Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
This chapter is structured in two main parts. The first part offers a brief, and selfadmittedly stylized, overview and critique of dominant approaches to knowledge management and its links with innovation. Adopting a view of knowledge as socially constructed, it concludes from this that, where the specific purpose is innovation, then action
concerns need to be as critical to knowledge management as cognitive or decision concerns. The second part draws upon a case study example to begin to draw out some key
issues from a more action-oriented approach to knowledge management. This suggests,
first, that innovation is often, by nature, a highly interactive process requiring knowledge
and expertise from different functions and layers across the organization. In such cases
cridcai problems concern the integration of knowledge across disparate, sometimes
loosely formed, social groups and communities, rather than the accumulation of knowledge within communities. Second that if knowledge integration is to develop, then a
more action-oriented perspective on knowledge management and the development of associated tools and technologies may be needed.
Keywords: Knowledge Management; Innovation; Action; Knowledge Integration; Community
Introduction
One of the first things to be said about knowledge management is that definitions
abound. This is likely (even desirable) because knowledge itself is defined in
many different ways and approached from many different angles and levels of
analysis. Whereas some focus on knowledge as an individual phenomenon - for
example Nonaka's (1994) acceptance of knowledge as 'justified true belief - others, highlight its collective nature. Spender (1995), for example, argues for a pluralistic epistemology of knowledge based on the extent to which knowledge is
individually or socially located, and the extent to which it is implicit or explicit.
Importantly knowledge is seen as comprising "both meaning (i.e,, cognitive, affective, symbolic and cultural) and praxis (i.e., behaviours, rituals, and organizational
routines)" (p:73). This chapter accepts that knowledge, and therefore knowledge
management, are complex, multilayered, and multifaceted phenomena (Blackler,
1995), Knowledge management is therefore scoped out very broadly as any process or practice of creating, acquiring, capturing, sharing and using knowledge,
wherever it resides, to enhance learning and performance in organizations
(Quintas et al., 1996),
272
Jacky Swan
This chapter also argues that approaches to knowledge management have, thus
far, tended to privilege an individual view of knowledge and a single dimension that of meaning. Hence there has been a strong emphasis on the conversion of (individual) tacit knowledge into explicit (Nonaka, 1994). The individual and cognitive aspects of knowledge - in particular the tacit-explicit dichotomy, often attributed to Polanyi (falsely, since Polanyi was only concerned with tacit knowledge) have thus tended to subsume its social and praxis-based components. This risks
divorcing knowledge from social context and action. In contrast this chapter seeks,
not to discard the cognitive, but merely to redress the balance of debate in knowledge management by stressing the essentially social nature of knowledge (Lave
and Wenger, 1988).
Knowledge, then, even individual knowledge, thus is seen as socially constructed - produced and negotiated through social action - action that is anchored
in a social context and connected to specific (if not articulated) purposes. Thus,
borrowing from Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001), a working defmition of knowledge can be taken as "the individual capability to draw distinctions, within a domain of action, based on an appreciation of context or theory, or both. Organizational knowledge is the capability members of an organization have developed to
draw distinctions in the process of carrying out their work, in particular concrete
contexts, by enacting sets of generalizations whose application depends on historically evolved collective understandings" (p.973). According to this view, knowledge lacks meaning if divorced from the context of action in which it has been
produced and accepted.
The notion that 'knowledge' is an asset that needs to be nurtured and protected
in order to sustain the survival or organisms and organizations is not new. The development of American patenting systems of the 18"' Century, and Tayloristic attempts to manage (identify, codify, control and apply) the tacit craft-based knowledge of workers at the turn of the last century, cast a familiar shadow behind the
current knowledge management 'revolution' (Chumer et al., 2000). Yet, recent
decades have seen an explosive growth in the attention and status afforded to
knowledge in relation to economic growth. Studies tracking the emergence of the
term 'knowledge management', for example, demonstrate exponential growth
since it first appeared in the mid 1990s (Scarbrough and Swan, 2001). Web
searches on knowledge management also result in an astonishing number of 'hits',
albeit many are marketing devices for consultants and software vendors (Chumer
et al., 2000).
The explosion of interest in knowledge management no doubt reflects, to a
large extent, its fashionable tendencies - with management 'pop stars' and consultants such as Drucker, Sveiby, and Senge, turning up the volume. In this hyped
environment, it is easy to dismiss knowledge management as just another management fad, not worthy of any further serious attention. Yet, if we look behind
the hype, what is interesting is the remarkable degree of convergence across academic disciplines and areas of industrial practice around the notion that knowledge is a - if not the - most valuable asset and resource that organizations and societies currently have. Discussions and debates around post-industrialism, knowledge work, intellectual and social capital, the knowledge economy, knowledge intensive firms, and so forth, are undoubtedly wide ranging and diverse in their par-
273
ticular histories, perspectives, and approach. Yet all tend to be underpinned by one
central assumption - knowledge is a critical resource and the more there is of it,
the better off we will all be. Despite some early warning signs (e.g., see Blackler
et al.'s introduction to the 1993 special issue of Joumal of Management Studies on
Knowledge Work), and a few critical studies (e.g., Chumer et al., 2000), few writers in the field (broadly defined) of knowledge management attempt to distance
themselves from this assumption.
As 'knowledge' has come to be viewed as such a critical organizational resource, there has also been a corresponding tendency towards what might be
termed a 'quantity approach' to knowledge management in much of the literature.
According to this, knowledge (however difficult to define) is assumed to have a
direct and positive relation to innovative capability and organizational performance. The role of knowledge management is therefore to enhance the production,
circulation and exploitation of knowledge. By capturing, stockpiling and transferring greater quantities of knowledge the organization's performance will be automatically improved. A message seems to be "we don't know what knowledge is
but it seems to solve problems in a functional way so let's use it anyway" (Alvesson and Karreman, 2001). This quantitative approach has led to numerous general
and prescriptive models aimed at increasing the quantity and circulation of knowledge available within the firm (Prusak, 1997).
