Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Volume2_CS4.indb 1
6/16/11 4:11 PM
Volume2_CS4.indb 2
6/16/11 4:11 PM
VI
Anurio Brasileiro
de Direito Internacional
Volume2_CS4.indb 3
6/16/11 4:11 PM
demar G. Bahadian, Alain Pellet, Andr de Carvalho Ramos, Antnio Paulo Cachapuz de Medeiros,
A
Antnio Remiro Brotns, Arthur Jos Almeida Diniz, Bruno Simma, Celso Lafer, Eduardo Grebler,
Fausto Pocar, Francisco Orrego Vicua, Francisco Rezek, Gilberto Giullaume, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Jos
Henrique Fischel, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Luigi Condorelli, Roy Lee, Thomas M. Franck (),
Vicente Marotta Rangel, Welber Barral.
PRODUO EXECUTIVA
arlos Eduardo Amoni Rangel, Dlber Andrade Lage, Eduardo Duarte, Gabriela Frazo Gribel, Gustavo
C
Silva Ribeiro, Lucas Svio de Oliveira Silva, Mariana Beiro Xavier, Natlia Meirelles Teixeira, Suzana
Santi Cremasco, Tlder Andrade Lage, Tiago Eler Silva e Vindelino Rodrigues Pereira.
Submisso de Artigos para Publicao | Articles Submissions
Admite-se Permuta | Exchanges are Accepted
Data Limite para Entrega dos Artigos | Deadline: 04/2012
E-mail | info@cedin.com.br
EDITORAO
Alexander Oliveira
Rosana Martins da Costa Diniz
APOIO
Ficha Catalogrfica elaborada pela Biblioteca da Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de Minas Gerais
A636
Semestral
1. Direito Internacional. I. Centro de Direito Internacional II. Brant, Leonardo
Nemer Caldeira. III. Ttulo: Brazilian yearbook of International
Law. IV. Ttulo: Annuaire Brsilien de Droit International.
Volume2_CS4.indb 4
CDU: 341.
6/16/11 4:11 PM
Volume2_CS4.indb 5
6/16/11 4:11 PM
Volume2_CS4.indb 6
6/16/11 4:11 PM
SUMRIO
9
Apresentao
34 The Global War on Terror, Jus ad Bellum and Normative Change in International Law
Jorge M. Lasmar
166 The Role Of The Member States Courts In The Jurisdictional System Of The
European Union: The Portuguese Case
Nuno Piarra
Francisco Pereira Coutinho
Volume2_CS4.indb 7
6/16/11 4:11 PM
ANEXOS
227 ANEXO I Jurisprudncia Relativa ao Direito Internacional no STJ e STF em 2010
Volume2_CS4.indb 8
6/16/11 4:11 PM
Apresentao
A partir do dilogo entre o meio acadmico e a sociedade civil, o Anurio
Brasileiro de Direito Internacional tem como finalidade estabelecer no pas, em
definitivo, uma publicao semestral, com insero internacional, engajada na
promoo e consolidao de uma viso brasileira do Direito Internacional. Visase, assim, simultaneamente, contribuir para uma melhor compreenso do sistema
normativo internacional, bem como assegurar um espao para reflexo acerca de seus
recentes desafios.
Este sexto nmero apresenta anexos que traro a jurisprudncia do Supremo
Tribunal Federal e do Superior Tribunal de Justia relativa ao Direito Internacional,
os casos contenciosos e pareceres consultivos da Corte Internacional de Justia e uma
compilao dos tratados ratificados pelo Brasil no ano de 2010, alm de contribuies
de importantes doutrinadores do Direito e das Relaes Internacionais.
A iniciativa resultante da viso empreendedora do Centro de Direito
Internacional (CEDIN) e conta com o fundamental apoio do Centro Universitrio
UNI-BH, da Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de Minas Gerais (PUC-MG), da
Faculdade Novos Horizontes, da Fundao de Amparo Pesquisa do Estado de Minas
Gerais (FAPEMIG), da Fundao Konrad Adenauer (FKA) e do Ramo Brasileiro da
International Law Association (ILA Brasil).
Esta realizao igualmente o resultado da competncia, da generosidade
e do compromisso com o Direito Internacional de brilhantes jovens. Agradeo
profundamente ao Carlos Eduardo Rangel, ao Dlber Lage, ao Eduardo Duarte,
Gabriela Gribel, ao Gustavo Ribeiro, ao Lucas Svio, Mariana Xavier, Natlia
Teixeira, Suzana Cremasco, Ttia, ao Tlber Lage, ao Tiago Eler, ao Rodrigues e,
em especial, Ana Carolina Rezende.
Volume2_CS4.indb 9
6/16/11 4:11 PM
10
Presentation
From the dialogue between academia and the civil society, the Brazilian
Yearbook of International Law aims to establish in the country a denitive biannual
publication with international visibility, engaged in the promotion and consolidation of
the Brazilian vision of International Law. The aim is thus to simultaneously
contribute to a better understanding of the international legal system and to ensure
a space for reection about its recent challenges.
This sixth edition contains attachments of the jurisprudence of the Brazilian
Supreme Court (STF) in relation to International Law, the contentious cases and
advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, and a compilation of
treaties ratied by Brazil in 2010, in addition to contributions by important
scholars of International Law and International Relations.
The initiative is the result of International Law Centers (CEDIN)
entrepreneurial vision and has full support of the Centro Universitrio
UniBH, Pontifcia Universidade Catlica of Minas Gerais (PUCMG), Faculdade Novos Horizontes, Fundao de Amparo Pesquisa do Estado
de Minas Gerais (FAPEMIG), Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Brazilian
Branch of the International Law Association (ILA Brazil).
This achievement is also the result of the competence and devotion to International
Law of brilliant young students. I would like to deeply thank Carlos Eduardo Rangel,
Dlber Lage, Eduardo Duarte, Gabriela Gribel, Gustavo Ribeiro, Lucas Svio,
Mariana Xavier, Natlia Teixeira, Suzana Cremasco, Tlder Lage, Tiago Eler,
Vindelino Rodrigues and, specially, Ana Carolina Rezende.
Volume2_CS4.indb 10
6/16/11 4:11 PM
11
Resumo
O artigo traa a evoluo do programa das Naes Unidas desde o incio at o
presente momento, mostrando os aspectos internos e externos do programa em questo,
delineando suas vicissitudes, escrito por um autor com quase 30 anos de experincia.
O gravame do argumento que todos os seres humanos tm locus standing perante
os comits de direitos humanos para defender-se. O artigo tambm revela a expanso
incrvel do programa, durante seus mais de 60 anos de existncia. Atualmente, a
proteo dos direitos humanos abordada holisticamente, e a proteo e promoo
dos direitos humanos so difundidas no sistema integral das Naes Unidas.
Abstract
The article traces the evolution of the human right programme of the United
Nations from its inception until the present. It shows the insides and outsides of the
programme containing a continued progress with up and downs, written by an author
with almost 30 years of experience within the system.The gravamen of the argument
is that human beings are entitled to have locus standing before human rights bodies
to defend themselves.The article also demonstrates the incredible expansion of the
programme over more than 60 years.Currently there exists an holistic approach to
human rights protection and human rights are being mainstreamed throughout the
United Nations system.
I. Introduction
Serious concern for the protection of human rights finds its roots in the barbaric
acts committed during the Second World War.
The preambular paragraphs of both the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights clearly bear witness of the importance of the individual human
dignity on which the evolution of the human rights program would manifest itself
over the years.2
However, the London Declaration of 12 July 1941 was the first step in the direction
of a universal charter where representatives of a number of governments, including
1 Docteur en droit University Nijmegen, the Netherlands,1976; Doctor of Civil Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 1989, former
Senior Staffmember of OHCHR, Geneva. This article is the result of a course delivered at Cedin in August 2010
2 See Johannes van Aggelen: The Preambular Paragraphs of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy, vol.28, Nr 2,2000, pp.129-141; see in general Leonardo Nemer Brant Caldeira(editor): Comentario da Carta das Naes
Unidas, Cedin,2008
Volume2_CS4.indb 11
6/16/11 4:11 PM
12
3 United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, UNCIO, 14 volumes (Conference Proceedings: texts of
documents adopted by the Conference,(London 1945).
4 UN Doc E/HR/6 dated 1 May 1946
Volume2_CS4.indb 12
6/16/11 4:11 PM
13
5 Section IV,arts. 35-44 (unpublished manuscript in the McGill Law Library on file with author, who worked with Professor Humphrey
in the late 1970s); See also Fontanus, vol. II, 1989, private collection McGill University, A. J. Hobbins: The first draft of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
6 Doc. E/CN.4/SR 29 dated 8 December 1947
7 See for an excellent survey: Antonio Augusto Canado Trindade: Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, vol.1, 2nd ed.
Sergio Fabris Editor, Porto Alegre, 2003, pp.51-59; for specific references. Johannes van Aggelen:Implementation of Article28 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN Conferences in the 1990s, key-note speech, 30 Hamline Journal of Public Law and
Policy, Fall 2008, pp. 1-3.
8 GA Res. 217(III), adopted with 48 votes, in favour,8 abstentions and none against with two delegations absent.
9 Bulletin of the State Department, 19, (1948), p.751
10 Eduardo Muylaert Antunes: Natureza juridica da Declarao Universal de Direitos Humanos, Revista dos Tribunais, Nr. 446, p.35,
december 1972, So Paulo; J.P.Humprhrey: Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure, Dobbs Ferry, Transnational
Publishers, New York, 1984, p. 85; L.B.Sohn: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A Common Standard of Achievement? - The
Status of the Universal Declaration in International Law, Journal of the International Commission of Jurists, vol.8, pp. 23-26in passim;
Th.Meron: Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989; A. Eide, G.Alfredsson ed. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights - A Commentary, Oslo, Scandinavian University Press,1992; Philosophical Foundations of
Human Rights, Unesco, Paris, 1986; H. Hannum: The Status of the Universal Declaration in National and International Law, Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 25(1995-1996), pp. 289-354
Volume2_CS4.indb 13
6/16/11 4:11 PM
14
Unlike previous human rights bills such as the American and French Declarations
of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Universal Declaration contains civil and political
rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights.11
After an Australian proposal to establish a mechanism to implement the
Declaration was defeated early on12, the Commission was to embark on the task to
elaborate a Convention with measures of implementation for states to comply with
upon ratification.13
During the period 1950-1954 the Commission on Human Rights worked diligently
together with ECOSOC and the General Assembly on the issue. Due to different
visions and interpretations between the Western and Eastern bloc, the General
Assembly during its 6th session decided to draft two Covenants, one on civil and
political rights and another on economic, social and cultural rights.14
In the US Senate, there was considerable opposition to enforceable rights in view
of segregation policies and outlawing racial discrimination was so difficult to realize
that President Eisenhower had to abandon support for the two Covenants.15
In this connection one should not forget that the US Senate only ratified the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 8 June 1992 and entered into force for the
US three months later.16
The Covenants were adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force in 197617.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination preceded the adoption of the two Covenants(18)18. Although President
Johnson signed the Convention on 28 September 1966, it was not transmitted to
the Senate until President Carter did so in 1978. Neither President. Reagan nor
first President Bush supported ratification. The Clinton administration finally
11 H.Lauterpacht: International Human Rights Law, London, Stevens, 1950, pp. 321-355; L. Sohn and T. Buergenthal: International
Protection of Human Rights, Bobbs - Merill,Indianapolis, 1973, pp. 516; A. Cassesse: Human Rights in a Changing World, Philadelphia,
Temple Press, 1990, pp. 38-39; J.Donnelly: International Human Rights: a regime analysis in International Organization,Massachusetts
Insitute of Technology.Summer 1986, pp: 599-642; K. Vasak: Human Rights as a Legal Reality in The International Dimensions of
Human Rights,Vasak ed, Paris, Unesco/Greenwood Press, 1982.
12 Proposal by Australian delegate Hodgson, draft res. E/CN. 4/15 and E/CN. 4/21, p.89.
13 R. Cassin: La Dclaration universelle et la mise en oeuvre des droits delhomme, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International
Law, vol. 79, 1951, pp. 241-362; B.Mirkine-Guetzvitch: Quelques problmes de la mise en oeuvre de la declaration universelle des droits
de lhomme, Collected Courses, vol. 83, 1953,pp. 255-376; A.Verdoodt: La Naissance et Signification de la dclaration universelle des
droits de lhomme,Louvain,1964;C.Malik:The Drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,Bulletin of Human Rights, vol.
1, 1986, UN Center for Human Rights, Geneva; A. Canado Trindade: Co-existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International
Protection of Human Rights at the Global and Regional Level,Collected Courses, vol. 202, 1987, pp.21-428.
14 G. A. Res. 543(VI) of 5 February 1952.
15 See Kaufman, Hevener and Witheman: Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker
Amendment, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 10, Nr. 3, August 1988, pp. 309-337; C. Roberts: Exploring the Fractures with Human
Rights: An Empirical Study of Resistance PHD Dissertation, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 2010.
16 A de Zayas: The Potential for US Ratification and Enforcement of the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 20, 1990, pp. 299-310. 102 Congress. Rec. 4781-4784.
The ratification was encumbered by five reservations; five understandings, four declarations and one proviso. The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant was only signed by the American government on 5 October 1977, but pressure by
the Senate on subsequent administrations have prevented until now ratification of the Covenant. See also for the status of all ratifications
www.ohchr.org treaty bodies,ratifications.
17 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200 A(xxi), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (N.16) at 49, 993 UNTS, 3,entered into
force on 3 January 1976; Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,at ibidem, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force on 23 March 1976, both
documents in A/6316(1966).
18 GA Res .2106 A adopted on 21 March 1965; entered into force on 4 January 1969; 666 UNTS 195.
Volume2_CS4.indb 14
6/16/11 4:11 PM
15
Volume2_CS4.indb 15
6/16/11 4:11 PM
16
In its resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985, the Council renamed the Working Group
Committee on Economic, Social and Culture Rights.
The Committee is composed of 18 independent experts and serve as any other
member of any other human rights treaty body in their individual capacity.
In view of the fact that the Committee was not established when the Covenant
was adopted, the Committee is considered to have a quasi-judicial function. The
Committee started its work in 1987.
Since 1988, the then chairman of the Committee, Prof. Philip Alston has been
working on a protocol to the Covenant similar to that of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in order to give individuals and groups of persons locus standing
before the Committee.
He submitted a detailed report to the Commission on Human Rights in 1997, but
due to the progressive implementation of the rights enshrined in the Covenant, the
process took far more time to materialize and the General Assembly finally adopted
the Protocol in 2008.21
Another feature of the formative years of human rights protection, was the positive
impact on the development of human rights by the members of the Sub -Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
Established by the Commission on Human Rights in 1947, the Sub-Commission
was mandated in 1949 to undertake studies, particularly in the light of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and to make recommendations to the Commission
on Human Rights concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind relating
to human rights and fundamental freedoms and the protection of racial, national,
religious and linguistic minorities.
The Sub-Commission really functioned as a think-thank for the Commission on
Human Rights, but also stimulated the ever-increasing NGO community and civil
society to ponder on the depth of international protection of human rights.
In the first 25 years of its existence, studies were carried out in the field of education,
discrimination in matters of religious and political rights and practices, discrimination
in respect of the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return
to his country, discrimination against persons born out of wedlock, equality in the
administration of justice, racial discrimination, the question of slavery and slave trade in
all their practices and manifestations, the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious
and linguistic minorities, the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations,
the question of prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, exploitation of labor
through illicit and clandestine trafficking, the adverse consequences for the enjoyment
of human rights of assistance given to the then colonialist and racist regimes in southern
21 Alston report: E/CN.4/1997/105; the Optional Protocol was adopted by the General Assembly by Resolution A/63/117. For an excellent
survey on the history of the Optional Protocol see:Catarina de Albuquerque: Chronicle of an Announced Birth: The Coming into Life of
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-The Missing Piece of the International Bill
of Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly,vol. 32, N 1, February 2010, pp 144-178.
Volume2_CS4.indb 16
6/16/11 4:11 PM
17
Volume2_CS4.indb 17
6/16/11 4:11 PM
18
Volume2_CS4.indb 18
6/16/11 4:11 PM
19
The first case examined was Chile following the overthrow of Allende by
Pinochet. The Commission established a working group to launch an inquiry into
the situation. In 1978, the working group was replaced by a Special Rapporteur, who
was requested to submit an annual report. The Special Rapporteurs mandate lasted
until 1990 until Chile became a constitutional elected government. This initiative led
to investigation of human rights violations by other South American countries under
dictatorial regimes.
How power politics can interfere with human rights protection, shows the case
of the third Director of the Human Rights Division,Dr.Theo van Boven, who was
dismissed on 8 February 1982 from the United Nations by the then Secretary General
of the United Nations,Mr.Javier Perez de Cuellar, under pressure from the then
American Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, Mrs. Kirkpatrick. The
Argentinian government had protested against the position taken by Dr.van Boven on
human rights violations in that country.28
A quite exhaustive list of so-called country rapporteurs may be found on the
website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights29...
Special Rapporteurs also played an increasing important role in initiating measures
to prevent or remedy violations of human rights in urgent cases. This procedure
in turn was taken over by certain human rights bodies, such as the Committee on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial discrimination. The Office of the High
Commissioner also maintains a so-called hot line to report urgent cases.
There is also coordination between human rights bodies and special procedures to
enhance protection. Since 1984 the chairpersons of treaty bodies are meeting annually
and since 1995 they are joined by mandate holders of special procedures.30
Alongside investigations of cases in specific countries, the Commission established
a mechanism for examining certain particularly grave human rights violations in
countries all over the world under so-called thematic mandates. The first one was
the Working Group on Enforced for Involuntary disappearances, established by the
Commission on 29 February 1980. Allegations that several thousand people had been
victims of such practices made this issue of high priority for the Commission. The
reports by the Working Group have gone far beyond the scope of a single state to
embrace a number of countries where such phenomena have been observed.
Once this mechanism had been put in place, it became possible to address other
human rights violations. The next step was the appointment in 1982 of a Special
28 I witnessed personally the event which took place at the opening of the 38th session of the Human Rights Commission. For a narrative
account, see Theo van Boven and Hans Thoolen: People Matter: Views on International Human Rights Policy, Meulenhof, Amsterdam,
1982. The position of the Secretary-General has been the subject of controversy. An early negative account was given by Shirly Hazard,
who worked in the office of the first two secretary generals under the title Defeat of an Ideal: a Study of the Self-Distruction of the
United Nations, Little Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1973. After the vigorous defense of human rights by Dr. van Boven, the
human rights Secretariat came into the limelight, which led Dr.Ramcharan to write an over-enthusiastic book entitled Keeping Faith with
the United Nations, Nijhoff, the Netherlands, 1987. See for a recent, balanced book on the role of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations: Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, Simon Chesterman ed, New York 2007, reviewed by Dr.
Johannes van Aggelen in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law,vol. 42,N3, 2010.
29 www.ohchr.org.
30 see the website www.ohchr.org.
Volume2_CS4.indb 19
6/16/11 4:11 PM
20
31 A/HRC/11/2/Add. 2 dated 23 March 2009 and addendum A/HRC/8/3/Add.4 dated 14 May 2008.
32 Doc. E/CN. 4/2004/9/Add. 2 dated 2 March 2004.
33 General Assembly Res. 2542(XXIV) of 11 December 1969; see for the report doc. A/7630.
Volume2_CS4.indb 20
6/16/11 4:11 PM
21
One of the landmark documents in this regard was the adoption, after 10 years of
intense negotiations, of the Declaration on the Right to Development by the General.
Assembly in December 1986.34
In the aftermath of the adoption of the declaration, a Global Consultation on the
Right to Development as a Human Right to place in Geneva in January 1990.35
This issue remains high on the agenda as the Commission on Human Rights
established an Intergovernmental Working Group in 1998 to monitor and review
progress made in the implementation of the declaration.36
Under the Human Rights Council procedure, the 12th session of that working
group will take place in May 2011 as requested by the Council in October 2010.37
The adoption of the declaration became the last important issue before the fall
of the Berlin Wall, which facilitated much the convergence of different ideological
positions towards the protection of human rights. The adoption of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child took place less than two weeks after this event. It is hitherto
the only human rights convention with universal ratification.38
IV. External Activities to Further Compliance with International Human
Rights Law
The first resolution concerning technical assistance in the field of human rights
was adopted in 1953. In 1955, the General Assembly decided to consolidate several
technical assistance programs within a broad program of assistance in the field of
human rights to be known as advisory services in the field of human rights. This
program contained advisory services of experts, fellowships and scholarships for
people who deal with human rights issues in their home countries and training courses
and seminars on human rights topics. This program was renamed theTechnical
Cooperation program in 198839
The Commission on Human Rights through this program encouraged the
establishment and development of institutions and infra structures for promotion
and protection of human rights at the regional and national level. Many technical
assistance programs, especially with developing countries have led to important
results. The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights was established in
1986 and the African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies as well as the
Arab Institute of Human Rights were established in 1989 with a major input by the
Human Rights Secretariat.
34 General Assembly Res. 41/128 dated 4 December 1986. The crucial final debate took place at the Commissions session in March 1986
where finally a consensus could be reached.
35 See for the proceedings document HR/PUB/91/2.
36 Commission resolution 1998/72.
37 HRC resolution 15/25 dated 7 October 2010.
38 General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989.
39 See for a detailed survey United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, United Nations 1994, Chapter VI.
Volume2_CS4.indb 21
6/16/11 4:11 PM
22
40 Commission on Human Rights res. 23( XXXIV) of 8 March 1978; see also the seminar on this issue contained in ST/HR/SER/A. 2(1978).
41 General Assembly Res. 48/134 of 4 March 1994; further developments in A/RES. 63/169 of 20 March 2009 on he role of the Ombudsman
in national institutions.
42 See in general Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace, Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti, Recommendations for
the United Nations, Aspen Institute, 1995. Cristine Bell: Peace Agreements and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2000.
43 Bell,Chapter 7; see for the current role of OHCHR in peace agreement the final chapter of this article.
44 General Assembly resolutions 44/156 dated 15 December 1989 and 45/155 dated 18 december 1990.
Volume2_CS4.indb 22
6/16/11 4:11 PM
23
During its first session in September 1991 the committee decided to establish
a provisional agenda and to request additional funds in order to accommodate
representatives of developing countries. It was also decided to convoke three regional
preparatory meetings.45
The second preparatory meeting took place in April 1992 with representatives of
125 states and the 77 NGOs. It was decided that one regional preparatory meeting
would take place in Africa at the end of 1992, one in Latin America and one in Asia
both to take place in early 1993. It was also decided that national human rights
commissions could participate in the capacity of observers.46
It became clear that the conference should deal with the following issues: the
relationship between human rights, democracy and development, the impact of
poverty on the enjoyment of human rights, national measures of implementation
of human rights (judicial,legislative and administrative), improvement of the
functioning of the human rights bodies, the relationship between international
law, international human rights law and international refugee law, principal of
equality and the problem of discrimination against vulnerable groups(indigenous
populations and minorities), the rights of the child, the problem of sexual orientation,
administration of justice and the rule of law and the establishment of programs in
teaching human rights law.47
It is very encouraging that the Secretary-General of the World Conference
openly invited non-governmental organizations to participate in view of their liberty
of expression, flexibility of action which enabled them to exercise a fundamental
complementary function.48
The third session of the Preparatory Committee took place in September 1992 and
finalized the agenda for the world conference. The outcome also made clear that the
conference should allow open debate between states, non-governmental organizations
and civil society.49
The regional preparatory meeting for Africa took place in Tunis in November
1992. 42 African states and a great number of NGOs adopted a declaration and 14
resolutions by consensus. The declaration affirmed the universality of human rights
and that the promotion and protection of rights was independent of any political or
economic system. It warned against new forms of extremism which would undermine
the universal values of human rights.50
The regional meeting for Latin America took place in San Jose, Costa Rica in
January 1993. The meeting did not adopt resolutions, but instead an extensive
declaration in which it emphasized the relationship between human rights, democracy
45 Doc. A/CONF/157/PC/13 of 20 September 1991.
46 Doc.A/CONF/157/PC/37 of 7 May 1992.
47 report of the Secretary-General on studies and documentation for the world conference, doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/20 dated 26 March 1992.
48 UN Center for Human Rights Newsletter vol. 5, (1992).
49 Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/54 dated 8 October 1992; the provisional agenda for the world conference is contained in document A/CONF.
157/1 dated 18 May 1993.
50 See Doc. A/.CONF. 157/AFRM/14 - A/CONF. 157/PC/57.
Volume2_CS4.indb 23
6/16/11 4:11 PM
24
Volume2_CS4.indb 24
6/16/11 4:11 PM
25
Volume2_CS4.indb 25
6/16/11 4:11 PM
26
A review process took place in July 1998 at the coordination segment of ECOSOC
followed by a review by the General Assembly in November 1998 in which the
implementation by states parties to human rights treaties was reviewed after the High
Commissioner for Human Rights had submitted a report in which she emphasized the
mainstreaming of human rights in all United Nations activities.
One of the most important recommendations to the General Assembly was the
request to establish the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights (para.18 of the
program of action).
It should be recalled that this initiative was not new at all. As early as 1947,while
drafting the Universal Declaration, the Australian delegate proposed the creation of a
post called Advocate-General or High Commissioner for Human Rights56. The cold
war brought the initiative to a hold for almost 30 years. In 1977, the General Assembly
finally discussed reports by the Secretary-General from 197557 and proposed the
establishment, under the authority of the Secretary-General, of a United Nations High
Commissioner for Humans Rights.58 The Commission on Human Rights as well as the
Sub-Commission lingered for a few years on the question and a mandate was proposed by
the Sub- commission in 198359. It was not until 10 years later that the post was finally
approved by the General Assembly.60
The United Nations-sponsored world conferences in the 1990s are excellent
examples of the new trend of mainstreaming human rights. Although the United
Nations organized many conferences before that period, there exists a structural
difference between the period before and after the cutting-edge of the 90s. Previous
conferences were organized to tackle a particular issue, but no implementation
procedures were envisaged.
The new trend in the 90s focused on a careful assessment of impacts long after the
final documents were adopted through so-called +5 follow-up conferences. Another
reason for the new strategy is that many problems are so universal in nature that old
forms of diplomacy are inadequate and very often inappropriate. The fundamental
transformations in the international community paved the way for the transformation of
epoch in the 21st century. It is our conviction that the outcome of the 1990 conferences
would have been totally different if the Berlin wall had not fallen in November 1989.
The first conference in the series was the 1992 UNCED conference held in Rio
de Janeiro. The United Nations conference on environment and development, held in
June 1992 produced a declaration and the daunting agenda : Agenda 2161.
56 Doc. E//CN. 4 /AC. 21/L1 at para.152; see a general discussion of this issue E/CN. 4/SR. 29 of 8 December 1947.
57 Documents A/10235; A/32/178; A/32/179.
58 See for an academic approach to the issue the book by Roger Clark: a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Martinus
Nijhoff, The Netherlands, 1972.
59 Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1983/43.
60 GA Res 48/141 of 20 December 1993, see for a narrative account of the mandate, B.Ramcharan: The United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights: The Challenges of International Protection, Martinus Nijhoff, The Netherlands, 2002, see also M.Schmidt: What Happened
to the Spirit of Vienna? The Follow-up of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action and the Mandate of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 64, 1995, pp. 591-617; A de Zayas: United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute, Heidelberg, electronic edition, 2010.
61 Report of the conference contained in doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1 (vol.I) and (vol.II) covering agenda 21 dated 1 January 1993.
Volume2_CS4.indb 26
6/16/11 4:11 PM
27
Volume2_CS4.indb 27
6/16/11 4:11 PM
28
displaced persons. It warned against the risks of social liberation and the need
to promote social development in light of the observing of human rights, setting
forth a detailed agenda for law-making by states and for coordinated action by
international organizations. The General Assembly devoted in June 2000 a special
session to the implementation of the outcome of the summit and took further
initiatives.
The fourth World Conference on Women took place in September 1995 in Beijing.
The Beijing declaration and platform of action expressed its determination to advance
the goals of equality, development and peace for all women everywhere in the interest
of humanity as well as to ensure respect for international law, including humanitarian
law, in order to protect women and girls in particular.64
Implementation of the platform of action required changes in values, attitudes
and practices and policies at all levels. Governments and United Nations agencies
agreed to promote mainstreaming of a gender perspective in policies and practices.
The conference called for greater interaction between key UN bodies focusing
on womens issues. In paragraph 8 of the declaration reference was made to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights treaties providing
for equal rights and inherent human dignity for women. The platform of action
warned against violence originating from certain cultural practices. Like other final
documents of recent conferences, the platform so itself is part of the process of
formation of the international agenda-centered on human beings, their needs and
rights in the 21st century.
It was acknowledged that the key function of a longer-term conference process
is to highlight progress of individual nations by reviewing their national practices
and policies as well as commitments. In June 2000, the General. Assembly devoted
a special session to the implementation of the program of action.
The UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) took place in June 1996
in Instanbul. This conference was the last to shape the development agenda and
the first to officially give a platform to civil society. The Habitat Agenda noted
the interdependence of economic and social development and environmental
protection.65
It affirmed the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, including
adequate food, clothing, water and sanitation and to continuous improvement in
living conditions. The conference stated that its objectives were in full conformity
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international
law, adding that to safeguard the interests of present and future generations in
human settlements is one of the fundamental goals of the international community.
The agenda devoted special attention to vulnerable groups and people with special
needs. It expressed the belief that obtaining the goals listed in the conference
64 Fourth World Conference on Women, 4-15 September 1995, Beijing China. The report is contained in document A/CONF. 177/20 dated
17 October 19 95.
65 The report of the conference is contained in document A/CONF. 165/14 dated 7 August 1996.
Volume2_CS4.indb 28
6/16/11 4:11 PM
29
document would promote a more stable and equitable world free from injustice
and conflict. The first human settlement conference had taken place in Vancouver
in 1976, where strategies to mitigate the negative effects of rapid urbanization
were outlined. Subsequently the General Assembly adopted the Global Strategy for
Shelter to the year 2000 in 1988. The conference reached consensus on the issue
of the right to adequate housing and pressed the office of the High Commissioner
to have it recognized as a human right. In June 2001, the General. Assembly held a
special session to consider progress made in the implementation of the agenda.
The World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance took place in Durban in September 2001 .
The Durban Declaration and Program of Action, unlike previous final documents,
was totally victim-oriented.66
The declaration singled out the dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty to
which more than 1 billion people were subjected and to which historical injustices
had undeniably contributed. The program of action also addressed itself to vulnerable
groups, such as members of minorities, persons subjected to marginalization and
social exclusion. They should be able to fully and effectively benefit from all human
rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction and in full equality before the
law. It also urged states to incorporate a gender perspective in all programs of action
against racism and racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
The conference urged states to take or strengthen measures, including through
bilateral or multilateral cooperation, to address the root causes, such as poverty
under development and lack of equal opportunity, which could be associated with
discriminatory practices.
It is indeed a bad turn of history that the conference finished only a few days
before 9/11, which put all the commitments made in jeopardy for the next decade. The
review conference which took place in April, 2009 in Geneva, could not change the
minds of delegations and was considered by many a failure.
A brief overview of these conferences was considered necessary to demonstrate
the new holistic approach to human rights after the Vienna conference which is also
evident in the UN reform proposals by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan.67
In this very detailed report on visions for the future, Mr.Annan correctly the finger
on the weak spot when he wrote we will not enjoy development without security and
security without development and we will not enjoy either without respect for human
rights (para.17 of the main report).
VI The Current State of Affairs: human rights protection during the first decade of
the new millennium.
66 The report of the conference is contained in document A/CONF. 189/12 dated 1 January 2002.
67 Strengthening of the United Nations: an Agenda for further Change, contained in document A/57/387 dated 9 September 2002; High-level
Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change contained in document A/59/565 dated 2 December 2004; In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development and Security: Follow-up of the Millennium Summit, contained in document A/59/2005 dated 21 March 2005 +Add. 1-3
Volume2_CS4.indb 29
6/16/11 4:11 PM
30
Volume2_CS4.indb 30
6/16/11 4:11 PM
31
Volume2_CS4.indb 31
6/16/11 4:11 PM
32
It is interesting to note that Brazil was selected for the first meeting on the UPR
in April 2008.
The review of Brazil followed the following process:
First, Brazil presented a national report which was compiled after
consultation with various ministries, non-governmental organizations
and civil society, including a public session of the Senate74. Brazil
expected that these periodic reports would not only increase the
critical analysis of compliance of states with their obligations under
international human rights law, but also would promote constructive
dialogue in order to overcome challenges.
Subsequently, the office of the High Commissioner prepared a
compilation of information contained in the reports of treaty bodies,
special procedures, including observations and comments by the state
concerned and other relevant official United Nations documents.75
The office of the High Commissioner also prepared a summary of
stakeholders submissions to the Universal Periodic Review process76
Then, representatives of three countries are selected to prepare
questions for the meeting. This is called the troika. The countries for
Brazil were Gabon, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland. In addition, a list
of written questions were received from Ireland, Germany, Portugal,
Denmark, Italy and Sweden.
During the meeting which took place on 11 April 2008, 44 countries
took part in the interactive dialogue with Brazil.
The final document contained 15 recommendations77:
Prison conditions should be improved; the criminal justice system, including
the juvenile should be reformed;violence and extrajudicial killings by state
military police should be investigated; human rights defenders should have
more protection; violence against women should be investigated; child and
slave labor should be abolished,; there should be no impunity for human
trafficking and corruption,; the recommendations by the Committee against
Torture and the Human Rights Committee should be implemented and serious
violations of human rights should become federal law.
In addition,national should be established in conformity with the Paris principles.
74 Document A/HRC/WG. 6/1/BRA/1 dated 7 March 2008.
75 Document A/ /HRC/WG. 6/1/BRA/2 dated 31 March 2008.
76 In the case of Brazil there were 22 submissions, see document A/HRC/WG.6/1/BRA/3 dated 6 March 2008.
77 contained in document A/HRC/8/27 dated 22 May 2008
Volume2_CS4.indb 32
6/16/11 4:11 PM
33
At the end of the meeting Brazil committed itself to establish annual reports on
human rights and create a national systemof human rights indicators.
VII. Concluding remarks
The evolution of human rights protection at the international level is steadily
growing. Nevertheless, it remains up to states to implement their international
commitments at the national level. Indeed, the number of ratifications of international
instruments is constantly on the rise and some are almost universally ratified. There
are currently nine supervisory human rights bodies as the refinement of the law also
continues.
It is difficult to make a prognosis whether the Human Rights Council will be an
improvement in comparison with the old Commission. The review of its activities in
2011 could become a benchmark.78
A major obstacle remains the supervisory functions of human rights treaty bodies.
Is it possible to streamline guidelines of all treaty bodies and will the creation of single
super treaty body, analyzing all reports by existing treaty bodies not be more wishful
thinking than a reality check?
It is far too early to predict the viability of yet another world conference on
human rights, but the United Nations program of human rights over the last couple of
decades has done much to change perceptions about human rights protection in states,
intergovernmental organizations and foremost civil society. Human dignity remains
the centerpiece of human rights protection and a daunting project has recently seen the
light called 2048: Humanitys Agreement to Live Together79.
As the first High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Jose Ayala Lasso stated
in a preface: Human rights are a permanent vocation. Even after the wonderful work
of codification by the United Nations and of the regional human rights commissions
and courts, reflection goes on because we need better mechanisms of implementation,
such as the World Court of Human Rights envisaged by project 2048. This is a noble
task that should reflect the views of all of humanity, including the approaches of the
thinkers and the lawyers of Central and South America.
78 See Carlos Villan-Duran: Lights and Shadows of the Human Rights Council, SUR, International Journal of Human Rights, So Paulo,
vol. 5, 2007; Analytical Assessment of UPR 2008-2010 available at UPR.info.org; B. Ramcharan: The Protective Concept of the Human
Rights Council in International Criminal Law and Human Rights, Manoj Kumar Sinha editor, Manak Publications, New Dehli, 2010.
79 J. Kirk Boyd: 2048: Humanitys Agreement to Live Together, The International Movement for Enforceable Human Rights, BerrettKoehler Publishers, San Francisco, 2010 see the website 2048 project.org.
Volume2_CS4.indb 33
6/16/11 4:11 PM
34
Volume2_CS4.indb 34
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
35
thin institutions, states interact and create norms by direct interaction. In this
scenario, interactions amongst actors are mainly driven by calculation and/
or coercion. This is a clearly pluralist 5 environment that noticeably affects
how the norms of international law are shaped, interpreted and applied. 6
Since Westphalia and the consolidation of states as the main actors in
international society, traditional international law has developed a strong
state-centric 7 identity. This, in turn, has reinforced the separation between
the domestic and the international order (Watson, 1992:188; 202ff). Thus,
since traditional international law was consolidated with its own pluralist
foundational principles, autonomy and identity, this institution has a dynamic
that is very distinct from domestic legal systems (Wilson, 2003:4; 2009:168).
Furthermore, the institutionalisation of norms into rules in international
law also possesses its own particular dynamic and occurs within a specific
pluralist law-making process (Pellet, Daillier, & Dinh, 2006:85-110; Shaw,
2008:1-4). International law rules were originally conceived with the intention
of regulating state interactions in an anarchical society that does not recognise
any international government or universal legislature. As a consequence,
traditional international law has the state as its main legislator. In domestic
law, the legislature (i.e. usually the congress or parliament) is responsible for
creating the rules that are applied to the citizens of that particular state. However,
unlike domestic law, in international law the state, as the main legislator, not only
creates the rules but also is directly regulated by these very rules. Traditionally,
states negotiate the rules of international law amongst themselves generating a
decentralised international legislative process (Pellet, et al., 2006:88; 92; Shaw,
2008:1-2; Wilson, 2009:168; 169).8 The absence of a centralised international
legislature was even recognised in a well-known decision of the Permanent Court
of Justice:
International law governs relations between independent states. The
rules of law binding upon states therefore emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with
a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the
independence of states cannot therefore be presumed (PCIJ, Ser. A,
N. 10 1927:18).
5 Pluralism is the opposite end of the spectrum from solidarism. Pluralism for Mayall is the view that states, like individuals, can and do
have differing interests and values, and consequently that international society is limited to creation of a framework that will allow them
to coexist in relative harmony [...] For pluralists, one of the features that distinguishes international society from any other form of social
organisation is its procedural and hence non-develpmental character (Buzan 2004:46).
6 For an account of the English Schools approaches to international law see Wilson (2003, 2009).
7 The first time international law explicitly recognised the legal personality of non-state actors was only in 1948 with the advisory opinion
on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, (ICJ, 1948).
8 Rosenne even refers to international law as a law of coordination (Byers, 2000:2).
Volume2_CS4.indb 35
6/16/11 4:11 PM
36
Volume2_CS4.indb 36
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
37
Volume2_CS4.indb 37
6/16/11 4:11 PM
38
global mechanisms for protecting individual human rights. Linklater and Suganami
argue that, in what is a clearly pluralist international environment, order between states
depends on an implicit or explicit contract to regard human rights issues as sovereign
matters in which the wider association of states has no legitimate interest (Linklater
& Suganami, 2006:132). Thus, they argue that the concept of territorial sovereignty
essentially prevents states from intervening in what becomes categorised as the
internal affairs of another state, with the result that what any one state in international
society sees as a serious violation of human rights must therefore go unpunished
(Linklater & Suganami, 2006:132). More recently, it has been argued that states
are moved to intervene to prevent human rights violations only when such a breach
threatens the security of other states in international society (Linklater & Suganami,
2006:132). In short, international mechanisms to protect individual human rights are
first restricted by the idea of territorial sovereignty and then by state interest. Therefore,
in a pluralist international society where solidarist international law is consolidated
through rules that are clearly determined by state interests (i.e. calculation or coercion
rather than real belief) it is perhaps unsurprising that mechanisms of enforcing these
rules remain weak and ineffective. In the case of protecting human rights, Bull argues
that while international society may have moved in the direction of solidarism it has still
stopped short of embracing new principles of humanitarian intervention (Linklater &
Suganami, 2006:132) demonstrating how mechanisms enforcing the protection of human
rights have remained limited and weak. Suganami and Linklater further argue that the
absence of efficient mechanisms of coercion/enforcement (which in this particular case
would involve humanitarian intervention) to protect solidarist values and prevent human
rights/humanitarian law atrocities, are at least partially rooted in the deep-seated fear
that relaxing pluralist principles, such as the international prohibition on intervention,
would facilitate intervention by states that seek to promote their own interests under
the cover of protecting human rights. This has fostered what is a calculated and careful
consolidation of solidarist international law on part of the states in international society,
which have therefore deliberately kept systems of coercion/enforcement weak in order
to protect both their territorial sovereignties and their own interests. In this sense, even
though enforcement is not a necessary condition for solidarism (Buzan, 2004:152154), the deliberate lack of enforcement powers limits the effectiveness of solidarist
international law rules and may be seen as one of the main reasons why states agree to
be bound by such rules in the first place.
The decision to withhold enforcement powers from the UN Human Rights
Commission is another clear example of this. As Linklater and Suganami read
Hedley Bull: the idea of the trial and punishment of war criminals by international
procedure may be just and wise but it invariably operates in a selective way and
reflects the operation of power politics (2006:145) or, in Bulls own words the
international order does not provide any general protection of human rights, only a
selective protection that is determined not by the merits of the case but by the vagaries
of international politics (1977:86). Also, such solidarist rules often permit an
Volume2_CS4.indb 38
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
39
instrumental political use of norms either as a result of fluid and vague notions of justice
or due to a deliberate lack of clarity in the rule. For example, the use of the values of
just war or humanitarian intervention to justify unilateral actions allows great powers
to reinterpret rules and instrumentally use this symbolic system of values to invoke
justice at the same time as they breach/bend established international law rules. Many
more examples can be found in daily international law such as the exercise of power
of veto in the Security Council (SC), the non-existence of an effective enforcement
system for most international legal rules, the non-implementation of rules with values
such as the reduction of inequality, the inexistence of a legal definition of the crime
of aggression15 or terrorism. Even the International Law Commission draft treaty
on state responsibility that envisions the right of a state to adopt countermeasures
when facing a legal breach of its rights confers greater advantages on stronger states
in the international society, which obviously possess a greater capacity to adopt
countermeasures, vis--vis weaker states. Thus, the lack of willingness on part of
states to implement effective mechanisms of coercion/enforcement may just reflect
a reasoned calculation about costs, capabilities and/or responsibilities, it can also
signify a lack of sincere belief in those values.
In summation, as Shaw puts it, international law reflects first and foremost
the basic state-oriented character of world politics (2008:41). In fact, according
to Manning, [a]t any moment international law is what it is because the facts of
international politics are what they are. It is the political framework which reflects
itself in the law and not the law which determines the political framework () If
international politics occur within and in terms of a framework, it is scarcely within
a framework of law (1972:318). This is especially true of the legal rules concerning
international security (Shaw, 2008:8).
The strongly pluralist creational environment characteristic of international law
still persists despite the development of solidarist branches in international law. The
majority of traditional international law norms, rules and principles created in the
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are still applicable today with minor
changes. Therefore, the international law-making process is still overwhelmingly
pluralist and instrumental in its structure. States themselves are still the sole legislators
in a system of rules where they can only be bound by their own consent. The principle
of consent is still the main tool used by states to confer authority and legitimacy to
international law and consent still determines the very reach of international legal
rules. Consent is also a foundational principle of traditional international law since
the authority and binding force of any international legal act must come from the
acceptance of its binding nature through the consent of the state(s). As seen, this also
means that the international law making process occurs through political negotiations
between states. As such, as Kaplan and Katzenbach state, to realistically understand
15 Even though a definition of aggression can be found in General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), this resolution is not legally binding
and the vast majority of states do not accept it as a legal definition of aggression (UNGA, Res. 3314).
Volume2_CS4.indb 39
6/16/11 4:11 PM
40
law, it is necessary to take into consideration the context within which legal rules are
created (Kaplan & Katzenbach, 1961:18-19). In the case of positive international law,
its law-making processes consist of direct negotiations amongst states (i.e. a nonlegal process) where all actors are subject to de facto asymmetries of power.16 Thus,
asymmetries of power are frequently imprinted and/or reflected within the normative
content of positive international law rules.
The rule of consent, therefore, benefits pluralism and individualism. And, yet, the
opposite is also true. The principle of consent simultaneously promotes a very thin
form of solidarism by ensuring that legal rules remain weak and, as such, promotes
collective action by making the agreement upon values easier. One way of achieving
this is by limiting the degree to which consenting states have to adhere to shared
values, for example, by accepting that reservations may be made to treaties. Another
way of making agreement upon values and norms easier for states is by reducing
the scope of their institutionalisation by creating, for example, weak mechanisms of
enforcement, control and/or responsibility; or alternatively by deliberately omitting
to establish any such mechanisms at all. Thus, consent reinforces both the relative
application and reach of international law.
Despite the emergence of solidarist manifestations in contemporary international
law it still lacks a centralised legislature (Wilson, 2009:169) a fact that is very
resilient. This absence of a centralised legislature has survived pressures for change
created by the end of the Cold War and the phenomena of globalisation. Traditional
international law has not changed considerably even in the face of the appearance of
quasi-legal rule systems marked by solidarist movements from non-state actors (e.g.
lex mercatoria,17 lex sportivae internationalis18 and lex petroleae).19 It has also kept its
identity despite the advent of various solidarist manifestations of international law that
now coexist with traditional international law (e.g. the consolidation of international
criminal law and the International Criminal Court). Contemporary international
law, despite incorporating values that have a distinctly solidarist appeal, still has the
same base as traditional international law. As a result, contemporary international
law continues to be characterised by the absence of a central legislature. In fact, as
recently as in 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)20 explicitly stated that
There is () no legislature, in the technical sense of the term, in the
United Nations system () That is to say, there exists no corporate organ
16 This can be directly contrasted with systems of domestic law where laws are created through existing legislative processes.
