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San Miguel Corp Employees Union v. Bersamira - Labor dispute is
defined under the LC as any controversy or matter concerning
terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing maintaining,
changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee. As the case is indisputably
linked with a labor dispute because it dwells on the terms, tenure
and conditions of their employment, jurisdiction belongs to the
labor tribunals.

: A labor dispute can nevertheless exist regardless
of whether the disputants stand in the proximaterelationship of
and employee. The existence of a labor dispute is not
negativedby the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not
stand in the proximate relation of employer andemployee.
Labor dispute
- "any controversy or matterconcerning terms and conditions of
employment or theassociation or representation of persons in
negotiating,fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms
thedisputants stand in the proximate relation of employerand
employee." (Art. 212(1), LC)
-Conclusion: Controversy is a labor dispute.
Layno vs. de la Cruz (1965) is not controlling( its members be
hired as stevedores in the placeof the members of a rival union
not a labor dispute.)

As to jurisdiction, Rule: Labor Arbiters have original andexclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide the followingcases involving all
workers including "1. unfair laborpractice cases; 2. those that
workers may file involvingwages, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment; ... and 5. cases arising from any

violation of Article 265 of this Code, including

questions involvingthe legality of striker and
lockouts. ..."
Conclusion: Labor arbiter has jurisdiction
As to jurisdiction, SMC proposition: regular Courts
fordamages under Arts. 19, 20 & 21
Conclusion: claim for damages is interwoven with
alabor dispute existing between the parties and
expeditious settlement of those disputes
Implication: to rule otherwise will result to split
jurisdiction, obnoxious to the orderly admin
istrationof justice
NLRC 189 SCRA 811 FACTS 1. Private respondent Jose
Bacalso was employed as an admeasurer by
petitioner Gold City. 2. He was suspected by
management of undermeasuring cargo. Hence, the
cargo control officer ordered two other admeasurers
to re-measure three pallets of bananas which had
already been measured by private respondent. 3. As it
turned out, the re-measurement revealed that
respondent had under-measured the bananas by
1.427 cubic meters. 4. Feeling insulted by the remeasurement, private respondent confronted and
quarreled with Mabalacad, on of the two admeasurers,
in the office of Chief Admeasurer Guangco. Guangco
told the two to stop fighting and behave properly but
this order was ignored and a fistfight ensued. 5.
Thereafter, private respondent was charged with
assaulting a co-employee and falsifying reports and
records of the company. He was then preventively
suspended pending investigation of the grievance
committee. 6. The committee recommended a fortyfive day suspension but apparently, Guanco and
Mabalacad did not consider suspension an adequate

sanction. 7. Subsequently, private respondent received a notice of

termination upon the grounds of assaulting a co-employee and of
insubordination. 8. Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, which granted such motion but
did not order respondents reinstatement. 9. On appeal, the NLRC
modified the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE 1. Whether or not
private respondent was denied due process in the course of his
dismissal. 2. Whether or not private respondent was dismissed for
a just cause. HELD It must be noted that petitioner did not
properly inform private respondent of all the infractions of
company regulations which subsequently became the justification
for his dismissal. After being preventively suspended, he was
charged with assaulting a coemployee and falsifying reports and
records of the company relating to his duties. But it came to pass
that when private respondent received his notice of termination,
the causes therefor were stated as assault on a co-employee and
insubordination. The Court considers that there was here at least
a partial deprivation of private respondents right to procedural
due process. He could not be expected adequately to defend
himself as he was not fully or correctly informed of the charges
against him which management intend to prove. It is less than fair
for management to charge an employee with one offense and
then to dismiss him for having committed another offense with
which he had not been charged against and which he was
therefore unable adequately to defend himself. Willful
disobedience of the employers lawful orders, as a just cause for
the dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at
least two requisites: that the employees assailed conduct must
have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to
the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge. Both requisites are present in the instant
case. It does not follow, however, that private respondents
services were lawfully terminated. We believe that not every case
of insubordination id reasonably penalized with dismissal. For one
thing, Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code refers to serious
misconduct or willful disobedience. There must be reasonably

proportionality between the willful disobedience by

the employee and the penalty imposed therefor.

In a certification election held, the Pambansang Kilusang

Paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation, won and was
subsequently certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream
The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its
proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same time, it
requested the Company for its counter proposals but the
requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the
As a result, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the
BLR on the ground of unresolved economic issues in
collective bargaining.
In the labor arbiter: due to series of postponements, and
non-appearance at the hearing conducted it ruled that the
Company has waived its right to present further evidence and,
therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution.
NLRC: ruled that respondent Sweden Ice Cream is guilty
of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g)
Article 248 (now Article 249)
Issue: WON respondent is guilty of unjustified refusal
to bargain?
Held: YES
The Court affirmed the NLRC, and ruled that,
petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice,
because the jurisdictional preconditions of Collective
Bargaining establish such as:
1. possession of the majority representation;

2. proof of majority representation;

3. a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a)
Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a
collective agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under
the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between
labor and management and to create a climate of sound and
stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the
employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation.
In the case at bar, (1) respondent Union was a duly certified
bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain,
accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining
Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were
left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made
no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate
lack of a sincere desire to negotiate.
From the overall conduct of the company, it is indubitably shown
that it disregarded its obligation to bargain in good faith.
WORKER ENLIGHTENMENT, ARTICLES 211 (d), 277 (a), 241 (p) (1)
To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights
and obligations as union members and as employees; (2) All
unions are authorized to collect reasonable membership fees,
union dues, assessments and fines and other contributions for
labor education and research, mutual death and hospitalization
benefits, welfare fund, strike fund and credit and cooperative
undertakings. (3) It shall be the duty of any labor organization and
its officers to inform its members on the provisions of its
constitution and bylaws, collective bargaining agreement, the
prevailing labor relations system and all their rights and
obligations under existing labor laws. For this purpose, registered
labor organizations may assess reasonable dues to finance labor
relations seminars and other labor education activities. Any
violation of the above rights and conditions of membership shall
be a ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of
officers from office, whichever is appropriate. At least thirty

percent (30%) of the members of a union or any

member or members specially concerned may report
such violation to the Bureau. The Bureau shall have
the power to hear and decide any reported violation
to mete the appropriate penalty. Criminal and civil
liabilities arising from violations of above rights and
conditions of membership shall continue to be under
the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. VICTORIA V.
INCIONG (1988) Victoria was employed in Far East
Broadcasting Company. He later together with other
employees organized an employees union. They
sought recognition from the company but the latter
maintained that they cannot as they are not under the
scope of the Industrial Peace Act. Despite conciliation
efforts and advise by the NCMB that they cannot be
recognized as the broadcasting company is not
included in the Industrial Peace Act, they staged a
strike. This prompted the company to file for damages
subsequently dismissed from the company and he
alleged that he was illegally dismissed since prior
clearance is needed from the Secretary before the
dismissal of employees or cessation of business.
HELD: Technically speaking, no clearance was
obtained by private respondent from the then
Secretary of Labor, the last step towards full
compliance with the requirements of law on the
matter of dismissal of employees. However, the
rationale behind the clearance requirement was fully
met. The Secretary of Labor was apprised of private
respondent's intention to terminate the services of
petitioner. This in effect is an application for clearance
to dismiss petitioner from employment. The
affirmance of the restrictive condition in the
dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's decision in
NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 by the Secretary of
Labor and the Office of the President of the
Philippines, signifies a grant of authority to dismiss
petitioner in case the strike is declared illegal by the

Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Consequently and as correctly

stated by the Solicitor General, private respondent acted in good
faith when it terminated the employment of petitioner upon a
declaration of illegality of the strike by the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan. Moreover, the then Secretary of Labor manifested his
conformity to the dismissal, not once, but twice. In this regard, the
mandatory rule on clearance need not be applied. The strike
staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then
enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent
company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court
to compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained
since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there
was no necessity on the part of private respondent to show
specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal.
This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as
a union leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the
union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of
law and any deviation LABOR 2 DISINI NOTES (PART 2: LABOR
the legal boundaries shall be imputable to the leader. He bears
the responsibility of guiding the union along the path of law and
to cause the union to demand what is not legally demandable,
would foment anarchy which is a prelude to chaos. Petitioner
should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed
knowledge to the members of the union that employees and
laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the
provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the Court of Industrial
Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of First Instance] has no
jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations
of said non-profit organizations for certification as the exclusive
bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers.
In PAL v. NLRC, it was held that the right exists but the employee
doesnt have the veto power. It just means that the right is
qualified and is not absolute. The right only exists for those

affecting their rights and welfare. Nonetheless, they

dont have the power to veto.
- On March 15, 1985, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL)
completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline.
TheCode was circulated among the employees and
was immediately implemented, and some employees
wereforthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures
embodied therein.- PALEA alleged that copies of the
Code had been circulated in limited numbers; that
being penal in naturethe Code must conform with the
requirements of sufficient publication, and that the
Code was arbitrary,oppressive, and prejudicial to the
implementation of the Code beheld in abeyance; that
PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with
PALEA; that employeesdismissed under the Code be
reinstated and their cases subjected to further
hearing; and that PAL bedeclared guilty of unfair labor
practice and be ordered to pay damages (pp. 7-14,
- Indeed, industrial peace cannot be achieved if the
employees are denied their just participation in
thediscussion of matters affecting their rights. Thus,
even before Article 211 of the Labor Code (P.D. 442)
wasamended by Republic Act No. 6715, it was already
declared a policy of the State: "(d) To promote
theenlightenment of workers concerning their rights
and obligations . . .as employees." This was, of
course,amplified by Republic Act No. 6715 when it
decreed the "participation of workers in decision and
policymaking processes affecting their rights, duties
and welfare." PAL's position that it cannot be saddled
prerogatives as during the formulation of the Code,
Republic ActNo. 6715 had not yet been enacted
(Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 44; Rollo, p. 212),

cannot thus besustained. While such "obligation" was not yet

founded in law when the Code was formulated, theattainment of a
harmonious labor-management relationship and the then already
existing state policy of enlightening workers concerning their
rights as employees demand no less than the observance of
transparency in managerial moves affecting employees' rights.
PAL v. NLRCG.R. No. 85985August 13, 1993Facts:PAL completely
revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated
among the employees and was immediately implemented, and
some employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary
measures embodied therein.The Philippine Airlines Employees
Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). PALEA contended that PAL, by
itsunilateral implementation of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor
practice, specifically Paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and Article
253 of the Labor Code. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had
been circulated in limited numbers; thatbeing penal in nature the
Code must conform with the requirements of sufficientpublication,
and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to the
rights of the employees.It prayed that implementation of the Code
be held in abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the
Code with PALEA; that employees dismissed under theCode be
reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that
PAL bedeclared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to
pay damagesPAL asserted its prerogative as an employer to
prescibe rules and regulations regarding employess' conduct in
carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that by
implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective
bargainingagreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor Code.
Assailing the complaint asunsupported by evidence, PAL
maintained that Article 253 of the Labor Code citedby PALEA
reffered to the requirements for negotiating a CBA which was
negotiated.Issue:W/N the formulation of a Code of Discipline
among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and
the employees.Ruling:Petitioner's assertion that it needed the
implementation of a new Code of Discipline considering the
nature of its business cannot be overemphasized. In fact, its being

a local monopoly in the business demands the most

stringent of measuresto attain safe travel for its
patrons. Nonetheless, whatever disciplinary measures
are adopted cannot be properly implemented in the
absence of full cooperation of the employees. Such
cooperation cannot be attained if the employees are
restive on account, of their being left out in the
determination of cardinal and fundamental matters
affecting their employment
Facts: There was in existence a collective bargaining
agreement between private respondents Associated
Labor Unions and Vassar Industries, Inc. which expired
on May 15, 1977. Prior to such date, 111 of a total
number of 150 employees of such firm disaffiliated
from the former labor organization and formed their
own union. Thereafter, they filed an application for
registration of their union with the Bureau of Labor
Relations, complying with an the requirements of both
the Labor Code and its implementing regulations.
While such application was pending, petitioner Union
filed a petition for certification as bargaining agent for
the rank-and-file employees of the company. The MedArbiter, on May 24, 1977, denied their plea on the
ground that the union was not duly registered with
the Department of Labor. Then came a motion for
reconsideration praying that the dismissal be set
aside until action be taken on its pending application
for registration.
On July 5, 1977, respondent Estrella, then Acting
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied, as
previously noted, the application for registration "on
the ground that there is a registered collective
bargaining agent in the company." Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the refusal of respondent
Francisco L. Estrella, then the Acting Director of the

Bureau of Labor Relations, to register petitioner Vassar Industries

Employees Union was proper
Held: NO. Petitioner Union should be registered, there being no
legal obstacle to such a step and the duty of the Bureau of Labor
Relations being clear in this regard. "Once the fact of disaffiliation
has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a
certification election is the most expeditious way of determining
which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining
In U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers Union v. Noriel,
reference was made to the fact that a notable feature of our
Constitution is that "freedom of association is explicitly ordained;
it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case
in the United States. It can trace its origin to the Malolos
Constitution." In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan
American Employees Association: "There is both a constitutional
and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form
unions to take care of their interests vis-a-viz their employees.
Their freedom to form organizations would be rendered nugatory
if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf
and to bargain for them." It cannot be otherwise, for the freedom
to choose which labor organization to join is an aspect of the
constitutional mandate of protection to labor. Prior to the
Industrial Peace Act, there was a statute setting for the guidelines
for the registration of labor unions.
Furthermore, the Court in Philippine Labor Alliance Council v.
Bureau of Labor Relations held that: "It is indisputable that the
present controversy would not have arisen if there were no mass
disaffiliation from petitioning union. Such a phenomenon is
nothing new in the Philippine labor movement. Nor is it open to
any legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association
explicitly ordained by the Constitution. There is then the
incontrovertible right of any individual to join an organization of
his choice. That option belongs to him. A workingman is not to be
denied that liberty. He may be, as a matter of fact, more in need
of it the institution of collective bargaining as an aspect of

industrial democracy is to succeed. No obstacle that

may possibly thwart the desirable objective of
militancy in labor's struggle for better terms and
conditions is then to be placed on his way. Once the
fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond
doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the
most expeditious way of determining which labor
organization is to be the exclusive bargaining
representative. It is as simple as that."
Singer Sewing Machine vs. Drilon
The respondent union filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of allcollectors of petitioner company. The
company opposed the petition on the ground that the
union members areactually not employees but are
independent contractor based on the collection
agency agreement which theysigned. The respondent
asserted that they perform the most desirable and
necessary activities for the continuousand effective
operations of the business of the petitioner. They
contended that the collectors are employeesbecause
the agent shall utilize only receipt forms authorized
and issued by the company. Monthly collection
quotawas also required by the company.
W/N ER-EE relationship exists between petitioner and
Applying the control test, there is no ER-EE
relationship exists. Hence, if the union members are
notemployees, no right for purposes of bargaining,
nor to be certified as such bargaining agent can ever
berecognized.Not all collecting agents are employees
and neither are all collecting agents independent
contractors. The requirement that collection agents
utilize only receipt forms and report forms issued by
the companyand reports shall be submitted at least

