THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-69303

July 23, 1987

HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN, namely, Teofilo, Isabel, Maximina, Anicia, and Francisco, all
surnamed Marasigan, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MARIA MARRON, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Who has a better right to the property in question, the party who bought it with a notice of lis
pendens annotated at the back of her title or the party in whose favor the notice of lis pendens was
made? The appellate court answered this question in favor of the party who had the notice
annotated and who won the litigation over the property. We affirm.
The disputed property in this case is a residential lot (Lot No. 2-A) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 100612 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila in the name of one Fe
Springael-Bazar, married to Felicisimo Bazar.
The pertinent facts as disclosed by the record are as follows:
On April 24, 1975, Civil Case No. 97479 entitled "Maria Marron v. Felicisimo Bazar and Fe S.
Bazaar" was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII. The action sought to
compel defendants Bazar to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale of their lot covered by
T.C.T. No. 100612 in favor of Maria Marron.
On January 27, 1976, while Civil Case No. 97479 was still pending, the private respondent caused
the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of T.C.T. No. 100612.
On February 24, 1976, judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 97479. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
a) Ordering the defendants Fe Springael Bazar and Felicisimo Bazar as vendors (1)
to execute in favor of the plaintiff Maria Marron as vendee a Deed of Absolute Sale in
a public instrument over the residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
100612 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila to and in the name of
Fe S. Bazar, married to Felicisimo Bazaar; and (2) to deliver to plaintiff sufficient
copies of such deed of sale, together with the Owner's copy of said Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 100612, in order that the plaintiff can register the Deed of
Absolute Sale with the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila and secure a transfer
certificate of title for the land in her name.
b) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500.00 Philippine
Currency, as and for attorney's fees; and
c) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. (Rollo, p. 15).

The above judgment became final and executory so Maria Marron filed a motion for execution which
was granted. A writ of execution was issued by the court on July 12, 1976. The spouses Bazar,
however, refused to surrender their title to the property in question and to execute the required deed
of sale in Marron's favor. On November 29, 1978, the lower court finally ordered the Clerk of Court to
execute the deed of sale in behalf of the erring spouses. When the said deed was presented to the
Register of Deeds of Manila for registration, the Deputy Clerk of Court was advised to secure a court
order in order that the new title issued in the name of herein petitioner Maria Marasigan could be
cancelled.
It appears that on December 18, 1974, a deed of absolute sale of Lot 2-A covered by T.C.T. No.
100612 was executed by Fe S. Bazar in favor of Maria Marasigan for and in consideration of the
sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). However, it was only on July 5, 1977 that said deed
was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Consequently, T.C.T. No. 100612 was
cancelled and a new title was issued in Maria Marasigan's name. When the Register of Deeds of
Manila issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126056 naming Maria Marasigan as the new owner of
Lot 2-A, the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by Marron on the Bazar's title was carried
over on the said new title.
Meanwhile, on May 26, 1977, the Bazaars filed a petition for relief from the judgment dated February
24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. While their petition was still pending, they moved to set aside the
said judgment on June 22, 1979 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons.
On the other hand, on February 24, 1979, Marron instituted L.R.C. Case No. 7680 captioned "Maria
Marron v. Maria Marasigan" which prayed for a court order requiring the Register of Deeds of Manila
to register the deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court in behalf of the Bazaars pursuant
to the order dated November 29, 1978 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, Branch XIII. L.R.C.
Case No. 7680 was tried by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV acting as a land
registration court. Said case was dismissed for the following reason:
... This court acting as a Land Registration Court, with limited and special jurisdiction
cannot act on this petition under summary proceedings but (sic) should be ventilated
before a court of general jurisdiction Branch XIII, which issued the aforesaid Order
dated November 29, 1978, the said petition is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice on the part of the petitioner to institute the appropriate
civil action before the proper court. ... (Annex "A," p. 4, Rollo, p. 138)
On September 6, 1979, Marron filed another case docketed as Civil Case No. 126378 to have
Marasigan's TCT 126056 cancelled conformably to the procedure outlined in the decision of the
above land registration court. On July 30, 1980, the parties submitted said case for decision.
On February 18, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV to which Civil Case No.
126378 was assigned dismissed Marron's complaint for being premature since the decision
rendered by the CFI, Branch XIII in Civil Case No. 97479 had not yet become final and executory
considering that it was still the subject of a petition for relief from judgment.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on August 7, 1984, ruled that Marron is entitled to the
property under litigation by virtue of the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Maria
Marasigan's title. The appellate court further ruled that the decision in Civil Case No. 97479 had
become final and executory because the petition for relief from judgment of the spouses Bazar was
filed out of time. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and another one entered