17 Lex mercatoria can be defined as () transnational rules made up of usages and principles which would constitute a true juridical order
specific to the operators of international commerce (Marquis, 2005:11).
18 Lex sportivae is a stateless legal order that governs the activities of international sporting federations. It is a private contractual order that
uses binding arbitration to settle its disputes. And as such, it is respected by national courts (Allison, 2005:71).
19 Lex petroleae can be understood as the () customary rule valid for the oil industry (Aminoil, 1982:para 121).
20 Note that the ICTY is, in itself, a secondary institution that was created with the support of strong pluralist arguments. Suffice to say that
the ICTY has preference of criminal jurisdiction over the domestic courts of Yugoslavia.
Volume2_CS4.indb 40
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
41
Volume2_CS4.indb 41
6/16/11 4:11 PM
42
followed, added a new and unprecedented legislative capacity to the SCs processes
(Szasz, 2002:904). So much so, that Alvarez declared how with resolution 1373 the
Security Council entered, what he terms, its legislative phase (2003:874). Although
one could still argue that the SC has always had a legislative capacity since SC
resolutions under chapter VII are legally binding - and thereby the SC in essence
creates laws - it is important to note that:
International legislation is not to be equated with legislative agenda
setting by the Council. It should be recalled that most resolutions
imposing economic sanctions require some kind of legislative activity
by the member states to make them applicable to individuals. The nature
of the measures in these resolutions as mainly aimed at individuals and
not at states is not the distinguishing feature of international legislation,
either. By the mid- 1990s, the Council had already turned to targeted
or smart sanctions and aimed its measures specifically against certain
persons or groups of persons deemed to bear particular responsibility
for a threat to the peace. It primarily used financial sanctions and travel
bans for this purpose. The hallmark of any international legislation is
the general and abstract character of the obligations imposed. These
may well be triggered by a particular situation, conflict, or event, but
they are not restricted to it. Rather, the obligations are phrased in
neutral language, apply to an indefinite number of cases, and are not
usually limited in time (Talmon, 2005:175).
In other words, the fact that SC resolutions are legally binding for states that are
party to the UN is not the same as saying that the SC possess or exercises a legislative
capacity or role. In fact, the example of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cited previously, illustrates how the SC, even though it has
existed and produced legally binding resolutions since 1945, has historically lack such
legislative capacity. Thus, to reiterate, in 1995 the ICTY underscored: [t]here is [...]
no legislature, in the technical sense of the term, in the United Nations system. [...] That
is to say, there exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws directly
binding on international legal subject (ICTY, 35 ILM 32 1996:para 43). This absence
of a centralised machinery of international legislation in positive international law
(Talmon, 2005:175) has also been widely noted within the legal literature (Campos,
Rodrguez, & de Santa Mara, 2002:74; Kaplan & Katzenbach, 1961:34; Pellet, et al.,
2006:92; Shelton, 2003:148).
This new legislative capacity of the SC was widely noted and even celebrated by
some states as: an unprecedented step;24 a groundbreaking resolution;25 a landmark
24 UN Doc. S/PV.4950 (2004b:at 9-10).
25 UN Doc. A/56/PV.48, (2001b:at 9).
Volume2_CS4.indb 42
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
43
decision26; a historic event27 and even as one of most important resolutions in the
history of the Council28 (Talmon, 2005:177). The academic legal literature also stressed
the shift that resolution 1373 brought about in the SC. Rosand, for example, stated that
such legislative resolutions are [] an unprecedented step for the Security Council to
take (Rosand, 2003:334). This view is also shared by Szasz and others (Pellet, 2003:180181), to whom the pioneering nature of resolution 1373 means that the Security Council
broke new ground by using, for the first time, its Chapter VII powers under the Charter
to order all states to take or to refrain from specified actions in a context not limited to
disciplining a particular country (Szasz, 2002:901). Kirsch went as far as to say that with
resolution 1373 the Security Council has in fact replaced the conventional lawmaking
process on the international level while the representative of Costa Rica declared that it
herald[ed] a new era in international relations (Talmon, 2005:175).
While it could be argued that this might not have been the initial intention of the
drafters, or that it is just a side effect or merely an example of pluralist flexibility, the
practice of the Council appears to reaffirm the willingness of member states to grant
it legislative powers and, in doing so, institutionalises an unprecedented procedural
change. Subsequent resolutions also deliberately adopted this legislative formula,
the most noteworthy of these being resolution 1540. Approved unanimously by SC
members, this resolution called for measures against nuclear terrorism and created a
series of obligations for all states in a manner similar to resolution 1373:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations
1. Decides that all states shall refrain from proving any form of support
to non-state actors that ()
2. ()all states () shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws
which prohibit any non-state actor to
3. () all states shall take and enforce effective measures to establish
domestic control ()
()
8. Calls upon all states:
(a) T
o promote the () adoption and full implementation () of
multilateral treaties ()
(b) T
o adopt national rules and regulations () (UNSC, Res. 1540).
In an explicit recognition of this new legislative role, the president of the SC, Mr.
Gunter Pleuger, openly stated in a press conference on 2 April 2004 that resolution 1373
was the first major step towards having the Security Council legislate for the rest of
26 UN Doc. A/56/PV.25, (2001a:at 15).
27 UN Doc. S/PV/4413, (2001c:at 15).
28 UN Doc. S/PV.4453, (2002:at 7).
Volume2_CS4.indb 43
6/16/11 4:11 PM
44
the United Nations Membership (UN, 2004c:1). After stressing how international law
rules (treaties and custom) and the law-making process are inappropriate to respond to
non-state threats to international peace, he affirmed that starting with the creation of
the Counter-Terrorism Committee () the council would be needed more and more
to do that kind of legislative work (idem). In this sense, when asked about the reform
of the SC and the background work to draft resolution 1540, he explicitly stated that
a new political psychology should create two principles of reform [of the SC]: first
to ensure that the decisions of the Council and its requests for legislative changes had
legitimacy and acceptance; and that representativeness created that acceptance and
legitimacy (UN, 2004c:1). Some states even discussed the terms under which such
legislature should be guided.29
Nevertheless, it is significant that such a legislative role comes under article
39 of the UN Charter. In this respect, the legislature can only act as a measure to
maintain international peace and security however broad such a label may be. This
also means that the SC can legislate exclusively under conditions of emergency
(Talmon, 2005:184). Still, as illustrated above, such power is an important change in
the international law making process. It creates a new norm since the urgent nature
of the legislative resolution indicates that the Security Council considers traditional
forms of legislation (through treaties and customary law) inadequate to govern
acts of transnational violence such as 9/11. Moreover, the fact that such a rule is an
emergency legislation does not mean that the rule created is either provisional or
temporary (Talmon, 2005:184). According to Pleuger:
there was a gap in international law pertaining to non-state actors.
So, either new international law should be created, either waiting for
customary international law to develop, or by negotiating a treaty or
convention. Both took a long time, and everyone felt that there was an
imminent threat, which had to be addressed and which could not wait
for the usual way (UN, 2004c:1).
Is such change a move towards a more solidarist jus ad bellum? Considering the
undemocratic structure of the SC and the fact that it hardly represents the will of the
international society as a whole, it is difficult to think so. Also, it can hardly be the case
when one considers the United States recurring preference for unilateral interventions
over the collective security system. It has been argued that a move to solidarism can also
be achieved by a conscious move towards greater homogeneity in domestic structures and
values among a set of states (Buzan, 2004:147). Since it is widely recognised that a state
cannot legally invoke the provisions of its domestic law as a justification for its failure to
perform an international obligation,30 it could be argued that the creation of an international
29 See UN Doc.S/PV4950 (2004b).
30 See art. 27 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Volume2_CS4.indb 44
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
45
Volume2_CS4.indb 45
6/16/11 4:11 PM
46
Volume2_CS4.indb 46
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
47
Volume2_CS4.indb 47
6/16/11 4:11 PM
48
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law (art.
2(1a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties - VCoLT, 1969). Their
binding force is limited to those states that consented to the treaty in question.
Additionally, as a general rule, such treaties cannot produce legal effects for nonparties (art. 12 of VCoLT). The same holds true for international customary law.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. Thus, in addition to
a general, constant and uniform practice, a custom must be recognized as being
legally binding to acquire the form of customary international law rule, i.e. it has
to have opinio juris sive necessitatis. Likewise, international customary law only
creates legal obligations upon those states that accept (consent) that such practice
has a binding nature. Even in the case of unilateral acts, such acts are obligatory
only if the state, implicitly or explicitly, promises to behave in a certain way.
Finally, resolutions of international organisations are binding only upon those
states that consent to being a part of an organisation that holds the jurisdiction to
produce such legal acts as defined in its statute.
Once norms acquire one of these forms, they become part of a normative
system and consequently also become one of the benchmarks that drive actors
behaviour and shape actor identity. International law rules can work both as a
guide and a tool to consolidate the concrete application of norms and values of
the institutions of interstate society. Once values and norms acquire the form of
international law rules, they function as a symbolic system that mediates37 both
direct and indirect interactions. This mediation is carried out through the creation
of symbols38 and procedures that serve to concretely codify agreed patterns of
interaction and create social control mechanisms. Therefore it is also important to
look at the impact of the GWoT on the content of jus ad bellum rules. The impact
of the GWoT on international law rules is not minor. The capacity of international
law to carry out its mediation function seems to be increasingly questionable,
especially in matters concerning the regulation of transnational violence. But such
impact is not uniform on all forms of international law rules.
Treaties
The creation of new conventional rules in the aftermath of 9/11 was relatively
modest. Most of the formal changes occurred only in 2005. Such changes
basically consisted of the codification of general rules already long established
through previous UN Security Council resolutions. By 2010, from the existing
39
37 I use mediation in Kawaguchis sense, i.e., mediation as a mean to establish relationships and connections between different entities by
processing, through the use of a symbol system, the signs that represents those entities (including their meanings) (2003:71).
38 To Kawaguchi symbols are sounds, images, or other physical patterns that have meaning (2003:73).
39 According to article 2 (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Treaty means an international agreement concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments
and whatever its particular designation [my emphasis]. Note that by this definition, conventions, agreements, charter, protocol and
statute are all treaties. Also, it is widely recognised that international organisations are also entitled to celebrate treaties.
Volume2_CS4.indb 48
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
49
13 major conventions dealing with terrorism, only one was created as a result of
the GWoT: the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (2005). Additionally two protocols were introduced to existing treaties:
Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005) and the Protocol to the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf (2005). Finally, the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material was amended in 2005.
In terms of their meaning (content), these treaties still follow the same
old legislative techniques used for dealing with terrorism prior to 9/11. These
techniques include the continued absence of a legal definition of terrorism and
their condemnation of actions through which terrorist deeds are carried out; most
importantly, even though these treaties call for international cooperation, the
suppression of terrorism is also still left to domestic police and legal systems40
(Guillaume, 2004:541). The continued application of such techniques reinforces
the idea of a jus ad bellum that is still largely pluralist. Further, these techniques
are limited by the fact that they privilege individual domestic actions in lieu of an
inter-state response. The treaties also only bind states that consent to be a part of the
agreement and that too only to the extent of their reservations. Most importantly,
these treaties still follow a state-centric formula and the adoption of measures
is left to the individual states will and capacity to carry out the obligations.41
These treaties have also proved to be extremely ineffective and inefficient since
they inevitably criminalise specific terrorist actions only after they have occurred.
Since terrorist acts are highly innovative and prone to unpredictable tactical
manoeuvring, new treaties and the expansion of their participants amount to a
change by addition with negative heuristics. This is because terrorist acts, like the
Achille Lauro and 9/11, make it patently clear that it is impossible to predict and
outlaw all possible terrorist actions before they occur.
Resolutions
The same cannot be said of resolutions. There was a significant increase in the
number of resolutions on the subject of terrorism following the attacks of 9/11.
The Organization of American States (OAS) invoked the collective self defence
clause of the Rio Treaty; Australia supported the invasion of Afghanistan invoking
article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS);
and The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) invoked the article 5 of the
Washington Treaty (i.e. the common self defence rule) less than 24 hours after the
40 The recourse to domestic remedies is done by the adoption of an aut dedere aut prossecure clause on such treaties. This clause obliges
States to prosecute or extradite the individual that committed the offences and can be found in its territory.
41 Even when a treaty deals with the international assistance of States, the assistance is driven to help the State and not directly to the threat/
fact. See, for example, articles 6, 7, 20 and 22 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005.
Volume2_CS4.indb 49
6/16/11 4:11 PM
50
attacks.42 Taking the example of the United Nations, the General Assembly (GA)
adopted 39 resolutions on terrorism after 9/11 alone, compared with a total of only
24 resolutions since its creation. In the context of the GWoT, the Sixth Committee of
the GA (Legal Committee) produced 9 reports on terrorism as opposed to a previous
total of 11 reports produced on the subject since its inception. Reports produced by
the working group of the Sixth Committee, are also indicative of this trend. Thus,
a total of 8 reports were produced after 9/11 alone compared to a total of 4 reports
produced before the attacks. Most significant, however, are the binding resolutions
of the Security Council: 32 resolutions were delivered in the 10 years following
the attacks of 9/11 and the GWoT as opposed to 12 resolutions on the subject since
1945. Also noteworthy is the establishment of counter-terrorism bodies by the SC
and UN in order to conduct the GWoT: 1267 Committee (created in 1999 with
the purpose of fighting Al-Qaeda); Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team; Counter-Terrorism Committee; Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (CTED); 1540 Committee; 1566 Working Group; Counter Terrorism
Implementation Task Force (CTITF).
These 32 resolutions of the Security Council delivered after 9/11 created new
jus ad bellum rules. Such rules are legally binding43 and strong indicators of the
existence of an opinio juris on those subjects (Alvarez, 2003:880). Amongst the
new rules created by resolutions of the SC, Alvarez underlines the following
novelties:
1. Terrorist attacks, even if perpetrated by non-state actors, are now
categorised as armed attacks and therefore justify the states right to
adopt an armed response in self-defence;
2. States that support terrorism are legally liable and can be subject to
military action on behalf of the interstate society;
3. States are legally authorised to use force to fight transnational
terrorism (2003:879).
In the light of the most recent resolutions, I might add that:
4. States have the obligation to pursue active legislative, financial,
intelligence and police measures against terrorism;
5. States have the obligation to adopt measures against nuclear
terrorism;
42 According to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson: We know that individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the
worldwide terrorist network of Al-Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden and his key lieutenants and protected by the Taleban. On the basis
of this briefing, it has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 9/11 was directed from abroad and shall therefore
be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all (2001:1).
43 See article 25 of UN Charter.
Volume2_CS4.indb 50
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
51
44 See Nicaragua (ICJ, Rep. 1984), Oil Platforms (ICJ, Rep. 1993); and Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (ICJ, Rep. 2001).
45 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ICJ, Rep. 2004).
Volume2_CS4.indb 51
6/16/11 4:11 PM
52
Volume2_CS4.indb 52
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
53
54 See, for example, UNSC (Res. 232, Res. 387, Res. 418, Res. 713, Res. 841).
Volume2_CS4.indb 53
6/16/11 4:11 PM
54
rule that shows this tendency is the US attempt to re-introduce the values of a very
particular understanding of just war as legal values under the GWoT.
From Legal to Just War, is There a Second Change?
The US discourse on the legality of the military actions undertaken within the
framework of the GWoT was strongly based on a very specific and contested kind
of ethical argument and perspective in the form of a also very particular value-laden
reading of just war theory that was used in defence of the practices of the GWoT
and which is specifically in line with the self-defence precept.55 In fact, George W.
Bush defended the just nature of the GWoT at the United States Military Academy
at West Point by stating that our nations cause has always been larger than our
nations defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace a peace that favors
human liberty () We have a great opportunity to extend a just peace, by replacing
poverty, repression, and the resentment around the world with hope of a better day
() (2002:4).
Although the GWoT discourse also uses legal arguments to justify its acts of
force (e.g. self-defence and SC resolutions), the effort to give this particular reading
of just war theory a legal use is significant. It clearly demonstrates the pursuit of a
justification for military actions outside the framework of positive international law.
The legal prohibition on the use of force by states is very recent. The first clear broad
legal restriction emerged in the aftermath of the World War I with article 1 of the 1928
Kellogg-Briand Pact. This treaty marks the first time that states renounced their
right to resort to force as an instrument of national politics in international relations.
At the time this restriction lacked an enforcement mechanism which was only created
later with the founding of the UN (Schmitt, 2003:521). Nevertheless, the Pact created
the antecedents of what later become a clear universal56 legal rule restricting the
use of force and its collective enforcement mechanism under the United Nations
Charter.57 The Charter also marked the creation of a collective security system.58 The
institutionalisation of this new rule created a norm outlawing any resort to threat or
the use of military force in international relations. The UN Charter delineates only
two exceptions in which the use of military force is permissible: self-defence (article
51) or if authorised by the SC (articles 39 and 42). This new normative system tried
to discard the legal reasoning of just wars in positive international law by creating a
binomial rule, i.e. the use of military force is either lawful (if in accordance to UN
Charter) or unlawful (any other use of force) (Reisman & Armstrong, 2006:525). As
Gazzini observes, such an argument was legally rejected even when dressed as a
55 This, however, do not invalidate the academic merits and utility of using just war theory to discuss the ethical implications of the GWoT.
See, for example Williams (Williams, 2008:585).
56 This obligation extent to all states of international society.
57 See art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter.
58 See articles 39 and 51 plus Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.
Volume2_CS4.indb 54
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
55
Volume2_CS4.indb 55
6/16/11 4:11 PM
56
Volume2_CS4.indb 56
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
57
recognised legal rule never found a great acceptance. The most remarkable example
of the unwillingness to institutionalise such practice as a rule is the SC resolution
487 that, with US support, explicitly condemned the actions of Israel against Iraq
in 1981 and rejected the legal validity of the concept of preventive and pre-emptive
self-defence:
The Security Council,
()
1. Strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation
of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international
conduct;
()
4. Fully recognizes the inalienable sovereign right of Iraq and all
other States () (UNSC, Res. 487).
The pre-emptive self-defence argument aims at creating an inter-state legitimisation
(collective acceptance) of military unilateral actions by a state even before it suffers
the aggression. Therefore, although it encompasses the universal value of the rightness
of self-defence, its application has a unilateral nature and thus easily falls into the
category of instrumental use and pluralist orientation. Hence, in the absence of welldefined terms, the acceptance of such an argument could lead to a reversion to the preKellogg-Briand value of the use of force as a lawful sovereign right and a standard tool
of international relations. As Gazzini emphasises, until quite recently virtually all states
regarded an authorisation of the Security Council as the only legal ground for the use
of force in addition to those expressly foreseen in the Charter (2005:59-60). This clear
opposition between the practice of states and formal international law rules reflects a
gap between reality and positive international law (Reisman & Armstrong, 2006:548).
After 9/11, however, the US launched a GWoT strategy strongly based on the argument
of the legality and justice of pre-emptive self-defence actions as the main tool to combat
the transnational terrorist threat. Again, not only the concept, but also its recognition as a
legal value, is a central component of the GWoT and one that is explicitly present in the
US National Security Strategy, US National Defence Strategy and US National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism. According to President Bush:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves
against forces that might present an imminent danger of attack. Legal
scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of
pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat most often a visible
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. ()
Volume2_CS4.indb 57
6/16/11 4:11 PM
58
[The US] must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of todays adversaries (USNSS, 2002:15).
In this sense, to be able to assess whether the GWoT has injected new values into
the rule of self-defence, one has to verify if such values were institutionalised. To this
end, it is necessary to investigate whether state practice after 9/11 created an opinio
juris and thus achieved the form of a new customary law. Since the practice of preemptive strikes is already a long-standing one, shifts in the rule of self-defence would
be signalled by the acceptance (attribution of meaning) that pre-emptive self-defence
was institutionalised as a legal rule (opinio juris). This would be an important difference
from other hard cases. If the GWoT is consolidating this value through an opinio juris,
this fact is especially important since rules created under the form of custom are binding
to all states that do not explicitly oppose it. Again, such practice alone is not enough and
was already present in previous hard cases. The novelty would be the evidence of opinio
juris sive necessitatis (a belief by the states that the practice is legally binding).
State behaviour, governmental statements, documents, etc. are used to prove
opinio juris. Unlike in other hard cases, evidence shows that after 9/11, there emerged
the view that new transnational threats capable of challenging the institutions of
international society exist. This view generated the conditions necessary for the
collective acceptance of the notion that pre-emptive self-defence could be lawfully
employed against enemy threats originating from outside interstate society. States
that publicly agreed with the legality of pre-emptive strikes against terrorists include:
Australia; Japan; UK, China (opposed to the GWoT but adopted a similar understanding
of pre-emptive strikes regarding Taiwan); France (opposed to the Iraq war but adopted
a defence policy that allows pre-emptive action);63 India; Iran; Israel; North Korea;
Russia; Taiwan (Reisman & Armstrong, 2006:538).
Other evidence of opinio juris can be found in the famous report of the UN HighLevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: Our Shared Responsibility (UN,
2004a). This panel was set up by the UN Secretary General to assess current threats
to international peace and security; evaluate how well [UN] our existing policies
and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to recommend ways of
strengthening the United Nations to provide collective security for the twenty-first
century (UN, 2004a:viii). As a panel of independent experts working for the UN
Secretary General it is supposed to represent the UN view, and thus the collective
interstate view, on the subject. In this regard, the report explicitly asks for a certain
loosening of the strict interpretation of armed attack as a requirement for the
authorisation of self-defence unilateral military actions (UN, 2004a:54, para 188).
But the general agreement on the need for a certain loosening of the strict
interpretation of armed attack does not mean an agreement on what certain
63 In fact, Dominique de Villepin, French foreign minister declared in 2003 that the possibility of pre-emptive action might be considered,
from the time that an explicit and confirmed threatening situation is identified (Rasmussen, 2006:120).
Volume2_CS4.indb 58
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
59
Volume2_CS4.indb 59
6/16/11 4:11 PM
60
Volume2_CS4.indb 60
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
61
consolidating norms and values through these resolutions. Such a mechanism inverts the
traditional international law logic. Since the international law making process is diffuse
and relative, legal norms are created following the units to whole direction and then are
consolidated/institutionalised as legal rules. The position of the SC as an organ that has
authority and formally represents the shared understanding of international society is key
to understanding this inversion. The change to a SC legislature would create the possibility
of consolidating norms and values straight from the acceptance of rules (resolutions) that
are legally binding to virtually the whole of interstate society and therefore would directly
produce cognitive effects over its parts. The pluralist use of the SC would permit the
states that hold the status of permanent members of the SC (the P-5 states) to introduce
individually held norms and values through the consolidation of rules in the form of
resolutions. Such a norm making process would permit the creation and acceptance
of rules whose meaning did not go through a process of negotiation of understandings
amongst the individual units of the interstate society, as is the case with treaties.
3. Operationalisation
Rules and norms play the role of social control. Social controls are social mechanisms
employed to influence/force actors to behave in an expected manner. Expectations are
formed by perceived understandings of what are commonly accepted norms, values and
institutions. Social control can act not only through coercion, but also by influencing
both actor beliefs and/or actor calculation through the exertion of authority (Buzan,
2004; Wendt, 1999). To evaluate how the GWoT affects the operationalisation of jus ad
bellum, this article will focus on the latters legal mechanisms of enforcement. In spite
of the fact that the al-Qaedas terrorist attacks and the GWoT constantly question both
the efficiency and efficacy of legal enforcement mechanisms, these mechanisms are not
strongly affected in their fundamental structure. Leaving aside other mechanisms of social
control (religion, beliefs, public opinion, etc) the social control mechanisms that lie within
traditional international law can be classified as peaceful and non-peaceful mechanisms.
Peaceful Mechanisms
Following the principle of legal sovereignty, as a general rule a state has jurisdiction
over the individuals that are in its territory. However, states are not legally allowed
to use force or impose their jurisdiction beyond the limits of their own territory.66 As
such, the response to transnational terrorism poses a serious and complex problem
since transnational terrorist activity has a non-territorial nature. Thus, states can find
two ways of peacefully enforcing international rules: through an international court
or through enforcing their domestic legal order by using mechanisms of extradition
or extraterritorial laws.
66 See article 2(7) of the UN Charter and UNGA (Res. 1516, Res. 2526).
Volume2_CS4.indb 61
6/16/11 4:11 PM
62
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the UN.67
The Court was created under an extremely pluralist international society and so were its
procedural rules. All the rules of the World Court are strictly embedded in the value of
consent. This creates a serious practical difficulty for the enforcement of GWoT rules
through its jurisdiction. Under ICJ rules, it is enough for a state to withhold its consent to
avoid the jurisdiction of the World Court.68 Thus, a state allegedly involved in the support
of international terrorism can avoid trial by simply rejecting the jurisdiction of the Court.
Another consequence of these rules is that there is no right to a collective claim (actio
popularis) for states and, as a consequence, only the states involved in the dispute can file
a claim. Thus, even though the Court has recognised69 that all states may have an interest in
the general compliance with norms that affect the international community as a whole (jus
cogens), there is no rule institutionalising an international actio popularis. Additionally
even if there is a case involving such rights, the sentence is relative and binding only upon
the litigating parties.70 Thus, even though the ICJ recognises the existence of jus cogens
rules, under which the condemnation of terrorist acts would fit, it also acknowledges the
non-existence of institutionalised rules that would allow the Court to exert its jurisdiction
in contentious cases that do not solely involve states or state activities.71
Another important restriction for the role of the ICJ in enforcing international rules
against transnational violence is the rule about who can legitimately initiate a claim before
the Court, i.e. who can exercise active personality. As established in the Statute of the
ICJ, the competency for making contentious claims is only granted to sovereign states.72
Individuals and non-state actors can only ask for diplomatic protection in which case
the state makes the claim in its name. Nevertheless, even under conditions of diplomatic
protection not only are the procedures carried out strictly among states, but the sentence
is also addressed to the state as opposed to the individual or organisation. It is therefore
impossible to prosecute a terrorist organisation, especially in cases where they have
no connections with a state. Finally, one has to underline the fragility of the coercion
system for enforcing the sentences of the ICJ. Although states generally comply with
the decisions of the ICJ, the truth is that the legal coercion system that allows the Court
to ask for SC measures under Chapter VII to ensure the compliance with judgments
rendered by it73 is merely theoretical and fragile in the face of the political nature of the
SC. Once again, such measures can only be addressed to a state.74
67 Article 92 of UN Charter.
68 See the cases Barcelona Traction (ICJ, Rep. 1970); Nottebohm (ICJ, Rep. 1955) and Monetary Gold Removed From Rome in 1943 (ICJ,
Rep. 1954).
69 See Barcelona Traction, (ICJ, Rep. 1970).
70 See article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
71 See Barcelona Traction, (ICJ, Rep. 1970); East Timor (ICJ, Rep. 1995); and South West Africa (ICJ, Rep. 1961).
72 See article 34 of the Statute of the Court.
73 See article 94 (2) of the UN Charter.
74 Even though some SC resolutions are addressed to non-state actors, the mechanism of Article 94 (2) of the UN Charter is directed to
enforcement of the sentences of the ICJ and therefore can only be directed to states. Even when resolutions are addressed to non-state
actors they must be implemented through a state.
Volume2_CS4.indb 62
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
63
The other international judicial organ that could have a prominent role in the GWoT
is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC tries to fill the gaps left by the
ICJ. Unlike the ICJ, the ICC has jurisdiction over individuals who commit one of the
following international crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes.75 Its competence is also linked to two other principles: active personality
and passive territoriality of the crimes. The active personality principle establishes
that the court can legitimately exercise its jurisdiction if the person who commits the
crimes is the national of a state party. According to the passive territoriality principle,
the ICC is also competent to judge a crime if it occurred in the territory of a state
party.76 However, there is no rule governing obligatory extradition. In addition, while
in the ICJ a contentious case can only be initiated by the consent of both parties
concerned, in the ICC a case can be initiated by the prosecutor, by the claim of one
of the states parties or by the demand of the SC.77 Therefore, the ICC breaks the
principle of the consent which allows it to judge individuals even in the face of a
lack of consent by his/her state. Nevertheless, there are no provisions of terrorism as
a crime. Terrorism was not institutionalised into a formal rule and thus legally does
not constitute an international crime. As a result, the ICC cannot judge such acts.
However, since 9/11, there is a movement towards including the crime of terrorism
under the competence of the ICC. But at the same time international society has as yet
not achieved the degree of solidarism necessary to arrive at an agreed legal definition
of terrorism.
Another international legal pacific instrument is the recourse to domestic law.
Through treaties of extradition or deportation states can enforce domestic jurisdiction
against criminals that are no longer within their borders by making agreements with
other states to handle criminals that are in their territory. But such a tool also faces many
difficulties due to its state-centric nature. Initially, an extradition agreement between
states must be made before the crime in question is committed. Secondly, there must be
a prescription defining the crime and, as terrorist action is characteristically innovative,
inevitably the reasons listed for demanding extradition will always be incomplete.
Thirdly, each state can have domestic laws that bar extradition (for example various
states do not extradite their own nationals). Fourthly, extradition must be in accordance
with international law rules. For example, international law upholds a rule in which the
criminal act must be defined as a criminal offence in both countries. In addition, political
criminals cannot be extradited a customary law that is extremely problematic in the
case of terrorism. Finally it is always possible to find reservations, interpretations or
ambiguities in treaties that can potentially block the extradition.
However, the case of extradition is an interesting exception. The GWoT did
institutionalised limited changes in the operationalisation of extradition in cases
75 The ICC does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until a provision is adopted defining the crime. See article 5 of the Rome
Statute.
76 Article 12 of the Rome Statute.
77 Article 13 of the Rome Statute.
Volume2_CS4.indb 63
6/16/11 4:11 PM
64
related to terrorism. Hence, after 9/11 specific extradition instruments within the
European Union (EU) and between the EU and the US were institutionalised.
These instruments effectively removed some of the traditional limits to extradition
such as the need for formal requests, political offence exception, basic levels of
evidence, the rule of speciality and the double criminality requirement.78 This
development in the operationalisation of extradition is very interesting for a
variety of reasons. First, because it is limited to cases of terrorism,79 although
there is no legal definition of what terrorism might be. Thus, these changes do
not alter the meaning of extradition per se but instead create a category within
extradition (i.e. terrorism) that is exempt from a set of traditional requirements.
This basically transforms terrorism-related extradition into something else,
corroborating the attempt to create a new category of violence within international
law (Moeckli, 2008:131). Second, these agreements are mostly limited to the EU
and the US. Third, it is also interesting to note that most of these changes occurred
at the national level. Nevertheless, in spite of the existence of a formal treaty,
these changes are a very shallowly internalised rule as both European Courts80
and states81 reject their validity. Moreover, most cases relating to the transfer of
terrorist suspects have been indifferent to the legal requirements for extradition
and have occurred outside international law.
Also long discussed is the principle of universal jurisdiction.82 The institutionalisation
of universal jurisdiction would allow domestic law criminal cases to be initiated even
if there is no clear element of connection between the crime and the state where the
proceedings are being held. The recourse to such technique has been employed in
some anti-terrorism treaties.83 In such treaties, the principle of universal jurisdiction is
applied when a clause establishes that the state that has the suspected perpetrator in its
territory is obliged to either extradite or prosecute him/her (aut dedere aut prossecure).
In spite of the growing pressure towards the enlargement of such a principle to all cases
where human/humanitarian law is seriously breached, one finds many obstacles in its
implementation due to the state-centric character of traditional international law. The
first obstacle is obvious. In the case of suicide bombings/ high-risk attacks, the criminal
loses/often loses his/her life with the action. Secondly, there is no legal custom that
obliges states to extradite criminals under any circumstances.
78 See for example, the European Arrest Warrant (EUC, 2002); Agreement on Extradition Between the European Union and the United States
of America (7 July 2003); and the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the European Union and the United States of America
(7 July 2003).
79 Note that in the case of the European Arrest Warrant, as it also involves EU criminal law, it exempt 32 categories of offence from the dual
criminality requirement in cases between EU countries. See article 2.2 of the European Arrest Warrant.
80 In a recent case, the European Court of Human Rights barred the extradition of Abu Hamza and others until the US could prove that they
will be treated humanely (Casciani, 2010; Dodd, 2010).
81 One example is the statement by the Spanish Foreign Ministers spokesman who stated that Spain would not extradite detainees to
countries that could not guarantee the same conditions of a trial as Spain (Dillon & McNeil Jr., 2001:1).
82 By this principle, the person recognized as a criminal should be delivered to the state that claims criminal jurisdiction over him or be
punished by the state where he is.
83 Article 4 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; Article 5 of the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation; Article 6 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings;
and article 9 of the International Convention for the suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Volume2_CS4.indb 64
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
65
Volume2_CS4.indb 65
6/16/11 4:11 PM
66
rescue of nationals abroad,92 or in the fight against terrorism. The principle was used to
justify actions like: the US bombings in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 which were a
response to the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the first economic
sanction imposed by the SC on Libya in 1992,93 and on Afghanistan and Sudan in
1999;94 and the unilateral US sanctions against seven countries accused of supporting
terrorism in 1999, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.95 The reality
is that the absence of a normative structure creating clear rules for humanitarian or
anti-terrorism interventions has contributed to the practice of unilateral actions and
consequently the growing disrespect for the equality and sovereignty of states.
However, the GWoT has created one new tool of law enforcement, i.e. the UN
counter-terrorism committees. The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), the 1267
Committee the 1540 Committee and the 1566 Working Group are the best examples
of this new tool. Created by the Security Council as a measure under Chapter VII
to maintain peace and international security, the main function of such bodies is to
monitor the compliance of states with relevant SC resolutions on the issue of terrorism
and they even have the power to adopt forceful measures under the auspices of the
UN. Such measures include: arms embargoes, travel bans and the freezing of terrorist
related assets. Even though such bodies have contributed a great deal to inter-state
cooperation and coordination in the GWoT, they are still created and housed within
the UN structure. This means that such organs still function in accordance with a
state-centric logic and operational structure. As a result, the recourse to travel bans or
financial measures against terrorists can only be implemented via state members. In
the recent years, these committees are also facing growing criticism for their failure to
overcome internal bureaucratic problems, for failing to ensure state cooperation and
are even being accused of trying to merely enforce the US domestic legislation on
money laundering at a global scale (Rosand, 2003, 2004).
Therefore, the great change in the operationalisation of jus ad bellum is not
marked by new revolutionary concepts of law enforcement or new tools capable
of acting transnationally. The GWoT did not create any new form of social control
within international law. As Judge Guillaume puts it, The events of 9/11 2001 did
not lead to the adoption of any new measures for the arrest, prosecution or extradition
of terrorists. They did however trigger a new determination to ensure the universal
application of existing measures (Guillaume, 2004:542). The greatest transformation
is the creation of a new category of violence that allows the US to act unilaterally
outside international law without being unlawful. It does so by introducing new values
that attempt to change the perception of right and wrong and thus constructs a new
understanding about the role of military violence in interstate society. By consolidating
the possibility of pre-emptive defence against transnational terrorism and by creating
92 See the cases of the Israeli Rescue of hostages in Entebbe or the US hostages in Teheran.
93 See UNSC (Res. 748).
94 See resolutions UNSC (Res. 1053, Res. 1267).
95 See UNGA (Res. 2131).
Volume2_CS4.indb 66
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
67
new categories outside positive international law, the US has created a set of norms
and rules that facilitates the legalised recourse to military actions beyond the borders
of international law. Thus, the US can act outside international law while at the same
time remaining socially compliant and preserving the fundamental social structure of
friends by sustaining the restriction on the use of force between states. This lack of
clear changes in the operationalisation of jus ad bellum seems to reinforce a tendency
of negative heuristics in international law as states consolidate a perception that
international law is not being able to mediate social reality. Hence states increasingly
perceive that international law is weakening, as it is unable to regulate and enforce
actions against both uncivil transnational actors and the unlawful unilateral uses of
military force by states.
Conclusion
The objective of this article was to investigate the normative impact of the GWoT
on the institution of traditional international law. To this end, I analysed whether the
GWoT brings any changes to the values, norms, rules and principles of its jus ad
bellum branch. Accordingly, in order to empirically investigate if the GWoT really
engenders unprecedented normative changes in jus ad bellum, I probed for signs
of significant transformation in its normative components, i.e. in its values, norms,
rules or principles. Evidence demonstrated that the GWoT has indeed brought about
normative changes and conferred new meanings on the normative components of
traditional international law. Signs of significant transformational normative changes
are discernable in all three sets of variables analysed: 1) the international law making
process (i.e. the creational environment) of jus ad bellum; 2) the substantive content
of the values, norms, rules and principles of jus ad bellum; and finally in 3) the
operationalisation (enforcement) of jus ad bellum rules related to the GWoT.
Consequently, the normative impact of the GWoT on jus ad bellum should not be
neglected. Unlike other hard cases where the validity of jus ad bellum was questioned,
the GWoT goes beyond small changes in the existing legal framework in order to
adapt to a new circumstance. Among the normative changes the GWoT brings to the
international law-making process (i.e., the creational environment) one can highlight
the new and unexpected legislative power of the SC. Such transformation is significant
and relevant since the GWoT seems to indicate that its instrumental use can offer a
way of introducing values of an individual state into the larger interstate society by
institutionalising rules that encompass these values. In the context of the GWoT, new
values and norms are institutionalised into jus ad bellum through resolutions of the
SC. Since these resolutions are legally binding for all UN members they create the
potential for introducing and /or consolidating individual norms and values in interstate
society. This transformation of the jus ad bellum creational environment creates the
possibility for rules to introduce new collective values and norms in interstate society
from the whole to parts, a fact that was impossible before the GWoT.
Volume2_CS4.indb 67
6/16/11 4:11 PM
68
At the substantive content level, changes occurred both in the meaning and in the
form of the jus ad bellum rules. Thus the practice of states under the GWoT has provoked
an enlargement of the notion of threat to international peace by acknowledging, for
the first time, that an actor alien to interstate society can perpetrate an armed attack
(in the legal sense of the term) against a state actor and thereby enable states to invoke
the right of self-defence in response (Gazzini, 2005:31). Another significant change
in the content of jus ad bellum is the broadening of the concept of self-defence. This
suggests a possible collective acceptance of the legality of unilateral pre-emptive
military actions against transnational terrorism. Together, these changes not only have
transformational power over the meaning of the existing rules of jus ad bellum, but
also, incorporate and consolidate new values and norms into it. At the same time, the
new rules follow the pluralist formula and are still deliberately phrased in a highly
indeterminate and vague way where terrorism remains undefined. As Alvarez points
out, this pluralist and instrumental use of jus ad bellum in the context of the GWoT
can create a hierarchical legal normative system: whose vagueness benefits primarily
(if not solely) the hegemonic recurrent projections of military force, and interventions
in the international affairs of other nations (Alvarez, 2003:873). These changes
reinforce the political nature of traditional international law and demonstrate that the
behaviour of major actors has a great implication for changing jus ad bellum (Alvarez,
2003; Reisman & Armstrong, 2006; Vagts, 2001). In terms of form, the US has shown
a preference for creating GWoT related rules as resolutions. This preference seems to
indicate that the US has used international organisations to magnify its authority. For
this particular study, this trend is located clearly in the SC where the US combines its
voting powers with the legitimacy granted by this organ to introduce resolutions that
carry its individual values into interstate society.
The attacks of 9/11 also highlighted the limitations and contradictions of the
traditional mechanisms of law enforcement and operationalisation of jus ad bellum
rules in combating transnational terrorism. No significant changes took place in an
enforcement system that is still basically pluralist and state-centric. Nevertheless,
such lack of change is also significant if one looks at why it is not changing. There
is, in the GWoT, an attempt to create a new category of violence that is also marked
by the discourse that the traditional due process of law is inadequate to deal with
transnational violence (Bellinger III, 2006; Frank, 2004). Therefore, to address
transnational terrorism, certain states try to create new hierarchical rules outside
international law. This implies that if these new norms are accepted by interstate
society then the practice of advanced interrogation techniques (a euphemism for
torture); state sanctioned targeted killings; military actions; and abductions, would be
legally allowed and socially accepted.
Finally, it could be argued that the GWoT pushes jus ad bellum (and traditional
international law as a whole) towards a reversion to its Westphalian structure.
However, the rupture of clear borders between national/international and the creation
of a new category of violence that takes into account threats from outside interstate
Volume2_CS4.indb 68
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
69
society makes it clear that this is not only a simple case of reversion. Further, there
is also evidence that traditional international law, at least in its jus ad bellum rules,
is undergoing a process of negative heuristics born from a disconnection between
positive law, the practice and expectations of states in the GWoT. There is a marked
general feeling that traditional international law is not able to effectively create a
normative body capable of governing transnational violence. In the context of the
GWoT, the US takes advantage of the fact that the existing rules cannot effectively
comply with their role to regulate transnational violence and hence calls for their
reform. In this endeavour, they try to consolidate new pluralist values by creating
rules that incorporate their individual values into interstate society. The expansion of
these rules under the GWoT increases the complexity of jus ad bellum, but the clash
of individual values within interstate society and the general view about both the
inefficiency and inefficacy of international law to address transnational threats, even
after the consolidation of these new jus ad bellum rules, shows that international law
is undergoing a negative process of increased complexity under the GWoT.
Volume2_CS4.indb 69
6/16/11 4:11 PM
70
Referncias
Allison, L. (2005). The Global Politics of Sport: The Role of Global Institutions in Sport. New York:
Routledge.
Alvarez, J. E. (2003). Hegemonic International Law Revisited. The American Journal of International
Law, 97(4), 873-888.
Aminoil (1982). 21 ILM 976.
BBC (2003). Russia Bares its Military Teeth: 2, October, 2003. BBC News.
Bellinger III, J. B. (2006). Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism. Paper presented at the Lecture at the
London School of Economics and Political Science.
Bull, H. (1977). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Palgrave.
Bush, G. W. (2002). Graduation Speech at West Point.
Buzan, B. (2004). From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social
Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Byers, M. (2000). The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Casciani, D. (2010). Abu Hamza US Extradition Halted. BBC News, 8 July.
Crawford, N. C. (2003). Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War. Perspectives on Politics,
1(1), 5-25.
de Lacharrire, G. (1983). La Politique Juridique Extrieure. Paris: Economica.
Dillon, S., & McNeil Jr., D. G. (2001). A Nation Challenged: The Legal Front; Spain Sets Hurdle for
Extraditions. New York Times 24, November.
Dodd, V. (2010). Abu Hamza Extradition to US Blocked by European Court. The Guardian, 8 July.
Elshtain, J. B. (2003). Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World.
New York: Basic Books.
European Council Framework Decision on the Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures betwen
Member States, (2002/584/JHA, ) OJ L 190/5 C.F.R. (2002).
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International
Organization, 52(4), 887-917.
Flory, M. (1996). International Law: An Instrument to Combat Terrorism. In R. Higgins & M. Flory
(Eds.), Terrorism and International Law (pp. 30-42). London: Routledge.
Frank, T. M. (2004). Criminals, Combatants or What? An Examination of the Role of Law in
Responding to the Threat of Terror. The American Journal of International Law, 98(4), 684-688.
Gazzini, T. (2005). The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Guillaume, G. (2004). Terrorism and International Law. International and Comparative Law Quaterly,
53, 537-548.
ICJ (1948). Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations: International Court
of Justice.
ICJ (Rep. 1954). Monetary Gold Removed from Rome.
ICJ (Rep. 1955). Nottebohm.
ICJ (Rep. 1961). South West Africa.
ICJ (Rep. 1970). Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltda.
ICJ (Rep. 1984). Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua.
ICJ (Rep. 1993). Oil Plataforms.
ICJ (Rep. 1995). East Timor.
ICJ (Rep. 2001). Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.
ICJ (Rep. 2004). Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.
ICTY (35 ILM 32 1996). Prosecutor vs. Tadi, Appeal, No. IT-94-1-AR72.
Kaplan, M. A., & Katzenbach, N. d. B. (1961). The Political Foundations of International Law. New
York: John Wiley & Sons.
Volume2_CS4.indb 70
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Global War on Terror, Jus and Normative Change in International Law
71
Volume2_CS4.indb 71
6/16/11 4:11 PM
72
Volume2_CS4.indb 72
6/16/11 4:11 PM
73
Resumo
O presente artigo tem como objetivo demonstrar a natureza normativa do Direito
Internacional dentro da ordem jurdica internacional. Para tal, apresenta as principais
correntes doutrinrias relativas sua fonte de obrigatoriedade, analisadas sobre o espectro
da evoluo de casos da Corte Permanente de Justia e da Corte Internacional de Justia.
Palavras-chave
Direito Internacional, obrigatoriedade, voluntarismo, objetivismo, normativismo
Abstract
This paper aims to demonstrate the normative nature of internacional law within
the international legal order. For such, it presents the major doctrinal and theoretical
lines, relating to its source of obligation, on the spectrum analysis of the evolution
in the cases of the Permanent Court of Justice and the International Court of Justice.
Keyword
International law, obligatoriness, voluntarism, objectivism, normativism
I A natureza normativa da ordem jurdica internacional
Se por um lado, na origem e em seus princpios elementares, o direito internacional
se distingue do direito interno, por outro, deve-se reconhecer que ambos so sistemas
normativos e esto inseridos em um determinado ambiente social. Conseqentemente
inexiste uma obrigao jurdica isolada. Qualquer produo normativa est sempre
atrelada a uma ordem jurdica que lhe confere um sentido e um alcance determinado.