once a week is not necessarily an indication of control over the

means bywhich the job of collection is to be performed. The
monthly collection quota is a normal requirement. It is clear that
the company and each collectingagent intended that the
company take control only over the amount of collection, which is
the result of the jobperformed.No such words as to hire and
employ are present. Moreover, the agreement did not fix an
amount for wagesnor the required working hours. Compensation
is earned only on the basis of the tangible results produced such
asthe total collections made. There is also nothing in the
agreement which implies control by the company over themeans
and methods in achieving the end.Since private respondents are
not employees of the company, they are not entitled to the
constitutionalright to join or form a labor organization for
purposes of collective bargaining.Wherefore, the petition for
certification election is dismissed.
The Secretary, in deciding the dispute between the union and
employer, held that executive secretaries are included in the
bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file employees. HELD:
Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to
join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial
employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions
or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary
manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to
sensitive and highly confidential records. The rationale for this
inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter
might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interests. The union can also become companydominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership. It may likewise be the source of undue advantage
wherein these employees may act as spies for either party to a
collective bargaining activity. Furthermore, in the collective
bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on
the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see
to it that its interest are well protected. The employer is not

assured of such protection if these employees

themselves are union members. Collective bargaining
in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the
same reason that impelled this Court to consider the
position of confidential employees as included in the
disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees were
written in the provision. If confidential employees
could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for
themselves, then they could be governed by their
own motives rather than the interest of the
employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining
would mean the extension of the law to persons or
individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of
the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course
of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that
interest which they are duty-bound to protect
-The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations
(Hon. Cresenciano Trajano) sustained the denial by
the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred
forty-one (141) members of the Iglesia ni Kristo
(INK), all employed in the same company, at a
certification election at which two (2) labor
organizations were contesting the right to be the
exclusive representative of the employees in the
bargaining unit.
-The certification election was authorized to be
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among
the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on
October 20, 1987. The competing unions were the TriUnion Employees Union-Organized Labor Association
in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and
Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services

(TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified

voters, only
240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the
supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the 240
employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK.
The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes
to be cast, of course, for either of the two (2) contending labor
organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably
with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a third choice: NO
The final tally of the votes showed the following results:
1.WON the members of the INC should not be allowed to vote
because they refused to participate in the previous certification
2.WON the NLRC was correct in saying that if the workers who
are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo in the exercise of their
religious belief opted not to join any labor organization as a
consequence of which they themselves can not have a
bargainingART. 242. Rights of legitimate labor organizations. -A
legitimate labor organization shall have the right:
(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of
collective bargaining;

(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of

all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
for purposes of collective bargaining;
(c) To be furnished by the employer, upon written
request, with its annual audited financial statements,
including the balance sheet and the profit and loss
statement, within thirty (30) calendar days from the
date of receipt of the request, after the union has
been duly recognized by the employer or certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit, or within sixty
(60) calendar days before the expiration of the
existing collective bargaining agreement, or during
the collective bargaining negotiation;
(d) To own property, real or personal, for the use and
benefit of the labor organization and its members;
(e) To sue and be sued in its registered name; and
(f) To undertake all other activities designed to benefit
the organization and its members, including
cooperative, housing, welfare and other projects not
contrary to law. Notwithstanding any provision of a
general or special law to the contrary, the income and
the properties of legitimate labor organizations,
including grants, endowments, gifts, donations and
contributions they may receive from fraternal and
similar organizations, local or foreign, which are
actually, directly and exclusively used for their lawful
purposes, shall be free from taxes, duties and other
assessments. The exemptions provided herein may be
withdrawn only by a special law expressly repealing
this provision.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing rubber sandals and oilier rubber
products. In 1985, the Samahang Manggagawa sa

General Rubber Corporation ANGLO was formed by the daily

paid rank and file employees as their union for collective
bargaining, after the expiration on October 15, 1985 of the
collective bargaining agreement previously executed by petitioner
with General Rubber Workers Union (Independent) on October 15,
1982. Be it noted however that on July 17, 1985, the monthly
paid employees of the petitioner-corporation, after forming their
own collective bargaining unit the National Association of Trade
Unions of Monthly Paid Employees-NATU, filed a petition for direct
certification with tile Bureau of Labor Relations which petition was
opposed by herein petitioner. On September 2, 1985, the MedArbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification election
after finding that a certification election is in order in this case
and observing that it is the fairest remedy to determine whether
employees of petitioner desire to have a union or not. On appeal,
the Bureau of Labor Relations denied both the appeal and motion
for reconsideration interposed by petitioner and affirmed the
ruling of the Med-Arbiter. Hence, the present petition, imputing
serious error's of law and grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Bureau of Labor Relations in issuing the assailed order which
sanctioned the creation of two (2) bargaining units within
ISSUE: WON The Bureau of Labor Relations committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that supervisors, employees
perform- ing managerial, confidential and technical functions and
office personnel, who are negotiated by petitioner to be excluded
from the existing bargaining unit because they are performing
vital functions to management, can form and join a labor
organization and be members of the new bargaining unit.
We deem it necessary to examine the respective functions of the
employees. It appears therefrom that they perform supervisory
functions. Verily they make recommendation petitions as to what
Managerial actions to take in disciplinary cases. However, that
fact alone does not make them managerial employees already, It
is more a question of how effective are those recommendations
which aspect has not been clearly established in this case. As
defined in the Labor Code, a "managerial employee is one who is
vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute

management policies and/or to hire, transfer,

suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees, or to effectively recommend such
managerial actions." Thus, employees who do not fall
within this definition are considered rank-and-file
employees.. It has been the policy of the Bureau to
encourage the formation of an employer unit "unless
circumstances otherwise require. The proliferation of
unions in an employer unit is discouraged as a matter
of policy unless there are compelling reasons which
would deny a certain class of employees the right to
self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining,
This case does not fall squarely within the exception.
It is undisputed that the monthlies who are rank-andfile have been historically excluded from the
bargaining unit composed of daily-paid rank-and-filers
that is, since 1963 when the existing rank- and- file
union was recognized. In fact, the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) which expired last 15
October 1985 provides as follows:
Section 1. Appropriate bargaining unit. This
Agreement covers all regular employees and workers
employed by the company at its factory in Malabon,
Metro Manila. The words "employee," "laborer" and
"workers" when used in this Agreement shall be
deemed to refer to those employees within the
bargaining unit. Employees who occupy managerial,
confidential or technical positions, supervisors,
security as wen as office personnel are excluded from
the appropriate bargaining unit (emphasis supplied).
In view of the above, the monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees ran form a union of their own, separate
and distinct from the existing rank-and-file union
composed of daily-paid workers. (Rollo, pp. 1920)
Thus, it can be readily seen from the above findings of
the Bureau of labor Relations that the members of

private respondent are not managerial employees as claimed by

petitioners but merely considered as rank-and-file employees who
have every right to self-organization or to be heard through a duly
certified collective bargaining union. The Supervisory power of the
members of private respondent union consists merely in
recommending as to what managerial actions to take in
disciplinary cases. These members of private respondent union do
not fit the definition of managerial employees which We laid down
in the case of Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez (144
SCRA 628). These members of private respondent union are
therefore not prohibited from forming their own collective
bargaining unit since it has not been shown by petitioner that "the
responsibilities (of these monthly-paid-employees) inherently
require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment as
supervisors" or that "they possess the power and authority to lay
down or exercise management policies." Similarly, he held in the
same case that "Members of supervisory unions who do not fall
within the definition of managerial employees shall become
eligible to loin or assist the rank-and-file labor organization, and if
none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such rank-and-file
Perhaps it is unusual for the petitioner to have to deal with two (2)
collective bargaining unions but there is no one to blame except
petitioner itself for creating the situation it is in. From the
beginning of the existence in 1963 of a bargaining limit for the
employees up to the present, petitioner had sought to
indiscriminately suppress the members of the private
respondent"s right to self-organization provided for by law.
Petitioner, in justification of its action, maintained that the
exclusion of the members of the private respondent from the
bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from forming their own
union was agreed upon by petitioner corporation with the
previous bargaining representatives namely: the General "Rubber
Workers Union PTGWO the General Workers Union NAFLU and
the General Rubber Workers Union (independent). Such posture
has no leg to stand on. It has not been shown that private
respondent was privy to this agreement. And even if it were so, it
can never bind subsequent federations and unions particularly
private respondent-union because it is a curtailment of the right

to self-organization guaranteed by the labor laws.

