St.

Lukes Medical Center

EmployeesAssociationvs. NLRC
[G.R. No. 162053.March 7, 2007]
Facts:
Maribel S. Santos was an X-Ray Technician
in the Radiology department of St. Lukes.
Subsequently Congress passed and
enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as
the Radiologic Technology Act of 1992,
which required that a person must obtain
the proper certificate of registration from
the Board of Radiologic Technology for the
practice or offer to practice as a radiology
and/or x-ray technologist in the
Philippines. In turn, the Director of the
Institute of Radiology issued a final notice
to Santos requiring her to comply by
taking and passing the examination;
otherwise St. Lukes may be compelled to
retire her from employment should there
be no other position available where she
may be absorbed. Despite extensions of
time within which she could comply,
Santos failed to comply with the
requirement for her continued
employment.
Issue:
Was Santos validly dismissed for failure to
secure a certificate of registration from the
Board of Radiologic Technology?
Held:
While the right of workers to security of
tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution,
its exercise may be reasonably regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State
to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and the general
welfare of the people. Consequently,
persons who desire to engage in the
learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to
take an examination as a prerequisite to
engaging in their chosen careers. The

most concrete example of this would be in

the field of medicine, the practice of which
in all its branches has been closely
regulated by the State. It has long been
recognized that the regulation of this field
is a reasonable
method of protecting the health and
safety of the public to protect the public
from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance among those
who would practice medicine. The same
rationale applies in the regulation of the
practice of radiologic and x-ray
technology. The enactment of R.A. (Nos.)
7431 and 4226 are recognized as an
exercise of the States inherent police
power. It should be noted that the police
power embraces the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
educations, good order, safety or general
welfare of the people. The state is justified
in prescribing the specific requirements for
x-ray technicians and/or any other
professions connected with the health and
safety of its citizens. St. Lukes being
engaged in the hospital and health care
business, is a proper subject of the cited
law; thus, having in mind the legal
requirements of these laws, the latter
cannot close its eyes and [let]
complainant-appellants private interest
override public interest.
Pursuant to the above provision of the
CBA, some departments of Dole reverted
to the previous practice of granting DOLE
PHILS. v. PAWIS NG MAKABAYANG OBRERO
January 13, 2003
Corona, J.
Petitioner: DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC.
Respondent: PAWIS NG MAKABAYANG
OBRERO (PAMAO-NFL)
Facts:


On February 22, 1996, a new fiveyear CBA for the period starting February
1996 up to February 2001, was executed
by Dole and Pawis Ng Makabayang
Obrero-NFL (PAMAO-NFL). Among the
provisions of the new CBA is the disputed
section on meal allowance under Section 3
of Article XVIII on Bonuses and Allowances,
which reads:

On September 22, 2000, the Court

of Appeals rendered its decision upholding
the assailed order. Thus, the instant
petition.

Section 3. MEAL ALLOWANCE. The

COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL
ALLOWANCE of TEN PESOS (P10.00) to all
employees who render at least TWO (2)
hours or more of actual overtime work on
a workday, and FREE MEALS, as presently
practiced, not exceeding TWENTY FIVE
PESOS (P25.00) after THREE (3) hours of
actual overtime free meals after exactly
three hours of actual overtime work.
However, other departments continued
the practice of granting free meals only
after more than three hours of overtime
work.

Held: NO. The disputed provision of the

CBA is clear and unambiguous. The terms
are explicit and the language of the CBA is
not susceptible to any other
interpretation. Hence, the literal meaning
of free meals after 3 hours of overtime
work shall prevail, which is simply that an
employee shall be entitled to a free meal if
he has rendered exactly, or no less than,
three hours of overtime work, not after
more than or in excess of three hours
overtime work.

PAMAO-NFL filed a complaint

before the NCMB alleging that Dole
refused to comply with the provisions of
the 1996-2001 CBA because it granted
free meals only to those who rendered
overtime work for more than three hours
and not to those who rendered exactly
three hours overtime work.

The parties agreed to submit the

dispute to voluntary arbitration.
Thereafter, the voluntary arbitrator,
deciding in favor of PAMAO-NFL, issued an
order directing Dole to extend the free
meal benefit to those employees who
actually did overtime work even for
exactly three hours only.