A norma no um fato destacado do conjunto, uma pea na formao de um sistema
coerente. Conceituando o direito internacional como um sistema normativo aplicado
a sociedade internacional, o direito internacional evidenciado no apenas como um
conjunto de normas, mas um sistema jurdico coeso e uniforme3. Afinal, um conjunto
1 Doutor em Direito Internacional Pblico pela Universit Paris X, Frana. Presidente do Centro de Direito Internacional. Professor da
Faculdade de Direito da UFMG e da Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de Minas Gerais.
2 Doutorando em Direito Internacional Pblico pela Pontifcia Universidade Catlica de Minas Gerais. Diretor do Centro de Direito Internacional.
3 M. Virally, Sur la validit du droit et son fondement (norme fondamentale hypothtique et droit international) , Recueil dtudes en
hommages Charles Eisenmann, Cujas, 1975, pp. 453-467.
Volume2_CS4.indb 73
6/16/11 4:11 PM
74
de normas pode no ser uma ordem jurdica, assim como um conjunto de folhas e
galhos pode no ser uma arvore4 (cogitar substituio de metfora).
De fato, no sendo a funo da norma apenas a de criar obrigaes, mas igualmente
a de estabelecer direitos, instituir poderes, criar rgos e procedimentos, como
determinar que ela o faa de forma coerente, uniforme e sistemtica? Como reconhecer
a existncia de uma determinada ordem jurdica internacional? Em outras palavras
como verificar que uma determinada obrigao internacional de origem normativa,
ou seja, dotada de fora e natureza obrigatria? Qual o elemento que distingue uma
obrigao normativa oriunda do sistema jurdico internacional? Como determinar que
uma obrigao de fato vincula e esta integrada ao sistema internacional?
O problema ser, portanto o de identificar a fonte de obrigatoriedade da norma
internacional e de relacion-la ao sistema normativo de origem. Existem, claro,
diferentes pontos de vista doutrinrios acerca desta questo. Contudo, h um acordo
de base. A natureza soberana das entidades que compem a sociedade internacional
impe o consentimento direto ou indireto do autor da norma como elemento essencial
na formao do direito internacional visto como norma e sistema. A jurisprudncia
da C.I.J. relativa ao estabelecimento de sua competncia um bom exemplo da fora
do vnculo entre o consentimento e a autoridade normativa. Assim, como sublinha a
C.P.I.J. no Parecer Consultivo relativo ao Statut de la Carlie Orientale:
(...) est bem estabelecido no direito internacional que nenhum
Estado poderia ser obrigado a submeter suas controvrsias com os
outros Estados seja arbitragem, seja, enfim, a no importa qual
procedimento de soluo pacfica, sem seu consentimento.5.
De fato, a necessidade de um consentimento dos Estados partes, para que a Corte
possa exercer sua competncia contenciosa, lembrada sistematicamente e em termos
categricos pelas duas Cortes. Assim, no caso Droits des Minorits en Haute-Silsie, a
Corte assinalou que: a jurisdio da Corte depende da vontade das Partes6. No caso
Or montaire pris Rome em 1943, a Corte declarou que:
no podia exercer sua jurisdio relativa a um Estado a no ser com
o consentimento deste ltimo7. Finalmente, a C.I.J. constatou, na sua
sentena de 30 de Junho de 1995, no caso do Timor Oriental, que no
teria competncia para julgar um litgio entre dois Estados sem que
estes tenham consentido na sua jurisdio8.
. Virally, Sur La prtendue primitivit du droit international, Recueil de travaux, mmoires publis par la Facult de droit de Genve,
M
1969, pp. 201-213.
5 C.P.J.I. Srie B, n 5, p. 27
6 C.P,I.J. Srie A, n 17, pp. 37-38.
7 C.I.J. Rec. 1978, p. 9.
8 C.I.J. Rec. 1995, p. 101.
4
Volume2_CS4.indb 74
6/16/11 4:11 PM
75
Volume2_CS4.indb 75
6/16/11 4:11 PM
76
12 J . Salmon, Le droit international lpreuve au tournant du XXI sicle, Cursos Euromediterrneos Bancaja de Derecho Internacional,
Vol. VI, 2002, p. 252.
13 H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, livro 1, PUF, 1999, p. 98.
14 E. de Vattel, O direito das gentes, IPRI, 2004, p. 16.
15 Dictionnaire de droit international, Bruylant, 2001.
16 Evidentemente como demonstra M. Virally, para alm do reconhecimento da igualdade soberana se instala uma poderosa luta poltica.
A desigualdade e a diversidade real de meios e de situaes provocam a tentativa de evitar a reciprocidade ou reverter s conseqncias
que lhe sero negativas desta pretensa igualdade. Naturalmente os Estados recorrem soberania para justificar a existncia de direitos
Volume2_CS4.indb 76
6/16/11 4:11 PM
77
e pretenses que lhe seriam teis negando a existncia de obrigaes consideradas inconvenientes. M. Virally, Panorama du Droit
International Contemporain, Cours gnral de droit international public, RCADI, 1983, p.78.
17 Isto no significa que no existam dificuldades de submisso dos Estados soberanos ao direito.A problemtica, contudo, tem outra
conotao e conseqncias.
18 C.P.J.I., 1923, Srie A, n. 1, p. 25.
19 C.I.J., Rec. 1986, p. 131.
20 Declarao sobre a utilizao do progresso da cincia e da tcnica no interesse da paz e em beneficio da humanidade, Assembleia Geral,
Res 3384, (XXX), 1975.
Volume2_CS4.indb 77
6/16/11 4:11 PM
78
este ato normativo precedido pela vontade, elemento subjetivo que se manifesta por
intermdio de uma forma que se deve considerar como jurdica (b).
1) O consentimento como expresso normativa de um ato de soberania
Em 1927 em uma jurisprudncia hoje profundamente contestada no caso Lotus21 a
C.P.J.I. sob forte influencia de seu Presidente, o jurista italiano D. Anzilotti, determinou
que: o direito internacional rege a relao entre Estados independentes. As regras de
direito que vinculam os Estados originam-se, portanto da vontade destes22. As bases
estruturantes do voluntarismo positivista estavam, portanto colocadas e reproduziam
em termos jurisprudenciais os fundamentos, que com pequenas distines nos detalhes,
eram sustentados pelos autores clssicos23. Assim, embora Jellinek proponha a teoria
da auto limitao como manifestao da vontade e Anzilotti reconhea a existncia
do Pacta sunt servanda, como norma fundamental ao qual os Estados esto ligados
por meio da vontade, o direito internacional, a luz do positivismo voluntarista existe
pela vontade dos Estados, ele fundado sobre esta vontade que sozinha d nascimento
a regras positivas mediante o consentimento. Como sustenta Jellinek: o direito
internacional existe para os Estados e no os Estados para o direito internacional.
Neste sentido, o fundamento do carter obrigatrio do sistema normativo internacional
reside na vontade estatal manifestada mediante ato soberano.
O Estado a nica fonte de produo do direito e este realizado a partir da sua
vontade. Neste sentido, a sociedade internacional no seria marcada por uma vocao
ou uma finalidade natural. Vattel afirmou:
O sistema normativo internacional tradicionalmente caracterizado
por sua unidade. Isto significa que qualquer que seja sua origem formal,
qualquer que seja seu objeto ou sua importncia, todas normas so
colocadas no mesmo plano, e nenhuma hierarquia ordena suas relaes
No existe uma norma moral, fundamento da sociedade internacional, exterior
a vontade de seus membros soberanos, e formadora de uma estrutura normativa
hierrquica24. Como sustenta J. Combacau:
a coeso jurdica do sistema legal no pode ser assegurada seguindo
uma lgica vertical, a do modelo hierrquico do Estado, mas deve
adequar-se a uma lgica horizontal ou transversal, na qual a
diferenciao entre a autoridade e seus subordinados no existe25.
21 A
. Pellet, Remarques sur le concept de souverainet dans la jurisprudence de la Cour mondiale, 2008, p.215-230.
22 C.P.J.I., Srie A, n. 10, p. 18.
23 Vattel, Jellineck, Triepel H. Triepel, Les rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne, RCADI, 1923, vol. 1, pp. 73-121.D.
Anzilotti, Cours de droit international, Panthon-Assas, LGDJ, 1999, pp. 1-49.
24 P. Weil, Vers une normativit relative en droit international RGDIP, 1982, pp. 5 ss.
25 J. Combacau, Le Droit international; bric--brac ou systme?Archives de philosophie du droit, T. 31, Sirey, Paris, p. 86.
Volume2_CS4.indb 78
6/16/11 4:11 PM
79
26 P
. M. Dupuy, Lunit de lordre juridique international, RCADI, t. 27, 2000, p. 54.
27 P. M. Dupuy, Droit international public, Dalloz, 2006, p. 9.
28 C.P.J.I., Srie A, n 10, p. 18.
Volume2_CS4.indb 79
6/16/11 4:11 PM
80
o concurso de vontade de outros Estados29. Isto significa que estes atos unilaterais
traduzem a liberdade de ao jurdica do Estado e se fundamentam na soberania e nos
ttulos de competncia que so a ela ligados.
O consentimento pode ser igualmente manifestado por via de acordo bilateral ou
multilateral. Normalmente o processo de formao da norma convencional regido
pela Conveno de Viena de 1969 que no seu artigo 11 enumera os diferentes modos
de expresso do consentimento: a assinatura, a troca de instrumentos constituindo
um tratado, a ratificao, a aceitao, a aprovao, ou adeso ou (...) todo outro
meio acordado. A ultima parte do texto indica que a denominao quanto a forma
do consentimento ou mesmo o processo interno utilizado para manifest-lo, que no
caso brasileiro responde aos imperativos constitucionais constantes nos artigos 49 e
84 da Constituio Federal de 1988, no tem conseqncia na construo da natureza
normativa advinda do consentimento. O que aparece como necessrio no o
consentimento expresso sob uma forma precisa, mas a demonstrao da real inteno
dos Estados de se vincularem30.
A corrente voluntarista defende ainda a idia do consentimento tcito como elemento
formador do direito gerado por via espontnea, no caso das normas de natureza
consuetudinria ou princpios gerais de direito. O argumento sustenta que o opinio jris,
necessrio a formao de um costume internacional, seria alcanada a partir de uma
determinada prtica constante, uniforme e reiterada no tempo. O resultado um consenso
e uma convico jurdica de que esta deve ser reconhecida como direito por refletir
uma necessidade social. Tal prtica, segundo os voluntaristas, seria a expresso de um
consentimento tcito obrigando unicamente os estados que participaram na formao
da norma ou que a ela consentiram posteriormente. No estendendo seus efeitos a
terceiros Estados norma consuetudinria permaneceria restrita a lgica segundo a qual
o destinatrio da norma internacional simultaneamente seu autor.
O voluntarismo moderno evidentemente no desconhece a validade normativa
de decises oriundas de rgos que compem uma determinada organizao
internacional. Trata-se de um direito derivado cuja legalidade reside no consentimento
delegado ao tratado constitutivo da organizao internacional. A fora normativa no
reside na funo social da organizao, mas em um encadeamento de consentimentos
diretos. Assim, a norma produzida no seio de um rgo pertencente a uma organizao
internacional pode estar ligada a atividade logstica da organizao e tratar do
funcionamento desta, de seu oramento, de seu regulamento interno, da forma como
a organizao se vincula ao Estado sede, da admisso de novos membros, entre
outros. A norma pode igualmente ter uma funo operacional relativa realizao dos
princpios e regras prescritos no tratado constitutivo da organizao31. Em ambos os
casos a confeco de normas no interior de uma organizao internacional retira sua
validade de uma norma anterior e consentida.
29 C
.I.J., Rec. 1974, p. 267.
30 P. Reuter, Introduction au droit des traits, PUF, 1985, p. 56.
31 J. Combacau; S. Sur, Droit international public, Montchrestien, 2006, p. 721.
Volume2_CS4.indb 80
6/16/11 4:11 PM
81
Volume2_CS4.indb 81
6/16/11 4:11 PM
82
Essa distino tem efeitos que permitem verificar os limites do alcance dos
argumentos voluntaristas.
- A hierarquia normativa. Em primeiro lugar, observa-se que uma mesma norma
pode ser criada por fontes diversas. Inversamente uma mesma fonte pode dar
origem a numerosas regras cujo contedo pode ser profundamente varivel.
Contudo, embora tal distino no obrigue ao reconhecimento de uma hierarquia
de fontes formais, dificilmente se pode negar a existncia de regras de jus cogens
que estabelecem uma precria hierarquia de normas. O voluntarismo parece neste
caso desfocado da realidade.
- A existncia de atos jurdicos no normativos. Se os atos jurdicos so o meio de
criao da norma, eles so atos de procedimento de deliberao. Neste sentido eles
podem, em certas circunstancias estar na origem de uma obrigao no normativa.
De fato, existem atos jurdicos no normativos e se a vontade o predicado do ato
jurdico, o efeito normativo no , em todos os casos, o seu efeito caracterstico.
- Segurana jurdica: Se o direito se baseia na forma, no procedimento e na vontade,
desconhecendo qualquer fora de validade em razo da matria ele no garante a
sua finalidade que a segurana jurdica. Ele de fato no obriga porque quando
inconveniente bastaria modific-lo, sem qualquer invocao de responsabilidade.
Se a fora normativa do direito reside neste elemento subjetivo que a vontade,
seria suficiente que o interesse tome outros contornos para que este deixe de existir.
Tal situao implica na inexistncia de qualquer idia de ordem jurdica.
- A formao do direito internacional geral por via espontnea. A teoria da vontade
como fundamento da fora normativa tambm irreal em face da formao
espontnea do direito internacional geral. A teoria do consentimento tcito no
reflete a realidade internacional. Normas de direito geral podem ser criadas e
destinadas sociedade internacional como um todo sob a forma de costumes sem
que a universalidade dos Estados tenha participado ativamente de determinada
pratica.
- A existncia de normas imperativas. Se o direito algo que no pode se
distanciar da idia de justia33, esta estaria minimamente representada nas normas
imperativas de direito internacional. O reconhecimento da existncia de regras de
jus cogens conforme previsto no artigo 53 da Conveno de Viena sobre direito
dos tratados reflete uma tmida idia de ordem publica e remete ao reconhecimento
de clausulas petreas internacionais. Um denominador mnimo e moral do qual a
vontade soberana no poderia ser contraria. Como admitir que um consentimento
33 C. Leben, Aspects de droit international et communautaire, Pantheon-Assas, LGDJ, 2002.
Volume2_CS4.indb 82
6/16/11 4:11 PM
83
formal possa ser suficiente para dar validade a uma norma que garanta o genocdio
ou o terrorismo internacional. Este indicativo mnimo de ordem pblica garante a
interdependncia e submete a vontade as suas prerrogativas podendo inclusive ser
reconhecido sob base consuetudinria.
- A inexistncia de precedente vinculante das decises da C.I.J. e a mudana da
jurisprudncia a partir do caso Lotus. A doutrina jurisprudencial mais moderna
desacorda do dictum da C.P.J.I. no caso Lotus. Esta tomada de posio resta isolada,
severamente criticada e goza de fraca autoridade. reconhecido o fato de que
esta deciso reflete um determinado perodo histrico cuja sociedade internacional
ainda era pouco institucionalizada e regida por um direito de estrita coexistncia.
Assim, diante da inexistncia do precedente jurisprudencial vinculante como
elemento formador do direito internacional, observa-se que tal deciso da Corte
da Haia no corresponde mais a realidade atual e caiu em desuso.
B) O normativismo jurdico A teoria pura do direito
A teoria pura do direito que tem em H. Kelsen seu mais proeminente defensor
apresenta um argumento original para determinar a fonte da autoridade de uma
norma internacional. Transpondo suas reflexes oriundas do direito interno segundo
a qual a norma deveria encontrar a sua validade em uma norma hierarquicamente
superior e assim sucessivamente, Kelsen retoma a idia da existncia de uma norma
fundamental, que no direito interno esta representada pela Constituio. Este eminente
jurista sustenta, portanto que para determinar a validade da norma internacional
preciso seguir um procedimento que conduz norma de base (originria) da ordem
jurdica internacional desenhando-se, assim, uma pirmide normativa ordenada e
hierarquizada. Deste modo, o fundamento de validade da norma internacional residiria
em uma norma hierarquicamente superior34. Como demonstra D. Anzilotti, toda
ordem jurdica consiste em um complexo de normas que encontram seu valor jurdico
em uma norma fundamental a qual elas se vinculam direta ou indiretamente35.
Considerando que uma ordem normativa internacional existiria unicamente na
medida em que a validade das suas normas residiria em uma nica norma fundamental
que lhe confere unidade e pluralidade, observa-se que o verdadeiro problema para
a teoria pura do direito consiste em determinar a gnese da validade normativa da
norma fundamental que estaria no topo da pirmide normativa. Recorre-se, portanto
ao princpio do pacta sunt servanda. Os acordos bilaterais ou multilaterais devem ser
cumpridos e o sentimento espontneo de tal obrigao determinante na manifestao
da norma fundamental. Se ns nos perguntamos porque uma norma vlida, a resposta
ser dada pelo tratado que fundamenta a sua criao. Se, novamente, nos perguntamos
porque esse tratado vlido, essa questo levar norma geral que obriga os Estados a
34 S
tphane Rials, La puissance tatique et le drot dans lordre international. Elments dune critique de la notion usuelle de souverainet
externe. APD, 1987. Archives de philosophie du droit, T.32, Sirey, Paria, 1987, p. 205.
35 D. Anzilotti, Cours de droit international, Panthon-Assas, LGDJ, 1999, p.44.
Volume2_CS4.indb 83
6/16/11 4:11 PM
84
respeitar os tratados assinados por eles, isto , norma que se exprime habitualmente
por meio da expresso pacta sunt servanda. Esta uma norma de direito internacional
geral, produzida pelo costume, ou seja, pela prtica reiterada e reconhecida como
direito. Conseqentemente, a norma de base do direito internacional decorre do
costume enquanto fato criador.36 Ocorre que tal argumento no garante a unidade no
fundamento de validade da ordem jurdica internacional. Kelsen ento prope um
projeto epistmico, um direito fundado na pureza metajurdica, ou seja, uma norma
fundamental hipottica cuja existncia suposta.
Apesar de considerado positivista o normativismo proposto por Kelsen rompe com
o voluntarismo e tem grande importncia no desenvolvimento do pensamento acerca
do fundamento da natureza jurdica do direito internacional. Primeiramente ele reduz
o papel da vontade como elemento formador do direito internacional. Segundo ele
uma norma no um ato de vontade, mas somente um ato cujo significado impresso
por outra norma. Isto significa que, apenas uma norma pode conferir sua validade
outra norma. Ento no pela vontade do autor de uma norma de direito internacional
que existe a obrigao de conformar. Esta decorre da validade objetiva que uma
norma superior confere a norma posta. Kelsen faz ento a distino entre a norma e o
ato de vontade que a determina. A norma o dever ser enquanto o ato o ser. Eliminase assim, o subjetivismo na determinao da validade da norma internacional. A
segurana jurdica prevalece porque o direito encontra sua validade no prprio direito.
Inverte-se assim a equao voluntarista proposta por Jellinek. O direito internacional
existe por meio do direito.
Aparentemente de forma contraditria, ao propor um direito puro cujo seu
fundamento somente poderia ser encontrado no prprio direito, Kelsen coloca
igualmente em nfase a idia da existncia de uma eventual hierarquia normativa.
Deste modo, embora distante da posio objetivista, fundada na funo social do
direito, Kelsen estabelece as bases para o reconhecimento da formao espontnea do
direito. Ele reconhece a interdependncia e, embora no afirme de forma categrica,
demonstra a necessidade social de certas normas processuais como o pacta sunt
servanda.
Entretanto, se a lgica de Kelsen coerente no quadro do direito interno, ela
apresenta graves lacunas quando aplicada ao direito internacional. O normativismo
jurdico apresenta de fato profundas limitaes na determinao da natureza jurdica
do direito internacional. Primeiramente a atitude de Kelsen ao separar o direito de
qualquer relao social, estritamente fictcia. O direito no puro como tambm
no neutro. Ele existe unicamente quando destinado regular o universo social.37
De fato o direito seria inconcebvel como cincia se ele j no fosse presente como
36 H
. Kelsen, Principios del Derecho internacional Pblico, Buenos Aires, 1965, pp. 357-358
37 E. V. Carreno, Donde encontrar el fundamento de la obligatoridad del derecho internacional? Lber Amicorum, homenaje al Profesor
E. J. de Archaga, Fundacin de Cultura Universitria, Montevideo, 1991, pp. 108-109;
Volume2_CS4.indb 84
6/16/11 4:11 PM
85
realidade social38. A escola de Viena parece ignorar que o direito funda sua razo
de ser igualmente no interesse da comunidade e do grupo social no qual aplicado.
Deste modo, embora o direito internacional encontre sua obrigao formal no
consentimento e no pacta sunt servanda, seu carter obrigatrio material explicase pela necessidade da manuteno da paz, da dignidade da pessoa humana, e dos
interesses da comunidade em produzi-lo garanti-lo e observ-lo.
Por outro lado, reconhecer o costume como uma fonte normativa originria e
apelar para a existncia de uma norma fundamental hipottica poderia conduzir a
uma estratificao irreal do direito internacional. Se, verdade que o costume aparece
como fonte do direito internacional, ele no a nica e nem poderia ser considerado
hierarquicamente superior. No h hierarquia de fontes no sistema normativo
internacional. Em outras palavras em caso de conflito de normas oriundas de fontes
consuetudinrias ou convencionais, por exemplo, no se aplicaria automaticamente
a primeira em detrimento da segunda. O sistema clssico de hermenutica deve ser
observado e a implementao da regra lex posteriori derogat priori se impe.
C) O objetivismo jurdico A teoria do interesse social
Em seu curso de 1934 na Academia de direito internacional da Haia G. Scelle ir
sustentar que o direito internacional fruto da solidariedade social. A sua natureza
obrigatria e o seu fundamento do direito residiriam, ento, na necessidade social que
este representa. Em outras palavras, se o direito um sistema normativo aplicado a um
agrupamento social este no pode ser determinado unicamente por um procedimento de
formao apoiado numa evasiva noo de vontade. G. Scelle rompe terminantemente
com o voluntarismo e admite a existncia de valores morais e da prpria idia de justia
como elementos formadores do direito internacional na medida em que estes representam
uma necessidade social. Para G. Scelle as regras de direito vem do fato social e da
conjuno da tica e do poder, os quais so produtos da solidariedade social39.
Por outro lado, o objetivismo sustenta igualmente a inexistncia de um direito
reduzido a uma estrutura normativa pura. Para Scelle o direito internacional deve ser
til ao seu destinatrio e representar os interesses do agrupamento social, ou seja, da
comunidade de Estados que em ltima anlise formado pelos seus indivduos.
Com efeito, o objetivismo incluiu no debate acerca da fundamentao da natureza
normativo do direito internacional a problemtica do contedo da norma. Para tanto,
ele introduziu uma distino entre direito objetivo que composto por leis biolgicas
oriundas da realidade social e o direito positivo que tem sua validade provada a partir
de sua conformidade com o direito objetivo. G. Scelle, deste modo, inverte a ordem e
condiciona s fontes formais a realizao do direito internacional por meio das fontes
materiais. Assim, segundo ele, o carter obrigatrio das normas de direito positivo
38 M
. Virally, Notes sur la validit du droit et son fondement (norme fondamentale hypothtique et droit international), Recueil dtudes en
hommages Charles Eisenmann, Cujas, 1975, pp. 453-467.
39 G. Scelle, Manuel de droit international, Montchrestien, Domat, p.6. P. Daillier, M. Forteau, A. Pellet, Droit international public,
LGDJ, 8 ed., p. 117.
Volume2_CS4.indb 85
6/16/11 4:11 PM
86
no reside no fato de que estas so oriundas da vontade e expressas por via de fontes
formais, mas de sua conformidade com o direito objetivo constitudo por fontes
materiais resultante das necessidades sociais. Nesta perspectiva no h como se opor
o direito interno dos Estados ao direito internacional. Para Scelle existe apenas uma
ordem jurdica cuja base reside na solidariedade. A lgica interessante e conduz a
algumas concluses.
Inicialmente, a distino entre ato normativo e norma (contedo do ato) pode
dar a impresso de que uma norma pode vir a ser vlida independentemente de uma
manifestao de consentimento. Assim, ao reconhecer que os tratados devem ser
respeitados e que eles vinculam juridicamente os Estados partes, pretende-se dizer
que moralmente necessrio que cada Estado respeite seus engajamentos. Esta norma
no resulta da vontade mesma do Estado. Ela se situa fora desta vontade a qual ela
se impe. primeiramente uma exigncia moral antes de ser uma obrigao jurdica.
Ela pode ser jurdica sim, mas o depois de ter sua fonte moral estabelecida. O pacta
sunt servanda no necessita de uma consagrao convencional para se impor como
uma norma jurdica internacional ele a condio de possibilidade do exerccio do
direito internacional. Sua fora jurdica aumenta a partir da tomada de conscincia da
necessidade de tal norma e no de seu carter de ato jurdico formal. A prpria C.I.J.
no caso dos Testes Nucleares sustenta que a regra pacta sunt servanda tem como base
a boa-f e no decorre necessariamente da vontade comum dos Estados40. Isso nos
remete evidentemente a formao autnoma do direito costumeiro que responde seja a
uma necessidade lgica, seja a uma necessidade social. A formao espontnea de tais
normas e sua validade erga omnes se realizam por uma tomada de conscincia. Isso
justifica a autoridade da norma aos Estados que no necessariamente manifestaram a
inteno de serem vinculados
No que concerne a res judicata pode-se igualmente sustentar que, apesar de seu
fundamento contratual, a soluo jurisdicional de controvrsias corresponde a um
interesse superior de justia da comunidade internacional em seu conjunto. Como
assinala Max Huber,
a deciso judiciria tira sua autoridade no do fato de se adaptar
bem s exigncias de uma situao particular e momentnea,
mas por repousar em razes que tem um valor geral exterior ao
caso concreto e uma fora conclusiva para todos. As instituies
judicirias repousam em dois princpios de ordem espiritual; a
lgica jurdica, elemento racional, e a justia, elemento moral.
Esses dois pilares da funo judiciria elevam-na acima de onde
se afrontam os interesses e as paixes dos homens dos partidos, das
classes, das naes e das raas41.
40 C.I.J., Rec. 1974, p. 268 e 473.
41 C.P.J.I. Srie C, n 7-I, p.17
Volume2_CS4.indb 86
6/16/11 4:11 PM
87
Alis, mesmo a doutrina que considerava que a arbitragem tinha um carter estritamente
contratual, constituindo uma espcie de integrao da vontade das partes expressa no
compromisso, no chegou nunca a negar a importncia da comunidade internacional. A
viso contratual da jurisdio reconhece, a partir da aplicao do princpio da relatividade
da coisa julgada no direito internacional que ao arbitro cabe decidir no limite do objeto
demandado42 e sua deciso estendida apenas as partes litigantes43. A liberdade que tem
o rbitro de estender livremente seu dispositivo jurisdicional ignorando os interesses
de terceiros no foi reconhecida pelo direito internacional. Isso quer dizer que, mesmo
numa concepo estritamente contratual da arbitragem, elementos institucionais jamais
deixaram de existir. Como demonstra Benedetto Conforti:
apenas ao considerar que a soluo jurisdicional de controvrsias,
apesar de seu fundamento contratual, corresponde a um interesse
superior de justia da comunidade internacional no seu conjunto,
que se pode justificar a tese segundo a qual os Estados terceiros
devem ser protegidos , em certa medida, e que, em conseqncia, o
rbitro deve encontrar limites que as partes no encontrariam em
suas relaes diretas44.
Embora v longe demais, o objetivismo demonstrou que a formao do direito no
unicamente o produto de um consentimento formalmente manifesto. Assim, ele abriu
espao para a incluso da comunidade internacional como elemento da formao de
sua natureza jurdica. Ele igualmente inseriu o debate acerca de suas fontes materiais
e permitiu reconhecer que o direito internacional movido por duas foras por vezes
antagnicas. De um lado ele delega aos Estados um pedao significativo da capacidade
soberana de deciso e produo normativa. Os Estados detm, portanto a prerrogativa
de manifestao do consentimento formal como instrumento de justificativa da
existncia e extenso da autoridade normativa. A justificativa da autoridade da norma
desconhece em grande medida a dinmica das relaes internacionais. Por outro lado,
o direito internacional reconhece na comunidade internacional certa capacidade de
ao poltica, jurdica ou econmica suscetvel de influenciar a deciso dos Estados
soberanos ou mesmo garantir a existncia de uma norma produzida por terceiros no
seio de uma Organizao internacional45.
Esta dialtica est representada no movimento que leva os Estados a afirmarem sua
soberania reconhecendo simultaneamente sua necessria interdependncia social46.
42 C.I.J., Rec. 1985, pp. 7 ss
43 C.I.J., Rec 1954, pp. 6 ss
44 B. Confort, Larrt de la Ciour Internationale de Justice dans lafaire de la Dlimitation du plateau continental entre ka Kibye et Malte,
R.G.D.I.P., vol 90, 1986, p. 338.
45 A. El Quali, Efeets juridiques de la sentence internacionale, contribuitions ltude de lexcution des normes intertionales, L.G.D.J.,
Paris, 1984, p.203.
45 Allan Pellet, Harmonie et contradictions de la justice internationale, Harmonie et contraciction em droit international, Colloque de la
Facult des Sciences Juridique, Politiques et Sociales de Tunis, Pedone,1956,p.196
Volume2_CS4.indb 87
6/16/11 4:11 PM
88
Volume2_CS4.indb 88
6/16/11 4:11 PM
89
Referncias
Anzilotti, D.Cours de droit international, Panthon-Assas, LGDJ, 1999.
_____________.Cours de droit international, Panthon-Assas, LGDJ, 1999.
Carreno, E. V. Donde encontrar el fundamento de la obligatoridad del derecho internacional? Lber
Amicorum, homenaje al Profesor E. J. de Archaga, Fundacin de Cultura Universitria, Montevideo,
1991.
Combacau, J. Sur, Droit international public, Montchrestien, 2006.
_____________. Le Droit international; bric--brac ou systme?Archives de philosophie du droit, T.
31, Sirey, Paris. Cultura Universitria, Montevideo, 1991.
Confort, B. Larrt de la Ciour Internationale de Justice dans lafaire de la Dlimitation du plateau
continental entre ka Kibye et Malte, R.G.D.I.P., vol 90, 1986.
Descartes, R. Discurso sobre o mtodo, Porto de Idias, 2010
Dupuy, P. M.Droit international public, Dalloz, 2006.
____________.Lunit de lordre juridique international, RCADI, t. 27, 2000.
Grotius, H.De jure belli ac pacis, livro 1, PUF, 1999. Haye, 1996.
Kelsen,H. Principios del Derecho internacional Pblico, Buenos Aires, 1965.
Leben, C. Aspects de droit international et communautaire, Pantheon-Assas, LGDJ, 2002.
Pellet, A. Archives de philosophie du droit, T.32, Sirey, Paria, 1987.
__________. Harmonie et contradictions de la justice internationale, Harmonie et contraciction em
droit international. Pedone, 1956.
___________. Remarques sur le concept de souverainet dans la jurisprudence de la Cour mondiale,
2008.
___________. Droit international public, LGDJ, 8 ed., 2002.
Quali, A. El Efeets juridiques de la sentence internacionale, contribuitions ltude de lexcution des
normes intertionales, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1984.
R. Higgins, Fundamentals of international law, perspectives on international law. Londres, 1995.
Reuter, P. Introduction au droit des traits, PUF, 1985.
Rezek, F. Sur le fondement du droit des gens, Theory of International Law at he Threshold of the 21
st Century. Essays in Honour of Krizysztof Skubiszewsk, Klumer, La Haye, 1996.
Rials, S.La puissance tatique et le drot dans lordre international. Elments dune critique de la notion
usuelle de souverainet externe. APD, 1987.
Salmon, J.Le droit international lpreuve au tournant du XXI sicle, Cursos Euromediterrneos
Bancaja de Derecho Internacional, Vol. VI, 2002.
SCELLE, G. Manuel de droit international public, Montchrestien, Domat, p. 6.
_________.Manuel de droit international, Montchrestien, Domat, p.6. P. Daillier, M.
Vattel, J. O direito das gentes, IPRI, 2004.
Vattel, J. Triepel, H.Les rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne,
RCADI, 1923.
Virally, M. Notes sur la validit du droit et son fondement (norme fondamentale hypothtique et droit
international), Recueil dtudes en hommages Charles Cujas, E. 1975.
___________. Panorama du Droit International Contemporain, Cours gnral de droit international
public, RCADI, 1983, p.78.
___________. Sur la validit du droit et son fondement (norme fondamentale hypothtique et droit
international). Recueil dtudes en hommages Charles Eisenmann, Cujas, 1975.
___________.Sur La prtendue primitivit du droit international, Recueil de travaux, mmoires
publis par la Facult de droit de Genve, 1969.
Weil, P. Vers une normativit relative en droit international RGDIP, 1982.
Volume2_CS4.indb 89
6/16/11 4:11 PM
90
Resumo
O aparecimento do sistema internacional de proteo aos direitos humanos,
com marco inicial em 1948 com a Declarao Universal dos Direitos Humanos
(DUDH), inicia um processo de transformao do Direito Internacional e da ordem
internacional. A partir do artigo 28 da DUDH se estabelece a construo de nova uma
ordem internacional social como uma obrigao jurdica. Tal evento permite avanos
no campo da fiscalizao da implementao dos direitos humanos, da efetivao do
direito ao desenvolvimento, da edificao de um constitucionalismo internacional,
e do fortalecimento de um Estado de Direito (rule of law) internacional. Essas
transformaes ensejam mudanas no cenrio internacional que refletem no Direito
Internacional e na prpria Ordem Internacional Contempornea como um todo,
abrindo espao para um ordenamento mais humano e justo.
Abstract
The emergence of the international system for the protection of human rights, in
1948 with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), marks the beginning
of a transformation process of International Law and International Order. Steaming from
Article 28 of the UDHR one sees the construction of a new international social order
as a legal obligation. This allows for advancements in the areas of implementation of
human rights, effectiveness of right to development, construction of an international
constitutionalism, and enhancement of an international rule of law. These transformations
imply changes in the international scenario, whic h reflect onto International Law and even
onto the Contemporary International Order as a whole, allowing for the establishment of a
more humane and just regulatory system.
1 Doutora e Mestre em Direito Internacional pela Faculdade de Direito da USP; tem LL.M. em International Legal Studies pela New York
University School of Law; e Professora e Pesquisadora da Faculdade de Direito do Sul de Minas.
2 Doutora e Mestre em Direito Internacional pela Faculdade de Direito da USP.
Volume2_CS4.indb 90
6/16/11 4:11 PM
91
Sumrio
Introduo
1. A Ordem Internacional
1.1. A construo da ordem internacional ao longo da histria
1.2. O estabelecimento da Ordem Internacional Contempornea
1.2.1. As transformaes na Ordem Internacional no ps-Segunda
Guerra Mundial
1.2.2. A Nova Ordem Internacional Econmica (NOIE)
1.2.3. A reestruturao da ordem no ps Guerra Fria e o reflexo nas
instituies internacionais
1.3. A Relao entre a Ordem Internacional e o Direito Internacional
2. Os direitos humanos e a ordem internacional
2.1. A Declarao Universal dos Direitos Humanos (DUDH)
2.2. A Declarao Universal dos Direitos Humanos e o artigo 28:
uma nova ordem internacional social.
3. O art. 28 da DUDH e o direito ao desenvolvimento
Concluso
Introduo
O aparecimento dos direitos humanos provocou transformaes significativas no
Direito Internacional3. No plano nacional, como requisito do Estado de Direito, os
direitos humanos constituram um instrumento limitador do poder4 nos ordenamentos
jurdicos e estabeleceram novos valores e paradigmas a serem respeitados pelos
Estados em suas aes internas, criando, desta feita, novos critrios de legitimidade
interna. Com resultados semelhantes, respeitando-se as inmeras diferenas entre
os planos nacionais e o plano internacional, pode-se afirmar que, o processo de
internacionalizao da proteo aos direitos humanos, aps a Segunda Guerra
Mundial, alterou significativamente o ordenamento jurdico internacional5.
A matriz poltica e jurdica desse processo de internacionalizao a Declarao
Universal dos Direitos Humanos (DUDH), adotada pela Assembleia Geral da
Organizao das Naes Unidas (ONU) em 1948. Tal documento enuncia direitos
de titulariedade universal - direitos civis e polticos e direitos econmicos, sociais
3 JUBILUT, L.L. A proteo internacional do ser humano e as transformaes no Direito Internacional In: VEOSO, F. F. C. (Coord.)
Internationalizao das Relaes Jurdicas no Contexto Global. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2011. (in print)
4 SCHAPIRO, M.G. Repensando a relao entre Estado, Direito e Desenvolvimento: os limites do paradigma rule of law e a relevncia das
alternativas institucionais. Revista Direito GV 11, v. 6, n. 1, p. 215, jan-jun 2010.
5 JUBILUT, L.L. Op. cit.
Volume2_CS4.indb 91
6/16/11 4:11 PM
92
e culturais -, garantindo que ao lado dos sistemas internos de proteo aos direitos
humanos co-exista um sistema complementar de carter internacional.
Para alm da consagrao de direitos em espcie, a DUDH traz as bases para
a construo de uma nova ordem internacional social. Trata-se do artigo 28 da
Declarao que estabelece que: Toda pessoa tem direito a uma ordem social e
internacional em que os direitos e liberdades estabelecidos na presente Declarao
possam ser plenamente realizados. Esse artigo transforma, pois, um cenrio de
soberanias absolutas em um cenrio de soberania enquanto responsabilidade6. E em
face disso, tal proposio pode ser considerada uma das mais radicais da DUDH, no
sentido de que demanda o estabelecimento de medidas e de aes que transformaro
o cenrio internacional, refletindo tanto no Direito Internacional quanto na Ordem
Internacional Contempornea.
O presente artigo buscar analisar tais transformaes, objetivando contribuir para
a anlise dos reflexos dos direitos humanos, em geral, e da DUDH, em especial, para
o estabelecimento de um Direito Internacional mais humano e justo.
Como instrumental ao alcance dessa ordem social e internacional destacam-se o
direito ao desenvolvimento, afirmado como um direito humano no seio da ONU em
1986, e os diversos mecanismos de efetivao dos direitos humanos.
Para tanto, apresentar-se- as linhas gerais do histrico de construo da ordem
internacional at o que atualmente conhecido como a Ordem Internacional
Contempornea, em que se entende que o Direito Internacional possui papel de
extrema relevncia. Na sequncia, abordar-se- como os direitos humanos assumiram
a posio de pilares dessa Ordem, na medida em que o artigo 28 da DUDH afirmou
como objeto de um direito humano uma ordem social e internacional, na qual os
direitos humanos possam ser realizados. Em face das caractersticas efetivas da ordem
internacional delineada no ps Segunda Guerra Mundial, em razo das relaes
de poder, principalmente na esfera da fora e da economia (ser), o direito ao
desenvolvimento assumiu um papel instrumental para o alcance da ordem prevista no
artigo 28 (dever ser), sendo fundamental entender essa relao.
1. A Ordem Internacional e o Direito Internacional
1.1. A construo da ordem internacional ao longo da histria
A existncia de uma ordem internacional e suas possveis caractersticas um tema
que h muito vem sendo discutido pela doutrina na rea das Relaes Internacionais e
Cincias Polticas, no sendo o intuito do presente artigo se debruar sobre tal polmica.
A resposta a respeito de existncia ou no de uma ordem internacional depende
de qual conceito de ordem adotado. Elegendo-se como duas concepes principais
Volume2_CS4.indb 92
6/16/11 4:11 PM
93
de ordem7 aquelas propostas por Hedley Bull8 - a concepo normativa, que entende
que h ordem quando existe um arranjo particular que conduza a certos resultados9
- e James Rosenau10 - a concepo emprica, que entende que h ordem quando h
regularidades empricas observveis que perduram ao longo do tempo11 (padres
previsveis de conduta12) -, conclui-se pela existncia de uma ordem internacional13.
Verifica-se, assim, que ainda que distinta das ordens internas e com dificuldades
prprias, no existe anomia e nem anarquia14 - no cenrio internacional e como
existem objetivos compartilhados (como a manuteno da paz e segurana
internacionais, a manuteno do meio-ambiente, e o respeito aos direitos humanos)
que dependedem de normas de cooperao internacional15 e, ao menos, um mnimo
de segurana em termos de quais condutas so esperadas, pode-se concluir que h
ordem internacional.
Tendo-se estabelecido que possvel falar em ordem internacional, interessante
apontar as diferentes fases pelas quais a Ordem Internacional passou ao longo da
Histria; ou, em outras palavras, apresentar, ainda que sumariamente, as principais
caractersticas das ordens internacionais16.
Costuma-se apontar a Ordem Internacional da Cristandade como a primeira
Ordem Internacional17. Tal ordem compreenderia o perodo imediatamente anterior ao
aparecimento do Estado moderno e do Direito Internacional com a Paz de Westphalia, em
1648. Como se depreende de sua denominao, inclua to somente entidades polticas
em que os soberanos (e consequentemente a populao) expressassem a f crist,
Com o advendo dos tratados de Mnster e Osnabrck que compuseram a Paz de
Westphalia, ao colocar fim Guerra dos Trinta Anos, surgiu a Ordem Internacional
de Westphalia, cujos princpios podem ser identificados no Direito Internacional
at os dias atuais. A Ordem Internacional de Westphalia, com o declnio do poder
papal e a desintegrao do Imprio, estabeleceu os princpios da territorialidade, de
igualdade entre os Estados, de soberania, e a regra de no-interveno, entre outros,
enfocando, assim, a ideia de absteno e de normas de co-existncia a fim de assegurar
a manuteno da Ordem Internacional18, por meio do equilbrio de poder.
7 AMARAL JUNIOR, A. do. Curso de Direito Internacional Pblico. 2.ed. So Paulo: Atlas, 2011. p. 8.
8 BULL, H. A Sociedade Anrquica. : Um estudo da ordem na poltica mundial. Braslia: Editora Universidade de Braslia; Instituto de
Pesquisa de Relaes Internacionais So Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 2002. Em especial p. 31-64.
9 Ibid, p. 8.
10 ROSENAU, J.N. Governana, ordem e transformao na poltica mundial. In: CZEMPIEL, E-O.; ROSENAU, J.N. (orgs.). Governana
sem governo: ordem e transformao na politica mundial. Braslia: Editora Universidade de Braslia; So Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do
Estado, 2000. p. 11-46.
11 AMARAL JUNIOR, A. do. Op. cit., p. 11.
12 Id, O direito de assistncia humanitria. Tese de Livre-docncia apresentada Faculdade de Direito da USP, 2001. p. 34.
13 No obstante essa concluso, cumpre ressaltar que vrias correntes das teorias de relaes internacionais respondero negativamente a tal
indagao. JUBILUT, L.L. No interveno e legitimidade internacional. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2010. p. 75 e ss.
14 BULL, H. Op. cit., p. 57 e ss.
15 JUBILUT, L.L. Os fundamentos do Direito Internacional Contemporneio: da Coexistncia aos Valores Compartilhados. Op. cit.
16 A classificao das ordens internacionais aqui propostas se baseia na diviso apresentada em JUBILUT, L.L. No interveno e
legitimidade internacional. Op. cit, p. 43 e ss.
17 BULL, H. Op. cit., p. 36 e ss. Apesar de utilizar a expresso sociedade internacional crist, o que Bull apresenta o que aqui se define
como ordem internacional crist.
18 JUBILUT, L.L. No interveno e legitimidade internacional. Op. cit.
Volume2_CS4.indb 93
6/16/11 4:11 PM
94
Neste perodo, a Europa era o grande palco da Histria universal, na medida em que
as maiores potncias mundiais eram europias. Vigia a ideia da superioridade europia,
que distinguia a sociedade dos Estados como o conjunto de Estados que partilhavam
valores comuns e ditavam as regras de relacionamento da Comunidade Internacional
do sistema dos Estados, conceito que integrava potncias extra-europias (tais como
China, Japo e Imprio Otomano), mas que no comungavam da matriz ideolgica em
que assentava a civilizao europia. Ainda nesse contexto, o sistema de capitulaes
e o colonialismo assentavam-se na desigualdade de tratamento existente no cenrio
internacional19.
A Ordem Internacional de Viena, por sua vez, derivou do re-arranjo institucional
ocorrido aps as Guerras Napolenicas por meio do Congresso de Viena, em 18141815, o qual buscou criar um sistema de proteo das monarquias europias contra
o perigo de alastramento dos ideais revolucionrios. As cinco principais potncias da
poca (a Pentarquia) Frana, ustria, Prssia, Reino Unido e Rssia estabeleceram
o Concerto Europeu, e com isso uma tentativa de regulamentar de modo colegiado
as relaes internacionais. Dos acordos de 1815, surgiu a prtica das cimeiras de
soberanos para discusso de assuntos de interesse comum. Era o incio do mtodo das
conferncias diplomticas multilaterais como mecanismo de resoluo de conflitos
e o reconhecimento da diplomacia como atividade ao servio da Comunidade
Internacional20.
Essas mudanas favoreceram a afirmao de um primeiro limite hegemonia e
prepotncia do poderio europeu. Alm disso, face ao perigo da propagao alm
atlntico do contedo de tais acordos, o Presidente dos Estados Unidos (EUA), em
1823, afirmou que o continente americano no deveria mais ser considerado como
domnio de colonizao futura pelas potncias europias; e que os EUA abster-se-iam
de intervir em assuntos europeus, o que ficou conhecido como Doutrina Monroe21.