A problem, however, with such quantitative approaches is that, whilst they assume a positive relationship between the accumulation of knowledge and improvement in innovative capability and organizational performance, this relationship is rarely examined. More often than not, knowledge is treated as valuable in
its own right - divorced from the social action and tasks that actually generate
changes in performance - the assumption being that the more knowledge an organization has, the more innovative and therefore more successful it will become.
Yet knowledge can only generate changes in performance if it is linked to concrete actions, tasks and purposes (McDermott, 1999). Dorothy Leonard Barton
likens 'purposeless' knowledge to the misfortunes of Sisyphus in the Greek fable:
"For all eternity, Sisyphus was sentenced to haul an immense boulder painfully to
the top ofa hill only to see it repeatedly crash back down to the bottom. Too often,
the researchers and engineers on development projects harness their mental and
physical creative powers to achieve the almost impossible - often at considerable
personal cost - only to wonder, at the project's end, whether and why the corporation needed that particular boulder moved, or to speculate that they were climbing the wrong hill and the work was in vain". Leonard-Barton, (1995; pp. 88-89).
More recently a 'new wave' of research on knowledge management has underlined a critical reaction to this quantity approach to knowledge. Drawing, typically, from earlier work on communities of practice and situated learning (Lave
and Wenger, 1988, Lave 1991), a number of writers observe that too great an emphasis on knowledge as a resource, per se, risks divorcing it from concrete actions,
practices, and outcomes (McDermott, 1999). This may lead to excessive stockpiling of knowledge (or, perhaps more accurately, information) at the expense of important organizational tasks, as well as to problems such as information overload
(Schultze and Vandenbosch, 1998). These writers argue that knowledge should
not be seen as valuable in itself, but as adding value only where it is created and
274
Jacky Swan
applied for specific activities, tasks and purposes (McDermott, 1999; Seely Brown
and Duguid, 2001). Yet, despite these observations, there are relatively few empirically grounded examples that actually link the deployment and management of
knowledge to tasks and action (with notable exceptions - e.g., Orr, 1996, Hansen,
1999). Fewer still question or explore the role of knowledge as it connects with
action.
The remainder of this chapter develops this altemative perspective by linking
knowledge and its management to action directed at specific tasks and purposes,
in a specific context - that of the development of new technology in a particular
case firm. Whereas quantity approaches see a direct and linear relationship between knowledge stocks and flows and innovative outcomes (Amidon, 1998), this
analysis suggests a need to understand the relation between knowledge deployment and action as nonlinear and essentially socially and contextually embedded.
In particular, the chapter highlights the ways in which the deployment of knowledge in organizations is driven by action that is connected to a specific purpose in this case technological innovation
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: first a brief overview of
dominant perspectives in the literature on knowledge management is offered. This
highlights the need to question some of the dominant orthodoxy of knowledge
management in order to connect, more closely, knowledge and knowledge management to tasks and action. Moving from this rather abstract discussion, the chapter then uses a case study example of innovation in order to provide a closer (more
tangible?) analysis of the tasks and activities associated with managing knowledge
in the context of an innovation project. This demonstrates, first, that in many cases
innovation is an interactive process requiring knowledge and expertise that is
widely dispersed across multiple functions and layers across the organization. In
such cases - and agreeing with authors such as Grant (2001) - critical problems
concem the integration and synthesis of knowledge across disparate social groups
rather than, simply, the accumulation or transfer of ever greater quantities of
knowledge. Second, that if knowledge integration is to develop, then a more action-oriented perspective on knowledge management and the corresponding development of knowledge management tools and approaches is needed. Finally,
based on this case example of innovation, the chapter hints at some directions that
an action-oriented perspective might take.
Although early writings on knowledge management were dominated by an emphasis on tools and techniques, now the 'field' - referring here to the, now large,
literature on the subject - appears to have diverged. Currently, and broadly speaking, at least two main perspectives and approaches seem to dominate behind the
meaning of 'knowledge management' with the latter strengthening and gathering
ground largely as a result of a critique of the former.
Consciously polarizing these perspectives in order to highlight their different
orientations, the first can be described as 'knowledge management as technology'
camp (Alvesson and Karreman, 2001). This has been labeled, variously, as the
275
Engineering perspective (Markus, 1999, Shadbolt and Milton, 1999), the Cognitive perspective (Swan et al., 1999) or the Codification strategy (Hansen, et al.,
1999). Tiiis perspective is grounded in seminal work from library and information
studies - that informed the development of internet search engine technologies
(e.g., Salton, 1968) - as well as in a strong tradition of knowledge engineering research among artificial intelligence and computer science experts - that has informed the development of knowledge-based systems development (e.g., Schreiber et al., 2000). It has also informed attempts among Information Systems experts
to develop IT-based tools fe.g., intranets, data warehouses, data exchange tools)
aimed at the capture, storage, retrieval and sharing of knowledge.
Proponents of the engineering school often comment that knowledge management is not simply about developing computer systems (Shadbolt and Milton,
1999). However, following this initial caveat and some hints of discomfort with
the technologically deterministic view, the focus frequently then narrows to an
emphasis on using IT-based systems and methodologies to capture, codify and
store knowledge so that it can be exploited more effectively in the organization
(Chumer et al., 2000). Thus, comments as: "some might say that cultural problems
are insurmountable using knowledge technology. We disagree. We believe that
with further modification and adaptation our techniques and tools can be used to
capture the ways in which behavioural, cultural and organizational change takes
place, and how it can be managed best" (Shadbolt and Milton, 1999). Such beliefs
in the power of technology are rarely as honestly or openly stated, but nonetheless
appear to underpin much of what is written in the 'knowledge management as
technology' perspective.
