Volume 14, Number 1

April 2008

International Association for Political Science Students

 POLITIKON
The IAPSS Journal of Political Science

Volume 14 Number 1
April 2008

ISSN 1583-3984

2
 Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science

Editor in Chief
Klavdija Pojbic IAPSS Vice-Chairperson

Editorial Board

Andrea Amici Adrien Jahier Mehmet Ozkan

Università Roma III Université de Toulouse I Univeristy of Linkoping
Italy France Sweden

Advisory Board

Birol Akgun Milan Brglez Cristina Dogot

Selcuk University University of Ljubljana University of Oradea
Turkey Slovenia Romania

Theodore Chadjipadelis Hasan Kosebalaban

Aristotle University of Thessaloniki Lake Forest College
Greece Illinois - USA

Edmé Domínguez Sergiu Gherghina Laura Herta

Gotheborgs University CEU Babes-Bolyai University
Sweden Hungary Romania

Dessislava Gavrilova Giannis Papageorgiou

CEU Aristotle University of Thessaloniki,
Hungary Greece

Politikon is the academic journal of the International Association for Political Science Students
(IAPSS). It is recognized as one of the leading academic journals publishing the work of students from
across the fields of political science and international relations. Founded in 2001, the journal is
published twice yearly and distributed in hard copy and online to more than 10,000 IAPSS members
in more than 40 countries on every continent, as well as outside the IAPSS network. Politikon
publishes the best in undergraduate and graduate student scholarship from around the world. The
peer-review and refereeing process involves full Professors, leading academics and experts from
across the world and abstracts from Politikon are included in the International Political Science
Association s (IPSA) Annual International Political Science Abstracts.

3
 Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science

Volume 14 Number 1 – April 2008

Contents

Foreword International community under microscope.

KLAVDIJA POJBIC 7

Paper At the down of a new order: hegemonism as the landmark of an

evolving international system.
TURKHAN SADIGOV 9

Paper Clash or alliance. Civilizations and their meaning in political conflicts.

NINA-BIRKE GLONNEGGER 29

Paper The approach of moderate constructivism towards the international

regimes.
VALDRIN GRAINCA 47

Paper Understanding the EU democratic deficit . A two dimension concept on

a three level-of-analysis.
DORIAN JANO 61

Paper Minority rights in world politics: group or individual rights?

CORINA REBEGEA 75

Book Review Norms of liberty. A perfectionist basis for non perfectionist

politics.
LUCIAN BOGDAN (Book of DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN) 87

Book Review The Romanian revolution of December 1989.

MILENA MARIN (Book of PETER SIANI-DAVIES) 91

4
Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No 1, 7-8

The international community under microscope

Klavdija Pojbic
Editor in Chief, Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science
klavdija.pojbic@iapss.org

Dear reader,

The present Number critically evaluates different aspects of the international

community, from foreign policy questions over international regimes and
European Union to minority rights in world politics.

It seems that 9/11 had more effect on the international community than any
other contemporary occurrence. Turkhan Sadigov, Master in International
Relations and European Studies, in his article At the Dawn of a New Order:
Hegemonism as the Landmark of an Evolving International System
argues that the developments within NATO and other institutional mechanisms
of the transatlantic interaction, triggered by September 11th, give grounds to
qualify the latter as the latest order-scale breaking point , and that American
strategies toward European partners and transatlantic arrangements, adopted
in the post-9/11 order, testify to the hegemonic nature of the emerging
international order. In order to contribute to the realist-institutionalist and
unilateralist-multilateralist debate, the author s analysis builds on the
fundamental theoretical frameworks of international order by Robert Gilpin and
John Ikenberry. Applying both theoretical frameworks to the institutional
arrangements of the transatlantic relations of the post-Cold War period, the
research highlights the qualitative changes of international order, resulting from
the events of September 11th, thus instituting the latter as a breaking point in
the wake of which the order took a hegemonic shape.

Nina-Birke Glonnegger, Master in International and European Relations, in her

Clash or Alliance: Civilizations and their Meaning in Political Conflicts
also stresses the importance of 9/11 for a political science discourse. The
author believes that Huntington s Clash of Civilizations theory gained new
topicality through actual events in the political world climate against the
background of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The article aims to
evaluate Huntington s theory within the context of actual political events in the
field of international relations.

Another aspect of the international community are international regimes.

Valdrin Grainca, a student of Master on International and European Relations,
presents The Approach of Moderate Constructivism towards
International Regimes. The article adapts a theoretical approach toward
explanations of international regimes. Since the author estimates liberal
institutionalism as the leading perspective on international regimes, his article
defies its main theoretical foundations rather Prisoner s Dilemma and Market

5
Failure and rates these explanations as not convincing. Therefore he turns to
the moderate constructivism by arguing that this perspective can provide better
explanations by focusing on identity theory, which argues that the strength of
international regimes depends on the identity of states.

Dorian Jano focuses on another challenge of a democratic international

community democratic deficit. In his Understanding the EU democratic
deficit : A two-dimension concept on a three level-of-analysis author
argues that divergences among the scholars emanate from the methodological
and the conceptual difficulties that the concept itself has, when applied to the
case of EU. Given the lack of a common ground for understanding the EU
democratic deficit debate the author proposes an all-inclusive model
Democratic Deficit Space ) of how to understand the EU democratic deficit
arguments in the enormous already existing literature.

In the last article Corina Rebegea, Master in Human Rights, elaborated on this
issue in the article Minority Rights in World Politics: Group or Individual
Rights? Author presents minority rights as a very sensitive issue for the
international community in the context of the recognition and protection
afforded to human rights and argues that as the only internationally recognized
rights-holders are the states, the recognition of minority groups as rights-
holders would challenge the established principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity and statehood. Consequently, she argues, minority rights are
constructed through international and regional documents from an
individualistic perspective in order to project a certain notion of citizenship,
sovereignty, nationhood or autonomy.

The articles give a great theoretical and practical insight into specific fields of
international political science, which hopefully will prove value-added to your
studies and interests.

****

For the first time Politikon presents book reviews.

Lucian Bogdan, a Ph.D. student in Contemporary History reviewed Norms of

Liberty. A Perfectionist Basis for Non-perfectionist Politics by Douglas B.
Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl.

Milena Marin, a student of the Interdisciplinary Master in East European

Research and Studies reviewed The Romanian Revolution of December
1989 by Peter Siani-Davies.

Enjoy your reading!

6
Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No 1, 9-26

At the down of a new order:

hegemonism as the landmark
of an evolving international system.
Turkhan Sadigov
turkhans@yahoo.com

The aim of this article is to analyze the continuity and change in

the evolution of American order in the post-Cold War period.
Puzzled by the relative disregard of commensurate conceptual
analysis of the effects of the dramatic events of September 11th on
the evolution of the international order, in this work I consider the
ways that the international order evolution has taken as a result of
the terrorist attacks. Engaging in an analysis from the perspective
of the transatlantic relations and striving to contribute to the
realist-institutionalist and unilateralist-multilateralist debate, my
analysis builds on the fundamental theoretical frameworks of
international order by Robert Gilpin and John Ikenberry. Applying
both theoretical frameworks to the institutional arrangements of
the transatlantic relations of the post-Cold War period, the
research highlights the qualitative changes of international order,
resulting from the events of September 11th, thus instituting the
latter as a breaking point in the wake of which the order took a
hegemonic shape

Introduction

It is already a common place to speak about the events of September 11, 2001
as the latest turning point of historical importance. However, while many
scholarly works implicitly or explicitly underline the critical nature of changes
engendered by the terrorist attacks, they tend to define their arguments in very
narrow terms, considering for instance a set of interstate relations (Friedberg,
2002) or various policy areas (Gormley, 2002). Thus, the gap exists between
the revolutionary scope of the development and narrower approaches to its
analysis.

While attempting to fill this gap, this article approaches the events of
September 11th from the perspective of international order. American foreign
policy and specifically its transatlantic dimension is the decisive area to look at.
The very unprecedented scope of the US power, enjoying supremacy virtually in
every aspect of social life, enables it to develop and sustain an international
order. On the other hand, the transatlantic relations stand at the center of the
American order-building efforts, for the very potential of Europe to influence the
central place of Washington in the international system.

7
The aftermath of the terrorist attacks on America witnessed considerable
weakening of the transatlantic ties unlike for the turbulent post-Cold War
decade. The souring of the US-EU relations in the wake of 9/11 developed in a
clear contrast to the Euro-Atlantic ties in previous periods. The tide of problems
triggered by the developments in Afghanistan, Iraq and in a number of policy
areas has shaken transatlantic consensus, animating the long-standing debate
between unilateralism and multilateralism and the wider debate between
realism and institutionalism1 in the US foreign policy discourse. While the post-
Cold War order was marked by transatlantic disputes over the perception of
power, force, stability and other broad issues (Kagan, 2003), these
disagreements, according to John Ikenberry, within 1991 2001, had no
negative impact on the further development of the American international
order, based on the wider shared constitutional principles (Ikenberry, 2001).
However, all this harmony changed after 9/11 that brought about crucial
reorientation of the US strategies. Noting this, can we speak about the (post-)
September 11th world as an instance of the new international order? And if the
change has indeed occurred, then what is the nature of the American order in
the wake of the new historic breaking point 2 represented by 9/11?

In this article I argue that firstly, the developments within NATO and other
institutional mechanisms of the transatlantic interaction, triggered by
September 11th, give grounds to qualify the latter as the latest order-scale
breaking point ; and secondly that American strategies toward European
partners and transatlantic arrangements, adopted in the post-9/11 order,
testify to the hegemonic nature of the emerging international order, albeit of its
weak modification.

I begin the article by placing the American order-building strategy into the
context of multilateralism/institutionalism unilateralism/realism debate,
developing it into a more concise discussion within constitutional theory -
hegemonic stability spectrum, thus creating a framework for the subsequent
analysis. Next, I discuss American strategy throughout post-Cold War period,
noting a qualitative difference between the 1991-2001 American order and that
of the post-9/11 period, thus establishing the latter as a new breaking point 3.

1
In my article I equate unilateralism with realist paradigm and multilateralism with the institutional
image of international relations. Though the legitimate concerns may be expressed about the
adequacy of this equation, the underlying logic of both unilateralism and multilateralism gives
ground to draw parallels with realist-institutionalist debate, which will be shown in the first section
of the article.
2
The term breaking point is borrowed from Adam Bronstone (1997). In this work, the concept of
breaking point closely relates to change , with the latter meaning the qualitative shift in the
governing arrangements among a group of states, including basic rules, principles, and institutions
of the order (see Ikenberry, 45) and the former a point that introduces change , delineating one
international order from the other.
3
In accounting for the nature of post-war orders, according to Ikenberry two variables should be
employed: first, the basic characteristics of orders in managing power disparities and second, the
strategies that the leading power employs to create the order (see Ikenberry, 21-22).
8
And finally I concentrate on the main features of the American post-9/11
strategy, arguing that it basically represents an instance of the hegemonic
order-building practice.

Framing the debate

The very scope of the American preponderance in world politics throughout the
20th and beginning of the 21st century, complemented by the historic experience
of breaking away with isolationism, and thus embracing only internationalism,
induced the debate between unilateralists and multilateralists over the most
expedient ways of the projection of this preeminent US power in world politics.
Moreover, this debate is echoed by a general realist-institutionalist dispute in
international relations discipline. A set of policy issues, which the debate is
revolving around are: the ways of assuring the longevity of American
hegemony and broadly, mechanisms of advancing American national interests;
advisability of either short- or long-term returns to power ; capability of the
American power in addressing global problems.

While arguing for the central role of the American hegemony as a guarantor of
the stability of international order, unilateralists stand for Washington s freedom
of action in its engagement policies, echoing realist perception of power
maximization. They believe that while diminishing returns to the dominant
power weaken American positions, unfettered projection of power gives more
margins of the choice and the tailoring of successful policies to prevent
unfavorable developments. On the other hand, as the power, underpinning
international stability, the United States is said to have certain custodial
obligations; it cannot afford to be constrained by rules and institutions (Patrick,
2002, 15). This orientation to the short-term gains is closely tied with negative
perception of institutions, rules, obligations and other binding commitments.
Unlike multilateralists, unilateralists perceive power calculation as the sole
guiding principle of the foreign policy, fearing that foreign commitments could
lead to the political engagement that is devastating to the American national
interests.

Contrary to the unilateralists, multilateralists assume a broader room for

maneuver, emanating from the consensual engagement and self-restraint.
Thus, they argue that by providing mechanisms to resolve differences
coordinate action, and monitor and enforce commitments (Patrick, 2002, 10),
multilateral frameworks expand the specter of the hegemon s alternatives
rather than constrain them. Therefore, multilateralists like institutionalists,
argue for the greater employment of international institutions, rules,
transnational regimes and other frameworks finding unilateralist skepticism
premature. Multilateralists argue that as a result of the employment of the
institutional and other forms of cooperative power projection, the leading state
wins the minds of allies and challengers, thus raising the legitimacy of its
domination.

Of course, each of the debating approaches also has its own vision of the
international order. A more focused analysis enables to sort out two interrelated
9
theoretical frameworks of international order, specifically constitutional theory
of John Ikenberry and hegemonic stability of Robert Gilpin (Gilpin, 1981), each
representing one of the debating parties, laying out a more focused take on the
questions posed. Both Gilpin and Ikenberry approach international order from
the standpoint of change in its functioning, at the same time complementing
each other: while Gilpin concentrates on the decline of order, Ikenberry s focus
is on the emerging order. At the same time, hegemonic stability underpins one
of the three types of Ikenberry s international order gradation (Ikenberry,
2001, 23-29). According to this gradation, while hegemonic and constitutional
theories exhibit opposite poles of the spectrum of order-building efforts, they
have a middle ground: weak constitutional orders can develop into hegemonic
order, and vice versa (Ikenberry, 2001, 49). This gives an opportunity to
develop a flowing gradation of orders and, thus, account for the much broader
instances of international phenomena.

The focus of Ikenberry s analysis is the fundamental problem of devising and

maintaining a stable and legitimate order (Ikenberry, 2001, 4)4. He argues that
the best place to analyze the problem is to turn to the rare historic junctures
after major wars, when states are grappling with fundamental questions of
order (Ikenberry, 2001, xiii). While the end of the war ruins the old system and
leaves the world politics in a state of huge power disparities between winners
and losers, the leading state has a fundamental task of creating a stable5 and
legitimate order. From a set of alternatives available, Ikenberry argues that the
best way of handling this task is the strategic restraint , underpinned by
institutions, on the part of the hegemon, which this way earns legitimacy for its
new order. He defines this kind of modest order as constitutional.

According to Ikenberry (Ikenberry, 2001, 30-32), there are three fundamental

characteristics of a constitutional order. First, there is a broad agreement about
the basic rules of the game . Both leading state and minor powers engage into
the order willfully, as they see clear advantages of this type of order to their
specific set of interests (positive sum game). Second, institutions and
procedures, with substantial independent voice and growing influence ( high
returns to institutions ) are established, which ensure the indiscriminate
exercise of power. In consensual order the leading state engages into strategic
restraint , employing institutional mechanisms that set effective restraints on its
own power and simultaneously bind minor powers to the institutional
procedures. And, finally, these institutional arrangements should be rooted in
the wider political context, which makes them difficult to retract.

4
According to Ikenberry Order refers to the governing arrangements among a group of states,
including its basic rules, principles, and institutions. Political order is created when these basic
governing arrangements are put in place, and the political order is threatened or broken apart when
these arrangements are overturned, contested, or in disarray (Ikenberry, 2001, 23). Moreover,
change in these governing arrangements embrace not every rule or principle, but only basic rules,
or rules of the game (Ikenberry, 2001, 23).
5
The definition of stability in Ikenberry is closely tied to the understanding of order and means the
ability of political order to contain and overcome disturbances to order and ability to handle
internal and external forces that encroach on the foundations of order (Ikenberry, 2001, 45).
10
Moreover, a constitutional order embraces various types, from weak to strong
institutionalism. The strength of this order hinges on the degree that the
binding mechanisms of power restraint play a central role within the order. The
stronger the legitimacy of rules, rights and protections are and the more they
get institutionalized and generally observed , the stronger the constitutional
order grows (Ikenberry, 2001, 36). The weak constitutional order exhibits, on
the contrary, tendency to limit and often negate central role of binding
mechanisms. This creates the possibility of development of order into the
hegemonic one (Ikenberry, 2001, 28) that, as I will argue later, was the case
with the weak constitutionalism of the post-Cold War world, which developed
after 9/11 into the weak hegemonic order. In this case, there is a conceptual
bridge between various types of order in Ikenberry s analysis, and between his
constitutional theory and Gilpin s hegemonic stability.

Taking for granted the realist perceptions of states as rational profit maximizing
actors, Gilpin argues that order is created by the hegemonic state, whose
power preponderance renders system stable. Striving to further its gains,
according to hegemonic stability, a leading power fashions the order in the way
that best suites its interests of power maximization (thus embracing the
unilateralist logic). It provides both threats and benefits to ensure the
participation of weaker states in the systemic arrangements that favor its
interests. However, as a result of economic, technological and military changes,
the hegemon loses its power preponderance, while other states gain in their
power relative to that of the leading state. As a result, a disjuncture between
the existing social system and the redistribution of power (Gilpin, 1981, 9)
creates an incentive for discontent actors to seek to alter the order, leading to
hegemonic war the consequences of which reflect the new distribution of power.

An interesting theoretical issue is that hegemonic orders can run a broad way
from weak to strong modifications (Ikenberry, 2001, 26-27), forming a
spectrum of strength . The strong hegemonic order is built around direct
coercion, embodying a hierarchical logic of strict subordination. On the
contrary, in the weak modifications of hegemonic order, hierarchical power
relations and political authority are established by the rule of law (Ikenberry,
2001, 26) and come very close in its operational logic to the weak
constitutional orders (Ikenberry, 2001, 28).

Continuity and change in the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War

period.

The American order throughout 1990s was generally marked by a constitutional

logic, championed by the engagement and enlargement doctrine of the Clinton
administration (Clinton, 1996,
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm). For the
reasons mentioned previously, the research focuses on the transatlantic ties to
assess US foreign policy for the period under discussion. Thus, initially the US
substantially strengthened, in comparison to previous years, its institutional ties
with the European Union by signing the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and
the Joint Action Plan (JAP) in 1995. On the other hand, as the basic pillar of
11
transatlantic institutional security cooperation, NATO has not only preserved its
existence, but also entered an era of expansive readjustment and evolution.
These developments rendered neorealist worries obsolete and expanded the
agenda of transatlantic relations on the new institutional basis.

However, the analysis of the post-Cold War international order shows that the
evolution of institutional developments has been marked by ambiguity and half-
heartedness, which was apparent both regarding the implications of NTA and
JAP and subsequent evolution of NATO. The close examination of the afore-
mentioned institutions, underpinning transatlantic relations for the 1991-2001
period shows that in each case one of the three fundamental characteristics of
constitutional order was absent, thus rendering the post-Cold War American
order constitutional, albeit of its weak modification.

In the wake of 9/11, the American order has dramatically changed its
underlying logic. A weak constitutional order could not manage to absorb a
major shock that has shaken the underpinnings of the international order. As a
result, all three features of constitutional order lost their credibility, with the
American order taking a brand new shape in the post-9/11 period. While the
end of (a weak) constitutionalism of the post-Cold War order in this situation is
at hand, this makes September 11th the latest order-scale turning point of
international relations.

NAT / JAP

On December 3, 1995 at the Summit in Madrid transatlantic partners signed the

NAT / JAP, which became the most important transatlantic arrangement besides
the NATO alliance (Bail, et. al., ix). While the very fabric of the Agenda and the
Plan and their implications for the creation of more robust, consensual
transatlantic relations are substantial, the lack of meaningful institutional
provisions, underpinning the implementation of the documents have, rendered
them inefficient. While the development shows the lack of one of the substantial
elements of the constitutional orders (strong institutional mechanisms that
effectively lower the returns to power), the same development testifies to the
weak nature of the American post-Cold War order.

The treaty generally meets two out of three basic features of constitutional
orders. Thus, it sets four major goals for the EU-US relations: promoting peace
and stability, democracy and development around the world; responding to
global challenges; contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer
economic relations; building bridges across the Atlantic. This framework signals
the resolve of both parties to engage in mutually cooperative order building-
relations, setting the agreement about basic rules of the game between the
parties.

On the other hand, NAT / JAP also testify to the will of parties to support a
wider political context, which makes their institutional cooperation more robust.
First, both parties recognize the importance of the construction of a new
European security architecture in which NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE and the Council
12
of Europe have complementary and mutually reinforcing roles to play
(European Commission, 2001,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/new_transatlantic_agenda),
thus marking a favorable political context for institutional arrangements.

At the same time, the treaties do not introduce credible institutional

mechanisms to ensure the implementation of its provisions. As some authors
note, the NAT refers to the development of the security architecture of Europe
without making any propositions for institutional change (Bail et al., 12).
Although both sides were moved toward closer cooperation and readjustment of
relations after the emergence of new problems, they have not gone much
further than developing merely a shopping list of what has been done (Bail et
al., 17), while the extent of readjustment, exemplified by no less than 150
specific actions (European Commission, 2001,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/new_transatlantic_agenda )
obviously required more effective institutional mechanisms. Responding to the
growing economic problems in Euro-Atlantic relations, policy-makers initially
agreed to create the Transatlantic Free Trade Area and endorse a New
Transatlantic Marketplace, relying on institutional strategy. However, the fact
that these initiatives subsequently have not been endorsed testifies to the weak
institutional underpinnings of the transatlantic dialog for the post-Cold War
period. While the case of NATO proves the resilience of this institutional
framework, the subsequent discussion shows that transatlantic relations, even
in the security dimension, were constructed on weak constitutionalism.