DOLE sought a reconsideration of

the order but the same was denied.
Hence, DOLE elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue: WON after three hours of actual

overtime work should be interpreted to
mean after more than three hours of
actual overtime work

Ratio:

The meal allowance provision in

the 1996-2001 CBA is not new. It was also
in the 1985-1988 CBA and the 1990-1995
CBA. The 1990-1995 CBA provision on
meal allowance was amended by the
parties in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement.
The clear changes in each CBA provision
on meal allowance were in the amount of
the meal allowance and free meals, and
the use of the words after and after
more than to qualify the amount of
overtime work to be performed by an
employee to entitle him to the free meal.

The Court noted that the phrase

more than was neither in the 1985-1988
CBA nor in the original 1990-1995 CBA. It
was inserted only in the 1993-1995 CBA
Supplement. But said phrase is again
absent in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the
1996-2001 CBA, which reverted to the
phrase after three (3) hours.

The omission of the phrase more

than between after and three hours

in the present CBA spells a big difference.

No amount of legal semantics can
convince the Court that after more than
means the same as after.

Date: July 20, 1987

Dole asserts that the more than

in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement was
mere surplusage because, regardless of
the absence of said phrase in all the past
CBAs, it had always been the policy of
petitioner corporation to give the meal
allowance only after more than 3 hours of
overtime work. However, if this were true,
why was it included only in the 1993-1995
CBA Supplement and the parties had to
negotiate its deletion in the 1996-2001
CBA?

Respondents: The Honorable National

Labor Relations Commission, Romeo
Quitco and Ricardo Dionele, Sr.,

o
Clearly then, the reversion to the
wording of previous CBAs can only mean
that the parties intended that free meals
be given to employees after exactly, or no
less than, three hours of actual overtime
work.

The exercise of management

prerogative is not unlimited. It is subject
to the limitations found in law, a collective
bargaining agreement or the general
principles of fair play and justice. This
situation constitutes one of the limitations.
The CBA is the norm of conduct between
petitioner and private respondent and
compliance therewith is mandated by the
express policy of the law.

Dole cannot assail the voluntary

arbitrators interpretation of the CBA for
the supposed impairment of its
management prerogatives just because
the same interpretation is contrary to its
own
Decision: Petition DENIED.

Petitioners: Rosalina Perez Abella/Hda.

Danao-Ramona

Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS:
On June 27, 1960 the petioner,
Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land
known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a
period of ten (10) years. She opted to
extend the leased contract for another ten
(10) years. During the existence of the
lease, she employed the private
respondents Ricardo Dionele, Sr., and
Romeo Quitco. Upon the expiration of her
leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed
private respondents and turned over the
hacienda to the owners thereof on October
5, 1981, who continued the management,
cultivation and operation of the farm. On
November 20, 1981, private respondents
filed a complaint against the petitioner at
the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Bacolod City District Office, for overtime
pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement
with backwages. After the parties had
presented their respective evidence, Labor
Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas, Jr., in a Decision
dated July 16, 1982, ruled that the
dismissal is warranted by the cessation of
business, but granted the private
respondents separation pay. Petitioner
appealed, the National Labor Relations
Commission, in a Resolution affirmed the
decision and dismissed the appeal for lack
of merit. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was
denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:

ABELLA VS NLRC
G.R. No. 71818

Whether or not private respondents

are entitled to separation pay?

HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 284 of the Labor Code as amended
by BP 130 is the law applicable in this
case. The purpose of Article 284 as
amended is obvious-the protection of the
workers whose employment is terminated
because of the closure of establishment
and reduction of personnel. Without said
law, employees like private respondents in
the case at bar will lose the benefits to
which they are entitled for the thirty
three years of service in the case of
Dionele and fourteen years in the case of
Quitco. Although they were absorbed by
the new management of the hacienda, in
the absence of any showing that the latter
has assumed the responsibilities of the
former employer, they will be considered
as new employees and the years of
service behind them would amount to
nothing.
It is well-settled that in the
implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration.
The instant petition is hereby dismissed
and Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the
resolution of the ministry of labor and
employment are hereby affirmed.

CLEMENTE V GSIS
Doubt: resolve in favor of labor (liberal
construction). Theres doubt
when the law is susceptible to 2 or more
interpretations, both or all of which are
correct.
FACTS

- Carolinas husband, Pedro Clemente was

a janitor for 10 years in the DOH Dagupan
City assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin
Clinic.
- He was hospitalized for 12 days due to
his ailment of nephritis, and was also
found to be suffering from Hansens
disease (portal cirrhosis and leprosy).
Then, he died on Nov 14, 1976.
- Petitioner then filed with GSIS a claim for
employees compensation under the Labor
Code.
This was denied by GSIS because the
ailments of her husband are not
occupational diseases taking into
consideration the nature of his work and
were not causally related to his duties and
conditions of work.
Under Art. 167(L) of the Labor Code and
Sec. 1(b) Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, for the
sickness and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, sickness must
be the
result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex A of the rules; otherwise
proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.
- Petitioner claimed that the ailments were
contracted in the course of employment
and were aggravated by his work since he
was in direct contact with persons
suffering from different skin diseases and
was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other
dirt.