(a) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel T.C.T. No. 126056 in the
name of Maria Marasigan and issue another in the name of Maria Marron by virtue of
the Deed of Sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch XIII;
(b) Ordering the said Register of Deeds, during the pendency of this case, to refrain
from registering any deed of sale pertaining to T.C.T. No. 126056 in the name of
Maria Marasigan other than that of the herein plaintiff; and
(c) Ordering the defendant Maria Marasigan to pay attorney's fees in the amount of
P10,000.00. (IAC, Decision. Rollo, pp. 17-18).
Maria Marasigan who died in the course of the proceedings is now represented by her heirs in the
instant petition which assigns the following errors:
I
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT THE RIGHT
OF ACTION OF RESPONDENT MARIA MARRON (AS PLAINTIFF) IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479
HAD PRESCRIBED AND SHE INCURRED IN LACHES.
II
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT RESPONDENT
ABANDONED OR WAIVED HER PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EFFECTS TO/OF THE DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 97479, WHEN SHE FILED CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378, DURING ITS
EFFECTIVITY.
III
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
IV
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THE LACK OF
JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378 OVER THE
PERSONS OF PETITIONERS.
V
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF
DEFENDANTS SPOUSES FELICISIMO BAZAAR AND FE S. BAZAAR.
VI
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY THE DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT, WAS NOT LEGAL AND
VALID AND WITHOUT PROOF AND EFFECT. (Brief for the appellant, pp. 1 and 2)
We find no merit in the present petition.

There is a clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired the property in question
from the Bazaars pursuant to a deed of absolute sale on December 18, 1974 or a little over four
months before the filing of Civil Case No. 97479, the transaction became effective as against third
persons only on July 5, 1977 when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the
act of registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world. Section 51 of Act 496, as
amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) provides:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance ... affecting
registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive
notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Moreover, there is no question that when the late Maria Marasigan was issued her transfer
certificate of title to the subject property (T.C.T. No. 126056), the Registrar of Deeds of Manila then
carried over to the new title the notice of lis pendens which the private respondent had caused to be
annotated at the back of the Bazar's title. In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of
Deeds is duty bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens on all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if he
cancels any notice of lis pendens in violation of his duty, he may be held civilly and even criminally
liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third persons (The Director of Lands, et al. v. Reyes, 68
SCRA 177).
A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as notice
to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at his own risk (Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation v. Morales, 101 Phil. 171). It was also a clear notice to Maria Marasigan that there was
a court case affecting her rights to the property she had purchased.
1avv phi 1

As earlier stated it was only on July 5, 1977 that the sale between Maria Marasigan and the Bazaars
became effective as against third persons. The registration of the deed of sale over the subject
property was definitely subsequent to the annotation made on January 27, 1976. Consequently,
Marasigan was bound by the outcome of the litigation against her vendors or transferors. (See
Rivera v. Tirona, et al., 109 Phil. 505).
We reiterate the established rule that:
... the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of the
particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter
acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit. The doctrine of lis
pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which
is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the
judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations
pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and
impossible of execution. ... (Laroza v. Guia, 134 SCRA 34 1)
The late Marasigan's transferors did not interpose any appeal from the adverse judgment dated
February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. The 30-day period under the old rule (Rule 41, section 3
of the Revised Rules of court now amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, section 39) within
which the Bazaars may have taken an appeal started to run from May 12, 1976 when they were
served with a copy of the said decision. On June 11, 1976, the February 24, 1976 decision in Civil
Case No. 97479 became final and executory. At this point after the finality of the said decision, the
Bazaars no longer had the right to alienate the property subject of the litigation. Any transaction
effective during the period of litigation is subject to the risks implicit in the notice of lis pendens and
to the eventual outcome of the litigation.

Moreover, we agree with the finding of the appellate court that the petition for relief from judgment by
the Bazaars dated May 26, 1977 was filed beyond the two periods provided in Section 3 Rule 38 of
the Revised Rules of Court. There may have been some errors in the computations but the petition
itself was out of time.
Rule 38, Section 3 of said Rules provides, in part, that:
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition. ... A petition provided for in either of the preceding
sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than
six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such proceeding was
taken. ...
The 60-day period must be reckoned from May 12, 1976 when the Bazaars were served with a copy
of the assailed decision. Therefore, the 60-day period expired on July 11, 1976. It was only after 379
days or more than 12 months after they learned of the judgment that the Bazaars filed their petition
for relief from said judgment. (See Domingo v. Dela Cruz, 23 SCRA 1121) The appellate court
computed the 6-month period from the date of the judgment was rendered. Rule 38 states that the
counting should commence from the entry of the judgment or order. (See Dirige v. Biranya, 17
SCRA 840). A judgment is entered only after its finality and Civil Case No. 97479 became final on
June 11, 1976. Since the records do not bear the exact date the questioned judgment was entered,
the 6-month period can be counted for purposes of our decision from July 12, 1976 when the writ of
execution of the final judgment was issued. The phrase "or other proceeding" in Section 3 of Rule 38
includes a writ of execution (Aquino v. Blanco, 79 Phil. 647). The 6-month period from July 12, 1976
lapsed on January 8, 1977. A period of ten (10) months had already lapsed when the Bazaars filed
their petition for relief from judgment on May 26, 1977. Obviously, the petitioners cannot now
question the effects of the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 97479. In the words of
Laroza v. Guia (supra) they cannot render the final judgment abortive and impossible of execution.
The deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court on behalf of the Bazar spouses pursuant to
the court's judgment was valid and binding.
The petitioners cannot also raise before us the issues of prescription or laches and lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of the Bazar spouses in Civil Case No. 97479. This cannot be done in
this petition which stems from Civil Case No. 126378 in the trial court and AC-G.R. No. 00183 in the
appellate court. The Bazaars were the proper parties who ought to have raised them as defenses
either in a motion to dismiss or in their answer. Since they did not do so, the same were deemed
waived. (See Rule 9, section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court; MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Estrella,
113 SCRA 378; Torreda v. Boncaros, 69 SCRA 247; Visayan Electric Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 39 SCRA 43; Republic v. Mambulao Lumber Company, 6 SCRA 858).
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124242