NATO

Despite the lack of notions of a specific institutional transformation by NTA and

JAP, the security realm of transatlantic relations witnessed a substantial
readjustment of institutional mechanisms. As an institutional expression of the
transatlantic security interaction, NATO s remarkable resilience in its adaptation
to the post-Cold War realities testifies in favor of a constitutional logic behind
the American order. While from three fundamental characteristics of a
constitutional order a general consensus on the order has been achieved and
new institutional mechanisms to lower the returns to power have been
developed, at the same time, American inconsistency worsened a wider political
context of the post-Cold War NATO.

At the dawn of the new world order, transatlantic partners unequivocally

expressed their intent to proceed with the institutional cooperation. The new
Strategic Concept of NATO adopted during the Rome Summit in November
1991 stated that member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well
as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain
unchanged (North Atlantic Council, 2000,
www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm). While according to Stanley Sloan
(2001), after the Cold War defense of democracy, human rights, and the rule
of law constituted the heart and soul of the alliance (Sloan in Papacosma et
al., 2001, p.5), the allies underlined the continuing commonality of interests.

13
This reflected one of Ikenberry s characteristics of a constitutional order,
namely broad agreement about the basic rules of the game .

Moreover, NATO transformation affected mainly the introduction of new

institutional mechanisms that render the alliance more resilient and assist it in
lowering the returns to power, testifying for the second feature of constitutional
order. First, the Strategic Concept of 1991 considerably downsized the levels of
armaments, at the same time raising their integration on the multilateralist
basis, thus reflecting effective constraint on the possible disengagement from
the alliance and balancing in the new strategic circumstances. Second, the
United States welcomed the adoption of the European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI) as a necessary step in the achievement of the provisions of
Maastricht Treaty, concerning the realization of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP)6. Under the provisions of the ESDI, a substantial part of
NATO assets can be placed under European command for operations in which
the Alliance itself may not be directly involved (NATO Handbook, p.253). This
pooling and sharing of assets may be viewed in this case as a vivid instance of
the institutional limitation of the returns to power .

However, transatlantic relations (as well as other dimensions of the American

order throughout 1990s) were marked by inconsistent constitutionalism. In the
case of NATO, a number of security initiatives were taken up by Washington
unilaterally, despite the reluctance of both the closest allies and international
community. The US bombing of Iraq in late December 1998 in close
coordination with Britain put under strain the feasibility of the development of
European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) (BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk_politics/newsid_1178000/1178971.stm),
and thus threatened broader ESDI.

One of the most strenuous points of the post-Cold War transatlantic interaction
was the Kosovo air campaign in 1999. While allies agreed on the necessity of
joint multilateral operation, Europeans viewed the acting without the UN
Security Council (SC) mandate as an exception rather than the rule
(Papacosma, et al., p. xiii). On the other hand, while the US contributed the
bulk of forces, apparent European weakness in the conventional weapons
triggered the adoption by the EU at the Cologne summit the task of creating
autonomous military forces (Serfaty, 1999,
http://csis.org/hill/ts991110serfaty.html) that could be called upon in cases
when the EU acts without NATO s involvement. Hence, apart from pointing to
the inconsistency of the American institutional strategy, the Kosovo campaign
also testified to the relative weakness of the NATO institutional mechanisms in
muting the implications of the power disparity between the allies.

The US military initiatives generally undermined one fundamental component of

a constitutional order. The Iraq (1998) and Kosovo (1999) campaigns had been
launched without the UN SC mandate that testifies to a broader US

6
For details of the CFSP, see the Treaty on European Union (1996) on the European Union web-
page, Luxembourg, <http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>
14
inconsistency toward the international institutional frameworks. Viewing the
American triggering of the UN financial crisis, American extraterritorial
sanctions and Washington s reluctance over the ICC Statute adoption as
extremely harmful to the transatlantic relations, many analysts insisted on
these developments as various instances of one phenomenon American
ambivalent multilateralism (Patrick and Forman, 2002). More than that, this
ambivalence was part of a greater American ambivalence toward international
institutions. American policy concerning the Kyoto protocol, ICC statute, debts
to the UN, and rejection of a host of international conventions substantially
undercut the constitutional nature of the international order. The developments
make it clear that the American post-Cold War order lacked the third
fundamental component of constitutional order, namely the necessity of
institutional arrangements to be rooted in the wider political context, which
makes them difficult to retract.

Change after September 11th

American order dramatically changed its underlying logic following the events of
September 11th. A weak constitutional order could not manage to absorb a
major shock that had shaken the underpinnings of the international order. As a
result, all three features of constitutional order lost their credibility. Agreement
about the basic rules of the game disappeared with American questioning
about the effectiveness of the basic institutional arrangements of NATO and UN
SC to be adequate in the new, post-9/11 circumstances and placing high value
on unilateralism advanced by the doctrine of preemption (Bush, 2002, pp. 5-7,
13-16). On the other hand, the post-9/11 events showed the whole extent to
which NATO is inefficient in exhibiting independence ( high returns to
institutions ) and making power less consequential. Acting unilaterally in
Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington virtually ousted institutions from the arena of
day-to-day power management. This disregard for institutions was
accompanied by the new alliance doctrine, advanced by Paul Wolfowitz,
according to which the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must
not determine the mission that substantially diminished the role of institutions
and their value in lowering the returns to power. Not strategic restraint, but
employment of institutions to advance narrow self-interest became the
dominant feature of the post-9/11 period. In this situation, Europeans reacted
by the commensurate employment of NATO as a tool of power projection rather
than consensual power restraint. As a result of the afore-mentioned, the
institutional mechanisms became easily retractable as September 11th provided
for the drastic changes in the overall political context.

The immediate developments of post-9/11 period pointed first to the

disappearance of the consensus about the basic rules of the game . The initial
rejection by Washington of the European attempt to invoke article 5 of the
NATO treaty marked the essence of the post-9/11 unilateralist American
strategy that repeatedly manifested itself in Afghanistan and Iraq. The NATO
mechanism became less attractive to Washington, which strove not to be
constrained by the militarily weak allies. Moreover, the development manifested
itself in the official doctrine of preemption / prevention, outlined in the National
15
Security Strategy (2002) of the Bush administration. The doctrine asserts the
right of the US to act unilaterally, stating that we must be prepared to stop
rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use
weapons of mass destruction against the United States (Bush, 2001, p.14).
The administration argued that international institutions cannot provide for a
swift response to the national security threats, and preemption is a better
option, giving the US self-imposed (and, thus, substantially less legitimate)
right to use power indiscriminately. It runs counter to the principle of strategic
restraint that the leading power usually engages in the development of a
constitutional order, marking deep transatlantic disagreement about the basic
rules of the game .

The deterioration of the consensus regarding the basic rules of the game was
accompanied by the growing inefficiency of NATO in making power less
consequential and exhibiting low returns to institutions . Thus, one of the
central arguments of the post-9/11 doctrine, formulated by Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, is that the mission must determine the coalition, the
coalition must not determine the mission ( ) It follows that there will be
different coalitions for different missions (Ham, 2002, p.43). This, according to
Peter van Ham, means that NATO is no more the privileged institutional
platform for the coordination of Western military efforts (Ham, 2002, p.43).

On the other hand, transatlantic partners began to employ NATO institutional

mechanisms to advance their narrow national interests that further deteriorated
the situation. Initially, the European allies attempted to bind American power
institutionally and lower the future returns to power and make it less
consequential. As Stephen Walt notes, invoking of the article 5 of the NATO
treaty was accompanied by European insistence that the United States consult
with its allies before taking action (Walt, 2001/02, p.61). However, while the
Americans were using NATO to approve the decisions already taken in
Washington (Ham, 2002, p.31), the European allies followed suit, employing
NATO to advance a set of their own narrow self-interests. As France led the
opposition to Turkey s request to invoke article 4 of the NATO treaty prior to the
war in Iraq in January February 2003, motivating it with the argument that
the provision of such aid would be an acknowledgement that war was
inevitable (Grant, 2003, p.19), the alliance was becoming a tool of advancing
narrow self-interests of one group of member states against others. This
attitude substantially questioned the independence of the NATO mechanisms as
a principal tool and underpinning of the post-Cold War order, and
commensurately diminished the returns to institutions , which together with
lowering the returns to power form the second fundamental nature of a
constitutional order.

Finally, September 11th substantially changed the wider political context in

which the institutional mechanisms of the international order operated.
American policy of playing off Old and New Europe against each other
(Donald Rumsfeld quoted in Grant, 2003, p.20) signaled about the
reconsideration of Washington s constitutional policy-making toward European
allies. It was a sign of an old-known divide and rule mechanism or balance-of-
16
power policy, an instance of a hegemonic policy-making when the leading state
departs from its narrow power calculations, to ensure the advance of its short-
term national interests as opposed to the long-term gains that provides
consensual strategic restraint as a genuinely constitutional arrangement. The
US made it explicit that its further strategy will be based on devising coalitions
of willing a coalition of states that engage into the alliance on an ad-hoc
basis, instead of assuring the legitimacy of the issue that drives the effort. In
this case, the coalitions are supposed to be created according to particular
interests, but not the other way around, when constitutionalism endows alliance
with independent voice and ability to forge commonality of interests. As a
result, the defense summit of the leaders of Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany
and France on April 29th, 2003 in Brussels formulated an avant-garde principle,
according to which some European nations should integrate even closer in the
security sphere to form a core of the EU and thus drive further the subsequent
closer integration of remaining Europe. While Britain, Spain, Italy and East
European countries were left out of the scheme, the venture seemed to be
implicitly anti-American and anti-NATO (Grant, 2003, p.97). Thus, while the old
transatlantic mechanisms in this case became even less relevant, at the same
time, the very underlying political context, on which these institutions were
found, was also gone.

In the situation of a weak constitutionalism of 1991-2001, when the returns to

institutions were low and they played diminishing roles in muting the power
disparities, the breakdown of order after the shocking events of September 11th
was predictable. American strategy, marked by ambivalent and selective
multilateralism has already set up a shaky basis for the constitutional order. In
this situation, September 11th reversed all three characteristics of
constitutionalism. Thus, September 11th became a watershed between the weak
constitutionalism of the post-Cold War period and post-9/11 international order.
However, while September 11th marks the breaking point , the question arises:
What instead is emerging in place of the old American order?

American ambiguous hegemonism

The initial trajectory of the Bush administration policy in the immediate wake of
September 11th testified to the aspiration of Washington to seek acquiescence
of weaker and secondary states , thus striving to legitimate order (Ikenberry,
2001, p.xi). The US engaged in the enormous effort to forge an international
coalition to combat terrorism. However, what eventually happened was the
reversal of constitutionalism of the pre-9/11 American order.

Many analysts have argued that the post-9/11 developments can aptly be
accounted for in terms of the realist power politics (Gray in Booth and Dunne,
2002)7 framework. Moreover, the major thrust of developments aptly fits into
Gilpin s hegemonic stability theory provisions, as following. Firstly, while, the

7
See also Abdullah Ahmed An-Na im, Upholding International Legality Against Islamic and
American Jihad , Ibid., 164; Robert Cox, Meaning of Victory: American Power after the Towers ,
Ibid.; Amitav Acharya, State-Society Relations: Asian and World Order after September 11 , Ibid.
17
distinctive feature of the international order is hierarchy, the stability of the
system hinges on the power preponderance of the leading state. Next, the
hegemon acts on the basis of power maximization, managing the system in the
ways that serves this aim. And finally, in adjusting the order, the leading state
employs both threats ( sticks ) and benefits ( carrots ) to ensure the
participation of weaker states in the systemic arrangements that favor interests
of the hegemon.

The following discussion proceeds in three steps, based on Gilpin s framework.

First, I will analyze the character of mechanisms employed by Washington to
ensure the stability of the post-9/11 order. Secondly, I will elaborate on the
underlying incentive that drives the US order-building. Finally, I will elaborate
on the ways of Washington s strategy to ensure the operation of the order. The
analysis shows that the weak constitutionalism of the post-Cold War order has
developed after the breaking point into a hegemonic order, albeit of its weak
modification.

One of the prominent features of the emerging international order is the

American inclination to secure the stability of the system through the projection
of its dominant power. However, this projection is often marked by
inconsistency.

Driven by the huge power preponderance, Washington in the post-9/11 period

embraced unilateralist/realist strategies to defeat the threat and ensure the
ultimate stability of the order. When in the immediate aftermath of the attacks
in New York and Washington, European allies on September 12, 2001 invoked
article 5 of the NATO treaty, the US was reluctant to positively react to the
initiative. Afterwards, during the war in Afghanistan, as Cox notes, the US
showed little interest in concerted action with allies, while the Europeans had
been sidelined almost completely in an American war fought for largely
American ends (Cox in Booth and Dunne, 2002, p.156). Thus, the ultimate
stability of the order became reliant solely on the American [military]
preponderance, which was the prime tool of ensuring order stability.

The hegemonic perception of the stability of the post-9/11 order makes itself
explicit also in the case of Washington s aspiration for exemption from
international law. While the Americans argue that they are painfully aware of
the exceptional risks that they will run as the sheriff for order (Gray in Booth
and Dunne, 2002, p.233), they seek the right to act unilaterally, without
constraints and legal obligations. Between July 2003 (Grant, 2003, p.46) and
May 2004 (ISN Security Watch,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/infoservice/secwatch/index.cfm?service=cwn&parent=d
etail&sNewsID=8864&menu=74860) Washington pressed 99 countries to
engage into bilateral treaties with the US, ensuring that they would never hand
over American soldiers to the International Criminal Court one of the prime
institutional pillars of the international law enforcement. On the same grounds
of exemption as a necessary precondition of attaining security in the new
circumstances, Washington also used 9/11 to renounce the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty.
18
However, while the post-9/11 order is marked by instances of the American
initiatives in the accommodating of allies, these developments testify to a weak
nature of this hegemonism. Specifically, despite wariness, the US subsequently
acquiesced to the invoking of article 5 and gave allies vast roles during the
post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan, seeking their accommodation in
achieving order stability. On the other hand, the American appeals to the UN SC
authorization for exemption of US soldiers from the ICC provisions, signals the
inconsistency of the US policy toward international law exemption. In its foreign
policy Washington strongly relied on the Security Council Resolution 1487,
adopted in July 2003, which effectively exempts US troops from international
war crimes prosecution. Moreover, the Bush administration reportedly
requested the renewal of the Resolution (ISN Security Watch,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/infoservice/secwatch/index.cfm?service=cwn&parent=d
etail&sNewsID=8864&menu=74860), expressing the readiness to work with the
UN on the law exemption. On the other hand, the withdrawal from the ABM was
accompanied by efforts to gain Russian approval and broader international
acquiescence (Perez-Rivas, 2001,
www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/12/13/rec.bush.abm/). Thus, Washington s
ambiguity in the issue of exemption from international law and treaties to
ensure stability of the hegemonic order, points to weak hegemonism of the
emerging order.

Power maximization as the underlying incentive of order

The post-9/11 American strategies are heavily predetermined by the power

maximization. In doing so, Washington followed hegemonic methodologies of
order management. However, while this logic behind the American strategy is
at place, the US works extensively with other states to gain legal coverage from
the UN, making the emerging system an instance of a weak hegemonism.

The Bush administration s policy of preemption is one of the most prominent

examples of urging other states to comply with the American security interests.
It secures Washington s right to launch a military operation against a range of
states (defined by the axis of evil doctrine) to prevent them from acquiring
WMD or tailor policy that is alien to the US. Preemption marked a substantial
resistance of the European allies to share a common vision of the American
anti-terrorist strategies centered on the issue as to what extent the use of
military means is justified. While the preemption is a tool of advancing broad
American national interests, at the same time it does so in a clear hegemonic
style of direct coercion, demanding compliance of other states with the US
policy and, thus, avoiding consensual mechanisms.

The axis of evil doctrine (Bush, 2002,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html) is
another instance of the hegemonic molding of the order in ways that satisfies
the interests of the leading power, violating the UN Charter that prohibits the
threat or aggressive use of force in foreign policy, thus triggering transatlantic
disagreements. While Europeans share Washington s worries about the WMD
proliferation, they do not see a direct link between the proliferation and rogue
19
regimes (Voigt, 2002, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=3740&type_id=3&ber
eich_id=31). Brussels sees the military solution as pre-mature and destabilizing
rather than alleviating. Instead, Europeans propose to accommodate these
regimes and provide incentives for cooperation. Notwithstanding the conceptual
differences, the Bush administration s reliance on the military coercion is clearly
hegemonic.

However, while Washington clearly seeks power maximization, at the same

time, it does so often on the basis of consensus rather than a sheer power
projection. Throughout the post-9/11 period Washington has engaged in a
number of consultations, to ensure that national interests of other states are
also secured. Simultaneously, the US actively worked with the UN SC to secure
the legal framework for its power maximization. As a result, there have been
adopted a number of resolutions, condemning terrorism, with the Security
Council members support of the September 28, 2001 UN resolution that
gave carte blanche to the US to take whatever actions it thought justified to
attack sanctuaries for terrorism (Keohane in Booth and Dunne, 2002, p.144).
Thus, the American power maximization to a good extent relies on the
coordination of interests with other states, thus facilitating American attempts
to gain support of the UN, and rendering Washington s power maximization of a
weak hegemonic nature. As Peter van Ham argues, Washington s post-9/11
policies reflect the American strategy of building a benign empire (Ham,
2002, p.32).

Coalition building after 9/11 or the hegemonic policy of sticks and

carrots

While Washington discovered that the war on terror cannot succeed without
extensive and enduring support from many other countries (Walt, 2001/02,
p.63), its strategy was marked by the employment of both sticks and carrots ,
as two elements of hegemonism. However, by rendering substantial assistance
to both the improvement of NATO capabilities and raising of allies military
preparedness, the Bush administration endorsed weak hegemonism.

The pre-Iraqi war US coalition building is a suggestive instance. While making it

clear that neutrality is unadvisable, Washington, at the same time, entered an
astonishing bargain with its NATO allies. It promised multibillion-dollar
assistance to Ankara in the case of joining the military campaign (Hartung et
al., 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/021019-iraq2.htm).
And this is despite the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO and there are
institutional mechanisms of reaching a (consensual) solution to the Turkish
participation in the US coalition. The same economic aid promises have been
extended also to other European allies. Thus, instead of the institutional
mechanisms of order/coalition building and appeal to legitimacy, the US
engaged in the policy of carrots on the bilateral basis (Walt, 2001/02, p.61).

On the sticks end of the hegemonic coalition-building spectrum was an

American drive to punish errant allies after 9/11. On March 2002 Washington
20
introduced tariffs on imported steel. While American partners on NAFTA have
been excluded from the tariffs, their major target was the European Union. By
this, according to Wallerstein, the Bush administration intended to teach
Europe the lesson that it had better toe the line (Wallerstein in Booth and
Dunne, 2002, p.99).

However, the American policy of hegemonic incentives is marked by

inconsistency in the light of the Prague summit of NATO in November 2002. The
US has made substantial contribution to ensure the achievement of two summit
objectives: first, to endorse the institutional improvements ensuring the
efficiency of NATO capabilities as a security actor; second, to provide measures
for the development of allies military capabilities to alleviate power asymmetry
within NATO, testifying to the American support of both the further
improvement of the transatlantic institutional mechanisms and allies military
capabilities.

Thus, the breaking point of September 11th instituted weak hegemonic order.
While the emerging system complies with all the characteristics of the
hegemonism, outlined by Gilpin, at the same time the continuing validity of
major institutional mechanisms and huge potential and experience of
constitutional cooperation between the transatlantic partners, shapes a weak
nature of the current hegemonic order.

Conclusion

In an attempt to account for the revolutionary impact of September 11th on

international developments in commensurately big-scale terms, this article
engaged in the analysis of the problem of continuity and change of the
international order. It did so through the prism of the transatlantic relations,
due to their importance for the order-building efforts of the US. The analysis
tried to highlight the degree to which the events of 9/11 triggered changes in
the international system, while at the same time assessing the nature of these
changes.

The research argued that September 11th became the instance of the latest
breaking point , after which the American order embraced hegemonic logic,
albeit of its weak modification. The analysis of the American post-Cold War
order (1991-2001) does show the continuity of its constitutional underpinnings
throughout 1990s. During this period, Washington has taken steps to ensure
the important role of multilateral institutions, treaties and procedures in
shaping the distribution of power between the US and its European partners,
reflected in the constitutional logic behind the institutional evolution of NATO
and the NTA / JAP. However, the Clinton administration s policy was marked by
inconsistency and selected multilateralism toward international institutions
that rendered the American order an instance of weak constitutionalism. In this
situation, the major shock of September 11th changed the nature of the
international order, resulting in the retraction in all of the basic features of a
constitutional order. Transatlantic agreement about the basic rules of the
game disappeared, and the UN and NATO became less independent, thus
21
deteriorating the overall political context, in which the institutional mechanisms
became easily retractable.

The major developments of the post-9/11 period have pointed to the

hegemonist track of the American order evolution. The stability of the order
became heavily dependent on Washington s power preponderance. Accordingly,
the underlying incentive that drives the US order building has become power
maximization, to sustain order stability. And finally, Washington employed the
policy of both threats and benefits to ensure the participation of other states in
the operation of order. However, in each of these hegemonic inclinations the
Bush administration demonstrated inconsistency that gives ground to qualify
the emerging order as an instance of weak hegemonism.