This approach, then, emphasizes the cognitive aspects of knowledge - knowledge is seen as something (that resides predominantly in peoples' heads) that can
be extracted, codified, stored, and transf^erred in order to improve the information
processing capability of the organization. As with information processors, the
main problems associated with knowledge management are to do with the capacity and heuristic capabilities of the tools and systems involved - including the human systems' limited capacity to use knowledge management tools. The basic assumptions of this perspective, then, are:
knowledge can be codified, stored and distributed
knowledge management is about managing/fitting together pieces of
intellectual capital
knowledge is as an objective 'stock' or entity, with characteristics in its
own right (i.e., knowledge is reified)
the purpose of knowledge management is the explification of knowledge
- the conversion of tacit to explicit and explicit to explicit (or, in the
terms of Nonaka, 1994, externalization and combination)
knowledge can be captured and transferred via IT systems. 'Weak ties'
are also important (Hansen, 1999).
the outcomes of knowledge management are reuse (or, in the terms of
Levinthal and March, 1993, exploitation)
276
Jacky Swan
Its conclusions are, then, that knowledge is able to be abstracted from context and
transferred from place to place and therefore using IT systems is essential for
knowledge management. The main strategy for knowledge management could be
described as codification (Hansen et al., 1999).
More recently an alternative perspective on knowledge management has
emerged in the literature. This can be described broadly as the 'knowledge management as people camp' and has been labeled variously as the 'cultivation' perspective (Markus, 1999), the 'community' perspective (Swan et al., 1999) and the
'personalization' strategy (Hansen et al., 1999). This perspective dominates in the
fields of organization studies (in particular organizational learning) and strategic
management, and has emerged in part as a backlash to the failure of knowledge
management systems and the obvious limits of technology in codifying relevant
organizational knowledge (Newell et al., 2000). Hence comments such as: "There
is much more to KM than technology alone: KM is a business process ...KM is not
seen as a matter of building a large electronic library but as one of connecting
people so they can think together" (Sarvary, 1999). This approach, then, emphasizes the cognitive but also the social and relational nature of knowledge (Nonaka,
et al. 2001). For example, knowledge is seen as developing through and within
social relationships and 'learning communities' or 'communities of practice'
(Nonaka, et al., 2001, Seely Brown and Duguid, 2001). Moreover, the exploitation
of intellectual capital is seen as developing through the development of social
capital and networks (Nahapiet and Goshal, 1998). Here, technology is seen as
possibly enabling the development of such communities, but not an essential component of knowledge management. The major assumptions of this perspective,
then, are:
277
embedded and situated in practice and action (Lave and Wenger, 1988). As noted,
the perspectives outlined above are consciously stylized in order to demonstrate
the different waves of thinking in relation to knowledge management. Of course,
the distinction between the two 'camps' is not clean cut. For example, whilst the
community perspective may pay closer attention to socialization and internalization processes, it would not dismiss combination and externalization as important
for the creation of knowledge. The difference is one of emphasis rather than type.
Moreover, some common assumptions - and underlying critiques - can be noted
in connection with both perspectives, especially in terms of their treatment of social relations and action. These are outlined next.
This section offers some points of critique that could be made in relation to both
cognitive and community approaches. These concern, specifically: their assumptions about information technology and people, their assumptions about the nature
and impacts of knowledge (particularly in terms of the functionality of knowledge
for innovation) and the different - possibly conflicting - rationalities underpinning
knowledge management and action.
278
Jacky Swan
279
to be reified as 'thing like' with its own objectifiable parameters. This is implied
by definitions of knowledge, for example, as "justified true belief (Nonaka, et al.
2001). Much of the discourse treats knowledge like a building block - reflected in
terms like stockpiling knowledge (Cole-Gomolski, 1997), or 'mass of knowledge'
(Wikstrom and Normann, 1993), or 'storing' knowledge (Starbuck, 1992). The
idea of knowledge as a stock to be piled (using IT systems) or as a thing to be
transferred (by connecting people through communities) still pervades the literature. The metaphor is jigsaw-like with the critical thing being to amass pieces of
knowledge (through codification) and join them together (through connecting
people).
The implicit wish to objectify organizational knowledge arguably underpins
many attempts to categorize and describe 'it' according to types. Thus "the management literature is replete with attempts to establish mutually exclusive and definitive typologies of knowledge" (Alvesson and Karreman, 2001) - taxonomies
typically employing dichotomies, such as tacit-explicit, collective-individuals,
embodied-embrained, and so on. For example, the widely held distinction between
tacit and explicit knowledge is prevalent in both engineering and community perspectives, with community perspectives focusing on the sharing of tacit knowledge and engineering perspectives focusing on the sharing of explicit knowledge.
This dichotomy also underpins some of the most widely cited writings on knowledge creation (e.g., Nonaka, 1994). It also implies that at least some knowledge
can be separated from its social context - made explicit - making knowledge a
more portable commodity.
Critiquing this notion, others note that all knowledge is contextual, subjective/intersubjective and constructed through social relationships in particular contexts (Tsoukas, 1996). What is meaningful in one context may be meaningless in
another. Taxonomies and dichotomies may be useful but, if taken too far, may obscure more than they reveal. For example, explicit knowledge is always underpinned by tacit understandings. In short: "knowledge is not developed in splendid
isolation from social context and culture" (Tsoukas, 1996). This is why some authors prefer to talk about claims to knowledge (e.g., Alvesson and Karreman,
2001) and about processes of knowing (e.g., Blackler, 1995), thus highlighting the
highly situated nature of knowledge.