O mecanismo das conferncias diplomticas contribuiu de forma importante para
a afirmao do Direito Internacional. Ele no ficou imune onda de internacionalismo
que percorreu todo o sculo XIX, e que determinou um alargamento dos seus contedos.
As conferncias diplomticas se tornaram um instrumento de democratizao do
sistema internacional; ainda que continuassem dominadas pelas grandes potncias,
pois concediam aos Estados que no eram potncias a oportunidade de darem a
conhecer as posies perante os seus parceiros. Todavia, a influncia efetiva destes
Estados emergiu de forma mais concreta com a celebrao de tratados multilaterais,
em consequncia das conferncias diplomticas, sobretudo no final do sculo XIX
e incio do sculo XX, dentre as quais se destacam as Conferncias de Paz de Haia
1899 e 1907.
19 Os principais acontecimentos deste perodo podem ser consultados em: ROMANO, R. Paz da Westflia (1648). In: MAGNOLI, D. (org).
Histria da paz: os tratados que desenharam o planeta. So Paulo: Contexto, 2008. p. 69-91.
20 Detalhes a respeito do Congresso de Viena (1814-1815) e seus resultados podem ser consultados em: MAGNOLI, D. Congresso de Viena
(1814-1815). In: MAGNOLI, D. (org). Histria da paz: os tratados que desenharam o planeta. So Paulo: Contexto, 2008. p. 93-121.
21 A base da Doutrina Monroe foi apresentada no discurso do presidente James Monroe no Congresso Americano em 2 de dezembro de 1823.
Volume2_CS4.indb 94
6/16/11 4:11 PM
95
Volume2_CS4.indb 95
6/16/11 4:11 PM
96
Volume2_CS4.indb 96
6/16/11 4:11 PM
97
Volume2_CS4.indb 97
6/16/11 4:11 PM
98
Volume2_CS4.indb 98
6/16/11 4:11 PM
99
Volume2_CS4.indb 99
6/16/11 4:11 PM
100
Volume2_CS4.indb 100
6/16/11 4:11 PM
101
se tornaram instrumentos de modernizao e desenvolvimento, no contexto da idia de salvar Estados fracassados. Sobre o tema, ver:
FONTOURA, P. R. C. T. da. O Brasil e as operaes de manuteno da paz nas Naes Unidas. Braslia: FUNAG, 1999; JUBILUT, L.L.
No interveno e legitimidade internacional. Op. cit, p. 117 e ss.
50 OLIVEIRA S.M. Op. cit. p. 51-55.
Volume2_CS4.indb 101
6/16/11 4:11 PM
102
Volume2_CS4.indb 102
6/16/11 4:11 PM
103
culturais, etc. pelos impactos de uns na esfera dos outros, e possibilitou uma maior
interao entre as esferas jurdicas que regulam tais fatos no mbito internacional. H,
dessa forma, uma necessidade de aprofundamento do estudo das questes de validade,
nulidade, completude e coerncia do ordenamento jurdico internacional, levando em
conta as especificidades do sistema internacional descentralizado, em que h uma ordem
estipulada pelo consenso fragilizado pela marca da assimetria58.
No se pode negar que o Direito Internacional assume papel de destaque na
construo da ordem internacional porque, ainda que pesem os limites de ao do
mesmo59, ele auxilia tanto no estabelecimento de padres de ao quanto na busca
de resultados acordados60. Tanto os resultados como os processos que levam a
tais resultados, que delimitam a ordem internacional, devem estar balizados pelas
normas de proteo da pessoa humana, que encerram o valor de prioridade no Direito
Internacional, dotando o ordenamento de coerncia61.
Neste particular, o reconhecimento universal dos direitos humanos resultou numa
constitucionalizao do Direito e das polticas internacionais, baseada nos direitos
humanos e nos princpios do primado do Direito, da limitao e da separao dos
poderes, da justia social, da paz democrtica e do constitucionalismo nacional e
internacional62. O reconhecimento universal dos direitos humanos e da obrigao
genrica de todos os Estados de proteger e promover os direitos humanos demanda
que se interpretem os tratados internacionais em conformidade com as obrigaes
relevantes de direitos humanos63 e pesem a proteo e a promoo dos direitos
humanos com seus interesses de agir na arena internacional. neste contexto que
cumpre analisar a relevncia da DUDH e, em especial, de seu artigo 28, sobretudo
na construo de uma nova ordem internacional social a partir do respeito aos
direitos humanos.
2. Os direitos humanos e a ordem internacional
2.1. A Declarao Universal dos Direitos Humanos (DUDH)
Como mencionado a DUDH foi aprovada pela Assembleia Geral da ONU, em 10
de dezembro de 1948, marcando o incio da internacionalizao dos direitos humanos
e colaborando com a construo da Ordem Internacional Contempornea.
58 I bid., p. 722-725.
59 KINGSBURY, B. (2003) The international legal order. IILJ Working Papers, Disponvel em http://www.iilj.org/papers/2003/2003.1%20
Kingsbury.pdf. Acessado em 10/10/2005, 2003. p. 22-ss.; BULL, H. A sociedade anrquica um estudo da ordem na poltica mundial.
Coleo Clssicos IPRI. So Paulo: IMESP, UNB, IPRI, 2002. p. 164.
60 JUBILUT, L.L. Os fundamentos do Direito Internacional Contemporneio: da Coexistncia aos Valores Compartilhados. Op. cit.
61 OLIVEIRA, S. M. Barreiras no tarifrias no comrcio internacional e direito ao desenvolvimento. Op. cit., p. 722-725.
62 PETERSMANN, E-U.. Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century, The need to clarify their interrelationships.
Journal of International Economic Law, v. 4, n. 1, March 2001, p. 3-39.
63 Essa posio est plenamente de acordo com as normas gerais de interpretao dos tratados, codificadas na Conveno de Viena sobre
Direito dos Tratados (1969), que determina, em seu artigo 31, que os tratados internacionais sejam interpretados de boa f, segundo o
sentido comum dos termos do tratado em seu contexto e luz de seu objeto e finalidade, incluindo qualquer norma pertinente de Direito
Internacional aplicvel s relaes entre as partes. OLIVEIRA, S. M. Barreiras no tarifrias no comrcio internacional e direito ao
desenvolvimento. Op. cit.,p. 91-93.
Volume2_CS4.indb 103
6/16/11 4:11 PM
104
Ela surge, desta feita, tecnicamente como um ato unilateral de uma organizao
internacional, sendo considerada pela maioria doutrinria, portanto, como
originalmente soft law, ou seja, dotada de baixa obrigatoriedade jurdica.
Tal situao era a desejada por seus idealizadores e por seus quatro principais
arquitetos: Ren Cassin, John Humphrey, Eleanor Roosevelt e Charles Malik64. Isto
porque a ideia inicial era declarar os reflexos jurdicos da dignidade humana no plano
internacional a partir da concepo de que there are a few common standards of
decency that can and should be accepted by people of all nations and cultures65,
a fim de permitir que se desse incio a uma transformao cultural que o objetivo
ltimo dos direitos humanos66.
A DUDH surge, assim, com carter pedaggico e aspiracional. Combina, desta
feita, a consagrao internacional dos direitos humanos, revestindo-os de todas
as vantagens (e desvantagens) de um discurso de direito, por um lado, e por outro
servindo de inspirao para as aes estatais e com objetivos a serem alcanados
progressivamente.
Muito em funo deste duplo carter e da falta de um documento dotado de maior
fora jurdica, a DUDH passou a ser respeitada com a conscincia de sua obrigatoriedade,
e, em face disso, tida atualmente como sendo, no mnimo um costume internacional.
Dada sua relevncia, alguns doutrinadores vo alm e propugnam pelo status de jus
cogens (i.e. de norma imperativa do Direito Internacional) para a DUDH.
Em seus 30 artigos a DUDH estabelece tanto direitos civis e polticos quanto
direitos econmicos, sociais e culturais. Tem, portanto, preocupao em garantir os
direitos humanos de forma holstica a fim de assegurar a maior proteo possvel
dignidade humana.
A DUDH , assim, o evento matriz no apenas da internacionalizao dos direitos
humanos, mas tambm de uma nova poltica do direito ou uma vis directiva
fundada na dignidade humana,67 estabelecendo uma ordem tica da sociedade
universal dos cidados da Terra68.
2.2. A Declarao Universal dos Direitos Humanos e o artigo 28: uma nova
ordem internacional social
Para que tal ordem tica se consolide, contudo, necessrio que se estabelea
uma nova ordem internacional, do que decorre a importncia capital do artigo 28 da
DUDH ao definir no apenas o estabelecimento desta ordem como uma obrigao,
mas tambm os parmetros dentro dos quais tal ordem deve ser edificada, definindo-a
como uma ordem social que permita a realizao plena dos direitos humanos.
64 C
f. GLENDON, M. A. The rule of law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Northwestern Journal of International Human
Rights, v. 2, Spring 2004, p. 2-19.
65 Ibid, p. 2.
66 Ibid, p. 18.
67 LAFER, C. A ONU e os direitos humanos. Estudos Avanados, v. 9. n. 25, Setembro-Dezembro 1995, p. 169-185.
68 ALMEIDA, G. A. A Declarao Universal dos Direitos Humanos de 1948. In ALMEIDA, G. A.; MOISS, C. P. Direito Internacional dos
Direitos Humanos- Instrumentos Bsicos. 2. ed. So Paulo: Atlas, 2007. p. 9.
Volume2_CS4.indb 104
6/16/11 4:11 PM
105
Volume2_CS4.indb 105
6/16/11 4:11 PM
106
neste sentido que se afirma que o artigo 28 enuncia o que pode ser qualificado
como um princpio do jus cosmopoliticum:
Postula a aspirao de uma nova ordem internacional que v alm do
tradicional Direito Internacional Pblico. Encaminha a vis directiva
de uma ordem na qual a interao entre os Estados e a ONU, como um
tertius interpartes, enseje a tutela da dignidade da pessoa humana75.
A fim de que este jus cosmopoliticium venha a ser desenvolvido e efetivado, as
mudanas que decorrem do artigo 28 da DUDH so indispensveis. Tais mudanas
so relevantes uma vez que
[d]efiniu-se que a ordem jurdica interna e internacional deve assentar-se em
valores que compem o seu ncleo axiolgico fundamental. A concretizao desses
valores fonte de legitimidade da ordem jurdica e condio necessria para que as
potencialidades humanas desabrochem76.
Para a construo de uma nova ordem internacional social aes em diferentes
frentes e por meio de estratgias variadas so necessrias; j que tal ordem deve contar
com os requisitos de justia e paz:
The social and international order that will be needed for this purpose
[ to guaranteed the rights of the UDRH] must be a just a peaceful
one. Justice requires equitable economic development and equitable
distribution of its benefits; development policies that avoid destruction
of the environment; and international respect for the rule of law.
Peace requires economic and social justice; abolition of weapons of
mass destruction; sharply restricted transfer and use of conventional
weapons; and vastly expended support of nonviolent conflict resolution
and of the United Nations and other relevante institutions77.
Neste sentido a ordem propugnada pelo artigo 28 exige tanto a consolidao da
tradicional paz negativa, enquanto ausncia de conflito, quanto o fortalecimento da
paz positiva78 enquanto respeito aos direitos humanos, considerados como universais,
indivsiveis, inter-dependentes e inter-relacionados, de acordo com o artigo 5 da
Declarao e Programa de Ao de Viena.
Ao estabelecer como objeto de um direito humano uma ordem internacional que
respeite e promova os direitos humanos, o artigo 28 fornece as bases para a criao
de mecanismos de fiscalizao desse processo, uma vez que no seria concebvel que
75 L
AFER, C. A DUDH (1948). In: MAGNOLI, D. (org). Histria da paz: os tratados que desenharam o planeta. So Paulo: Contexto, 2008.
p. 297-329.
76 AMARAL JUNIOR, A. Curso de Direito Internacional Pblico. Op. cit, p. 442.
77 SIDEL, V. W. The right to a just and peaceful social and international order. Health and Human Rights, v. 3, n. 2, 1998. p. 110
78 Cf. MOISS, C. P. Direitos humanos e desenvolvimento: a contribuio das Naes Unidas. Op. cit., p. 185-186.
Volume2_CS4.indb 106
6/16/11 4:11 PM
107
Volume2_CS4.indb 107
6/16/11 4:11 PM
108
Volume2_CS4.indb 108
6/16/11 4:11 PM
109
mas, sim, uma obrigao aplicada a quaisquer relaes sociais seja na esfera local,
nacional ou internacional90. O direito ao desenvolvimento teria, pois, a capacidade de
dar maior contexto operacional essa interpretao.
Para alm da questo dos fundamentos, cumpre verificar a constribuio do
direito ao desenvolvimento internacionalizao dos direitos humanos91. No mbito
das responsabilidades em relao aos direitos humanos, o direito ao desenvolvimento
apresenta um novo componente. Desde o incio da internacionalizao dos direitos
humanos, o conceito permaneceu adstrito s tradicionais noes de soberania estatal,
ou seja, as obrigaes dos Estados membros da ONU de proteger e promover os direitos
humanos eram em geral vistas como limitadas s fronteiras nacionais. No entanto, o
direito ao desenvolvimento deixa claro que a plena realizao dos direitos humanos
no pode ignorar o mbito internacional e atribui um componente internacional
obrigao dos Estados em relao aos direitos humanos. a sua contribuio
internacionalizao das obrigaes de direitos humanos92.
Neste sentido, o direito ao desenvolvimento como direito humano apresenta trs
funes principais: (1) permite a anlise e a compreenso dos direitos humanos alm
do modelo abstrato da norma e sua violao, ou seja, uma viso mais substancial das
condies globais que condicionam o respeito aos direitos humanos em geral; (2)
desloca a ateno para a inadequao de algumas normas internacionais no plano da
poltica legislativa; e (3) explicita e torna mais operativos os elementos da obrigao
internacional de cooperao para promoo e realizao dos direitos humanos93.
H uma autonomia de moralidade internacional e as normas que devem governar
as relaes entre Estados so aquelas que evoluram na sociedade de Estados para
sustentar interesses mtuos nas relaes externas. Entretanto, h uma influncia
indireta de valores globais via atores internacionais, ou seja, valores ticos globais
como os direitos humanos influenciam a conduta dos Estados na proporo em que
so considerados pelos atores internacionais na formao do Direito Internacional
costumeiro e convencional e nas decises polticas. Assim, os Estados possuem a
obrigao de apoiar o desenvolvimento dirigido realizao dos direitos humanos na
medida em que essa obrigao foi contemplada pelo Direito Internacional94.
Arjun Senguptacomenta que o reconhecimento do direito ao desenvolvimento
como um direito humano inalienvel confere sua implementao uma pretenso
sobre recursos nacionais e internacionais e obriga os Estados e outras agncias da
90 A
LSTON, P. The Shortcomings of a Garfield the Cat Approach to the Right to Development. California Western International Law
Journal, v. 15, summer 1985, n. 3. p. 514-518.
91 OLIVEIRA, S. M. Barreiras no tarifrias no comrcio internacional e direito ao desenvolvimento. Op. cit., p. 517-524.
92 SHELTON, D. A Response to Donnelly and Alston. California Western International Law Journal, v. 15, summer 1985, n. 3, p. 526-527.
Flory Maurice discorre acerca da resistncia transposio dos direitos humanos ao nvel internacional. FLORY, M. propos des doutes
sur le droit au dveloppement. In: LAMBRECHTS, C.; PRIEUR, M. Les Hommes et lEnvironnement, quels droit pour le vingt-et-unime
siecle? tudes en hommage Alexandre Kiss, 1998. p. 166. Cf. tambm: ROSAS, A. The right to development. In: EIDE, A.; KRAUSE,
C.; ROSAS, A.. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a Textbook, 1995, p. 247.
93 A obrigao internacional de cooperao para promoo e realizao dos direitos humanos est, segundo Abi-Saab, prevista nos seguintes
dispositivos: artigos 55 e 56 da Carta das Naes Unidas, artigo 22 da DUDH e artigo 2., 1. e 11 do Pacto Internacional de Direitos
Econmicos, Sociais e Culturais. ABI-SAAB, G. Le Droit au Dveloppement. Annuaire Suisse de Droit International, v. XLIV, 1988. p. 23-24.
94 Ibid., p. 18-19.
Volume2_CS4.indb 109
6/16/11 4:11 PM
110
Volume2_CS4.indb 110
6/16/11 4:11 PM
111
Volume2_CS4.indb 111
6/16/11 4:11 PM
112
Volume2_CS4.indb 112
6/16/11 4:11 PM
113
Volume2_CS4.indb 113
6/16/11 4:11 PM
114
Referncias Bibliogrficas
ABI-SAAB, G. Le Droit au Dveloppement. Annuaire Suisse de Droit International, v. XLIV, 1988.
p. 9-24.
ALMEIDA, G. A. A Declarao Universal dos Direitos Humanos de 1948. In ALMEIDA, G. A.;
MOISS, C. P. Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos- Instrumentos Bsicos. 2. ed. So Paulo:
Atlas, 2007. p.1-11.
ALSTON, P.. Some notes on the concept of the right to development. In: PRMONT, D. Essais sur le
concept de droit de vivre en mmoire de Youngindra Khushalani, 1988. p. 75-76;
---------------. The right to development at the international level. In: SATHIRATHAI, S.; SNYDER, F.
E. Third World Attitudes Towards International Law: an Introduction, 1987. p. 811-813.
------------. The Shortcomings of a Garfield the Cat Approach to the Right to Development. California
Western International Law Journal, v. 15, summer 1985, n. 3. p. 514-518.
AMARAL JUNIOR, A. do. Curso de Direito Internacional Pblico. 2.ed. So Paulo: Atlas, 2011
-----------------------------. O direito de assistncia humanitria. Tese de Livre-docncia apresentada
Faculdade de Direito da USP, 2001
ANNAN, K. Two concepts of sovereignty. The Economist, 18/setembro/ 1999.
ARARIPE, L.A. Tratado de Versalhes (1919). In: MAGNOLI, D. (org). Histria da paz: os tratados que
desenharam o planeta. So Paulo: Contexto, 2008. p. 211-239.
BEACA, J. D. D.; GARCA, R. B.. El derecho al desarrollo, un derecho complejo con contenido
variable. Anuario de Derecho Internacional, VIII, 1985, p. 224-236.
BEDAJOUI, M. Pour un nouvel ordre conomique international? Paris: Economica, 1983.
BOBBIO, N. Teoria geral da poltica: a filosofia poltica e as lies dos clssicos; Rio de Janeiro:
Campus, 2000.
-----------------------. A era dos direitos. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992. p. 32
BOUTROS-GHALI, B. An agenda for development 1995. New York: United Nations, 1995.
-----------------------. An agenda for peace 1995. 2nd ed. New York: United Nations, 1995.
-----------------------------. An agenda for democratization 1996. New York: United Nations, 1996.
------------------------. An agenda for development 1995. New York: United Nations, 1995.
BULL, H. A sociedade anrquica um estudo da ordem na poltica mundial. Coleo Clssicos IPRI.
So Paulo: IMESP, UNB, IPRI, 2002.
COMISSO MUNDIAL SOBRE MEIO AMBIENTE E DESENVOLVIMENTO. Nosso futuro
comum. 2. edio. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1991.
FERRAZ JR., T.S.. Introduo o estudo de direito: tcnica, deciso, dominao. 2. ed. So Paulo:
Atlas, 1994. p. 195.
FLORY, M. propos des doutes sur le droit au dveloppement. In: LAMBRECHTS, C.; PRIEUR, M.
Les Hommes et lEnvironnement, quels droit pour le vingt-et-unime siecle? tudes en hommage
Alexandre Kiss, 1998. p. 165-170.
FONTOURA, P. R. C. T. da. O Brasil e as operaes de manuteno da paz nas Naes Unidas.
Braslia: FUNAG, 1999.
GLENDON, M. A. The rule of law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Northwestern
Journal of International Human Rights, v. 2, Spring 2004, p. 2-19.
GRZYBOWSKI, K. Soviet Public International Law: doctrines and diplomatic practice. Durham, NC:
rule of Law Press, 1970.
JUBILUT, L.L. A proteo internacional do ser humano e as transformaes no Direito Internacional
In: VEOSO, F. F. C. (Coord.) Internationalizao das Relaes Jurdicas no Contexto Global. So
Paulo: Saraiva, 2011. (in print)
-----------------. No interveno e legitimidade internacional. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2010
-----------------. Os fundamentos do Direito Internacional Contemporneio: da Coexistncia aos Valores
Compartilhados. V Anurio Brasileiro de Direito Internacional, n. 9, v. 2, 2010.
KINGSBURY, B. (2003) The international legal order. IILJ Working Papers, Disponvel em http://
www.iilj.org/papers/2003/2003.1%20Kingsbury.pdf. Acessado em 10/10/2005, 2003
Volume2_CS4.indb 114
6/16/11 4:11 PM
115
KISS, A. C. La notion de patrimoine commun de lhumanit. Recueil de Cours, v. II, tomo 175, p.
98-256, 1982
LAFER, C. A DUDH (1948). MAGNOLI, Demtrio (org). Histria da paz: os tratados que desenharam
o planeta. So Paulo: Contexto, 2008. p. 297-329
------------. A Reconstruo dos Direitos Humanos - Um Dilogo com o Pensamento de Hannah Arendt.
3. ed. So Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1999.
-------------. A ONU e os direitos humanos. Estudos Avanados, v. 9. n. 25, Setembro-Dezembro 1995,
p. 169-185.
MAGNOLI, D. Congresso de Viena (1814-1815). In: MAGNOLI, D. (org). Histria da paz: os tratados
que desenharam o planeta. So Paulo: Contexto, 2008. p. 93-121.
MBAYE, K.. Le droit au dveloppement en droit international. In: MAZARCKZYK, J. (ed.). Essays
in international law in hounor of Judge Manfred Lachs. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984,
p. 163-178.
----------------.. Le droit au dveloppement. In: DUPUY, R.-J. (ed.). The right to development at the
international level. Workshop, The Hague, 1979. The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, p.
72-93.
MNDES, Cndido (dir.). El mito del desarrollo. Barcelona: Editorial Kairs, 1980.
MOISS, C. P. Direitos humanos e desenvolvimento: a contribuio das Naes Unidas. In: AMARAL
JUNIOR., A.; MOISS, C. P. (orgs.). O cinqentenrio da Declarao Universal dos Direitos do
Homem, So Paulo: Editora da USP, 1999, p. 179-198.
OLIVEIRA S.M. Direito ao desenvolvimento: teorias e estratgias de implementao. Tese de
doutorado apresentada Faculdade de Direito da USP, 2006. p. 48-51.
----------------------. Barreiras No Tarifrias no Comrcio Internacional e direito ao desenvolvimento.
Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2005.
-----------------------. Desenvolvimento sustentvel na perspectiva da implementao dos direitos
humanos (1986-1992). In: ALMEIDA, Guilherme de A.; MOISS, Cludia P. (coords.). Direito
internacional dos direitos humanos: instrumentos bsicos. So Paulo: Atlas, 2002, p. 87-112.
ORFORD, A. Globalization and the right to development. In: ALSTON, P. (ed.). Peoples rights.
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 146-147.
PREZ DE CULLAR, J. (org.). Nossa diversidade criadora: relatrio da Comisso Mundial de
Cultura de Desenvolvimento. So Paulo: Papirus; Braslia: UNESCO, 1997.
PETERSMANN, E-U.. Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century, The need
to clarify their interrelationships. Journal of International Economic Law, v. 4, n. 1, March 2001, p.
3-39.
PIOVESAN, F. Direitos Humanos e o direito constitucional internacional. 12. ed. revista e atualizada.
So Paulo: Saraiva, 2011.
------------------. Direitos humanos e justia internacional. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2006.
ROMANO, R. Paz da Westflia (1648). In: MAGNOLI, D. (org). Histria da paz: os tratados que
desenharam o planeta. So Paulo: Contexto, 2008. p. 69-91.
ROSAS, A. The right to development. In: EIDE, A.; KRAUSE, C.; ROSAS, A.. Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, a Textbook. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 247-255.
ROSENAU, James N. Governana, ordem e transformao na poltica mundial. In: CZEMPIEL, ErnstOtto; ROSENAU, James N. (orgs.). Governana sem governo: ordem e transformao na politica
mundial. Braslia: Editora Universidade de Braslia; So Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 2000. p.
11-46.
SCHAPIRO, M.G. Repensando a relao entre Estado, Direito e Desenvolvimento: os limites do
paradigma rule of law e a relevncia das alternativas institucionais. Revista Direito GV 11, v. 6, n. 1,
jan-jun 2010. p.213- 252.
SENGUPTA, A. O direito ao desenvolvimento como um direito humano. Social Democracia Brasileira,
maro de 2002, p. 64-84.
SHELTON, D. A Response to Donnelly and Alston. California Western International Law Journal, v.
15, summer 1985, n. 3, p. 526-527
Volume2_CS4.indb 115
6/16/11 4:11 PM
116
SIDEL, V. W. The right to a just and peaceful social and international order. Health and Human Rights,
v. 3, n. 2, 1998. p. 110-125
SIMPSON. G. Duelling Agendas: International Relations and International Law (Again). Journal of
International Law and International Relations, v. 1, issues 1-2, December 2005, p. 61-74.
SOARES, G. F. S. A proteo internacional do meio ambiente. Barueri, SP: Manole, 2003
---------------------------. Direito internacional do meio ambiente: emergncia, obrigaes e
responsabilidades. So Paulo: Atlas, 2001.
VIRALLY, M. Sobre el presunto carcter primitivo del derecho internacional. In: VIRALLY, M.
El devenir del derecho internacional: Ensayos escritos al correr de los aos. Mxico, D.F.: Fondo de
Cultura Econmica, 1997, p. 104-116.
WITKOWSKA, M.M.K. Development ideology in international law. In: CHOWDHURY, Shubrata R.
et al. (eds.). The right to development in international law. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1992.p. 40-62.
-------------------------------. The UN Declaration on the Right to Development in the light of its travaux
preparatoires. In: DENTERS, E. et al. (eds.). International law and development. Dordrecht: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1988, p. 381-388, p. 381.
ZALMAI, H. Le droit au dveloppement: fondements et sources. In: DUPUY, R.J. (ed.). The right
to development at the international level. Workshop, The Hague, 1979. The Netherlands: Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1980, p. 22-47.
Volume2_CS4.indb 116
6/16/11 4:11 PM
117
Introduo
O presente artigo objetiva apresentar aos leitores, sobretudo queles que estudam e
se interessam pela temtica da proteo internacional dos direitos humanos no mbito
da Organizao das Naes Unidas (ONU), o Comit Consultivo do Conselho de
Direitos Humanos (Comit Consultivo)1, rgo do Conselho de Direitos Humanos
(ConDH) da ONU.
Para tanto, o texto ser dividido em trs partes:
i) a primeira delas trar uma abordagem histrica a respeito das razes
de criao do Comit Consultivo no seio do ConDH da ONU, a partir
da anlise de seus mais relevantes documentos constitutivos, bem como
daqueles que so frutos de suas j realizadas sesses;
ii) adiante, a segunda parte cuidar de questes institucionais de carter
formal do rgo, tais como sua sede, forma de composio e de
organizao e, finalmente;
iii) a terceira parte estudar as competncias do Comit Consultivo e suas
principais normas de funcionamento.
1. Histrico e Institucionalizao do Comit Consultivo
A proteo e salvaguarda dos direitos humanos encontra-se, na atualidade, tutelada
internacionalmente sob duas perspectivas:
(i) uma de carter universal e
(ii) outra de amplitude regional, edificada a partir da existncia de trs
diferentes e autnomos sistemas regionais de proteo aos direitos
humanos.
1 1 Mestre em Direito Pblico com nfase em Direito Internacional pela PUC Minas; Especialista em Direito Internacional pelas
Faculdades Milton Campos; Bacharel em Direito pela UFMG; Bacharel em Histria pela UFMG; Professora e membro da Coordenao
do Curso de Graduao em Direito do Centro Universitrio UNA; Professora e ex-Coordenadora do Programa de Ps-Graduao em
Direito Internacional das Faculdades Milton Campos/CEDIN; Pesquisadora do Programa de Capacitao em Direitos Humanos da Misso
Diplomtica do Brasil junto Organizao das Naes Unidas em Genebra, Sua (DELBRASGEN/ONU 2009); Pesquisadora do Centro
de Direito Internacional (CEDIN); Membro do Grupo de Anlise e Preveno de Conflitos Internacionais (GAPCon), do Centro Jurdico
Brasileiro (CJB) e do Instituto de Reintegrao do Refugiado no Brasil (ADUS). Human Rights Council Advisory Committee ou mesmo
Advisory Committee a nomenclatura oficial do rgo, em Lngua Inglesa, conforme informado no website do ConDH e, por isso, presente
e utilizada em seus documentos oficiais de trabalho, respeitadas e tambm utilizadas as verses nas demais cinco lnguas oficiais da ONU,
a saber: rabe, Chins, Francs, Russo e Espanhol. Para maiores informaes, visitar: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.
aspx e http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/languages.shtml. Acesso em: 01 de abril de 2011.
Volume2_CS4.indb 117
6/16/11 4:11 PM
118
Volume2_CS4.indb 118
6/16/11 4:11 PM
119
Volume2_CS4.indb 119
6/16/11 4:11 PM
120
Volume2_CS4.indb 120
6/16/11 4:11 PM
121
24 Estima-se que o governo da Espanha tenha arcado com, aproximadamente, 40% dos custos da obra, o equivalente a 8 milhes de euros.
O Partido Popular (PP) do pas revoltou-se com as cifras e, poca, Gonzalo Robles, Deputado conservador do Partido, disse imprensa
que o dinheiro deveria ter sido investido em projetos ligados ao combate pobreza ou melhoria dos servios de sade em pases
subdesenvolvidos.
25 Para maiores informaes, visitar http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/mundo/ult94u468928.shtml. Acesso em: 04 de abril de 2011.
26 Artigo 65 da Resoluo 5/1 do ConDH, traduo livre: O Comit Consultivo do Conselho de Direitos Humanos (a partir de agora
intitulado Comit Consultivo), composto por 18 especialistas que trabalharo a partir de suas capacidades pessoais....
27 A imparcialidade e a independncia do membro do Comit Consultivo so requisitos de tamanha relevncia para o ConDH que, alm de
serem sido positivadas no artigo 67, (c), da Resoluo 5/1, mereceram destaque tambm nos dizeres do artigo subseqente, artigo 68,
que expressamente ressalvou que: Individuals holding decision-making positions in Government or in any other organization or entity
which might give rise to a conflict of interest with the responsibilities inherent in the mandate shall be excluded. Elected members of the
Committee will act in their personal capacity.
28 Artigo 74 Resoluo 5/1 do ConDH.
29 Deciso de 27 de setembro de 2007 que, em seu ttulo II, dedicou-se a melhor desenvolver os technical and objective requirements for
eligible candidates for mandate holders.
Volume2_CS4.indb 121
6/16/11 4:11 PM
122
30 Como exemplo, atualmente so alguns dos membros do Comit Consultivo do ConDH o Sr. Miguel dEscoto Brockmann (Nicargua), a
Sra. Chung Chinsung (Repblica da Coria), o Sr. Alfred Ntunduguru Karokora (Uganda), o Sr. Wolfgang Stefan Heinz (Alemanha) e o
Sr. Latif Hseynov (Azerbaijo).
31 Artigo 66 da Resoluo 5/1 do ConDH, traduo livre: Todos os Estados-Membros das Naes Unidas podero propor ou endossar
candidatos de suas respectivas regies.
32 Artigo 71 da Resoluo 5/1 do ConDH.
33 Consultar notas 26 e 27 que detalham quais as trs caractersticas mnimas desejveis a um membro do Comit, a saber: i) competncia e
experincia reconhecidas na rea dos Direitos Humanos; b) idoneidade moral e tica e; c) independncia e imparcialidade.
34 Artigo 70 da Resoluo 5/1 do ConDH.
35 A primeira eleio para o Comit Consultivo do ConDH ocorreu em 26 de Maro de 2008, durante a 7 sesso do Conselho. A ltima
eleio ocorreu recentemente, em 23 de Maro de 2011, durante a 16 sesso do Conselho, mediante adoo do item 1 da Agenda do
Conselho, documento A/HRC/16/19. Foram eleitos sete novos membros para o Comit, sendo estes: Sr. Dheerujall Baramlall Seetulsingh,
Sr. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Sr. Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Sra. Purificacion Quisumbing, Sr. Latif Huseynov, Sra. Anantonia Reyes Prado e Sra.
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes.
36 Consultar nota 28.
37 Artigo 74 da Resoluo 5/1 do ConDH.
Volume2_CS4.indb 122
6/16/11 4:11 PM
123
Volume2_CS4.indb 123
6/16/11 4:11 PM
124
Volume2_CS4.indb 124
6/16/11 4:11 PM
125
Volume2_CS4.indb 125
6/16/11 4:11 PM
126
Volume2_CS4.indb 126
6/16/11 4:11 PM
127
o lugar da guerra aberta entre pases soberanos que o sistema das Naes Unidas
fora concebido para conter. Como resultado, cada vez mais a segurana coletiva se
v ameaada no por guerras clssicas entre exrcitos profissionais, mas por crises
humanitrias de grande escala envolvendo civis cujos direitos humanos fundamentais
so grosseiramente ignorados.
O conceito de Responsabilidade para Proteger deriva de um sentido de obrigao
moral em evitar que tais violaes massivas voltem a repetir-se no futuro. Esse conceito
modelou-se no sentido, primeiro formulada nos anos 70, de uma obrigao de intervir
em resposta passividade operacional e paralisia moral da comunidade internacional
frente a sucessivas catstrofes humanitrias, como aquela que se abateu sobre a Biafra2. A
natureza autoritria da maioria dos regimes em que se davam essas calamidades parecia
justificar o que seria dever inquestionvel da comunidade internacional intervir para
conter as violaes macias de direitos humanos resultantes desses conflitos intestinos.
Estaria justificada a violao da soberania nacional desses pases uma vez que no eram
democracias segundo os padres clssicos ocidentais. Por conseguinte, as violaes
seriam mais uma prova de que esses regimes no estavam aptos a governar. Variante
abrandada dessa tese, intitulado o direito de intervir, foi empalmada posteriormente
em resposta aos excessos das guerras civis na Somlia e no Kosovo.
Assim, a natureza cambiante dos conflitos no mundo contemporneo minava o
axioma clssico de que a soberania nacional seria a ncora definitiva da estabilidade
da ordem internacional. Na verdade, muitos comeavam a enxergar na defesa
incondicional da intangibilidade da soberania estatal a raiz de muitos da impunidade
dos mais srios crimes. No surpreende, portanto, que a relativizao dos princpios
de no-interveno e de autonomia estatal absoluta seja hoje defendida de forma
entusistica em muitos pases ocidentais como a melhor maneira de coibir crises
humanitrias.
No entanto, essa formulao do conceito de Responsabilidade para Proteger vista
com cautela, para no dizer desconfiana por outros segmentos. Equiparar paz global
ou segurana coletiva com a ao internacional para reprimir violaes de direitos
humanos no uma equao universalmente aceita. Para pases com recordaes de
um passado colonial recente e que ainda lutam para consolidar uma independncia
e sentido de auto-estima pleno, preocupa o enorme desequilbrio de poder entre
os pases normalmente proponentes do direito de interveno e aqueles que so
candidatos bvios a sofr-la3. Esse questionamento reforado pela constatao
de que os valores, perspectivas e objetivos normalmente associados ao conceito de
Responsabilidade para Proteger so marcadamente eurocntricos4. Teme-se que, no
2 A Guerra da Biafra ilustra tragicamente o impacto das foras centrfugas associadas globalizao sobre Estados nacionais frgeis. A
competio entre essa provncia nigeriana e o governo central em Lagos pelos rendimentos do petrleo produzido naquela provncia
desencadeio guerra civil que custou centenas de milhares de vidas.
3 Para afastar tais temores, o Secretrio Geral da ONU, em seu relatrio de 2009, recordou que abusos massivos, como os ocorridos em
Ruanda e Camboja, podem ocorrer em qualquer lugar, independente do nvel relativo de desenvolvimento econmico e social, como
sugere o caso de Srebrenica, na antiga Yugoslvia.
4 Declaraes como aquela do Ministro das Relaes Exteriores da Frana, em 2008, no sentido de que era necessrio passar por cima do
Governo de Mianmar para garantir assistncia populao, s fazem reforar essas preocupaes.
Volume2_CS4.indb 127
6/16/11 4:11 PM
128
Volume2_CS4.indb 128
6/16/11 4:11 PM
129
Volume2_CS4.indb 129
6/16/11 4:11 PM
130
Volume2_CS4.indb 130
6/16/11 4:11 PM
131
Volume2_CS4.indb 131
6/16/11 4:11 PM
132
11 Isso sublinhado pelo fato de que a Unio Africana estabeleceu como princpio ptreo a noo de no-indiferena em contraste com o
conceito de no-interferncia que est consagrado na sua antecessora, a Organizao de Unidade Africana.
Volume2_CS4.indb 132
6/16/11 4:11 PM
133
Volume2_CS4.indb 133
6/16/11 4:11 PM
134
Volume2_CS4.indb 134
6/16/11 4:11 PM
135
Volume2_CS4.indb 135
6/16/11 4:11 PM
136
Volume2_CS4.indb 136
6/16/11 4:11 PM
137
humanos. Ao longo da luta de 20 anos para pr fim ao regime militar22 e nos anos
subseqentes, o tema da proteo aos direitos humanos foi sempre visto sob a tima
da luta histrica da sociedade civil para fazer valer prticas e consolidar instituies
democrticas frente a tendncias e tentaes autoritrias longamente incrustadas na
psique brasileira.
O fato de ao longo do regime militar e mesmo hoje o pas ser alvo de crticas
de fora por conta de abusos aos direitos humanos gerava e gera reaes domsticas
desencontradas. Crculos intelectuais de esquerda geralmente consideravam essas
crticas como instrumento vlido de presso para constranger o pas a cumprir com
seus compromissos sob a Declarao de 1948. Em contraste, setores conservadores
e sentimentos populares e nacionalistas viam, no mais das vezes, essa tentativa de
constrangimento como ingerncia estrangeira indevida e potencialmente insidiosa
nos assuntos domsticos do pas. Para alguns, essa linha de ao seria no mnimo
contraproducente, haja vista a questionvel eficcia da ttica agressiva em matria
de direitos humanos do Governo Carter no final da dcada de 70. Reaes da ala
mais autoritria dos crculos castrenses brasileiros contra a presso norte-americana
tornavam ainda mais difcil para o Presidente Geisel levar adiante a poltica de gradual
descompresso poltica no mesmo perodo23.
O dilema entre, de um lado, os direitos humanos como uma realizao soberana de
uma sociedade em processo de amadurecimento e, de outro, como um imperativo tico
merecedor de acolhimento e estmulo universais (pela coero, se necessrio) veio
tona quando, em 1998, o Brasil passou a aceitar a jurisdio obrigatria da Corte InterAmericana de Direitos Humanos. Essa deciso histrica se seguiu incorporao pelo
regime jurdico domstico de toda a legislao internacional sobre direitos humanos.
Entendeu-se que as decises da Comisso Inter-Americana no serviriam de pretexto
para presses de fora em favor de reformas internas, mas que estimulariam e apoiariam
a implementao de compromissos amadurecidos nacionalmente, mas carentes de
eficcia em uma federao to descentralizada como o Brasil. As decises da Comisso
ajudariam a constranger autoridades locais recalcitrantes a cumprir a legislao
vigente, ao mesmo tempo em que dariam apoio aos seus defensores. Em contraste
com outros pases latino-americanos, o nvel relativamente pequeno de abusos aos
direitos humanos ao longo do regime militar explica que essa permanea uma questo
controversa entre os brasileiros24. Com a restaurao da democracia, temas como o
crescimento da criminalidade passaram a ser vistos pelas elites progressistas como
decorrncia de polticas econmicas socialmente regressivas sob o governo militar.
Trata-se, na verdade, de reao contra os desmandos perpetrados no perodo autoritrio
22 Se bem o Congresso Nacional se reuniu quase ininterruptamente ao longo do perodo, uma junta militar ou general nomeada por uma junta
comandou a Presidncia de 1964-1985.
23 Em resposta ameaa norte-americana de no renovar o acordo bilateral de cooperao militar de 1952, o Governo brasileiro jogou para
a platia nacionalista e denunciou imediata e unilateralmente o referido acordo.
24 Durante a campanha eleitoral de 2010, pela primeira vez a agenda de poltica externa e, mais especificamente, de direitos humanos tornouse um tema de intenso debate pblico. Discutiu-se se os direitos humanos deveriam ser item central da agenda bilateral com pases com
m reputao no tema, como Cuba, Venezuela e Ir. A poltica oficial tem historicamente sido no sentido de tratar o tema pelos canais
multilaterais apropriados.
Volume2_CS4.indb 137
6/16/11 4:11 PM
138
25 No deixa, portanto, de ser preocupante ouvir referncias vagas da parte do aparato de segurana dos EUA sobre o risco de o Mxico
torna-se um estado falido.
Volume2_CS4.indb 138
6/16/11 4:11 PM
139
do agora, nas palavras de Kofi Annan, e medidas preventivas que evitem o mal maior.
Se aceitarmos que a globalizao torna a Responsabilidade para Proteger em um
imperativo moral, que dizer das demais implicaes de uma maior interdependncia?
As crises ambiental, alimentar e energtica que grassam mundo afora, por exemplo,
representam ameaa to intensa segurana global quanto violaes de direitos
humanos. Estaremos dispostos a tomar medidas intervencionistas igualmente drsticas
para cont-las? At o momento, isto no tem sido o caso. Assim, uma ampla e coerente
reviso da prtica de governana global faz-se necessria se quisermos, em nome do
interesse coletivo, que a soberania nacional definitivamente ceda lugar aos princpios
de extraterritorialidade e seu corolrio, o universalismo tico26.
O Brasil considera que a noo de no-indiferena bem encapsula a necessidade
de responsabilidade coletiva e vontade poltica global para lidar com desastres e
crises humanitrias, causados no mais das vezes por pobreza, doenas e outros males
evitveis por falta de ao internacional coordenada. Eleva-se, assim, a outro patamar
a noo de ao preventiva, ao insistir no imperativo de reformar-se a estrutura
multilateral de tomada de decises crticas da agenda global27.
Por essa razo, o Brasil apia vigorosamente a reforma das Naes Unidas e,
em particular, de seu Conselho de Segurana. No que respeita os seus mtodos de
trabalho, o Brasil subscreve propostas para que os membros permanentes aceitem
abrir mo do emprego do veto em casos de genocdio, crimes de guerra, crimes contra
a humanidade e limpeza tnica, assim como em casos de embargos de armas quando
envolvam seus prprios interesses comerciais.
Ainda mais importante, o Brasil cr que um Conselho mais representativo das
Naes Unidas como um todo permitir um foco mais efetivo em medidas preventivas
e menos em operaes de paz ps-conflito. Pases em desenvolvimento nas adjacncias
dos principais pontos de conflito globais muito provavelmente apoiaro aes que
ajudem a antecipar tenses junto a suas fronteiras. Essas incluem misses de bons
ofcios, apoio ao Tribunal Penal Internacional e outros tribunais penais internacionais, e
o fortalecimento da Comisso da Construo da Paz. Ser a melhor forma de incorporar
efetivamente o conceito da Responsabilidade para Proteger agenda do Conselho.
O tema dos mtodos de trabalho do Conselho e, portanto, de sua credibilidade - veio
tona de forma dramtica por ocasio das deliberaes, em maio de 2010, em torno da
imposio de uma quarta rodada de sanes contra o Ir por violar clusulas do Tratado
de No-Proliferao. O Brasil juntou-se Turquia no voto contrrio a novas sanes, por
entender que tal medida minaria o acordo que os dois pases haviam negociado com o Ir
sobre suas pendncias junto Agncia Internacional de Energia Atmica (AIEA). Pesou
26 Falando na abertura da LIV Assembleia Geral das Naes Unidas, em setembro de 1999, Kofi Annan perguntou: No corremos o risco
de tais intervenes minaram o sistema coletivo, imperfeito que , mas resistente, criado na sequncia da Segunda Guerra Mundial, e de
deitar precedentes perigosos para futuras intervenes sem um claro critrio para decidir quem poder invocar tais precedentes e em que
circunstncias?...Da mesma forma como aprendemos que o mundo no pode ignorar violaes crassas e macias de direitos humanos,
tambm aprendemos que intervenes devem assentar-se em princpios legtimos e universais para que possam merecer o apoio dos povos
do mundo(traduo do autor).
27 Isto no significa ignorar o vigoroso debate pblico no Brasil sobre os limites da no-indiferena. A poltica no-assertiva do Governo
Lula em matria de direitos humanos em Cuba e no Ir, em particular, tem sendo objeto de crescente escrutnio.