Understanding the true role of September 11th and its effects on the
international order has both theoretical and empirical implications. On the
theoretical level, transformation of constitutional arrangements of the post-Cold
War into post-9/11 hegemonism means that constitutional orders are not as
stable as Ikenberry portrayed them. While Ikenberry argues that once in place,
a constitutional order exhibits high returns to the character and makes the
change of its underlying arrangements costly (Ikenberry, 2001, p.70), the
analysis of the transformation of constitutional arrangements of the post-Cold
War into hegemonism points to the contrary. Second, while Ikenberry argues
that the leading power prefers to embrace a constitutional logic to proceed with
the order building at the historic juncture (Ikenberry, 2001, p.xi), the Bush
administration s policy has not complied with this logic. Third, the post-9/11
developments have not proved Ikenberry s thesis that huge power disparity
(more drastic in 2001 than in the immediate aftermath of 1991) and democratic
nature of states (transatlantic partners) make constitutional outcome more
likely. The immediate empirical implication of the research findings, on the
other hand, informs about the period of the long-term instability that the
American order has entered. According to Ikenberry, hegemonic order does not
possess meaningful mechanisms to mute the consequences of emerging power
disparities (Ikenberry, 2001, p.29) that threaten the order stability. On the
other hand, hegemonic stability (with constitutionalism following the same
path) argues for the inevitable decline of the hegemon as the diminishing
returns and other factors bring into the arena of world politics challenging
powers (Gilpin, 1981, p.9). With strong signs that the new US president will not
drastically change the US policy toward international institutions and policy-
formation (ISN Security Watch,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18790), the persistence of the
hegemonic instrumentality, even in its weak mode, could mean the beginning of
the decline of the American global predominance and an era of global
instability.

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24
Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No 1, 29-46

Clash or alliance:
Civilizations and their meaning in political conflicts.
Nina-Birke Glonnegger
ninaglonnegger@web.de

Huntington s Clash of Civilizations theory gained new topicality

through actual events in the political world climate against the
background of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Along
with those conflicts, Huntington s theses seem to be more current
than ever before and became the focus of the public discourse, in
which - it seems - the gap between supporters and adversaries
gets bigger every day.
This article aims to evaluate his theory within the context of actual
political events in the field of international relations. The empirical
attempt of this study will be the presentation and evaluation of
conflict statistics regarding the conflict climate in the years 2000
and 2006 in order to confirm or disprove several aspects of the
clash of civilizations hypothesis.

1. Introduction

In the summer of 1993, the renowned American political scientist Samuel P.

Huntington released his article The Clash of Civilizations? (Huntington, 1993:
22-49) in the journal Foreign Affairs. According to the Foreign Affairs publisher,
this article provoked more reactions and discussion from scientific quarters than
any other contribution since the 1940 s (Huntington, 1996: 13).

Without any doubt, Huntington s theses hit the mark, not least due to the fact
that it was published at a strategic wisely chosen moment. Shortly before, the
end of the Soviet Union marked the final expiration of a conflict between the
two superpowers, which has been dominating the world climate for 40 years.
The sudden laps of those concrete points of reference lead to disorientation in
politics and science. Nobody could tell what the future in international relations
would look like.

At the same time, the shift of global attention from Eastern Europe towards the
Middle East during the first Gulf war where a mostly Western/Christian
coalition under command of the USA fought against a Muslim state that had the
support from the majority of the Arabic states indicated a new perspective. At
this point, Huntington presented his theory, which claimed that the
phenomenon of clash of civilizations would create and dominate a new world
order. He therewith hit the nerve of many observers who had already thought,
feared or perceived this scenario. In retrospect, Huntington s theory was the
first approach that tried to interpret in a comprehensive and systematic way the
historical developments after the end of the Cold War.
25
In 1996, Huntington finally published his book The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order in which he elaborates on those theses that he could
only mention briefly in his article. To intensify his statement, he also removed
the question mark in the title.

The clash of civilizations theory gained new topicality through actual events in
the political world climate against the background of 9/11, the US invasion of
Afghanistan, the Bali bombings, the invasion of Iraq, the cartoon crisis, the
bombings in Madrid and London, the ongoing Iranian nuclear threat and the
Israel-Lebanon conflict. Along with those conflicts and crises, Huntington s
theses are more current than ever before and became the focus of the public
discourse, in which - it seems - the gap between supporters and adversaries
gets bigger every day.

By now, the term clash of civilizations is a fixed term within the debate about
the new world order after the end of the Cold War. Because of this, the
influence in cultural variables on political and societal developments can no
longer be denied in the scientific discourse. Despite of this, Huntington s radical
theory remains very controversial and is challenged not only by other scholars
and researchers, but also by international institutions like, e.g., UNESCO, which
launched a program called Alliance of Civilizations to encourage a cross-cultural
dialogue.

1.1. Huntington s hypothesis

To summarize Huntington s work in a hypothesis one can say that Huntington

gave a definition of the new world order of world policy in the twenty-first
century. He understands the world policy after the end of the East-West
conflict, no longer, or at least not in the first place, in categories of political
power conflicts, or arms race, or fighting for scarce economic resources or as
an ideological system antagonism. Instead, Huntington intended to introduce
into the analysis of international policy a completely new way of looking at it as
a clash of cultures. Therefore, the future international system according to
Huntington will be characterized by the clash of civilizations on the macro- as
well as on the micro- level. In other words, he defines the major future conflicts
no longer between nation states but between civilizations, and defines Islam as
the most threatening possible future antagonist of the declining West. Following
in this study, it shall be examined if the clash of civilization constituted by
Huntington really exists or is emerging and if his theory of this clash as well
as the attitude of Islam can be proven right or wrong by statistics.

1.2. Research questions and delimitation

The clash of civilizations thesis constitutes an attempt to formulate a new

paradigm in international relations after the end of the Cold War, which could
be helpful for politicians and scientist to understand and grasp the new
developments within the international system (Huntington, 1996: 13).

26
Huntington s central thesis states that the bipolar age of ideology was displaced
by the multipolar age of civilizations. Therefore, conflicts will not longer have
ideological or economical reasons, but will arise out of cultural clashes between
nations and ethnical groups of different civilizations. Huntington assumes that
the clash of civilizations has already started and that it will gain intensity in the
future.

The questions, this paper aims to answer, will therefore be: What does the
conflict situation look like in 2000 and 2006 according to the HIIK (Heidelberg
Institute for International Conflict Research) conflict barometer and are there
any changes in the world-conflict-climate between 2000 and 2006? What kind
of variants can be detected? Is the immanent relation between civilization and
conflict that Huntington postulates, provable by empirical means?

Regarding the time limitation, I have chosen to focus on the years of 2000 and
2006. Huntington s theory predicts a new world order for the 21st century.
Therefore I have chosen the year 2000 as the first year of the 21st century,
which seems to be a good starting point for my analysis. The second year,
which will be analyzed is 2006. This is not only due to the fact that it is the
latest statistic available, but also because a period of 6 years is a suitable span
for being able to identify possible changes and similarities. One will be in the
position to talk about variances during that period and might be able to give an
outlook for the future.

1.3. Comparative research design

As conceptual framework of this paper, a simple comparative research design

will be applied. We need such a roadmap because collected data evidence
reclusively means very little until they are analyzed and evaluated (Bell, 2005:
201).

Hall claims, that making comparisons, and tracking differences and similarities
means moving from simply describing to looking at how several variables are
related (Hall, 2004: 147). This brings us to one weakness of this experimental
design. It is not good at establishing why things have changed (DeVaus, 2002:
315). The facts therefore have to be analyzed and interpreted.

By analyzing and comparing the conflict statistics of 2000 and 2006, this paper
aims to identify possible changes in the world-conflict-climate over a period of
six years. The thesis wants to determine to what extend this conflict-situation
of the world is congruent with Huntington s prognosis regarding the future
conflict-situation. Observing and comparing the statistics of 2000 and 2006 is
therefore considered to be an excellent means to combine Huntington s theory
with empirical findings.

Furthermore, the comparative design can encourage us to seek explanations for

similarities and differences or to gain a greater awareness and a deeper
understanding of social reality in different contexts (Hantrais, 1996: 13).

27
To stress those differences, the intention is to use cross-cultural research
(Bryman, 2004: 53) coming from an unusual direction. Instead of comparing
two different regions at the same point in time, we will look at five different
regions all around the world in two different moments and circumstances. The
special criteria that will be used are going to be presented later on.

2. (Neo-)Realism as historical background

Samuel P. Huntington was influenced and embossed by the neo-realistic

approach, which emerged from classical realism. Hence, the neo-realistic theory
can be seen as the fundament of Huntington s clash of civilizations approach. It
is important for the further understanding of Huntington s train of thought, to
be familiar with (neo-) realism as a main theory in international relations.

The realist theories of international relations describe the international system

as anarchic and look at nation-states as the primary constituent units of that
system. J. Morgenthau one of the first scholars of the realistic approach - saw
international politics as a struggle for power between states: the pursuit of
national interests was a normal, unavoidable and desirable activity (Burchill et
al, 2005: 80). That means that, from a realist point of view, states are
fundamentally engaged in the struggle for survival through maximizing power.
The fact that there exist numerous states in this anarchic international system
renders an acute problem of insecurity for each one of them. This phenomenon
is described by the security-dilemma that leads to permanent threat for the
nation-states. The security dilemma encourages a constant competition for
power, particularly between the great powers (Baylis, 2005: 162-165).
Since there is no effective authority, which acts as a mediator in conflict
resolution between states in the international system, it is considered to be a
self-help system. In the context of explanatory realism, this fact is seen as a
secondary reason for the state of affairs (Sandole & van der Merve, 1993: 4).
In general, realism wants to detect actual and concrete facts and phenomena of
international politics.

2.1. (Neo-)Realism and the clash of civilizations

After having understood Huntington s theoretical background, an important

question for this paper will be, where his theory ties with realism.

One of the most obvious points, which shows Huntington s relation with neo-
realism is his claim that nation-states remain the main actors in the
international system even after changes in the world order. However, he states
that their interests, associations, and conflicts are increasingly shaped by
cultural and civilizational factors (Huntington, 1996: 36). Thus, he predicts that
future conflicts will be between civilizations and not between nation states and
this is the point, where he differs from classical realism. In the realistic view,
cultural factors are irrelevant, if not perturbing, when it comes to the definition
of state interest. In contrast to the political realistic belief, nation-states in the
28
clash of civilizations are not longer considered to be rational actors in that
sense that they all act equally rational. In fact, Huntington s emphasis on
cultural factors implies that different states react differently in the exact same
situation due to their specific cultural background. Considering the plurality of
civilizations, this necessarily leads to a very complex sphere of interests in the
international system. How to deal with this complex world - in which every
civilization considers its values as binding - and how to reach common decisions
is, however, not explained by Huntington.

Other statements from the clash of civilizations, however, can be clearly and
easily related to political realism. Huntington is concordant with the classical
theory when he underlines that the structures in the international system are
anarchic. Furthermore, his statement that the world is divided between a
Western one and a non-Western many reminds us easily of the former
bipolarity in the world system (Huntington, 1996: 36).

3. The HIIK conflict barometer

Following, this paper aims to detect, to what extend the de facto conflict
situation is congruent with Huntington s theory about future conflicts.
The HIIK (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research) conflict
barometer and its statistics from the years 2000 and 2006 will serve as
fundaments, as they document all conflicts around the world (Heidelberg
Institute for International Conflict Research, 2000 & 2006).

In listing the conflicts, there will be a four-level distinction of conflict intensity.

Level 1 of intensity concerns a latent conflict that is completely non-violent.
Level 2 appoints predominantly non-violent crisis, whereas level 3 is about
severe crisis with reappearing use of violence. Finally, level 4 describes wars
with systemic and collective dedication to violence and regular troops.

The charts are tabulated according to five geographical regions (Europe,

America, Middle East and Maghreb, Asia/Oceania, Sub-Sahara Africa) and show
in a chronological manner:

§ where the conflict takes place

§ who the participating central actors are
§ which intensity level can be allocated to the conflict
§ which is the primarily conflict cause according to the Heidelberg
Institute for International conflict research
§ if the conflict is occurring along the civilizational fault lines (as
defined by Huntington) or not.

Since Huntington did not define the borders between the civilizations explicitly,
we will attempt to evaluate - in terms of Huntington s theory if it is a fault line
clash or not.

29
3.1. Empirical conflict analysis of the year 2000

3.1.1. Armed Conflicts in 2000

The following chapter deals with all conflicts of level 3 and 4 from the year
2000, because the primarily focus shall first be on those conflicts, which were
carried out in a violent way.

To summarize the empirical findings, one can state that in the year 2000, the
world had to face 36 violent conflicts (12 wars and 24 severe crises),
whereupon already 25 of those conflicts occurred in Sub-Sahara Africa and
Asia/Oceania. One can observe ten cases of civilizational fault line wars, which
is equal to a percentage of 27,8%. This statistical outcome does not show any
tendency that the international system is dominated by clashes of civilizations.

Besides, there is no indicator or evidence for involvement of the core states in

the way Huntington postulated it. First of all, there was no clash between one
core state and another core state and secondly, those conflicts, where core
states were involved (Russia, India, USA) occurred exclusively due to own
national interests. There are also no combat operations carried out for loyalty
reasons from core states or their fellows.

Moreover, it is remarkable that most conflicts were intrastate struggles and

only four out of the 36 severe and violent crises occurred between different
nation states. Thus, states or even civilizations are only marginal actors and the
main actors are representatives of conflict groups of different civilizational
groups.

A look on the conflict causes shows that the reasons are very variable and
complex. The main emphasis however, is on attempting autonomy, national
power and territory. Additionally, one can identify that, even though religion
does not dominate the conflict situation, it is nevertheless an important factor
and contributes definitive to the extension and intensification of wars. Cultural
and religious issues can however not be considered to be direct activators of
conflicts. In fact, it is more ethnical factors as well as authority- and
distributional injustice that play an important role herby.

3.1.2. Latent Conflicts in 2000

The conflict barometer documents in total 144 conflicts in 2000 (Heidelberg

Institute for International Conflict Research, 2000: 3) whereof 36 are
categorized as wars (level 4) and severe crises (level 3). By means of the
remaining 108 latent conflicts and crises (level 1 and 2), this study aims now to
illustrate what could be expected in the future regarding civilizational clashes in
terms of Huntington. Therefore, it is important to notice that the following
results will show only those latent conflicts and crises, in which members of
different civilizations are involved.

30
This distinction is not easy since the index of European latent conflicts and
crises shows many struggles between members of the (Slavic-)Orthodox and
the Western civilization. To label those conflicts as clashes of civilizations,
however, seems insofar problematic as Huntington defined the Slavic-Orthodox
civilization as a civilizational group that is undetermined regarding the question
if it is a self-contained civilization or if it can be attributed to the West.

A similar problem occurs looking at the American continent because the Latin
American civilization has according to Huntington its roots in the Western
civilization.

As a summary of the conflict situation, one can claim that among the 108 latent
conflicts and crises in 2000, there were 24 cases with participants from
different civilizations, which corresponds to 22,2 %.

Since, however, some conflicts on the European and American continent are
problematic to be classified as civilizational clashes (as pointed out before), one
must speak of a maximal percentage of 22,2 %. Not taking the latent conflicts
and crises on those two continents into consideration would minimize the
percentage to 15,7 % in total.

Those numbers, which are supposed to give us a hint about the future
developments regarding civilizational conflicts, lie below the percentage of 27,8
%, which illustrates the actual clashes of civilizations in 2000, as we found out
before. Hence, following those numbers, one could predict that there will be
less civilizational conflicts in the future.

Having a closer look at the latent conflicts and crises in 2000, it is remarkable
that there occur more quarrels between different states, than it is the case in
wars and violent conflicts, which emerge mostly within a single state.

Concerning causes for latent conflicts and crises, one can notice that even if the
quest for autonomy is a very common reason to struggle, the fight for territory
and resources remarkable gains importance as a conflict cause in comparison to
the conflicts on the third and fourth intensity level.

3.1.3. Conflict-Summary of 2000

The following figure will summarize once more the overall conflict situation in
2000 and the percentaged share, the members of different civilizations pertain
in those conflicts.

With participants With participants

CONFLICTS from different from one Total
civilizations civilization
Number of Conflicts 34 110 144

Percentaged Share 23,6 % 76,4 % 100 %

31
Wars and Severe Crises 10 26 36

Percentaged Share 27,8 % 72,2 % 100 %

Latent Conflicts and
Crises 24 84 108

Percentaged Share 22,2 % 77,8 % 100 %

Latent Conflicts and

Crises 17 91 108
(allocating the Slavic-
Orthodox and the Latin
American civilizations to
the Western)

Percentaged Share 15,7 % 84,3 % 100 %

As one can see in the table, more conflicts are fought within a civilization than
between different civilizations in the year 2000. Besides, most of the wars are
intrastate wars and the only interstate war occurs between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Most violent conflicts (level 3 and 4) are carried out in Sub-Sahara Africa (13)
and Asia/Oceania (12). By far the most wars eight out of twelve - can be
observed in Africa, whereas one can identify only a small number of violent
conflicts in Europe and on the American continent.

The most common conflict causes for political clashes in 2000 are autonomy,
national authority, and territory. The most violent conflicts, however, are fought
for national authority, the political system, or secession. (Heidelberg Institute
for International Conflict Research, 2000: 3-5)

3.2. Empirical conflict analysis of the year 2006

3.2.1. Armed Conflicts in 2006

The following chapter presents all conflicts of level 3 and 4 from the year 2006,
because this chapter shall follow the same structure as the chapter 3.1.1, in
order to be able to make a comparison of the two points in time.

In 2006, one can identify 35 violent conflicts worldwide, whereof 6 can be

classified as wars and 29 are severe crises. By far the most violent crises (15)
occur in the Sub-Sahara Africa region. Both, Asia/Oceania and Middle
East/Maghreb face each nine violent conflicts. The European and the American
continents are the most stable and peaceful regions. 11 of the 35 mentioned
wars and severe crises can be classified as conflicts along civilizational fault
lines. This corresponds to a percentage of 31,4 %. This means that 1/3 of all
violent conflicts in 2006 occur along civilizational fault lines.
32
In 2006, one cannot observe any clash between two core states and those core
states that are involved in crises fight for national reasons only. Regarding the
combat operation in Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom one could
claim that it is a loyalty alliance of Western forces. The same could be said
about President Bush s Coalition of the Willing in 2002 during the second Iraq
war. This fact supports Huntington s thesis about loyalty clusters within the
same civilization.

It is remarkable that in 2006 there is only one interstate conflict (Israel vs.
Lebanon) worldwide and all other struggles are intrastate conflicts. This shows
that states become more and more insignificant as actors and that ethnical and
religious groups gain importance in the conflict context.

The main conflict causes for wars (level 4) are either power or system/ideology.
When it comes to the reasons for violent conflicts in general, one can see a
strong tendency to national and regional predominance and power as conflict
reasons, followed by autonomy/secession ambitions and system/ideology
issues. Resources play a very marginal role in 2006.

Furthermore, even though religion still does not dominate the conflict situation,
it gains however importance and contributes to a large extension to the
intensification of conflicts. Nevertheless, ethnical factors as well as authority-
and distributional injustice are still the dominant variables in this context.

3.2.2. Latent Conflicts in 2006

The conflict barometer documents in total 278 political conflicts in 2006

(Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2006: 1), whereof 35
are categorized as wars (level 4) and severe crises (level 3). By means of the
remaining 243 latent conflicts and crises (level 1 and 2), this study aims now to
illustrate what could be expected in the future regarding civilizational clashes in
terms of Huntington. Therefore, it is important to notice that the following
figures will show only those latent conflicts and crises, in which members of
different civilizations are involved.

To summarize, in the year 2006 the world has to face 160 latent conflicts and
83 crises. Among those 243 level 1 and 2 conflicts one can identify 37 cases
with participants from different civilizations, which corresponds to 15,2 %. This
percentage, however, includes also the clashes between the Western and the
Orthodox as well as between the Latin American and the Western civilizations,
which have been classified as problematic due to identical origins. Excluding
those conflicts the percentage of civilizational clashes decreases to a
percentage of 11,9 %.

Those numbers, which are supposed to give us a hint about future

developments regarding civilizational conflicts, lie below the percentage of 31,4
%, which illustrates the actual violent clashes of civilizations in 2006, as we
found out before. It is remarkable how much the percentages regarding
33
civilizational conflicts differ between level 3 and 4 (31,4%) and level 1 and 2
(15,2 % or 11,9 %). This allows the interpretation that civilizational issues
matter more in violent conflicts and wars than in latent crises. Latent conflicts
and crises occur mostly within a civilization. This supports Huntington s theory
that civilizational affiliations and convictions can reinforce a conflict and that
clashes of civilizations are the most violent ones.

Furthermore, one can identify more interstate quarrels on level 1 and 2 than on
the violent levels. Having a closer look at the conflict causes for latent conflicts
and crises, one can notice a clear tendency to fight for territory and power
reasons.

3.2.3. Conflict-Summary of 2006

The following figure will summarize once more the overall conflict situation in
2006 and the percentaged share, the members of different civilizations pertain
in those conflicts.

With participants With participants

CONFLICTS from different from one Total
civilizations civilization
Number of Conflicts 48 230 278

Percentaged Share 17,3 % 82,7 % 100 %

Wars and Severe Crises 11 24 35
68,6 %
Percentaged Share 31,4 % 100 %
Latent Conflicts and
Crises 37 206 243

Percentaged Share 15,2 % 84,8 % 100 %

Latent Conflicts and
Crises 29 214 243
(allocating the Slavic-
Orthodox and the Latin
American civilizations to
the Western)

Percentaged Share 11,9 % 88,1 % 100 %

In 2006 one can find a big number of conflicts, especially on level 1 and 2. As
one can see in the table, the percentage of clashes of civilizations in wars and
severe crises (level 3 and 4) is double as high as the percentage of civilizational
conflicts in latent crises (level 1 and 2).