- the GSIS forwarded the records of the

petitioner's claim for review by the ECC
(Employees Compensation Commission).

ECC also dismissed the claim since there

was no substantial evidence of causal
connection and there was evidence that
deceased had already contracted the
Hansens before employment.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is entitled to the
Employees compensation?
HELD
YES.
Strict rules of evidence are NOT applicable
in claims for compensation.

The degree of proof required is

merely substantial evidence, which means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. What the law requires is a
reasonable work connection and not a
direct causal relation.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of the
claimant-employee.

The major ailments of the

deceased could be traced to bacterial and
viral infections. For instance, in the case of
leprosy, it is known that the source of
infection is discharge from lesions of
persons with active cases.

Petitoners husband worked in a

skin clinic and was exposed to different
carriers of diseases. As janitor, he was the
employee most exposed to the dangerous
concentration of infected material, and not
being a med practitioner, least likely to
know how to avoid them.
GSISs conservative stand is not consistent
with the liberal interpretation of the Labor
Code and the social justice guarantee
embodied in the Constitution in favor of
workers.

Disposition Decision appealed from is set

aside and GSIS is ordered to pay petitioner
death benefits and attorneys fees.
8.
RESOLUTION OF DOUBT IN LAR OR
EVIDENCE
Doubt as to the interpretation of labor
laws & regulations has to be resolved in
favor of labor
This precept extends to doubts about the
evidence of the disputants

CASE: Nicario v. NLRC

Facts:
-Petitioner employee claimed that she
worked 12 hrs a day, thus rendering OT
work for w/c she claimed OT pay. The
labor arbiter, taking notice of the fact that
the establishment is open for 12 hrs,
decided in favor of petitioner. On motion
for reconsideration filed by the employer
w/ the NLRC, the decision was modified
based on the daily time records presented
by the employer showing that there was
no OT work
Ruling:
The DTR are unreliable since the originals
thereof were not presented in evidence
-No noon break is observed but the DTR
shows petitioner has a rest period from
12n 2pm
All entries in the DTR are suspiciously
inconsistent In controversies between a
laborer & his master, doubts reasonably
arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements & writing
should be resolved in the formers favor
COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES VS
OPLEG.R. No.

73681
Date:
June 30, 1988
Petitioner:
Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc.,
Respondent:
Hon. Blas F. Ople and Colgate Palmolive
Sales Union
Ponente:
Paras, J.
FACTS:
On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union
filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau
ofLabor Relations (BLR) on ground of
unfair labor practice consisting of alleged
refusal to bargain,dismissal of union
officers/members; and coercing
employees to retract their membership
withthe union and restraining non-union
members from joining the union. After
efforts at amicablesettlement proved
unavailing, the Office of the MOLE, upon
petition of petitioner assumed jurisdiction
over the dispute pursuant to Article 264
(g) of the Labor Code.Colgate Palmolive
Philippines, Inc in its position stated that
there is no legal basis for thecharge that
the company refused to bargain
collectively with the union considering
that thealleged union is not the certified
agent of the company salesmen. The
union's status as alegitimate labor
organization is still under question
because on March 6, 1985, a
certainMonchito Rosales informed the BLR
that an overwhelming majority of the
salesmen are not infavor of the Notice of
Strike allegedly filed by the Union. While
the respondent Union, on theother hand,
in its position paper, reiterated the issue in
its Notice to Strike, alleging that it wasduly

registered with the Bureau of Labor

Relations.On August 9,1985, respondent
Minister rendered a decision which found
no merit in theUnion's Complaint for unfair
labor practice allegedly committed by
petitioner as regards thealleged refusal of
petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and
the secret distribution of surveysheets
allegedly intended to discourage
unionism. It also found the three
salesmen, PeregrinoSayson, Salvador
Reynante & Cornelio Mejia "not without
fault" and that "the company hasgrounds
to dismiss above named
salesmen"Respondent Minister directly
certified the respondent Union as the
collective bargainingagent for the sales
force in petitioner company and ordered
the reinstatement of the threesalesmen to
the company on the ground that the
employees were first offenders. Hence,
thePetitoner now seeks to set and annul
the order of then Minister Blas Ople.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Minister
committed a grave abuse of discretion
when hedirectly certified the Union solely
on the basis of the latter's self-serving
assertion that itenjoys the support of the
majority of the sales force in petitioner's
company? and;
2. Whether or not respondent Minister
committed a grave abuse of discretion
when,notwithstanding his very own finding
that there was just cause for the dismissal
of thethree (3) salesmen, he nevertheless
ordered their reinstatement.
HELD:

1. Yes. The respondent Minister has the

power to decide a labor dispute in a
caseassumed by him under Art. 264 (g) of
the Labor Code but this power was
exceededwhen he certified respondent

Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of

the company'ssalesmen since this is not a
representation proceeding as described
under the LaborCode. Moreover the Union
did not pray for certification but merely for
a finding of unfairlabor practice imputed
to petitioner-company.
2. Yes. The order of the respondent
Minister to reinstate the employees
despite a clearfinding of guilt on their part
is not in conformity with law.
Reinstatement is simplyincompatible with
a finding of guilt. Where the totality of the
evidence was sufficient towarrant the
dismissal of the employees the law
warrants their dismissal without
makingany distinction between a first
offender and a habitual delinquent. Under
the law,respondent Minister is duly
mandated to equally protect and respect
not only the labor orworkers' side but also
the management and/or employers' side.
The law, in protectingthe rights of the
laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of theemployer. To order
the reinstatement of the erring employees
namely, Mejia, Saysonand Reynante would
in effect encourage unequal protection of
the laws as a managerialemployee of
petitioner company involved in the same
incident was already dismissedand was
not ordered to be reinstated. As stated by
Us in the case of San MiguelBrewery vs.
National Labor Union,
2 "an employer cannot legally be
compelled tocontinue with the
employment of a person who admittedly
was guilty of misfeasance ormalfeasance
towards his employer, and whose
continuance in the service of the latter
ispatently inimical to his interest."`
Judgment is hereby rendered reversing
and setting aside the Order of the
respondentMinister, dated December 27,
1985 for grave abuse of discretion.
However, in view of the factthat the
dismissed employees are first offenders,

petitioner is hereby ordered to give

themseparation pay. The temporary
restraining order is hereby made
permanent
ST. THERESAS SCHOOL OF NOVALICHES
FOUNDATION and ADORACION ROXAS,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and ESTHER
REYES, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Justitia nemini neganda est. Justice is to be
denied to none. The law, while protecting
the rights of the employees, authorizes
neither the oppression nor destruction of
the employer.[1] When the law angles the
scale of justice in favor of labor, the scale
should never be so tilted if the result is an
injustice to the employer.[2]

The petition at bench seeks to modify the

Resolution issued on November 29, 1994
by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and its Decision of 29
November, 1995 in NLRC NCR Case No.
00-6078-94.
Petitioners contend that the public
respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in handing down its disposition
wherein, notwithstanding the finding that
the dismissal of private respondent was
valid, it awarded backwages for the latter,
computed from November 12, 1993 up to
the time of rendition of the decision under
attack.
Undisputed are the following facts:
Petitioner Adoracion Roxas is the president
of St. Theresas School of Novaliches
Foundation. She hired private respondent,
Esther Reyes, on a contract basis, for the

period from June 1, 1991 to March 31,

1992. However, private respondent
commenced work on May 2, 1991. During
the said period of employment, private
respondent became ill. She went on a
leave of absence from February 17 to 21
and from February 24 to 28, 1992, such
leave of absence having been duly
approved by petitioner Roxas. On March 2,
1992, private respondent reported for
work, but she only stayed in her place of
work from 6:48 to 9:38 a.m. Thereafter,
she never returned. For what reason did
private respondent stop working?
Petitioners theorize that the private
respondent abandoned her work. On the
other hand, the latter maintains that she
was replaced. When she went back to
work on February 20, 1992, she found out
that her table, chair, and other belongings
were moved to a corner of their office, and
she was replaced by Annie Roxas,
daughter of petitioner Adoracion Roxas.
She tried to contact her employer but the
latter could not be found within the school
premises.