Volume2_CS4.indb 139
6/16/11 4:11 PM
140
nessa posio a estreita vinculao entre o fracasso das sanes impostas pelo Conselho
ao Iraque ainda nos anos 90 e a invaso norte-americana de 2003. O notvel sacrifcio
imposto ao povo iraquiano no foi capaz de dobrar Saddam Hussein, mas foi suficiente
para obrigar os Estados Unidos a enxergar na invaso do pas sua nica opo, mesmo
sem endosso pelo Conselho. As alternativas eram reforar ainda mais as sanes e o
sofrimento j enorme de uma populao inocente ou suspender de forma ignomnia as
sanes. Em nome da luta contra o jihadismo global, os invasores tambm passaram
batido pelo desrespeito grosseiro ao direito internacional, sem que se houvesse qualquer
perspectiva de compensao pelos estragos decorrentes ou preocupao em justificar
legalmente a interveno militar28. O episdio do Kosovo, em 1999 quando a paralisia
do Conselho de Segurana na esteira das atrocidades srvias levou interveno da OTAN
tambm vai ao mago da carncia de credibilidade do processo de tomada de deciso
em questes de segurana coletiva. No houve consenso mesmo entre os aliados quanto
s condies para uma ao legtima nos Blcs29. No surpreende que a reconciliao
ps-conflito no Kosovo tenha se frustrado, o que ajuda a explicar a declarao unilateral
de independncia kosovar em franco desrespeito ao direito internacional dos tratados e em
prejuzo do pilar central da paz internacional: regras multilaterais30.
No-indiferena moda brasileira
Nada disso significa que o imperativo da Responsabilidade para Proteger ressoe
com menos vigor na Amrica Latina, especialmente junto queles pases que
experimentaram violaes macias de direitos humanos. Ajuda, no entanto, a explicar
porque, de um ponto de vista brasileiro, a Responsabilidade para Proteger s faz sentido
num contexto mais amplo. O desafio est em lidar com traumas sociais e frustraes
econmicas que so frequentemente terreno frtil para violaes de direitos humanos
e, em ltima anlise, para crises humanitrias.
O ponto de partida a crena por certo na Amrica Latina - de que a convivncia
democrtica fundamentalmente ameaada por instituies frgeis, incapazes
de responder ao desafio de condies inadequadas para o crescimento econmico
e o desenvolvimento social. Essas vulnerabilidades muitas vezes se desdobram
regionalmente em rivalidades nacionalistas oriundas de disputas territoriais e
ideolgicas que se perdem na histria. Essas vulnerabilidades ajudam a explicar porque
a Amrica do Sul, em particular, um continente com amplas reservas energticas,
mas onde apages continuam freqentes; que dispe da maior biodiversidade do
planeta, mas onde o meio ambiente est sob permanente ameaa; um celeiro mundial,
28 Vale notar que as sanes foram aplicadas sob o pretexto de reduzir o risco de guerra. No entanto, a probabilidade de que essa nova rodada
de sanes dificilmente convencer assim como nas rodadas anteriores o Ir a recuar j motivou clamores para que os EUA recorram
ao militar frente inevitabilidade de que o regime iraniano seguir com seu programa de enriquecimento nuclear.
29 A misso das Naes Unidas no Kosovo assumiu funes na sequncia de uma campanha militar que carecia de autorizao do Conselho
de Segurana. Este incio infeliz foi agravado pela sensao de que nem todas as alternativas para prevenir uma ao blica haviam
sido exauridas. Suspeita-se que Washington tudo fez para tornar politicamente impossvel Srvia propor uma acomodao prvia aos
bombardeios. A legitimidade da interveno foi minada ainda mais pelo recurso pelas foras norte-americanas a bombardeios de altitude
para resguardar seus pilotos mesmo ao risco de causar severos danos colaterais contra civis inocentes.
30 De uma perspectiva brasileira, o atual impasse particularmente infeliz. O Kosovo decidiu sustentar o princpio da auto-determinao do
povo kosovar custa do princpio igualmente fundamental da intangibilidade das fronteiras nacionais de que o Brasil tem dez.
Volume2_CS4.indb 140
6/16/11 4:11 PM
141
mas onde crianas passam fome; e onde a riqueza mineral pouco fez para erradicar os
vastos bolses de pobreza.
A Unio de Naes Sul-Americanas (UNASUL) 31, constituda em 2007, descortina
viso renovada da integrao regional voltada para essas fragilidades. D direo ao
compromisso de forjar mecanismos eficazes para lidar com os mltiplos desafios
que deveriam unir a regio, mas muitas vezes o dividem. Representa um ambicioso
arcabouo institucional para estimular uma melhor compreenso dos interesses
compartidos e os benefcios potenciais de enfrentar de forma cooperativa problemas
comuns. Ambiciona traduzir em compromissos executveis o apego histrico da regio
aos princpios basilares de no-ingerncia e de soluo pacfica de controvrsias. Ao
invs de esconder-se por detrs de ameaas imaginadas e animosidades pessoais, os
pases objetivam tomar ativamente as rdeas de seus desafios compartilhados32. Caso
contrrio, atores externos continuaro a sentir-se obrigados ou tentados a ocupar o vazio
poltico e de segurana resultante da incapacidade coletiva de enfrentar problemas
compartilhados. A deciso da UNASUL de instituir mecanismos regionais em matria
de defesa, drogas e sade um passo decisivo nessa direo. Esforos colaborativos em
matria de aviso prvio e soluo de conflitos e, depois, em reconstruo ps-conflito
dentro de uma moldura regional ajudaro a gerar maior coerncia e aceitao para a
Responsabilidade para Proteger em matria diplomtica, econmica e de defesa.
A urgncia de tomar as rdeas dos problemas da regio torna-se bvia em vista
da persistncia da guerrilha colombiana e de seu impacto desestabilizador para todo o
continente 33. A cpula da UNASUL, em agosto de 2009, debruou-se sobre essa e outras
questes de segurana regional, tais como aquisio de armamentos, bases militares
norte-americanas na Colmbia e alianas militares extra-regionais. Trata-se de sinal
alvissareiro de que a regio comea finalmente a lidar abertamente com as dificuldades
derivadas de rivalidades e suspeies latentes. A deciso dos lderes regionais de discutir
em pblico as origens e implicaes regionais desse conflito sinal de que se est dando
uma chance para a democracia multilateral funcionar no continente. A mera sugesto
de que se constitusse na Amrica Latina uma unidade militar capaz de intervir em
situaes emergenciais desencadearia tenses polticas e castrenses preocupantes em
regio onde o fervor nacionalista e anti-colonialista permanece elevado.
O Brasil tem plena conscincia de seu papel decisivo na consecuo dessa
transformao. O pas jamais prosperar em paz nem se projetar plenamente em
31 A proposta foi lanada durante a primeira Cpula de Chefes de Estado Sul-Americanos, em Braslia, em 2000, inicialmente sob o ttulo de
Comunidade Sul-Americana de Naes.
32 Conceito equivalente foi primeiramente lanado pela Nova Parceria para o Desenvolvimento da frica (NEPAD), estabelecido no final
dos anos 90 como parte de um modelo de desenvolvimento socioeconmico integrado para o continente. Estabelece um mecanismo de
automonitoramento (peer review) sobre prticas democrticas nos pases membros que mais ambicioso do que a clusula democrtica
instituda na OEA e no MERCOSUL.
33 A tradicional nfase de Bogot em solues militares para a insurgncia a despeito de tentativas esparsas de dilogo refletia o temor
existencial de ingerncia externa nos assuntos domsticos. Apelos em favor de uma soluo negociada com mediao internacional tm
sido regularmente descartados por medo de manipulao por parte de rivais polticos domsticos e adversrios ideolgicos no exterior.
Como resultado, nenhum esforo de monta foi feito para lidar objetivamente com o desborde da insurgncia para os pases vizinhos em
busca de santurios. Questes de soberania nacional e controvrsias ideolgicas com pases vizinhos terminaram por traduzir-se em um
clima pr-blico na sequncia da ao punitiva colombiana em territrio equatoriano no incio de 2008.
Volume2_CS4.indb 141
6/16/11 4:11 PM
142
34 A poltica externa do Presidente Lula tem sido taxada de excessivamente generosa com os vizinhos sul-americanos. Criticam a tolerncia
em termos polticos, assim como comercial, em funo dos crditos concessionais para projetos de infra-estrutura naqueles pases.
35 EMBRAPA.
36 As ONGs brasileiras estabelecem um paralelo entre as campanhas de desarmamento no Rio de Janeiro e projetos de reintegrao no
Haiti e enfatizam a importncia de afinidade cultural para expandir as oportunidades para promover a paz sustentvel. Similarmente, a
experincia colombiana na reintegrao de ex-combatentes estudada no Brasil.
Volume2_CS4.indb 142
6/16/11 4:11 PM
143
37 O Brasil ressaltou esta questo por ocasio do debate na Assembleia Geral das Naes Unidas em 2009: A Responsabilidade para
Proteger no um princpio novo, muito menos um conceito legal desconhecido. , na verdade, um chamamento poderoso para que todos
os Estados cumpram as obrigaes jurdicas j consagradas na Carta, nas convenes de direitos humanos e no direito humanitrio
internacional e outros instrumentos.
Volume2_CS4.indb 143
6/16/11 4:11 PM
144
38 O Brasil tem estado na vanguarda de esforos para estimular pases desenvolvidos a cumprir seus compromissos. So exemplos, a
Conferncia de Monterrey (assistncia ao desenvolvimento), a Rodada de Doha da Organizao Mundial do Comrcio (eliminao de
barreiras comerciais s exportaes agrcolas de pases em desenvolvimento), o Tratado de Quioto (distribuio equitativa dos custos
de adaptao mudana climtica) e as Metas de Desenvolvimento do Milnio (adoo de mecanismos inovadores para financiar o
desenvolvimento).
Volume2_CS4.indb 144
6/16/11 4:11 PM
145
observar distncia uma revolta popular que ameaa degenerar em uma guerra civil
ou intervir em nome de conter uma verdadeira crise humanitria e de refugiados.
Ao contrrio da maioria dos casos mencionados acima, a crise que ameaa consumir
a Lbia teve como ponto de partida uma revoluo popular contra um autocrata sem
escrpulos. Em que pese a crise humanitria e a ameaa de uma prolongada guerra civil,
justificar-se-ia uma interveno externa, em nome da Responsabilidade para Proteger?
H que pesar, em primeiro lugar, o fato de que qualquer interveno mesmo
na sua verso mais branda, isto , a imposio de uma zona de excluso area
geraria fortes protestos em pas com uma longa histria de resistncia anti-colonial,
sem falar do bombardeio norte-americano de Trpoli, em 1984. Nesse sentido, o
sentido libertrio e espera-se democrtico desse movimento poderia facilmente
ser deturpado e descarrilado por manipulaes anti-imperialistas, que explorariam a
hipocrisia das potncias ocidentais, que at h pouco mantinham excelentes relaes
econmicas e diplomticas o com regime lbio. Mesmo a modalidade mais branda de
interveno armada, a imposio de uma zona de excluso area exigiria neutralizar
militarmente a Fora Area lbia.
Em segundo lugar, uma interveno armada poderia produzir uma carnificina
de propores muito superiores aos abusos j identificados, ainda mais quando se
considera que Gadafi j anunciou a disposio crvel ou no de anistiar os rebeldes
que depuserem as armas prontamente.
Em terceiro lugar, dificilmente se conseguir um consenso no Conselho de
Segurana para uma interveno armada, o que implicaria ao margem do consenso
multilateral. de se esperar que as lies do passado, mais recentemente da invaso
noautorizada do Iraque, tenham sido aprendidas. Ironicamente, o Iraque, que os
Estados Unidos pretenderam resgatar da tirania de Saddam Hussein, tambm vem
sendo varrido pela onda democrtica que se alastra pelo Oriente Mdio. raiz
dessa instabilidade est a precria legitimidade de um regime imposto de fora e sem o
aval da comunidade internacional.
Em compensao, a comunidade internacional com o apoio da Liga rabe e
da Unio Africana - j logrou consenso para adotar um conjunto de medidas que
pem presso sobre o regime lbio. Essas incluem desde o embargo venda de armas
ao regime, restries de viagem e de operaes financeiras s autoridades lbias, at
a investigao pelo Tribunal Penal Internacional da represso desproporcional aos
opositores do regime e a expulso do pas do Conselho de Direitos Humanos.
por demais cedo para saber o impacto dessas medidas. Certo que ficou provada
a falncia da estratgia das potncias ocidentais de aliar-se com regimes autoritrios na
expectativa de resguardar seus interesses estratgicos no Oriente Mdio. Claramente,
chegada a hora de apostar na vontade do mundo rabe de construir seu prprio
modelo de desenvolvimento soberano. A comunidade internacional tem o dever de
colaborar nesse esforo. nesse sentido que a Responsabilidade para Proteger tem
um papel decisivo no futuro de regio crucial para a paz e segurana internacional.
Volume2_CS4.indb 145
6/16/11 4:11 PM
146
Referncia
AMORIM, Celso. A ONU aos 60, Poltica Externa, So Paulo, v. 14, n. 2, p. 17-24, set-out-nov 2005.
ANNAN, Kofi. The two concepts of sovereignty. The Economist, London, v. 352, n. 8137, 18 Sept.
1999, p. 49.
__________. We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21st. century. New York: United
Nations, 2000.
__________. In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. New York:
United Nations, 2005.
ARBOUR, Louise. Preventing mass atrocities. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007.
AREND, Anthony Clark; BECK, Robert J.. International law and the use of force. London: Routledge,
1993.
BANNON, Alicia L.. The responsibility to protect: the U.N. World Summit and the question of
unilateralism. The Yale Law Journal, v. 115, p. 1157-1165, March 2006.
BETTATI, Mario. Le droit dingrence: mutation de lordre international. Paris: Odile Jacob, 1996.
BETTATI, Mario; KOUCHNER, Bernard. Le devoir dingrence. Paris: Denol, 1987.
BHLKE, Marcelo. Integrao regional e autonomia do seu ordenamento jurdico. Curitiba: Juru,
2001.
BOUTROS-GHALI, Boutros. An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. New York: United Nations, 1992.
BROWNLIE, Ian. International law and the use of force by States. Oxford: Clarendon, 1963.
BULL, Hedley (Ed.). Intervention in world politics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.
__________. A follow-up: forcible humanitarian countermeasures and opinio necessitatis. The
European Journal of International Law. Firenze, v. 10, n. 4, p. 791-799, 1999.
CHAN, Steve; DRURY, A. Cooper (Ed.). Sanctions as economic statecraft: theory and practice. New
Yok: St. Martins, 2000.
INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO. The Kosovo Report: conflict,
international response, lessons learned. Oxford: Oxford University, 2000.
HUMAN SECURITY COMMISSION. Human security now: Commission on Human Security. New
York: Communications Development Incorporated, 2003.
COMPARATO, Fbio Konder. A afirmao histrica dos direitos humanos. 3. ed. rev. e ampl. So
Paulo: Saraiva, 2003.
CORTRIGHT, David; LOPEZ, George A. (Ed.). Economic sanctions: panacea or peace-building in a
post-Cold War world? Boulder: Westview, 1995.
__________. Smart sanctions: targeting economic statecraft. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
CORTRIGHT, David; LOPEZ, George A. Sanctions and the search for security: challenges to UN
action. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
__________. The sanctions decade: assessing UN strategies in the 1990s. Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
2000.
EVANS, Gareth. The responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all. Washington:
Brookings Institution, 2008.
FARER, Tom J.. A paradigm of legitimate intervention. In DAMROSCH, Lori Fisler (Ed.). Enforcing
restraint: collective intervention in internal conflicts. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.
p. 316-347.
FERNANDES, Jean Marcel. A promoo da paz pelo direito internacional humanitrio. Porto Alegre:
Sergio Antonio Fabris, 2006.
FONTOURA, Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse da. O Brasil e as operaes de manuteno da paz das
Naes Unidas. Braslia: FUNAG, 1999.
FRANCK, Thomas M.. Recourse to force: State action against threats and armed attacks. Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 2002.
GARCIA, Eugnio Vargas. O Brasil e a Liga das Naes (1919 1926). 2. ed. Porto Alegre: UFRGS,
2005.
Volume2_CS4.indb 146
6/16/11 4:11 PM
147
GLENNON, Michael J.. The new interventionism: the search for a just international law. Foreign
Affairs, v. 78, n. 3, p. 2-7, May-June 1999.
HAAR, Barend ter. Peace or human rights? The dilemma of humanitarian intervention. The Hague:
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2000.
HARGROVE, John Lawrence. The Nicaragua Judgment and the future of the law of force and selfdefense. American Journal of International Law, Washington, DC, v. 81, n. 1, p. 135-143, Jan. 1987.
HIGGINS, Rosalyn. Intervention and international law. In BULL, Hedley (Ed.). Intervention in world
politics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. p. 29-44.
__________. Problems and process: international law and how we use it. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994.
HOBSBAWN, Eric. Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism. London: Little, Brown, 2007.
HAMPSON, Fen Osler; AALL, Pamela (Ed.). Turbulent peace: the challenges of managing international
conflict. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001. p. 273-283.
__________. The problem of intervention. In BULL, Hedley (Ed.). Intervention in world politics.
Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. p. 7-28.
ICISS. The responsibility to protect: report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001.
__________. The responsibility to protect: research, bibliography, background. Ottawa: International
Development Research Center, 2001.
JENTLESON, Bruce W.. A responsibility to protect: the defining challenge for global community.
Ethnic conflict. Harvard International Review, Cambridge, v. 28, n. 4, winter, 2007.
KINACIOGLU, Mge. The principle of non-intervention at the United Nations: the Charter framework
and the legal debate. Perceptions - Journal of International Affairs, Ankara (Turkey), v. X, n. 2, p. 1539, Summer 2005.
KRATOCHWIL, Friedrich. Sovereignty as dominium: is there a right of humanitarian intervention? In
LYONS, Gene M.; MASTANDUNO, Michael. Beyond Westphalia? State sovereignty and international
intervention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1995. p. 21-42.
LEWANDOWSKI, Enrique Ricardo. Proteo dos direitos humanos na ordem interna e internacional.
Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1984.
LINDGREN ALVES, Jos Augusto. Os direitos humanos como tema global. So Paulo: Perspectiva,
1994.
LUCAS JR., George. From jus ad bellum to jus ad pacem: re-thinking just-war criteria for the use of
military force for humanitarian ends. In CHATTERJEE, Deen K; SCHEID, Don E. (Ed.). Ethics and
foreign intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2003. p. 72-96.
MALONE, David. Decision-making in the UN Security Council: the case of Haiti, 1990-1997. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1998.
HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE. A more secure world: our
shared responsibility. New York: United Nations, 2004.
OSULLIVAN, Meghan L.. Shrewd sanctions: statecraft and state sponsors of terrorism. Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003.
PAOLILLO, Felipe H.. Evolucin del principio del no uso de la fuerza. In CURSO DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL, 30, 2003, Rio de Janeiro. El derecho internacional y el mantenimiento de la paz
y seguridad internacionales. Washington, DC: OEA, 2004. p. 1-57.
PATRIOTA, Antonio de Aguiar. O Conselho de Segurana aps a Guerra do Golfo: a articulao de um
novo paradigma de segurana coletiva. Braslia: FUNAG, 1998.
PNUD. Human development report 1994: new dimensions of human security. Oxford: Oxford
University, 1994.
__________. Identifying the threats. In STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL FORUM, 4, 2004,
Stockholm. Preventing genocide: threats and responsibilities. Stockholm: Danagards, 2004. p. 83-86.
RAMOS, Andr de Carvalho. Processo internacional de direitos humanos: anlise dos sistemas de
apurao de violaes de direitos humanos e implementao das decises no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro:
Renovar, 2002.
Volume2_CS4.indb 147
6/16/11 4:11 PM
148
RUGGIE, John Gerard. The United Nations and the collective use of force: whither or whether? New
York: UNA/USA, 1996.
SARDENBERG, Ronaldo Mota. O Brasil na Presidncia do Conselho de Segurana das Naes
Unidas. In FONSECA JR., Gelson; CASTRO, Srgio Henrique Nabuco de. Temas de poltica externa
II. So Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1994. p. 135-145.
SCHEFFER, David J.. Toward a modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention. University of Toledo
Law Review, Toledo, v. 23, n. 2, p. 253-293, 1992.
SIMMA, Bruno. NATO, the UN and the use of force: legal aspects. European Journal of International
Law. Firenze, v. 10, n. 1, p. 1-22, 1999.
TRINDADE, Antnio Augusto Canado. A humanizao do direito internacional. Belo Horizonte: Del
Rey, 2006.
__________. A incorporao das normas internacionais de proteo dos direitos humanos no direito
brasileiro. 2. ed. San Jos: IIDH/CICV/ACNUR/ASDI, 1996.
__________. A proteo internacional dos direitos humanos: fundamentos jurdicos e documentos
bsicos. So Paulo: Saraiva, 1991.
__________. International law for humankind: towards a new jus gentium. General Course on Public
International Law at The Hague Academy of International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijjhoff, 2006.
VERWEY, Wil D.. Humanitarian intervention under international law. Netherlands International Law
Review, The Hague, v. 32, n. 3, p. 357-418, 1985.
WEISS, Thomas G. Humanitarian intervention. Cambridge: Polity, 2010.
__________. The humanitarian impulse. In MALONE, David M.. (Ed.). The UN Security Council:
from the Cold War to the 21st. century. Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 2004. p. 37-54.
Volume2_CS4.indb 148
6/16/11 4:11 PM
149
Resumo
Este artigo explora a adequao do uso de sistemas alternativos de soluo
de controvrsias para questes relacionadas com Propriedade Intelectual. So
apresentadas explicaes sobre os pontos comuns entre os dois temas e pontos
importantes a serem levados em conta quando trabalhando com ambos. Os institutos
da Arbitragem e da Mediao so discutidos, juntamente com suas respectivas
vantagens e desvantagens. O artigo desenvolve-se debatendo as tendncias no cenrio
da Arbitragem Internacional, comentando sobre tratados internacionais aplicveis
matria. Finalmente, apresentado o Centro de Arbitragem e Mediao da Organizao
Mundial de Propriedade Intelectual, com informaes sobre seu funcionamento, os
sistemas alternativos de solues de controvrsias oferecidos pelo mesmo e como
se tem acesso a esses servios. dada nfase ao sistema do Centro de resoluo de
controvrsias sobre nome de domnio.
Abstract
This paper explores the adequacy on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) systems for Intellectual Property (IPR)-related pendencies. Explanations are
given on the interaction points between the two subjects and points to keep in mind
when working with both. The Arbitration and Mediation institutes are displayed, along
with their respective advantages and disadvantages. The text goes on debating trends
on the International Arbitration scenario, commenting on applicable International
Treaties. Finally, the Arbitration and Mediation Center at the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) is presented, with information on how it works, the
types of ADRs offered by it, and how to have access to such services. An emphasis is
given to the Centers domain name dispute resolution system.
Introduction
The continuous growth of international transactions witnessed in our days has
as one of its natural consequences the constant raise on the number of international
1 Maria Beatriz Pennacchi Dellore atua como Especialista em Propriedade Intelectual para a Amrica Latina do US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), estando lotada no Consulado Geral dos Estados Unidos da Amrica no Rio de Janeiro. LL.M. em Propriedade Intelectual
pela The George Washington University (EUA) e bacharel em Direito pela Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (So Paulo)
- Maria Beatriz Pennacchi Dellore is the IP Specialist for Latin America at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), based at the
US Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Ms. Dellore has an LL.M. degree in Intellectual Property by The George Washington
University Law School (Washington, D.C.), and a J.D. degree by the Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie (So Paulo).
Volume2_CS4.indb 149
6/16/11 4:11 PM
150
disputes.2 Once a dispute emerges, there are two possible ways to obtain a resolution:
litigation or Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).
Presently, we can observe a growing preference in the international commercial
transaction world for the use of ADR instead of litigation to settle disputes of any
kind. Such preference emerges for a number of reasons, such as the parties ability
to keep control over the process in ADR procedures, willingness to avoid the risk of
biased decisions by foreign countries courts in favor of their nationals, high costs to
proceed with a judicial trial and dramatic delays for the issuance of its final decision.
Being an extension of negotiations between the parties,3 ADR has many forms
among which the parties can choose to settle their dispute. Some examples of ADR
are Mediation, Arbitration, Mediation followed by Arbitration, ex-parte non binding
Arbitration and Mini-Trial (abbreviated presentation of the facts and issues by each
partys counsel in the presence of a neutral third party, with further evaluation of the
issues at dispute and attempt to reach a settlement)4.
For the scope of this paper, though, we will focus specifically on the Mediation
and Arbitration procedures, which are particularly adopted by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) through the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center.
Mediation
Mediation is a voluntary and informal process where disputing parties select a
neutral to assist them in reaching a negotiated settlement.5 The purpose is to create a
mutually beneficial solution, through the explanation, understanding and articulation
of each partys interests and needs, with the help of the mediator.6
The decision to use Mediation can be reached by the parties at the time of
contracting or when the dispute actually emerges.7 Either party is free to abandon the
Mediation at any stage prior to the signing of an agreed settlement.8
Being a non-binding process, the mediator has relatively restricted powers.
The mediator cannot make fact-findings, resolve legal issues, or enter awards or
judgements9. On the other hand, due to the inner informality of the procedure, the
mediator is free to conduct the negotiations in what he considers to be the most
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
J agdish Sharan Verma, Defining the Proper Limits of Judicial Intervention in and Assistance for the Arbitral Process; How A-National can
an International Arbitration Be?, in Biennial Conference of the International Federation of Commercial Arbitration Institutions on
the Institutional Response to Changing Needs of Users 73 (WIPO publication, 1998)
Robert Coulson, Arbitration and Other Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution General Overview, in Worldwide Forum on the
Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes 21 (WIPO Publication, 1994)
John Kidd, ADR: The Future of Dispute Resolution in International IP Disputes, in International Intellectual Property 622, 646
(Insight Press, 1998)
Id. at 623
David W. Plant, Resolving International Intellectual Property Disputes, 19 (ICC Publishing S.A., 1999)
Sir Laurence Street, Mediation, in Worldwide Forum of the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes 247, 251 (WIPO Publication,
1994)
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Mediation Procedures, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/Mediation/index.html (accessed on
Apr. 12. 2003)
Richard W. Page, Mediation: The Parallel Process, in Biennial Conference of the International Federation of commercial Arbitration
Institutions on The Institutional Response to Changing Needs of Users 101-102 (WIPO Publication, 1998)
Volume2_CS4.indb 150
6/16/11 4:11 PM
151
suitable way for that specific case, and the parties can work in rather creative ways to
reach an agreement.
Usually, the first phase of the Mediation is a general meeting of the parties, their
counsels and the mediator. In this first meeting, the parties outline their respective
positions on the dispute. Even though in many cases the mediator, at this point, has
already received a briefing from both sides, it is important that the antagonist parties
reaffirm their positions in front of the opposing party.10
In the second phase, the caucus meetings take place. These are individual
and separated meetings that the mediator holds with each of the parties, and they
are aimed to further develop the proposition initially presented. The content of each
caucus shall not be disclosed by the mediator to the adverse party, unless express
authorization in contrary.11
The third stage involves the active work of the mediator, who conducts the so-called
shuttle diplomacy between the parties. The mediator works separately with each
adversary, trying to find a common ground that will satisfy both parties. The process
will continue until the parties reach an agreement on a reasonable number of issues.12
The fourth stage is a joint session of both parties, their counsels and the mediator, where
the mediator reviews the reached agreement. If the adversaries consider it necessary, extra
days for mediating on additional or still pending issues can be agreed upon.13
All the acts and statements performed during the Mediation procedure above
described are covered by confidentiality.
The fifth and final phase of the Mediation process is the draft by the attorneys
of the Memorandum of Agreement, if an agreement is reached. Such document
contains the principal terms of such understanding.14 If necessary, a more
detailed contract, based on the Memorandum of Agreement, can be prepared
afterwards.15
In case of future problems with the compliance of Memorandum of Agreements
provisions, the parties may return to Mediation or may seek enforcement before
courts.16
It is important to consider the legal infrastructure where the Memorandum of
Agreement ought to be enforced. Such framework may vary considerably in each
different jurisdiction and render the document unenforceable. In most jurisdictions,
though, the Memorandum of Agreement is enforceable as a contract, or may be
entered as a consent award in an Arbitration process.17
10 S
tephen B. Goldberg. Mediation as a Dispute-Resolution Procedure. The dynamic of Mediation: is Creative Genius the Key to Successful
Mediation?, in WIPO Conference on Mediation 11, 12-13 (WIPO Publication, 1996)
11 Id. at 12-13
12 Goldberg, supra note 9, at 12-13
13 Goldberg, supra note 9, at 12-13
14 Page, supra note 8, at 102
15 Goldberg, supra note 9, at 12-13
16 Goldberg, supra note 9, at 12-13
17 Page, supra note 8, at 103
Volume2_CS4.indb 151
6/16/11 4:11 PM
152
As it can be easily inferred from the above explanation of the Mediation procedure,
the mediator has a fundamental role in the success of the process. Hence, it is of great
importance that he has a good background, training and experience in mediating, as well
as ability to negotiate with people and bring about settlements. The mediator can even, if
he considers that to be the case, make proposals for the settlement of the dispute.
The advantages of Mediation as an ADR are many. It has proved to be an effective
method of settling international commercial disputes, with rates of success that
reaches from 80 to 90% of the total number of submitted cases, which explains the
high satisfaction of the parties with the procedure.18
It is also a method of dispute resolution where only the real interests and needs
of the parties will be discussed, with no interference of procedural issues. For this
reason, it is being effectively used as a parallel process to try to resolve disputes that
are pending before courts.19
Also, Mediation is more prone to maintain and create new relationships
between the parties, as opposed to litigation and Arbitration procedures, where
the confrontation usually jeopardizes or at least endangers the future relationship
of the parties.
Some issues, however, are unlikely or not suitable to be solved through Mediation.
A few examples of cases in which the use of Mediation is not recommended are when
one party is in need of injunctive relief, in cases of piracy or any other situation in
which one party is acting in bad-faith, and when one party wishes to establish legal
precedent and/or deter similar activities by third parties.20
Arbitration
Arbitration is a consensual, adjudicative process in which a third person (or persons)
resolves a dispute within agreed upon parameters.21 This definition by David V. Plant
indicates the main features of the Arbitration process, as explained bellow.
Arbitration is a consensual process, meaning that it only can take place if the
disputing parties agree upon using such ADR. The consensus may be reached either
before or when the dispute arises. In any case, it is advisable that the agreement
to arbitrate is formalized in written as to guarantee its enforcement. If there is an
Arbitration Agreement and in case of refusal of one party to submit a certain dispute
to Arbitration, courts shall order the procedure.22
Also, Arbitration is an adjudicative process, where a third person or persons, not
directly involved with any of the parties, solves the dispute. The arbitrator(s) will hear
arguments, review evidences and impose the award, which is the final decision
on the dispute. The award may be binding or non-binding, depending on the parties
18 P
age, supra note 8, at 101
19 Page, supra note 8, at 108
20 William A. Finkelstein, Part III: The role of Counsel and Client getting the other side of the table, in WIPO Conference on Mediation
115, 118 (WIPO Publication, 1996)
21 Plant, supra note 5, at 14
22 Coulson, supra note 2, at 24
Volume2_CS4.indb 152
6/16/11 4:11 PM
153
agreement on the issue23. In most cases, parties opt for binding awards, which are
readily enforceable through National Courts24 of countries under the aegis of the New
York Convention.
Another important characteristic of Arbitration is that the boundaries of the
subject on which the arbitrators authority will issue his award are to be established
by an Arbitration Clause or Agreement, and also by the submissions presented by the
parties to the arbitrator. It is a procedure with settled parameters, with most of issues
being decided upon by the parties, such as definition of arbitrator(s), substantive law
governing the resolution of disputes and arbitral law that will control the procedure.
As far as its types are concerned, Arbitration may be conducted in two forms.
The first type is called administered arbitration, and happens when the procedure is
conducted with the assistance of an arbitral institution in issues such as selection of
arbitrator, selection of guiding rules and processing of the award. It is also possible
to have an ad hoc arbitration, where the parties themselves and the arbitrators are
primarily responsible for the administrative matters. In many cases, parties agree upon
a mixed up form of Arbitration with characteristics of both ad hoc and administered
arbitrations.25
Although each jurisdiction has different procedural rules for Arbitration, today
there is a clear trend towards legal unification on arbitral procedural rules over the
world26.
Another observed trend is the growing acceptance of a minimum degree of judicial
intervention on the autonomous procedure,27 such as in cases of necessity of award
enforcement and compelled Arbitration, mentioned above.
In what concerns the advantages of the method, Arbitration channels legal disputes
into a private resolution, rather than into courts,28 meaning that the parties are in charge
of deciding, in principle, to what extent they want to keep to procedure confidential.29
As previously mentioned, this is only one of the many features of the process that are
decided by the parties.
Apart from the possibility of dispute resolution without publicity or government
intervention, which protects the privacy and confidentiality interests that the parties
may have in many cases, Arbitration has many other advantages. Just to mention a
few, the parties can also design their own forum, according to their own convenience
and interests,30 and are free to decide upon all the rules which will be applied.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Volume2_CS4.indb 153
6/16/11 4:11 PM
154
Volume2_CS4.indb 154
6/16/11 4:11 PM
155
Volume2_CS4.indb 155
and Use
6/16/11 4:11 PM
156
are some specific features of both subjects Intellectual Property and ADR -, that
render the combination of both successful, as explained bellow.
First of all, Intellectual Property rights, due to their very nature, are meant to
be internationally protected and observed. In recent years, there was a considerable
increase on the number of Intellectual Property titles issued that were intrinsically
related to the increase of foreign-origin applications.41 Additionally, agreements
involving Intellectual Property issues, especially those on technology transfer, are
in most of cases international transactions. As explained above, international issues
are in general better served by the use of ADR, instead of litigation, when a dispute
arises.
Also, Intellectual Property issues generally contain highly technical subject
matters, which are better understood and analyzed by an adjudicator with deeper and
specialized knowledge.42
Still, Intellectual Property matters, especially those related to trade secrets and
proprietary information and technology, involve confidential evidence in most cases.
Unlike general litigation, this evidence can remain undisclosed to the public during
the dispute settlement by means of use of an ADR method.43
Additionally, contracts involving Intellectual Property issues are usually longlasting, and it is desirable that all disputes related to a singe contract are pacified by
the same tribunal. This can only happen if an ADR is chosen and applied.44
Furthermore, Intellectual Property matters often involve issues that go beyond the
leading edge of the law, and where principles have not yet been fully developed. In
such cases, an adjudicator is more prepared to give faster decisions and with less farreaching legal consequences as opposed to a court judge.45
It is important to keep in mind, however, that Intellectual Property rights are
of public interest, and are treated in a distinct way in each jurisdiction. Therefore,
attorneys must consider the local rules in the area in which the ADR is meant to
be conducted, to see if they are a permissible way of dispute resolution under that
jurisdiction.46
Other possible disadvantage of the use of ADR in solving Intellectual Property
related disputes is, in case of Arbitration, the waiver of the Right to Appeal. In
many jurisdictions, the awards are vacated only in narrow or limited instances,47
and the parties do not have many feasible options to appeal from the adjudicators
decision. This characteristic is especially preoccupying when the patent under
dispute is fundamental for the survival of the patentee company. In such a case,
41 W
orld Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 29, at 233
42 Bryan Niblett, The Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, in Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of the Intellectual Property
Disputes, 197-198 (WIPO publication, 1994)
43 Kidd, supra note 3, at 626
44 Kidd, supra note 3, at 626
45 Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 116-118
46 Kidd, supra note 3, at 626
47 Kidd, supra note 3, at 625
Volume2_CS4.indb 156
6/16/11 4:11 PM
157
48
49
50
51
52
53
Volume2_CS4.indb 157
6/16/11 4:11 PM
158
The Center has created a bridge between two areas that have undergone considerable
changes: ADR and Intellectual Property54. As a consequence, the Rules specifically
created for the procedures to be conducted by WIPO incorporate important lessons that
have been learned over time in international Arbitration. Some innovative provisions
prove the importance of evolvement and specific adaptation of the general rules of
Arbitration and Mediation to the peculiarities of Intellectual Property field, such as
the creation of emergency in interim relief rules.
Also, the Rules help the parties become aware and avoid some of the pitfalls
that may make international Arbitration excessively costly, complex, and lengthy.
Particularly, the WIPO Rules are aimed to the issuance of an award that is valid and
enforceable.55
The Center has focused significant resources on establishing an operational
and legal framework for the administration of disputes relating to the Internet and
electronic commerce. Subsequently, the Center became recognized as the leading
dispute resolution program on issues relating to intellectual property dispute resolution
and the Internet, particularly in the areas of the registration and use of Internet domain
names.56
Nevertheless, the Center has also shown through time a substantial increase in the
number of Arbitrations and Mediations under its administration with subject matters
related to contractual disputes, such as patent and software licenses, trademark
coexistence agreements, distribution agreements for pharmaceutical products and
research and development agreements. Furthermore, the Center cites the increase in
non-contractual disputes, such as patent infringement. These disputes usually involve
parties generally in different jurisdictions.57
The Center is also oftenly asked to recommend WIPO neutrals. These neutrals
act as appointing authority, for parties to disputes that are not subject to the WIPO
Rules but nonetheless require experience in Arbitration or Mediation and specialized
knowledge of the intellectual property rights in dispute.58
The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center administers four dispute-resolution
procedures, the first three involve Arbitration and the fourth involves Mediation. In
addition to the standard Arbitration and Mediation procedures, discussed in detail
earlier in this paper, the Center also offers the following procedures:59
A. Expedited Arbitration
A form of Arbitration in which certain modifications are introduced to ensure
that the Arbitration can be conducted and an award rendered in a shortened
54 W
orld Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 29, at 233
55 Chirstopher S. Gibson, Awards and other Decisions: Articles 59 to 66, 9 Am. Rev. Intl Arb. 181, 181 (1998)
56 WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/
background.html (accessed on Apr. 12. 2003)
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
Volume2_CS4.indb 158
6/16/11 4:11 PM
159
60 W
IPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Expedited Arbitration Rules, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/arbitration/expedited-rules/
index.html (accessed on Apr. 12. 2003)
61 WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Expert Determination Rules, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/expert-determination/
rules/index.html (accessed on Jan. 20, 2011)
62 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 29, at 234-5
63 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 29, at 234-5
64 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 29, at 234-5
Volume2_CS4.indb 159
6/16/11 4:11 PM
160
the companies services and products, such companies usually choose domain names
containing their name, brand or trademarks.65
Nevertheless, the option of having such domain names is not always possible. The
principle used to assign domain names is the first come-first served, meaning that
the first person who applies for a certain domain name shall, in principle, be the owner
of it. No further evaluation on the fairness and accuracy on the assignment of a certain
domain name to a party is in general proceeded.66
The application of such principle quickly led to numerous disputes, since many
bad faith parties applied for domain names which were the mere reproduction of third
parties trademarks or names. This practice became known as cyber squatting.67
Another problem that has emerged is the so called reverse domain name hijacking.
It occurs when there is the initiation of a court or dispute resolution procedure by
which the hijacker wrests control of the domain name from the lawful owner. It is
the bad faith intention of depriving the legitimate holder of its domain name that
characterizes the conduct.68
As to try to resolve the emerging disputes related to domain names in a quick an
inexpensive manner, in October 1999, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Number (ICANN)69 approved the Uniform Domain Name dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP). The Policy seeks to apply accepted international standards to the
disputes. The intention is to supplement court procedures, but not replace them,70 for
the right to present a law suit during or after the conclusion of the procedure is not
precluded.71
UDRP provides holders of trademark rights with an administrative mechanism to
resolve disputes related to the registration and use by bad faith third parties of domain
names corresponding to such trademarks.
Such administrative procedure is mandatory as to deal with domain name disputes,
since the domain name registration agreement incorporates UDPR, requiring the
holder of the domain name to submit to such procedure, if a dispute arises.72 Also,
once the complaint is filed, it will be processed by the dispute resolution provider,
unless the complaint is settled or withdrawn.73
65 V
ukmir Mladen, Arbitration and New Technologies: Arbitration in Internet Domain Disputes ICANN UDRP Procedure, 8 Croat. Arbit.
Yearb. 21, 21 (2001)
66 Id. at 22
67 Mladen, supra note 64, at 23
68 Ian L. Stewart, The best Laid Plans: How Unrestrained Arbitration Decisions have corrupted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 53 Fed. Comm. L. J. 509, 509 (2001)
69 ICANN is a private non-profit corporation formed to assume responsibility for the IP addresses space allocation, protocol parameter
assignment, domain name system management, and root server system management functions previously performed under U.S.
Government contract by other entities - in Id. at 23
70 Stewart, supra note 42, at 510
71 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap and out of control: lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus.
L. 191, 193 (2002)
72 Stewart, supra note 42, at 512
73 Thornburg, supra note 45, at 195
Volume2_CS4.indb 160
6/16/11 4:11 PM
161
In December 1999, the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center became the first
provider of dispute resolution services UDRP. Apart from the UDRP rules, the Center
has adopted Supplemental Rules to regulate side aspects related to the procedure, such
as applicable fees.
Besides WIPO, ICANN approves at least four other organizations to provide
dispute resolution services: National Arbitration Forum (N.A.F.); C.P.R. Institute for
Dispute Resolution and e-Resolution (eRes).74
Being an administrative procedure, distinct from Arbitration or Mediation,
UDRP can be used by the trademark holder as an option or in parallel with litigation.
Distinctively, domain name holders must submit to UDRP procedures when they wish
to file a complaint related to their domain names. The loosing registrant may, however,
appeal to court on the unfavorable decision.
UDRP procedure is restricted to cases of bad faith registrations. A complaint will
only be successful in case there is enough proof on the three cumulative criteria:
- The domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the complaint has rights, regardless of whether
the trademark is registered or not;75
- The registrant of the domain name has no rights or legitimate interests
in respect to the domain name;
- The domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
The bad faith standard can be met in a couple of circumstances: the domain name
registrant requests to the owner of trademark - or one of its competitors76 - financial
compensation for the transfer or rental or sale of the domain name in an amount
exceeding the costs of its registration; the registration was performed with the purpose
of preventing the trademark owner from registering the trademark as a domain name,
provided that the registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; the domain
name is registered with the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor or the
domain name is intentionally used for attracting, for commercial gain, users through
the Web,77 by creating confusion with the complainants mark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of its web site or location or of a product or
service on its Web site or location.78
The first step of the procedure is the file by an interested party of a complaint. In
the specific case of WIPO, such complaint must be submitted directly on-line or a
complaint-form can be downloaded and completed by the party.
74
75
76
77
78
Volume2_CS4.indb 161
6/16/11 4:11 PM
162
Upon receipt of the complaint and payment of fees, WIPO will have three calendar
days to verify the formal compliance with the requirements of the Policy and Rules.
In case of any shortcoming, the complainant has five calendar days to proceed with
the due corrections.79
Next step is the notification to the Respondent of the complaint. After the
Respondent has been notified by the Center, it has twenty days to file a response. The
response should specifically address the statements in the complaint, as well as any
applicable defense.80 A Response Form, prepared by WIPO, must be completed and
submitted together with the official response.
There are three possible affirmative defenses that can be used by the Respondent:
use or demonstrable preparations to use domain name or name corresponding to the
domain name in connection with bona fide offer of goods or services, before the
delivery of the notice of dispute; the domain name owner demonstrates that it has been
commonly known by the domain name, even absent a trademark or service mark;
or the domain name holder is making a legitimate, noncommercial or fair use of the
domain name, without intent of commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or
to tarnish the trademark or service mark of the Complainant.81
If no response is presented by the registrant in due time, he or she will be considered
in default, and the decision will be made on the basis of the information available to
the Panel.
In case of a one-member Panel, the Panel member is appointed five days after the
responses file date or after the deadline for taking such measure has expired. If, on
the other hand, the Panel is to be composed by three members, WIPO will normally
appoint the panelists in 15 days.
WIPO has a list of panelists that are chosen on the grounds of some specific special
criteria, such as good reputation, impartiality, good judgments and experience in decision
making.82
The arbitrator has the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality,
and weight of the evidence, and may request further statements and documents from the
parties.83
There shall be no in-person hearings unless the arbitrator determines, in his own
discretion and under exceptional circumstances, that such formality is necessary.84
The final decision on the dispute normally should be completed in 60 days of the
date WIPO Center receives the Complaint.
The majority of the remedies applied are either the cancellation of the domain name
or the transfer of the domain name registration to the Complaint.
79
80
81
82
83
84
Volume2_CS4.indb 162
6/16/11 4:11 PM
163
The fact that the possible remedies list is restricted facilitates the dispute resolution
process, allowing for streamlined evidence presentation and, as a consequence,
permitting a fast dispute resolution. Decisions such as ordering monetary compensation
or representation costs are not permitted.85
If any of the available remedies is ordered, such decision shall be implemented by
the registrant within ten working days, upon receipt of notification of the decision from
WIPO or any other Provider. The implementation will not be necessary if the registrant
files in such period of time a law suit against the complainant in the country which was
specified by the Complainant as mutual jurisdiction.86
Due to its efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, simplicity and consistency of
decisions, the WIPO domain name dispute resolution service is meeting significant and
growing demand. Parties from more than eighty-five countries have used the service.87
On the other hand, it is to be mentioned that the dispute resolution system under
analyses was tailored to be applied only to a very specific list of cases, involving clear bad
faith of the domain name holder in commercially profiting from others trademarks.
To summarize, although the Domain Name Dispute Resolution process shows some
flaws, the procedure is being applied and used with considerable success up to the
present moment.
Conclusion
The use of ADR as a rather efficient method of dispute resolution has been a
consistent trend in the last few years, especially in what concerns disputes between
parties in an international environment.
It is undeniable that such methods have considerable advantages over the traditional
jurisdictional ones, as explained above. Especially in the context of Intellectual
Property matters, which tend to be complex and evolve rather cutting edge issues, the
use of technically able arbitrators or mediators permits the issuance of more reliable
and accurate decisions, as may not happen in a jurisdictional environment.