One third of all violent conflicts are fought between members of different
civilizations. This fact supports Huntington s theory that civilizational clashes

34
tend to have a very violent character. However, one can claim that there are
still more conflicts fought within a civilization than between different
civilizations in the year 2006. The big amount of latent conflicts in the world
could be an indicator for a future intensification of the worldwide conflict
climate.

With a total number of 90 conflicts, Asia/Oceania is the region where the most
conflicts occur. Most wars (level 4), however, take place in the Middle
East/Maghreb region. Even though, America is the most peaceful region
regarding political conflicts, it has to face an increase in violent criminality.
Europe has to deal with a total amount of 45 conflicts, whereof most are
intrastate struggles for autonomy and secession.

In general, one can identify 196 intrastate conflicts and 76 fights between
different states (the other 6 states do not fit into this scheme).

The dominant conflict reason in 2006 is ideological differences between the

several parties with the aim to change the existing political system. Another
important reason to fight is the quest for national power. It is remarkable that
conflicts are often caused by more than one reason. Common combinations in
this context are resources with territory/authority as well as system/ideology
with authority.

4. Analysis and evaluation

In the following analytical part, the empirical research results shall be evaluated
with special regard to Huntington s theoretical framework. In this context the
analysis will support the attempt to answer the research questions.

4.1. Variancies and similarities between 2000 and 2006

2000 2006
Total Number of Conflicts 144 278
Wars and Severe Crises 36 35
Latent Conflicts and Crises 108 243
Fault Line Conflicts (all
levels) 23,6 % 17,3 %
Main Conflict Causes Autonomy, National Ideology/Political
Authority, Territory System
Region with the most
conflicts Asia/Oceania /Oceania
Region with the most violent
conflicts Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
Most Peaceful Region America and Europe America
Fault-Line Conflicts with
Islamic Civilization involved 21 35

35
As one can see in the table above, there was a remarkable increase in the total
number of conflicts between the years 2000 and 2006. This is mainly due to a
rise in the total number of latent conflicts and crises in 2006. The amount of
wars and severe crises however, remained constant during those six years. This
means that even though the world faces more non-violent struggles in 2006, a
more responsible exposure to violent wars and crises is obvious. This claim is
supported by the fact that the number of level 4 wars declined from 12 to 6
between 2000 and 2006.
Although the number of latent conflicts increases, the amount of open and
violent wars is more or less stable and has even decreased a bit. The Human
Security Centre in Vancouver sees the explanation for this decline of violent
wars not in the rise of peacemaking but in the descent of war-making. In other
words, the experts do not see the aim for worldwide democracy, but the end of
colonization as a reason (Hillenkamp, 2007: 45).

Even if one can identify an increasing total number of conflicts between

different civilizations, it turns out to be a descent from 23,6 % to 17,3 % once
taking into consideration the rising amount of conflicts in total. Thus, the
figures do not necessarily show any evidence of an imminent clash of
civilizations. Moreover, there is no tendency of core states to fight other core
states, or solidarity combat operations, which is contradictive to Huntington s
statement about core states.

One can identify no changes when it comes to the region with the most conflicts
(Asia/Oceania) and the region with the most violent conflicts (Sub-Saharan
Africa). America remains the most peaceful region over the years, whereas
Europe has to deal with a slight increase in conflict numbers from 2000 to
2006.

It seems remarkable that the main conflict causes change from autonomy,
territory, and national authority towards ideology and political system, since
Huntington predicted that the future conflicts will no longer include ideology as
a primary reason to fight.

Another interesting point is the tendency towards intrastate conflicts, even

thought Huntington postulated that states will remain the main actors.

Regarding the involvement of the Islamic civilizations into conflicts, one can
identify a remarkable increase. In 2000 the Islamic civilization was involved in
21 out of 34 struggles between different civilizations, which corresponds to a
percentage of 61,8%. In 2006 the percentage rose to 72,9% (35 out of 48).
This supports Huntington s predictions about Islam s bloody borders.

The most obvious difference occurs however evaluating the percentage of

civilizational wars. In 2000 only 2 out of 12 level 4 wars were fought along
civilizational fault lines, which corresponds to 16,7 %. In 2006, however, the
percentage increased to 50% since 3 out of 6 level 4 wars occur between
different civilizations. This numbers support Huntington s claim that conflicts

36
between different civilizations tend to have a more violent character. Thus,
even if the former figures showed a decline in the total percentage of
civilizational fault line conflicts, one can identify a remarkable percentual
increase when it comes to wars between different civilizations on the most
violent level. However, one must see that many of those struggles, notably in
the Middle East region, began as secular tribal disputes and gained the religious
component only after a while. Yet that they include this religious component,
they are harder to solve.

5. Conclusion

Huntington postulates that the clash of civilizations is the latest phase of

modern history. In publishing his thesis he is completely aware of the fact that
he will have to mention good reasons why this clash of civilizations will happen
exactly in the present point in time. In this context, his assumption prevails
that the ongoing globalization does not lead to a greater mutual intercultural
understanding, but to a reinforced emphasis on the own civilizational values.
Since this is a very complex assumption, it is hard to answer it in a sufficient
way with the empirical findings of this study. Since there is a percental
decrease of conflicts between different civilizations, however, one could claim
this statement to be wrong.

However, speaking about globalization as a source of conflict in general, one

could refer to the area of security policy where globalization is seen as a direct
or indirect threat to national and international security and therefore a possible
source of conflict. In the course of globalization, one can identify several
concrete security risks, such as demographic, technological, and economic
changes. Demographic changes include for example an increasing urbanization
and the resulting imbalance through population clusters. The increased spread
of technology has also not just positive outcomes, since it facilitates networking
and transnational communication of terrorists and criminals.

The consequences of globalization can be noticed all over the world, but its
effects are stronger in those parts of the world, where phenomena, such as
better technologies are newer. This leads us the Asia/Oceania and the Middle
East/Maghreb regions, where we found the biggest number of fights and the
most violent conflicts in the world. Europe and America are traditionally more
modernized regions, where urbanization and an increased spread of technology
are rather old phenomena. The claim that regions, in which globalization has
further reaching and more drastic effects on stability and security, are possible
more susceptible to conflicts might therefore be right.

Moreover, Huntington analyzed the international relations in categories of

cooperation and conflict. According to the American scholar, future conflicts in
the international system will be fought for cultural and civilizational differences
rather than for ideological or economical causes. And in the same time,
culturally similar actors show a stronger tendency to cooperation than culturally
different actors do. To put it in other words, it can be said that conflicts
between groups and states of different civilizations will occur more often than
37
struggles between members and groups of the same civilization. As mentioned
before, a decrease in the percentage of intercivilizational conflicts proves this
claim to be wrong and the shift towards ideology as the main conflict cause in
2006 does not exactly support this statement either. However, one can identify
a recent tendency towards religious wars and this is one of the important
reasons why a future clash of civilizations cannot be excluded per se.

Even though one cannot identify a remarkable increase of intercivilizational

conflicts since the Cold War era which means that Huntington s main thesis
cannot be proven right by empirical means there are still some aspects of his
theory that can be supported and proven to be right. As Henderson points out,
it is true that the combatants belong to different religions surpassingly often
(Henderson, 1997: 649-668). Fox (2001: 459-472) complements an interesting
perspective to this discussion in claiming that, even if the occurrence of
civilizational conflicts did not change significantly over the years, there is
however a remarkable increase in conflicts between the Western and the
Islamic civilization since 1989. This statement is supported by the statistics of
this study as well, which show an obvious increase in the number of conflicts
where members of the Western civilization fight against members of the Islamic
civilization. According to Fox, those developments could have influenced
Huntington when he launched his theory about Islam s bloody borders and the
clash between the Western and the Islamic civilization. In this part of his theory
Huntington argued that the Islamic civilization has experienced a drastic
population explosion, which is encouraging instability both on the borders of
Islam and in its interior, where fundamentalist movements are becoming
increasingly popular. Besides he stated that civilizational conflicts are
particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims and identified the
bloody borders between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations. As a
consequence, he claims that the current global war on terror between the West
and Islam is not a new outcome of the behavior of some radicals, but rather a
reflection of the problematic history between those two civilizations.

The new world order in Huntington s analysis is necessarily multipolar, since

every civilization has its own center of power and competence (usually the most
powerful state of the civilization). This core state hold a crucial double role in
the international system: on one hand side, they represent the interest of their
civilization against extern powers, and on the other hand side they incur the
power function to control, order and organize. According to the empirical
findings of this study, there is no evidence for the clash between different core
states or solidarity actions of other members of the same civilization that was
predicted by Huntington.

Another problem is Huntington s concept about the relation between state and
civilization and the obvious tense relation between both entities. To keep it
short, the problem is that the state is an actor within the international system
and the civilization not. Huntington claims that the nation state will remain the
dominant actor in the international system in the future and will take over all
the interests of the civilization bit by bit. This process is difficult to imagine,
however and seems rather impossible to realize. Additionally, there exist some
38
essential differences between the concepts of states and civilizations: states
have borders, civilizations have frames; states are actors, civilizations are
entities; states have interests, civilizations have cultural similarities.
Nevertheless, it is not generally to doubt that nation states could also represent
the interests of bigger entities such as civilizations.

A closer look at the present conflict panorama shows us that peace is prevailing
mainly in industrialized areas and democracies. Susceptible for conflicts are
dictatorships, states in which the public order failed, third world countries with
big raw material deposits, and regions along civilizational fault lines. This proofs
that civilization do matter when it comes to conflict issues, but there are still
other important conflict causes. Thus, although the clash of civilizations cannot
be totally excluded, it is definitely not necessarily imminent. The fact that
complicates foreign policy enormously these days is that culture wars are now
global (The Economist (special), November 2007: 12 ).

Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the rising number of religious conflicts all
around the world. After having played a rather marginal role in the 20th century
politics, religion holds a central role in the 21st century. Outside Western
Europe, religion has gained remarkable importance. An Islamist party rules
once-secular Turkey; Hindu nationalists may return to power in India s next
election; even more children in Israel and Palestine are attending religious
schools that tell them that God granted them the whole Holy Land and on
present trends, China will become the world s biggest Christian country (and
perhaps its biggest Muslim one too). How should those developments be
evaluated? First of all (as The Economist claims), the idea that religion has
recently re-emerged in public life is clearly wrong. It never really went away. In
this context, one can state that the religion that influences public life the most
is Islam. At its most theocratic, Islam forces people to follow sharia laws,
sometimes with cruel penalties. Yet, Islam can clearly co-exist with a modern
liberal state, as the democracies in Malaysia and Indonesia show. Thus, one
could consider Turkey to be a test case since it is a secular state currently ruled
by Islamists whose progress is being watched with nervous attention (The
economist, November 2007: 13).

As the previous chapters have shown, one could conclude saying that most of
Huntington s theses are disprovable. Furthermore, his theory reflects the reality
sometimes in a blurry manner. Especially his concepts of culture, civilizations,
core states and conflicts request further questioning and explanations.

Nevertheless, it seems that Huntington is well aware of the fact that his picture
of future world politics is not complete, and thus, a bit distorted. He actually
points out that his paradigm is not more than a framework for reflecting about
international system. It is, in fact, a theoretical construct that cannot (and does
not aim to, either) explain everything.

The reactions towards Huntington s theory vary from appreciating affirmation to

categorical refusal. There is, however, an accordance about the fact that it is

39
Huntington s credit to put the meaning, difficulties, and endangerments of
civilizations into worldwide focus.

Another important term in this context is the new form of international

terrorism. This international terrorism derives mostly from religious
fundamentalism. Noticing an increase in religious fundamentalism and thus
international terrorism may, however, not be mixed up with civilizational
conflicts. Religious fundamentalism is not necessarily directed against another
civilization, but happens also within the same civilizations (e.g. Islam). It is
therefore important to keep these two terms separated. Having a closer look on
those conflicts in which the Islamic civilization is involved, one will notice that
the statement that Islam is stuck in a clash of civilizations with the West is
rather unconvincing. One irony of the war on terror is e.g. that although George
W. Bush has declared war upon jihadism, his enemies invest very little energy
to fighting him. The jihadists fight their main war not against Westerners but
against apostate Muslim regimes. In cases where they do fight against
outsiders (America in Iraq, India in Kashmir, Russia in Chechenia, and Israel in
Palestine), they fight mainly against occupying powers (The Economist
(special), Nov 2007: 15).

Besides, one should pay more attention to the rather unexpected last part of
Huntington s book, where he advocates in a quite conciliatory way a
multicultural world.

Since one of the most important outcomes of this paper is the tendency
towards intracivilizational conflicts, a suggestion would be, to have those
conflicts on focus for future research. Are those wars compatible with theories
about the fragmented society or which other reasons and issues can be
detected? It therefore could be very interesting to have a closer look at specific
intracivilizational conflicts in future research papers.

To conclude, it remains to say that the empirical analysis of this paper could not
find sufficient evidence for an imminent clash of civilizations. However, it is
obvious that several aspects of his thesis could be proven right by the analysis
of this study.

Nevertheless, one has to be aware of the fact that this paper examines a very
short span of time only and that it would request a far larger and more detailed
study to gain further reliable results.
Regarding future developments in the world system, one probably can neither
expect the ultimate clash of civilizations nor a unique and unified world
civilization. Thus, most likely the reality will lie somewhere in between.

40
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Burchill, S et al. 2005, Theories of International Relations, 3rd Edition, Palgrave

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De Vaus, D 2002, Analyzing Social Science Data 50 key problems in data analysis,
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Henderson, E A 1997, Culture or contiguity: ethnic conflict, the similarity of states, and
the onset of war, 1820-1989 , The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, no 5, October
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Hillenkamp, S 2007, Strategien für den Weltfrieden , GEO, August 2007, p. 44-48.

Huntington, S P 1993, The clash of civilizations? , Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, Vol.
72, Issue 3, p. 22-49.

Huntington, S P 1993b, If not civilizations, what? paradigms of the post-cold war world ,
Foreign Affairs, 72:5, p. 194.

Huntington, S P 1996, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
Simon&Schuster, London.

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Sandole, D J D & van der Merwe, H 1993, Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice
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The Economist (author not mentioned) 2007, The new wars of religion, November 3rd,
9th 2007, Volume 385, Number, 8553, London

42
Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No 1, 46-60

The approach of moderate constructivism

towards international regimes1

Vladrin Grainca
valdrin_gr@hotmail.com

This article adapts a theoretical approach toward explanations of

international regimes. The main point is to see how moderate
constructivism can contribute to the study of the international
regimes. Since liberal institutionalism is the leading perspective on
international regimes, this article defies its main theoretical
foundations rather Prisoner s Dilemma and Market Failure . After
viewing these explanations as not convincing we turn to the
moderate constructivism by arguing that this perspective can
provide better explanations by focusing on identity theory. By
focusing on identity theory this article argues that the strength of
international regimes depends on the identity of states. The
behaviour of the great powers will take place as illustrations.

Introduction

From 1970s emerged theories focusing on interdependence and study of

international politics (Little 2005, p.370-371). These theories focused on
international regimes in order to explain cooperation and institutions of
international politics. The interactions between states attracted attention of the
scholars within the area of international regimes. One important aspect was the
role of hegemonic power and its role on facilitating international regimes. This
raises a question about other great powers and international regimes: if the
hegemonic power established regimes for its interests then how do other great
powers view international regimes? The aim of this article is to provide a critical
examination of Prisoners Dilemma and Market Failure dealing with the
concept of international regimes. During the past many wars between powerful
states occurred as a consequence of power quest of rising powers (revisionist
identity). Beside existence of international regimes, these great powers made
war as a normal tool towards the peak of international politics. France, Great
Britain, Germany, Japan etc., were using war as a means of progress in
international affairs. International regimes that were created during this period
had incorporated norms and principles to justify the gains of wars (Puchala &
Hopkins 1982, p.257). After the Second World War (WWII), the emergence of
regimes became a fashion and, at the same time, there was no war between
great powers. Proliferation of international regimes continued while great
powers such as China and Russia joined World Trade Organization (WTO) or

1
This article contains some parts of the master thesis Great Powers Behavior towards
International Regimes: introducing moderate constructivism .
43
International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the Cold War. These organizations and
regime that they promoted were biased because they served the interests of
the United States of America (U.S.) (Puchala & Hopkins 1982, 260).
Nevertheless, China and Russia joined these regimes advocated by
abovementioned organizations. How this could happen? China and Russia made
a step that leads to assumptions of compliance with the established rules, thus,
making their power quest as a non-violent behavior. In sum, behavior of
powerful states in search for power has changed, shifting from war to
international regimes as a means of power projection. In this aspect, even
though international regimes existed before WWII they didn t reduce
uncertainty, as they didn t maximize benefits of concerned parties. This gap
emerges by ignoring the contextual aspect of great powers their identity,
indeed. The concept of international regimes is changing effectively as a result
of states identity. By adapting a theoretical approach we intend to understand
this change of behavior and a great help will be moderate constructivism of
Alexander Wendt.

The concept of international regimes

Toward the concept of international regimes Susan Strange brings a profound

criticism. Her criticism is based on Marxist structuralism and economic aspect
where she made some points. Strange (1982, p. 484-485) asserts (as Arthur
Stein does) that the concept of international regimes is so broad that when
used by international scholars it means different things and is used to analyze
different aspects of international politics, thus, being woolly . Moreover, the
concept of international regimes attempts to obscure the fragility of
international politics where disagreements are more usual than agreements (p.
491). Her critique is elaborated further by accusing regime scholars to be
tending to assert that regimes are reducing uncertainty and bringing order,
meanwhile many regimes brings disorder than order (p. 480-489).

States behavior, power and interests are important parts of the explanation of
international regimes. In this respect, liberal institutionalism gave profound
insights on international regimes. On the other hand, constructivism divided
in two groups gave insights, too, but it substituted regimes for institutions. In
this way, Wendt (1999, p. 96) views institutions made of norms and rules,
which are ideational phenomena . Rationalists, too, substitute regimes for
institutions only that there are different thoughts to what an institution or
regimes are. Therefore, there is a need for a proper concept of international
regimes that would have two elements: first, it would have elements of
moderate constructivism or it wouldn t be in contradiction with this perspective
and it would limit the concept of international regimes to certain institutions
that are within regimes, thus, avoiding criticism of Strange.

Alexander Wendt reduced regimes to institutions and this represents the

problem underlined by Strange and Stein that the concept of regimes became
woolly . But Wendt distinguishes these institutions in terms of incorporation of
them within the society as norms and principles thus using them also in
international arena where these institutions became as shared ideas. In this
44
way, we intend to combine the definition of Wendt and Stein. Arthur Stein
(1982, p. 301) emphasized the most important element in regime formation by
asserting that the facilitation of regimes takes place when behavior of states is
constrained by joint decision/action. Thus, conventions and agreements are the
basis to identify elements of a regime but not the only one. To translate this in
constructivist language and combine it with Wends understanding, regimes
represents shared ideas incorporated within joint decisions of states, thus,
constraining and establishing a certain behavior of states.

Liberal institutionalism

Another tradition of thought is liberal institutionalism (or neoliberalism). The

neoliberalist point of view accentuates that institutions exert a significant
influence on international relations enabling states, as rational actors, to solve
cooperation problems and realize what autonomy and self-help cannot provide
(Reus-Smit 1997, p. 560). Neoliberals propose to analyze regimes as a strictly
interest-based phenomena the creation, maintenance, and demise of which can
and must be accounted for from the perspective of strategically rational but
otherwise mutually indifferent actors (Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger 1996,
p. 26). A leading thinker is Keohane who relying heavily on modern economic
theories of institutions , proposes a contractualist approach of international
regimes (p. 27). The main function of regimes is described by the Prisoner s
Dilemma, where the role of regimes is to serve as a means of cooperation, and
market failure that gives a functional attribute to regimes (1996, p. 27).
Moreover, actors interests or values are not changed by international regimes,
these regimes alter the incentives for action, thus changing the calculations of
advantage that governments make where, as Keohane points out, regimes are
the cause while cooperation is the effect (Keohane in Hasenclever, Mayer &
Rittberger 1996, p. 32).

International regimes have an advantage because states are provided with an

environment where they can cooperate through agreements (Keohane in
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, p. 37). But, what about the role of shared
ideas? Do regimes serve as a place where states can share ideas on interests
and power? Moreover, do these ideas have any role at all in states interactions?
These are cognitivist questions that will bring insights on the role of the state
and international regimes meanwhile stressing the limits of liberal
institutionalism.

Robert Keohane as a leading thinker of liberal institutionalism, from the

beginning of 1990s turns to the study of the role of ideas in foreign policy.
Keohane, in this respect, introduced new insights in the role of ideas between
states and within international regimes. In his book, a co-editor with Judith
Goldstein, he asserts that ideas, which are defined as beliefs held by
individuals , help to explain outcomes particularly those related to the foreign
policy (eds Keohane and Goldstein 1993, p.3). Nevertheless, since politics is a
realm where states are faced with continuous uncertainties, ideas can serve as
roadmaps in maximizing interests of the actors (p. 16). Accordingly, ideas guide
the behavior by stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical
45
or moral motivations for action (p. 16). The role of ideas as roadmaps is very
profound but nevertheless, ideas are not limited only to the causal factor. As it
will be mentioned below, Wendt pointed out that interests, beside their
materialistic part, are constituted by ideas.