On March 25, 1992, petitioners sent

private respondent a letter by registered
mail, informing her that her contract, due
to expire on March 31, 1992, would not be
renewed. Prior thereto, or on March 3,
1992, to be precise, the private
respondent instituted NLRC NCR Case No.
00-03-01481-92[3] against the herein
petitioners for unfair labor practice based
on harassment, illegal dismissal, 13th
month pay, allowances, removal of desk
and chair form place of work, and refusal
to communicate, moral and exemplary
damages.[4] On November 12, 1993,
absent any amicable settlement
hammered out by the parties, the Labor
Arbiter came out with a decision,
disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, responsive to the foregoing,

judgment is hereby ordered declaring
complainant (sic) dismissal from the
service illegal. Respondent is hereby
ordered to reinstate complainant to her
former position without loss of seniority
rights and to pay for full backwages from
the time of dismissal to her actual
reinstatement in the amount of Seventy
Six Thousand Seven Hundred One
(P76,701.00) Pesos.
Respondent is hereby ordered to pay
complainant P25,000 as moral damages
and P10,000 by way of exemplary
damages.
Respondent (sic) are further assessed
attorneys fees of 10% of the award.

On December 7, 1993, after posting the

necessary supersedeas bond, petitioners
appealed the aforesaid decision to the
NLRC.
On January 12, 1994, private respondent
presented a Motion for Partial Execution of
the reinstatement aspect of the Labor
Arbiters decision.
On April 5, 1994, when no action was
taken by the Labor Arbiter on her motion,
she filed a Motion for Immediate
Resolution, and, on July 13, 1994, after
three months, still without any action
taken by the same Labor Arbiter on her
yearning, the private respondent sent in a
second Motion for Immediate Resolution.
However, Labor Arbiter Raul T. Aquino was
appointed as Commissioner of the NLRC,
thereby leaving subject motions of private
respondent unresolved.
On November 29, 1994, petitioners
appeal, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
006078-94, was resolved in the assailed
Resolution of the of the Second Division of
the NLRC; disposing, as follows:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the

decision of the Labor Arbiter below dated
November 12, 1993 is hereby reversed
and set aside and another one rendered,
declaring the separation of Esther Reyes
from service legal and valid.
However, respondent is directed to pay
the backwages of herein complainant from
November 12, 1993 up to the date of the
promulgation of this Resolution.
Therefrom, both parties moved for
reconsideration; petitioners assailing the
award of backwages in favor of private
respondent.

On November 29, 1995, the same Second

Division of NLRC rendered its challenged
Decision, denying subject motions for
reconsideration.

Sometime in February 1996, the private

respondent filed with NLRC a Motion for
Execution, through the deciding Labor
Arbiter. But until now, no writ of execution
issued. Unfortunately for private
respondent, she never interposed any
appeal from NLRCs ruling, upholding the
validity of her dismissal. It is therefore
settled, beyond the reach of this courts
power of review, that private respondents
employment was validly terminated.
On the part of petitioners, they have come
here to question the award of backwages
for the private respondent, whose
dismissal has been upheld with finality.
Before delving into and passing upon the
propriety of the assailed award of
backwages, which is the core of the
Petition before us, the court takes note of
the undisputed fact that private
respondent was employed on a contract
basis.

Article 280 of the Labor Code does not

proscribe or prohibit an employment
contract with a fixed period provided the
same is entered into by the parties,
without any force, duress or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other
circumstance vitiating consent. It does not
necessarily follow that where the duties of
the employee consist of activities usually
necessary or desirable in the usual
business of the employer, the parties are
forbidden from agreeing on a period of
time for the performance of such
activities. There is thus nothing essentially
contradictory between a definite period of
employment and the nature of the
employees duties.[5]
It goes without saying that contracts of
employment govern the relationship of the
parties. In this case, private respondents
contract provided for a fixed term of nine
(9) months, from June 1, 1991 to March
31, 1992. Such stipulation, not being
contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy, is valid,
binding and must be respected.[6]
It bears stressing that private teachers are
subject to special rules with respect to
requisites for their permanent
employment and security of tenure, to wit:
1. He must be a full time teacher;
2. He must have rendered at least three
consecutive years of service; and,
3. Such service must be satisfactory.[7]
This is in accord with the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools issued by
the then Department of Education.[8]
We now tackle the pivotal point of inquiry the award of backwages in favor of private
respondent. Is it proper in light of the
finding that her dismissal was valid?

The term backwages has been defined as

that for earnings lost by a worker due to
his illegal dismissal.[9] Backwages are
generally granted on grounds of equity.
[10] Payment thereof is a form of relief
that restores the income lost by reason of
such unlawful dismissal.[11] It is not
private compensation or damages, but is
awarded in furtherance and effectuation of
the public objectives of the Labor Code.
Nor is it a redress of a private right but,
rather, in the nature of a command to the
employer to make public reparation for
dismissing an employee, either due to the
formers unlawful act or bad faith.[12]

vs.

