Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
http://emr.sagepub.com/
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
Additional services and information for Emotion Review can be found at:
Email Alerts: http://emr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://emr.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Citations: http://emr.sagepub.com/content/3/4/371.refs.html
Emotion Review
Vol. 3, No. 4 (October 2011) 371378
The Author(s) 2011
ISSN 1754-0739
DOI: 10.1177/1754073911410737
er.sagepub.com
Carroll E. Izard
Abstract
This article clarifies my current and seemingly ever-changing position on issues relating to emotions. The position derives from
my differential emotions theory and it changes with new empirical findings and with insights from my own and others thinking
and writing. The theory distinguishes between first-order emotions and emotion schemas. For example, it proposes that first-order
negative emotions are attributable mainly to infants and young children in distress and to older individuals in emergency or
highly challenging situations. Emotion schemas are defined as emotion feelings interacting with cognition in motivating the
decision making and actions of everyday life.
Keywords
cognition, emotion, functions, interactions
Basic Emotions
I have always thought of emotions as being fundamental to
human nature (Izard, 1971, 1977, 1991), but only recently did I
identify a few emotions (interest, joy, sadness, anger, fear) that
may be called basic for the following reasons. They (a) have
a simpler structure by virtue of the absence of complex cognition, (b) have more specificity of functions, (c) are largely
derived through bio-evolutionary processes, (d) continue to
retain relatively more evolutionarily derived features (e.g.,
Author note: I am very grateful to Fran Haskins for her help in preparing this article for submission.
Corresponding author: Carroll E. Izard, Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, 108 Wolf Hall, Newark, DE 19716, USA. Email: izard@psych.udel.edu
Emotion Schemas
Except for the period of early development and the relatively
rare occasions of emergencies, highly threatening or challenging situations, emotion schemas (not first-order emotions) are
typical of everyday life. Many contemporary emotion scientists
refer to the phenomena they study simply as emotion and
often, but not always, provide a clear operational definition that
identifies the stimulus. When asked to define the general term
emotion they give widely different definitions (Izard, 2010).
Although I have modified, expanded, and attempted to
clarify my theory several times (sometimes in response to critiques), I have never thought of it as basic emotion theory. I
have always identified it as differential emotions theory (DET;
Izard, 1971, 1977, 1991, 2007, 2009).
Discrete Emotions
Any emotion, first-order emotion as well emotion schemas, may
be a discrete emotion. Yet discrete emotions frequently interact
(e.g., interest and joy in play and social interactions, and sadness and anger or shame and guilt in depression). Apparently,
bio-evolutionary processes provided ample neural systems for a
wide variety of discrete emotions and their interactions with
each other and with cognition and behavior (cf. Edelman, 2006,
on qualia). There is some evidence to support the idea that
highly complex emotional phenomena like anxiety and depression involve a variable set of interacting discrete emotion schemas anchored by fear and sadness respectively (Izard, 1972).
The contrary assumptions that emotions are not discrete or that
they form blends of feeling states seem untenable because that
would rule out their specific and directional influences on cognition and action. The blending of two or more discrete emotions might seriously compromise the unique functionality of
each. In sum, all emotions are discrete, yet they are highly interactive with each other as well as with cyclical affects (e.g.,
hunger, sexual arousal) and with perceptual and higher order
cognitive processes including deliberative thought. Some of
what is attributed to emotion in current research is probably
the result of emotion in interactions with other emotions and
other nonemotional affects as well as with cognition. These
interactions may make it difficult to ascertain the specific emotion that is prominent in consciousness at a particular time. They
may also make a dimensional approach to the study of the
effects of emotion processes a strategy that focuses on identifiable patterns of emotions (e.g., sadness and anger in depression,
or fear, shame, and guilt in anxiety disorders) more attractive
than a plan that focuses on single discrete emotions.
First-order emotion responses are typically activated rapidly,
automatically, and largely nonconsciously (outside reportable
awareness) in response to a limited set of stimuli that have a
limited presence in contemporary peaceful cultures. They can
be activated by minimal perceptual/evaluative processes and
without participation of the neural systems underlying higher
order cognition (LeDoux, 1996, 2009; Merker, 2007). In contrast to first-order emotions, emotion schemas depend on continual interaction among the neural substrates of both emotions
and higher order cognition.
Question 3: Does the existence of a basic emotion depend on
the existence of a central organizing mechanism (something
like an affect program) or can a basic emotion be simply a
patterned response?