January 21, 2005

SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO S. BABASANTA, SPS. MIGUEL LU and PACITA ZAVALLA LU,
respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
From a coaptation of the records of this case, it appears that respondents Miguel Lu and Pacita
Zavalla, (hereinafter, the Spouses Lu) owned two (2) parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
covered by TCT No. T-39022 and TCT No. T-39023 both measuring 15,808 square meters or a total
of 3.1616 hectares.
On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold the two parcels of land to respondent Pablo
Babasanta, (hereinafter, Babasanta) for the price of fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square meter.
Babasanta made a downpayment of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as evidenced by a
memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu of the same date. Several other payments totaling two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) were made by Babasanta.
Sometime in May 1989, Babasanta wrote a letter to Pacita Lu to demand the execution of a final
deed of sale in his favor so that he could effect full payment of the purchase price. In the same letter,
Babasanta notified the spouses about having received information that the spouses sold the same
property to another without his knowledge and consent. He demanded that the second sale be
cancelled and that a final deed of sale be issued in his favor.
In response, Pacita Lu wrote a letter to Babasanta wherein she acknowledged having agreed to sell
the property to him at fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square meter. She, however, reminded Babasanta
that when the balance of the purchase price became due, he requested for a reduction of the price
and when she refused, Babasanta backed out of the sale. Pacita added that she returned the sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Babasanta through Eugenio Oya.
On 2 June 1989, respondent Babasanta, as plaintiff, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 31, of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages1 against his
co-respondents herein, the Spouses Lu. Babasanta alleged that the lands covered by TCT No. T39022 and T-39023 had been sold to him by the spouses at fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square
meter. Despite his repeated demands for the execution of a final deed of sale in his favor,
respondents allegedly refused.
In their Answer,2 the Spouses Lu alleged that Pacita Lu obtained loans from Babasanta and when
the total advances of Pacita reached fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), the latter and Babasanta,
without the knowledge and consent of Miguel Lu, had verbally agreed to transform the transaction
into a contract to sell the two parcels of land to Babasanta with the fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to be considered as the downpayment for the property and the balance to be paid on
or before 31 December 1987. Respondents Lu added that as of November 1987, total payments
made by Babasanta amounted to only two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) and the latter
allegedly failed to pay the balance of two hundred sixty thousand pesos (P260,000.00) despite
repeated demands. Babasanta had purportedly asked Pacita for a reduction of the price from fifteen
pesos (P15.00) to twelve pesos (P12.00) per square meter and when the Spouses Lu refused to
grant Babasantas request, the latter rescinded the contract to sell and declared that the original loan
transaction just be carried out in that the spouses would be indebted to him in the amount of two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Accordingly, on 6 July 1989, they purchased Interbank
Managers Check No. 05020269 in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in the
name of Babasanta to show that she was able and willing to pay the balance of her loan obligation.