Petitioners are employees of respondent

Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. Petitioners filed a
complaint againstrespondents for unfair
labor practice through illegal dismissal,
violation of their security of tenure and the
perpetuation of the "Cabo System." For
failure to prosecute as they failed to either
attend the scheduledmandatory
conferences or submit their respective
affidavits, the claims of the other
complainant-employeeswere dismissed.
Labor Arbiter conducted clarificatory
hearings to elicit information from the
remainingcomplainants (petitioners
herein). In lieu of a position paper,
respondent company filed a motion to
dismisscomplaint for lack of jurisdiction
and cause of action. On 29 May 1998
Labor Arbiter rendered a decisionordering
respondent company to reinstate
complainants. Thereafter, the NLRC also
sustained the findings of theLabor
Arbiter.However, Respondent Coca-Cola
Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals,
although the CA affirmed thefinding of the
NLRC that an employer-employee
relationship, but nonetheless agreed with
respondent that theaffidavits of some of
the complainants, namely, Prudencio
Bantolino, et al. should not have been
given probative value for their failure to
affirm the contents thereof and to undergo
cross-examination. As aconsequence, the
appellate court dismissed their complaints
for lack of sufficient evidence. Hence, this
petitionaccording to petitioners, the Rules
of Court should not be strictly applied in
this case specifically by puttingthem on
the witness stand to be cross-examined
because the NLRC has its own rules of
procedure which wereapplied by the Labor
Arbiter in coming up with a decision in
their favor.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,

Issue:

G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003

Whether or not the Rules of Court should

be strictly applied in giving evidentiary
value to the affidavitsdespite the failure of

Jurisprudence is filled to the brim with

cases wherein backwages were awarded
to an employee illegally dismissed.[13]
But where, as in this case of a pitiful
employee rendered hapless by her lawyers
inaction or ignorance, the dismissal has
been adjudged valid and lawful, the
challenged award of backwages is
decidedly improper and contrary to law
and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the
Decision of the respondent NLRC rendered
on November 29, 1995 in NLRC NCR Case
No. 00-6078-94 is hereby MODIFIED by
deleting therefrom the award of
backwages in question. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, and
Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.
BANTOLINO,

Facts:

the affiants to undergo the test of crossexamination?

Ruling: NO. In the oft-cited case of
Rabago v. NLRC,

is given the discretion to determine the

necessity of a formal trial or hearing.
Hence, trial-type hearings are not even
required as the cases may be decided
based on verified position papers, with
supporting documents and their affidavits.

the Supreme Court held that

"the argument that theaffidavit is hearsay
because the affiants were not presented
for cross-examination is not persuasive
because therules of evidence are not
strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies like the NLRC
wheredecisions may be reached on the
basis of position papers only."
Moreover, in
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction
Co. v. NLRC,
it held that under Art. 221 of the Labor
Code, the rules of evidence prevailing
incourts of law do not control proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC are authorized to adopt
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily andobjectively and
without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due
process.Hence, to reiterate, administrative
bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure
and the rules obtaining in courts of law.
Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence may be given
only stringent application, i.e., by analogy
or in a suppletory character and effect.In
the case at bar, the submission by
respondent, that an affidavit not testified
to in a trial, is mere hearsayevidence and
has no real evidentiary value, cannot find
relevance in the present case considering
that a criminal prosecution requires a
quantum of evidence different from that of
an administrative proceeding. Under the
Rulesof the Commission, the Labor Arbiter

Pfizer vs Galan
Facts: Respondent Edwin V. Galan was an
employee of petitioner Pfizer, Inc., a drug
manufacturer. He was initially hired in
August 1982 as a professional sales
representative, commonly known as a
medical representative. He was a recipient
of several company awards, which
eventually resulted in his promotion as
District Manager for Mindanao in 1996.
In September 1997, respondent was
recalled to Manila to meet with his
superiors and was issued a memorandum
requiring him to explain his alleged
unauthorized use of, and questionable
expense claims made on, the company
vehicle, as well as the doubtful liquidation
of his cash advance of US$5,000 for a
recent official trip to Indonesia, which
ultimately led to his dismissal and
prompted him to file a complaint before
the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter declared that
respondent was illegally dismissed and
ordered Pfizer, Inc., to pay him back
wages, separation pay, thirteenth month
pay, incentives and bonuses,
reimbursement of expenses and attorneys
fees. Respondents monetary award
totalled P2,052,013.50. Case was
appealed to NLRC Cagayan de Oro, which
affirmed the decision and the Motion for
Reconsideration was denied as well. And
upon respondents motion, a writ of
execution was issued.
The Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals , to