Later, Keohane (2002, p.1) asserted the principal motor of action in this view
is self-interest, guided by rationality, which translates structural and
institutional conditions into payoffs and probabilities, and therefore incentives .
How can states share ideas within a certain regime when they are self-
interested entities? The generated behavior that derives from the self is very
limited, since the state would be interested to realize its own goals. Liberal
institutionalism shares rationalist framework of studying international regimes.
Liberalists ignore identity issues of states and as a consequence they cannot
explain why regimes serve as means of advancing interests in present-day and
didn t provide same opportunities before the WWII. This is the reason why in
this thesis liberal institutionalism is considered as a non-comprehensive
perspective.

Market failure

In his explanation of market failure, Keohane (1984), takes the explanation

market lemons provided by George Akerlof where institutions are needed to
reduce uncertainty. Arrow, examining this market failure, asserted that the
problem here is not the buyers (actors) but the problem is at the products
(Arrow in Keohane 1984, p. 96-97). Translated into the international politics,
this means that, as Arrow notices, actors are not the problem because they are
rational utility-maximizers but the problem is the structure of international
system (which is anarchic) and the absence of institutional arrangements that
would determine the price of lemons (Arrow in Keohane 1984, 97). Therefore,
the key element is the uncertainty that we face in international politics. In this
way, states do not have same opinions during their interactions. And this
results to the market failure. To escape the market failure, international system
needs international regimes (institutional arrangements) to reduce uncertainty
and to have coordination in order to maximize interests.

Market failure is the concept that, provided by liberal institutionalism, explains

the reason why international regimes exist and are beneficial. According to
Richard Little (2005, p. 80), the decline of state authority expressed the need
for regime formation in the international arena. In this way, international
regimes emerge as a consequence of states self-interests because these
regimes provide cooperation and beneficial agreements that may maximize
their gains (Keohane 1984, p. 27). As a result, great powers enter regimes
because these regimes provide cooperation amongst them and may advance
their interests. Here after, we cannot argue why regimes did not have this role
before WWII. During that time, international regimes existed but nevertheless
they were not seen as the means to maximize interests. In sum, we cannot be
certain that by establishing a regime the uncertainty of the anarchic world will
be reduced.

46
Robert Keohane (1984, p. 96) pointed out that interactions are with sub-
optimal outcomes and these interactions are mediated by market thus giving
the utility functions of actors and the resources at their disposal . In the same
section, Keohane asserted the asymmetry of relations where not all states
benefit equally from agreements. Therefore, the probabilities of the great
powers to benefit are greater than the other states. Moreover, stressing the
role of hegemony, liberal institutionalism claims, actors being investigated
are rational and that the institutions and the social practices to be explained
were designed to fulfil anticipated functions (p. 95). As an illustration he
provides the formation of International Energy Agency, where the interests of
United States was to promote its ambitions on the field of energy.

But viewing actors as egoistic, how cooperation can prevail? To this question
Keohane (1984, p. 97) answers by explaining how egoistic actors do cooperate.
He asserts that egoistic actors are always interested in each other s behaviour
and how this behaviour would influence the interests of the egoistic actor. So,
for their own sake, these actors cooperate by adjusting or modifying behaviour
in order to cooperate since these actors are self-interested and rational. As we
can infer if great powers do not comply with this schema then market failure
would emerge and actors wouldn t be rational. Therefore, regimes/institutions
provide great powers with cooperation and uncertainty reduction. In this way, if
there is a market failure it is because of the lack of the institutions that
facilitate coordination. Once again, we have problems to put these explanations
in the historical context. Anterior WWII, there were regimes and institutional
arrangements but these states didn t see these arrangements as lucrative
because they didn t maximize interests by these regimes. For instance, after
First World War (WWI) Germany and Japan sought to maximize their gains by
war and not international regimes (cooperation). In this way, this situation can
be explained by revisionist identity theory. More argument and illustration will
be provided in the section of revisionist states and international regimes where
the analogy of market failure has limited explanations.

Prisoner s dilemma

Prisoner s Dilemma represents a situation where two prisoners are caught and
they cooperate in strategic way. This game theory explains how actors can
maximize their gains. In Prisoner s Dilemma, individuals are foreseen to be
rational where by cooperating they achieve a maximum outcome. What we see
here is that parties are not interested in maximum gains (that would be if one
of the actors confess thus not being prosecuted at all), because the best
outcome would be neither of prisoners to confess and be detained only for
thirty days. As a result, Keohane asserts that Prisoner s Dilemma helps to
explain strategic interaction between actors and it explains why cooperation
brings collective goods. As we explored above, institutional arrangements helps
actors to carry out this cooperation and strategic interaction. Nevertheless,
relying on Hardin and Taylor, Keohane (1984, p. 83) asserted that in multi-case
Prisoners Dilemma concept of practice, or better to say repeating (not learning)
takes place where actors conclude better calculations. Thus, Keohane refuses
the role of the learning ability. Referring to Haas concept of learning, Keohane
47
(1984, p. 83) asserted that this concept is not possible in a political context,
since there are structural constraints, thus, actors have to stay close to the
boundaries of political action within international regimes. Therefore, here are
obvious limits of institutional liberalism when it comes to the change of
interests.

In this way, we understand that great powers by joining or forming

international regimes, seek to reduce uncertainty and cooperate to make
beneficial outcomes. And here the concept of actors as egoistic and maximizers
of gains, is not convincing since the Prisoner s Dilemma is about actors who
care for others. This care is manifested by the action not to get released
immediately, but by willing to take thirty days in prison and granting the other
actor with the same benefits. As we mentioned above, Keohane (1984) fills this
gap the care for others by asserting that the concept of self-interest is
very broad and doesn t exclude the other in order to achieve better results for
parties. Nevertheless, it is not convincing, since a rational-egoistic actor would
choose to maximize its own gains. This means that prisoners are interested on
maximizing gains for their Self. This dilemma can be fulfilled by moderate
constructivism where it introduces the collectivist identity of states. In this
identity great powers care for each other since they have learned each other s
interests during interactions. The decision of China to buy Boeing airplanes, in
order to reduce its own benefits of trade with the USA, shows how the great
powers are not maximizers of interests.

Moving towards reflexivism

Later, by the beginning of 1990s, liberal institutionalism moved towards

reflexivism. They turned to the role of ideas and how these serve to
institutions. Nevertheless, the meaning that liberals gave to ideas is far from
the constructivist thought. Keohane and Goldstein asserted that ideas have only
causal impacts (eds Keohane & Goldstein 1993, p. 13-14). This means that
ideas serve as a tool or means to reach better outcomes, in this way serving as
strategies that are incorporated into institutions. Liberalists claim, that war is
an obsolete means and that trade is the tool of maximizing interests, it is not
new. As the classical liberalist Norman Angell (in Nye 2005, p. 43) asserted a
century ago, war became too expensive therefore trade makes states merely to
be determined for trade rather than conduct wars. Nevertheless, two world
wars occurred. As it will be argued below, trade always enables major powers
to advance their interests but the exclusion of war as a tool of advancing
interests happens only when states abandon revisionist identity. Before the
Second World War, nothing stopped Germany or Japan to advance their
interests by existing institutions. Here it is obvious that liberal institutionalism
makes the assumptions as the realist tradition concerning the origins of
interests. Conceiving ideas and interests as exogenous, liberalists see
international politics as material and not social, thus, giving to institutions a
material purpose and not conceiving them as shared beliefs that constitute
power and interest of the great powers (Wendt 1999, p. 34). Therefore, the
main dilemma is that liberal institutionalism cannot provide an answer for the

48
role of international regimes in historical context.

Moderate constructivism

As a grand theory, constructivism is a very broad approach. Within this broad

approach is moderate constructivism endorsed by Alexander Wendt in his book
Social Theory of International Politics . Having in mind Wendt s approach
toward international regimes, he is considered as a strong constructivist
(Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger 1996, p. 167). Accordingly, Wendt doesn t
view regimes as a sufficient external element in constraining the behavior of
other states unless there is not internalization of norms/institutions by states
(Wendt 1999, p. 359). As a result, it allows focusing in the internalization of
norms and regime robustness. A hypothetical claim would suggest that the lack
of internalization of norms by states caused the weakness of international
regimes before the end of WWII, while the internalization of these norms (such
as the norm/institution of sovereignty) after WWII led to the robustness of
regimes. This is what Wendt argued in his above-mentioned book only that he
viewed the internalization of institutions in different periods of time than the
one we tend to have in our study and he spoke in terms of peace and not
regimes.

Moderate constructivism, as Wendt (1999, p. 47) claims, is a via media

approach. He applies a constructivist ontology and epistemology of scientific
realism , thus representing his methodology of moderate constructivism.
Guzzini and Leander (2001, p. 324) called this a dualist ontology since it
implies holist and individualist elements. But actually we can call it as dualist
only the origin of this ontology because Wendt integrated individualism and
holism in a unique form. In our study, this ontology will inform about constrains
and possibilities of states behavior and regimes. For instance, this ontological
position would suggest that shared ideas contain the concerns for the self and
the other. In this way, if there is empirical ground, we could argue that states
quest for power concerns the first element (the self) while multidimensionality
of power would argue that power is not for the egocentric state only, but also
about later concerns (the other). As it will be argued below, both modalities of
concerns are embedded in international regimes. In sum, Wendt (1999, p. 372)
represented an ontology of ideas that has two elements: social and
constructionist. The former one represents ideas since these serve as a bridge
between states and the later constitutes the identity of states. This discerns the
identities of states and the concept of international regimes by studying the
ideas that states have in their pockets . As Joseph Nye (2005, p. 6) pointed
out, for constructivists ideas and culture shape international politics, in this
constructing identities where states converge. The overall picture of Wendt s
theory relies on culture that is constituted by structural facts and states
identities. In this ambient, power and interests have different meanings from
assumptions of rationalism and (strong) constructivism. As scholars have
asserted, when studying regimes is mandatory to explain interests and power
of states in the context of international politics (Krasner 1982, p. 193). In this
way, to understand international regimes we have to explain what does
moderate constructivism means by power and interests.
49
Power

Wendt (1999, p. 97) asserts that not only realists write for power and use it as
a concept to explain international politics. Nevertheless, there is a difference
between theories by asking how power is constituted (Wendt 1999, p. 97).
Writing for power doesn t make you a realist because it depends from the
explanation of power that a scholar is using. In order to explain power Wendt
(p. 109) refers to interests since [t]he explanatory significance of the
distribution of power depends on historically contingent distributions of state
interests , thus, power has a meaning taken from interests. The highest
concern of states is even when they calculate their goals the survival.
Wendt agrees with this concept if we are talking for revisionist states. Wendt
(p. 262) explains that [s]ince the enemy's revisionist intentions are "known,"
the state can use the enemy's capabilities to predict his behavior, on the
assumption that he will attack as soon as he can win and it is this moment that
power takes a determining role in the survival. Wendt explains power politics in
terms of Weberian concept of social by referring to the Self and Other. Viewing
the power also as social phenomenon, interactions can succeed since actors
bring their beliefs enough into line that they can play the same game, each side
tries to get the other to see things its way (Wendt 1999, p. 331). Concerning
international regimes, the conception of power provided by Wendt is important
since it allows distinguishing the role of these states and how regimes can be
affected.

In sum, it matters how power is constituted and what explains. In this way,
power is dependent from the context whether we have to deal with revisionist,
status-quo, or collectivist identity of the great powers. Wendt s assumption
relies on the functionality of power in the meaning that what constitutes that
power material interests or social interests? Therefore, to understand via media
conception of power we have to understand the interests of actors since as
mentioned above power depends from the states interests. Are these
interests constituted by motivation of survival or other factors too? Wendt s
theoretical claims bring also insights on constitution of interests.

Interests

Interests, like power, depend from the context, too. Concerning interests,
Wendt (p. 123-124) assumed that states have desires . Nevertheless, it
depends for which states we are talking about. Are we considering desires of
status quo, revisionist, or collectivist states? According to Wendt, status quo
states in contradiction with revisionist one do not have interests in
conquering other states, redrawing boundaries, or changing the rules of the
international system , thus these beliefs are not merely about an external
world: they also constitute a certain identity and its relationship to that world,
which in turn motivates action in certain directions (123-124). Different from
status quo states, revisionist states are interested in conquering and changing
rules of the interactions. Third category of states is collectivist one, collectivist
states have the desire to help those they identify with even when their own
security is not directly threatened (123-124). Thus, here we have to do with
50
identities of states and socialization of states. Before the WWII we had many
revisionist states such as Germany and Japan, and this is their identity where
interests were materialistic in the meaning that these states had some
materialistic needs while in the same time they had an idea (war) of
maximizing their interests. We have to bear in mind that these materialistic
needs are not given exogenously but are determined by human nature so it is
different from realist conceptualization. Therefore, a conclusion is the formula
of desire plus belief plus reason equals action (125-126). Portraying power
and interests in this way it is important for our understanding of great powers
behavior toward international regimes in different contexts.

Identity theory

Identity theory, which is represented by Wendt, will be as a distinguishing

factor of interests during contexts. To summarize, identity theory represents
the state itself with ideas about the world where this identity is constituted by
interactions (Wendt 1999, p.224). In this way we will be able to notice the
identity of great powers and to reveal reasons how a certain state such as
Japan behaves in different ways in historical contexts. One determining element
of the certain identity is interest. Here we can assume the nature of interests of
states thus serving as a roadmap to study empirical findings and interpret them
in relation to international regimes.

Maja Zehfuss (2001), by taking the example of Germany, suggested that using
identity to describe world politics is a dangerous liaison. This liaison undermines
Wendt s constructivism because we are not able to calculate whether a certain
state is bounded with a certain kind of identity. As an argument he takes the
commitment of Germany to the basement of foreign policy never again in war .
The author explains that as a consequence of history, Germany used this
phrase to abolish the use of force in foreign policy. Nevertheless, during the
Kosovo War and other conflicts, Germany abandoned that phrase and used the
war (violence) as a means of foreign policy. In this context, we cannot
distinguish between the identity of the Third Reich and nowadays Germany. But
Zehfuss s argument is not representative. The German use of war as a means
of foreign policy is not the same as it was during the Third Reich. As the
Wendian identity theory is developed, it is obvious that within identity theory
it s important to know the purpose and means of war. If it is used for territorial
purposes or it is a regular (normal) means of realizing shared beliefs
(humanitarian intervention). If the first one takes place, then we have to do
with a revisionist identity. Otherwise, if that war is meant to be for collective
purposes (such as the intervention in Kosovo) where a particular state (for
instance Germany) doesn t benefit solely, then we cannot identify revisionist
ideas. In sum, we have to attach the ideas of a particular state that it has in a
certain action. Moreover, in this article we concentrate on identity of great
powers and relations between these great powers. However, Zehfuss argument
is valid, to some extent, when it comes to describe a certain great power as a
collectivist or a status quo. Since there are no strict and ad hoc shifts from one
identity to another one, as nowadays identity of the great powers is mixed
between status-quo and collective one. This is the reason why we asserted that
51
in this study after Second World War, world politics contains great powers with
status quo and collectivist one. But, when it comes to revisionist identity, the
difference is obvious.

In his book Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt analyzed three types
of state identities: revisionist identity, status-quo, and collectivist one. These
types of identities are the one that bounded international politics. This identity
theory is important for international regimes because it asserts what kind of
interests Great Powers have. What follows is a summary of these identity
theories that Wendt represented in his book.

Revisionist states

The concept of international regimes before the Second World War can be
analysed in terms of the great powers behaviour. To analyse this behaviour we
will concentrate in a particular form of the identity theory. This form is
revisionist states. According to this theory, states will try to conquer each
other, territorial property rights will not be recognized, and weak states will
have a high death rate (Wendt 1999, p. 105). In this way, interests and
shared beliefs are not embedded within the international regimes but they will
bandwagon with other great powers to change the system (p. 105). Here
we can put states such as Germany and Japan, but also empires of XIX century.
This identity theory is compatible with constructivism since here interests and
shared beliefs, defined as in moderate constructivist framework, will be helpful
in determining the role of international regimes.

According to Wendt (p. 269), revisionist states are encircled by norms that are
similar with Hobbesian culture where interest of these states is in conquering
each other, at the limit in creating a world empire, and as such they are not
better off cooperating . Interests of these states are from human nature and
not in the meaning of shared ideas (p. 286-287). Moreover, here shared ideas
have different connotation representing the commonly known", for instance,
the institution of sovereignty is not shared in the sense of "accepted" by
revisionist states (p.286-287). In this way, regimes had an informal role since
they were constituted only through practices of the great powers and not by
frameworks of deliberation where regime creation would take place and
different agreements would serve long term interests. In general, beliefs and
interests of revisionist states can be explained under the anarchic culture of
Hobbes (p. 124). Wendt (p. 124) asserts that under this culture, these states
have desires of conquering and changing the rules of the game. These desires
and beliefs are a culturally constituted cognitions and to explain these aspect
Wendt (p. 124) turns to the socio-psychological aspects of states like the belief
of being a victim or the passions for glory .

Richard Rosecrance (in Nye 2005, p. 5) identified two ways of increasing power.
First, power can be increased by territorial conquest (revisionist states), as an
illustrative example is Japan and Germany. Second is by peaceful means
(status quo and collectivist states), where major powers can gain power without
waging wars. Here as examples are Japan and Germany again, where the
52
former became the second largest economy in the world. As it is mentioned in
the power/interests section, revisionist states are not attached to joint
institutions to advance their interests. This is because they are interested in
territorial gains, since powers and interests are mainly based on human nature
(Wendt 1999, p. 105). This human nature makes great powers to view power
and interests only for the materialistic Self and here the concept of self and
other , as it is in status-quo and collectivist identity, it is not present.
Therefore, the great powers were not interested in advancing their interests by
international regimes. Instead, they viewed regimes only as joint impacts to
halt their ambitions. The assertion of realism that powerful states use regimes
as means of power projection in this context, fails. Beside the existence of
these regimes, as we notice in illustrations, great powers didn t use regimes as
power projection. The revisionist beliefs are the reasons why Japan and
Germany didn t advance their interests primary by international regimes. As
Wendt asserted (see above), in revisionist identity ideas among countries (read
great powers) are not shared as accepted but as commonly known. In this way,
these ideas in an easy fashion can be rejected. To illustrate these theoretical
explanations of moderate constructivism, we described three samples of
regimes anterior WWII, where the role of revisionist great powers toward
international regimes is discerned.

Status quo and collectivist states

From the end of WWII, no war between major powers has occurred. In this
sense, new theories of international relations emerged to explain this situation.
While liberal institutionalism offered interdependence, Alexander Wendt focused
on identity theories. As we mentioned above, revisionist theory of state is
intended to explain the occurrences of politics before the end of WWII since this
period was identified with many great wars. But the period after WWII is much
complicated and it has no clear boundaries in states behavior. Therefore, here
are represented two identity theories of state: status-quo and collectivism one.

According to Alexander Wendt s thought (p. 105) represented in Social Theory

of International Politics, the status-quo states are the one who doesn t fight and
they get along with each other with the formula Live and let live . In an
anarchic situation they possess a culture that is called the Lockean one. An
attribute of this theory is the fact that states may get into security dilemmas
and arm races (Herz and Jervis in Wendt 1999, p. 105) but interests of this
culture are of that kind that no war occurs. According to Wendt, these states
are interested in material force, capabilities, therefore engagement in power
politics is obvious but their behavior doesn t degenerate in armed conflict since
shared ideas of these states (such as accepted institution of sovereignty) do
limit the behavior (Wendt 1999, p.269). Keohane (1984) represented
international regimes as a way of reducing uncertainty but this thought ignores
the fact represented by Wendt (1999, p. 108) that history exists and states
have knowledge about each other s interests and intended behavior by creating
an idea on the identity of a state whether it is a revisionist or status-quo.

53
This Lockean culture suggests that status quo states have self-help elements
but in the same time other-help because here states are not seen as enemies
but as rivals (p. 296). This type of identity theory allows us to explain the
concept of international regimes. In this way we claim that international
regimes became more important since great powers are advancing their
interests through peaceful manner. In this respect, theory of status quo states
will enable to see the attributes of great powers where these states are
interested on their own gains but not being warlike. But this theory alone will
not be helpful to explain ongoing politics. Thus, another state identity theory
will bring complementary insights.

Collective identity asserts that Self and Other are identified with each other by
accepted shared ideas (Turner in Wendt 1999, p. 229). Here states, through
homogeneity, are identified as a group (Wendt 1999, p. 352). States create a
group identity where self-restraint helps in creating common goals between Self
and the Other (p. 344). With other words, the Other is not a threat or risk of
Self. In this way states see themselves as encircled not by enemies (revisionist)
or rivals (status-quo) but by friendly states. As an example of this identity,
Wendt (p. 359) describes pluralistic security communities such as NATO. By
referring to individuals, Wendt (p. 163) asserts that states have commitment to
their group as individuals have commitment to the group they belong to since
there is a collective memory that generates patterns of behavior.