On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that the ADR system is not
useful and efficiently applicable to every sort of dispute. The parties shall carefully
consider the nature of their relationship, the characteristics of the dispute in itself and
their needs and interests before deciding if ADR shall be used or not. ADR, as any
other process, has its pitfalls and disadvantages, and should not be seen as a panacea
to all international disputes.
In what specifically refers to the Arbitration and Mediation processes conducted
by WIPO, a couple of years after the implementation of the Center and its Rules, we
may now be in a good time for reevaluation, collecting and analyzing data related to
85 M
laden, supra note 64, at 23
86 Mutual jurisdiction may be either the law of the country in which the registrars office is located or the law of the country of the domain
name owner.
87 Mladen, supra note 64, at 24
Volume2_CS4.indb 163
6/16/11 4:11 PM
164
the disputes already solved, systematically analyzing their pros an cons and trying to
refine and adjust the system for better and more fair results.
To sum up, the WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center is a good Institution and
has high quality rules to be applied to dispute resolutions methods, reason why it is
working satisfactorily up to this point. On the other hand, practice has shown some
problems related to such procedures, indicating that some points must be worked on,
helping to maintain the credibility and usefulness of the system.
Volume2_CS4.indb 164
6/16/11 4:11 PM
165
Referncias
Jagdish Sharan Verma, Defining the Proper Limits of Judicial Intervention in and Assistance for the
Arbitral Process; How A-National can an International Arbitration Be?, in Biennial Conference of
the International Federation of Commercial Arbitration Institutions on the Institutional Response to
Changing Needs of Users (WIPO publication, 1998)
Robert Coulson, Arbitration and Other Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution General Overview,
in Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes (WIPO Publication, 1994)
John Kidd, ADR: The Future of Dispute Resolution in International IP Disputes, in International
Intellectual Property (Insight Press, 1998)
David W. Plant, Resolving International Intellectual Property Disputes (ICC Publishing S.A., 1999)
Sir Laurence Street, Mediation, in Worldwide Forum of the Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes
(WIPO Publication, 1994)
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Mediation Procedures, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/
Mediation/index.html (accessed on Apr. 12. 2003)
Richard W. Page, Mediation: The Parallel Process, in Biennial Conference of the International
Federation of commercial Arbitration Institutions on The Institutional Response to Changing Needs of
Users (WIPO Publication, 1998)
Stephen B. Goldberg. Mediation as a Dispute-Resolution Procedure. The dynamic of Mediation:
is Creative Genius the Key to Successful Mediation?, in WIPO Conference on Mediation (WIPO
Publication, 1996)
William A. Finkelstein, Part III: The role of Counsel and Client getting the other side of the table, in
WIPO Conference on Mediation 115, 118 (WIPO Publication, 1996)
Austin N.E. Amissah, Judicial Aspects of the Arbitral Process, in Biennial Conference of the
International Federation of Commercial Arbitration Institutions on the Institutional Response to
Changing Needs of Users (WIPO publication, 1998)
Julian D.M. Lew, The Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, in Worldwide Forum on the
Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes (WIPO Publication, 1994)
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use
232 (WIPO Publication, 2001)
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/word/2003/d2003-0002.doc
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1816.html
Volume2_CS4.indb 165
6/16/11 4:11 PM
166
Resumo
Este artigo lida com a questo da assimilao pelas Cortes portuguesas da ordem
jurdica da Unio Europia desde a incluso de Portugal em 1986 . Revisa-se:
(i) os deveres europeus confiados s cortes dos Estados Membros, como
explicitado pela Corte de Justia da Unio Europia no contexto do procedimento
de decises preliminares, e
(ii) o modo pelo qual as cortes portuguesas implementaram esses deveres ao longo
das ltimas duas dcadas.
Abstract
This article deals with the Portuguese courts assimilation of the European Union (EU)
legal order since the accession of Portugal in 1986. It will review
(i) the European duties entrusted to the Member States courts, as made
explicit by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in the
framework of the preliminary ruling procedure, and
(ii) the way Portuguese courts have implemented such duties during the last
two decades.
Summary
I. Introduction.
II. The essential features of the EU jurisdictional system.
1. National courts as EU common courts.
2. The Court of Justice of the European Union as guarantor of the uniform
interpretation of EU law by national courts.
3. Relations between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
national courts in the preliminary ruling procedure.
3.1. The nature of the preliminary ruling procedure.
3.2. Cases of mandatory reference for a preliminary ruling.
III. National courts duties as EU Courts.
1 Law Faculty of the Universidade Nova of Lisbon.
Volume2_CS4.indb 166
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
167
1. The duty to enforce EU law.
2. Corollaries of the duty to enforce EU Law.
2.1. The principle of consistent interpretation.
2.2. The principle of Member States responsibility for the violation
of EU law.
2.3. The principle of procedural autonomy and its limits.
IV. A weak point of the EU jurisdictional system: the precarious nature of the
guarantees for compliance with Article 267(3) of the TFEU.
V. Portuguese courts reactions to the Europeanizing impulses.
1. Portuguese courts and Article 267 of the TFEU.
1.1. What the figures reveal.
1.2. The authors of the Portuguese preliminary references.
1.3. Portuguese preliminary reference subjects.
1.4. The ECJs reactions to Portuguese preliminary references.
1.5. Portuguese courts and the duty to refer.
2. The Portuguese peculiarity.
VI. Conclusions.
I. Introduction
The treaties, which during the 1950s created the foundations of what is today the
EU2, granted albeit discretely an important role to the courts of the Member
States; that of applying EU law as common courts.
EU law is directed towards individuals and not only towards Member States and,
moreover, has a binding force superior to that of international law. The Europeanization
of national courts has thus been essentially a consequence of their duty to apply also to
private parties a common European law, primarily of an economic nature.3
Each of the three treaties originally created a single central court the Court
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) conceived as a special court endowed
with the competences that national courts could not exercise properly. Amongst those
competences is the guarantee of the uniform interpretation and application of EU law
throughout the Member States.
2 The European Coal and Steel Treaty (ECS), which was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951, entered into force on 24 July 1952 and was
abolished on 23 July 2002. The European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy (EAE) Treaties were signed in Rome on
25 March 1957, and came into force on 1 January 1958. In contrast to the ECS, they contain a clause that expressly states their permanent
application. In 1992, with the entry into force of the Treaty on the European Union (TUE), the European Economic Community Treaty
became the European Community Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty, which has been in force since 1 December 2009, states in Article 1(3) in
fine that the Union shall replace and succeed the European Community. From that date, the Treaty of Rome became the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This text will refer only to the Union. All the articles from the TEU and the TFEU will be
quoted with their new numeration, except when otherwise results from the text.
3 The EU treaties also attribute to the public administrations of the Member States the role of common enforcers of EU law. Litigation
between Member States and individuals concerning the interpretation and the enforcement of EU law must be settled by the national courts.
Volume2_CS4.indb 167
6/16/11 4:11 PM
168
The relationship that the EU treaties originally established between the ECJ
and national courts was not hierarchical but cooperative.4 This feature of the EU
jurisdictional system remains unchanged.5
Within the scope of that co-operation between courts, an important set of
European duties has been assigned to national courts. Such duties have been
creatively extracted mainly from the most important of the founding treaties the
Treaty of Rome.
These Europeanizing impulses, largely jurisdictional in origin and of which
national courts are also co-authors will be briefly identified before determining
the extent to which the Portuguese courts have adapted to them since Portugals
accession to the EU.
II. The essential features of the EU jurisdictional system
The European duties conferred upon Member States courts can be explained
with reference to the nature of the EU jurisdictional system. Therefore, it is first worth
recalling the essential features of this system, within the parameters of which these
obligations have been delineated.6
1. National courts as EU common courts
Since its foundation, the EU has organised itself according to the principle of
subsidiarity. This meant rejecting the creation of its own system of courts to apply EU
law. The Treaty of Rome gave that responsibility to national courts, which thereby
became the EU common courts. In other words, the Member States courts took
on the obligation to apply EU law in addition to their duty of applying national law.
The powers at their disposal as national courts do not necessarily coincide with their
respective powers as EU courts. In the latter capacity, the ECJ has vested in them
the power to either set aside national norms conflicting with EU law or to suspend
their application.7
In this regard, it must be emphasized that the legal orders of several Member
States, namely the Netherlands and Sweden, deny such powers to their courts, which
are thus compelled to apply national legislation even when they consider it to be
unconstitutional.
4 P. Magnette, Au nom des peoples: le malentendu constitutionnel europen (Paris: Cerf, 2006), pp. 11 and 31. According to the author, the
original European Communities sought an improved means of inter-state diplomacy. Therefore, the treaties were a continuation of the
European diplomatic tradition, without prejudice that they constitute a greater rupture with the European Machtpolitik tradition.
5 The establishment of the Court of First Instance in 1988 (now recalled as General Court) and the European Civil Service Tribunal in 2004,
both of which were granted specific competences that cannot be properly exercised by national courts, in no way changes the deeper logic
of the EU jurisdictional system
6. The fundamental legal basis of these obligations is now in Article 4(3) of the TEU. It is worth remembering its wording: Pursuant to
the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks
which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the
achievement of the Unions tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Unions objectives.
7 These Europeanizing impulses for the national courts were made explicit by the ECJ in two well-known decisions: the Simmenthal case,
106/77 (9 March 1978), and the Factortame case, 213/89 (19 May 1990).
Volume2_CS4.indb 168
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
169
Volume2_CS4.indb 169
6/16/11 4:11 PM
170
can only be rebutted in exceptional circumstances: (i) when it is manifest that the
interpretation of EU law has no relation to reality or with the object of the litigation in
the national court; (ii) when the problem is of an hypothetical nature; and (iii) when
the ECJ does not have the factual and legal elements necessary to present a useful
response to the questions referred. In these exceptional circumstances, the ECJ can
declare the reference inadmissible.11
3.2. Cases of mandatory reference for a preliminary ruling
The aim of Article 267(3) of the TFEU that of ensuring the uniform
interpretation and application of EU law is to determine those cases in which a
reference to the ECJ should not be considered as an option for the national court,
but rather as an obligation.12
The most obvious example occurs when the reference for interpretation or
validity of EU law is, to quote Article 267(3) of the TFEU, raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose decision there is no
judicial remedy under national law. If the court was not obliged to refer the matter
to the ECJ, and was able to reach a decision alone, the objective of ensuring the
uniform interpretation and application of EU law would be frustrated. This solitary
interpretation or appreciation of the validity of an EU provision could result in a
solution contrary to that of any other national court of last instance.
It follows from Article 19(1) in fine of the TEU that the ECJ has the final word in
cases involving the interpretation and validity of EU law.13 This explains why the ECJ
has interpreted Article 267(3) of the TFEU in order to provide a very strict delimitation
of cases in which an exception to the obligation to refer can be accepted. According
to a consistent case law, such an exception is only acceptable if the national court of
last instance can invoke the following: (i) that the EU law question is not pertinent for
the resolution of the national judicial case; (ii) that the question raised is materially
identical to a previous ECJ decision; or (iii) that the correct application of EU may be
so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The latter possibility must
be assessed on the basis of the characteristic features of EU law and the particular
difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise as well as the risk of divergences in
judicial decisions within the EU.14
11 See, amongst others, the ECJ decision in Beck and Bergdorf, C-355/97 (7 September 1999), para. 2.
12 In the ECJs own words, the obligation to refer is () particularly designed to prevent a body of national case-law that is not in
accordance with the rules of Community law from being established in any Member State. See the case Gomes Valente, C-393/98 (22
February 2001), para. 17.
13 See J. H. H. Weiler, The transformation of Europe, Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), p. 2414.
14 According to the ECJ, it must be borne in mind that EU legislation is drafted in several languages and that the different versions are all
equally authentic. An interpretation of a provision of EU law thus involves a comparison of the different language versions. Even where
the different language versions are entirely in accord with one another, EU law uses terminology which is peculiar to it. Furthermore, legal
concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in EU law and in the law of the various Member States. In addition, every provision
of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard being
had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied. In order to limit
as far as possible the exceptions to the duty to refer, the ECJ further emphasises that, in any case, the national judge must be convinced
that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the ECJ. This somewhat rigid and dated case law, which
might have become to some extent impractical in an enlarged EU, was expounded in CLIFIT, 283/81 (6 October 1982), paras 16-21, and
was reiterated in Intermodal, C-495/03 (15 September 2005), para. 45.
Volume2_CS4.indb 170
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
171
The other, less obvious, case that the ECJ has identified as being subject to a
mandatory reference for a preliminary ruling occurs when the national court does not
decide in the last instance and has doubts about the validity of EU law vis--vis the
treaties. In this case, and contrary to the text of Article 267(2) of the TFEU, the ECJ
transformed this court into one against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
under national law. Therefore, this court is obliged to refer a question whenever it
considers EU law to be invalid15.
III. National courts duties as EU courts
1. The duty to enforce EU law
As stated above, the keystone of the EU jurisdictional system is the preliminary
rulings procedure, which has potential consequences that were unforeseen by the
authors of the treaties. In fact, within the framework of such procedure it has been
possible to confer upon EU law a binding force similar to that of national law.
This became clear when, in a decision of 5 February 1963, the ECJ responded
in the affirmative to the question of whether Article 12 of the Treaty of Rome (now
Article 30 of the TFEU) which was directed to Member States16 produced an
internal effect. In other words, a Dutch court asked if parties could lay claim to
individual rights which the national courts must protect. The question concerned
the company Van Gend & Loos, which imported urea formaldehyde from Germany.
The company invoked Article 12 to contest the decision of the Dutch administrative
authorities obliging it to pay more customs duties.
The principle of the direct effect implies that the Treaty of Rome is more than an
agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the Contracting States.
According to the ECJ, the task assigned to it under Article 267 of the TFEU confirms that
the Member States have acknowledged that EU law has an authority which can be invoked
by their nationals before the national courts and tribunals. Moreover, the vigilance of
individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition
to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 (now Articles 258 and 259 of the
TFEU) to the diligence of the Commission and of the Member States.
In the case Van Gend & Loos, the ECJ also established the supremacy of EU
law over conflicting national law albeit implicitly. In effect, EU law is able to
produce immediate internal effects and to confer individual rights that the national
courts must protect, only if conflicting national law, whether prior or posterior to EU
law, constitutional or infra-constitutional, is not applied by those courts.17
Volume2_CS4.indb 171
6/16/11 4:11 PM
172
Volume2_CS4.indb 172
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
173
on all national authorities, including, within the ambit of their responsibilities, courts
and tribunals, the obligation to adopt any appropriate measure, general or particular,
to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the EU treaties or resulting from
the acts of the EU institutions.
This principle assumes special importance in relation to directives. The direct
effect of these acts can only be invoked in proceedings between individuals and public
authorities (direct vertical effect)26, and not between individuals (direct horizontal
effect). Moreover, the direct effect of a directive can only be invoked in cases where
there has been no transposition into national law within the established deadline, or
where the transposition was concluded in an incorrect manner27.
It follows from the principle of consistent interpretation that national courts are
required to interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of
the directive in order to achieve the result referred to in the third paragraph of Article
189 [now Article 288 of the TFEU].28 This indirect direct effect to a large extent
mitigates the absence of the directives direct horizontal effect.29
2.2. The principle of Member States responsibility for the violation of EU law
This principle, the most recent of the corollaries to the principle of the effectiveness
of EU law, was initially invoked by the ECJ against the Italian State for not transposing,
within the established deadlines, a directive whose provisions were not unconditional
and sufficiently precise. That meant that such provisions could not be invoked before
a national court.
According to the ECJ, in such cases the full effectiveness of Community rules
would be impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened
if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach
of Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible.
The ECJ has held that this right to reparation depends on the fulfilment of three
conditions:
(i) the EU provision infringed must be intended to confer rights on
individuals;
(ii) the breach must be sufficiently grievous; and
26 In this context, the ECJ interprets the concept of public authority in very wide-ranging terms. See Foster, C-188/89 (12 July 1990), para. 20.
27 See Ratti, 148/78 (5 April 1979), paras 23 and 24.
28 See Von Colson and Kamann, 14/83 (10 April 1984), para. 26. According to the Arcaro ruling, C-168/95 (26 September 1996), the obligation
of the national court to refer to the content of the directive when interpreting the relevant rules of its own national law reaches a limit where
such an interpretation leads to the imposition on an individual of an obligation laid down by a directive which has not been transposed or,
more especially, where it has the effect of determining or aggravating, on the basis of the directive and in the absence of a law enacted for its
implementation, the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of that directives provisions (para. 42).
29 The principle of conforming interpretation was even extended to the framework decisions of the former EUs third pillar through the ECJs
ruling on the Pupino case, C-105/03 (16 June 2005). This has contributed towards a considerable strengthening of the efficacy of these
legal acts, which were closer to international law, and particularly attenuated the reach of the former Article 34(2)(b) of the TUE, which
stated that framework decisions do not produce a direct effect.
Volume2_CS4.indb 173
6/16/11 4:11 PM
174
(iii) there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the
obligation resting on the Member State and the loss or damage
sustained by the injured parties.30
More recently, the ECJ always within the preliminary rulings framework
extended the principle of responsibility for the infringement of EU law to the decisions
of the national courts adjudicating at last instance. Nevertheless, State liability for
such an infringement can be incurred only in the exceptional case where the court
has manifestly infringed the applicable law.
Among the factors that the competent national court hearing a claim for reparation
due to a judicial decision of that nature must take account are in particular, the
degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed, whether the infringement was
intentional, whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the position
taken, where applicable, by a Community institution and the non-compliance by
the court [adjudicating at last instance] in question with its obligation to make a
reference for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 (now
Article 267 TFEU).31
Developing this case law, the ECJ, prompted by an Italian court that had
referred a question for preliminary ruling concerning the States responsibility for
an infringement of EU law allegedly committed by one of the countrys supreme
courts, ruled that EU law precludes national legislation which (i) excluded State
liability, in a general manner, for damage caused to individuals by an infringement
of EU law attributable to a court adjudicating at last instance by reason of the fact
that the infringement in question results from an interpretation of provisions of law
or an assessment of facts or evidence carried out by that court, and (ii) limited such
liability solely to cases of intentional fault and serious misconduct on the part of the
court, if such a limitation were to lead to exclusion of the liability of the Member
State concerned in other cases where a manifest infringement of the applicable law
was committed, as set out in paragraphs 53 to 56 of the Kbler judgment. Since the
interpretation of legal norms and the assessment of facts and evidence are the true
essence of the jurisdictional function, such law would be tantamount to rendering
meaningless the principle of State responsibility for the violation of EU law by a
national court adjudicating at last instance.32
With this decision, the Europeanizing impulses emitted to national courts by the
ECJ case law reached a new peak. It becomes possible for a lower court competent
to hear claims for reparation to judge and, eventually, sanction the actions of a higher
court for infringements of EU law and, particularly, for infringing the duty to refer
30 See Francovich et al., C-6/90 and C-9/90 (19 November 1991), para. 33, and Brasserie du Pcheur et. al., C-46/93 and 48/93 (5 March
1996), paras 51-52.
31 See Kbler, C-224/01 (30 September 2003), paras 53-56.
32 See Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C-173/03 (13 June 2006), paras 36 and 40.
Volume2_CS4.indb 174
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
175
imposed by paragraph three of Article 267 of the TFEU. This has been seen as a
curious inversion of roles in the national legal hierarchy.33
2.3. The principle of procedural autonomy and its limits
In the absence of provisions adopted by the EU, the national courts competent to
apply EU law are in principle bound by their procedural judicial organisation laws.
It is, therefore, within this framework that individuals must seek to protect their
rights granted by EU law. The principle, according to which national courts must
comply with national procedural law when applying EU law, is called the principle of
procedural autonomy of Member States.34
Since differences in procedural law can have serious repercussions on substantive
law, the principle of the effectiveness of EU law had to impose limits on the principle
of procedural autonomy of Member States. These limitations are twofold:
(i) n ational procedural law cannot make a distinction between the
demands of individuals based on EU law and their demands based
on national law (the principle of equivalence); and
(ii) e ven if such distinction is not made, national procedural law cannot
render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of
rights conferred by EU law (the principle of effectiveness).35
EU law proscribes, as a breach of the principle of equivalence, that in order to
exercise rights conferred by EU law such as the right of reparation for damages
caused by the Member State for the non transposition of a directive the individual
must pay legal expenses and meet deadlines more onerous than those that would
result from the exercise of a similar right based on the national law. The injured
party can invoke such principle before the national court in order to eliminate the
discrimination.
Similarly, EU law proscribes, in the name of the principle of effectiveness, that
national procedural law, despite being applied indiscriminately, establishes rules of
proof that create a practical impossibility for an injured party to exercise the right
of refund for any undue payments. In such a case, the injured party can invoke
the principle of effectiveness in order to prevent the application of national norms
demanding such a proof.
These principles represent strong Europeanizing impulses for the national courts,
leading them to set aside, when necessary, any conflicting national provisions. These
impulses also extend to the national legislator and lead it to establish procedural
rules compatible with EU law.
33 See A.-S. Botella, La responsabilit du juge national, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europen, 2 (2004), pp. 283-315.
34 See Rewe, 33/76 (16 December 1976).
35 See Aprile, C-228/96 (17 November 1998), para. 18.
Volume2_CS4.indb 175
6/16/11 4:11 PM
176
It remains to be seen to what extent the principle of State responsibility for the
infringement of EU law by a national supreme court will imply the adaptation of the
judicial organisation of the Member States in order to prevent or limit the effects of
the hierarchical inversion mentioned above. In any case, it is essential to avoid an
eventual scenario whereby a supreme court could review, on appeal, a decision of a
lower court which imputes on the same supreme court an infringement of EU law.
Otherwise, the principle of impartiality would be impaired.36
IV. A weak point of the EU jurisdictional system: the precarious nature of the
guarantees for compliance with Article 267(3) of the TFEU
The preliminary ruling procedure has succeeded to such an extent that the ECJ
has become a so-called victim of its own success37. This disguised the main
weaknesses of this procedure: the precarious nature of the guarantees provided by
the EU legal order itself for compliance with the duty to refer set out in Article
267(3) of the TFEU.38
It has been claimed that a Member State can, under Article 258 of the TFEU,
be called before the ECJ for infringements of EU law by its courts. Nevertheless,
the Commission only recently initiated infringement proceedings in cases related to
failures to refer in breach of Article 267(3) of the TFEU.39
It could also be argued that as a result of the Kbler case law, State responsibility
emerges if the duty to refer is breached. Nonetheless, Article 267(3) of the TFEU
was never intended to confer rights upon individuals, and particularly the right to a
preliminary reference. This has always been rejected in the name of the inter-court
procedural nature of such mechanism.
Nevertheless, as a result of the Kbler and CILFIT decisions, a supreme
court that wishes to avoid the serious risk of giving rise to Member State
responsibility must carefully assess the necessity to make a preliminary
reference and cannot except when a case is materially identical to one on
which the ECJ has already made a ruling simply resolve the question ex
36 See, however, judgement of the Supremo Tribunal de Justia of 3 December 2009, P. 9180/07.3TBBRG.G1.S.1, Cadernos de Justia
Administrativa, n. 79, 2010, pp. 29-37, with a critical annotation of Maria Jos Rangel de Mesquita, Irresponsabilidade do Estadojuiz por incumprimento do Direito da Unio Europeia: um acrdo sem futuro, pp. 37-45; see also Alessandra Silveira, Da (ir)
responsabilidade do Estado-juiz por violao do Direito da Unio Europeia Anotao ao Acrdo do Supremo Tribunal de Justia
de 3 de Dezembro de 2009, Scientia Iuridica, tomo LVIII, n. 320, 2009, pp 773-804, and Nuno Piarra, As incidncias do direito
da Unio Europeia sobre a organizao e o exerccio da funo jurisdicional nos Estados-Membros, http://encontrosdireitopublico.
blogspot.com, pp. 12-16.
37 See T. Koopmans, La procdure prjudicielle victime de son succs?, in F. Caportorti, C.-D. Ehlermann, J. Frowein, F. Jacobs, R.
Joliet, T. Koopmans and R. Kovar (eds), Liber Amicorum Pescatore (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987), pp. 347-57.
38 At the national level, some Member States have developed internal mechanisms to guarantee compliance with the duty to refer questions
to the ECJ. For example, the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Austrian Constitutional Court and the Spanish Constitutional
Court have all declared themselves competent to control failures to refer by courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law. For a discussion of the Portuguese case, see N. Piarra, O Tribunal de Justia das Comunidades Europeias
como juiz legal e o processo do artigo 117 do tratado CEE: as relaes entre a ordem jurdica comunitria e as ordens jurdicas dos
estados-membros na perspectiva dos tribunais constitucionais (Lisbon: AAFDL, 1991).
39 In a case regarding the Swedish supreme courts failure to refer cases to the ECJ. See Schmauch, Lack of Preliminary rulings as an
infringement of Article 234. European Commission case COM 2003/2161, procedure against the Kingdom of Sweden, European Law
Reporter (2005) pp. 445 ff., and U. Bernitz, The duty of supreme courts to refer cases to the ECJ: the Commissions action against
Sweden, Swedish Studies in European Law 1 (2006) pp. 37 ff.
Volume2_CS4.indb 176
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
177
40 See P. J. Wattel, Kbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: we cant go on meeting like this, Common Market Law Review 41 (2004), p. 178.
Volume2_CS4.indb 177
6/16/11 4:11 PM
178
Finland
France
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
0
3
6
2
4
5
3
7
4
4
4
42
19 18
2
36 32 17
38 34
0
28 47
2
21 34
2
29 54
3
15 62
1
22 57
5
36 44
0
43 51 10
24 66
4
10 46
2
16 49
5
17 49
3
12 47
3
15 53
4
8
59
7
9
43
4
21 50 18
17 51 11
436 946 103
4
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
2
3
0
1
3
2
2
1
0
2
1
2
33
5
5
28
10
25
36
22
24
46
58
70
50
39
43
50
40
37
45
48
18
699
1
3
2
1
4
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
4
0
2
4
4
1
2
42
16
19
26
18
9
17
18
43
13
19
10
24
21
23
12
14
12
28
28
36
406
0
0
0
1
2
3
1
3
1
5
6
2
7
7
8
4
3
1
1
2
57
1
1
1
2
6
5
5
7
13
10
6
9
55
4
5
4
3
8
8
10
163
6
4
7
6
5
4
4
5
4
5
11
61
91
8
144
9
16 179
14 139
12 141
14 186
18 162
12 204
24 203
20 251
21 256
18 239
24 264
22 255
26 223
21 237
14 216
22 210
22 247
12 216
349 4063
Total
Denmark
4
5
4
2
5
2
3
7
4
8
4
7
7
3
3
5
8
3
4
4
92
Germany
Belgium
13
15
30
13
17
19
16
22
19
2
14
6
30
35 19
16 12
56 13
31 15
57 10
31 18
15 18
12 24
15 21
276 358
Austria
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Volume2_CS4.indb 178
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
179
courts have referred an average of just over one case per year. To some extent, this
undermines the thesis proposed by Sweet and Brunnel, who claim that there is a
direct link between the evolution of a countrys GDP and the levels of trade with
other Member States, on the one hand, and the number of cases referred to the ECJ
by the national courts, on the other.42
One of the possible explanations for these figures is Portugals small population in
comparison with other Member States. The population variable which must not be
considered as decisive allows for the calculation of the relative value of the total
number of cases referred (see Table II).
Table II: Preliminary References and Population of Member States (1986-2005)
Number of references
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
276
357
92
42
436
946
103
42
699
33
406
57
163
61
349
Population
(in millions)
8.20
10.40
5.40
5.20
60.50
82.50
11.10
4.10
58.50
0.46
16.30
10.50
43.00
9.00
60.00
Ratio references/
population
33.65
34.32
17.03
8.07
7.20
11.46
9.27
10.24
11.94
71.73
24.90
5.42
3.79
6.77
5.81
The introduction of this scale element worsens Portugals relative position, since its
courts are the penultimate in terms of the ratio of population to number of references
(5.42), exceeding Spain (3.79) and coming in some distance behind courts of Member
States with similar populations, such as the Netherlands (24.90), Austria (33.65) and
Belgium (34.32).
1.2. The authors of the Portuguese preliminary references
Analysing Portugals references from the perspective of their authors that is
to say, the courts that made the reference to the ECJ (see Table III) produces a
conclusive set of data.43
42 See A. C. Sweet and T. L. Brunell, Constructing a supranational constitution: dispute resolution and governance in the European
Community, American Political Science Review 91/1 (1998), p. 73.
43 For more on Portugals preliminary references, see R. Chambel Margarido, O pedido de deciso prejudicial e o princpio da cooperao
jurisdicional, Working Papers da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Nova de Lisboa 8/99 (1999).
Volume2_CS4.indb 179
6/16/11 4:11 PM
180
Number of references
0
1
%
0.0
2.0
32
56.0
5.0
4.0
11
19.0
8
57
14.0
100.0
The first relevant fact to note is the disproportionate number of cases referred by
the administrative courts (80 per cent) and those referred by the civil courts (20 per
cent). Nevertheless, this may be partially justified by the fact that EU law continues to
be essentially of an economic and administrative nature.
The second fact worth noting is that only approximately one-third of the cases
referred originated in lower courts, which are by far the most numerous courts in the
Portuguese jurisdictional system as indeed they are in every jurisdictional system.
This figure clearly contrasts with the situation in the majority of Member States and,
therefore, casts some doubts on Weilers judicial empowerment thesis, which states
that it is essentially the lower courts that feel a greater need to refer cases to the
ECJ for a preliminary ruling. Weiler argues that through this mechanism lower courts
obtain powers reserved to the supreme courts.44
In the case of Portugal, the Supreme Administrative Court (STA) made more
references (32) than all the lower administrative and tax courts combined (14). The
same cannot be said of the civil courts. The statistics reveal that it took the Supreme
Court of Justice (STJ) which for the purposes of Article 267(3) of the TFEU is one
of the highest courts in the land 20 years to make its first reference to the ECJ.45
All the countrys lower civil courts have, taken together, referred fewer than ten cases
to the ECJ.
It should also be noted in this context that the Portuguese Constitutional Court has
never made a reference to the ECJ within the framework of Article 267 TFEU, a fact
that is consistent with the general trend found in the other Member States. However,
the Portuguese constitutional court has recognised its duty to refer in a manner that is
uncommon amongst its peers.46
44 See J. H. H. Weiler, The transformation of Europe, Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), p. 2426.
45 This occurred on 3 November 2005, in Process 05B1640, which, curiously, was heard by a former Portuguese judge in the ECJ, Jos
Carlos Moitinho de Almeida.
46 See ruling 163/90 (23 May 1990), in Acrdos do Tribunal Constitucional 16 (1990), p. 301, and ruling 606/94 (22 November 1994), in
Acrdos do Tribunal Constitucional 29 (1994), p. 161. See also J. L. Cruz Vilaa, L. M. Pais Antunes and N. Piarra, Droit constitutionnel
et droit communautaire: le cas portugais, Rivista di Diritto Europeo 2 (1991), p. 301.
Volume2_CS4.indb 180
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
181
Volume2_CS4.indb 181
6/16/11 4:11 PM
182
Volume2_CS4.indb 182
6/16/11 4:11 PM
The Role of the Member States Courts in the Jurisdictional System of the European
Union: The Portuguese Case
183
provided the basis rather than recognition of the autonomy of EU law. In contrast to
certain French and German courts, Portuguese courts had no difficulty in accepting
their duty to enforce directly European directives. The same is true with respect to the
principles of consistent interpretation and the States responsibility for infringements
of EU law.
During the first 20 years of EU membership there have been few examples of
rebellious attitudes by Portuguese courts vis--vis their European obligations48.
How, then, can we explain this apparent peculiarity; the small number of cases
referred to the ECJ, given the acceptance by the Portuguese courts of their European
obligations related to the application of EU law? There are a number of possible
factors that should be considered in providing an answer to this question.
Firstly, when Portugal joined the EU, the Member States courts had, to a
significant extent, overcome the resistance that originally surrounded some of the
more revolutionary principles of EU law, such as those of supremacy and the direct
effect.
Secondly, the revisions of the Portuguese constitution have, in some ways,
incorporated these principles and facilitated the acceptance of newly created ones.
Thirdly, the Portuguese constitution explicitly entitles each court to set aside
provisions that are considered to be unconstitutional a competence that gives all
courts equal status. With this embedded autonomy, the Portuguese courts may have
felt less need than their European counterparts to seek support from the ECJ on the
interpretation and application of EU law.
V. Conclusions
More than 20 years after Portugals accession, EU law still does not have an impact
on the Portuguese legal order comparable to the impact experienced in other Member
States49.
Without prejudice to the fact that some Portuguese courts are still not completely
familiar with the preliminary reference procedure, the rare use of this mechanism by
lower courts is largely rooted in the particular status they have been vested with by
the 1976 Constitution. This status allows them to decide upon the most important
questions of law without the need to seek advice or rulings from superior courts.
Concerning the highest courts, if on one hand the absence of references for preliminary
rulings by the STJ is perplexing, on the other hand the STAs successive violations of
the duty to refer might also have something to do with the rigidity of the criteria set
out in CILFIT.
48 For an example see the judgement of the Supremo Tribunal de Justia of 3 December 2009, quoted above, footnote 35.
49 In this sense, see Fausto de Quadros, Vinte e cinco anos de aplicao do Direito da Unio Europeia em Portugal, Europa. Novas
Fronteiras 25 Anos de Integrao Europeia, n. 26/27, 2010, p. 76.
Volume2_CS4.indb 183
6/16/11 4:11 PM
184
Resume
Um dos aspectos mais polmicos sobre o instituto arbitral sobre a natureza (ou
ausncia) jurisdicional da arbitragem. E de acordo com o presente trabalho, citando alguns
expoentes da doutrina, a resposta afirmativa. Contudo, a partir deste ponto, diversas outras
questes se depreendem como qual seria o efeito do carter jurisdicional nos laudos arbitrais,
especialmente sobre sua extenso e uso como precedentes para casos futuros. Considerando
que os laudos arbitrais tem contando constantemente com mais pontos de similaridade com
as decises judiciais em sua estrutura, efeitos e limitaes, este trabalho pretende discutir se,
assim como as decises judiciais, os laudos arbitrais podem ser usados como precedentes e
caso afirmativo, se devem ser considerados como referencia para casos futuros ou devem
ser tratados de acordo com a doutrina do stare decisis, no servindo apenas de referncia
para rbitros no futuro, mas sim ditando uma soluo aplicvel aos casos que viro.
Abstract
One of the most polemical questions concerning the arbitral institution is whether
the arbitration has or not jurisdictional nature. And according to this paper, quoting
some doctrinal exponents the answer is affirmative. But from this point, some other
questions are raised such as what effects does this jurisdictional character has in the
arbitral awards concerning to its extension and its use as precedents to future cases.
From the point that arbitral awards become constantly more and more alike judicial
decisions in its structure, effects and limitations , the paper intends to discuss whether,
just like judicial decisions, arbitral awards can be used as precedents, and if so, if
they should be just references to future cases or should be taken according to stare
decisis doctrine, not serving as references to arbiters but further, dictating the solution
applicable to the cases to come.
Keywords
Arbitration Jurisdictional Function Precedents Stare Decisis Doctrine
Jurisprudence Constante
1 PhD Student at Universidade de Coimbra Portugal. LL.M from Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG). Professor of Arbitration
at UFMG and at Center for Studies in International Law (CEDIN). Coordinator at the Center for Studies in International Law (CEDIN).
Member of the Brazilian Institute for Procedural Law (IBDP) and the Brazilian Academy of Civil Process Law (ABDPC), and Brazilian
Arbitration Committee (CBAr). Attorney-at-law.
2 LL.M from London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom. LL.B from Federal University of Minas Gerais
(UFMG). Member of the Center for Studies in International Law (CEDIN).
Volume2_CS4.indb 184
6/16/11 4:11 PM
185
Summary
1. Arbitration as an alternative resolution method of conflicts.
2. The jurisdictional character of arbitration.
3. Principles applicable to arbitral jurisdiction.
4. The Jurisdictional Character of Arbitration and its effects on the arbitral
awards.
5. Difference between the precedent as an earlier case and the precedent as stare
decisis
6. The use of precedents in arbitration proceedings. 7. The precedents and ICSIDs
arbitral awards. 8. Conclusion. 9. Bibliographical References
The existence of conflict is inherent to life in society. The excess of demands and the
scarcity of goods needed for the satisfaction of such demands, along with the predatory
and selfish character that usually permeates human nature3, are often responsible for
placing individuals in opposed sides of disputes that require solutions.
Since the very beginning and throughout the history of civilization, the law has
always sought to create, recognize and improve the mechanisms for the settlement of
conflicts, given the unequivocal assertion that the preservation of peace and social
order, through the use of suitable methods, are indispensable to the maintenance and
survival of the individual and, in the final analysis, of society itself.
In this scenario, arbitration presents itself, fundamentally, as one of those methods
for the resolution of conflicts. More precisely, it is the mechanics of the composition
of disputes by which natural or legal persons, as long as they are capable of entering
into contract, reciprocally agree to trust the judgment of disputes involving alienable
rights to a court formed by one or more arbiters, chosen specifically for this purpose,
and having been nominated by the parties or not.
It is a method of conflict settlement in the way that it establishes a method of acting, a
path to be followed, from the realization of the existence of a controversy involving two
or more people that claims to be solved, to the achievement of the solution that presents
itself as the most convenient and fair for the situation. It comprehends, therefore, a
series of coordinated, continuous and preestablished acts, whose sole purpose is the
composition of the existing conflict, being this composition the result of the work of
third parties external to the conflict. The action of the third party classifies arbitration
among the so-called neutral third party dispute composition methods.
Arbitration is a special modality of dispute resolution that, even though is meant
for natural as well as legal persons indifferently, requires for its use the coexistence of
two fundamental requisites: a) the full juridical capacity of the parties involved in the
3 MANCUSO, Rodolfo de Camargo. A resoluo dos conflitos e a funo judicial no Comtemporneo Estado de Direito. So Paulo: RT,
2009, p.35.
Volume2_CS4.indb 185
6/16/11 4:11 PM
186
controversy, determined by applicable the civil law4; and b) the full alienability of the
rights which will be the object of discussion, that is to say, the individuals complete
freedom to act as he chooses in relation to his rights, including in negotiating and
alienating them, since there is no normative discipline, no imperative command that
restricts his autonomy5.
Indeed, regarding the alienability of the right, one says that a right is alienable
when it can be freely exercised by its holder, without there being any cogent norm
imposing its observance, on the risk of nullity of the act done in violation. Therefore,
are alienable those rights that can be freely conveyed or negotiated, since the juridical
holder of the right has complete autonomy to do so. 6
Only alienable rights can be submitted to arbitral proceedings. It follows that,
once the arbitral proceeding is in motion, if during the course of arbitration arises
a controversy concerning inalienable rights, and on this issue the arbitral judgment
will depend, the arbiter or the arbitral chamber shall direct the specific demand to the
Judiciary, suspending the arbitral proceedings until the matter is solved definitively,
allowing the arbitration to continue from this point.
In order for the parties to have a controversy settled through arbitration, it is
furthermore indispensable that it exists between them compliance, an agreement of
will that the issue will be submitted to an arbitral court specifically constituted for this
purpose. Every arbitration presupposes an arbitral convention, established either by a
contractual clause or an arbitral commitment.
This agreement, necessary to the constitution of the arbitral procedure, comprises
a bilateral juridical act, that as such, in order to exist: not only demands two parties
to express freely their will. The juridical relation arises when the volitions coincide,
because from this moment on it may be said that there is consent (from the Latin
cum + sentire, to feel with). The lack of consent or of coincidence of wills precludes
the formation of the juridical relation; the apparent emission of will without real
agreement on the object allows its creation, but tarnishes it with a defect, which may
bring about its nullity7.
The conflict of interests is submitted to the appreciation of one or more persons,
impartial and idoneous, who may be freely chosen by the parties or by an institution
chosen by them. These arbiters will compose the so-called arbitral tribunal, on whom
it falls, in principle with exclusivity, the sovereign deliberation on the matter that is
the object of the controversy.
4 In this specific matter, it is important to observe that the juridical capacity to submit conflicts to arbitration shall be dictated by the juridical
capacity rules of the country where the parties have their residence, according to the international private law, except if another rule has
been voluntarily established by the parties in the arbitral convention.
5 One must not neglect to mention the significant controversy about the possibility of the use of arbitration for dispute settlement in Family
Law, Succession Law, Labor Law, Criminal Law and Public Administration, considering the legal limitation on the alienability of the
rights taken to the arbitral tribunal. On this matter: cf. CARMONA, Carlos Alberto. Arbitragem e processo: um comentrio lei 9.307/96.
3.ed., rev., atual. e ampl. So Paulo: Atlas, 2009, p. 38-44.
6 CARMONA, Carlos Alberto. Arbitragem cit., p. 38.
7 PEREIRA, Caio Mrio da Silva. Instituies de direito civil. v. 1. 23. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2010, p. 425, n. 85.
Volume2_CS4.indb 186
6/16/11 4:11 PM
187
8 About this matter, its important to emphasize that other theories that try to explain the juridical nature of the process, were created
throughout its development by some exponential authors. This paper has chosen to adopt the theory exposed by Oskar von Bllow in his
Theory of Procedural Prerequisites and the Exceptions dilatory, from 1868, being this theory predominant in the Brazilian Law. Quanto
a esse aspecto, importante ressaltar que existem vrias outras teorias que buscam explicar a natureza jurdica do processo, que foram
sendo criadas ao longo do seu desenvolvimento, por autores consagrados. Optou se, aqui, por adotar a teoria exposta por Oskar von
Bllow na sua Teoria dos Pressupostos Processuais e das Excees Dilatrias, de 1868, por se tratar da corrente at ento predominante
no direito processual brasileiro: CINTRA, Antnio Carlos de Arajo; GRINOVER, Ada Pellegrini; DINAMARCO, Cndido. Teoria geral
do processo. 25.ed. So Paulo: Malheiros, 2009, p. 298-305; THEODORO JR., Humberto. Curso de Direito Processual Civil. v. I. 50.ed.
Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2009, n. 43, p. 47; BARBOSA MOREIRA, Jos Carlos. O novo processo civil brasileiro. 21. ed.. Rio de Janeiro:
Forense, 2000, p. 3, entre outros. On the contrary: Em sentido contrrio, cf. MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. Teoria geral do processo. 3.ed.,
rev. e atual. So Paulo: RT, 2008, p. 396 e ss.
Volume2_CS4.indb 187
6/16/11 4:11 PM
188
Discussion rises, however, when the matter is the juridical nature of the activities
carried out by the arbitral court and their final result, or more specifically, if these
activities have a jurisdictional nature.
Some authors9 suggest that the arbitral function, due to the fact that it is necessarily
buttressed by a mutual agreement, has a clear contractual nature, and the arbitral
award, produced at the final stage of the arbitral proceedings, is very similar to a
juridical unilateral relation of private Law. There are six fundaments, commonly
quoted aiming to refrain the jurisdictional character of arbitration, although its not
denied its function to settle conflicts and promote social pacification:
(a) the exercise of jurisdiction is a prerogative and monopoly of the
State, and can only be exercised by those who were invested by the
State according to all the procedures and formalities;
(b) w
hen the parties opt for arbitration, they automatically renounce
jurisdiction;
(c) a rbitration has not as a trait inevitability, as State jurisdiction has;
(d) the exercise of jurisdiction would require investiture through public
service examination;
(e) a rbitration does not observe the principle of the natural judge; and
(f) the arbiter does not have aptitude to execute his decisions.
This conception is opposed to the views of other authors10/11, who maintain
that the arbitral judge is as any other judge as to the jurisdictional function. It is
a private institution that fulfills a function identical to the judicial institution in the
administration of Justice, only in a smaller range (comprehending the cognition and
9 FAZZALARI, Elio. Larbitrato. Torino: UTET, 1997, p. 87. cf. MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. Rpidas observaes sobre arbitragem e
jurisdio. Available at: http://marinoni.adv.br. Access: 07/03/2011. DINAMARCO, Cndido Rangel. Instituies de Direito Processual
Civil, v.I, 5 ed. So Paulo: Malheiros, 2005.
10 CARREIRA ALVIM, Jos Eduardo. Direito arbitral. 3.ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2007, p. 250. DIDIER JR, Freddie. Curso de Direito
Processual Civil11.ed. Salvador: Jus Podivm, 2009, p. 82 - 85.
11 About the doctrines on the juridical nature of arbitration, ARMINDO RIBEIRO MENDES, professor at the University of Lisbon,
emphasizes in his book Introduo s Prticas Arbitrais: the doctrine presents at least four different theories on this nature. The first
sustains the jurisdictional character of arbitration, emphasizing the states influence, which not only allows but also regulates arbitration.
From a historical point of view, this theory was admitted by great authors in the private international law in France (LAINE, PILLET,
BARTIN, etc) and admitted by the French jurisprudence (case Del Drago 1901). The arbiters are given almost judicial powers,
being, therefore, an alternative tolerated by the state. The second theory considers that the nature of arbitration is contractual, depending
entirely on the agreement between the parties. The arbitral award depends, therefore, on the arbitration agreement. The French Court,
in 1937, followed this theory in the Rose/Moller et Companie case, affirming that arbitral awards are based on the arbitral convention
and constitute a single unity with this agreement, sharing its contractual nature. A third theory is described as a hybrid, accepting that
arbitration has a contractual origin but performs a jurisdictional function, being a private Justice created by a contract with procedural
nature. This third theory, created in the last century by SAUER-HALL, has been admitted by the majority of the doctrine, which considers
both the contractual and jurisdictional natures as intrinsically connected in arbitration. Finally, a new autonomy theory or sui juris
of arbitration has recently been developed in France, which concludes that it is possible to construct from the analysis of arbitration and
its finality. In the words of JAQUELIN RUBELLIN DEVICHI it appears certain that the notions of contract and sentence undergo an
alteration, when one tries especially simultaneously to find them in the development of the arbitral proceedings, where they lose all
meaning, without appearing, however, a particular trait of arbitration. In the words of J.D.M. Lew, the autonomy theory constitutes a
development of the hybrid theory, in the way that it develops the juridical regime of arbitration, but transfers the focus of the control of
the law in the arbitration place.