While many accounts of knowledge management note the social nature of
knowledge creation (e.g., the importance for knowledge sharing of connecting
people), they regularly stop short (even those in the community 'camp') of pursuing the socially constructed nature of knowledge itself (Alvesson and Karreman,
2001). With exceptions, for example, cognitive accounts tend to freeze knowledge
and social relations in time and space, focusing on form and structure rather than
on process and context. However, knowledge management is more than just
stockpiling information or connecting people - it is also about understanding how
meanings and interpretations are negotiated and established through particular social actions taking place within particular contexts and mediated by particular artifacts (Blackler, 1995). One implication, then, is a stronger need to address the
processes underlying 'activities of knowing' and the ways in which these are
shaped by social context (Blackler, 1995). Notwithstanding Polanyi's insightful
exposition of the links between knowledge (knowing) and action, there is still
280
Jacky Swan
281
2001). For example, at the same time that Drucker was talking about the importance of knowledge work and knowledge workers, Ritzer was providing evidence
for the 'McDonaldisation of society'; firms were rationalizing on a mass scale
through, for example, the reduction and outsourcing of managers with specialist
expertise and the use of IT to automate previously skilled work; and mergers
among large powerful corporations were signifying "dinosaurs herding together in
the face of likely distinction" (Seely Brown and Duguid 2001). It may be dangerous, then, to generalize about the degree of organizational reform, the declining
role of institutions, and the supposed rosy" future of communities of knowledge
workers and their value for economic performance, at least in some sectors (Seely
Brown and Duguid, 2001).
Such caution should be reinforced when we remember that 'knowledge' has a
strong symbolic value (Alvesson and Karreman, 2001). It helps consultancies sell
services, helps academics raise the profile of their work, and helps managers initiate change, but it does not necessarily map, in any direct way, onto actual value in
terms of performance improvement. There are other things than knowledge (defined simply in cognitive terms) that are important for organizational performance
- such as action, motivation and emotional commitment. This has been emphasized by earlier work on organizational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978).
282
Jacky Swan
knowledge (seen in cognitive terms) and decisions are necessarily useful to encourage action is also questionable, even as far as individuals are concerned, and
highly dubious when it comes to organization of collective action (Argyris and
Schon, 1978). Importantly, Brunsson observes, that what is needed making decisions is not necessarily the same as what is needed for taking action, especially in
the context of organizational action. For example, decisions are about knowing
what to do and how to go about doing it. Therefore having tightly specified
knowledge about the problem and the pros and cons of alternative solutions is important for making the right decision. Perversely, in organizational settings, sharing tightly specified knowledge about problems and alternative solutions may be
bad for action because knowledge can generate confiict and uncertainty over
which solution to follow. Thus Brunsson argues that, in contrast to what is needed
for decisionmaking, what may be needed for action is a broad, clear, but suitably
ambiguous, ideology that helps to generate a context in which people can act.
If knowledge management is really to make performance improvement possible
through innovation, then action (doing things) is just as important as choosing
what to do and how to do it. Hence Alavi and Leidner's (1999) observations that
"to make information resources productive they should be converted into actionable knowledge." Engaging in actions (whatever they happen to be) can also create opportunities for learning. This doesn't mean that decision is controllable and
action is somehow anarchic, wayward or uncontrollable. Action can also be purposeful but is much more situated - based on the here and now, on intuition and
instinct albeit within a context of plans and decisions (Ciborra, 1999). As a case in
point, innovation involves knowledge but also people doing things, sometimes in
the absence of much knowledge. Ciborra (1999), for example, refers to the importance of 'improvisation' - working 'in situ' to develop ad hoc ways of solving
problems, or "situated performance where thinking and action occur simultaneously and at the spur of the moment". To encourage innovation - an oft-cited reason for knowledge management - knowledge management systems and strategies
may need to prioritize action as much as thinking, considering both the requirements for each, and the possible tensions between.
The remainder of the chapter focuses on the various ways that knowledge was
'managed' during a particular innovation project (the Sales Support Project) in a
particular company (BT Industries). This is done in order to provide a concrete
example of the links between knowledge management and innovation. The analysis of BT Industries adopts the view, outlined at the start, that knowledge is produced and negotiated through social action - action that is anchored in a social
context and connected to specific purposes. Thus the focus is on illustrating the
various ways that knowledge was 'managed' through new combinations of actors,
actions and social practices within this specific context, where the purpose of the
action was innovation. The aim here is not to come up with a new set of (overly)
generalized prescriptions about knowledge management - this would not be possible from a single case. Rather, the aims is merely to draw out some key issues
283
that could inform understanding and practice from a more action-oriented perspective on knowledge management. The case example, then, focuses on knowledge,
and knowledge management, in the context of action.
The purpose of this innovation project was to achieve organizational integration
in a geographically dispersed company through the introduction of a large scale IT
system. BT Industries is the third largest manufacturer and service provider of
specialized materials handling (forklift trucks and hand trucks) equipment. It has
its headquarters in Sweden and divisions are spread across Europe, Asia and the
USA. At the time of the research, BT had around 3400 employees, 4.9 billion
Swedish Kroner turnover and was increasing its market share by around 1% per
year. Around half the business was in manufacturing and half in sales/after-sales
service, the latter including short and long-term truck rental agreements. The SSP
was aimed at multi-site, multi-national and cross-functional strategic co-ordination
of the European service side of the business, prompted by a need to provide common services to global customers. A significant part was to improve the sharing of
information across the disparate business units through the implementation of a
standard IT system that would integrate information used for parts and service delivery across BT companies in the different countries in Europe.
Until this point, each of the BT companies had operated more or less autonomously and each had gone its own way in terms of systems development for business applications. BT's structure was largely de-centralized and its culture could
be described as one of 'responsible autonomy' (Friedman, 1977). The implementation of this new standardized IT system would, therefore, involve significant
changes in core work practices (Swanson, 1996). Moreover, there was no "off-theshelf package available that met BT's multi-site, multi-functional and complex
leasing requirements. Therefore a new system would need to be designed and developed. The SSP was to achieve the design and implementation of an integrated
management information and planning system for all the European businesses
through the introduction of common, integrated IT platforms and information systems - essentially Enterprise Resources Planning (ERP) technology. It was
launched in 1996, with overall responsibility resting with the small corporate IT
function in Sweden. The vision of implementing a common and standardized
software platform represented a major cultural change for BT in the way people
thought about, and managed, IT. Nonetheless, owing to perceived millennium
problems with existing systems, this was to be completed within an ambitious, 2year time schedule.