Babasanta later filed an Amended Complaint dated 17 January 19903 wherein he prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order and the inclusion of the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna as party defendant. He contended that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was necessary to restrain the transfer or conveyance by the Spouses Lu of the
subject property to other persons.
The Spouses Lu filed their Opposition4 to the amended complaint contending that it raised new
matters which seriously affect their substantive rights under the original complaint. However, the trial
court in its Order dated 17 January 19905 admitted the amended complaint.
On 19 January 1990, herein petitioner San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) filed a Motion
for Intervention6 before the trial court. SLDC alleged that it had legal interest in the subject matter
under litigation because on 3 May 1989, the two parcels of land involved, namely Lot 1764-A and
1764-B, had been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage.7 It alleged that it was a buyer
in good faith and for value and therefore it had a better right over the property in litigation.
In his Opposition to SLDCs motion for intervention,8 respondent Babasanta demurred and argued
that the latter had no legal interest in the case because the two parcels of land involved herein had
already been conveyed to him by the Spouses Lu and hence, the vendors were without legal
capacity to transfer or dispose of the two parcels of land to the intervenor.
Meanwhile, the trial court in its Order dated 21 March 1990 allowed SLDC to intervene. SLDC filed
its Complaint-in-Intervention on 19 April 1990.9 Respondent Babasantas motion for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction was likewise granted by the trial court in its Order dated 11 January 199110
conditioned upon his filing of a bond in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
SLDC in its Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that on 11 February 1989, the Spouses Lu executed in
its favor an Option to Buy the lots subject of the complaint. Accordingly, it paid an option money in
the amount of three hundred sixteen thousand one hundred sixty pesos (P316,160.00) out of the
total consideration for the purchase of the two lots of one million two hundred sixty-four thousand six
hundred forty pesos (P1,264,640.00). After the Spouses Lu received a total amount of six hundred
thirty-two thousand three hundred twenty pesos (P632,320.00) they executed on 3 May 1989 a
Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage in its favor. SLDC added that the certificates of title over the
property were delivered to it by the spouses clean and free from any adverse claims and/or notice of
lis pendens. SLDC further alleged that it only learned of the filing of the complaint sometime in the
early part of January 1990 which prompted it to file the motion to intervene without delay. Claiming
that it was a buyer in good faith, SLDC argued that it had no obligation to look beyond the titles
submitted to it by the Spouses Lu particularly because Babasantas claims were not annotated on
the certificates of title at the time the lands were sold to it.
After a protracted trial, the RTC rendered its Decision on 30 July 1993 upholding the sale of the
property to SLDC. It ordered the Spouses Lu to pay Babasanta the sum of two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) with legal interest plus the further sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
and for attorneys fees. On the complaint-in-intervention, the trial court ordered the Register of
Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the original of
the TCT No. T-39022 (T-7218) and No. T-39023 (T-7219).
Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that since both Babasanta and SLDC did
not register the respective sales in their favor, ownership of the property should pertain to the buyer
who first acquired possession of the property. The trial court equated the execution of a public
instrument in favor of SLDC as sufficient delivery of the property to the latter. It concluded that

symbolic possession could be considered to have been first transferred to SLDC and consequently
ownership of the property pertained to SLDC who purchased the property in good faith.
Respondent Babasanta appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals alleging in the
main that the trial court erred in concluding that SLDC is a purchaser in good faith and in upholding
the validity of the sale made by the Spouses Lu in favor of SLDC.
Respondent spouses likewise filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial
court erred in failing to consider that the contract to sell between them and Babasanta had been
novated when the latter abandoned the verbal contract of sale and declared that the original loan
transaction just be carried out. The Spouses Lu argued that since the properties involved were
conjugal, the trial court should have declared the verbal contract to sell between Pacita Lu and Pablo
Babasanta null and void ab initio for lack of knowledge and consent of Miguel Lu. They further
averred that the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint filed by Babasanta; in awarding
damages in his favor and in refusing to grant the reliefs prayed for in their answer.
On 4 October 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision11 which set aside the judgment of the
trial court. It declared that the sale between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu was valid and subsisting
and ordered the spouses to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of Babasanta, and
the latter to pay the balance of the purchase price in the amount of two hundred sixty thousand
pesos (P260,000.00). The appellate court ruled that the Absolute Deed of Sale with Mortgage in
favor of SLDC was null and void on the ground that SLDC was a purchaser in bad faith. The
Spouses Lu were further ordered to return all payments made by SLDC with legal interest and to pay
attorneys fees to Babasanta.
SLDC and the Spouses Lu filed separate motions for reconsideration with the appellate court.12
However, in a Manifestation dated 20 December 1995,13 the Spouses Lu informed the appellate
court that they are no longer contesting the decision dated 4 October 1995.
In its Resolution dated 11 March 1996,14 the appellate court considered as withdrawn the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Spouses Lu in view of their manifestation of 20 December 1995. The
appellate court denied SLDCs motion for reconsideration on the ground that no new or substantial
arguments were raised therein which would warrant modification or reversal of the courts decision
dated 4 October 1995.
Hence, this petition.
SLDC assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAN LORENZO WAS NOT A BUYER IN
GOOD FAITH BECAUSE WHEN THE SELLER PACITA ZAVALLA LU OBTAINED FROM IT THE
CASH ADVANCE OF P200,000.00, SAN LORENZO WAS PUT ON INQUIRY OF A PRIOR
TRANSACTION ON THE PROPERTY.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE ESTABLISHED FACT
THAT THE ALLEGED FIRST BUYER, RESPONDENT BABASANTA, WAS NOT IN POSSESSION
OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WHEN SAN LORENZO BOUGHT AND TOOK POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY AND NO ADVERSE CLAIM, LIEN, ENCUMBRANCE OR LIS PENDENS WAS
ANNOTATED ON THE TITLES.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT

RESPONDENT BABASANTA HAS SUBMITTED NO EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT SAN LORENZO
WAS AWARE OF HIS RIGHTS OR INTERESTS IN THE DISPUTED PROPERTY.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FULL
CONCURRENCE ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, IT REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT UPHOLDING THE TITLE OF SAN LORENZO AS A
BUYER AND FIRST POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH. 15
SLDC contended that the appellate court erred in concluding that it had prior notice of Babasantas
claim over the property merely on the basis of its having advanced the amount of two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) to Pacita Lu upon the latters representation that she needed the
money to pay her obligation to Babasanta. It argued that it had no reason to suspect that Pacita was
not telling the truth that the money would be used to pay her indebtedness to Babasanta. At any
rate, SLDC averred that the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) which it
advanced to Pacita Lu would be deducted from the balance of the purchase price still due from it
and should not be construed as notice of the prior sale of the land to Babasanta. It added that at no
instance did Pacita Lu inform it that the lands had been previously sold to Babasanta.
Moreover, SLDC stressed that after the execution of the sale in its favor it immediately took
possession of the property and asserted its rights as new owner as opposed to Babasanta who has
never exercised acts of ownership. Since the titles bore no adverse claim, encumbrance, or lien at
the time it was sold to it, SLDC argued that it had every reason to rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title and it was not obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. Invoking the presumption of good faith, it added that the burden rests on Babasanta to
prove that it was aware of the prior sale to him but the latter failed to do so. SLDC pointed out that
the notice of lis pendens was annotated only on 2 June 1989 long after the sale of the property to it
was consummated on 3 May 1989.
1aw phi 1.nt

Meanwhile, in an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation dated 27 August 1999, the Spouses Lu informed
the Court that due to financial constraints they have no more interest to pursue their rights in the
instant case and submit themselves to the decision of the Court of Appeals.16
On the other hand, respondent Babasanta argued that SLDC could not have acquired ownership of
the property because it failed to comply with the requirement of registration of the sale in good faith.
He emphasized that at the time SLDC registered the sale in its favor on 30 June 1990, there was
already a notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles of the property made as early as 2 June 1989.
Hence, petitioners registration of the sale did not confer upon it any right. Babasanta further
asserted that petitioners bad faith in the acquisition of the property is evident from the fact that it
failed to make necessary inquiry regarding the purpose of the issuance of the two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) managers check in his favor.
The core issue presented for resolution in the instant petition is who between SLDC and Babasanta
has a better right over the two parcels of land subject of the instant case in view of the successive
transactions executed by the Spouses Lu.
To prove the perfection of the contract of sale in his favor, Babasanta presented a document signed
by Pacita Lu acknowledging receipt of the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as partial
payment for 3.6 hectares of farm lot situated at Barangay Pulong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.17
While the receipt signed by Pacita did not mention the price for which the property was being sold,
this deficiency was supplied by Pacita Lus letter dated 29 May 198918 wherein she admitted that she
agreed to sell the 3.6 hectares of land to Babasanta for fifteen pesos (P15.00) per square meter.

An analysis of the facts obtaining in this case, as well as the evidence presented by the parties,
irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the agreement between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is a
contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
Contracts, in general, are perfected by mere consent,19 which is manifested by the meeting of the
offer and the acceptance upon the thing which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be
certain and the acceptance absolute.20 Moreover, contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.21
The receipt signed by Pacita Lu merely states that she accepted the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) from Babasanta as partial payment of 3.6 hectares of farm lot situated in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. While there is no stipulation that the seller reserves the ownership of the property until full
payment of the price which is a distinguishing feature of a contract to sell, the subsequent acts of the
parties convince us that the Spouses Lu never intended to transfer ownership to Babasanta except
upon full payment of the purchase price.
Babasantas letter dated 22 May 1989 was quite telling. He stated therein that despite his repeated
requests for the execution of the final deed of sale in his favor so that he could effect full payment of
the price, Pacita Lu allegedly refused to do so. In effect, Babasanta himself recognized that
ownership of the property would not be transferred to him until such time as he shall have effected
full payment of the price. Moreover, had the sellers intended to transfer title, they could have easily
executed the document of sale in its required form simultaneously with their acceptance of the partial
payment, but they did not. Doubtlessly, the receipt signed by Pacita Lu should legally be considered
as a perfected contract to sell.
The distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale is quite germane. In a contract of
sale, title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a contract to sell, by
agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the
price.22 In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the
contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the
full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition and failure of which is
not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming
effective.23
The perfected contract to sell imposed upon Babasanta the obligation to pay the balance of the
purchase price. There being an obligation to pay the price, Babasanta should have made the proper
tender of payment and consignation of the price in court as required by law. Mere sending of a letter
by the vendee expressing the intention to pay without the accompanying payment is not considered
a valid tender of payment.24 Consignation of the amounts due in court is essential in order to
extinguish Babasantas obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. Glaringly absent from
the records is any indication that Babasanta even attempted to make the proper consignation of the
amounts due, thus, the obligation on the part of the sellers to convey title never acquired obligatory
force.
On the assumption that the transaction between the parties is a contract of sale and not a contract to
sell, Babasantas claim of ownership should nevertheless fail.
Sale, being a consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent25 and from that moment, the parties
may reciprocally demand performance.26 The essential elements of a contract of sale, to wit: (1)
consent or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2) object
certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) cause of the obligation which is established.27