which the challenged resolution was

issued which dismissed the petition for
certiorari for having been filed beyond the
sixty-day reglementary period. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the appeal for being
filed beyond the reglementary period?
Held: Yes. In Systems Factors Corporation
v. NLRC we declared that the amendment
introduced under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC is
procedural or remedial in character, as it
does not create new or remove vested
rights, but only operates in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing. It is settled that
procedural laws may be given retroactive
effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their
passage, there being no vested rights in
the rules of procedure. Thus, the said
amendment may be given a retroactive
effect. We reiterated this ruling in Unity
Fishing Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals.
Thus, by virtue of the retroactive effect of
the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
introduced by our Resolution in A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC, which allows the filing of a
petition for certiorari within sixty days
from notice of the denial of a motion for
reconsideration, the filing of petitioners
petition before the Court of Appeals was
on time. Indeed, there is no dispute that
their petition was filed on the sixtieth day
from notice of the denial of their motion
for reconsideration.
JOSE SONZA vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 138051 June 10, 2004

FACTS:

In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an

agreement with the Mel and Jay
Management and Development
Corporation (MJMDC). ABS-CBN was
represented by its corporate officers while
MJMDC was represented by Sonza, as
President and general manager, and
Tiangco as its EVP and treasurer. Referred
to in the agreement as agent, MJMDC
agreed to provide Sonzas services
exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio
and television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay
Sonza a monthly talent fee of P310, 000
for the first year and P317, 000 for the
second and third year.

On April 1996, Sonza wrote a letter to

ABS-CBN's President, Eugenio Lopez III,
where he irrevocably resigned in view of
the recent events concerning his program
and career. The acts of the station are
violative of the Agreement and said letter
will serve as notice of rescission of said
contract. The letter also contained the
waiver and renunciation for recovery of
the remaining amount stipulated but
reserves the right to seek recovery of the
other benefits under said Agreement.

After the said letter, Sonza filed with the

Department of Labor and Employment a
complaint alleging that ABS-CBN did not
pay his salaries, separation pay, service
incentive pay,13th month pay, signing
bonus, travel allowance and amounts
under the Employees Stock Option Plan
(ESOP). ABS-CBN contended that no
employee-employer relationship existed
between the parties. However, ABS-CBN
continued to remit Sonzas monthly talent
fees but opened another account for the
same purpose.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint

and found that there is no employeeemployer relationship. The LA ruled that
he is not an employee by reason of his
peculiar skill and talent as a TV host and a
radio broadcaster. Unlike an ordinary
employee, he was free to perform his
services in accordance with his own style.
NLRC and CA affirmed the LA. Should
there be any complaint, it does not arise
from an employer-employee relationship
but from a breach of contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was

employer-employee relationship between
the parties.

HELD:
There is no employer-employee
relationship between Sonza and ABS-CBN.
Petition denied. Judgment decision
affirmed.

Case law has consistently held that the

elements of an employee-employer
relationship are selection and engagement
of the employee, the payment of wages,
the power of dismissal and the employers
power to control the employee on the
means and methods by which the work is
accomplished. The last element, the socalled "control test", is the most important
element.
A. Selection and Engagement of
Employee
ABS-CBN engaged SONZAs services to cohost its television and radio programs
because of SONZAs peculiar skills, talent
and celebrity status. SONZA contends
that the discretion used by respondent in
specifically selecting and hiring

complainant over other broadcasters of

possibly similar experience and
qualification as complainant belies
respondents claim of independent
contractorship.
However, independent contractors often
present themselves to possess unique
skills, expertise or talent to distinguish
them from ordinary employees. The
specific selection and hiring of SONZA,
because of his unique skills, talent and
celebrity status not possessed by ordinary
employees, is a circumstance indicative,
but not conclusive, of an independent
contractual relationship. If SONZA did not
possess such unique skills, talent and
celebrity status, ABS-CBN would not have
entered into the Agreement with SONZA
but would have hired him through its
personnel department just like any other
employee.
B. Payment of Wages
ABS-CBN directly paid SONZA his monthly
talent fees with no part of his fees going to
MJMDC. SONZA asserts that this mode of
fee payment shows that he was an
employee of ABS-CBN. SONZA also points
out that ABS-CBN granted him benefits
and privileges which he would not have
enjoyed if he were truly the subject of a
valid job contract.