Combining collective and status quo identity, we can represent a better

illustration of states behavior and why they act in a different way in comparison
with revisionist states. Also, when we introduce the analogy it will be noticed a
process of socialization. In turn, this makes great powers to be more cautious
with each other s needs. For example, China decided to spend billions of dollars
to buy few Boeing planes in order to reduce the gap of trade imbalance with the
USA. Therefore, this form of identity will supplement status-quo identity since
there are some phenomena in international regimes that rivalry cannot explain.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, we argued that to understand the approach of moderate

constructivism towards international regimes, we have to give a primary
concern to identity theory. Liberal institutionalism is constrained by their
ontological and epistemological assertions, thus not giving a proper concern to
the role of ideas and identities that states may have during the history. To
overcome these gaps, moderate constructivism offered explanations that are
able to identify these ideas in different contexts. Analogies provided by liberal
institutionalism have ignored contextual aspects of states and their identities.
Great powers with revisionist identity were not interested in advancing their
interests by international regimes. Instead, they preferred war and
revolutionary change. This ended in the great wars and the meaningless of
regimes. And since history exists, these great powers have been able to learn
from the past and changing their behaviour towards international regimes, they
also began to socialize with the rules of regimes while constantly trying to
change prospects. These great powers, such as China, joined the trade regime
54
that is evolving from WTO because interests and power, as are defined by
moderate constructivism, exclude the narrow egoistic behaviour of the great
powers. Therefore, there is always possibility for change.

Trying to escape from this pessimistic view, liberal institutionalism asserted a

more adequate approach towards international regimes. With market failure,
Prisoner s Dilemma , and later incorporating a causal function of ideas liberal
institutionalism, stressed the ability of the great powers to cooperate. As Nye
has mentioned, liberals tend to write about trade regimes and they neglect
other regimes. And this is true because all analogies derive from economic
theories and these analogies tend to explain reasons of why egoistic states
cooperate to maximize interests. Nevertheless, liberalism does not answer our
questions such as why the existing regimes before Second World War failed to
perform their functions as uncertainty reducer. Moreover, introduced analogies
ignore contextual factors, learning, and the identities of the great powers. As
we mentioned, from classical liberalism to liberal institutionalism, trade and
emergence of regimes is seen as a way of avoiding war. But WWI and WWII
argued that even though regimes may exist, they do not prevent the
occurrence of war. Another argument against liberal institutionalism is the
maximization of interests. As Wendt mentioned, when states are in interaction
they cannot maximize interests. The only way of maximization of interests is
war where a state may impose to the defeated states unconditional requests.
This is the reason why the word advance suits better in analyzing the great
powers interests. A valuable critique is the concept of trade and issue.
Dunnoff (1999) argued that liberal institutionalism cannot explain more than
trade issues. Nowadays, many trade issues are related to other issues, such as
environment and in this context we can not speak for pure trade issues only. In
sum, by ignoring contextual factors, ideas and the concept of learning, liberal
institutionalism fails to see the difference between regimes before and after the
end of Second World War and identities of the Great Powers.

Finally, we offered an explanation of moderate constructivism. Constructivism

ignores the study of regimes respectively, transfers the study of international
regimes to social institutions. Nevertheless, conceptualizing in this way,
constructivists cannot escape from the profound criticism of Susan Strange on
international regimes. In this way, assertions of moderate constructivism had to
be accommodated in a proper way in order to make comprehensive theoretical
framework of regime analysis. This accommodation is enabled by Arthur Steins
concept of regimes and Alexander Wendt´s writings on the identity theory.

The concept of international regimes was designated to explain the cooperation

of states. Nevertheless, Susan Strange (1982) criticized this concept calling it
as woolly . Arthur Stein (1982) made the same criticism where the concept of
international regimes meant to explain all of international politics. Stein
formulated some principles when certain cooperation can be seen as a regime.
Also, Wendt, as other constructivists, views international regimes in terms of
institutions. Nevertheless, when he introduces the identity theory, he is writing
about specific institutions that are embedded in the identity of a state
depending on whether it is a revisionist, status quo, or a collectivist identity.
55
From combining Wendt s assertions with Stein s conceptualization of regimes
emerges a comprehensive conceptualization of regimes. In this way, we argued
that from moderate constructivism perspective we can explain the concept of
international regimes.

REFERENCES
Dunoff, J L 1999, The Death of the Trade Regime, European Journal of International
Relations, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 733-762.

Guzzini, S and Leander, A 2001, A Social Theory for International Relations: An appraisal
to Alexander Wendt s Theoretical and Disciplinary Synthesis, Journal of International
Relations and Development, December no. 4, pp. 316-338.

Hasenclever, A, Mayer, P & Rittberger, V 1996, Theories of International Regimes,

Cambridge , Cambridge University Press.

Goldstein, J & Keohane, R O (eds) 1993, Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions,
and political change, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Keohane, R O 2002, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, Routledge,

New York.

Keohane, R O 1984, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, at www.ebrary.com

Krasner, S D 1982, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as

Intervening Variables, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 185-205.

Little, R 2005 International Regimes , in The Globalization of World Politics: An

introduction to international relations. Third Edition, eds J Baylis & S Smith, Oxford
University Press, London, pp. 369-384.

Nye, J. S. Nuclear Learning and U.S. Soviet security Regimes, International

Organization, 41 (3): Summer 1987: pp. 371-402.

Puchala D J and Hopkins R F 1982, International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive

Analysis International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 245-275.

Reus-Smith C 1997, The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the

Nature of Fundamental Institutions International Organization, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 558-
589.

Stein, A A 1982, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,

International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 229-324.

Strange, S 1982, Hic Dragones! A Critique of Regime Analysis, International

Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, pp.479-496.

Wendt, A 1999, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge.

Zehfuss, M 2001, Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison. European Journal of

International Relations, vol. 7, no. 3, pp.315-348.

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Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No 1, 61- 74

Understanding the “EU democratic deficit”.

A two dimension concept on a three level-of-analysis.
Dorian Jano
dorian.jano@unimi.it

This paper acknowledges the still unsettled debate on the EU

democratic deficit by arguing that divergences among the
scholars emanate from the methodological and the conceptual
difficulties that the concept itself have when applied to the case
of EU. Given the lack of a common ground for understanding the
EU democratic deficit debate I propose an all-inclusive model
Democratic Deficit Space ) of how to understand the EU
democratic deficit arguments in the enormous already existing
literature. As a last but not least point this paper will suggest how
we need to look at the EU democratic deficit, putting the
emphasis on the deficit term rather than on the democracy
term.

Introduction

It was David Marquand who originally coined the famous phrase democratic
deficit as a term to underline the weakness of the democratic components in
then European Community Institutions (Bouwen, 2003, p. 3, footnote 4; Mény,
2002, p. 8). Since then the debate started to be a more vibrant topic of
discussion as it links up with very real concerns about the future of the EU in
light of enlargement fatigue and constitutional rejection (Schmidt, 2007). But
despite the importance of the issue and the vast literature written on the EU
democratic deficit we still have a perplexed rather than an illuminated
understanding on the topic. This is because the democratic deficit literature not
only encompasses great disputes about whether there is a democratic deficit or
not, it rather has created more ambiguity and confusion on what the concept is
really referred to. Such confusion is primarily and foremost a matter of
methodological and conceptual difficulties. If the former difficulty is related
more to the preferences and viewpoints on EU, the latter problem is more a
result of the undefined character of the concept of democracy itself adding here
also the impreciseness of the deficit magnitude .1

1
First, the democratic deficit is a powerful catchword, which can be easily manipulated by all those
who are not fully satisfied with the working of European institutions (Mény, 2002, p. 8), a second
problem stems from a false conception of what democracy is (Mény 2002, p. 9). Mény (2002, p. 9)
puts also forward the argument of the imprecise character of the deficit concept that can be found
in the literature.
57
Many of the scholars recognizing such shortcomings have return over and again
to the debate of EU democratic deficit. Most of them tackle the issues of
conceptualization as a second order concern; while even fewer stress the
importance of methodologically correctness (Majone 1998 is an exception)2.
The main concern and importance of this enormous literature seem to be the
outcome (the what question) rather than the process to arrive at it (the how
question). Scholars are preoccupied and concentrated more on refining and\or
adding more other arguments in support or against a democratic deficit in EU.
But as Majone stresses out regardless of their substantive merits, all proposed
solutions are methodologically flawed because they take for granted what is, in
fact, contestable and in need of justification (1998, p. 6). Given the state of
art, adding other arguments on whether EU suffers from a democracy deficit or
not seems worthless discussing unless the methodological and conceptual
issues have been primarily clarified and looked up in details.

Speaking of a democratic deficit we need to understand firstly, what the

concept means since only few clarify what exactly constitutes a democratic
deficit in their opinion (Crombez 2003, p. 103) and secondly but also equally
important is to clarify the context in which such concept is applied. That is why
in this paper I focus mostly on what democratic deficit does mean per se and
in the EU context. To be more specific, what scholars refer to when they speak
for or against an EU democratic deficit? This paper will have fulfill its aim if it
gets to help the reader direct on how one need to read and understand the
already existing literature and arguments put forward so far on the EU
democratic deficit debate.

Acknowledging that consensus remains obscure at the level of diagnosing if

there is or not a real democratic deficit in the EU I will suggest that we better
reject this white or black portrait and rather look at the democratic deficit as a
term conceptualizing the need for improving the institutions and polity building
in EU.

The challenges and how to deal with the issue

Dealing with the democratic deficit question two issues need to be highlighted
and explicitly said. The first concerns the concept itself and the later refers to
the meaning and characteristics attributed to the European Union. Reading the
literature on democratic deficit these two issues seems to be widely open and
problematic. From the one hand, there is the conceptual problem of what
democratic deficit is itself. On the other hand, there are methodological
difficulties, related to the unit of analysis, on how to assess this concept in the
case of EU. Unless these two crucial issues are settled and get a wide scholarly
consensus we may endlessly debate on the issue losing the point. In order to
address these challenges I will unfold the concept of democracy into its

2
The key question which has been raised in [his] paper is whether it is realistic and
methodologically correct to assess the legitimacy [(democratic deficit)] of present institutions and
policy-making processes with reference to norms that are largely irrelevant today and may not
become relevant in the future (Majone 1998, p. 27).
58
compound elements as well as distinguish between different levels-of-analysis
EU is approached. For doing so I review and make use of the already existing
literature with a final aim at mapping the debate into a three-dimension model,
which I will call the democratic deficit space in the EU context. The democratic
deficit space in the case of EU is nothing but a simplified representation of both
the academic and political debate focusing on the two main elements of the
concept of democracy (institutional and socio-cultural dimension) and on the
three levels-of-analysis EU has been considered (state-like, sui generis or
international organization-like). In order to picture the complexity of the issue I
will begin by discussing separately each term of the democratic deficit concept.
The first task will be to analytically distinguish the two dimensions of the
democratic concept found in the academic literature while the second will be to
argue on the term deficit. Then I will move to relate this two terms in a
graphical representation, that of a democratic deficit space . The subsequent
step will be to put the concept into the context of European Union since
academics have been referred to EU in many different ways.

Two dimensions of democracy and the meaning of deficit

As Føllesdal and Hix (2006, p. 534) have observe there is no single meaning of
the democratic deficit . That is why to decipher the claims and counter-claims
of the debate one has to go beyond the label and observe the content behind
these claims. Mény (2002), in trying to provide an understanding of the
democratic deficit concept makes a useful distinction between demos and
check-and-balance element. As he has argued, these two elements are the two
fundamental pillars of democracy as all of the today s democracies are made
up of a mix of popular and constitutionalist elements (Mény, 2002, p. 3).
Pointing to these elements of democracy may be a useful starting tool to map
the already existing literature into two main categories since the debate on the
EU s democratic deficit has usually centred on the absence of a European
demos and [or] the shortcomings of its institutional arrangements (Bellamy,
2006, p. 725). From the one side there is the institutional approach stressing
the institutional imbalance of the EU institutions and from the other side it is
the socio-cultural approach pointing the absent of a European demos. Although
it has to be admitted that the arguments on both, demos and check-and-
balance element sometimes are mingled and do not always have a clear cut. At
this present time I prefer to portray them separately, re-taking them at a later
moment where I will build the democratic deficit space model as a trade off
between the two (institutional and socio-cultural) dimensions.

Institutional dimension of democracy

Scholars that have employed in their analysis the institutional dimension

particularly argue on the (non)weakness of the structure and\or the functions of
the EU institutions. The structure of EU institutions and the way they function
has raised the concern about the transparency, accountability and legitimacy of
EU itself.

59
The argument about the structure of the EU institutions refers to the balance of
power between the EU Commission, Council and European Parliament. The
overall question is if the present balance of the three EU institutions leaves
enough room for the citizens voice to be heart since, democracies are, above
all, the expression of popular will and choice (cited in Mény, 2002, p. 3). Those
who support the present EU configuration have been arguing that all EU
institutions are under direct or indirect democratic control (Moravcsik-ECSA
Review 2000). The will of the peoples can and is expressed, indirectly and
strongly through the national executives sitting in the Council of Ministers and
directly, although much more weakly, through the elected members of the
European Parliament (Schmidt, 2004, p. 983). On the whole, the most
disputable issue centers on whether European Parliament should take a greater
role or not. The present deficit of EU institutional structure refers to the partial
integration of the European Parliament in legislative decision making since
despite the numerous procedures EU uses, the European Parliament only
participates in a few of them and is not the decisive legislator in the procedures
in which it does participate (cited in König, 2007, p. 422). Some scholars argue
that the limited ability of the European Parliament to legislate and to control the
executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers leaves EU lack
electoral accountability (cited in Bellamy, 2006, p. 725).

Other scholars admit that the problem of the democratic deficit may rest not on
the institutional setup of the EU but rather on the functioning of its institutions
(Crombez, 2003, p. 115). Such arguments focus more on the procedural
aspects of the EU institutions which bears a set of problems. Many scholars
have noticed that EU institutions, especially the Council of Ministers, suffer
from too much secrecy (Sbragia cited in Zweifel, 2002, p. 817). The
transparency on the decision-making process or an excess of delegation in the
legislative process has been a strong critic showing that a democratic deficit of
the EU may exist precisely owing to these problems (Crombez, 2003, p. 101).
It is the complexity and distance of European decision-making that at minimum
weakens the potential for EU-wide democracy.

But to a deeper critic, beyond the weaknesses of the EU procedures rest the
argument of the EU legitimacy, both procedural and substantive since there is
insufficient trust in EU institutions. This legitimacy is being question both on the
inputs and the outputs of the Union. Those arguing that EU lacks legitimacy in
its output (effectiveness) see this primarily because of its failure to provide
social justice (cited in Majone- ECSA Review 2000). While those who see EU
losing legitimacy in the input rather than in the output speaks primary about
the lack of more EU democratic institutions.3

Socio-cultural dimension of democracy

Beside the institutional dimension the concept unfolds another major

dimension, that of socio-cultural factors. Employing such an approach the

3
Traditionally [what EU lacks is] the need to justify the EU through more democratic institutions
(Moravcsik- ECSA Review 2000).
60
analysis have put the stress mostly on (the lack of) demos, public sphere and
few on community-building (see for example Etzioni 2007)4. Such literature
suggests that the EU does not function well as a democracy because there is
no European public opinion, no European electorate and no European demos
(cited in Crombez, 2003, p. 105 and Bellamy, 2006, p. 725). The attributes of
the socio-cultural dimension range from the simplest to more complex elements
of socio-cultural cohesion

It has been argued, that demo-cracy as a term in itself implies the presence of
a demos otherwise the term would be meaningless. The no-demos assumption
holds that the lack and more the potential impossibility of a demos in Europe -
since demos is not a given, but historically constructed (Zweifel, 2002, p.
819), - is in fact enough to speak of a democratic deficit in EU. In the absence
of demos, that is of people who do not belong to a political constituted
community, it has been argued that there can be neither a democratic
sovereignty (cited in Cohen & Sabel, 2003, p. 703) nor a democratic
legitimacy (Offe and Preuss, 2006). Such arguments have been widely
criticized as being traditional and populist, pointing so to the new, more liberal
components that we need to look at when evaluating if there is a democratic
deficit or not (Mény, 2002, p. 11).

On more sophisticated arguments the issue of demos is related to the relations

between citizens and EU institutions since a bigger problem is the lack of a
connection between the growing democratic politics inside the European
Parliament and EU Council and the views of the public (Føllesdal and Hix,
2006, p. 553). It has been argued that public have very little influence and
involvement on the decision-making process creating so an insufficient trust in
EU institutions (Zweifel, 2002, p. 818). This mistrust is observed in the
steadily decline of the European parliamentary elections turnouts (Cohen and
Sabel, 2003, p. 697) as well as on the unhappiness expressed by
Eurobarormeters polls (Offe and Preuss, 2006).

A second reading on the socio-cultural dimension of the democratic deficit

refute to talk of demos, it rather prefers to argue by a more ambitious idea of
democracy, that of polity-building as the EU political entity. This new vision is
based, rather than in homogeneity, in the idea of solidarity grounded in the
mutual recognition of otherness (Offe and Preuss, 2006, p. 31). This
presupposes that the EU polity has achieved a considerable degree of maturity
as a political system that has come to exercise classical functions of political
systems, (such as the production of public policy) with regulatory politics as the
central pillar of the EU s political activity (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006, p.
35). But the questions arising here is if we can speak of a polity without a
coherent public space and a lack of community building.

Although there is a widely accepted view that indeed there is a developing

European public sphere, this is seen skeptically since it is made of European

4
Etzioni (2007) argue that European Union is suffering not just from a democratic deficit, but a
community deficit .
61
Member State publics rather than some idealized single public (Risse cited in
Schmidt, 2004, p. 992). EU beside the formal engagements in EU election does
not go further to build a polity. EU has not encouraged, beyond the formalities
of elections, the creation of an engaged European public sphere debating the
future of a European polity (Cohen and Sabel, 2003, p. 697). In an Europe that
is becoming with time ever wider it is more easily to see a heterogeneous public
composition across an European space rather than a compact polity. The
problem that arises here is that such incompatible (divergent) polity has little
ability to engage at EU issues and on the other side EU have little opportunity
to speak directly to its polity.

More advanced arguments are put forward arguing on a lack of affinity with EU.
It has been notice that EU citizens lack a feeling of belonging to a (single)
community (Moravcsik, 2004, p. 361). Føllesdal (nodate) argues that present
domestic democratic arrangements (that is, European-wide Political Rights and
EU citizenship) are insufficient. He also finds that Europeans share thick values
and sense of community, and often carrying several loyalties arguing that such
broad more universally shared values does not necessary build a community.
The point of a community deficit - that is, the lack of shared values and bonds-
will be stressed by Etzioni (2007) as an important factor that will contribute to a
more democratic and stable EU. It is necessary to invest in the civic dimension
of community-building, giving so importance in the we-feeling and the
community argument, in order to give individuals a reason to care about EU
politics (Moravcsik, 2004, p. 361). The existence of minimum level of we-
feeling seems important since citizens with some sort of distinctive share
values and sentimental bond will give much substance and validity to the EU.

The deficit meaning of democracy

If this first dichotomy explains the content of the concept of democracy it

cannot capture the notion of deficiency. As it can be observed from the
literature and is also mentioned by others (Crombez, 2003, p. 103) all scholars
in a way or another imply the presumed existence of a democratic deficit as
part of their arguments but nobody really dared to discuss the magnitude of
this gap (Mény, 2002, p. 9). The debate has been and still remained normative
with quite divergent interpretations concerning the nature and the quality of
the deficit (Gianfranco, 2001). Although the discourse tries to put emphases
more on the deterministic nature of the problem, a yes or a no answer, it still
indirectly points on a number of elements characterizing the deficit concept.
Zweifel in his article tries to build on these elements and set up a measure of
democracy but which he himself recognize that this scale do not measure the
real issue (2002, p. 834). At best its purpose has been a comparison between
other polities and the EU (Zweifel, 2002) not if the EU suffers from a
democratic deficit per se. That is why there is no given all-encompassing scale
to measure this deficit rather than there are normative assessments. But even
these standards for a norm deficit's assessment are diverse and yet unsettled.
Although Majone (1998) wrote on the issue of standards, Føllesdal and Hix will
re-assess them with the aim to bring a contemporary standard version of the

62
democratic deficit (2006, p. 533). So what we are left here are only disputable
models to which we can at best refer to.

Democratic deficit space : a trade off between the institutional and

social-cultural dimensions

So how can we at least understand what the literature in EU democratic deficit

is all about? Is there a way to map all these argument into a single model? At
this point what may be helpful is to graphically represent the normative
(qualitative) evaluation of the two previous dimensions where deficit is nothing
but a matter of degree 5 of the two dimensions.

The magnitude of the deficit (that is the range of characteristics of each of the
two dimensions) graphically is represented in the longitude of a vector, where
each (horizontal and vertical) vectors embody cumulatively adding each of the
elements discussed (institutional and socio-cultural) while the space in between
can capture the democratic deficit debate which is nothing but any degree of
combinations of the two elements (See figure 1). The assumption here is that
any polity can suffer of a democratic deficit (Radu, 2006, p. 3) and this
democratic deficit can be graphically represented by the area in the democratic
deficit space . Any other point falling out of this bounded space does not suffer
from a democratic deficit. An ideal democracy type still makes part of the model
of democratic deficit space but out of the bounded space created by combining
any two critical (minimal) points a dimension may have. In such case the
combination of dimensions elements depends on ones own evaluations, that is,
where one puts the critical points on both of the dimension. An ideal democracy
model should be rather a system overcoming both of the minimum institutional
and socio-cultural thresholds (in the figure 1, showed as I* and S*). A
satisfactory equilibrium between these two points is not yet fixed. Different
authors discuss and argue precisely on this point of equilibrium. Some believe
that the problem rest on the institutional dimension and some on the polity
dimension. While there are also others who see both of these dimension
interchangeably. What is even more within a dimension is that there is a wide
range of elements being argued to lack in the EU case creating so the space
deficit composed of combining elements. This deficit spoken by the scholars
regards any or both of the dimensions and it is amplified across the two
dimensions regarding different attributes that compose each dimension
depending on one s normative standpoint of what constitute a democracy. The
democratic deficit space is not a deterministic concept but at least it can map
the scholarly argument in a qualitative way (virtually) catching all the
arguments. The answer rest on whether there will be a consensus on how much
the institutional balance and to what degree polity-building is needed for EU.

