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Deontological Ethics

Baylor University
Fall 2005
Dr. Paul C. Grabow

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Teleological vs Deontological
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Deontological ethics

Morality based on certain inherent features in

the act (or in the rule on which the act is a token
or example)

Teleological ethics

Morality based on the consequences of an act

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Act-deontological Theories
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Each act a unique ethical occasion

We must consult our conscience or our intuitions, or make a

choice apart from any rules
Two kinds

intuitionism: consult your conscience in every situation to

discover the morally right (or wrong) thing to do

decisionists (i.e., existentialists): believe that there is no morally

right answer until we choose for ourselves what is right (or
wrong)
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Act-deontological Theories, cont.

Serious Disadvantages

Difficult to see how any argument could take place with an

intuitionist (e.g., either you both have the same intuition about
lying or you dont) [There is room for intuition in moral
philosophy, but intuitions must be scrutinized by reason and
corrected by theory.]

It seems that rules are necessary for all reasoning, including

moral reasoning

Different situations seem to share common features, so it would

be inconsistent for us to prescribe different moral actions
[Holding two different and conflicting views both based on
intuition would seem to violate the universalizability principle.]

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Rule-deontological Theories
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Accept the principle of universalizability

In making moral judgments we appeal to

principles or rules

Example: W. D. Ross (1877-1971)

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W. D. Ross: objectivist rule-intuitionist

Intuitions: internal perceptions

The moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of
ethics, just as sense-perceptions are the data of a natural science.

Intuition both discovers the correct moral principles and applies them correctly

Moral principles:

Cannot be proved

Self evident to any normal person upon reflection

Constitute a plural set, which cannot be unified under a single overarching principle

Not absolute, i.e., every principle can be overridden by another in a particular situation

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W. D. Ross, cont.
Two kinds of rules or duties

Prima facie (i.e., Latin for at first glance) or conditional duties;

they may become actual duties based on circumstance

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Actual duties: those that we are obliged to meet

promise keeping
fidelity
gratitude for favors
beneficence
justice
self-improvement
Non-malfeasance

Note: a thorough intuitionist cannot use reason to argue for

or against an action

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Rule-deontological Theories, cont.

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Absolutist position

An adequate moral system can never produce

moral conflict

A basic moral principle cannot be overridden by

another moral principle

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

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Arguably the greatest philosopher of the

German Enlightenment

Absolutist and rationalistic

Believed that reason could be used to develop a

consistent, non-overridable set of moral principles

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Immanuel Kant, cont.

Born: Knigsberg, Germany
Never married and never left the city his entire life
Devoted his entire life to study/teaching philosophy at the
University of Knigsberg
Parents were Pietist Lutherans; emphasized sincerity, deep
feeling, and the moral life over theological doctrine or
orthodox belief a religion of the heart not the head
However, Kant emphasized the head as much as the heart
Important works:

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Critique of Pure Reason (1781)

The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)

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Immanuel Kant, cont.

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Major influences

Pietism: importance of deep sincerity; rather

than correct beliefs or results that really matter,
but inner goodness
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if we live within our lights we will be given more light

God judges us not on how lucky or successful we are
in accomplishing our tasks but on how earnestly we
have lived according to our principles

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Immanuel Kant, cont.

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Major influences

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)

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on human freedom: Social Contract

taught

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the meaning and importance of human dignity

the primacy of freedom and autonomy
the intrinsic worth of human beings apart from any
functions they might perform

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Immanuel Kant, cont.

Rationalists (e.g., Rene Descartes, Baruch
Spinoza, Gottfried Leibnitz, Christian Wolff)

claimed that pure reason could tell us how the world is,
independent of experience

Empiricists (John Locke and David Hume)

denied that we have any innate ideas and argued that all
knowledge comes from experience
Human nature Feelings and desires Moral principles

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Immanuel Kant, cont.

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Moral debate

Rationalists
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Scottish empiricists (Francis Hutcheson, David

Hume, Adam Smith)
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Claimed our knowledge of moral principles is a type of

metaphysical knowledge, implanted in us by God and
discovered by reason

Argued that morality is founded entirely on the

contingencies of human nature and based on desire

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Scottish Empiricists

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Morality concerns making people happy, fulfilling their reflected

desires

Reason a practical means of helping them fulfill their desires

Nothing of special importance in reason in its own right; mainly

a servant of the passions

Morality founded on our feeling of sympathy with other peoples

sufferings

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Immanuel Kant, cont.

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Rejected ideas of Scottish empiricists

Outraged by the thought that morality should depend on

human nature and be subject to fortunes of change and
luck of empirical discovery

Morality is necessary, not contingent upon desires or

feelings

Reason is sufficient for establishing the moral law as

something transcendent and universally binding on all
rational creatures

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Immanuel Kant, cont.

Wanted to

Define morality within the realm of necessary,

absolute, universal truth
Remove moral truth from the zone of
Scontingency[1] and empirical observation

[1] noun (pl. contingencies) 1 a future event or circumstance

which is possible but cannot be predicted with certainty. 2 a
provision for such an event or circumstance. 3 the absence of
certainty in events.

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Immanuel Kant, cont.

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Only thing that is absolutely good, good in itself and

without qualification, is the good will

All other intrinsic goods (e.g., intellectual or moral)

can serve the vicious will and thus contribute to evil

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success or happiness are not good in themselves

success or happiness only morally valuable if accompanied
by good will

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Kant: Two Imperatives

Hypothetical imperative

If you want A, then do B, e.g., If you want a

good job, then get a good education.
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not representative of a moral imperative

Categorical imperative

Do B!, e.g., Tell the truth.

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show proper recognition of the higher status of moral

obligations

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Categorical Imperative: 1st version

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Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the

same time will that it would become a universal law.

The way to apply the test of universalizability

Maxim: general rule in accordance with which the agent

intends to act

Law: an objective principle, a maxim that passes the test of

universalizability

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Categorical Imperative: 2nd version

The principle of ends

Implication

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So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person

or in that of any other, in every case as an end and never
as merely a means.

Each person has dignity and profound worth, meaning

that they must never be exploited or manipulated or
merely used as a means to our idea of what is for the
general good

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Categorical Imperative: 3rd version

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The principle of autonomy

Every rational being is able to regard oneself as

a maker of universal law
That is, we do not need an external authority (be
it God, the state, our culture, or anyone else) to
determine the nature of the moral law
We can discover the nature of the moral law for
ourselves

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Reference
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Ethics, Discovering Right and Wrong, Louis

P. Pojman, chapter 7, Wadsworth, 2002

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