Volume2_CS4.indb 188
6/16/11 4:11 PM
189
not the execution), providing the jurisdictional service justified by the convention of
the parties, authorized by the rules of the state. 12
For the matter to be solved, it is indispensable to take into account which elements
characterize state jurisdiction, in order to examine whether such elements are
compatible to those found in the arbitral institute.
Jurisdiction is one of the functions inherent to the state, being for it exercised, in
principle, as a monopoly, as a way to offer solutions, fair and effective, to the conflicts
of interests existing among the members of the society. Through the application of the
normative system to the concrete situation, the exercise of jurisdiction aims, always,
at the re-establishment and maintenance of peace and social order. As Law does not
tolerate justice done by the individuals themselves, it falls to the party to expose in
court the dispute and require the judge to solve the matter applying the law, making,
in this way, the composition of the conflicting interests, once the respective bearers
of the rights could not find on their own a voluntary method to do so. Taking into
consideration the allegations of each party, the judge will define whose is the best
interest, according the rules of the valid juridical system, and will settle the conflict,
guaranteeing the prevalence of the pretension that is correspondent. There we have, in
practical terms, a definition of jurisdiction13.
But jurisdiction is not only a state function. It is, at the same time, power,
function and activity. As power, it is the manifestation of the state power, defined as
the capability of pronouncing imperative and authoritative decisions. As function, it
expresses the onus on state institutions to promote the pacification of interindividual
conflicts, through the fair application of the law and through the process. And as
activity, jurisdiction is the complex of the judges acts in the process, exercising
the power and performing the function that the law entitles him to. The power, the
function and the activity are only manifested legitimately through the process properly
structured (due process of law)14.
Arbitration is not a public method of settlement of conflicts. At first, this could
lead to a false belief that it cannot be classified as jurisdiction, given the fact that
this function shall be performed under the state monopoly15. In spite of that, it must
be recognized that it is the state itself, through a legislative norm (Law 9.307/96,
in the Brazilian case), which confers on the arbitral chambers and courts (that have
unequivocal private nature) the power to settle definitively the conflicts, equating not
only the arbiters to judges but also the arbitral award to a judicial sentence, giving it
the status of executive judicial title, and thus rendering unnecessary any further acts of
ratification from the Judiciary to produce all its effects, as long it is a national arbitral
award and in case of a foreign arbitral award it must submit itself to homologation act
in the Superior Court of Justice. Therefore, if the State itself, through its legislative
12 CARREIRA ALVIM, Jos Eduardo. Direito arbitral. 3.ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2007, p. 250.
13 THEODORO JR., Humberto. Curso de direito processual civil. 50.ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2009, p. 37, n. 34.
14 CINTRA, Antnio Carlos de Arajo et all. Teoria geral cit., p. 147.
15 OWEN FISS, The forms of justice, Harvard Law Review, p. 30-31
Volume2_CS4.indb 189
6/16/11 4:11 PM
190
function grants the arbitral award the same treatment as its given to the judicial award,
it leaves no doubts about the nature of the award. If the arbitral award was not produced
through jurisdictional function and as such a manifestation of sovereign it would
be completely inappropriate the condition to its efficacy the homologation procedure
in the Superior Court of Justice, as its certain that this sort of conditions are not
present when the question is simply over the efficacy of a international contract.16
On the other hand, it is imperative to recognize that the function exercised by
the arbiters, in searching a solution for the conflict and using the existent juridical
norms, does not differ from the function carried out by the judges. In fact, there
is no difficulty in demonstrating that both arbiter and judge get to know the facts
exposed by the parties in the process (a proceeding characterized by impartiality and
contradiction), both drawing from various procedures (legal, for the judge; legal and
conventional, for the arbiter)17.
In the same way, it is indispensable to acknowledge that, by solving the controversy,
through the application of the law or equity to the situation in hand, arbitration also
has the unequivocal function of social pacification.
In this context, there remains no doubt that arbitration is cloaked in the mantle
of jurisdiction18, like the activity performed in the Judiciary sphere, and therefore
its jurisdictional character cannot be removed19, even if the contractual character is
also present. The arbiter, as the judge, knows the practical fundaments that justify the
pretensions of the parties, proceeds to their appraisal in face of the existent evidences,
applies the rules of equity and law, and then reaches his decision, strictly observing,
on each step of the way, the proceedings preestablished and also the principles of the
due process of law. Therefore, there is no significant difference between the result of
the judiciary activity and the arbitral activity.20
It is certain, however, that while a method of nonjudicial jurisdiction, and
considering its eminent private character, the arbitral jurisdiction remains limited to
the exercise of the iudicium, in all its terms and prerogatives, reserving the realization
16 According to Professor Jos Carlos Magalhes (Recognition and Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Revista dos Tribunais, So Paulo,
a 86, vol. 740, jun. 1997) to whom the arbitral award is an eminent private act, deviating solely of the exclusive will of the parties to settle
its conflicts over available rights. In this context, absolutely unnecessary would be to submit the award to previous homologation of the
Judiciary Power, in the same way that occurs with international contracts celebrated abroad and with execution and implementation in
Brazil, that requires ratification of the Judiciary to be recognized. The Judiciary Power would only interfere over matters of disrespect of
public order, national sovereign, in the terms of art. 17, LICC.
17 CARMONA, Carlos Alberto. A arbitragem no processo civil brasileiro. So Paulo:Malheiros,1993,p.34.
18 About this matter, the decision of the Superior Court of Justice in the competence judgment n. 113.260/SP, on which the 2nd Section,
in the decision published on April, 7th, 2011, expressed that: arguments in the doctrine that are favorable to the jurisdictional character
of arbitration are covered with rationality and coherence. There are no longer reasons to turn away the jurisdictional character of this
activity
19 HUMBERTO THEODORO JR. asserts: if in the period before the Brazilian Arbitration Law, was predominant the privative and
contractual nature of arbitration, now its no longer possible to doubt that the jurisdictional doctrine became prevalent. In fact, despite
the fact of its creation is found in a contractual relationship among the parties, the arbitral procedure, is in all its aspects equivalent to
official jurisdiction, as not even the arbitral agreement depends on any judicial intervention, neither the arbitral award is submitted to any
judicial approbation. (Arbitration as an alternative to settlement of conflicts, Revista Sntese de Direito Civil e Processo Civil, n.2, Nov
Dez/1999, p.5). Corroborating this view, Nelson Nery Jnior: The juridical nature of arbitration is jurisdictional. The arbiter exercises
jurisdiction as applies to the concrete case the law and leads the conflict to a final and definitive solution. Arbitration is an instrument to
social pacification. Its decision is exteriorized through an award, that holds the trait of executive judicial title, having no need to be ratified
by any Judicial instance. (Cdigo de processo civil comentado e legislao civil extravagante em vigor. 3. ed., So Paulo: RT, 1997)
20 CARREIRAALVIM,JosEduardo.Direitocit.,p.252.
Volume2_CS4.indb 190
6/16/11 4:11 PM
191
of the imperium to the state court. This occurs as the iudicium requires previously the
implement of acts of forced expropriation, which means, that requires use of force.
And in fact, this use of force is a solely State prerogative, as only those invested by the
State can legitimately use force to implement decisions
According to Liebman, the competence is the amount of jurisdiction which is
attributed to each State institution. In other words, the competence determinates which
cases will be one specific court be authorized to issue decisions and at the same time,
it abstractly determinates the group of demands and controversies that the Court shall
judge21 From this conception, from the moment the arbiter accepts its nomination, he is
immediately invested with jurisdiction. Just as the judge, he exercises jurisdiction, and
does so observing some limits. In sum, the acknowledgement of the similarities between
state and arbitral jurisdiction leads the foreign doctrine22 to unequivocally point out the
presence of jurisdictional traits in arbitration, and it consequently also acknowledges the
formation of jurisprudence and, in the final analysis, precedents, in the arbitral sphere.
3. Principles ruling the arbitral jurisdiction
Principle, in the definition of CELSO ANTNIO BANDEIRA DE MELLO, is
the nuclear command of a system, true foundation of it, fundamental disposition
that irradiates over different rules, constituting the spirit and serving as a criterion for
its exact comprehension and intelligence, by defining the logic and rationality of the
normative system, and so conferring on it the tonic and giving it its harmonic sense.
It is the knowledge of principles which governs the intellection of the different parts
composing the unity known as positive juridical system23. They are, therefore, the
fundamental points that guide the elaboration and application of the juridical system
in its many different definitions.
This work is concerned only with the informative principles of jurisdiction, that
is, those principles concerning to jurisdiction, as function or activity, in order to
determine if such principles are also applicable to arbitration. An if it is certain that
the principles inherent to state jurisdiction are nominally those which have incidence
in the arbitral jurisdiction, it is also certain that they do not have the same extension in
one and the other not because they have different natures or finalities, since they do
not, but due to the structure of the institutions and the way each procedure constitutes
itself (one is permanent and the other transitory), and to the procedure, that is in one
case necessarily legal, and on the other, conventional 24.
21 LIEBMAN, Enrico Tulio. Manual de direito processual civil. v. 1. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1984, p. 55, n. 24.
22 On this matter, cf. POUDRET e BESSON. Comparative law of international arbitration. 2.ed., London: Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell,
2007, pp. 1-2: This controversy [between the jurisdictional and contractual nature of arbitration] is object of a specific regulation.
Studying the fonts of arbitration, it is clear that this regulation is more often found in the Civil Procedure Code, as in Germany, Belgium,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, emphasizing its closeness to the judicial procedure. At other times, there are special laws as in England and
Sweden. Only Switzerland presents itself as an exception, regulating international arbitration in its international private law, not only by
its nature but mostly by the legislative competence between the Confederation and the Cantons ()
23 BANDEIRA DE MELO, Celso Antnio. Curso de direito administrativo. 17.ed. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2004, p. 807.
24 CARREIRAALVIM,JosEduardo.Direitoarbitral cit.,p.110.
Volume2_CS4.indb 191
6/16/11 4:11 PM
192
To begin with, there are six fundamental principles applicable both to state and
arbitral jurisdiction which must be highlighted:
(a) the investiture; (b) the adherence to the territory;
(c) the non-delegability;
(d) the prohibition of refusal of competence exercise;
(e) the natural judge; and
(f) the jurisdiction inertia.
The principle of investiture contemplates the idea that jurisdiction can only be
exercised by those to whom the state, which holds the monopoly of the exercise of
jurisdiction, attributes the authority of judge. Its imperative to clarify that, in this
specific matter, its no longer possible to sustain the statement according to which
jurisdiction would be an exclusive prerogative given to those approved in public
service examination, as the Federal Constitution (1988), states that private lawyers
can become part of the Judiciary to integrate the composition of the Superior
Courts - and as such exercise jurisdiction25 without any process of public service
examination.
In fact, in the arbitral sphere, the investiture translates as the notion that only
those nominated as arbiters by the parties or by an institution by them chosen can be
responsible for the judgment of the controversy. The arbiter invests himself in the
arbitral jurisdiction from the moment he accepts his nomination and only loses this
power in the end of the arbitral proceedings or in the case of impediment, suspicion,
death or the end of the time defined for the arbitral award to be produced.
Adherence to the territory means that the judge only exercises authority, and
therefore holds legitimacy to practice acts of conduction and judgment in the process,
inside the territorial boundaries which, by law, are under his jurisdiction. This principle
defines that every act in the process which must the practiced outside the territorial
limits the judge can exercise its jurisdiction depends on the cooperation of the judge
that has jurisdiction over that place26, to whom aid is requested by official letters,
depending on the place and hierarchy existing between the soliciting judge and the
other authority. The arbitral jurisdiction also adheres itself to a determinate territory,
that is defined by the parties in the arbitral convention and may be only one, called
place of arbitration, or many places, being that definition at the exclusive discretion
of the parties. This may occur when circumstances demand the hearing of witnesses
or the gathering of evidences in places other than the one chosen as the place of the
arbitral proceedings. Such dispositions are essential, given that among arbitral courts
there is no imperative system of cooperation.
25 Cf., arts. 94, 104,107, I, 111-A, I, 115, 118, II, 119, II, 120, 1, III, e 123, pargrafo nico, I, da CF/1988.
26 CINTRA, Antnio Carlos de Arajo et all. Teoria geral cit., p. 154.
Volume2_CS4.indb 192
6/16/11 4:11 PM
193
Especially in Brazilian Law, the issue of territory is vital in arbitration, since the
art. 34 Law 9.307/96 considers foreign the arbitral sentence pronounced outside the
limits of Brazilian territory, and as such, submits this award to a special procedure of
homologation in the Superior Court of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justia). Besides
that, art. 10, IV Law 9.307/96 considers the indication of the place where the sentence
shall be pronounced a requisite indispensable to the validity of the arbitral clause; and
the art. 26, IV, determines that this indication must be mentioned in the arbitral award.
The non-delegability principle comprehends the prohibition imposed on the judges
to, by their will, delegate the exercise of jurisdictional function to any other institution,
except in those cases where there is some sort of impediment or suspicion that
compromises his impartiality and consequently renders imperative the delegation.
That occurs because each judge, exercising the jurisdictional function, does not
do that in his own name and based on a private law: he is an agent of the state (acting
on behalf of it). The state invested on him, according to a certain criterion, the power
to exercise a public function; the state has delegated to him, according to the states
own criterion, the jurisdictional function referring to specific matters. And the judge
has no authority to invert the criteria established by the Constitution and the law and
transfer unto others the competence to appreciate causes.27
The arbiters, too, have the obligation to exercise personally all the acts of
conduction of the proceedings and the judgment of the arbitral demand, being not
authorized to give this power to others, even when the act must be practiced outside
the place of the arbitration, in which case the arbiter must relocate himself personally,
unless the parties have decided otherwise in the arbitral convention.
The principle of prohibition of refusal of competence is connected with the nondelegability, and bars judges from refusing, without just reason, to act in the judgment
of a certain controversy. This principle has a very restrict incidence in the arbitral
jurisdiction, since the refusal of the arbiter normally occurs before the institution of
the arbitral jurisdiction, that is, before the arbiter accepts his nomination. Although
the arbiter is not obligated to act in a proceeding against his will, from the moment he
accepts the nomination, he can no longer decline from his commitment, under penalty
of responsibility, except in cases of supervening suspicion or impediment.
According to the natural judge principle, every citizen is entitled to the right of
having all his matters, both in the judicial and the administrative sphere judged by an
independent judge, impartial and nominated in accordance to legal and constitutional
rules. The principle of the natural judge is opposed to the creation of ad hoc courts,
created for the judgment of certain people or crimes of a special nature, without
constitutional prevision 28
If this conception is taken to an extreme interpretation of this conception may lead
one to believe that any demand could only be appreciated by a judge whose competence
27 CINTRA, Antnio Carlos de Arajo et all; Teoria geral cit., pp. 154-155.
28 CINTRA, Antnio Carlos de Arajo et all. Teoria geral cit., p. 156.
Volume2_CS4.indb 193
6/16/11 4:11 PM
194
Volume2_CS4.indb 194
6/16/11 4:11 PM
195
the arbitral awards a nature of a merely opinions, as the whole arbitral procedure and
especially its final decision are overlaid with the State authorization and protection,
guaranteeing the execution of the obligations contained in the award issued. Indeed, the
modern tendency prevailing in the majority of the States is to enclose the arbitral awards to
the judicial decisions, now having both multiple points of convergence and even respected
the autonomy of the arbitral procedure, in many cases there are the pacific coexistence of
arbitral procedures and judicial collaboration, such as the arbitral award enforcement.
About this necessary coexistence, if there were not the State guard collaborating
to the arbitration by disposing the State apparatus and the prerogative of use of force
to implement the arbitral awards, in a very short time, due to the lack of spontaneous
fulfillment of the decisions, arbitration would certainly face serious issues. However,
the fact that the State interferes in the execution procedures, does not diminish at
all the jurisdictional character of arbitration, indicating only that the use of force
is a prerogative that belongs to the State only, but the function of saying the Law
applicable to the concrete case, this function may be also exercised but other than the
State and its staff.
Further, about the strength of arbitral awards nowadays, quoting the Brazilian
Arbitration Act from 1996: the arbitral award shall produce, among the parties and
their successors, the same effects that a judicial decision has and in case the award is
condemnatory, it constitutes an enforcement order. In the past decades, as the legal
diplomas concerning the matter of arbitral awards would demand homologation of
the Judiciary Power as a sine qua non condition for the award to produce fully effects
However, from the interpretation of the supra dispositive, which is very similar to
those found in many other countries where arbitration already represents a very well
developed institute, its simply impossible to deny that imperative force that the
arbitral award radiates over the parties involved.
Furthermore, still based in the Brazilian perspective, the law concerning to arbitration
in the country in its article 18 equates arbitrates and judges in their functions, not only in
power exercise but also in civil and criminal responsibilities in its duties. Moreover, the
act of decision is ruled by strict legal commands under penalty of nullity, and even the
structure of the arbitral award resemble the traditional judicial sentence. Therefore, as the
modern tendency based on long practical experience confirms that once the arbitral award
respects all the requirements inherent to the judicial decisions, its completely useless
to condemn the parties to submit the award to judicial appreciation, drawing from the
arbitration one of its most distinguished traits: speediness.
So, given the crescent prestige and innumerous consequences arriving from the arbitral
award, its absolute imperative a more carefully consideration over them. This caution
is justified in the fact that one of the most powerful instruments in any State of Law is
the judicial command that does not leave any discretionary to their addressees whether
of obey or not the order. So, once vanquished any characterization of arbitral awards as
having little, or no importance at all, and as a immediate consequence of this importance
of arbitral awards and its similarity to judicial elements, an important question raised is
Volume2_CS4.indb 195
6/16/11 4:11 PM
196
whether arbitral awards shall serve as precedents and if so, if they should have the same
force given by the stare decisis predominate in the common law States, or should the that
solely appoint to elements and referential instead of dictated it.
4. The difference between precedent as an earlier case and as stare decisis
doctrine.
Even when taken into account the natural differences existing between the civil
procedure and the arbitral proceedings, there are certainly points of convergence that
approximate these two institutes, such as the jurisdictional function performed and
also the same principles applicable to both procedures. Both represent fundamental
bases in the defense of Justice and the due process of law. And one of the elements that
must be regarded in any method that aims at the definitive resolution of conflicts is
that the decision must provide both parties with equal treatment, avoiding any unfair
manifestations.
Indeed, given the avocation of the State to settle conflicts between persons, there
exists also the obligation to provide citizens with security and predictability of the
decisions. In order to do so, some systems have adopted Codes of Law to direct the
judicial decisions, describing hypothetical situations and attributing to them juridical
consequences. Other systems approved the binding of the decisions to earlier judicial
pronunciations in similar cases. And despite the significant differences between
each system, the binding of the decisions either to a command of law or to an earlier
decision from the courts aims to restrain the discretionary power of the one who
judges, either a judge or arbiter, in order to preclude any sort of teratological practices
that would suscitate or aggravate social conflicts, instead of mitigating them. In short,
the objective is to make the decision not a creation of the judges own will, but instead
the materialization of the law to the case, either the one described in the Codes or that
established in earlier decisions.
In order to initiate the discussion on the precedents, it is essential to present the
distinction between the two main meanings of the word. In common law countries,
precedents have their origins in the XVI century, when courts first began to follow earlier
decisions on particular matters. In the following centuries, the British Courts adopted a
position even more favorable to finding the law in earlier decisions, rather than creating
a new one34. Since then, precedents have constantly evolved in common law countries,
becoming not only a persuasive evidence of law, but rather a primary source of it.
None the less, in a system so highly developed as our own, precedents
have so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from
which the labor of the judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is
to examine and compare them.35
34 () the function of common law, which consists of the original common custom and the role of courts, was to find and declare such
custom and to provide persuasive evidence of its content and existence. BLACKSTONE, William. (1764)
35 CARDOZO, Benjamim. The Nature of Judicial Process. Yale Press University. 1921. p.20-21.
Volume2_CS4.indb 196
6/16/11 4:11 PM
197
36 COOLEY, Thomas M. A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which rest upon the Legislative. 5th edition. Boston. Little, Brown and
Company. 1898.
37 [t]he role of the courts is to solve disputes that are brought before them, not to make laws or regulations DAVID, R.. French Law: its
structure, sources and methodology. Louisiana State University Press. 1972. p.180-181.
Volume2_CS4.indb 197
6/16/11 4:11 PM
198
The fears that guided radical opinions about the imperative separation of Powers
and so would not allow the Judiciary to legislate turned out to be unfounded, and
even the civil law countries have adopted the view that the observance of earlier
judicial opinions represents an element that add security, consistence and stability. In
doing so, the doctrine of jurisprudence constante was created, according to which the
earlier judicial decisions should be taken into consideration as long as such decisions
already present sufficient uniformity.
So, the judicial precedents, here understood as earlier decisions that present
uniformity in the jurisprudence, even though not able to bind the courts, would
certainly have a great persuasive power, being an alternative to judges and arbiters
when facing complex questions38. The opinions expressed by other judges would
definitely serve as guides to the resolution of difficult situations.
In the international sphere, the issue of the application of precedents has
arisen recently, due to the fact that in the past decades it would be impossible to
search for a base of consolidated jurisprudence, as it was being developed and
matured in order not only to find acceptance but also to resist posterior criticism.
In the current stage of arbitration development, especially in the international
community, and also considering the new possibilities of access to the many
different arbitral decisions from tribunals and chambers around the world, the
importance and the very possibility that further decisions are able to draw from
earlier ones is undeniable.
5. The use of precedents in arbitration.
Throughout the past decades, arbitration has been undergoing a period of
exponential growth. As a direct consequence, new questions have been rising within
the matter, and their solution is essential to prevent any obstacles to the continuous
development of arbitration. In this scenario, one of the main questions is whether
arbitral awards would constitute precedents, and if so, if these decisions would have a
binding force, such as in common law, or if they would have only a persuasive effect,
similar to the civil law system.
In order to gauge the influence of precedents, and especially the impacts generated
by them in arbitration, one will first of all resort to international sources, due to the
fact that international arbitration is more consolidated and developed.
In this context, the reference to the art. 59 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) is mandatory: the decision of the Court has no force, except among
the parties to a particular case39.
Even the arbitral jurisprudence has already shown itself in some cases favorable to
the literal interpretation of art. 59 of ICJ, in the following terms:
38 It is only expected that arbitrators when faced with difficult issues of law want to know what others in similar situations have done,
and regard awards by other arbitrators in related cases as veritable precedents. BERGER, K. Peter. The International Arbitrators
Application of Precedents. Journal of International Arbitration. Kluwer Law International. 1982
39 See also NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1.136). Available at: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp.
Access: 10.11.10
Volume2_CS4.indb 198
6/16/11 4:11 PM
199
Volume2_CS4.indb 199
6/16/11 4:11 PM
200
those established within the ICSID system, will generally take account
of the precedents established by other arbitration organs, especially
those set by other international tribunals. The present Tribunal will
follow the same line, especially since both parties, in their written
pleadings and oral arguments, have heavily relied on precedent.47
Considering the increase in arbitrations proceedings, noticeably those of a
commercial nature, under the auspices of prestigious institutions or even ad hoc courts
in the MERCOSUL region (with particularly important contributions from Brazil and
Argentina), a great volume of information begins to appear and may already be used as
references for arbitral decisions. In fact, seeking to have more stability and recognition
in the MERCOSUL area, arbitral courts consider that the reference to earlier arbitral
awards indicates coherence in the treatment of matters that are considered vital to the
countries in the region.
So, following the standard of European and American arbitral courts, which have
been consolidating agreements over certain important matters, this initiative can now
also be seen, incipiently, in the MERCOSUL area, and one is able to find among
Brazilian and Argentine arbitral courts allusions to earlier awards.
Also, in international arbitral chambers the reflections over the force of precedents
as a source to be used points mainly to arbitration under ICSID auspices, as the awards
found in the Center heavily reference other awards.
6. The precedents and the ICSID arbitrations.
The majority of international arbitrations are marked by the previous existence
of bilateral treaties among states, with the nomination of the International Center
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as the institution responsible for the
designation of arbiters and conduction of procedures. The preference is due to the fact
that the Convention which created the ICSID allows not only states but also investors
to present their claims directly to the Center.
Over the last 60 years, ICSID has seen an exponential growth of arbitrations under
its auspices, forming an incomparable database of arbitral jurisprudence. Even though
the imposition of stare decisis doctrine in arbitrations under the International Center
for Settlement of Investment Disputes48 is impossible, by the express disposition of
the art. 5349 of ICSID Convention, it is increasingly consolidated inside the ICSID the
agreement that the observance of its own earlier decisions, as well as the decisions of
other arbitral courts, is important. After all, in the past fifteen years, the practice of
arbitration under the ICSID was so significant that the use of precedents became more
47 El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, April 27, 2006, Available
at: www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0315-DOJ-E.pdf
48 the absence [] of a rule of stare decisis in the ICSID arbitration () Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Annulment, 16 May 1986, para.
44, 1 ICSID Reports 509, 521.
49 award shall be binding on the parties () art. 53. ICSID Convention. Available: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/
CRR_English-final.pdf. Acesso: 10 de novembro de 2010.
Volume2_CS4.indb 200
6/16/11 4:11 PM
201
Volume2_CS4.indb 201
6/16/11 4:11 PM
202
7. Conclusion.
The long debate over the nature of the arbitration, whether purely contractual or
jurisdictional, is finally over, prevailing the view of those who advocates that the
classic definition of jurisdiction by Chiovenda has developed, being now completely
possible to grant arbitration the jurisdictional character for all the reasons demonstrated
in this paper. And as any other institute that is constantly in evolution, once a debate
is over, many others are raised. For the purposes of this paper, given the similarities
existing among arbitral awards and judicial decisions, as the imperative element is
undoubtedly existing in both, some applications and uses inherent to judicial decisions
are now being expanded to arbitral award such as the consideration on early decisions
either as references to the decision yet to come or as mandatory guidelines that must
be followed.
And considering the peculiarities of arbitral institute, the demand of consent as
a sine qua non condition for its institution leads to the assertion that it would not be
possible to impose, in the arbitral proceedings, the binding force of precedents. In the
first place, the parties could reasonably argue that their chances of success would be
significantly mitigated if precedents were mandatory, taking the parties away from
any arbitral procedure which would previously have a solution contrary to the interests
involved.. In addition to that, there is the opinion of Lord Denning:
[ I]f we never do anything which has not been done before, we shall
never get anywhere. The law will stand still whilst the rest of the world
goes on: and that will be bad for both.54
Nevertheless, if on one hand it is agreed that the imposition of stare decisis
opinion in arbitration as a general rule is not viable, the peremptory denial of the force
of precedents as a subsidiary source to arbiters in the process of disputes resolution
is also not acceptable. In fact, the arguments contrary to the use of precedents in
arbitration, which are as a rule founded in the words of art. 53 of the ICJ Statute,
represent only its literal, and certainly not its best, interpretation55.
Those dispositions, point to the prohibition imposed on arbiters to be limited to
earlier arbitral awards, but do not preclude them of using such decisions, considering
case by case the similarities. In conclusion, it can be said that a de facto precedent
finds wide reception in the arbitrations, and it is understood that early decisions can
serve perfectly as guides for later analyses.
The ability to follow new paths and demonstrate versatility in answering the
modern challenges of arbitration is an imperative task that Brazilian jurists and arbiters
must undertake. If the effects of precedent in arbitration, domestic or international,
would have had little relevance for the country a few decades ago, they now have
54 DENNING, Alfred T. The Discipline of Law 1979, p. 296.
55 SCHREUER, CH. The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001).
Volume2_CS4.indb 202
6/16/11 4:11 PM
203
great impact56. After all, the increase in Brazilian arbitration proceedings has been
leading to the gradual emergence of a considerable volume of arbitral decisions from
prestigious institutions and respected national arbiters.
Another important factor that contributes to this fruitful debate, and points to
possible solutions, is the understanding about the viability of applying in Brazil the
internationally common practice of partially releasing arbitral awards, which does
not compromise the confidentiality of the proceedings, and greatly contributes
to the setting of milestones and the consolidation of opinions applicable to future
controversies.
Finally, once confirmed the importance of the theme in the international community,
it is absolutely required of Brazilian arbiters and experts to provide answers concerning
the use of precedents in arbitration, its consequences and its limits.
56
Volume2_CS4.indb 203
6/16/11 4:11 PM
204
References
BANDEIRA DE MELO, Celso Antnio. Curso de direito administrativo. 17.ed. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2004.
BARBOSA MOREIRA, Jos Carlos. O novo processo civil brasileiro. 21. ed.. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2000.
BERGER, K. Peter. The International Arbitrators Application of Precedents. Journal of International
Arbitration. Kluwer Law International. 1982
BLACKSTONE, William. An Analysis of the Laws in England. Harvard University. 1764
BRUNET, Edward. Arbitration and Constitutional Rights. Constitutional Law Review. 1992
CARDOZO, Benjamim. The Nature of Judicial Process. Yale Press University. 1921.
CARMONA, Carlos Alberto. Arbitragem e processo: um comentrio lei 9.307/96. 3.ed., rev., atual.
e ampl. So Paulo: Atlas, 2009.
__________.A arbitragem no processo civil brasileiro. So Paulo:Malheiros,1993.
CARREIRA ALVIM, Jos Eduardo. Direito arbitral. 3.ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2007.
CINTRA, Antnio Carlos de Arajo; GRINOVER, Ada Pellegrini; DINAMARCO, Cndido. Teoria
geral do processo. 25.ed. So Paulo: Malheiros, 2009.
COOLEY, Thomas M. A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which rest upon the Legislative.
5th edition. Boston. Little, Brown and Company. 1898.
COUTURE, Eduardo. Fundamentos del derecho procesal civil. 14.ed. Buenos Aires: Depalma, 1988.
DAVID, R.. French Law: its structure, sources and methodology. Louisiana State University Press. 1972.
DENNING, Alfred T. The Discipline of Law. LexisNexis. England. 1979 p. 296.
FAZZALARI, Elio. Larbitrato. Torino: UTET, 1997.
KNAPP, Charles. Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law. Fordham. 2002.
LOPES DA COSTA, Alfredo de Arajo. A administrao pblica e a ordem jurdica privada (jurisdio
voluntria). Belo Horizonte: Bernardo lvares, 1961.
LUBAN, David. Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm . Georgetown Law. 1995.
MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. Teoria geral do processo. 3.ed., rev. e atual. So Paulo: RT, 2008.
MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. Rpidas observaes sobre arbitragem e jurisdio. Disponvel em
http://marinoni.adv.br. Acesso em 07/03/2011.
OWEN FISS, The forms of justice, 93 Harvard Law Review, 1978.
PEREIRA, Caio Mrio da Silva. Instituies de direito civil. v. 1. 23. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2010.
POUDRET e BESSON. Comparative law of international arbitration. 2.ed.. London: Thomson/Sweet
& Maxwell, 2007.
ROCCO,Alfredo.Lasentenzacivile.Milano:Giuffr,1962.
THEODORO JR., Humberto. Curso de direito processual civil. 50.ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2009.
WEIDERMAIER, W. Mark. Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration. William and Mary Law
Review. Vol. 51. 2010.
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS.
I CSID Convention. Available at: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_Englishfinal.pdf. Access: 10.09.10
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1.136). Available at: http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/nafta/naftatce.asp. Access: 10..
INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE.
AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17.
Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Annulment, 16 May 1986, para. 44, 1 ICSID Reports 509, 521.
El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on
Jurisdiction, April 27, 2006, available at: www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0315-DOJ-E.pdf.
Access: 10.09.10;
ICC Partial Award 4131, Collection ICC Arbitral Awards (1990), p.151.
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Preliminary Objections Judgment)
[1998] ICJ Rep.275, para. 28
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A.
v. Argentine Republic,ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, May 16, 2006, available
at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/.pdf. Access: 10.09.10
Volume2_CS4.indb 204
6/16/11 4:11 PM
205
Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 10 December
1984 is the the centrepiece of todays international law of the sea. It has codified and
progressively developed this branch of international. One hundred and sixty States
and the European Union are bound by it, confirming the importance of the Convention
within the general framework of international law.
The Convention establishes and presupposes a world that is far away from that of
traditional international law:
(I) A world in which institutions, judges and individuals play a significant
role.
(II) However central, UNCLOS is not all the law of the sea: a variety of
sources participate in building what can be called the law of the sea
system.
(III) This system must, in the current post-codification era, meet a number
of challenges consisting in completing tasks set out in UNCLOS and in
confronting new needs and problems.
I. The world of UNCLOS
1. UNCLOS at the centre of a highly institutionalized world
The world of UNCLOS is a highly institutionalized one in which cooperation
between States Parties is an obligation. Under UNCLOS institutions have a powerful
role in implementing cooperation, in fleshing out substantive rules and helping to
keep these rules abreast of developments. UNCLOS provides for the establishment
of new institutions and entrusts tasks to existing ones.
The institutions established in compliance with the rules of the UNCLOS are: the
Meeting of the States parties to the Convention, the International Seabed Authority,
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Commission for the
Limits of the Continental Shelf. All of them have developed a considerable activity
and, at the same time, given rise to some concerns.
1 This article considers some of the questions dealt with in the authors course on the law of the sea held in July 2010 at the Cursos de
Inverno of international law at the University of Belo Horizonte
2 Professor at the University of Milano, Faculty of Law. Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
Volume2_CS4.indb 205
6/16/11 4:11 PM
206
The Meeting of States parties under the Convention has relatively modest
functions. They consist in adopting the budget of the ITLOS, in electing the latters
members as well as those of the Commission for the limits of the continental shelf,
and in receiving a report by the UN Secretary-General. In practice, however, it has
become a forum in which parties, acting by consensus, have adopted adjustments
to the LOS Convention, mainly concerning time-limits for elections and for
submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Whether
the Meeting has a broader competence allowing it to discuss every kind of law
of the sea question is hotly debated as such competence might entail a possible
duplication of the debates in the UN General Assembly3. A question discussed in
scholarly writing is whether the Meeting of States Parties may submit a request
for an Advisory Opinion to the ITLOS, in light of article 138 of the Rules of the
Tribunal, which may be read as envisaging this possibility.
The International Seabed Authority has been active since the entry into
force of UNCLOS notwithstanding the absence of significant activity for the
mining of polymetallic nodules in the International Seabed Area. Through its
complex structure, in part simplified by the 1994 Implementing Agreement,
the Authority has produced regulations for prospecting and exploration for
polymetallic nodules in 2000 and for polymetallic sulphides in 2010 and is
working on regulations on ferromanganese crusts. Eight contract for exploration
of polymetallic nodules have been granted. In 2010 Russia submitted the first
request for a contract of exploration of polymetallic sulphides. The Authority
has also produced significant studies, in particular as regards the impact of
seabed mining on the environment. It suffers, nevertheless, from the lack of
interest of a high number of States parties, that often fail to send delegates to
the Assembly meetings in Kingston, Jamaica, thus making it difficult to reach
the quorum necessary for decisions.
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has been active since
1996 and has had so far 18 cases, mostly concerning prompt release of vessels
and provisional measures. Although its jurisprudence has been praised for its
quality and promptness, the Tribunal has not yet had the opportunity to prove its
capacity in dealing with a sufficient number of normal contentious cases. The
narrowness of its compulsory jurisdiction under UNCLOS and the fact that so
far States have not entrusted to it a case by agreement, are probably the main
reasons why this institution is underemployed. The submission to the Tribunal
in 2009 of a delimitation case (Bangla-Desh v. Myanmar) and the request by the
Council of the International Seabed Authority in 2010 of an advisory opinion
to the Tribunals Seabed Disputes Chamber (which was rendered on 1 February
2011) seems to indicate a renewal of interest for the Tribunal.
. Treves, The General Assembly and the Meeting of States Parties in the Implementation of the LOS Convention, in A. G. Oude Elferink
T
(ed.), Stabiliy and Change in the Law of the Sea: The Role of the LOS Convention, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, pp. 55-74.
Volume2_CS4.indb 206
6/16/11 4:11 PM
207
The Commission for the limits of the continental shelf, after a slow start, is now
under the severe pressure of a high and growing number of submissions. It encounters
serious difficulties in facing its complex and time-consuming tasks. Moreover, its light
structure, as well as the lack of transparency of its procedures and the questionable
independence guarantees of its members, may raise criticism, especially in view of
the media attention its activity has attracted since claims on the Arctic seabed have
been in the news.
As regards organizations existing before its entry into force, UNCLOS establishes
a tight relationship between the exercise of rights of States parties and international
rules and standards that are generally accepted, or recommended by the competent
international organizations. For instance, in stating the measures flag States must
take to ensure safety at sea, article 94 (5) provides that they are required to conform
to generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices. Such
reference alludes to IMO conventions and rules and standards, and make them relevant,
whenever they are generally accepted, also for States that are not bound by them.
Other rules of UNCLOS give a role to international institutions in limiting the
powers conferred to States parties by stating that they cannot exercise such powers
unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards
(art. 21, para 2, as regards laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships exercising innocent
passage). In still other cases, international rules and standards are indicated as setting
minimum requirements with which domestic laws and regulations must comply. So,
for instance, national laws, regulations and measures concerning dumping shall be
no less effective than the global rules and standards (art. 210, para 6; similarly art.
208, para 3).
Sometimes the IMO, as the competent international organization, is entrusted
with a role in obtaining the right balance between the exercise of coastal States
powers and the interests of other States. The following are the main examples.
a) Coastal States shall take into account the recommendations of
the competent international organization in the designation of sea
lanes and in the prescription of traffic separation schemes in the
territorial sea (art. 22, para 3) generally accepted international
standards in regulating the removal of abandoned or disused
installations in the exclusive economic zone (art. 60, para 3).
b) Derogations to certain obligations of the coastal State are
permitted only if authorized by the competent international
organization. For instance, the breath of safety zones around
artificial islands, installations and structures in the exclusive
economic zone can exceed 500 meters only if authorized by
generally accepted international standards or recommended by the
competent organization (art. 60, para 5).
Volume2_CS4.indb 207
6/16/11 4:11 PM
208
Volume2_CS4.indb 208
6/16/11 4:11 PM
209
Since UNCLOS has entered in force, practice shows that recourse to international
judges and arbitrators is becoming a physiological, not necessarily hostile, occurrence
in international relations as regards law of the sea questions. The ITLOS and annex
VII arbitration tribunals have been seized, on the basis of the jurisdictional clauses
of UNCLOS, more than twenty times since 1994. The ICJ, although it has never been
seized under these clauses, has had a number of opportunities to apply UNCLOS and
has made a significant contribution to the interpretation of some of its provisions.
So far no conflicting views have emerged as between these different adjudicating
bodies.
A further aspect to be underlined is the deterrence effect of compulsory settlement.
Even though these cases receive little publicity, it is well known that various disputes
have not materialized in courts and tribunals, and have been quietly settled by the
parties, in light of the fact that one party was fully aware that the other was ready to
utilize the compulsory means of settlement set out in UNCLOS.
3. UNCLOS and the enhancement of the position of individuals in the law of
the sea
Most rules of UNCLOS concern relationships between States and State interests.
This notwithstanding, and consistent with trends emerging in other branches of
international law, UNCLOS makes relevant in various ways the position of individuals.
Some of its provisions aim at protecting individual interests. One example concerns
the protection human life at sea through the obligation imposed on States by article
98 to request masters of ships flying their flag to render assistance to persons lost at
sea or in distress or in case of collision.
In some cases UNCLOS grants rights to individuals. These rights are limited,
however, to procedural matters. This is the case of persons allowed to act on behalf
of the flag state in prompt release proceedings under UNCLOS article 292(2) and of
state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which may be granted contracts for
conducting activities in the international Seabed Area under article 153(2)b of the
same Convention.
In both cases such grant of rights to private entities is conditional and might be
seen as a fiction. The flag or national State may exclude the exercise of the right by
the individual, or, if such right has been granted, it can replace the individual in its
exercise. So the flag State may abstain from authorizing the interested private party to
act on its behalf in prompt release proceedings and proceed on its own or decide not to
proceed at all. The State whose nationality the entities mentioned in art. 153(2)b have
may abstain from sponsoring the private person, making it impossible to exercise the
right to obtain a contract; moreover, if the national State of the contractor has become
a sponsoring State, in case the sponsored person acts as plaintiff in a case, the State
may be requested to appear in the proceedings on behalf of that person (art. 190(2)
UNCLOS), thus making its procedural rights ineffective.
Volume2_CS4.indb 209
6/16/11 4:11 PM
210
In still other cases the best way for a State Party to implement certain obligations
set out by UNCLOS consists in introducing in its domestic law rules that can be
invoked by individuals before domestic courts. This is the case of articles 73(3) and
230 concerning penalties that can or cannot be imposed as regards fisheries violations
and pollution. This is also the case of articles 21(2) of Annex III and 39 of Annex VI
concerning enforcement in the territories of states parties of decisions concerning the
Authority or adopted by the Sea Bed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS. Depending on
the manner in which the relationship between treaty obligations and domestic law
is regulated in a given State Partys domestic legal system, this result is obtained
automatically because the State is bound by UNCLOS, or through the adoption of
specific provisions.
II. The law of the seasystem
1. A plurality of sources
Almost three decades have elapsed since the adoption of UNCLOS and almost
two since its entry into force. The current international law of the sea, although
dominated by UNCLOS, does not consist only in UNCLOS. Rules set out by
other sources are relevant and it becomes important to examine the relationship
between them and UNCLOS. The most important sources to be considered are
customary law and treaties. Non-binding soft-law instruments must also be taken
into consideration.
a. Customary law
For the wide majority of existing States, as parties UNCLOS, most of the
general law of the sea rules are treaty rules. Still, also in an area of international
law dominated by a convention whose ambition is to function as the constitution
of the Oceans, customary law continues to play a relevant role. Not all law of the
sea questions are regulated by UNCLOS and not all states are parties to UNCLOS.
The last paragraph of the UNCLOS preamble recognizes the continuing role of
customary law stating that: matters not regulated by this Convention continue to
be governed by the rules of general international law. The fact that UNCLOS as
an international treaty does not bind states that are not parties to it, entails that
among non-parties, and in relations between parties and non-parties, customary
rules apply (unless both States involved are parties to the Geneva convention
relevant in the concrete case).
The relevance of customary law and its relationship with UNCLOS emerge clearly
in recent international instruments. These instruments, also because of the influence
of non-parties to UNCLOS in their negotiation, put on the same level UNCLOS
and customary law, and give them priority over their own provisions. So the 2001
Volume2_CS4.indb 210
6/16/11 4:11 PM
211
Volume2_CS4.indb 211
6/16/11 4:11 PM
212
b. Treaties
A substantial amount of treaties different from UNCLOS complete the texture of
the international law of the sea. Some of them have been concluded after UNCLOS
and aim at completing and sometimes correcting its provisions on specific issues.
Others, concluded before and also after UNCLOS, may be seen as implementing the
framework convention function of the UNCLOS.
In the first category have particular relevance the so-called implementing
agreements, namely agreements that explicitly state the purpose of implementing
certain provisions of UNCLOS. Two agreements state that purpose in their very
title: the 1994 Agreement for the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 12 December 198211 and the 1995 Agreement for
the Implementation of the Provisions the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. (the UN Fish Stock Agreement)12. The
two implementing agreements are not in the same relationship with UNCLOS. The
Implementing Agreement of 1994 amends the Convention and becomes a necessary
part of it as states must, after its adoption, become parties to the Convention and to
the Agreement at the same time. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement may be ratified
or acceded to also by States that are not parties to UNCLOS. Agreements and
Conventions concluded after the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and implementing it on
a regional basis, as well as the FAO Compliance Agreement of 1993, the UNESCO
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage of 2001, and the
IMO Wreck removal Convention of 2007 do not state as a purpose the implementation
of provisions of UNCLOS, but all contain provisions recognizing the particular role
of UNCLOS.
A review, or even a list, of all treaties that are to be applied together with the
UNCLOS, and whose existence is presupposed by it or whose conclusion and further
development is encouraged by it, would be too long. Suffice it to recall the universal
and regional conventions concerning the protection of the marine environment,
especially those concluded within the framework of the IMO; and the conventions
regarding fisheries in whose preparation FAO plays an important role.
Article 311 of UNCLOS sets out, for States Parties, a complex set of rules
concerning the relationship between UNCLOS and other conventions. Its purpose
is to ensure the central position of UNCLOS in the international law of the sea by
obliging States Parties to give it a hierarchically superior position.
It states that UNCLOS shall prevail over the 1958 Geneva Conventions
(paragraph 1) and that it does not affect international agreements expressly permitted
or preserved under other articles of the Convention (paragraph 5). These include the
11 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (New
York, 28 July 1994, entered into force 28 July 1996) 1836 UNTS 42
12 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. (New York 4 December 1995, entered
into force 11 December 2001) 2167 UNTS 88.
Volume2_CS4.indb 212
6/16/11 4:11 PM
213
Volume2_CS4.indb 213
6/16/11 4:11 PM
214
A number of soft-law rules have had an influence on customary law. For instance
UN General Assemblys resolution 2574 D (XXIV) of 1991 on drift-net fishing and
the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries of 1995.