5
Here we have to acknowledge, as Sartori has pointed out, that the use of it is a matter of degree
phraseology and of the continuum image leave us with qualitative-impressionistic statements
which do not advance us by a hair's breadth toward quantification (1970: 1036).
63
 Figure 1: Democratic deficit space as a trade off between the
institutional and social-cultural dimension
Notes:
The vector Institutional dimension represents
I* the democratic degree of the EU institutions

The vector Socio-cultural dimension

Institutional dimension

represents the degree of Polity-building.

Democratic deficit space I* is the minimal institutional threshold one

as a trade off bet ween the two puts on Institutional characteristics
dimensions: (institutional and S* is the minimal socio-cultural threshold one
social-cultural) puts on polity characteristics

Any combination below the two threshold falls

S* into the democratic deficit space which is far
from any ideal democratic type one puts
Soci o-cultural dimension forward.

Democratic deficit space in the EU context: the three levels of

analyses

Adding to the conceptualization problem the term democratic deficit embeds,

we have to consider also the methodological difficulty we face when applying
such (democratic deficit) concept into a particular context (the European
Union). The problem becomes more acute in the EU context because one had to
deal with a fuzzy object under investigation. The ever-long disagreements on
what the EU itself is still exist because there is no academic consensus over
the EU s elusive ontology (Chryssochoou, 2002, p.1). What we are being left
here is only a term which unfortunately, does not help us to understand the
genuinely political character of the EU. In such a case any researcher that deals
with EU issues has firstly to resolve the puzzle of whether and if EU is or at
least resembles more a state-like entity or an international organization; or
rather considering it an entity in its own. Different from the previous
discussions, what is at stake here is not the presence or absence of a given
dimension of the concept but it is more a matter of establishing the unit of
analysis. The EU being an unidentified political object - as claimed once by
Jacques Delors,- have left open choices to the researcher to choose from which
angel to approach. This raised the level-of-analysis problem6 that is why before
evaluating any argument we first have to identify at what level the scholars are
making their case.

6
The level-of-analysis problem is concerned with the choice and limitations of particular units of
analysis (Moul, 1973, p. 494).
64
The argument and counter-argument speaking rather in favour or against a
democratic deficit has been developed at three major levels-of-analysis; namely
state-like, sui generis and international organization-like approach. For
Moravcsik the EU is merely an international organization and he analyses EU as
such. While Majone does accept the state-like analysis only by analogy (1998)
but he do this because to cite him we are still groping for normative criteria
appropriate to the sui generis character of the European Community (1998, p.
6). Føllesdal and Hix on their response to Majone and Moravcsik, have raised
the concerns about their level-of-analysis arguing that Majone s views of the
EU democratic deficit are logical extensions of his general regulatory politics
theory of the EU, while Moravcsik s views of the democratic deficit are
extensions of his liberal-intergovernmental theory (2006, p. 541). On the
other side, Zielonka s main critics on Føllesdal and Hix arguments rest precisely
on the same issue, that of the level of analysis, arguing that they try to apply
state-like democratic recipes to a polity that is not a state (2007, p. 203). He
himself prefers to take a sui generis approach where the union is seen as a
prototype of post-modern, multi-level, polycentric governance that is
decentralized, flexible, deliberative, informal, inclusive and non-territorial
(Zielonka, 2007, p. 187). But the sui generis level-of-analysis does not rest
unproblematic. As Zweifel argues, seeing the EU as sui generis has still
shortcomings since such an approach treats EU in a vacuum and fail to compare
it to other polities (2002, p. 812), turning us once more to the state-like level-
of-analysis. This brings us back to where we started, at both Majone and
Moravcsik first arguments. Such controversies are close cycle where everyone
brings its counter-arguments which, in many cases, more than frontal try to
confront the scholars choice level-of-analysis, that is if what they are refereeing
is a state-like, sui generis, or international organization.

It is to be noticed here the double-side argument. Although they argue about

the EU democratic deficit they still need a second ideal or relative democratic
model to compare at. These later depend still on the authors choice. It is
precisely the choice and the approach (state, sui generis, international
organization) that has raised so many disputes. One may find them disagree on
which level should EU be compare rather than on the essence of if there is a
democratic deficit or not. Just to mention one, for example Marovcik and
Zweifel both agree that there is not a democratic deficit on the EU but they
disagree on the level-of-analysis. Most of the discourses and divergences
among the scholars are not about EU democratic deficit itself, they are rather
related to the model one is refereeing to. My point here is that one has to be
careful in accepting or rejecting any argument since they are contextual-
embedded on the level-of-analysis one has chosen. The point here is that one
should be, if possible, explicit about his choice on the type of polity he is
refereeing to EU and the model comparing with. How EU would be depicted and
with what it will be compared will have an effect on whether we can speak or
not about a democratic deficit. Gerring s proposition seems to perfectly fit here,
reminding us that what one finds is contingent upon what one looks for, and
what one looks for is to some extent contingent upon what one expects to find
(2004, p. 351).

65
At the current stage, since EU remains still a disputable political entity (in the
scholarly debates) it seems plausible that either of the approach may be
employed. Figure 2 graphically represent the democratic deficit space model
separately at the three levels-of-analysis EU can be conceptualized. This
distinction between different levels-of-analysis suggests explicit referent (state
or sui generis or international organization) which may be used for the purpose
of comparison by analogy. Presenting the issue this way will help us better
know how to appraise the arguments on the democratic deficit on the bases of
the level-of-analysis one has selected.

Figure 2: Democratic Deficit Space in the EU context

International
Organization-like level

Sui Generis level

I*
State-like level
Institutional dimension

Democratic deficit Space

as a trade off bet ween the two
dimensions: (institutional and
social-cultural)
at the three levels-of-analysis

S*
Socio-cultural dimension

A graphical representation of the debate on EU democratic deficit comprising the democratic

deficit space (institutional and polity dimensions of democracy) separately at the three levels of
analysis (State-like, Sui Generis and International Organization)

Suggestions on what the Democratic Deficit argument can stand for

in the case of EU

Unless we want to speak of a democratic deficit we need to compare it to

something. The question is compare to what? First of all we miss an ideal-type
of democracy, and what is more although scholarly literature provide us with
some minimal criteria, they are questionable. Secondly, given the undefined
character of EU what we can do at best is compare by analogy. The divergences
found in the literature rises precisely on these two points: what standard and
which analogy best fit our case?

66
 Since the mid-1990s when Weiler and his colleagues set out what they called a
standard version of the democratic deficit (cited in Føllesdal and Hix, 2006, p.
534) many other scholars had return to them aiming at re-viewing. Even after
Majone s (1998) standards re-setting, the debate on the democratic deficit
continued with the latest Føllesdal and Hix (2006) upgrading standard version
of the democratic deficit. As Majone has pointed out to speak of re-setting the
standards is to suggest that the debate about Europe s democratic deficit is still
in the standard-setting stage (Majone, 1998, p. 6) that is we still are in the
normative type of analysis and arguing. This has left behind the empirical
analysis (with few exceptions, see Zweifel 2002). Such a lack of empirical
measurements is legitimized since as Sartori suggests we cannot measure
unless we first know what it is that we are measuring (Sartori, 1970, p.1038).
But is it useful to endless continue with this re-assessment debate or should
we, as Mény (2002, p. 11) suggests, turn to a new concept of post-national
democracy ? Before any term abandonment may be helpful that once more we
refer to the origin from were the term came. That is, Marquand analysis of the
functioning of the EU (then EC) institutions in order to underline the weakness
of their democratic components; since then the EU - a political entity in motion
- has increasingly taken measures to rectify the democratic deficiencies
(Eriksen, 2006, p. 20). Pointing to the weakness or gap and to the expectations
or requirements for improvement may be more useful. Rather than stressing on
the democratic term we better stress the deficit term, meaning something
required or expected 7. As such, democratic deficit in the case of the European
Union should be conceptualized in the broad context as a term assessing the
European Union's performance not the EU democracy. This seems to be a
characteristic shared also by the literature since almost all use the presumed
existence of a democratic deficit as part of their arguments (Crombez, 2003, p.
103). Even those that does not find a democratic deficit in the European Union
find problems and speak of a need for an improvement of the actual status quo8
either through reforming the institutions or by bringing more community
integration. Picturing the debate more as the half-full or half-empty glass
argument doesn t change the real essence, that of the need for improvement.

Conclusion

In this paper I had required to bring some clarity to the debate on the EU
democratic deficit by trying to map up the already existing literature on EU
democratic deficit issue. What I have tried to do is utilizing the enormous
literature thus to unfold the concept of democracy. Both, the institutional
approach that stresses the institutional imbalance of the EU institutions and the
socio-cultural approach that points at the absent of a European demos have

7
This is one of the meanings of the term deficit in the Compact Oxford English Dictionary.
8
The authors that argue that there is no democratic deficit admit that there are still problems and
there is a need for improvement. For example Zweifel (2002, p. 812) admits that there is much
room for improvement ; while for Crombez (2003, p. 117) the democratic deficit is, in the first
place, a problem of lack of information and excess of delegation ; such statements enforce more and
more Mény s idea that nobody can deny that there is a real problem (2002, p. 11) in the EU.
67
been considered. I accept these two different interpretations as two elements of
the term democracy which if mingle together portray us the democratic deficit
space . The logic behind this democratic deficit space is that we need to relay
on a number of elements (institutional and socio-cultural) when speaking of a
(democratic) deficit. This model is still a normative representation and depends
on scholars assessment. Furthermore, when it has been applied into the EU
case it has become even more contextual depending on the level-of-analysis
one has chosen since scholars approach EU differently; some consider it an
entity in its own while others more a state-like entity or even an international
organization.

As outlined here, the issue remains still open and very broad without a definite
answer on whether we can speak of an EU democratic deficit. But what we can
propose at this stage, which is also a shared characteristic of the existing
literature, is the need for improving the institutions and polity building in EU.

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Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No 1, 75-85

Minority rights in world politics:

group or individual rights?
Corina Rebegea
corinarebegea@yahoo.com

Minority rights are a very sensitive issue for the international

community in the context of the recognition and protection
afforded to human rights. As the only internationally recognized
rights-holders are the states, the recognition of minority groups as
rights-holders would challenge the established principles of
sovereignty, territorial integrity and statehood. Consequently,
minority rights are constructed through international and regional
documents from an individualistic perspective in order to project a
certain notion of citizenship, sovereignty, nationhood or autonomy.
International and regional documents deal with the rights of
persons belonging to minorities, rather than with minorities as
such, a concept still in search of a clear-cut definition.

Introduction

Human rights can be considered to have a subversive force on the established

principles of state sovereignty. International recognition of human rights broke
the exclusive tie between the individual and the state in that the way in which a
state treated its citizens became a matter of international scrutiny. On the other
hand, minority rights movements (especially powerful after the end of the Cold
War) challenged state pre-eminence once more by bringing into discussion
principles such as self-determination, territorial integrity and again sovereignty.
The idea of minorities as groups seeking recognition on the international arena
raises very interesting issues regarding the type of entities which are entitled to
rights and the types of rights they may possess. What kind of rights are
minority rights, group or individual rights?

In a world in which precedents make the rule while the established norms are
hailed, the question above reaches beyond the purely theoretic conundrum. The
rapid multiplication of collectivities claiming to be right-holders and the
increasing importance of identity place both recognized minority groups and
states in a complex and problematic circumstance. The clash of identities and
the quest for recognition demands increased attention and a new type of
management of minority issues especially in the historic context of emerging
group identities and maybe even new nations. It becomes apparent not only in
international law, by which only states can be considered legitimate rights-
holders qua groups, but also in theoretical circles that the central problem is
where to place minorities on the axis from individual to state, if ever should
they take a position between the two.

71
Given the political and normative complexity of minority issues, exploring the
problem of the type of rights that should be accorded to minorities becomes
extremely cogent. From the perspectives of both political theory and political
practice, the question regarding the entities that should possess rights and the
types of rights that should be recognized remains unaddressed with respect to
minorities despite this flux of normative instruments. The importance of norms
and legal instruments is not only given by their regulative meaning, but also by
their political implications and the maintenance of a certain stability or status-
quo. Nevertheless, this regulative meaning of norms impacts on the formation
of identities and interests, individual or group ones.

This article will approach the problem of minority rights as reflected in

international documents and practices and it will show that minority rights are
constructed within these documents through the perspective of individual
human rights so as to preserve a certain political status-quo. More precisely
minority rights are not considered group rights, as the only authentic
internationally recognized group rights are those of states. This means that
instead of really addressing the problem of minorities by offering a framework
of defining and interpreting the nature of minority rights, the practice of
international politics and the norms governing it frame minority rights in such a
way as to preserve the current understanding of basic principles of international
law: self-determination, territorial integrity, sovereignty. The basic
constructivist assumption utilized in this paper is that norms have an important
role in consolidating the structures of political order and that the social
environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings define behaviour
and identities (Wiener 2003).

In order to show that minority rights are constructed within international norms
in such a manner as to respond to sovereignty concerns of states this article
will follow a triple strategy. First of all it will address definitional issues
concerning minorities, groups and their rights. Secondly, it will identify the
main problems for the principles of sovereignty that are attached to the
international recognition of minority rights as group rights. Thirdly, the
perspective on minority rights as constructed in international instruments will
be analyzed from the point of view of individual-centred approaches.

One more specification is necessary at this point. In this essay the concept of
minority is understood in its broadest sense without addressing issues of
different types of minorities and their different entitlements. However, the
international documents seem to leave the interpretation of the concept of
minority to national governments (taking mainly a historic stance). The
emergence of new groups claiming the status of minorities (such as life-style
minorities or people with disabilities) poses further problems for the existing
interpretations of minority rights, already contested and very problematic. The
issue of definition is controversial and remains largely un-addressed in
international documents, as will be shown later in this article, despite the fact
that giving a clear-cut definition of minorities would clarify not only which
groups are minorities, but also to what types of rights they are entitled.
72
Minority rights - a definition bid

There are several components of a possible definition of minorities that can be

identified notwithstanding the different typologies: a numerical component, an
identity component, a sense of self-preservation, a non-voluntary character, a
temporal and sometimes territorial component. There is another general
characteristic of minorities, the relational component, which complicates the
idea of minority rights in that it can only be understood by opposition with
some other groups. This relational component can either be a numerical
disproportion between two or more groups of people (Vizi 2002, p. 40), a
political imbalance or ethnicity issue. A widely accepted definition of minority
groups is that offered by Francesco Capotorti, a Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in
1977, but it s a working definition not one agreed upon in a binding document:

A group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State and
in a non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic, religious or
linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population
and who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language. (Lerner 2003, p. 8)

The definition is formulated widely enough to include the basic characteristics

so that a group could be considered a minority whether in terms of ethnicity,
race, culture, or religion. It does however leave a lot of room for interpretations
as to the number of people who can form a minority or what does a non-
dominant position presuppose (it may well be applicable to some majorities,
such as women). A further question would be whether the criteria are
cumulative or just some of them would do for a group to be considered a
minority. Moreover, the definition leaves aside the issue of territorial
concentration which is one of the most problematic aspects in dealing with
minority rights.

Thus recognizing minority rights raises many difficulties because on the one
hand it is not readily obvious which types of collectivities constitute minorities,
and on the other hand, it is extremely problematic to establish on the basis of
which moral or legal considerations we should give rights to minorities/groups.
We can t explore all the facets of this issue, but it s worth pointing at the
relevance of having all these problems in mind when addressing minority rights
in world politics.

Group rights within the theoretical debate

Minority rights have either been seen from an individualistic point of view, or a
collectivist one, a theoretical duality with broad political implications. The
former sees individuals as the only possible right-owners due to their moral
capacity (for instance Carl Wellman) or inherent worth (from a Kantian
perspective). Mainly focused on the moral standing of right-owners Peter Jones
sees the rights of a group qua group only making sense because of the
73
individuals who form the group and their eventual need for protection against
vulnerability due to group membership (Jones 2000, pp. 202-203).
Consequently groups or group rights can only have an instrumental value for
advancing individual rights. However, Jones seems to agree that there are
group rights but with a necessary clarification between what he calls collective
group rights and corporate group rights. The collective approach promotes the
idea that individuals enjoy their human rights collectively but the individuals
moral standing grounds the allocation of group rights.

The second understanding is that of corporate group rights, by which the group
has an identity and moral standing independent from its members which is not
based on the individual identity, but on that of the group (Jones 1999, pp. 86-
87). This brings us to the second perspective on minorities and groups, with far
less adepts (Vernon Van Dyke), which sees groups as entities entitled to have
different sorts of rights that are both different from and non-reducible to
individual rights. He claims that group rights should be the foundation of any
theory of the state and that when we talk about the rights of representation or
to self-determination of a certain community we are committing ourselves to
the position that groups have moral rights (Van Dyke 2000, pp. 34-45). This
however does not explain the nature of group rights. This debate between
individual and group rights informs (and is informed by) the political debates
and has an obvious impact on the implementation of minority rights.

Whatever the perspective, there is a certain number of rights associated with

minorities: a right to existence, to representation, to preserve its traditions,
culture, language and identity, to internal self-determination (Lerner 2003, pp.
39-41) and very rarely to form their own states.

Group rights in international documents

The discussion of minority rights in international politics is extremely important

because giving rights to groups other than states, but which might have similar
claims, such as self-determination, would completely change the principle of
inviolability of the states territorial and political integrity. But before turning to
these problems, it is worth pointing out that there is a noticeable increase in
the attention towards minorities and their rights in international politics,
especially after the end of the Cold War.

Under the UN system, the idea of minority protection reflected the impact of the
Second World War and a first concern for the treatment of minorities appears in
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
which addresses expressly in article 2 the importance of group membership
from the perspective of human rights and rights violations. This idea of group
membership and its repercussions on the exercise of rights is on the other hand
inherent to all UN documents under the general clause of non-discrimination.

The first direct reference to minority groups and their rights appears in article
27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Only in 1992, a
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
74
and Linguistic Minorities was adopted, although it hasn t constituted a major
impact on the existing understanding of minority rights. To these we can add
documents adopted by regional organisations, such as the OSCE (minority
clauses appear in all its working documents) or the Council of Europe (the 1995
Framework Convention on Minorities), as well as instruments concerning non-
discrimination. However, although the importance of group/cultural belonging is
recognized, the individual (and not groups) remains the right-holder. Moreover
these documents fail to give a clear definition of minorities and minority rights
and thus avoid a commitment towards minority claims. In what follows we will
look at the construction of minority rights within these international documents.

Minority rights as group rights raise difficult problems for the world of sovereign
states which can be addressed at several levels. First of all there is a
fundamental principle of self-determination to which only peoples are entitled.
Secondly, the distinction between minorities and nations or peoples is not clear-
cut. Thirdly, states are already facing problems of domestic jurisdiction in the
field of human rights (Pentassuglia 2002, p. 303) with the creation of supra-
national human rights organizations and courts and minority rights put more
strains on the existing understanding of sovereignty. All three aspects are
interrelated and have serious repercussions on the practice of international
relations and interpretation of international law (for instance the problem of
double standards) at least at three levels: recognizing minorities as such,
protecting individuals and groups from massive abuses of their rights,
recognizing a right to external self-determination and the formation of new
sovereign states.

The principle of self-determination is inscribed in article 1(2) of the UN Charter

and the two International Covenants and it is seen as a right of a community to
conduct its own business without interference. By guaranteeing this principle
the UN took a slightly different approach than the way self-determination was
understood under the League of Nations. While after the First World War this
principle was meant to contribute to the formation of new independent states
and was strictly connected with the idea of minority rights, both the rights to
have their own nation and that of being protected inside a newly created state
(Kovacs 2003, p. 436), self-determination had to do more with non-interference
in internal affairs of states after the Second World War. Thus, it meant an
absence of outside constraints (external self-determination) and the possibility
to make collective choices concerning the form of government or political
system, i.e. internal self-determination (Preda 2003, p. 206). Article 1(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: All peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development .

The danger of supporting the creation of collective rights for national minorities
would be the reinterpretation of this principle as to mean a trespass on the
right of states to choose their own form of political organisation (Jackson
Preece 1997, p. 354) by giving certain rights of self-government to minorities,
on the internal dimension, but also a possible claim to secession, which is not
75
recognized by international law. Moreover, there is a general acceptance of the
notion of statehood which emphasizes the loyalty of citizens (including
members of minorities) towards their state (Vizi 2002, p. 41). Obviously this is
incompatible with the existence of groups claiming rights that interfere with this
unitary state doctrine. The (probably deliberate) lack of an agreed definition of
minorities leaves the interpretation of self-determination to the will of
governments representing the whole people belonging to its territory without
any distinctions (Jackson Preece 1997, p. 348). This brings us to the second
problem of group rights for minorities: the differentiation between minorities
and peoples.