However, to prevent any difficulty. and to avoid
confusion to all concerned and, more importantly, to
fulfill the policy of the New Labor Code as well as to
be consistent with Our ruling in the Bulletin case,
supra, the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees
should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paidrank-and-file employees of petitioner so that they can
also avail of the CBA benefits or to form their own
rank-and-file union, without prejudice to the
certification election that has been ordered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
FACTS: In the bargaining of knitjoy, the CBA has been
consistently limited to the regular rank and file
employees paid on daily rate basis. The rank and file
paid on a monthly basis were never included within
the scope . Prior to the expiration of the CBA, FF
WORKERS was split into 2 factions.
In the certification election, themonthly paid
employees are excluded. The negotiation is only with
the rank and file employees.
ISSUE: WON there is a violation of ollective right of
employees to self organization.
HELD:yes. The suggested bias of the labor code on
one company one policy must yield to the right of the
employees to form union or associations not contrary
to law, to self organization and to enter into collective
bargaining negotiations.
Pan American World Airways System vs. Pan American
Employees Association
Petitioner herein claims that the one hour meal period
should not be considered as overtime work, because
the evidence showed that complainants could rest
completely, and were not in any manner under the

control of the company during that period. The court below found,
on the contrary, that during the so-called meal period, the
mechanics were required to stand by for emergency work; that if
they happened not to be available when called, they were
reprimanded by the lead man; that as in fact it happened on
many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals
or told to hurry up eating to perform work during this period.
Whether or not the 1 hour meal period of the mechanics is
considered working time.
Yes. The Industrial Courts order for permanent adoption of a
straight 8-hour shift including the meal period was but a
consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of
complete rest but was actually a work hour, since for its duration,
the laborers had to be on ready call.
FACTS: In December 1993, SAMANA BAY (SamahanNg Mga
Manggagawang Nagkakaisa sa Manila BaySpinning Mills and J.P.
Coats) decided to disaffiliatefrom ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist
and GenuineLabor Organization) due to the latters dereliction of
duty to promote the welfare of SAMANA BAY andthe alleged case
of corruption. ANGLO overthrew allofficers of the respondent, and
appointed new set of officers, for non-remittance of federation
dues.ANGLO contended that the disaffiliation was voidsince the
freedom period has not yet set in.
MED ARBITER: Declared the disaffiliation void butmaintained that
the dismissal of officers was illegal;
ON APPEAL TO DOLE: Disaffiliation was VALID,Directed the
Company (Manila Bay Spinning Mills) toremit the dues directly to
SAMANA; MR of ANGLOwas DENIED. SC: Dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the disaffiliation of SAMANA wasvalid.
HELD: Yes.
As a rule, a labor union may disaffiliatefrom the mother union only
within the freedomperiod.

(PD 1391 No petition for certificationelection, for

intervention and disaffiliation shallbe entertained or
given due course except withinthe 60-day freedom
period) However, under
disaffiliation may be carried out bya vote of 2/3 of its
general membership in ameeting duly called for that
purpose to dissolvethe organization.
In addition, with respect to theremoval of the officers,
a local union does not oweits existence to the
federation with which it isaffiliated. Having its own
personality, the mother federation has no license to
act independently of thelocal union. Any act
performed by ANGLO affectingthe interest and affairs
of SAMANA, including theouster of herein individual
private respondent, isrendered without force and
FACTS: Bautista is a union organizer of (ALU)
asscoiated labor organization. He filed his sick leave
but when he returened to work, his services was
terminated. The director ruled that there is no
emplyer-employee relationship.
HELD: YES. The mere fact that the respondent is a
labor union does not mean that it cannot be
considered an employer of the persons who work for
it. Existence of er-ee relationship: the selection and
engagement, power of control with respect to the
means and methods, payment of wages, dismissal.
Case facts: payroll, sss contributions , union hired
him. The petitioner is awarded back wages and
separation pay for there exist er-ee relatyionship
between bautista and ALU.

HELD: After deliberating on the petition and the documents

annexed thereto, We find no merit in the Petition. The public
respondent did not err in dismissing the petitioner's appeal in BLR
Case No. A-12-389-87. This Court's decision in Victoriano vs.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, upholding the right of
members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union
for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the
members of that sect from forming their own union. The public
respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets
of the sect ... should not infringe on the basic right of selforganization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of
religious affiliation." The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a
new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period of the
existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW
ULO, to challenge TUPAS' claim to majority status, by filing a
timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987
before TUPAS' old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before
it signed a new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987. As
pointed out by Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a "certification election is
the best forum in ascertaining the majority status of the
contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely
choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot." Since it
has not been shown that this order is tainted with unfairness, this
Court will not thwart the holding of a certification election.

and Employment but the petition was denied on the

ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit
medical institution, therefore, its employees may not
form, join, or organize a union pursuant to Article 244
of the Labor Code. Private respondent filed a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code.
Pending resolution of the aforesaid petition Batas
Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article
244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even employees
of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to form,
join and organize labor unions of their choice. In the
exercise of such right, private respondent filed
another petition for certification election with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment.

FACTS: The petitioner, Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes
Memorial Foundation, Inc., has a work force of about 350 rank and
file employees, majority of whom are members of private
respondent Alliance of Filipino Workers.

Art. 244. Coverage and employees right to selforganization. All persons employed in commercial,
industrial and charitable, medical or educational
institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall
have the right to self-organizations of their own
choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Ambulant intermittent and itinerant workers, selfemployed people, rural workers and those without
any definite employers may form labor organizations
for the purpose of enhancing and defending their
interests and for their mutual aid and protection.
(underscoring supplied).

On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for

Consent and/or Certification Election with The Ministry of Labor
and Employment. The petitioner opposed the petition on the
ground that a similar petition involving the same issues and the
same parties is pending resolution before the Supreme Court,
Apparently as early as May 10, 1976, private respondent filed a
similar petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor

ISSUE: W/N rank and file employees of non-profit

organization are covered by the right to selforganization
HELD: YES. At the time private respondent filed its
petition for certification election on February 13,
1986, Article 244 of the Labor Code was already
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, to wit:

Under the aforequoted provision, there is no doubt that rank and

file employees of non-profit medical institutions (as herein
petitioner) are now permitted to form, organize or join labor
unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining. Since
private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by
law for calling a certification election (p. 15, Rollo), it was
incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification
election to ascertain the bargaining representative of petitioners
employees .
HELD: As stated for the Court by the now Chief Justice in AG & P
Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. C.I.R., section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act
"explicitly provides that "employees" and this term includes
supervisors "shall have the right to selforganization, and to form,
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining through representations of their
own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or
protection" and that "individuals employed as supervisors ... may
form separate organizations of their own". Indeed, it is well settled
that "in relation to his employer," a foreman or supervisor "is an
employee within the meaning of the Act" ... For this reason,
supervisors are entitled to engage in union activities and any
discrimination against them by reason thereof constitutes an
unfair labor practice."Supervisors and confidential employees,
even though they may exercise the prerogativesof management
as regards the rank and file employees are indeed employees in
relation to their employer, the company which is owned by the
stockholders and bondholders (capital) and should therefore by
entitled under the law to bargain collectively with the top
management with respect to their terms and conditions of
Toyota Motor Phil Corp. Labor Union filed a petition for certification
election with Dept. of Labor, for all rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner Toyota Motor Corp.Petitioner seek the denial of the

holding of thecertification election on 2 grounds: (1)