Although he did not specifically use the term, the SSP Project Leader recognized early on that knowledge management would be a critical issue. There were
three main reasons for this. First, refiecting BT's decentralized structure, IT support for software development was effectively 'insourced' to a small group at the
Centre, while hardware and network infrastructure provision was outsourced.
There were very limited resources available in the Central IT Group (only 14 people worked there) so they would be unable to support a project of this scale and
scope single-handedly. Second, the Project leader recognized that he and his small
team did not have sufficient knowledge of the working practices across the different businesses and functional areas, that would be needed to design the new system. The knowledge and skills of end users across far-fiung sites in Europe would
284
Jacky Swan
therefore be required. Third, given BT's overall culture, in particular the core
value placed on local autonomy, changes that were seen as imposed by the Swedish Centre would likely be met with local resistance (this had happened in the
past). The SSP Leader was therefore keen for local BT firms to provide necessary
expertise and resources, and to 'own' the project themselves, by managing their
own implementation. The role of the SSP team was to 'kick start' the changes and
to then provide ongoing support where needed (hence the label 'Sales Support').
However, given differences in IT skills and local variation in systems, this could
prove very difficult. A key knowledge management issue, then, was to identify
people locally with relevant expertise as well as with the interest and motivation to
manage each implementation. Managing knowledge, as well as expectations and
motivational concerns, was therefore critical in order to get others to act in relation
to the innovation.
The SSP began by bringing together a small group of senior managers representing different functional areas and different countries to review and evaluate
systems available on the market. They concluded that none could handle BT's
core business portfolio. Following negotiations with various external suppliers,
BT contracted a Swedish software supplier, Intsoft, to design and develop a new
version of their software, jointly with BT personnel. Intsoft was chosen because,
even though their software had less requisite functionality than a competitor bid,
managers in BT trusted that the relationship with Intsoft would be a close, mutually beneficial partnership. BT would have an ERP system that fitted their business requirements, and Intsoft would have a new version of their system that they
could market more widely to other similar businesses using BT as a reference site.
Prior informal, personal contacts among some BT and Intsoft personnel, and the
fact that Intsoft was also a Swedish company, helped to establish this initial trust.
The Project Leader recognized early on that selection, recruitment and commitment would be a critical in developing a project team with the necessary
knowledge of IT and business. The Human Resources Director was therefore
called upon to help in designing the project management procedures to be used
prior to the work f^ormally starting, and continued to have informal contact with
the Project Leader throughout. The project team was selected through informal
consultation with senior managers from the different European divisions, who
suggested those divisional staff who had the most knowledge of the local systems
they were currently using. These were often people with detailed knowledge of
operating procedures (e.g., from finance functions) rather than IT specialists.
The design and development phase was intensive, with Intsoft consultants
working alongside BT managers representing different functional areas (e.g., from
sales, finance, operations), and different European divisions, brought together on
one site in Sweden for approximately three days a week, over a twelve week period. In addition, two (later 4) graduates in Business and IT were employed on the
SSP. These were employed by Intsoft but, usually, were offered the option of employment either with Intsoft or BT when the project ended. These graduates
worked partly on site at BT and partly in Intsoft and proved to be important
'knowledge brokers' in the relationship between BT and Intsoft, bringing valuable
expertise, and acquiring detailed knowledge of both Intsoft's product and BT's
operating context.
285
Following this design and development work, implementation of the ERP system was managed by three co-ordinated project teams, each of which were responsible for two to four different European sites. Each team comprised representatives from Intsoft, the corporate IT function, and divisional business managers
who (where possible) were those that had been involved during the design phase.
The teams were thus multiskilled and, importantly, involved representatives from
most of the different social communities that would be affected by the system and
who, therefore, had important knowledge of the local operating contexts. They
were selected (on an informal basis) to comprise different 'personality types'. For
example, where it was known informally that a team leader was less 'dynamic'
(but suitably senior) they would be complemented by one of the more proactive
BT or Intsoft staff.
These teams traveled to the sites to deliver initial training in the software. However, it was continuously stressed that implementation itself had to be owned locally. Therefore local divisions provided their own project managers who were
seconded to the SSP during implementation. Importantly, the activities of the three
implementation teams were coordinated so that they traveled two weeks in three
and, where possible, returned to the Swedish corporate centre on the same third
week. This was specifically to encourage knowledge sharing across the teams, and
hence across the European Divisions they were responsible for.
There was little formal project documentation, although email was used extensively for communication both within and across teams and across divisions. For
example, an email site, which emerged informally, for 'frequently asked questions',
began to provide an important network for users in different countries to learn
from one another about implementation problems in other sites. Noticing this, the
Project Leader arranged for the site to be supported more formally by his group.
Further every local user was provided with the 'ring binder' - a book on the related subject of network implementation. Importantly this IT-based communication of written information was supported by a high degree of verbal communication, either face-to-face or by telephone (every team member was provided with a
mobile phone). Knowledge sharing in the innovation project was characterized,
then, by a high degree of informal networking, which emerged as different social
groups began to practice with the new system and to experience common problems.
Our research tracked the innovation project over its lifecycle and found that,
despite its ambitious nature and the significant knowledge management challenges
faced, it was largely successful. Indicators of this were: the project met most of its
initial expectations; the overall project was completed within 1 month of target;
with a few exceptions the new software delivered the functionality needed; the
project team developed a relatively good long-term relationship with their software supplier; there was high reported satisfaction and low turnover of project
team staff and key users. The next section highlights those practices relevant to the
management of knowledge that appeared to be important in this case.