Sovereignty v. minority rights

The theoretical approaches concerning terms like nation, nationality, people etc.
are extremely vast and definitions are not clearly cut and generally agreed
upon. Some authors see no inherent difference between national minorities and
nations, which can be defined as historical communities, more or less
institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, and sharing a
distinct language and mass culture plus an element of self-definition (seeing
themselves as nations). National minorities are nothing more than stateless
nations (Kymlicka and Norman 2000, pp. 18-19). Notably, it seems that
dictionary definitions in different languages bring no clarification as to the
distinctions between ethnic groups and nations except for the level of their
political organization, which for nations is the state (Bauman 1999, p. 31). If
this description of minorities were agreed, the entire system of nation-states we
know now would be put under a big question mark. As we can see, the only
apparent difference between nations and national minorities is statehood and
this poses interesting problems to the idea of self-determination and national
sovereignty. It is interesting that external self-determination is seen as the
basis of group rights for independent nations, when in fact it is more a
consequence of independence. On the other hand, in the absence of definitions
and of an acknowledgement of the nature of group rights the status-quo
remains relatively untroubled. Sovereignty, however elastic, remains an
important line for demarcating a large range of issues in global politics.

Sovereignty issues were first raised by the recognition that individuals possess
rights which overflow national borders both through the establishment of
regional (for instance the European Convention or the Inter-American systems)
and international (the procedure of individual communication under the First
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR) mechanisms of judicial or quasi-judicial
enforcement of human rights, and through the norm of humanitarian
intervention.

Secondly, minority rights made room for a reconsideration of the principle of

sovereignty primarily for international security concerns. These concerns
envisaged not only the possibility of inter-ethnic wars and of intervention of an
international organization to protect a minority group, but also the possibility of
involvement of the kin-state of the respective minority (Vizi 2002, p. 43).
Internal ethnic conflicts risk not remaining internal and producing a spill-over
76
effect, but the idea of international security risks is an elastic one and is used
for political purposes (sometimes a conflict is an international problem,
sometimes it s an internal affair). To give just an example of the malleability of
concepts, the beginning of the 1990s with the inter-ethnic conflicts in Europe
led to a temporary re-interpretation of self-determination, sovereignty and
statehood. On the one hand the international community gave way to the
recognition of a right to secession in the case of the former Yugoslav republics
of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia (Kovacs 2003, p. 434). On the
other hand however, in dealing with the situations in Kosovo or Chechnya
among others the same principle did not apply. But even in the absence of
conflict, the idea of separate nationhood inside a sovereign state may constitute
a serious challenge to the world-order. Minority rights and other concepts are
thus constructed in such a way as to respond to the existent or desired
characteristics of the international state-system.

Minority rights as individual rights

While group rights for minorities remain somehow a taboo for international law,
the rights of persons belonging to minority groups are internationally
recognized. This individualistic picture of minority rights takes the form of two
protection models: the first one is the anti-discrimination model and the second
is the positive action model. The former presupposes the neutrality of the state
in relation to its citizens and the equality of rights. The latter requires the
involvement of the state in protecting and promoting minority identities.

The principle of non-discrimination touches every aspect of human rights law

and thus it falls under the monitoring mechanisms established under different
UN bodies. There are also several conventions regarding the principle of non-
discrimination and usually this provision is attached to the enjoyment of every
recognized human right. The problem of discrimination is seen as one affecting
individuals, as a result to their belonging to a certain category or group, but not
as one possibly affecting groups as such. As Natan Glazer observes the issue is
one of making justice for individuals, rather than for groups (Glazer 2000, p.
124). As for the second model, interpretations of recognition and positive action
are more complicated. Some of these interpretations are dealt with in the
following section.

Article 27 of the ICCPR is considered to be a major step in the protection of

minorities, probably because it is the first to deal directly with this issue, but
also because it shows that minority problems are of legitimate international
concern and need to be considered as such. However, when analyzing the
individualistic wording of this article it may seem superfluous to guarantee
rights that are already contained in other articles of the Covenant. Although this
article frames minority rights as individual rights the persons belonging to
minorities have rights, not minorities as such it also points to the importance
of group identity. This is an obvious progress from the Genocide Convention
which only envisaged a right to existence (Thornberry 1992, p. 141). Moreover,
despite the implicit negation of group rights for minorities, article 27 makes the
object of the individual communication procedure established under the First
77
Optional Protocol and thus, through the affirmation of individual rights, minority
rights can permeate the system of international protection. On the other hand,
article 1 (self-determination) of the same Covenant can not make the object of
this procedure and no group can claim a violation of their right to self-
determination (Verstichel 2005, p. 27).

Furthermore, the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities brings no new

developments on the conception of minority rights. As seen from the title
minority rights are still to be understood in terms of individual rights. The only
article that mentions minorities without attaching an individualistic sense is
article 1, but it gives no definition of minorities and thus increases the
ambiguity surrounding the application of these rights. The element of
innovation is that it establishes positive rights and obligations upon states to
ensure the enjoyment of rights by the members of minorities. Article 4 makes
reference to the possibility of enjoying minority rights both individually and in
community with others, but this is far from recognizing any group right. It
should be noted that article 8(4) of the declaration reassures states of the
primacy of sovereignty and related principles. On the other hand, by doing that
it implicitly acknowledges the need to contemplate the idea of group rights for
minorities and the danger it may pose to the existing order of sovereign states.
While the Declaration lists very important rights and somehow brings them to
the mainstream human rights, it didn t produce any development to the
traditional understanding of minority rights. Minority rights are constructed as a
special category of individual rights.

On the same frame of mind, regional documents are equally cautious in

representing minority rights as group rights for the same reasons of preserving
a certain political balance. More than that, they make the recognition of
minority status conditional upon citizenship of the state of residence. The
preference for individual rights as opposed to group rights is often motivated by
a concern regarding the proliferation of groups and of their claims that would
lead to the piracy of minority discourse by any kind of self-proclaimed group,
to inter-minority competition and even to a certain homogenization between
minorities (Joppke and Lukes 1999, p. 13). This concern reveals how the
definitional indeterminacy creates further problems for decision-makers, but for
groups as well. Moreover, it is difficult to separate different characteristics of
minorities from their territorial disposition and this is a major challenge for any
minority protection regime. In the absence of standards by which to give
minorities rights, the existing individual rights system seems safer.

In a nutshell, while constructing minority rights as individual rights may serve

for protecting minority groups, as well as for keeping minority rights protection
at an acceptable level for states, this does not solve the problem of ethnic
conflicts. It is still unsure whether individual rights suffice to prevent massive
violations of rights and conflicts from occurring. Furthermore, by constructing
minority rights as individual rights the international community seeks to avoid
problems of definition and re-ordering of principles so as to preserve the fragile
international equilibrium and internal political arrangements. But as far as
ethno-cultural conflicts are concerned, in the absence of accepted principles,
78
these conflicts are often decided on the basis of brute power (Kymlicka 2000,
p. 3).

Final remarks

One last point about minority rights in international politics should touch upon
the value of discourse and official documents that regulate the relations
between states. Talking about the EU, Andrew Williams explains that it
continuously constructs its identity through textual projections and thus
becomes a print community (Williams 2003, p. 8). Similarly, other regional
and international organizations can be said to affirm their existence mainly
through the documents they produce. It is a matter of justifying and
legitimating themselves, as well as ensuring their self-preservation. By defining
minority rights as individual, rather than group rights, the international
community commits itself to a certain notion of the nation-state. It not only
constructs minority rights by emphasizing the individual, but in a certain way it
re-constructs minority identities by putting them in the context of global politics
dominated by the existent state-units. The wording of norms and documents
has not only a regulatory meaning, but also an identity-building value and
consequences in the sphere of recognition. In the case of minority rights, their
framing points more to state affiliation and individual value, rather than group
membership.

All in all, the problem of minority rights which minorities, which rights is
extremely difficult both from a theoretical point of view and a political and
practical one. While individual rights adepts see group rights as morally
unsustainable and as possible encroachments on a person s human rights, the
adepts of group-based perspectives show that there are identities and values
that are not based on individuals, but which nevertheless need the protection
offered by rights. To a certain extent both categories of rights have an
instrumental value: the recognition of individual rights may ensure the
protection of minority groups, while the protection of groups may be absolutely
necessary for human rights to be respected. As seen in recent cases of ethnic
or religious conflicts, such as those in Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Palestine etc., by
not granting rights to groups, individuals find their human rights violated.
However this is not an answer to the question whether minority rights are
group rights and whether they should be recognized as such.

What this article has tried to show is that the problem of minority rights is dealt
within international documents from an individual rights perspective and that
the indeterminacy of minority status serves particular political interests.
Minority rights are constructed by international norms not to exceed the already
heavily contested framework of human rights. Considerations of sovereignty,
territorial inviolability, self-determination of (existing and recognized) peoples
are still taking precedence in world politics. But the very fact that minority
rights have penetrated international politics and the discourse on rights
demonstrates the importance they retain both for safeguarding rights and for
preventing conflicts. Taking into account all the difficulties raised by the
recognition and application of minority rights, recognizing and responding to
79
minority claims should be a matter of balancing between individual and group-
based approaches.

REFERENCES

Bauman, Gerd. 1999. The Multicultural Riddle. Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious
Identities. Oxford University Press, New York.

Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Co-operation

Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
<http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline4/2625.htm>.

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and

Linguistic Minorities, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_minori.htm>.

Green, Leslie. 2000. Internal Minorities and Their Rights , in The Rights of Minority
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.257-272.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm>.

Jackson Preece, Jennifer. 1997. National Minority Rights vs. State Sovereignty in
Europe: Changing Norms in International Relations? , Nations and Nationalism vol. 3,
no.3, pp. 345-364.

Jones, Peter. 1999. Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples Rights , Human Rights
Quarterly vol. 21, no.1, pp. 80-107.

Jones, Peter. 2000. Individuals, Communities and Human Rights , Review of

International Studies, vol. 26, Special Issue, pp. 199-215.

Joppke, Christian, and Lukes, Steven. 1999. Introduction: Multicultural Questions , in

Multicultural Questions, eds. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes, Oxford University
Press, New York, pp. 1-24.

Kovacs, Maria. 2003. Standards of Self-Determination and Standards of Minority Rights

in the Post-Communist Era: A Historical Perspective , Nations and Nationalism, vol. 9,
no. 3, pp. 433-450.

Kymlicka, Will. 2000. Introduction , in The rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will
Kymlicka, Oxford University Press,Oxford, pp. 1-27.

Kymlicka, Will, and Norman, Wayne. 2000. Citizenship in Cultural Diverse Societies:
Issues, Contexts, Concepts , in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, eds. Will Kymlicka and
Wayne Norman, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 1-41.

Lerner, Natan. 2003. Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law. Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Hague.

Park, Jungwon. 2006. Integration of Peoples and Minorities: An Approach to the

Conceptual Problem of Peoples and Minorities with Reference to Self-determination

80
under International Law , International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 13,
no.1, pp. 69-93.

Pentassuglia, Gaetano. 2002. State Sovereignty, Minorities and Self-Determination: A

Comprehensive Legal View , International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 9,
no.4, pp. 303-324.

Preda, Adina. 2003. The Principle of Self-Determination and National Minorities ,

Dialectical Anthropology, vol. 27, no.3-4, pp. 205-226.

Thornberry, Patrick. 1992. International Law and the Rights of Minorities, Oxford
University Press, New York.

United Nations Charter, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.

Van Dyke, Vernon. 2000. The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political
Theory , in The rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp. 31-56.

Verstichel, Annelies. 2005. Recent Developments in the UN Human Rights Committee s

Approach to Minorities, with a Focus on Effective Participation , International Journal on
Minority and Group Rights, vol. 12, pp. 25-41.

Vizi, Balazs. 2002. Minority Groups and Autonomy from an International Political
Perspective , Local Government and Public Service reform Initiative, Open Society
Institute, viewed 4 May 2007, <http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2002/213/Mg-P1.pdf>.

Wellman, Carl. 2001. Alternatives for a Theory of Group Rights , in Groups and Group
Rights, eds. Christine Sistare, Larry May, Leslie Francis, University Press of Kansas,
Lawrence, pp. 17-42.

Wiener, Antje. 2003. Constructivism: the Limits of Bridging Gaps , Journal of

International Relations and Development, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 252-275.

Williams, Andrew. 2003. Mapping Human Rights, Reading the European Union ,
European Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 659-676.

81
Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No 1, 87-89

Defending liberty – The core task a government must

strive to accomplish
Lucian Bogdan
lbogdan@go.com

Reviewed book: Norms of Liberty. A Perfectionist Basis for Non-perfectionist

Politics
Author: Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl,
Print house: Pennsylvania State University Press,
Year of publication: 2005.
Format: Paper, 380 pp.

For long have political regimes tried to shape society according to what they
have deemed as the most appropriate values their citizens (or, rather, subjects,
if we embrace the Tocqueville-ian distinction) should embrace. This meant that
society was not necessarily directed towards the goals citizens had in mind, but
rather towards those envisioned for them by the state and we need not think
of extreme examples as the new man communists and fascists alike had tried
shaping, but simply of strikingly obvious ones, from practically every collectivist
society (Rand, 1967, 202-220).

Rasmussen and den Uyl support more appropriate an alternative. Instead of

endorsing a specific view and promoting a single set of virtues recognized as
paramount by the government, it should simply promote freedom, of which
every actor in society will do his/her very best to the advancement of his/her
goals.

The key concept at the groundwork of the authors demonstration is the

Aristotelian eudaimonia (Greek, happiness , well-being Stanford
Encyclopedia of Phyloosophy, 2003; also translatable as human flourishing
the acceptation used by Rasmussen and Den Uyl). Following Aristotle s
argumentation, the authors agree human flourishing cannot be achieved merely
by possession of goods or undertaking a specific action, but has to result from
factors within one s control and from his/her acts of will (p. 86). Consequently,
for one to flourish, it is imperative that he/she is a free person.

Moreover, since [o]ne must be active, not passive, to discover the goods and
virtues of human flourishing as well as to achieve and implement them (p. 87),
it would be impossible for one s real happiness to stem from someone else s will
imposed unto him/her. Though supporters of collectivism may claim that it
would be possible for the state to devise the best conditions for one s
flourishing, actually this would be nothing more than a surrogate which only
persons not accustomed to living in freedom would content with.

82
Conversely, the authors argue, one s life is best lead according to one s (and
nobody else s) thought, practical reason [being] the intelligent management of
one s life so
that all the necessary goods and virtues are coherently achieved, maintained
and enjoyed in a manner that is appropriate for the individual human being (p.
147). Therefore, one may choose utterly different priorities for his/her life than
any other person, precisely because humans are different and perceive things
in different manners. This, in turn, leads them to the establishment of different
convictions.

Thus, a government willing to serve its constituents best should refrain itself
from imposing a certain version of human flourishing upon them. Contrarily,
acknowledging that everyone is his/her best policy planner for his/her future,
the government must do its best (or, actually, to do is its least, by refraining
itself from overextended action, in a laissez-faire manner), not to infringe one s
liberties.

Moreover, the authors argue (pp. 158-160), human flourishing is agent-neutral,

in the acceptation that it would be preposterous to think of human flourishing
as providing the basis for a unified race, with a single standard ; there is no
single panacea, but simply versions of human flourishing. Basically, we could
say that accepting the existence of diversity and securing liberty go hand-in-
glove.

Accepting the aforementioned statements leads us to the conclusion that once

more contrary to what collectivists claim the best for a liberal (or, at least,
liberty-friendly) regime, is to promote non-perfectionist politics (p. 284),
meaning assigning the first priority to freedom, while not submitting the
citizens to any other line of conduct deemed as paramount.

Therefore, argue the authors, who obviously defend the liberal approach,
governments ought not overextend themselves and overregulate every aspect
of society, but should rather stick to a metanormative approach (pp. 286-288).
This supposes simply devising the general rules, principles everybody should
follow, establishing the legal and constitutional framework and not interfering
anymore in the most mundane aspects of everyday s life, as champions of big
government would like.

By not actually guiding the individual in any way, but by offering his/her the
best possibly framework for him/her to use his/her creative potential to its
fullest extent, it becomes possible for citizens to improve their lives materially,
while simultaneously making them aware it is their decision and not anyone
else s that matters most for their lives.

Therefore, we may conclude the authors have supported their case

convincingly, successfully defending the reasons liberty constitutes a key virtue
in any democracy s existence and, at the same time, pleading for a government
as warrant of freedom, practically the best one for its constituents.

83
Though the argumentation line is obviously inspired from the liberal doctrine,
the tone is definitely not biased, the text being appealing not only to staunch
liberals, but practically to everyone who accepts liberty as a key-value in
his/her life.

REFERENCES

Rand, Ayn 1967, Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal, New York: Signet Books.

Rasmussen, Douglas & Den Uyl, Douglas 2005, Norms of Liberty. A Perfectionist Basis
for Non-perfectionist Politics, Pennsylvania State University Press.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy July 18th 2003, Virtue Ethics , viewed January 17th
2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/

Tocqueville, Alexis de 1997, Democracy in America, Charlottesville: University of

Virginia.

84
Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No 1, 91-93

The break-up of communism –

between myths and reality in Romania

Milena Marin
marin.milena@gmail.com

Reviewed Book: The Romanian Revolution of December 1989

Author: Peter Siani-Davies
Print House: Cornell University Press
Year of publication: 2005
Format: paper, 315 pages

After almost 10 years since the Romanian revolution of December 1989, both
the academic community and public opinion of Romania, have still many doubts
regarding the nature and the exact unfolding of those events. Peter Siani-
Davies, one of the few western researchers involved in the study of the
Romanian society, through his excellent work The Romanian Revolution of
December 1989 , offers a detailed account of the Romanian revolutionary
upheaval and of the difficult birth of democracy in Romania, giving at the same
time an important contribution on the elucidation of the myths and realities of
the Romanian revolution.

Following a linear and chronological structure, the author begins by analysing

the causes of the Romanian revolution of December 1989, identifying grounds
like the extreme food rationing that kept for years the population to the limit of
starvation, the persistent human rights abuses with a particular focus on the
restriction of abortions that determined the highest rates of maternal mortality
in Europe, the rigidity of command economy, the peculiarities of Ceausescu s
neo-Stalinist coercion-based regime, the lack of an organised dissidence
correlated to the general popular discontent and the changed international
context.

The author emphasises that this hardship of life conditions and the brutality of
the communist regime in Romania was not a novelty in 1989, and seeks in-
depth explanations of why the country erupted in revolution in December 1989
analysing the mechanisms of revolt and using detailed examples in connection
to a solid theoretical foundation.

The following chapters provide the reader with a descriptive, but also analytical
perspective of the events of December 1989, dividing it in two phases, prior
and post December 22nd, the date of the capture of Nicolae Ceausescu and the
establishment of the new leadership. With regard to the first phase, the author
pays a particular attention to events like the eruption of the revolution in
Timisoara, the escalation of the crisis through the spreading of revolts all over
the country and the succession of events in Bucharest, describing it literary
85
hour by hour. As for the second phase, the author concentrates on the
description of the general chaos generated by the fear of the so called
terrorists and on the active role played by the television in the shaping of the
events. The establishment of the new structure of power was based mainly on
the removal of the twin pillars of the old regime, namely the Ceausescu family
and the Securitate, the political police of the communist rule.

A particular emphasis is given by the author, in a separate chapter, to the

counter-revolutionary forces who were responsible for the impressive number
of victims, for the general confusion during the second part of the revolution
and for the violent character of the revolution. As this book brings out, many of
the above mentioned terrorists were part of the Securitate units, but their
importance was generally exacerbated, being manipulated by the new formed
government in order to gain legitimacy and to justify the unnecessary victims.
Regarding the central argument of the role of the Securitate forces in the
Romanian Revolution, the author also takes into account the conspiracy
theories about certain plotting inside the system against the rule of Ceausescu,
but concludes that the importance of such conspiracy prior to the overthrow of
the communism should not be over exacerbated.

The book under review also offers a concise and well documented account of
the formation of the new state administration under the leadership of Ion
Iliescu and the National Salvation Front (NFS) and examines the matrix of ideas
taken up by the Front. Beside giving a detailed picture of the structure and
composition of the Council of the National Salvation Front, the author puts
forward solid arguments for fact that even though apparently the general
platform of the NFS was based on a reformed socialism associated to a socialist
model of the market economy, in reality it was a non-ideological party
appealing only to the creation of a general consensus and an organic solidarity.

The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 has an excellent theoretical

background, examines the most notorious revolution theories and analyses in-
depth the events in 1989 in accordance to them. Moreover, it brings a valuable
contribution to the elucidation of the myths and realities of the Romanian
revolution, by analysing different perspectives on the events such as
revolution , coup d état and popular uprising , and by giving space for a
fierce polemic over the nature of the revolutionary act.

It is important to notice that even if it takes into consideration the hypothesis of

coup d état or coup de palace , widely debated among the international
academic community, the book under review concentrates strictly on the
revolutionary perspective of the analysed events, concluding that it was a
violent and involved mass mobilisation , which led to the storming of the
institutions of the old regime, followed by the establishment of revolutionary
councils . Hence, the author provides us with a very prudent conclusion and
leaves the debate open. We consider important to point out that, event if the
reviewed book is based on excellent sources, it fails to bring into discussion the
documents of the communist archives, relying mainly on academic books and
on journalistic sources. This is a fundamental aspect considering that the very
86
truth about the Romanian revolution of December 1989 can be known only
when the entire archives will be available to the researches, fact that can only
occur when all the ones accountable for the violent events will leave the
political scene of Romania.

To conclude, we can certainly argue that many of the unanswered questions on

the events of December 1989 can find their response in Peter Siani-Davies s
brilliant work about the Romanian revolution.

REFERENCES

Gabanyi, A.U (1999) Revolu ia neterminat [The Unfinished Revolution ], Bucharest:The

Romanian Cultural Foundation Press;

Green, T.H (1984) Comparative Revolutionary Movements. Search for Theory and Justice,
Englewood Cliffs;

Brown JF (1991) Surge to Freedom. The End of Communist Rule in Eastern

Europe, Duke University Press.

87
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