the union, being process of registration had no legal
personality to filethe same as it was not a legitimate
labor organization atthe time the petition was file; and
(2) that the union wascomposed of both rank-and-file
and supervisoryemployees in violation of the law. The
Med-Arbiterdismissed the petition for certification
election in favorwith the grounds stated by petitioner.
However, onappeal, the Secretary of Labor set aside
the decision of the Me-Arbiter and ordered the holding
of thecertification election contending that the union
wasalready a legitimate labor organization at the time
of thefiling of the petition evidenced by a certificate of
Whether the Secretary of Labor committed
graveabuse of discretion in directing the certification
Held:YES. Petition Granted.
A labor organization composed of both rank-and-file
andsupervisory employees is no labor organization at
all. Itcannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate
labororganization. Not being one, an organization
whichcarries a mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisoryemployees cannot possess any of the
rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the
right to file apetition for certification election for the
purpose of collective bargaining.In the given case, as
respondent union's membership listcontains the
names of at least 27 supervisory employeesin Level
Five positions, the union could not, prior topurging
itself of its supervisory employee members, attainthe
status of a legitimate labor organization. Not
beingone, it cannot possess the requisite personality
to file apetition for certification election. The union's
compositionbeing in violation of the Labor Code's
Prohibition of unionscomposed of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees, itcould not possess the

requisite personality to file forrecognition as a legitimate labor

NOTE: A labor organization composed of both rank and file and
supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot
posses the rights of a legitimate labor organization (Dunlop v. Sec.
of Labor (1998))Supervisors can be an appropriate bargaining
unit. [Dunlop Slazenger v. NLRC (1998)]Why cant supervisors join
a union of rank-and-file? To avoid a situation where supervisors
would merge with the rank and file, or where the supervisors'
labor organization would represent conflicting interests (Dunlop v.
Sec. of Labor (1998)).
Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election
todetermine the exclusive bargaining representative of
respondents bank employees occupying supervisorypositions.
The Bank moved to dismiss on the ground thatsaid supervisory
employees were actuallymanagerial/confidential employees, thus,
they areineligible to join, assist or form a union. The MedArbitergranted the petition and directed the holding of
thecertification election. The Bank appealed to the Secretaryof
Labor. Said court partially granted the appeal ruling thatthe
Department Managers, Assistant Managers, BranchManagers,
Cashiers and Controllers are declaredmanagerial employees and
cannot join the union of thesupervisors
notmanagerial employees but supervisors. Even assumingthat
they are confidential employees, there is no legalprohibition
against confidential employees who are notperforming managerial
functions to form and join a union.A confidential employee is one
entrusted with confidenceon delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or careand protection of the employer's
property. While Art. 245of the Labor Code singles out managerial
employees asineligible to join, assist or form any labor

implication, confidentialemployees

are similarly

collectivebargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Triumph International with which the
latter has a validand existing collective bargaining
agreement effectiveup to September 24, 1989. In
1987, a petition for certification election wasfiled by
the respondent union with the Department of Labor
and Employment. a motion to dismiss the petition for
certificationelection was filed by Triumph International
on thegrounds that the respondent union cannot
lawfullyrepresent managerial employees and that the
petitioncannot prosper by virtue of the contract-bar
rule.But the Labor Arbiter issued an order granting
thepetition for certification election and directing
theholding of a certification election to determine the
soleand exclusive bargaining representative of all
monthly paid administrative, technical, confidential
andsupervisory employees of Triumph International.
Whether or not the public respondent gravely abused
its discretion in ordering the immediate holdingof a
certification election among the workers sought tobe
represented by the respondent union.
Where the supervisory employees sought to
berepresetned by the union are actually NOT
recommendatory powers arenot even instantly
effective since they are subject toreview by at least
three (3) managers (dept. mgr.,personnel mgr. And

general manager), then it is evidentthat these employees doe not

possess managerialstatus.
The fact that their work designations are either managerial or
supervisory is of no moment,considering that it is the nature of
determinestheir respective status.
A careful examination of the records of this case revealsno
evidence that rules out the commonality orcommunity of interest
among the rank-and-file membersof the petitioners, and the
herein declared rank-and-filemembers of the respondent union.
Instead of forminganother bargaining unit, the law requires them
to bemembers of the existing one.
The ends of unionismare better served if all the rank-and-file
memberswith substantially the same interests and whoinvoke
their right to self-organization are part of a single unit so they can
deal with their ER with JUST ONE AND YET POTENT VOICE. The
Eesbargaining power with management is strengthened thereby.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the petitioneris the
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of Triumph International.
o If candidate is proven to be disqualified, it does not mean that
the candidate with 2nd highest number of votes becomes the
elected officer (Manalad v. Trajano (1989)).
FACTS: The parties herein are employees of United Dockhandlers,
Inc. They are members of rival groups in the Associated
PortCheckers and Workers' Union (APCWU for short) in said
company, the petitioners' faction being led by petitioner Ricardo
R.Manalad, with respondent Pablo B. Babula heading the group of
private respondents.From their submissions, it appears that
sometime in 1982, the petitioners were disqualified from running
as candidates in theelection of APCWU officers by the Med-Arbiter.
However, on appeal, said order was set aside by the Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations on October 31, 1984. The
candidates of the petitioners, that is, Manalad, Leano and Puerto,
won over those of the private respondents, who were Babula,
Mijares and Navarro, for the positions of president, treasurer and

auditor,respectively. As a consequence, the latter

group filed a petition for review with this Court
assailing the aforesaid order of October 31, 1984 of
the Bureau of Labor Relations which had declared the
aforesaid petitioners eligible to run for said union
offices. TheSC in a previous case entitled "Associated
Port Checkers and Workers Union, et al. vs. Ricardo R.
Manalad, et al." however declared vacant all positions
and ordered the winners of the elections to stop
acting as officers, and to turn-over all union
funds.Pursuant thereto, the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations issued an order on July 10, 1985 to
the effect that he was takingover the management of
the affairs of said union, ordering private respondents
Babula and all other persons to cease acting
asofficers of the union, and requiring them to turn
over the union funds to said director. Subsequently,
the Court's aforesaidresolution of July 3, 1985 was
modified on July 17, 1985 by providing that the
special election scheduled on July 20, 1985 shallbe
held under the personal supervision of respondent
Director Trajano. Private respondents still won the
elections, despiteattempts from petitioners to have
them disqualified for their alleged refusal to comply
with the resolution of the SC.Director Trajano issued a
resolution proclaiming private respondents as the
electedofficers of APCWU, with the following
observation: "The submission that Mr. Babula failed to
completely turn over managementof the union to the
undersigned is within the competence and authority
of the Supreme Court to pass upon considering that
themandate for such a turn-over came from the
Court.Meanwhile, the three-year term of the private
respondents under the disputed July 20, 1985
elections expired on July 20, 1988.However
petitioners insist that they be declared the winners in
said election (in 1985) with their terms of three (3)

years tocommence from the time they assume office in execution

of a final and executory resolution of the SC.
ISSUE: WON the election of officers should be annulled
HELD: It is pointless and unrealistic to insist on annulling an
election of officers whose terms had already expired. The SC
wouldhave thereby a judgment on a matter which cannot have
any practical legal effect upon a controversy, even if existing,
andwhich, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.We agree
with the petitioners that disobedience to a resolution of this Court
should not be left unpunished. However, before thealleged
disobedient party may be cited for contempt, the allegations
against him should be clearly established. The contentionsof
petitioners, even disregarding some evidential deficiencies, do not
adequately establish the basis for contempt. On thecontrary,
respondents have satisfactorily answered the averments thereon.
At this juncture, it would further be appropriate to remind
petitioners that even if the disqualification of private respondents
couldbe justified, the candidates of petitioners certainly cannot be
declared as the winners in the disputed election. The mere fact
thatthey obtained the second highest number of votes does not
mean that they will thereby be considered as the elected officers
if the true winners are disqualified.
Expulsion Remedy
Remedy against erring union officers is not referendum but union
expulsion.However, re-election of union officers and non-election
of complaining unionmembers is convincing show of faith on
union officers leadership.
EXPULSION REMEDY - If herein union officers were guilty of the
alleged acts imputed, BLR pursuant to Article 242 should have
meted out the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to expel them
from the Union,as prayed for, and not call for a referendum to
decide the issue (Kapisanan v. Trajano (1985)).
Facts: A request for accounts examination of the financial status
of KMP Labor Union (UNION), the existing labor union at Franklin
Baker company in San Pablo City, was filed by Catalino Silvestre

