82

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
David vs. Court of Appeals
*

G.R.No.111180.November16,1995.

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

RAMONR.VILLAR,respondents.
Habeas Corpus; Parent and Child; Custody; While it is true
that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children
is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each
other, are for some reason separated from each other, it does not
follow that it cannot arise in any other situation.Itisindeedtrue,
as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the
righttothecustodyofminorchildrenisrelevantincaseswherethe
parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason
separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of
Salvaa v. Gaela,itwasheldthatthewritofhabeascorpusisthe
proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
daughtereventhoughthelatterbeinthecustodyofathirdperson
ofherfreewillbecausetheparentswerecompellinghertomarrya
managainstherwill.
Same; Same; Same; Family Code; Illegitimate Children; Where
the mother of an illegitimate child has been deprived of her rightful
custody by the childs father, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.Inthecaseatbar,ChristopherJ.isanillegitimate
child since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other
thanthechildsmother.Assuch,pursuanttoArt.176oftheFamily
Code,ChristopherJ.isundertheparentalauthorityofhismother,
the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is
entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has
been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent,sheisentitledtoissuanceofthewritofhabeascorpus.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Support; The fact that the
father of an illegitimate child has recognized the minor child may
be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not
for giving him custody of the child.The fact that private
respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him
custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, no child
undersevenyearsofageshallbe
_________________
* SECONDDIVISION.

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David vs. Court of Appeals

separatedfromthemotherunlessthecourtfindscompellingreasons
toorderotherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That the mother
receives help from her parents and sister for the support of her three
children is not a point against hercooperation, compassion, love
and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the
close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it
what it is.Nor is the fact that private respondent is welloff a
reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,
especially considering that she has been able to rear and support
them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market
vendorearningfromP2,000toP3,000permonthin1993whenthe
RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working
as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a
monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her
employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She
works up to 8:00 oclock in the evening to make up for time lost
duringtheday.Thatshereceiveshelpfromherparentsandsister
for the support of the three children is not a point against her.
Cooperation,compassion,loveandconcernforeverymemberofthe
family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the
Filipinofamilyandhavemadeitwhatitis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Pleadings and
Practice; Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding
for that purpose, the grant of support in a petition for habeas corpus
is justified where the respondent has expressed willingness to
support the minor child.Although the question of support is
properinaproceedingforthatpurpose,thegrantofsupportinthis
case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed
willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of
allowanceneednotbeconditionedonthegranttohimofcustodyof
the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to
givesupportcanfulfillhisobligationeitherbypayingtheallowance
fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family
dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter
case,thereisamoralorlegalobstaclethereto.

PETITIONforreviewofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Orlando R. Pangilinanforpetitioner.
Danilo G. Pinedaforprivaterespondent.
84

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
David vs. Court of Appeals

MENDOZA,J.:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles
City.Privaterespondentisamarriedmanandthefatherof
four children, all grownup. After a while, the relationship
between petitioner and private respondent developed into
anintimateone,asaresultofwhichason,ChristopherJ.,
was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was
followedbytwomorechildren,bothgirls,namelyChristine,
bornonJune9,1986,andCathyMaeonApril24,1988.
The relationship became known to private respondents
wife when Daisie took Christopher J. to Villars house at
Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and
introducedhimtoVillarslegalwife.
Afterthis,thechildrenofDaisiewerefreelybroughtby
Villartohishouseastheywereeventuallyacceptedbyhis
legalfamily.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
ChristopherJ.,thensixyearsofage,togowithhisfamilyto
Boracay.Daisieagreed,butafterthetrip,Villarrefusedto
givebackthechild.VillarsaidhehadenrolledChristopher
J.attheHolyFamilyAcademyforthenextschoolyear.
OnJuly30,1991,Daisiefiledapetitionforhabeascorpus
onbehalfofChristopherJ.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at
AngelesCity,renderedadecision,thedispositiveportionof
whichreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
infavorofthepetitionerandagainsttherespondent:
1. therightfulcustodyoftheminorChristopherJ.T.Davidis
hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner
DaisieT.David;
2. respondentisherebyorderedtogiveatemporarysupportof
P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor Christopher J. T.
David,ChristineDavidandCathyMaeDavidtotakeeffect
uponthefinalityofthisdecision;and
3. topaythecostsofthissuit.
SOORDERED.
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David vs. Court of Appeals

Onappeal,theCourtofAppealsreversed,holding:
We agree with the respondentappellants view that this is not
properinahabeascorpuscase.
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a
minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a
situation where the parents are married to each other but are
separated.ThisissobecauseundertheFamilyCode,thefatherand
mother have joint parental authority over their legitimate children
andincaseofseparationoftheparentsthereisneedtodetermine
rightfulcustodyoftheirchildren.Thesamedoesnotholdtrueinan

adulterousrelationship,asinthecaseatbar,thechildbornoutof
sucharelationshipisundertheparentalauthorityofthemotherby
express provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and
supportshouldbebroughtinacasesingularlyfiledforthepurpose.
Inpointoffact,thisismoreadvisableinthecaseatbarbecausethe
trialcourtdidnotacquirejurisdictionovertheotherminorchildren
of the petitionerappellee and respondentappellant and, therefore,
cannotproperlyprovidefortheirsupport.
Admittedly,respondentappellantisfinanciallywelloff,hebeing
averyrichbusinessman;whereas,petitionerappelleedependsupon
hersistersandparentsforsupport.Infact,hefinanciallysupported
petitionerappelleeandherthreeminorchildren.Itis,therefore,for
the best interest of Christopher J. that he should temporarily
remainunderthecustodyofrespondentappellantuntiltheissueon
custodyandsupportshallhavebeendeterminedinapropercase.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the petition for
habeascorpusinSpecialProceedingNo.4489.