The perfection of a contract of sale should not, however, be confused with its consummation. In
relation to the acquisition and transfer of ownership, it should be noted that sale is not a mode, but
merely a title. A mode is the legal means by which dominion or ownership is created, transferred or
destroyed, but title is only the legal basis by which to affect dominion or ownership.28 Under Article
712 of the Civil Code, "ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by
law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by
tradition." Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while
delivery or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same.29 Therefore, sale by itself does not
transfer or affect ownership; the most that sale does is to create the obligation to transfer ownership.
It is tradition or delivery, as a consequence of sale, that actually transfers ownership.
Explicitly, the law provides that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the
moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Article 1497 to 1501.30 The word
"delivered" should not be taken restrictively to mean transfer of actual physical possession of the
property. The law recognizes two principal modes of delivery, to wit: (1) actual delivery; and (2) legal
or constructive delivery.
Actual delivery consists in placing the thing sold in the control and possession of the vendee.31 Legal
or constructive delivery, on the other hand, may be had through any of the following ways: the
execution of a public instrument evidencing the sale;32 symbolical tradition such as the delivery of the
keys of the place where the movable sold is being kept;33 traditio longa manu or by mere consent or
agreement if the movable sold cannot yet be transferred to the possession of the buyer at the time of
the sale;34 traditio brevi manu if the buyer already had possession of the object even before the
sale;35 and traditio constitutum possessorium, where the seller remains in possession of the property
in a different capacity.36
Following the above disquisition, respondent Babasanta did not acquire ownership by the mere
execution of the receipt by Pacita Lu acknowledging receipt of partial payment for the property. For
one, the agreement between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu, though valid, was not embodied in a
public instrument. Hence, no constructive delivery of the lands could have been effected. For
another, Babasanta had not taken possession of the property at any time after the perfection of the
sale in his favor or exercised acts of dominion over it despite his assertions that he was the rightful
owner of the lands. Simply stated, there was no delivery to Babasanta, whether actual or
constructive, which is essential to transfer ownership of the property. Thus, even on the assumption
that the perfected contract between the parties was a sale, ownership could not have passed to
Babasanta in the absence of delivery, since in a contract of sale ownership is transferred to the
vendee only upon the delivery of the thing sold.37
However, it must be stressed that the juridical relationship between the parties in a double sale is
primarily governed by Article 1544 which lays down the rules of preference between the two
purchasers of the same property. It provides:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.

The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right) gains greater significance
in case of double sale of immovable property. When the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one
who acquires it and first records it in the Registry of Property, both made in good faith, shall be
deemed the owner.38 Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with good faith that is, the
registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been
aware of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary
to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.39
Admittedly, SLDC registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds after it had acquired knowledge of
Babasantas claim. Babasanta, however, strongly argues that the registration of the sale by SLDC
was not sufficient to confer upon the latter any title to the property since the registration was
attended by bad faith. Specifically, he points out that at the time SLDC registered the sale on 30
June 1990, there was already a notice of lis pendens on the file with the Register of Deeds, the
same having been filed one year before on 2 June 1989.
Did the registration of the sale after the annotation of the notice of lis pendens obliterate the effects
of delivery and possession in good faith which admittedly had occurred prior to SLDCs knowledge of
the transaction in favor of Babasanta?
We do not hold so.
It must be stressed that as early as 11 February 1989, the Spouses Lu executed the Option to Buy
in favor of SLDC upon receiving P316,160.00 as option money from SLDC. After SLDC had paid
more than one half of the agreed purchase price of P1,264,640.00, the Spouses Lu subsequently
executed on 3 May 1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor or SLDC. At the time both deeds were
executed, SLDC had no knowledge of the prior transaction of the Spouses Lu with Babasanta.
Simply stated, from the time of execution of the first deed up to the moment of transfer and delivery
of possession of the lands to SLDC, it had acted in good faith and the subsequent annotation of lis
pendens has no effect at all on the consummated sale between SLDC and the Spouses Lu.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property.40 Following the foregoing definition, we rule that SLDC qualifies as a buyer in good faith
since there is no evidence extant in the records that it had knowledge of the prior transaction in favor
of Babasanta. At the time of the sale of the property to SLDC, the vendors were still the registered
owners of the property and were in fact in possession of the lands. Time and again, this Court has
ruled that a person dealing with the owner of registered land is not bound to go beyond the
certificate of title as he is charged with notice of burdens on the property which are noted on the face
of the register or on the certificate of title.41 In assailing knowledge of the transaction between him
and the Spouses Lu, Babasanta apparently relies on the principle of constructive notice incorporated
in Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) which reads, thus:
l^vvphi1.net

Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed, or
entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it
relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.
However, the constructive notice operates as suchby the express wording of Section 52from the
time of the registration of the notice of lis pendens which in this case was effected only on 2 June
1989, at which time the sale in favor of SLDC had long been consummated insofar as the obligation
of the Spouses Lu to transfer ownership over the property to SLDC is concerned.