and 13 other employees. Union Account Examiner

Florencio Vicedo from Ministry of Labor and
Employment conducted the necessary investigation.
in the findings, it was found out that there was P1,278
worth of disallowed expenditures (some spent in
picture taking in the zoo, payment for long distance
calls, sound systems, etc.). Catalino et al filed with
the Regional Office of Ministry of Labor and
Employment for the expulsion of union officers on the
ground that they committed gross violation of the
Labor Code (Art. 242) and the constitution and bylaws of the Union.
o Union officers denied the imputation and argued
that the disallowed expenditures were made in good
faith for the benefit of the members, and that they
were willing to reimburse the same from personal
o They also said that they should not be held
accountable for non-production of account books
since the same werent turned over to them. MedArbiter ordered the holding of a referendum to decide
on the issue of whether to expel or suspend the union
officers from their respective positions.
o Union Officers raised their same arguments and
asked that resolution on the issue be held in
o Catalino, on the other hand, claimed that MedArbiter erred in calling a referendum to decide the
issue and reiterated that the appropriate action
should be expulsion of officers. Director Trajano
affirmed the Med-Arbiters decision. Petitioners filed
MR, reiterating their arguments and claiming that in
the general election recently held, all of them (except
Ambrocio dela Cruz and Eliseo Celerio) were elected

by an overwhelming majority, while Catalino and Cesar Alfaro (the

lost. Director Trajano denied the MR.
Issue: Should Director Trajanos orders be SET ASIDE? (YES)
Reasoning: If the union officers are guilty of the imputed acts, in
light of the ruling in Duyag v Inciong, the appropriate penalty is
expulsion from the union and NOT a referendum. The falsification
and misrepresentation of the union officers are not supported by
substantial evidence. Such expenditures appeared to have been
made in good faith and the amount spent for the purpose
mentioned in the report, if concurred in or accepted by the
members, are reasonable.The results of the elections (putting
them again in office and not the respondents) is a convincing
manifestation and demonstration of the union membership's faith
in the herein officers' leadership on one hand and a clear
condonation of an act they had allegedly committed.

In Pascual v Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, the Court said:

When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by
reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will
of the people.
The Court ruled in the negative. The 30%support requirement
needed to report violationsof rights and conditions of union
membership, asfound in the last paragraph of Article 241 of
theLabor Code, is not mandatory.The assent of 30% of the
unionmembers is not a factor in theacquisition of jurisdiction by
the Bureauof Labor Relations is furnished by Article226 of the
same Labor Code, whichgrants original and exclusive

theDepartment of Labor, over "all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor management
relations," making no referencewhatsoever to any
officialsmentioned are given the power to act "on all
inter-union and intra-unionconflicts (1) "upon request
of either or both parties" as well as (2) "at their
When the violation directly affects only oneor two
members, then only one or twomembers would be
enough to report suchviolation.
Free and honest elections are indispensable to the
enjoyment by employees and workers of their
constitutionally protected right to self-organization. If
attended by grave irregularities election should
therefore be declared INVALID (Rodriguez vs Director
FACTS: Petitioners compromise the Executive Board of
Solidbank union, the collective bargaining agent for
the Solidbank Corporation. Private respondents are
members of said union. The unions EB decided to
retain the services of their counsel in connection with
negotiations for a new CBA. A general membership
meeting was called where majority of union members
approved a resolution confirming the decision to
engage the services of the unions counsel, Atty.
Lacsina. The resolution provided that 10% of the total
economic benefits that may be secured be given to
the counsel at attorneys fees. Also it contained an
authorization for Solidbank Corporation to check-off
said attorneys fees the first lump sum of payment of
benefits under the new CBA. Private respondents
issued a complaint for illegal deduction.
ISSUE: W/N the union may check-off attorneys fees.

HELD: No. Article 241 has 3 requisites for the validity of the
special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorneys
fees and representation expenses. They are:
1. authorization by a written resolution of majority of all the
members at the general membership meeting called for the
2. secretarys record of the minutes of the meeting
3. individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the
employees concerned.
Such requirements were not complied with as there were no
individual written check-off authorizations; thus, the employer
cannot legally deduct thus the assessment. The union should be
made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a
lawyers and accordingly, reimbursement should be charged to the
unions general fund or account. No deduction can be made from
the salaries of the concerned employees other than those
mandated by law.
E. MANDATORY ACTIVITY Art. 214: Other than for the mandatory
activities under the Code : nospecial assessment, attorneys fees,
negotiation fees or any otherextraordinary fees may be checked
off from any amount due to an EEwithout an individual written
authorization duly signed by the EE. Judicial process of settling
dispute laiddown by law.
Judicial process of settling disputes laid down by the law. Amicable
settlements cannot be considered as a mandatory activity. ART
241 (o) envisions a situation where there is a judicial or
administrative proceeding for recovery of wages (Vengco v
Trajano (1989)) Note: Article 222 (b) does not except a CBA, later
placed under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its
prohibition. Hence, individual written authorizations for check-offs
are not dispensed with, even if the CBA provides so (Galvadores v
AND SANCTIONS JURISDICTION ART. 241, last paragraph Criminal
and civil liabilities arising from violations of above rights and
conditions of membership shall continue to be under the

jurisdiction of ordinary courts. ART. 226 o The BLR and

the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of
the Department of Labor shall have original and
exclusive authority to act o at their own initiative or o
upon request of either or both parties o on all interunion and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting
labormanagement relations in all workplaces o Except
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
which shall be the subject of grievance procedure
and/or voluntary arbitration.
Facts:1.Sometime in the latter part of 1981, the
Corporation and the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa
Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (FOITAF) entered
into a compromise agreement wherebythe company
will pay to the union members the sum of
P150,000.00 for theirclaims arising from the unpaid
(ECOLA)2.Respondent Emmanuel Timbungco who is
the union president received themoney which was
paid in installments. Thereafter, he distributed the
amountamong the union members. Petitioners
Ambrocio Vengco, Ramon Moises,Rafael Wagas and
80 others (Vengco, et al., for short) who are union
membersnoted that Timbungco was not authorized by
the union workers to get themoney; and that ten
percent (10%) of the P150,000.00 had been deducted
topay for attorney's fees without their written
authorization in violation of Article242(o) of the Labor
Code.3.Vengco, et al. filed a complaint with the
Ministry of Labor praying for: "(1) theexpulsion of
Emmanuel Timbungco as president of the union for
violation of (the) union constitution and by-laws and
the rights and conditions of unionmembers under the
Labor Code; (2) an order to require Timbungco to
renderan accounting of how the P150,000.00 was

distributed; and (3) an order torequire private respondent to

publish in the bulletin board the list of themembers and the
theP150,000.00."4.Timbungco alleged among others, that he was
authorized by a resolutionsigned by the majority of the union
members to receive and distribute theP150,000.00 among the
workers; that the computation of the benefits wasbased on the
payroll of the company; that the ten percent (10%) attorney'sfees
was in relation to the claim of the local union for payment of
emergencycost of living allowance before the Ministry of Labor
which is totally distinct andseparate from the negotiation of the
CBA5.Timbungco was found guilty by the BLR and expelled as
president of theorganization.
Issue: Whether Respondent is guilty of illegally deducting 10%
attorneys fees frompetitioner?
No. The deduction of 10% for attorney's fees is illegal and void
for failure to comply with the
requirements of the law.
-Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code provides: Rights and conditions
of membership in a labor organi-zation. The following are the
rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization.
x x x.
(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other
extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due an
employeewithout an individual written authorization duly signed
by an employee. The authorization should specifically state the
amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
x x x.-It is very clear that attorney's fees may not be deducted or
checked off from any amount due to an employee without his
written consent except for mandatory activities under the Code.
-A MANDATORY ACTICTY has been defined as a judicial process of
settling dispute laid down by the law.-In the instant case, the
AMICABLE SETTLEMENT entered into by the management and the
union CAN NOT be considered as a mandatory activity under the
Code. It is true that the union filed a claim for emergency cost of
living allowance and other benefits before the Ministry of Labor.
But this case never reached its conclusion in view of the parties'

