Christine Faith R.

Sabella
Legal Research
Atty. Janer Sanchez
Heirs of Christensen vs. Helen Christensen Garcia
G.R. No. L-16749, 31 January 1963
FACTS: Edward E. Christensen was born in New York,
moved to California where he resided and because a citizen.
In 1913, he came to the Philippines and became domiciliary
until his death. He has always considered himself a
Californian citizen though he was living in the Philippines. He
executed a will in March 5, 1951, acknowledging Maria Lucy
Christensen as her natural daughter and only heir. On the
other hand, he also left a sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia who was also declared and acknowledge
as a natural daughter of Edward E. Christensen. The counsel
for appellant claims that California law should be applied
wherein under California law, the matter is referred back
to the law of the domicile. Therefore the Philippine law is
applicable. It was contended that the share of Helen must
be increased under the successional rights of illegitimate
children under Philippine law.
The counsel for the heir of Christensens contention was as it
is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national
law of the deceased must apply, our courts must
immediately apply the internal law of California on the
matter. Under the California law there are no compulsory
heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of
any property possessed by him in absolute dominion
and that the illegitimate children are not entitled to anything
and the will remain unchanged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in
administering the estate of Christensen?
RULING: The court decided to grant additional successional
rights to Helen since in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter.
First, the internal law which should apply to Californians
domiciled in California. Second is the conflict rule which
should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California.
The California conflict rule says: If there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is
deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by
the law of his domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside
California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to

be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will be

referring to both country back and forth.

Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson Marcos

G.R. No. 13649, Oct. 19, 20003
FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson
Marcos were married twice and had five children. in1987,
after the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left
the military service. Due to the respondents inability to find
a new job, the married couple would often fight in wherein
respondent would beat the petitioner. In 1992, they were
already living separately. The petitioner filed for the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The lower court ruled that the respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not
been fully established by the totality of the evidence
presented.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Wilson Marcos violent

acts and unemployment towards Brenda Marcos constitute
psychological incapacity
RULING:
The actions of the respondent do not lead to a conclusion
that he is psychologically incapacitated. There is absolutely
no showing that his actions were already before the
celebration of the marriage or his actions are considered to
be incurable. Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting one or both parties even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a psychological
problem so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Psychological
incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs Court of Appeals

266 SCRA 324

FACTS: Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming
Tsoi were married in Manila in May 22, 1988. Ginas
expectations that as newlyweds, they be having sexual
intercourse with each other, however the defendant just
went to bed, turned his back and go to sleep.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together
in the same room and on the same bed but there was no
attempt of sexual intercourse from the petitioner. A case was
then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi
Ming Tsoi was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show him his penis. It was clinically found out that petitioner
Chi Ming Tsois penis was only 3 inches and 1 cm even when
erected. Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was
ever made between them.
ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
intercourse with the petitioner considered to be
psychological incapacity?
RULING: A spouse who is physically capable of sexual
intercourse but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations constituted psychological incapacity.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. In the case at bar, the prolonged
refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant nonfulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage.
In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.