Daisieinturnfiledthispetitionforreviewoftheappellate
courtsdecision.
Rule102,1oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatthewrit
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinementordetentionbywhichanypersonisdeprivedof
hisliberty,orbywhichtherightfulcustodyofanypersonis
withheldfromthepersonentitledthereto.
Itisindeedtrue,astheCourtofAppealsobserved,that
the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are
married to each other, are for some reason separated from
eachother.Itdoesnot
86

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
David vs. Court of Appeals

follow,however,thatitcannotariseinanyothersituation.
1
For example, in the case of Salvaa v. Gaela, it was held
that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter
eventhoughthelatterbeinthecustodyofathirdpersonof
her free will because the parents were compelling her to
marryamanagainstherwill.
Inthecaseatbar,ChristopherJ.isanillegitimatechild
since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondentRamonR.Villar,wasmarriedtoanotherwoman
otherthanthechildsmother.Assuch,pursuanttoArt.176
of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequenceofsuchauthority,isentitledtohavecustodyof
2
him. Since,admittedly,petitionerhasbeendeprivedofher
rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is
entitledtoissuanceofthewritofhabeascorpus.
Indeed, Rule 102, 1 makes no distinction between the
caseofamotherwhoisseparatedfromherhusbandandis
entitledtothecustodyofherchildandthatofamotherof
an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole

parentalauthority,butisdeprivedofherrightfulcustodyof
herchild.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the
minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
supporttothelatter,butnotforgivinghimcustodyofthe
child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order
3
otherwise.
________________
155Phil.680(1931).
2

Family Code, Art. 220 provides that The parents and those

exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their

unemancipatedchildrenorwardsthefollowingrightsandduties:(1)To
keepthemintheircompany,....
3Art.363oftheCivilCodeoriginallyprovidedthatnomothershall

be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court
finds compelling reasons for such measure. This was changed by the
Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603), 17 of which provided
thatincaseofseparationofhisparents,nochildunderfiveyearsof
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David vs. Court of Appeals

Nor is the fact that private respondent is welloff a reason
for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,
especially considering that she has been able to rear and
supportthemonherownsincetheywereborn.Petitioneris
amarketvendorearningfromP2,000toP3,000permonth
in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She
augments her income by working as secretary at the
ComputerSystemSpecialist,Inc.earningamonthlyincome
ofP4,500.00.Shehasanarrangementwithheremployerso
thatshecanpersonallyattendtoherchildren.Sheworksup
to8:00oclockintheeveningtomakeupfortimelostduring
theday.Thatshereceiveshelpfromherparentsandsister
for the support of the three children is not a point against
her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every
memberofthefamilyarecharacteristicsoftheclosefamily
tiesthatbindtheFilipinofamilyandhavemadeitwhatit
is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of
affluencethatprivaterespondentpromisesifthechildlives
withhim.Itisenough,however,thatpetitionerisearninga
decentlivingandisabletosupportherchildrenaccording
tohermeans.
TheRegionalTrialCourtorderedprivaterespondentto
give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of
P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for
support, after finding that private respondent did not give
any support to his three children by Daisie, except the
meageramountofP500.00aweekwhichhestoppedgiving
themonJune23,1992.Heisarichmanwhoprofesseslove
forhischildren.Infacthefiledamotionfortheexecutionof

the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had

observedhissontobephysicallyweakandpalebecauseof
malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities
he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the
respondent.Heprayedthathebegiventhecustodyofthe
childsothathecanprovidehimwiththepropercareand
education.
Although the question of support is proper in a
proceedingforthatpurpose,thegrantofsupportinthiscase
isjustifiedbythe
________________
age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds
compelling reason to do so. The Family Code, Art. 213 thus restores
theoriginalprovisionoftheCivilCode.
88

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
David vs. Court of Appeals

fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to

supporttheminorchild.Theorderforpaymentofallowance
neednotbeconditionedonthegranttohimofcustodyofthe
child.UnderArt.204oftheFamilyCode,apersonobliged
togivesupportcanfulfillhisobligationeitherbypayingthe
allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is
entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is a
moralorlegalobstaclethereto.
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out,
ChristopherJ.,beinglessthansevenyearsofageatleastat
thetimethecasewasdecidedbytheRTC,cannotbetaken
fromthemotherscustody.Evennowthatthechildisover
sevenyearsofage,themotherscustodyoverhimwillhave
to be upheld because the child categorically expressed
preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the
Family Code, courts must respect the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit
and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any
way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private
respondentloveshischild,heshouldnotconditionthegrant
of support for him on the award of his custody to him
(privaterespondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to
delivertheminorChristopherJ.T.Davidtothecustodyof
hismother,thehereinpetitioner,andtogivehimtemporary
support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of
theamountofsupportinanappropriateaction.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), RegaladoandPuno, JJ.,
concur.
Francisco, J.,Onleave.
Judgment reversed, respondent Ramon R. Villar ordered

to deliver custody of the minor child to petitioner.

Notes.An unrecognized spurious child has no rights
from his parents or to their estate. (Ilano vs. Court of
Appeals,230SCRA242[1994])
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David vs. Court of Appeals

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinementbywhichanypersonisdeprivedofhisliberty.
(Ordoez vs. Vinarao,239SCRA114[1994])
o0o

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