agreement. It is not also shown from the records that

the lawyer was instrumental in forging the said
agreement on behalf of the union Members.
Galvadores v. Trajano
-An individual written authorization of an the
anyassessment can be made against the monetary
benefits awarded to them pursuant to Article 242(o)
of the Labor Code; and that Respondent Counsels
entitlement to attorney's fees should be taken from
Union funds. No check-offs from any amounts due
employees may be effected without individual
writtenauthorizations duly signed by the employee
andbeneficiary of the deduction.The required individual authorizations in this case are
wanting. In fact, petitioner employeesare vigorously
objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite,
besides not being explicit,assumed that there was no
dispute relative to attorney's fees.The benefits awarded to PLDT employees still formed
part of the collective bargainingnegotiations although
placed already under compulsory arbitration. This is
not the"mandatory activity" under the Code which
dispenses with individual written authorizationsfor
check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature. It
is a judicial process of settlingdisputes laid down by
law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a CBA,
later placed undercompulsory arbitration, from the
ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principle should
beborne in mind that employees are protected by law
from unwarranted practices that diminishtheir
compensation without their knowledge and consent
Villar v. Inciong -

It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal

objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by
the Constitution. However, a closed shop is a valid form of union
security, and such provision in a CBA is not a restriction of the
right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges
filed by their coemployees in the local union and after finding
them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of
membership under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the
local union was affiliated. - Recognized and salutary is the
principle that when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it
becomes bound by the laws and regulations of the parent
organization. When a labor union affiliates with a parent
organization or mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior
body, it becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under
whose authority the local union functions. The constitution, bylaws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter it
issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an
enforceable contract between the parent body and the
subordinate union, and between the members of the subordinate
union inter se. - Inherent in every labor union, or any organization,
is the right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union,
therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union;
when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very
union to which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to
remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy. Thus, petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate from their union
and form a new organization of their own, must, however, suffer
the consequences of their separation from the union under the
security clause of the CBA.
4. Effect of Non-registration If not registered union does not
become LEGITIMATE labor organization; hence, CANNOT enjoy
rights and privileges granted under ART. 242 (Sugbuanon Rural
Bank,Inc. v. Laguesma (2000), Protection Technology v. Sec. Of
Labor (1995)).
5. IV. Workers with No Right to Self-Organization MANAGERIAL

assist or form any labor organization. ART. 212 (m)

Managerial employee is one who is vested with
powers or prerogatives: To lay down and execute
management policies and/ or To hire, transfer,
suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline
employees. Sugbuanon Rural Bank vs. Laguesma
(2000) Confidential employees are those who a.
Assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard b. To
persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies [specifically in the field of labor
relations]. The two criteria are cumulative, and both
must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee. NOTE: The managers right to
self-organize is NOT removed, but only limited. It
cannot be a labor organization which has a technical
meaning of its own, being composed of employees
(which excludes managers, as managers are
considered employers under labor relations) and for
the purpose of collective bargaining. Art. 245 of the
Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential
employees from engaging in union activities.
However, under the doctrine of necessary implication,
the disqualification of managerial employees equally
applies to confidential employees RATIONALE:
Employees should not be placed in a position
involving a potential conflict of interests.
FACTS: Sugbuanon Rural Bank employed some 5
supervisory employees. APSOLTEU-TUCP, a legitimate
labor organization, then filed a petition for
certification election of the said supervisory
employees. The bank opposed the petition on the
ground that the supervisory employees were actually
managerial/confidential employees. In addition, the
union was represented in the petition by ALU-TUCP,
and since according to the Bank the latter also sought
to represent the rank and file members, granting the
petition would violate the principle of separation of

ISSUE: Should the petition for certification election be granted, or

HELD: It should be granted. For one, the supervisory employees
cannot be considered managerial or confidential employees.
While the nature of the employees work (evaluating borrowers
capacity to pay, approving loans, scheduling terms of repayment
of the latter, and endorsing delinquent accounts to legal counsel
for collection) indeed constituted the core of the banks business,
their functions did not fall within the definition of either a
managerial employee (lay down and execute management
policies related to labor relations) or a confidential employee
(they did not act in a confidential capacity to persons who
formulate and execute management policies related to labor
relations). Secondly, granting the petition would not be violative
of the separation of union doctrine. The petition for certification
election was filed by APSOTEU-TUCP, a legitimate labor
organization. True, it was assisted to some extent by ALU and the
national federation TUCP. However, APSOTEU-TUCP had separate
legal personality from ALU and TUCP, under the principle that a
local union maintains its separate legal personality despite
affiliation with a national federation.
Therefore in the absence of the specific provision of law
prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of the arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed
vested with plenary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
FACTS:The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc. (FORMEY),
formed a local union known as PambansangKapatiran ng mga
Anak Pawis sa Formey Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of
the National WorkersBrotherhood (NWB). They ratified their
Constitution and By-Laws on 4 April 1993.On 22 April 1993
KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for Certification Election alleging that
there was no existing andeffective CBA between FORMEY and any

union; neither was there any recognized union within

the company.FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition
while Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI)
intervened andlikewise moved to dismiss on the
ground that there was already a duly registered CBA
covering period Jan. 1,1992 to Dec. 31, 1996,
therefore the contract bar rule will apply.KAPATIRAN
opposed both motion to dismiss claiming that the CBA
fraudulently registered with the DOLE and that it was
defective since what was certified as bargaining
agentwas KAMAPI which as federation only served as
mere agent of the local union and without any legal
personalityto sign in behalf of the latter.Med-Arbiter
found that there is a valid and existing CBA between
FORMEY and KAMAPI which effectivelybarred the filing
for petition for certification election. KAPATIRAN
appealed imputing grave abuse of discretion tothe
Med-Arbiter in applying the contract bar rule.
Secretary of Labor upheld the decision of MedArbiter.KAPATIRAN filed a motion for reconsideration
which was likewise denied.ISSUES:1. Whether or not
the petition for certification election was properly
filed.2. Whether or not there was a valid CBA between
FORMEY and KAMAPI.HELD:1. No, the petition for
certification election was not properly filed. The CBA
entered into between FORMEYand KAMAPI was made
effectively Jan. 1, 1992 and will expire Dec. 31, 1996.
The petition forcertification election was filed on April
22, 1993 which was filed before the so-called 60-day
freedomperiod.2. Yes, the court affirmed that there
was a valid CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI. Art.
253-A of the labor code provides that no petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent
shall be entertained and no certification election shall
be conducted by the DOLE outside the 60-dayperiod
immediately before the date of expiry of such 5 year
term of the CBA.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 15

August1993 sustaining the order of the Med-Arbiter dated 31 May
1993 is AFFIRMED
In February 1990, M. Greenfield, Inc. (MGI), through its officers
Saul Tawil, Carlos Javelosa, and Renato Puangco began
terminating employees. The corporation closed down one of their
plants and so they said they have to retrench the number of
employees. Consequently, the Malayang Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG-UWP) filed an illegal
dismissal case against MGI. The National Labor Relations
Commission, chaired by Cresencio Ramos, ruled against the
union. But on appeal, the decision of the NLRC was reversed and
the corporation was ordered, among others, to pay the
employees backwages. The union further appealed as they
contend that the officers of the corporation should be held
solidarily liable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the officers of the corporation should be
held solidarily liable.
HELD: No. A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality
separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and,
in general from the people comprising it. The rule is that
obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its
directors, officers and employees are its sole liabilities. There is no
question that MGI is guilty of illegal dismissal but the officers
cannot be held solidarily liable.
Its true that theres a plethora of illegal dismissal cases where
the SC made corporate officers personally liable but these cases
usually involve corporate officers who acted in bad faith in
illegally dismissing employees. Corporate directors and officers
may be solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of
employment of corporate employees if the same is done with
malice or in bad faith.
A petition for certification election was filed by privaterespondents
Kampil-Katipunan on behalf of the supervisors union, a union

