McCulloch v.

Maryland
Brief Fact Summary. The state of Maryland enacted a tax that would force the United States Bank in
Maryland to pay taxes to the state. McCulloch, a cashier for the Baltimore, Maryland Bank, was sued for
not complying with the Maryland state tax.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress may enact laws that are necessary and proper to carry out their
enumerated powers. The United States Constitution (Constitution) is the supreme law of the land and
state laws cannot interfere with federal laws enacted within the scope of the Constitution.
Facts. Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States. Branches were established in many
states, including one in Baltimore, Maryland. In response, the Maryland legislature adopted an Act
imposing a tax on all banks in the state not chartered by the state legislature. James McCulloch, a
cashier for the Baltimore branch of the United States Bank, was sued for violating this Act. McCulloch
admitted he was not complying with the Maryland law. McCulloch lost in the Baltimore County Court
and that courts decision was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The case was then taken by
writ of error to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court).
Issue. Does Congress have the authority to establish a Bank of the United States under the Constitution?
Held. Yes. Judgment reversed.
Counsel for the state of Maryland claimed that because the Constitution was enacted by the
independent states, it should be exercised in subordination to the states. However, the states ratified
the Constitution by a two-thirds vote of their citizens, not by a decision of the state legislature.
Therefore, although limited in its powers, the Constitution is supreme over the laws of the states.
There is no enumerated power within the Constitution allowing for the creation of a bank. But, Congress
is granted the power of making all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers. The Supreme Court determines through Constitutional construction that
necessary is not a limitation, but rather applies to any means with a legitimate end within the scope of
the Constitution.
Because the Constitution is supreme over state laws, the states cannot apply taxes, which would in
effect destroy federal legislative law. Therefore, Marylands state tax on the United States Bank is
unconstitutional.
Discussion. This Supreme Court decision establishes the Constitution as the supreme law of the land,
taking precedent over any state law incongruent with it.

US vs Ruiz (136 SCRA 487)

Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The
base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de
Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based
on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not
qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on
a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and
Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the
defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific
performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of
this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of
the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United
States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for
the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to
no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Issue/s:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity

Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and
Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil
(sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the
legal nature of the act.

FACTS:
The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases
agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted
by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For
this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

ISSUE:
Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity.

HELD:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and
equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and
evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them
between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result is
that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines, indisputably, a function of the government of highest
order, they are not utilized for, nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
115. Is the US Government also immune from suit in the Philippines in connection with the exercise of
its governmental functions?
Yes. This was the ruling in U.S. VS. RUIZ, 136 SCRA where it was held that even if there is a contract
entered into by the US Government but the same involves its jusre imperii functions (governmental
functions, it cannot be sued. It is only when the contract involves its jus gestiones or business or
proprietary functions that it may be sued.
116. Are local governments also entitled to invoke immunity from suit?
Yes.

Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
FACTS:
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966,
sought the payment of just compensation for a registeredlot, containing an area of 1045 square meters,
alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and

material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City,
without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an
allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession,
but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.
It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved
Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square
meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the
sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either the restoration of possession or
the payment of the just compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against
the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11,
1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are
the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO
Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing
an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee
of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00
per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same
being utilized as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as
yet paid thevalue of the land which is being utilized for public use."
The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly
against the National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not consented to
be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision and contended that
they are entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Government
immunity from suit correct?
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in
sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires
and the petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme
Court decided that the lower courts decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case
remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.
114. May the government be sued in the exercise of its governmental functions?
Yes if the government agency has a charter which allows it to be sued. (RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN, 110
SCRA 456). Also, the government is not allowed to invoke its immunity from suit if by doing so, it will be
causing an injustice to its citizens. (MINISTERIO VS. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA and SANTIAGO VS. REPUBLIC, 87
SCRA 294)

Yamashita vs. Styer

G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945
Ponente: Moran, C.J.
Facts:
Tomoyuki Yamashita was an erstwhile commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Philippines. He was charged before an American Military Commission with the
most monstrous crimes ever committed against the American and Filipino peoples.
Filed before the Court were petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer,
Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.
It was alleged that General Yamashita, after his surrender, became a prisoner of war of the US but was
later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused charged for war crimes before
an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer.
Petitioner wanted to be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military
Commission be prohibited from further trying him.
Issues:
(1) That the Military Commission was not duly constituted, and, therefore, it is without jurisdiction;
(2) That the Philippines cannot be considered as an occupied territory, and the Military Commission
cannot exercise jurisdiction therein;
(3) That Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice of the implementing trial
against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1892, and therefore,
the Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try the petitioner;
(4) That there is against the petitioner no charge of an offense against the laws of war; and
(5) That the rules of procedure and evidence under which the Military Commission purports to be acting
denied the petitioner a fair trial.
Held:
The Court deemed that petition for habeas corpus is untenable.
The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure,
disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.

Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The military
Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged,
without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying
the petitioner.
Constitutionality of the Military Commission
The Commission has been validly constituted by Lieutenant General Styer duly issued by General
Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United States Army Force Pacific, in accordance in authority
vested in him and with radio communication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Under paragraph 356 of the Rules of the Land Welfare a Military Commission for the trial and
punishment of the war criminals must be designated by the belligerent. And the belligerent's
representative in the present case is none other than the Commander in Chief of the United States Army
in the Pacific.
The Military Commission thus duly constituted has jurisdiction both over the person of the petitioner
and over the offenses with which he is charged. It has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
reason of his having fallen into the hands of the United States Army Forces. Under paragraph 347 of the
Rules of the Land Warfare, "the commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose
authority they are committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands
they may fall."
As to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission over war crimes, the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including
that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status rights and duties and
of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15,
Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition
to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the
jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons and offenses which, according to the rules and
precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Philippine jurisdiction to the case
Petitioner is charged before the Military Commission sitting at Manila with having permitted members
of his command "to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people of the United
States and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines," crimes and atrocities which in the

bills of particulars, are described as massacre and extermination of thousand and thousands of unarmed
noncombatant civilians by cruel and brutal means, including bayoneting of children and raping of young
girls, as well as devastation and destruction of public, or private, and religious property for no other
motive than pillage and hatred. These are offenses against the laws of the war as described in paragraph
347 of the Rules of Land Warfare.
It is maintained, however, that, according to the Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals in the
Pacific. "the Military Commission . . . shall have jurisdiction over all of Japan and other areas occupied by
the armed forces commanded by the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific"
(emphasis supplied), and the Philippines is not an occupied territory. The American Forces have
occupied the Philippines for the purpose of liberating the Filipino people from the shackles of Japanese
tyranny, and the creation of a Military Commission for the trial and punishment of Japanese war
criminals is an incident of such war of liberation.
Third Issue Spain as protecting power of Japan
It is maintained that Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice before trial was
begun against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. But
there is nothing in that Convention showing that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of Military
Commissions appointed by victorious belligerent. Upon the other hand, the unconditional surrender of
Japan and her acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Ultimatum are a clear waiver of such a notice. It
may be stated, furthermore, that Spain has severed her diplomatic relation of Japan because of
atrocities committed by the Japanese troops against Spaniards in the Philippines. Apparently, therefore,
Spain has ceased to be the protecting power of Japan.
Dismissal of the petition
And, lastly, it is alleged that the rules of procedure and evidence being followed by the Military
Commission in the admission of allegedly immaterial or hearsay evidence, cannot divest the commission
of its jurisdiction and cannot be reviewed in a petition for the habeas corpus. (25 Am. Jur., 218; Collins
vs. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416; 66 Law. ed., 692; 42 Sup. Ct., 326).
For all foregoing, petition is hereby dismissed without costs.

Facts:
1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during World War 2.
He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes.
2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status as
prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the
military tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held:
YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning the
creation of such tribunals.
2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures within his
powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of
war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure
to take such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, as
well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others.
3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to his former status as
prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military measure and not
within the jurisdiction of the courts.
4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the military commission is
not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order may be issued requiring it to refrain from
trying the petitioner.

VILLAVICENCIO V. LUKBAN
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 [Habeas Corpus]
Facts:
Mayor Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. The
city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women
to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the person be actually confined for writ of Habeas Corpus to issue.
RULING:
No, there is no need for actual confinement. Any restraint which precludes freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of women of ill-repute fromManila to be brought to Davao, deprived them
of their freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they were imprisoned.

Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs Santiago

58 SCRA 493
1974
The Public Service Commission (PSC) imposed a fine on a radio company for failure to render service
expected of a radio operator.
FACTS
The PSC, acting on complaints by dissatisfied RCPI customers, penalized it with a fine. RCPI alleged that
the Commission was devoid of such competence since the Public Service Act (C.A. No. 146) expressly
exempted radio companies from the jurisdiction, supervision, and control of such body over their
franchises, equipment, and other properties (Sec. 13[a] thereof) except with respect to the fixing of
rates. (Sec. 14 thereof)
The first paragraph of Sec.21 of the Act reads:
Every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or
any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission shall be subject to a fine of not exceeding P200
per day for every day during which such default or violation continues; and the Commission is hereby
authorized and empowered to impose such fine, after due notice and hearing.
ISSUE
Is there anything in Sec.21 of the Act which empowers the PSC to impose a fine?
HELD
None. The power is neither expressly nor impliedly granted.
In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the
required power to proceed against petitioner.x x x a public official must locate in the statute relied upon
a grant of power before he can exercise it. It need not be express. It may be implied from the wording of
the law. Absent such requisite, however, no warrant exists for the assumption of authority. The act
performed, if properly challenged, cannot meet the test of validity. It must be set aside.

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary
of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before
the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as
Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a
component city of theProvince of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the
ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the
transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta.
Monica, PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan.
He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a
petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that
Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the
Constitution.
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld
in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome
Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation
on this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to
conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."