286
Jacky Swan
The case of BT illustrates some of the mechanisms used, more or less effectively,
to mobilize different kinds of knowledge and expertise in order to enable a particular innovation. These are discussed next and suggest a need to apply knowledge management strategies and practices to action concerns.
287
being associated with what was seen a 'success story', they also acquired status in
the wider organization.
Whilst a community perspective emphasizes the importance of identifying and
linking definable social communities, the relevant communities in this case would
have been difficult to locate, build or connect at the outset in any formal of
planned way. Innovation is characteristically uncertain - it is often difficult to
know what you might need to know, or who has relevant knowledge, until actions
have been taken - definitions of problems often chase solutions (Swan and Clark,
1992). Here, it was only by participating 'in-situ' in highly uncertain practices of
innovation that a community began to define itself and formal systems were developed to support it (Cibbora, 1999). This is not to pit chaos and informal social
practices against order and formal planning. In terms of knowledge management,
there were significant strategic actions that encouraged this 'loose' community,
around the SSP, to consolidate itself. The Project leader, for example, was proactive in both initiating and supporting the community of 'key users'. For example,
he deliberately targeted individuals at the outset to get involved who were likely to
be enthusiastic about (but not necessarily formally responsible for) the ERP system. He also provided technical support necessary for them to communicate and to
develop their own database. In this case, then, the development of formal systems
for managing knowledge (i.e., a cognitive approach) was interwoven with the development of an informal social community mobilized around a set of shared
problems and interests (a community approach). More formal knowledge management systems were, in effect, 'socialized' around those who needed to use
them.
In this example, then, it was not a case of either adopting a cognitive approach
(emphasizing technology) or a community approach (emphasizing people) to
managing knowledge. Nor was it a case of switching from one to the other.
Rather, the broad approaches were mutually constituted, with an emphasis on the
former being supported (cognitive) by, and supporting, a continued focus on the
latter (community). This supports earlier points regarding the dangers of maintaining a false dichotomy within cognitive and community approaches (or more
broadly between technology and people). It suggests instead - in line with the
view of knowledge taken in this chapter - that both are always relevant to knowledge management, but that the relative emphasis should depend on specific action
concerns. In this case, then, the strong emphasis on building and maintaining a
community was relevant to the action requirements of the innovation task at hand.
288
Jacky Swan
1996). This meant providing support so that people involved could locate their
own ideas and experiences in the context of others. In BT, then, the actions involved in implementing a system meant that the key users shared some context for
understanding even though they operated in very different local conditions. As
Boland and Tenkasi (1995) put it: "the problem of integration of knowledge ...is
not a problem of simply combining, sharing or making data commonly available.
It is a problem of perspective taking in which the unique thought worlds of different communities of knowing are made visible and accessible to others". In this
case it was not essential, then, for those involved to develop the same 'world
view' or common understanding but, rather, simply to have some experience in
common that allowed them to appreciate, at some level, the worldviews of others.
If knowledge integration is the key issue then this suggests limitations to a
'connectionist' approach to knowledge management where IT is used simply to
connect people across social communities. Studies on technologies such as Lotus
Notes, for example, suggest organizational members who communicated frequently or infrequently without Lotus Notes continued to communicate on the
same basis with it (Vandenbosch and Ginzberg, 1996). Similarly, Newell et al.
(2000) found that the introduction of an intranet where the aim was knowledge
management merely served to reinforce social groupings and boundaries and/or
expose conflict around pre-existing groups in a large, geographically distributed
bank. This had the paradoxical effect of reducing, rather than creating, opportunities for knowledge sharing (Newell et al., 2000). This concurs with Alavi and
Leidner's (1999) observation that "in the absence of an explicit strategy to better
create and integrate knowledge in the organization, computer systems which facilitate information sharing have only a random effect at best". Knowledge integration, then, implies more than just using IT to link people - it highlights the importance of developing, to some degree, a sense of shared context and purpose to
peoples' actions (e.g., surrounding implementation problems) so that they can appreciate the possibilities for sharing knowledge.
289
Brunsson (1982) argues that a broad but clearly defmed ideology is important in
order to generate, what he terms, a rationality for action. This should be broad
enough to engage the interests of heterogeneous groups but not so woolly so that
acting on it can be avoided. Interestingly, this could be one reason why 'knowledge management' itself has such wide appeal - as with other fashionable management ideas, it couples ambiguity and breadth with simplicity and a clear imperative for action (i.e., to improve performance in order to survive (Clark and
Salaman, 1995)). This provides a high degree of 'interpretative flexibility' which,
arguably, gives the concept of knowledge management wide appeal (Bijker et al.,
1987). In BT a significant aspect of the ideology of the SSP was the 'cut-off date
to meet Y2K requirements. This was broad but clearly defined (in that the end
date was both fixed and widely communicated) but the process of getting there
was only very loosely defined. This helped to generate a 'must do' imperative
among those that needed to be involved but without aggravating the conflict that
would very likely have occurred if knowledge about specifics of the design and
implementation of the system was shared freely among all (especially the English
and French sites).
5.3.2
Conflict refers here not necessarily to outright fighting across different social
groups but to tensions between the different imperatives or 'logics of action' of
those involved (Scarbrough, 1999). In other words individuals and groups within
(or across) organizations may fail to engage in activities aimed at sharing knowledge, not because they are being defensive, but merely because they are concerned
with different activities, agendas and priorities. For example, in this case the software suppliers were interested in designing standard software they could sell
widely, whereas BT's main interest was in developing software they could use in
their particular context. These different interests may have precluded opportunities
for creating new knowledge. However, BT's approach to managing knowledge
found interesting ways of redressing these possible tensions. These were centred
on developing a close partnership with 'Intsoft'. For example, BT and Intsoft
agreed on a long term partnering agreement where Intsoft would dedicate the
amount of time required to undertake the desired modifications for a fixed (cheap)
fee - very much to BT's advantage - whilst being able to develop a new standard
(multisite, multifunctional) version of their software and using BT as a reference
site. This agreement was reinforced by the innovative joint employment contract
for the graduates employed in the project. These new 'hybrid' employees played a
critical role in limiting 'insider-outsider' tensions and in integrating knowledge by
embodying both BT business and Intsoft systems expertise (Blackler, 1995).