where the supervisory,administrative personnel,

production, accounting andconfidential employees of
the petitioner were affiliated.Petitioner opposed the
petition on the ground that KampilKatipunan cannot
represent the supervisory employees forthe purpose
of collective bargaining because said KampilKatipunan
also represents the rank-and-file employeesunion. The
Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of theprivate
Laboraffirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter.
Petitioner nowargue that to allow the supervisory
employees to affiliatewith the Kampil Katipunan is
tantamount to allowing thecircumvention of the
principle of the separation of unions under Art. 245
of the Labor Code.
Whether a local union of supervisory employeesmay
be allowed to affiliate with a national federation of
labor organizations of rank-and-file employees for
purposeof CBA?
Held:NO. Petition Granted
We agree with the petitioner's contention that a
conflict of interest may arise in the areas of discipline,
collectivebargaining and strikes. Members of the
disciplinary measures againsttheir co-member rankand-file employees.Under
Article 245 of the Labor Code
as amended byRep. Act No. 6715 provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to
joinany labor organization: right of supervisory
employees. Managerial employees are not eligible
to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employeesshall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-andfile employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.
The Court construes Article 245 to mean that
supervisorsshall not be given an occasion to bargain

together with therank-and-file against the interests of the

employerregarding terms and conditions of work. Thus, if the
intentof the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors
wouldmerge with the rank and-file or where the supervisors'labor
organization would represent conflicting interests,then a local
supervisors' union should not be allowed toaffiliate with the
national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that
federation actively participatesin union activity in the company.
A local union of supervisory employees may be allowed to affiliate
with a national federation of labor organizations of rank and file
employees. What the law prohibits is that supervisory employees
join a rank and file union. The national federation would be
representing the respective interests of the 2 groups separately.
Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may form separate organizations of their own.
Affiliation by a duly registered local union with a national union or
federationdoes not make the local union lose its legal personality.
Furthermore,notwithstanding affiliation, the local union remains
the basic unit to serve thecommon interest of all its members.
Locals remain the basic units of association, free to serve their
own and the common interest of all. Inclusion of FFW in the
registration is merely to stress that they are its affiliates at the
time of registrations. It does not mean that said local unions
cannot stand on their own. Affiliation does not mean they lost
their own legal personality.
Right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is wellsettled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association,
is free to serve the interest of all its members including the
freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is

consistent with the constitutional guarantee of

freedom of association.
FACTS:-Volkschel Labor Uniion was once affiliated
with ALUMETAL.- Both Volkschel and Alumetal entered
into a CBA.-They agreed that ALUMETAL will apply
payroll deductions twice a month on the members of
the UNION as membership dues and other fees/fines,
as may be duly authorized by the UNIONAND ITS
MEMBERS. They called this check-off authorization.Subsequently, a majority of Volkschels members
decided to disaffiliate from ALUMETAL in order to
operate on its own as an independent labor group,
pursuant to * Art. 241 of the Labor Code. Moreover,
the same want to revoke their check-off authorization
in favour of ALUMETAL.- On the other hand, ALUMETAL
assailed that the disaffiliation is contrary to law and
themembers are still obliged to pay their dues.
1. Can a local union like Volkschel disaffiliate from its
mother union likeALUMETAL?2.
2. Should the local union still pay union membership
dues even upon disaffiliation from itsmother union?
HELD:YES. A local union, being a separate and
voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of
all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate.
This right is consistent withconstitutional guarantee of
2.NO. The obligation of an employee to pay union
dues is coterminous with his affiliation/membership.
*ART. 241 of the Labor Code Incumbent affiliates of
existing federations or national unions may disaffiliate
for the purpose of joining a federation ornational
union in the industry or region in which is properly
belongs or for the purpose of operating as an
independent labor group.

Petitioners were regular and permanent employees of the

Manggagawa ng Occidental Foundry Corporation-Federation of
Free Workers (SAMAHAN) and the OFC entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). The agreement provides that a
union member who fails to retain a membership of good standing
may be dismissed by the employer upon written request by the
union. Pursuant to this provision, herein petitioners were
dismissed from employment on the ground of failure to retain
membership in good standing. It was later on found out that the
dismissal was due to an intra-union squabble arising out of the
attempt by the petitioners to oust the elected union officials.
Upon knowledge of their dismissal, petitioners volunteered to be
admitted as members of the Federation of Democratic Labor
Unions (FEDLU) who represented them before the DOLE in the
complaint for illegal dismissal against the company, SAMAHAN
and FFW.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners failed to maintain membership
in good standing by committing acts of disloyalty against
Held:No. Petitioners sought the help of the FEDLU only after they
had learned of the termination of their employment. Their alleged
application with federations other than the FFW can hardly be
considered as disloyalty to the SAMAHAN, nor may the filing of
such applications denote that petitioners failed to maintain in
good standing their membership in the SAMAHAN. The SAMAHAN
is a different entity from FFW, the federation to which it belonged.
Neither may it be inferred that petitioners sought disaffiliation
from the FFW for petitioners had not formed a union distinct from
that of the SAMAHAN. Parenthetically, the right of a local union to
disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision in the
federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is
legal. Such right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association. As to the propriety of the dismissal, the
court said that while it is true that the CBA between OFC and the
SAMAHAN provided for the dismissal of employees who have not
maintained their membership in the union, the manner in which
the dismissal was enforced left much to be desired in terms of
respect for the right of petitioners to procedural due process.

SAMAHAN did not conduct any investigation and

hearing where petitioners could have defended
themselves. Moreover, the company summarily
dismissed petitioners upon request of the union
officers without conducting their own investigation.
Facts: On May 17, 1964, thirty-two (32) out of the
thirty-six (36) members of the local union,
LibertyCotton Mills Union, disaffiliated themselves
from respondent PAFLU in accordance with Article X,
onUnion Affiliation, of the local union's Constitution
resolution of disaffiliation on May 25, 1964 and
immediately informedthe respondent company on
May 27, 1964 that the disaffiliation was null and void
and that it is taking overthe administration of the
local union in dealing with the management. Two days
later, on May 29, 1964,PAFLU advised the company
that the petitioner workers, who were among those
who signed thedisaffiliation resolution, were expelled
from their union membership in the mother federation
because theywere found guilty of acts unbecoming of
officers and members of the union and disloyalty to
disaffiliation, and at the same time requested for their
dismissal. On May30, 1964, the company terminated
the employment of the petitioner workers pursuant to
the Maintenanceof Membership provision of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.In the 1975 case,
the Court's decision, among others, limited the
liability of the respondent company(Liberty Cotton
Mills Inc.) to the immediate reinstatement of the
workers (petitioners herein) and directedrespondent
PAFLU to pay the petitioner workers the equivalent of
three (3) years backwages withoutdeduction or

Issue: Whether or not respondent company Liberty Cotton Mills

Inc. should be equally liable with PAFLUfor the payment of
Held: YesRatio: Respondent company is equally liable for the
payment of backwages for having acted in bad faithin effecting
the dismissal of the individual petitioners. Bad faith on the part of
the respondent companymay be gleaned from the fact that the
petitioner workers were dismissed hastily and summarily. At best,
itwas guilty of a tortious act, for which it must assume solidary
liability, since it apparently chose tosummarily dismiss the
workers at the union's instance secure in the union's contractual
undertaking thatthe union would hold it "free from any liability"
arising from such dismissal.
This is the resolution of the MR filed by Liberty Cotton Mills
Workers Union praying for immediate reinstatement and
declaring a solidary liability on payment of backwages by Liberty
CottonInc., and PAFLU.
Doctrine: The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the
employer. However, this is not withoutlimitations. The employer is
bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his
employeesespecially so when it is made upon the request of a
labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process
must be observed indismissing an employee because it affects
not only his position but also his means of livelihood.Employers
should therefore respect and protect the rights of their
employees, which include the right tolabor.