More fundamentally, given the superiority of the right of SLDC to the claim of Babasanta the
annotation of the notice of lis pendens cannot help Babasantas position a bit and it is irrelevant to
the good or bad faith characterization of SLDC as a purchaser. A notice of lis pendens, as the Court
held in Natao v. Esteban,42 serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that
the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless he
intends to gamble on the results of the litigation." Precisely, in this case SLDC has intervened in the
pending litigation to protect its rights. Obviously, SLDCs faith in the merit of its cause has been
vindicated with the Courts present decision which is the ultimate denouement on the controversy.
The Court of Appeals has made capital43 of SLDCs averment in its Complaint-in-Intervention44 that
at the instance of Pacita Lu it issued a check for P200,000.00 payable to Babasanta and the
confirmatory testimony of Pacita Lu herself on cross-examination.45 However, there is nothing in the
said pleading and the testimony which explicitly relates the amount to the transaction between the
Spouses Lu and Babasanta for what they attest to is that the amount was supposed to pay off the
advances made by Babasanta to Pacita Lu. In any event, the incident took place after the Spouses
Lu had already executed the Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage in favor of SLDC and therefore,
as previously explained, it has no effect on the legal position of SLDC.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that SLDCs registration of the sale had been tainted by the prior
notice of lis pendens and assuming further for the same nonce that this is a case of double sale, still
Babasantas claim could not prevail over that of SLDCs. In Abarquez v. Court of Appeals,46 this
Court had the occasion to rule that if a vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he has
acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration constitutes a registration in bad faith and
does not confer upon him any right. If the registration is done in bad faith, it is as if there is no
registration at all, and the buyer who has taken possession first of the property in good faith shall be
preferred.
In Abarquez, the first sale to the spouses Israel was notarized and registered only after the second
vendee, Abarquez, registered their deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds, but the Israels were first
in possession. This Court awarded the property to the Israels because registration of the property by
Abarquez lacked the element of good faith. While the facts in the instant case substantially differ
from that in Abarquez, we would not hesitate to rule in favor of SLDC on the basis of its prior
possession of the property in good faith. Be it noted that delivery of the property to SLDC was
immediately effected after the execution of the deed in its favor, at which time SLDC had no
knowledge at all of the prior transaction by the Spouses Lu in favor of Babasanta.
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The law speaks not only of one criterion. The first criterion is priority of entry in the registry of
property; there being no priority of such entry, the second is priority of possession; and, in the
absence of the two priorities, the third priority is of the date of title, with good faith as the common
critical element. Since SLDC acquired possession of the property in good faith in contrast to
Babasanta, who neither registered nor possessed the property at any time, SLDCs right is definitely
superior to that of Babasantas.
At any rate, the above discussion on the rules on double sale would be purely academic for as
earlier stated in this decision, the contract between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is not a contract
of sale but merely a contract to sell. In Dichoso v. Roxas,47 we had the occasion to rule that Article
1544 does not apply to a case where there was a sale to one party of the land itself while the other
contract was a mere promise to sell the land or at most an actual assignment of the right to
repurchase the same land. Accordingly, there was no double sale of the same land in that case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
31, of San Pedro, Laguna is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-60323

April 17, 1990

MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., RICARDO CHUNG, JOSE ESTRELLA,

LEONCIO PALANCA, NORBERTO ROBLEZA, J.S. VALBUENA, GREGORIO CANCIO
FRANCISCO BUENCAMINO, and JESUS TOMACRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., QUEZON CITY, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
A Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 ordering, on motion, the Register of Deeds to cancel a notice
of lis pendens annotated in several Torrens titles 2 is the subject of the special civil action of certiorari
at bar.
The notice of lis pendens was recorded at the instance of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-18223 of
the Court of First Instance at Quezon City. 3 The case involved a dispute regarding the ownership of
certain lots within a subdivision known as Magdalena Rolling Hills which the residents claimed had
been reserved as an "open space" and therefore could not in any manner be sold, disposed of or
encumbered.
The subdivision was owned by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. (hereafter simply MEI), located at New
Manila, Quezon City. It originally had a total area of 355,490 square meters. Among the subdivision
lots was Lot 15, Block 18, which had an area of 21,460 square meters. A part of this Lot 15,
measuring 7,100 square meters, had initially been set aside as the subdivision's "open space," i.e.,
reserved for use as a park, playground or recreational zone.
However, an amendment of the plan of the subdivision (amended subdivision plan [LRC] Psd18617) 4 substituting the area earlier designated as open space with an area of 7,100 square
meters (being as aforesaid a portion of Lot 15, Block 18), with several other lots (Lots 21 to 27 of
Block 20) having a combined area also of 7,100 square meters was approved by the City Council
of Quezon City. The Council also authorized the subdivision for disposition to the public of the former
open space. 5 Subsequently, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City also approved the same
amended subdivision plan [LRC] Psd-18167) in accordance with Republic Act No. 44, subject to the
condition "that all the roads, alleys, drainage and open space, dedicated for public use, delineated
therein, shall be made subject to the limitations imposed by law." 6
MEI then had the original open space (a portion of Lot 15, Block 18) result resurveyed and
subdivided into several lots. The new plan, (LRC) Pcs-2299, was approved in due course by the
Land Registration Commission. 7

