for estafa was filed against petitioner Judith Yu based on the complaint
filed by Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang. Trial then ensued, and the RTC, on its
decision on May 26, 2005, found the petitioner guilty as charged.
Fourteen (14) days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging
that she discovered new and material evidence which could exculpate her from estafa. The
same motion was denied.
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that
pursuant to the Supreme Courts ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of
15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to
November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being
filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.
On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on
the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision. Yu argues
that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when she filed her notice of

Cases on Rule 122 APPEAL

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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the fresh
period rule enunciated in Neypes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes is applicable in the present
case
HELD: Yes.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of
a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based,
makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case.
Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded,
mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as
legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for
new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No
reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal
cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a
purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for
review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in
criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
If a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in
civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in
seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is
at stake.
The petitioner filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of
15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for
new trial. Thus, respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is directed to cease and desist from
further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution
of the decision. The respondent Judge is also directed to give due course to the petitioners
appeal and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed
decision on the merits.

Cases on Rule 122 APPEAL

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JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law

Cases on Rule 122 APPEAL

Criminal Procedures

JORDAN B. JALBUNA JD2

University of Batangas - College of Law