Unlike Tomkins (1962, 1963, 1991), I do not use the term affect
program as a descriptor of processes in the activation of a
first-order emotion experience. It seems too restrictive, tending to imply fixed emotion responding with little or no flexibility. However, I do maintain that each of the small set of emotions
that I have called basic or first-order have dedicated or at least
partially dedicated neural systems that are involved in their activation and interactions (Izard, 2007; cf. Panksepp, 2007, 2008).
First-order emotion response systems do not always run
their course in an inevitable lockstep fashion, as might be
suggested by the term affect program. As mentioned above,
first-order emotion responses that often occur rapidly and automatically can be modified via interaction with cognitive and
affectivecognitive control systems which include the processing
of environmental information. For example, a monkey who
receives a painful bite on its rear end might automatically turn
toward the perpetrator in an attack mode, then quickly walk away
on discovering that the pain was delivered by the alpha monkey.
It seems reasonable to assume that such an emotioncognition
interaction would change a first-order emotion to an emotion schema that would have a relatively simple higher order component.
Question 4: In everyday discourse, emotions cause certain
behaviors (fear makes us flee, makes our heart race, and
makes us think irrationally, and so on). In your theory, does a
first-order emotion have such causal powers? Which powers?
My answer to the first of the foregoing questions is different for
different periods of development and for different first-order
positive versus first-order negative emotions. It concerns the
effects of emotions on self and others. For example, a smile
from mom or from almost anyone is highly likely to evoke a
smile in a 2- to 6-month-old infant who is comfortable and alert
(Izard et al., 1995). In turn, an infants smile typically begets a
smile in return and increases her chances of additional social
interactions and nurturance. It seems reasonable to assume that
this sort of stimulusfirst-order emotion response evolved
because it provides the infant an adaptive advantage. In a later
developmental period, a young childs smile when accompanied by persuasive pleading for cookies and ice cream may
often fail to get an assenting smile from a mom who is conscious of the effects of too many sweets on childrens health.
There is merit in the idea that declarations of specific cause
effect relations in human behavior are arbitrary. Usually there
are unidentified antecedent causes including individual differences in temperament/personality. After the period of early
infancy, the maxim of arbitrary causes holds on many occasions
where first-order emotions may be among the possible causes
of various outcomes. Even in early infancy, genetic factors
(e.g., temperament) as well as surrounding context and specific
stimuli within it influence the activation and processes of
first-order emotions and their effects.
After early infancy, a first-order emotion does not inevitably
cause any behavior change. All emotion-related causal processes
are probabilistic. Just as there is generality and flexibility in
emotion responding to events and situations (Izard, 2004), there
and they are often (though not always) associated with different
expressive behaviors and actions (broadly defined to include
cognitive and motor activity). If the cognitive activity moves
beyond perceptual processes to higher order cognition, the firstorder emotion is transformed into an emotion schema or an
interaction of emotion feeling and higher order cognition.
Each first-order emotion, as well as each of the other discrete emotions, has a distinct feeling component (subjective
experience). Although the feeling is always the same qualitatively for each emotion, the emotion-related expressive behaviors and actions can be influenced by events and context. These
expressive behaviors and actions provide feedback to the neural
circuits of the emotion feeling which, depending on the context,
may be attenuated or amplified.
Question 7: If your list of basic emotions is a set of English
terms, how do you respond to the claim that some languages
lack equivalent terms for those emotions but include emotion terms that differ in meaning from English terms? What
is the relation between your basic emotions and the everyday
folk language people use to talk about their emotions?
I recognize that lists of first-order emotions may vary among
theorists and across cultures. I think that culture and cultural
evolution may have a real effect in determining peoples
acknowledged and operating repertoire of emotions and on how
they are named. I think that these differences might diminish
or even disappear over time when an individual experiences
complete acculturation into a new and different culture.
Question 8: What are the minimal cognitive prerequisites
for the occurrence of a basic emotion?
The minimal cognitive prerequisite for eliciting a first-order
emotion is the perception of at least the contours of a bioevolutionarily prepared stimulus. An example is a 6- to 8-weekold infants smile on perceiving the contours of a human face
(Izard et al., 1995). Even young children suffering with anencephaly (and incapable of conceptual processes) smile at familiar
faces, suggesting that brainstem mechanisms can mediate the
smile response to a human face independent of neocortical structures (Merker, 2007).