A critical feature of knowledge management here, then, could be usefully characterized as introducing mechanisms for the "quasi resolution of conflict" (Cyert
and March, 1963) - that is mechanisms for uniting, temporarily (in this case for a
period of about 18 months) divergent sets of practices. The literature on communities of practice tends to see communities as tightly bounded by shared interests
and common practices - shared practice "enables participants over time to develop
290
Jacky Swan
a common outlook on, and understanding of, their work and how it fits into the
world" (Seely Brown and Duguid, 2001). This does not entirely reflect the situation here. Here it was perhaps more important that members of organizations or
sub-units with different, and possibly conflicting, agendas and outlooks could accommodate one anothers' interests on a temporary basis.
5.3.3
Creating Redundancy
Knowledge management is frequently driven by a perceived need to avoid reinvention and redundancy. However, this case suggests that, sometimes, actually
building in redundancy and reinvention (so that those concerned share the experience of doing something similar even if they get it a bit 'wrong') can be extremely
valuable in action terms. At BT, for example, there was significant reinvention
across the three mobile implementation teams, as they worked in parallel and each
tackled similar problems. However, their work schedules were also coordinated allowing them to meet face-to-face on average every third week, with interim
communication on a regular basis via specially provided mobile phones. That they
had worked through at some level through similar problems, meant they were better able to synthesize their knowledge and ideas during the periods when they did
meet - soon developing a common code of language and a shared sense of identity
as 'Mobile sales support teams'.
5.3.4
291
Conclusions
This chapter has touched on some areas that could be core concerns for those interested in generating knowledge management approaches focusing more closely
on action concerns. These could clearly be extended to incorporate issues such as
trust, legitimacy, status, and so forth. From the analysis presented here, a few
broad conclusions can be underlined. First, knowledge is created and deployed
292
Jacky Swan
through action and interaction as individuals from different backgrounds and disciplines come to understand other perspectives and frameworks. Knowledge, even
individual knowledge, can be understood as fundamentally dialectic - that is embedded in, and constructed through, relationships with others (Tsoukas and
Vladimirou, 2001). Knowledge management initiatives need, then, to address not
just information processing and decision concerns (e.g., accumulation of stocks of
information, or the conversion of tacit to explicit knowledge) but also relational
and action concerns (such as social identity, power, conflict, motivation). Whilst
there is much attention to the former of these concerns in the literature on knowledge management, it is rare to see the latter addressed in any serious way. This
chapter has sought to redress this balance.
Designers of knowledge management initiatives could think, then, in terms
what is necessary for action (for example, motivation, emotional commitment) not
just decision (e.g., providing ever more of information or mechanisms for knowledge transfer). However, engineering and, to a lesser extent, community approaches to knowledge management have still not seriously tackled the problem of
action or the socially constructed nature of knowledge. For example, most 'knowledge management systems' still tend to be underpinned by 'quantitative' assumptions - assuming the accumulation of knowledge (treated in cognitive terms) is
necessarily a goo_d thing. This has been driven by a view of knowledge, couched
in a scientific, decision rationality, that sees 'it' as an objectifiable (functional) entity. This is despite efforts by some to encompass assumptions other than decision
rationality into system design (Ciborra, 1999). Innovation processes, at least of the
particular kind presented here, often rely on knowledge being created
spontaneously, at the point of action, as the innovation process itself allows dispersed groups to engage in new, often unanticipated, forms of social interaction.
In such cases then, a model of knowledge management based on scientific rationality may have limited relevance.
Second, if action is to be taken seriously, then a critical problem for knowledge
management - and for the building or bridging of communities that engage in action - may be not so much to do with the transfer or flow of knowledge but to do
with the integration of distributed knowledge. Knowledge integration is based in
being able to share context. Our research suggests, however, that context is created not so much through harmonizing or sharing views, opinions and stories but
through addressing conflict and diversity (Scarbrough, 1999). The roles of knowledge management systems and strategies could be recast, then, in terms of building a 'shared context for knowing' (Blackler, 1995), rather than providing a facility for the storage and transfer of knowledge. For example, systems aimed at framing or generating common experience (either direct or vicarious), or for building
in (rather than necessarily avoiding) redundancy and reinvention, could be extremely valuable in action terms because they help to create a shared context for
negotiation and interpretation that may allow heterogeneous and disparate social
groups to share practice.
293
References
Alavi, M. and D. Leidner, "Knowledge Management Systems: Issues, Challenges
and Benefits," Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 1,
Article 7, 1999.
Alvesson, M. "Talking in Organizations: Managing Identity and Impressions in an
Advertising Agency," Organization Studies, 15, 4, 1994, 535-563.
Alvesson, M. and D. Karreman, "Odd Couple: The Contradictions of Knowledge
Management," Joumal of Management Studies, 38, 7, 2001, 995-1018.
Amidon, D.M., "The Evolving Community of Knowledge Practice: The Ken
Awakening," International Joumal of Technology Management, 16, 1998, 45-63.
Argyris, C. and D. A. Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978.
Bijker, W.E., T. Hughes, and T.J. Pinch (eds). The Social Construction ofTechnological_Systems, London: MIT Press, 1987.
Blackler, F., "Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organizations: An Overview and
Interpretation," Organization Studies, 16, 6) 1995, 16-36.
Blackler, F., M. Reed, and A. Whitaker, "Editorial Introduction: Knowledge
Workers and Contemporary Organizations," Journal of Management Studies,
30,6,1993,851-861.