All the talent fees and benefits paid to

SONZA were the result of negotiations that
led to the Agreement. If SONZA were ABSCBNs employee, there would be no need
for the parties to stipulate on benefits
such as SSS, Medicare, x x x and 13th
month pay which the law automatically
incorporates into every employeremployee contract. Whatever benefits
SONZA enjoyed arose from contract and
not because of an employer-employee
relationship. In addition, SONZAs talent

fees are so huge and out of the ordinary

that they indicate more an independent
contractual relationship rather than an
employer-employee relationship. ABS-CBN
agreed to pay SONZA such huge talent
fees precisely because of SONZAs unique
skills, talent and celebrity status not
possessed by ordinary employees.

C. Power of Dismissal
For violation of any provision of the
Agreement, either party may terminate
their relationship. SONZA failed to show
that ABS-CBN could terminate his services
on grounds other than breach of contract,
such as retrenchment to prevent losses as
provided under labor laws.

During the life of the Agreement, ABS-CBN

agreed to pay SONZAs talent fees as long
as AGENT and Jay Sonza shall faithfully
and completely perform each condition of
this Agreement. Even if it suffered severe
business losses, ABS-CBN could not
retrench SONZA because ABS-CBN
remained obligated to pay SONZAs talent
fees during the life of the Agreement. This
circumstance indicates an independent
contractual relationship between SONZA
and ABS-CBN.

SONZA admits that even after ABS-CBN

ceased broadcasting his programs, ABSCBN still paid him his talent fees. Plainly,
ABS-CBN adhered to its undertaking in the
Agreement to continue paying SONZAs
talent fees during the remaining life of the
Agreement even if ABS-CBN cancelled
SONZAs programs through no fault of
SONZA.

D. Power of Control
First, SONZA contends that ABS-CBN
exercised control over the means and
methods of his work. SONZAs argument is
misplaced. ABS-CBN engaged SONZAs
services specifically to co-host the Mel &
Jay programs. ABS-CBN did not assign
any other work to SONZA. To perform his
work, SONZA only needed his skills and
talent. How SONZA delivered his lines,
appeared on television, and sounded on
radio were outside ABS-CBNs control.
SONZA did not have to render eight hours
of work per day. The Agreement required
SONZA to attend only rehearsals and
tapings of the shows, as well as pre- and
post-production staff meetings. ABS-CBN
could not dictate the contents of SONZAs
script. However, the Agreement
prohibited SONZA from criticizing in his
shows ABS-CBN or its interests. The clear
implication is that SONZA had a free hand
on what to say or discuss in his shows
provided he did not attack ABS-CBN or its
interests.
Second, SONZA urges us to rule that he
was ABS-CBNs employee because ABSCBN subjected him to its rules and
standards of performance. SONZA claims
that this indicates ABS-CBNs control not
only [over] his manner of work but also
the quality of his work." The Agreement
stipulates that SONZA shall abide with the
rules and standards of performance
covering talents of ABS-CBN. The
Agreement does not require SONZA to
comply with the rules and standards of
performance prescribed for employees of
ABS-CBN. The code of conduct imposed
on SONZA under the Agreement refers to
the Television and Radio Code of the
Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster sa Pilipinas
(KBP), which has been adopted by the
COMPANY (ABS-CBN) as its Code of
Ethics. The KBP code applies to
broadcasters, not to employees of radio
and television stations. Broadcasters are

not necessarily employees of radio and

television stations. Clearly, the rules and
standards of performance referred to in
the Agreement are those applicable to
talents and not to employees of ABS-CBN.

In any event, not all rules imposed by the

hiring party on the hired party indicate
that the latter is an employee of the
former. In this case, SONZA failed to show
that these rules controlled his
performance. We find that these general
rules are merely guidelines towards the
achievement of the mutually desired
result, which are top-rating television and
radio programs that comply with
standards of the industry.
Lastly, SONZA insists that the exclusivity
clause in the Agreement is the most
extreme form of control which ABS-CBN
exercised over him. This argument is
futile. Being an exclusive talent does not
by itself mean that SONZA is an employee
of ABS-CBN. Even an independent
contractor can validly provide his services
exclusively to the hiring party. In the
broadcast industry, exclusivity is not
necessarily the same as control.

The hiring of exclusive talents is a

widespread and accepted practice in the
entertainment industry. This practice is not
designed to control the means and
methods of work of the talent, but simply
to protect the investment of the broadcast
station. The broadcast station normally
spends substantial amounts of money,
time and effort in building up its talents
as well as the programs they appear in
and thus expects that said talents remain
exclusive with the station for a
commensurate period of time. Normally,
a much higher fee is paid to talents who
agree to work exclusively for a particular
radio or television station. In short, the
huge talent fees partially compensates for
exclusivity, as in the present case.