In sum, first-order emotion response systems operate only
when the individual is confronted with an ecologically valid
stimulus (or its conditioned counterpart) in its natural context
(or a reasonable facsimile). After early development, a very
small proportion of negative-emotion experiences meet the
criteria for status as a first-order emotion. The frequency of
first-order negative emotion experiences in the everyday life of
normal people in a peaceful society, like the frequency of their
first-order positive emotions experiences, also varies as a
function of the genetically determined aspects of emotional or
temperamental disposition.
References
Bruehl, S., Chung, O., & Burns, J. (2006). Anger expression and pain: An
overview of findings and possible mechanisms. Journal of Behavioral
Medicine, 29, 593606.
Edelman, G. M. (2006). Second nature: The transformation of knowledge.
In G. M. Edelman (Ed.), Second nature: Brain science and human
knowledge (pp. 142157). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Finlon, K. J., Izard, C. E., Woodburn, E., Krauthamer-Ewing, S., Grossman,
S. R., Seidenfeld, A., & Laurenceau, J. P. (2010). Relative effectiveness
of an emotions-focused and a cognitive-behavioral intervention for
preschool Head Start children. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Delaware.
Foroni, F., & Semin, G. R. (2009). Language that puts you in touch with
your bodily feelings. The multimodal responsiveness of affective
expressions. Psychological Science, 20, 974980.
Grossmann, T., Striano, T., & Friederici, A. D. (2007). Developmental
changes in infants processing of happy and angry facial expressions: A
neurobehavioral study. Brain & Cognition, 64, 3041.
Izard, C. E. (1971). The face of emotion. New York, NY: AppletonCentury-Crofts.
Izard, C. E. (1972). Patterns of emotions: A new analysis of anxiety and
depression. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Izard, C. E. (1977). Human emotions. New York, NY: Plenum Press.
Izard, C. E. (1991). The psychology of emotions. New York, NY: Plenum
Press.
Izard, C. E. (2002). Translating emotion theory and research into preventive
interventions. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 796824.
Izard, C. E. (2004). The generalityspecificity issue in infants emotion
responses: A comment on Bennett, Bendersky, and Lewis (2002).
Infancy, 6, 417423.
Izard, C. E. (2007). Basic emotions, natural kinds, emotion schemas, and a
new paradigm. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 260280.
Izard, C. E. (2009). Emotion theory and research: Highlights, unanswered
questions, and emerging issues. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 125.
Izard, C. E. (2010). The many meanings/aspects of emotion: Definitions,
functions, activation, and regulation. Emotion Review, 2, 363370.
Izard, C. E., Fantauzzo, C. A., Castle, J. M., Haynes, O. M., Rayias, M. F.,
& Putnam, P. H. (1995). The ontogeny and significance of infants facial
expressions in the first 9 months of life. Developmental Psychology, 31,
9971013.
Izard, C. E., Hembree, E. A., & Huebner, R. R. (1987). Infants emotion
expressions to acute pain: Developmental change and stability of
individual differences. Developmental Psychology, 23, 105113.
Izard, C. E., King, K. A., Trentacosta, C. J., Laurenceau, J. P., Morgan, J. K.,
Krauthamer-Ewing, E. S., & Finlon, K. J. (2008). Accelerating the
development of emotion competence in Head Start children.
Development & Psychopathology, 20, 369397.
Izard, C. E., & Malatesta, C. Z. (1987). Perspectives on emotional development: I. Differential emotions theory of early emotional development.
In J. D. Osofsky (Ed.), Handbook of infant development (2nd ed.,
pp. 494554). New York, NY: Wiley Interscience.
Izard, C. E., Youngstrom, E. A., Fine, S. E., Mostow, A. J., & Trentacosta, C. J.
(2006). Emotions and developmental psychopathology. In D. Cicchetti &
D. J. Cohen (Eds.), Developmental psychology: Theory and method
(2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 244292). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Landau, B. (2010). The importance of the nativistempiricist debate: Thinking
about primitives without primitive thinking. Child Development
Perspectives, 3, 8890.
Langer, S. K. (1982). Mind: An essay on human feeling (abridged by Gary
van Den Heuvel, Ed.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press. (Original
work published 1967)
LeDoux, J. E. (1996). The emotional brain: The mysterious underpinnings
of emotional life. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
LeDoux, J. E. (2009). Emotional coloration of consciousness: How feelings
come about. In L. W. Weiskrantz & M. Davies (Eds.), Frontiers of
consciousness (pp. 69130). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.