Boland, R.J. and R.V. Tenkasi, "Perspective Making and Perspective Taking in
Communities of Knowing," Organization Science, 6, 4, 1995, 350-363.
Brewer, M.B., "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same
Time," Personality and Psychology Bulletin, 17, 1991, 475-482.
Brunsson, N., "The Irrationality of Action and Action Rationality: Decisions, Ideologies and Organizational Actions," Joumal of Management Studies, 19, 8,
1982, 29-44.
Chumer, M., R. Hull, and C. Prichard, "Situating Discussions about 'Knowledge'," in Prichard, C ; Hull, R.; Chumer, M. and Wilmott, H. (eds). Managing
Knowledge, London: Macmillan, 2000, 1-19.
Ciborra, C. and T. Jelassi, Strategic Information Systems: A European Perspective, Chichester: John Wiley, 1994.
Ciborra, C , "A Theory of Information Systems Based on Improvisation," in Currie, W. and Galliers, R. (eds.). Rethinking Management Information Systems.
Oxford: OUP, 1999.
Clark, T. and G. Salaman, "The Management Guru as Organizational Witch
Doctor," Organization, 3, 1996, 85-108.
Cohen, S., "Knowledge Management's Killer Applications," Training and Development, 52, 1, 1998, 50-53.
Cole-Gomolski, B., "Users Loathe to Share Their Know-How," Computerworld,
31,46, 1997,6.
294
Jacky Swan
Cyert, R.M. and J.G. March, Behavioural Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963..
Davenport, T.H., S.L. Jarvenpaa, and M.C. Beers, "Improving Knowledge Work
Processes," Sloan Management Review, Summer, 1996, 53-65.
De Sanctis, G. and M.S. Poole, "Capturing the Complexity in Advanced Technology Use: Adaptive Structuration Theory," Organization Science, 5, 2, 1994,
121-147
Drucker, P. "The Coming of the New Organization," Harvard Business Review,
January-February, 1988.
George, J.F. and J. King, "Examining the Computing Centralization Debate,"
Communications of the ACM, 34, 1991, 63-72.
Grant, R., "Toward a Knowledge Based Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17, 1996, 109-122.
Grant, R., "Knowledge and Organization," in Nonaka, I. and Teece, D. (eds.).
Managing Industrial Knowledge: Creation, Transfer and Utlization, London:
Sage, 2001, 145-169.
Hansen, M.T., "The Search Transfer Problem: The role of Weak Ties in Sharing
Knowledge across Organizational Sub-Units," Administrative Science Quar-
terly, 44,1999,^2-111.
Hansen, M.T., N. Nohria, and T. Tierney, "What's Your Strategy for Managing
Yinov/ledgel" Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1999, 106-116.
Kogut, B. and U. Zander, "What Firms Do?: Co-ordination, Identity and Learning," Organization Science, 1, 1996, 502-518.
Lave, J., Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics and Culture in Everyday Life.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Lave, J. and E. Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Leonard, D., Wellsprings of Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business
School Press, 1995.
Levinthal, D. and J. March, J., "The Myopia of Learning," Strategic Management
Journal, 14,1993,95-112.
Lindquist, J., "Open Sourcing," European Conference on Information Systems,
Vienna, July, 2000..
Markus. L., "Knowledge Management," Warwick Business School Seminar Series, University of Warwick, August, 2000.
McDermott, R., "Why Information Technology Inspired but Cannot Deliver
Knowledge Management," California Management Review, 4\, 1999, 103-117.
McLoughlin, I., Creative Technological Change. London: Routledge, 1999.
Mumford, E., "New Treatments or Old Remedies: Is Business Process Reengineering Really Socio-Technical Design?" Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 3, 4, 1994,313-326.
295
296
Jacky Swan
Seely Brown, J. and P. Duguid, "Structure and Sponteneity: Knowledge and Organization," in Nonaka, I. and Teece, D. (eds.). Managing Industrial Knowledge: Creation, Transfer and Utlization, London: Sage, 2000,44-67.
Shadbolt, N. and N. Milton, "From Knowledge Engineering to Knowledge Management," British Joumal of Management, 10, 1999, 309-322.
Starburck, W., "Learning by Knowledge-Intensive Firms," Journal of Management Studies, 34, 1992, 389-414.
Swan, J. and P. Clark, "Organizational Decision-Making in the Appropriation of
Technological Innovation: Cognitive and Political Dimensions," European
Work and Organizational Psychologist, 2,1992, 103-127.
Swan, J. and H. Scarbrough, "Knowledge, Purpose and Process: Linking Knowledge Management and Innovation," HICSS Conference, Maui, 2001.
Swan, J., S. Newell, H. Scarbrough, and D. Hislop, "Knowledge Management and
Innovation: Networks and Networking," Journal of Knowledge Management, 3,
1999, 262-275.
Swanson E.B., "Information Systems Innovation Among Organizations," Management Science, 40, 9, 1996, 1069-1092.
Tajfel, H., "Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparison," in Tajfel, H. (ed.). Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology oflntergroup Behaviour. London: Academic Press, 1978.
Tsoukas, H. "The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge System: A Constructionist
PeTspecti\e," Strategic Management Joumal, 17, 1996, 11-25.
Tsoukas, H. and E. Vladimirou, "What Is Organizational Knowledge," Journal of
Management Studies, 38, 7, 2001, 973-994.
Vandenbosch, B. and M. Ginzberg, "Lotus Notes and Collaboration: Plus CA
Change," Joumal of Management Information Systems, 13, 1996,65-82.
Weick, K.E., "Technology as Equivoque: Sensemaking in New Technologies," in
P.S. Goodman, L.S. SprouU and Associates (ed.). Technology and Organisations, Oxford: Jossey-Bass, 1990.
Wikstrom, S., and R. Normann, Knowledge and Value. London: Routledge, 1993.