Some time afterwards, by virtue of a deed executed by MEI and accepted by the City Mayor of
Quezon City, MEI donated to the City Government certain lots in its subdivision for use as parks and
playgrounds; and the donation was ratified by the Council.8
After the donation of the parks and playgrounds just mentioned, MEI disposed of the entire Lot 15,
Block 18 including that part thereof or originally designated as open space (measuring 7,100 square
meters). An area of' 15,778 square meters within this Lot 15, was subsequently conveyed to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) by way of dacion en pago on May 19, 1971. 9 The rest,
residential lots with an aggregate area of 5,688 square meters, were sold to third parties who
thereafter constructed houses thereon. 10
Now, the purchasers of the other subdivision lots, who had organized themselves into a non-stock
corporation known as the Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc., believed that the act of the
Quezon City Government of authorizing the release of said Lot 15 as open space, after it had been
so declared and earlier dedicated as such and its substitution by another portion of the
subdivision was beyond the City Government's authority. They therefore brought suit against the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. MEI in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City for the recovery of said Lot
15 as "open space" for public use of the residents of the subdivision. 11 The complaint, amended a
few months later to implead the Quezon City Government, 12 prayed for judgment (1) that MEI pay
Quezon City P2,575,200, representing the market value of Lot 15, Block 18, or that, alternatively, (2)
the transfer certificates covering Lots 1 to 10, Block 11 (12?), (LRC) Psd-19167, with an aggregate
area of 5,359 square meters i.e., Transfer Certificates of Title Numbered 166683, 166754 to 166763,
inclusive, of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City be cancelled and new ones issued in the name of
Quezon City for the use and employment, as parks and playgrounds, of the residents of the
subdivision. 13 Answers were in due course filed by the defendants.
While the case was pending, notices of lis pendens were, at the plaintiffs' instance, inscribed by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on the Torrens is titles of all the lots embraced within Block 12
(Numbered 166754 to 166763, inclusive, as well as those titles numbered 258973, 258974, 266509,
266510, 267304 to 267309, inclusive). 14 These were among the lots previously conveyed by MEI to
the Development Bank of the Philippines by way of dacion en pago, supra. 15
Judgment was rendered by the Trial Court after due proceedings, 16 the dispositive portion of which is
as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
defendant Quezon City government, the complaint against it is hereby DISMISSED.
HOWEVER, insofar as the action for recovery of open space is concerned, judgment
is hereby rendered authorizing the plaintiffs to recover the subject space from MEI,
thereafter to be donated to the Quezon City government, to maintain and develop the
same for the ultimate use of the common weal.
Not satisfied with this judgment, the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to seek its
modification. 17
While the case was pending adjudgment, MEI and DBP filed separate motions with the Court of
Appeals praying for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles of the lots in
Block 12 of the subdivision. 18 These motions were granted by resolution dated December 10, 1981.
Reconsideration was sought and denied by Resolution dated February 8, 1982. Hence, the petition
at bar, for nullification of the resolutions of December 10, 1981 and February 8, 1982 on the theory

that in promulgating them, the Court of Appeals had acted with grave abuse of discretion if not
indeed without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The petitioners' first argument, that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and grant the motion to cancel notice of lis pendens because no such motion had ever been filed in
the Court a quo, cannot be sustained.
According to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court 19 and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, 20 a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz.:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or
the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
The notice of lis pendens i.e., that real property is involved in an action is ordinarily recorded
without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an
action, an extra judicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their
own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are
subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be
finally determined and laid down therein. 21 The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it
at any given time. And its continuance or removal like the continuance or removal of a preliminary
attachment or injunction is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs' appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and
resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment.
The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those
affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis
pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies.
1w phi 1

Now, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, "after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." 22
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the case had dragged on and had been unnecessarily
prolonged by repeated amendments of the complaints by the plaintiffs, and that the circumstances
on record justified the conclusion that the annotation of the notice of lis pendens was intended to
molest and harass the defendants. 23
That determination, and the conclusion that Presidential Decree No. 1529 "authorizes the
cancellation of notices of lis pendens before final judgment upon order of the Court, upon the

grounds previously mentioned," are not whimsical or capricious, despotic, arbitrary or oppressive in
the premises so as to call for correction by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners.
IT IS SO ORDERED.