Sometimes, through references made in UNCLOS, soft law rules are given an
effect similar to that of binding rules. For example, under article 211(2) of UNCLOS,
laws and regulations adopted by States Parties to prevent pollution by vessels shall
at least have the same effect as that of generally accepted international rules and
standards established through the competent international organization or general
diplomatic conference. The non-binding standards are made binding in the sense
that they function as a minimum standard for legislation. And the rules, binding for
States parties to the conventional instruments that contain them, obtain also for States
that are not parties the same kind of binding character. In both cases it is necessary,
however, that the instruments be generally accepted. For non-binding standards or
recommended practices it is enough for their being generally accepted that they have
been adopted by consensus or without substantial opposition in a universal forum,
such as IMO; for conventional rules, it seems necessary that the treaties in which
they are contained be binding for a broad and representative majority of States (the
number of ratifications and the conditions relating to tonnage provided for in most
IMO Conventions as conditions for entry into force seem to be a good approximation
to what is required for rules to be generally accepted).
In some cases, soft law rules are hardened through the adoption of binding
instruments repeating or approximating their content. The European Union has resorted
to this practice adopting regulations (instruments binding for its member States also
within their domestic legal systems) which correspond to non-binding international
instruments. Examples are the regulations corresponding to the Paris Memorandum
for Port State Inspection, and the regulations on IUU Fishing and on Deep Seabed
Fishing, corresponding to the FAO soft law Action Plan of 2001 and Guidelines of
2008. FAO has resorted also to this technique by adopting in 2009 an Agreement on
Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing13 which is based
on the non-binding Model Scheme adopted in 2005. The hard law rules do not
eliminate those of soft law nor do they diminish their function, as the soft law rules
remain applicable (in their non-binding way) to all States that have adopted them.
2. A law of the sea system?
The primacy of UNCLOS, at least among its 160 States Parties, over other treaties
concerning the law of the sea and the connections established in provisions of UNCLOS
as well as in provisions of other treaties, as regards the relationship between UNCLOS
and these other treaties, is strengthened by a number of provisions set out in the UN
13 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (adopted by the FAO
Conference 22 November 2009, not yet in force) http://www.fao.org/treaties/037-e.pdf
Volume2_CS4.indb 214
6/16/11 4:11 PM
215
Fish Stocks Agreement (article 30) and in other multilateral instruments adopted after
the entry into force of UNCLOS, These provisions concern the settlement of disputes
relating to the interpretation or application of these instruments. They provide that
the rules concerning the settlement of disputes set out in UNCLOS shall also apply to
these disputes, independently of whether the parties to the dispute are also parties to
UNCLOS. Moreover, parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement agree, through article
30, paragraph 2, to apply the UNCLOS dispute-settlement provisions also to disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of global or regional fisheries agreements
relating to straddling or highly migratory fish stocks of which they are parties (these
agreements are about 20). A strong link is established through these provisions
between UNCLOS and other agreements that do not necessarily bind the same parties.
Even though under article 287 of UNCLOS a plurality of adjudicating bodies (the ICJ,
the ITLOS and arbitral tribunals) may be competent to settle disputes, these clauses
create a mechanism to foster the uniform interpretation of UNCLOS as well as the
interpretation of one instrument in light of the others.
It seems, consequently, possible to consider the international law rules concerning
the law of the sea as a system14. This is far from meaning that it is a self-contained
system. The law of the sea remains a branch solidly attached to the trunk of general
international law. The jurisprudence of the various adjudicating bodies that settle
disputes concerning the law of the sea (the ICJ, the ITLOS and arbitration tribunals),
has constantly considered the rules applicable to law of the sea issues as normal rules
of international law requiring no difference in the application of general rules such
as those on the interpretation of treaties, on reservations, on State responsibility. To
characterize the law of the sea as a system alludes to the interconnection of sources,
conventional, customary and soft law, as well as of institutions (apart from disputesettlement bodies, it is sufficient to consider the role of the UN General Assembly and
of the meeting of States parties) and the primary framework role of UNCLOS.
3. Stability and flexibility of the system?
UNCLOS was seen by its framers as the constitution of the oceans. They were
keener to ensure its stability than its adaptability. This explains why the conditions
set out in in the Convention for amendments and revision are very difficult to satisfy.
While since November 2004 the amendment procedure of article 312 can be triggered
by any State party, none has done so, nor has any State proposed an amendment
by simplified procedure under article 313 or an amendment to provisions relating
exclusively to the Area under article 314. The review by the Assembly of the Seabed
Authority of the functioning of the seabed mining system which, under section 4 of
14 T. Treves,The Law of the Sea System of Institutions, in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 2, 1998, pp. 325-340;
Id., Dispute-Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Disorder or System?, in M. Kohen (ed.), Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict
Resolution through International Law/ La promotion de la justice, des droits de lhomme et du rglement des conflits par le droit
international, Liber Amicorum Lucius Caflisch, Brill, Leiden, 2007, pp. 927-949.
Volume2_CS4.indb 215
6/16/11 4:11 PM
216
the Annex to the 1994 Implementing Agreement may be undertaken at any time, has
not been proposed yet. The chances of not succeeding have probably been considered
too strong 15, especially in view of the overwhelming support for the balance achieved
in the Convention. The idea of a Fourth Law of the Sea Conference, or of changes to
key provisions, has been sometimes advocated but never seriously pursued in view of
the negative reactions.
The need for stability of the law of the sea, while a commonly shared objective,
cannot make adaptability to new circumstances impossible. While UNCLOS, as
mentioned, is entrenched by its amendment procedures as an almost unchangeable
nucleus, the need for flexibility is satisfied in various ways as evidenced by practice
subsequent to its adoption.
States have agreed to introduce important changes to Part XI, through the 1994
Implementing Agreement16. This agreement has had the political result of opening the
way for the ratification or accession of most industrialized States.
Since the adoption of the 1994 Fish Stocks Agreement, the system has proved to
be resilient by developing tools for change. A limited number of these have emerged
within the UNCLOS, while more relevant others have found a place outside the
Conventions framework, although maintaining a strong link with it.
Within the UNCLOS, as mentioned above, the meeting of the States parties has
been utilized, through consensus decisions, to derogate certain provisions of the
Convention concerning time-limits for elections and, more remarkably, for submitting
applications to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf17.
Another tool for change within the scope of the Convention is the mechanism for
the settlement of disputes. Through interpretation by adjudicating bodies, questions
not explicitly considered in the Convention may be envisaged in the framework of the
conventional rules.
Yet, the most important tools for change have emerged outside the UNCLOS
framework. The agreements mentioned above concerning law of the sea matters
concluded after the entry into force of UNCLOS are the most important. Most of
them are in force, even though the number of States bound by them is far lower that
15 B
.H. Oxman, Tools for Change: the Amendment Procedure, in Proceedings of the Twentieth Anniversary Commemoration of the
Opening for Signature of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York, 9 and 10 December 2002, United Nations,
New York, 2003, pp. 194-2007; D. Freestone and A. G. Oude Elferink, Flexibility and Innovation in the Law of the Sea: Will the LOS
Convention Amendment Procedures ever be Used?, in A. G. Oude Elferink (ed.), Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: The Role
of the LOS Convention, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, pp. 169-221.
16 Agreement relating to the implementation of part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1983, New
York, 28 January 1994.
17 As regards the time limit for submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which article 4 of annex II to the
LOS Convention sets as 10 years after entry into force of the Convention for the submitting State, was modified in 2001 by a consensus
decision of the Meeting of the States Parties as having commenced on 13 May 1999 for States for which the Convention had entered
into force before that date ( Doc. SPLOS/72 of 29 May 2001). It is remarkable that in 2008 the Meeting of States parties decided not to
adopt a further postponement in order to meet the request of States that are just at the beginning of the preparation of their submissions. It
decided that the requirements to be satisfied within the 2009 time limit established in 2001 could consist in the submission of preliminary
information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and a description of the status of preparation
and intended date of making a submission in accordance with the requirements of article 76 of the Convention and the Rules of Procedure
and Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission (doc. SPLOS/184). It seems clear that in this way the Meeting of the States
Parties has again, although in a different way, amended the Convention. While the 2008 decision may make the necessity of further
amendments concerning the same question less likely, it would seem that it has not contributed to the orderly processing of submissions.
Volume2_CS4.indb 216
6/16/11 4:11 PM
217
that of States Parties to UNCLOS. Some, as the UN Fish Straddling Stocks Agreement
and the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage, consider subjects at
least in part dealt with by UNCLOS, while others, as the Wreck removal convention,
do not.
The United Nations as well as IMO and FAO are the most important forums where
new issues are debated and addressed. In these forums the primacy of UNCLOS is
always confirmed. For instance, the UN General Assemblys Resolution 65/37 of 7
December 2010, fourth preambular paragraph, emphasizes the universal and unified
character of the Convention, and reaffirms that the Convention sets out the legal
framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out and
is of strategic importance as the basis for national, regional and global action and
cooperation in the marine sector, and that its integrity needs to be maintained.
Still, it is through these forums that additions, interpretations and subtle changes to
the law of the sea are discussed and introduced. The UN has established an informal
forum, the UNICPOLOS, to debate important matters concerning the seas and oceans
with the participation of scientists, economists and other specialists and not of diplomats
and legal experts only. The yearly debate at the General Assembly, and even more so,
the negotiations leading to the adoption of the yearly resolutions on the oceans and
on fisheries, as well as these ever-expanding resolutions, are the opportunity to bring
into focus new questions and to address the basic ideas and the mechanisms to deal
with them. IMO and FAO have often been entrusted by the General Assembly with
the task to convene negotiations in order to develop new instruments, be they of a
binding or non-binding nature. As regards one particularly sensitive subject, marine
genetic resources, the General Assembly has resisted pressures to entrust it to the
International Seabed itself, establishing a Working Group that has met in 2006 and in
2008 and in 2010.
III. The open challenges
A number of challenges face the contemporary law of the sea. Some consist in
tasks to be undertaken by States on the basis of the rules of UNCLOS. Others arise
because of the need to tackle with new problems which are not always envisaged by
UNCLOS, or cannot be dealt with only on the basis of UNCLOS.
1. The completion of the zonal approach
The most important task States have to undertake on the basis of UNCLOS is to
complete the process of delimitation of maritime areas that is necessary to make the
zonal approach of the Convention functional and, in general, to further the good
governance of the seas and oceans. This process relates to the delimitation of maritime
Volume2_CS4.indb 217
6/16/11 4:11 PM
218
areas between States whose coasts are opposite or adjacent, and to the determination
of the external limits of continental shelves beyond 200 miles.
a. Delimitation of maritime areas between States: treaties
As regards the first task, as prescribed by the Geneva Territorial Sea and
Continental Shelf conventions, as well as by UNCLOS (articles 74 and 83) and
confirmed by judicial decisions, delimitation must be sought and effected by means
of an agreement (see, for instance, the 1984 ICJ judgment on the Gulf of Maine case,
para 112). In fact, more than 200 bilateral agreements for the delimitation of maritime
zones have been concluded and most of them are in force, even though some have
been involved in state succession, such as those concluded by the German Democratic
Republic, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union.
The process of delimitation is nonetheless far form being concluded. The
existing agreements do not cover all maritime borders. Moreover, many of them delimit
the continental shelf only, leaving undetermined the borders of exclusive economic
zones and other zones under national jurisdiction. Only in the few last decades the
practice of agreeing on single delimitation lines, namely lines delimiting all existing
(and sometimes also still to be adopted) zones, has started to be followed.
The question arises whether the borderlines agreed in existing continental
shelf delimitation treaties may be considered as applying also to the water column
lying above the shelf. In its judgment of 5 February 2009 on the case concerning
maritime delimitation in the Black sea (Romania v. Ukraine) the ICJ answered in
the negative stating that: State practice indicates that the use of a boundary agreed
for the delimitation of one maritime zone to delimit another zone is effected by a
new agreement (paragraph 69). Several agreements extending continental shelf
delimitation agreements to the exclusive economic zones already exist. Some instances
of States parties to a continental shelf agreement opposing proposals for its extension
to the exclusive economic zone are also known.
b. Delimitation of maritime areas between States: judicial and arbitral
decisions
As stated in the Gulf of Maine judgment, where agreement cannot be achieved,
delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party possessing the necessary
competence (paragraph 112). As a matter of fact, after the seminal North Sea
Continental Shelf cases decided by ICJ judgments of 1969, about twenty delimitation
cases have been submitted to the ICJ, to arbitral tribunals as well as, with the Bangla
Desh v. Myanmar case, to the ITLOS. On most of them a judgment or award has
been rendered, while a few are still pending. The earlier jurisprudence has envisaged
continental shelf delimitations, while in the most recent cases courts and tribunals
have be called upon to determine single line delimitations. Included in single line
delimitations is the prolongation of lateral delimitation lines beyond 200 miles to cover
the borders of adjacent outer continental shelves. This point has been made clear by
the arbitral award of 11 April 2006 in the delimitation dispute between Barbados and
Volume2_CS4.indb 218
6/16/11 4:11 PM
219
Trinidad and Tobago. It states that: there is in law only a single continental shelf
rather than an inner continental shelf and a separate extended or outer continental
shelf (paragraph 213).
In an early phase (especially the North Sea Continental Shelf cases and the
Libya-Tunisia Continental Shelf case) equidistance has been rejected as a possible
criterion for delimitation and the basic rule of the equitable result (also set out in
UNCLOS articles 74 and 83) has been followed. The most recent jurisprudence,
however, adopts the equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule, which takes
as the provisional point of departure the equidistance line and is admittedly very close
to the equidistance/special circumstances rule set out in article 6 of the Geneva
Continental Shelf Convention and, for the territorial sea, in article 15 of UNCLOS
(see the 1993 ICJ Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway) delimitation judgment, paragraph
231, and, for a synthetic statement, the 2009 ICJ Judgment on the Romania v. Ukraine
case, paragraph 288).
Judicial and arbitral decisions are an integral part of the outstanding task of
completing the process of delimitation of maritime zones between States. Since
entry into force of UNCLOS, resort to dispute-settlement mechanisms been made
easier. It has become a rule under articles 74, paragraph 2, and 83, paragraph 2, of the
Convention, stating that: When no agreement can be reached within a reasonable
amount of time, the States concerned shall resort to procedures provided for in
Part XV. More importantly, disputes concerning delimitation of maritime areas
are included in the scope of the general rule of articles 286 and 287 establishing
compulsory jurisdiction of a court or tribunal for disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of UNCLOS. Under article 298, paragraph 1, these disputes may be
excluded from compulsory jurisdiction by a declaration States parties may make.
While in fact several such declarations have been made, it remains true that, as a
rule, a State party to UNCLOS can start unilaterally judicial or arbitral proceedings
concerning delimitation and that the other party is automatically submitted to the
jurisdiction of the judge or arbitrator. Since entry into force of UNCLOS, three
delimitation proceedings have been unilaterally submitted to arbitration tribunals on
the basis of compulsory jurisdiction under UNCLOS provisions (Barbados v. Trinidad
and Tobago, Guyana v. Suriname, Bangla Desh v. India), and one to the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Bangla Desh v. Myanmar).
In case negotiation of agreements is not successful, or too much protracted, States
Parties to UNCLOS can, in most cases, start judicial or arbitral proceedings. This
possibility may also exercise pressure on States in reaching agreement.
Negotiation concerning delimitation under UNCLOS articles 74, paragraphs 1 and
2, and 83, paragraphs 1 and 2, is subsumed in the requirement of prior exchange of
views provided for in article 283, paragraphs 1, as stated in the Barbados v. Trinidad
and Tobago 2006 award, paragraph 202. Consequently, only one set of negotiations/
exchanges of views is required before submitting a delimitation dispute to a court or
tribunal.
Volume2_CS4.indb 219
6/16/11 4:11 PM
220
Volume2_CS4.indb 220
6/16/11 4:11 PM
221
Volume2_CS4.indb 221
6/16/11 4:11 PM
222
Volume2_CS4.indb 222
6/16/11 4:11 PM
223
member States, others stay out and lend their flags to vessels wishing to escape
regulation. Still other States oppose RFMOs for reasons of principle, arguing that, if
they became parties, they would be bound directly or indirectly by agreements they
are not parties to, especially the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and that RFMOs either
do not admit them or admit them under conditions they consider disadvantageous.
One promising further new trend responds to the need to combat IUU fishing
conducted under the protection of the flag State principle. FAO , with the encouragement
of the UN General Assembly, has started studies and negotiations concerning flag
State performance, including ways to ascertain and perhaps measure the degree of
compliance with their responsibilities.
The tasks for the future consist mainly in extending the geographical as well as
the material scope of the existing network of RFMOs, and in making effective the
existing law. The latter task requires economic measures, assistance to developing
countries, and coordination between fishing activities on the high seas with those
in the EEZs, as well as coordination of enforcement action by flag, coastal and port
States.
c. Policing of the high seas against internationally prohibited activities
UNCLOS confirms the fundamental rule of the freedom of the high seas, which
prohibits interference with ships flying a foreign flag unless otherwise provided by
applicable rules of international law. Such rules are rare in UNCLOS. They concern
the right of visit, set out in article 110, with respect ships engaged in piracy (for
which also more penetrating rights apply under article 105), in the slave trade and in
unauthorized broadcasts as well the right of hot pursuit and of intervention in case
of pollution incidents. Treaty-based cases of interference have grown, although to a
limited extent, especially in fishery matters with the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and
in a small number of bilateral treaties for combating the smuggling of narcotic drugs.
After the adoption of UNCLOS, States have become concerned about the
development of several illicit activities conducted in whole or in part on the high
seas: smuggling of drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling of migrants,
transportation of weapons of mass destruction, hijacking of vessels and their use as
means for terrorist activities. As explained in the article on High Seas, all efforts
to develop international cooperation in fighting these activities, while succeeding in
facilitating the grant of consent by the flag State to interference with its vessels on
the high seas, have failed to reach the result, wished by the US and other States, of
allowing such interference without flag State authorization. Attempts to adopt a rule
permitting such interference in Security Council Resolutions adopted under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter have also failed. See recently SC Res.1874 (2009) para 12
which, in the context of action under article 41 of the UN Charter against the Peoples
Republic of Korea, calls upon member States to inspect vessels, with the consent
of the flag State, on the high seas if they have information that these vessels carry
prohibited cargo (emphasis supplied).
Volume2_CS4.indb 223
6/16/11 4:11 PM
224
In tackling with the grave threats these illicit activities continue to pose, States
should realistically take notice of the political and legal reasons for maintaining the
principle of the flag States exclusive right on their vessels. They should develop rules
aimed at making the obligations of flag States more precise as regards these activities,
so that it would become clear that flag States not complying with these responsibilities
are committing an international wrongful act violating erga omnes obligations. Port
state enforcement measures should be enhanced including controls on shipments at
departure. Disincentives for lax behaviour by flag States and incentives for good
behaviour should be introduced.
Still, in extreme cases arrest and inspection on the high seas of vessels suspected
of conducting the gravest illicit activities cannot be ruled out. In some cases such
action may be justified invoking the concepts of self-defence or necessity. In other
cases it may be claimed to be a counter-measure by States having rights under erga
omnes obligations.
The idea of introducing an obligation of compensation in case of unfounded arrests
and inspections, already existing as regards piracy (UNCLOS art. 106) and hot pursuit
(UNCLOS art. 111, paragraph 8), as well as in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement article 21
and in the 2005 amended Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 8(2), could be developed and implemented in cases of
intervention on vessels suspected of conducting illicit activities including illicit fishing. It
might be argued that this obligation has already become part of customary law.
d. Piracy
Piracy represents a grave threat to international shipping. UNCLOS, codifying
customary international law, permits the seizure of pirate vessels by every State (art.
105). Piracy as defined by UNCLOS must, however, be conducted on the high seas
and involve two ships.
Recent developments, especially off the coast of Somalia, show that pirate
acts may happen also in the territorial sea, in particular where the authority of the
coastal State is weak or inexistent. In the case of Somalia, the possibility to conduct
enforcement activity also in the territorial sea has been granted to foreign flag States
by the permission of the local transitional and almost ineffective government as well
as by resolutions adopted by the Security Council under chapter VII of the UN Charter
(SC Res. 1816 and others of 2008, 1897 of 2009, 1918 and 1950 of 2010).
The current debates on future developments seem to concern finding efficient
ways to deal with captured pirates while observing their human rights. Looking at
a more distant future, politically the elimination of the root causes of piracy seems
the difficult but necessary task. Legally, it will be interesting to consider whether
the resolutions of the Security Council on piracy off the coasts of Somalia which
purport to be exceptional and not to aim at changing customary law will in fact have
exactly that effect and broaden the notion of piracy and the area of the seas in which
States may seize pirate vessels.
Volume2_CS4.indb 224
6/16/11 4:11 PM
225
Volume2_CS4.indb 225
6/16/11 4:11 PM
226
main difficulty will consist in the need not to repeat the scheme of the regime for the
mineral resources of the Area and to agree on an inventive and constructive way to avoid
ideology and make the exploitation of genetic resources workable taking into account
the different interests. A combination of the approaches of part XI of UNCLOS and of
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement could be considered.
f. Coping with the consequences of climate change
To deal with the consequences of climate change on the oceans will continue to
be a major task for the the law of the sea in the future . The UN Secretary Generals
Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea of 2010 states that: [c]limate change
continues to impact the oceans and briefly outlines as follows the various aspects
of this impact: rising sea levels, melting Arctic sea ice, increasing acidity, loss of
marine biodiversity, increasing frequency of extreme weather events and shifts in
distribution of marine species (UN doc. A/65/69/Add 2, para 374).
One of the major aspects that will have an impact on the law of the sea is the
melting of the Arctic ice. While no new rules seem necessary, as stressed by the 2008
Ilulissat declaration which confirms the applicability of the law of the sea to the Arctic
ocean, the old rules will find new areas of application. New navigational routes will
be open, continental shelves within and beyond 200 miles will be claimed and become
exploitable, fish stocks will migrate to former frozen ocean areas and fishing activities
will follow them. New dangers of pollution and needs for cooperation to prevent it
will arise. Conflicts between coastal and other interested States are also likely.
Rising sea level is likely to have consequences on certain island States that might
disappear. The discussion as to the rights on maritime zones of such States after their
disappearance has already started. Some low-tide elevations will remain submerged
and other features relevant for the establishment of baselines will change or disappear.
Uncertainty on baselines may bring about uncertainty on the outer limits of all maritime
areas measured from them.
Action to contain the effects of climate change such as efforts to limit greenhouse gas
emission from ships under discussion in the framework of IMO should be developed.
Halting the decline of natural carbon sinks as mangroves, salt marshes and sea
grasses will also be important. Measures to prevent the impact of ocean acidification
on marine biodiversity and living resources should be studied and implemented.
Some proposed methods for mitigation of the impact of climate change, such
as large scale ocean fertilization and carbon sequestration, after an early period of
widespread enthusiasm, are now questioned as there is no agreement as to whether the
dangers they pose are more important than the benefits.
Volume2_CS4.indb 226
6/16/11 4:11 PM
227
ANEXO I
Pesquisadores
Dalliana Vilar Pereira (Coordenadora)
Dayanna Beatriz Figueiroa Santos
Jos Carlos Carvalho Filho
Larissa Lins Ferreira
Volume2_CS4.indb 227
6/16/11 4:11 PM
228
1. Agravo Regimental
AgRg nos EDcl no REsp 703312 / PR
AGRAVO REGIMENTAL NOS EMBARGOS DE DECLARAO NO
RECURSO ESPECIAL 2004/0133823-6
Relator: Ministro MAURO CAMPBELL MARQUES
rgo Julgador: T2 - SEGUNDA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 18/03/2010
Ementa: PROCESSUAL CIVIL E TRIBUTRIO. EXPORTAO. ICMS.
PRODUTO INDUSTRIAL OU SEMI-ELABORADO. AUSENTE UM
DOS REQUISITOS CUMULATIVOS PREVISTOS NO ART. 1 DA
LC 65/91. IMUNIDADE RECONHECIDA. PRECEDENTES. NO
INCIDNCIA DA SMULA N. 7/STJ NA HIPTESE. PRESCRIO
QUINQUENAL. TRIBUTO SUJEITO A LANAMENTO POR
HOMOLOGAO. APLICAO DA SISTEMTICA DO 5 +
5. ORIENTAO CONSOLIDADA EM SEDE DE RECURSO
REPETITIVO. INCONSTITUCIONALIDADE PARCIAL DO ART.
4 DA LC N. 118/05. 1. A jurisprudncia desta Corte pacfica no
sentido de que, antes do advento da Emenda Constitucional n. 42/03,
para ser considerado semi-elaborado e, consequentemente, sujeitar-se
incidncia de ICMS, o produto deveria preencher cumulativamente os
trs requisitos indicados nos incisos do art. 1 da LC 65/1991. Assim,
no preenchido um dos requisitos, de se reconhecer a imunidade de
ICMS na operao de exportao do produto. (...) 5. Agravo regimental
no provido.
AgRg no RO 65 / RJ
AGRAVO REGIMENTAL NO RECURSO ORDINRIO 2008/0014277-2
Relator: Ministro JOO OTVIO DE NORONHA
rgo Julgador: T4 - QUARTA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 13/04/2010
Ementa: DIREITO INTERNACIONAL. AO DE INDENIZAO. BARCO
AFUNDADO EM PERODO DE GUERRA. ESTADO ESTRANGEIRO.
IMUNIDADE ABSOLUTA. 1. Correto o posicionamento do julgador
que, sob a gide do artigo 285-A do CPC, profere sentena antes da
citao se a matria trazida pelo autor da ao for exclusivamente de
direito e se o juzo sentenciante tiver proferido mais de uma sentena
sobre a mesma matria. 2. A questo relativa imunidade de jurisdio,
atualmente, no vista de forma absoluta, sendo excepcionada em
hipteses diversas. Contudo, em se tratando de atos praticados numa
ofensiva militar em perodo de guerra, a imunidade acta jure imperii
absoluta, no comportando exceo. 3. Agravo desprovido.
Volume2_CS4.indb 228
6/16/11 4:11 PM
229
Volume2_CS4.indb 229
6/16/11 4:11 PM
230
Volume2_CS4.indb 230
6/16/11 4:11 PM
231
Volume2_CS4.indb 231
6/16/11 4:11 PM
232
Volume2_CS4.indb 232
6/16/11 4:11 PM
233
Ementa: PROCESSUAL
CIVIL
E
ADMINISTRATIVO.
AGRAVO
REGIMENTAL NO RECURSO ESPECIAL. ENSINO SUPERIOR.
CURSO DE MEDICINA. CONVENO REGIONAL SOBRE O
RECONHECIMENTO DE ESTUDOS, TTULOS E DIPLOMAS
DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NA AMRICA LATINA E NO CARIBE.
NO REVOGAO DO DECRETO N. 80.419/77 PELO DECRETO
N. 3.007/99. INEXISTNCIA DE PREVISO LEGAL PARA
VALIDAO AUTOMTICA DE DIPLOMA OBTIDO NO
EXTERIOR. NORMADE CUNHO MERAMENTE PROGRAMTICO.
TEORIA DO FATO CONSUMADO. PRECLUSO CONSUMATIVA.
VIOLAO DO ARTIGO 44 DA LEI N. 9.474/97. AUSNCIA DE
PREQUESTIONAMENTO. INCIDNCIA DA SMULA 211/STJ.
(...) 2. A jurisprudncia de ambas as Turmas que compe a Primeira
Seo firmou entendimento de que a Conveno Regional sobre o
Reconhecimento de Estudos, Ttulos e Diplomas de Ensino Superior
na Amrica Latina e no Caribe, incorporada ao ordenamento jurdico
nacional por meio do Decreto n. 80.419/77, no foi, de forma alguma,
revogada pelo Decreto n. 3.007, de 30 de maro de 1999. Isso porque
o aludido ato internacional foi recepcionado pelo Brasil com status de
lei ordinria, sendo vlido mencionar, acerca desse particular, a sua
ratificao pelo Decreto Legislativo n. 66/77 e a sua promulgao atravs
do Decreto n. 80.419/77. Dessa forma, no h se falar na revogao do
Decreto que promulgou a Conveno da Amrica Latina e do Caribe
em foco, pois o Decreto n. 3.007/99, exarado pelo Sr. Presidente da
Repblica, no tem essa propriedade. Precedente do STF: ADI 1.480 MC/
DF, Relator Ministro Celso de Mello, Tribunal Pleno, DJ de 18/5/2001.
3. A Conveno Regional sobre o Reconhecimento de Estudos, Ttulos e
Diplomas de Ensino Superior na Amrica Latina e no Caribe no confere
o direito validao automtica de diplomas obtidos no exterior. Essa
a exegese que se infere da leitura atenta do artigo 5 da indigitada
Conveno. 4. Dessarte, ressoa inequvoco que o preceito normativo
em comento , to somente, programtico e, nesse sentido, sugere
que os Estados signatrios criem mecanismos simples e geis para o
reconhecimento dos diplomas obtidos no exterior. 5. Ademais, a referida
Conveno, em nenhum dos seus dispositivos, autoriza o imediato
reconhecimento de diplomas estrangeiros sem prvio procedimento
administrativo de revalidao. 6. Logo, defeso o reconhecimento
automtico de diplomas obtidos no exterior sem o anterior procedimento
administrativo de revalidao, consoante determina a Lei de Diretrizes e
Bases (Lei n. 9.394/96), em seu art. 48, 2 Precedente: REsp 939.880/
RS, Relator Ministro Mauro Campbell Marques, Segunda Turma, DJ de
29 de outubro de 2008. (...) 9. Agravo de regimental no provido.
Volume2_CS4.indb 233
6/16/11 4:11 PM
234
AgRg na CR 4635 / CH
AGRAVO REGIMENTAL NA CARTA ROGATRIA 2010/0024316-3
Relator: Ministro PRESIDENTE DO STJ
Relator para o Acrdo: Ministro CESAR ASFOR ROCHA
rgo Julgador: CE - CORTE ESPECIAL
Data do julgamento: 29/06/2010
Ementa: AGRAVO REGIMENTAL. CARTA ROGATRIA. INTIMAO.
EXERCCIO DE JUZO MERAMENTE DELIBATRIO. ART. 9 DA
RESOLUO N. 9/2005 DESTE TRIBUNAL. MANIFESTAO
ENDEREADA JUSTIA ROGANTE. No cumprimento dos
pedidos formulados nas cartas rogatrias, esta Corte limita-se a
exercer juzo delibatrio, ou seja, verificar se esto observados os
requisitos da Resoluo n. 9/2005 deste Tribunal e se a diligncia
no ofende a soberania nacional nem a ordem pblica. A
manifestao da parte versando sobre o mrito da ao, no obstante
ser insuscetvel de exame nesta carta rogatria, ser encaminhada
anlise da Justia rogante juntamente com a comisso. Agravo
regimental improvido.
AgRg na SE 2583 / NL
AGRAVO REGIMENTAL NA SENTENA ESTRANGEIRA 2007/0041243-6
Relator: Ministro PRESIDENTE DO STJ
Relator para o Acrdo: Ministro CESAR ASFOR ROCHA
rgo Julgador: CE - CORTE ESPECIAL
Data do julgamento: 29/06/2010
Ementa: HOMOLOGAO DE SENTENA ESTRANGEIRA. PROCESSO
DE ORIGEM. CITAAO. OBSERVNCIA DA LEGISLAO DO
PAS DE ORIGEM. AGRAVO REGIMENTAL IMPROVIDO. A
citao da parte no processo de origem observa o disposto na legislao
vigente no pas onde foi realizado o ato, no sendo cabvel contestar a
sua validade em face das leis brasileiras. Agravo regimental improvido.
AgRg na CR 3560 / US
AGRAVO REGIMENTAL NA CARTA ROGATRIA 2008/0209694-2
Relator: Ministro PRESIDENTE DO STJ
rgo Julgador: Ministro CESAR ASFOR ROCHA
Data do julgamento: 29/06/2010
Ementa: AGRAVOS REGIMENTAIS. CARTA ROGATRIA. ALEGADA
DEFICINCIA NA INSTRUO E IRREGULARIDADE FORMAL.
ART. 3 DO PROTOCOLO ADICIONAL CONVENO
INTERAMERICANA SOBRE CARTAS ROGATRIAS. ART. 202 DO
CDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL. APONTADA INCOMPETNCIA
Volume2_CS4.indb 234
6/16/11 4:11 PM
235
Volume2_CS4.indb 235
6/16/11 4:11 PM
236
Volume2_CS4.indb 236
6/16/11 4:11 PM
237
Volume2_CS4.indb 237
6/16/11 4:11 PM
238
Volume2_CS4.indb 238
6/16/11 4:11 PM
239
que levam o Tribunal de origem a fixar o valor da indenizao por danos morais so
de carter personalssimo e levam em conta questes subjetivas, o que dificulta ou
mesmo impossibilita a comparao, de forma objetiva, para efeito de configurao
da divergncia, com outras decises assemelhadas. 4. Agravo regimental a que se
nega provimento.
AgRg no RO .105/RJ
Relator: Ministro HAMILTON CARVALHIDO
Turma: PRIMEIRA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 18/11/2010
EMENTA: AGRAVO REGIMENTAL EM RECURSO ORDINRIO.
DIREITO TRIBUTRIO. EXECUO FISCAL. IPTU E TAXAS. ESTADO
ESTRANGEIRO. IMUNIDADE DE JURISDIO. 1. 1. Os Estados estrangeiros
gozam de imunidade de jurisdio e tributria, com esteio, respectivamente, nos
arts. 23, da Conveno de Viena sobre Relaes Diplomticas, e 32, da Conveno
de Viena sobre Relaes Consulares, estando, assim, isentos do pagamento de
tributos que recaiam sobre seu patrimnio ou lhes sejam exigidos pela prestao no
individualizada de servios. Precedentes: RO n. 49/RJ, Rel. Min. Jos Delgado,
DJU de 07/11/2006; RO n. 46/RJ, Rel. Min. Francisco Peanha Martins, DJU de
13/02/2006; RO n. 45/RJ, Rel. Min. Castro Meira, DJU de 28/11/2005; RO n. 35/
RJ, Rel. Min. Teori Albino Zavascki, DJU de 05/08/2004. 2. indevida a cobrana
de taxas de limpeza e iluminao pblica, porquanto declaradas inconstitucionais
em razo da ausncia de especificidade. (RO n 43/RJ, Relator Ministro Luiz
Fux, Primeira Turma, in DJ 8/11/2007). 2. Agravo regimental improvido.
AgRg na CR 4.893/US
Relator: Ministro ARI PARGENDLER
Turma: CORTE ESPECIAL
Data do julgamento: 15/12/2010
Ementa: CARTA ROGATRIA. AGRAVO REGIMENTAL. APLICAO DOS
ARTS. 214, 1, DO CDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL E 13, 3, DA
RESOLUO N. 9 DE 2005 DESTE TRIBUNAL. PRECEDENTES
DESTA CORTE. QUESTES REFERENTES AO MRITO DA AO
AJUIZADA NO EXTERIOR. REMESSA ANLISE DA JUSTIA
ROGANTE. Nos termos da jurisprudncia desta Corte, dispensvel
a remessa da carta rogatria Justia Federal, aps a concesso do
exequatur, quando a parte interessada considerada citada em razo
do comparecimento aos autos para apresentar impugnao. Questes
referentes ao mrito da ao ajuizada no exterior devem ser remetidas
anlise da Justia rogante, tendo em vista o juzo meramente delibatrio
exercido por este Tribunal no cumprimento das rogatrias. Agravo
regimental improvido.
Volume2_CS4.indb 239
6/16/11 4:11 PM
240
2. Conflito de Competncia
CC 107584 / PR.
CONFLITO DE COMPETENCIA 2009/0161217-6
Relator: Ministro ARNALDO ESTEVES LIMA
rgo Julgador: S3 - TERCEIRA SEO
Data do julgamento: 24/03/2010
Ementa: CONFLITO DE COMPETNCIA. ESTELIONATO. FALSIFICAO
DE DOCUMENTOS PARA OBTENO DA CIDADANIA ITALIANA.
APRESENTAO PERANTE CONSULADO. AUSNCIA DE
INTERESSE DA UNIO. CONFLITO CONHECIDO PARA DECLARAR
COMPETENTE A JUSTIA ESTADUAL. 1. A falsificao de documentos
pblicos perante representao de Estado estrangeiro, dentro do territrio
nacional, a fim de se obter visto e cidadania, no caracteriza hiptese de
competncia da Justia Federal, pois inexiste interesse da Unio. 2. Conflito
conhecido para declarar a competncia do Juzo de Direito da Vara Criminal
e Anexos de Marialva/PR, ora suscitado
CC 108840 / MG.
CONFLITO DE COMPETENCIA 2009/0216482-0
Relator: Ministro SIDNEI BENETI
rgo Julgador: S2 - SEGUNDA SEO
Data do julgamento: 14/04/2010
Ementa: CONFLITO DE COMPETNCIA. JUZO FEDERAL E JUZO
ESTADUAL.
PERMANNCIA
DE
ESTRANGEIRO
EM
TERRITRIO NACIONAL. I. A Lei n 6.815/80, que define a situao
jurdica do estrangeiro no territrio nacional, estabelece competir aos
rgos federais fiscalizar a entrada e permanncia de estrangeiros no
Brasil, atraindo, portanto, a competncia da Justia Federal. II. Conflito
conhecido para declarar a competncia do Juzo Federal da 3 Vara de
Juiz de Fora, o suscitante.
CC 101457 / RS.
CONFLITO DE COMPETENCIA 2008/0267963-6
Relator: Ministro JORGE MUSSI
rgo Julgador: S3 - TERCEIRA SEO
Data do julgamento: 09/06/2010
Ementa: CONFLITO NEGATIVO DE COMPETNCIA. TRFICO DE
DROGAS. MERA DECLARAO DO INDICIADO ACERCA
DA NACIONALIDADE ARGENTINA DO FORNECEDOR DA
SUBSTNCIA ENTORPECENTE. AUSNCIA DE INDCIOS ACERCA
DA INTERNACIONALIDADE DO DELITO. CRIME COMETIDO POR
Volume2_CS4.indb 240
6/16/11 4:11 PM
241
Volume2_CS4.indb 241
6/16/11 4:11 PM
242
Volume2_CS4.indb 242
6/16/11 4:11 PM
243
Volume2_CS4.indb 243
6/16/11 4:11 PM
244
Volume2_CS4.indb 244
6/16/11 4:11 PM
245
Volume2_CS4.indb 245
6/16/11 4:11 PM
246
Volume2_CS4.indb 246
6/16/11 4:11 PM
247
Volume2_CS4.indb 247
6/16/11 4:11 PM
248
HC 149.481/DF
Relator: Ministro HAROLDO RODRIGUES (DESEMBARGADOR
CONVOCADO DO TJ/CE)
Turma: SEXTA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 19/10/2010
Ementa: HABEAS CORPUS. DESCAMINHO E FALSIDADE IDEOLGICA.
DELITOS SUPOSTAMENTE PRATICADOS PELO CNSUL-GERAL
DE EL SALVADOR. IMUNIDADE DE JURISDIO. CONVENO
DE VIENA SOBRE RELAES CONSULARES DE 1963. RENNCIA
PELO ESTADO ESTRANGEIRO. PROCEDIMENTO REGULAR.
AUSNCIA DE CONSTRANGIMENTO ILEGAL. 1. Tendo o paciente,
na condio de Cnsul-Geral de El Salvador, praticado supostamente
os delitos de falsidade ideolgica e descaminho no exerccio de suas
funes, o artigo 43 da Conveno de Viena sobre Relaes Consulares
de 1963 lhe assegura a imunidade jurisdio brasileira. 2. No entanto,
possvel que o Estado estrangeiro renuncie a imunidade de jurisdio
de qualquer membro da repartio consular, nos termos do artigo 45 da
referida Conveno. 3. Instado a se manifestar, o Estado de El Salvador,
no exerccio de sua soberania, retirou os privilgios e imunidades do
paciente, no havendo, portanto, qualquer bice ao prosseguimento da
ao penal. 4. A imunidade de jurisdio no se verifica de plano, isto
, no se aplica de forma automtica, notadamente pelo fato de que h
a possibilidade de renncia pelo Estado estrangeiro. Deste modo, no
era o caso de se impedir de pronto a persecuo penal contra o paciente,
mas sim, de indagar o Estado de El Salvador acerca do interesse em se
submeter ou no jurisdio brasileira, conforme se deu na espcie. 5.
Habeas corpus denegado.
HC 166.496/DF
Relator: Ministro HERMAN BENJAMIN
Turma: PRIMEIRA SEO
Data do julgamento: 10/11/2010
Ementa: HABEAS CORPUS. DECRETO DE EXPULSO. PACIENTE COM
FILHO NASCIDO NO BRASIL. DEPENDNCIA ECONMICA E
AFETIVA. NO-COMPROVAO. ORDEM DENEGADA. 1. A
jurisprudncia do STJ firmou-se quanto impossibilidade de expulso de
estrangeiro que possua filho brasileiro, desde que evidenciada a dependncia
econmica ou afetiva. 2. No Direito brasileiro, que prestigia a dignidade
da pessoa humana a ponto de elev-la, constitucionalmente, ao patamar
de fundamento da Repblica (CF, art.1, III), a dependncia familiar no
necessariamente econmica, podendo ser to-s afetiva. Num e noutro caso,
deve estar razoavelmente comprovada para que possa obstar os efeitos de
Volume2_CS4.indb 248
6/16/11 4:11 PM
249
Volume2_CS4.indb 249
6/16/11 4:11 PM
250
Volume2_CS4.indb 250
6/16/11 4:11 PM
251
Volume2_CS4.indb 251
6/16/11 4:11 PM
252
Volume2_CS4.indb 252
6/16/11 4:11 PM
253
Volume2_CS4.indb 253
6/16/11 4:11 PM
254
Volume2_CS4.indb 254
6/16/11 4:11 PM
255
Volume2_CS4.indb 255
6/16/11 4:11 PM
256
Volume2_CS4.indb 256
6/16/11 4:11 PM
257
Volume2_CS4.indb 257
6/16/11 4:11 PM
258
Volume2_CS4.indb 258
6/16/11 4:11 PM
259
Volume2_CS4.indb 259
6/16/11 4:11 PM
260
Volume2_CS4.indb 260
6/16/11 4:11 PM
261
Volume2_CS4.indb 261
6/16/11 4:11 PM
262
Volume2_CS4.indb 262
6/16/11 4:11 PM
263
Volume2_CS4.indb 263
6/16/11 4:11 PM
264
Volume2_CS4.indb 264
6/16/11 4:11 PM
265
Volume2_CS4.indb 265
6/16/11 4:11 PM
266
REsp 933371 / RJ
RECURSO ESPECIAL 2007/0050090-8
Relator(a): Ministro ARNALDO ESTEVES LIMA
rgo Julgador: T1 - PRIMEIRA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 02/09/2010
Ementa: ADMINISTRATIVO E PROCESSUAL CIVIL. RECURSO ESPECIAL.
LEI 9.307/96 LEI DE ARBITRAGEM. APLICAO IMEDIATA.
CONTRATO CELEBRADO ANTES DE SUA VIGNCIA.
POSSIBILIDADE. PRECEDENTES DO STJ. CLUSULA
CONTRATUAL DE ARBITRAGEM. QUESTO NO EXAMINADA
PELO TRIBUNAL REGIONAL. SENTENA MANTIDA POR NOVO
FUNDAMENTO, ORA REFORMADO. RECURSO PARCIALMENTE
PROVIDO. 1. A Corte Especial deste STJ, por ocasio do Data do
julgamento da Sentena Estrangeira 349/EX, de relatoria da Min.
ELIANA CALMON (DJ 21/5/07), pacificou entendimento no sentido de
que as disposies contidas na Lei 9.307/96 tm incidncia imediata nos
contratos em que estiver includa clusula arbitral, inclusive naqueles
celebrados anteriormente sua vigncia, ante a natureza processual da
referida norma. Naquela oportunidade, S.Exa. confirmou orientao
consagrada no REsp 712.566/RJ (Rel. Min. NANCY ANDRIGHI, DJ
5/9/05) e na SEC 5.847-1, do Supremo Tribunal Federal (Rel. Min.
MAURCIO CORRA, DJ 17/12/99). 2. Colhe-se do voto condutor
da Min. NANCY ANDRIGHI no REsp 712.566/RJ, que : ... com a
alterao do art. 267, VII, do CPC pela Lei de Arbitragem, a pactuao
tanto do compromisso como da clusula arbitral passou a ser considerada
hiptese de extino do processo sem Data do julgamento do mrito.
Assim, impe-se a extino do processo sem Data do julgamento do
mrito se, quando invocada a existncia de clusula arbitral, j vigorava
a Lei de Arbitragem, ainda que o contrato tenha sido celebrado em
data anterior sua vigncia, pois, as normas processuais tm aplicao
imediata. Ademais, pelo Protocolo de Genebra de 1923, subscrito pelo
Brasil, a eleio de compromisso ou clusula arbitral imprime s partes
contratantes a obrigao de submeter eventuais conflitos arbitragem,
ficando afastada a soluo judicial. Nos contratos internacionais, devem
prevalecer os princpios gerais de direito internacional em detrimento da
normatizao especfica de cada pas, o que justifica a anlise da clusula
arbitral sob a tica do Protocolo de Genebra de 1923. 3. No prosperam
os argumentos expendidos pela empresa recorrida, na medida em que: a)
o recurso especial no encontra bice na Smula 5/STJ, porquanto no
se trata de interpretar as Clusulas Contratuais 6.2 e 6.3, mas analisar os
efeitos temporais da Lei de Arbitragem, impondo, ou no, sua aplicao
aos contratos celebrados anteriormente sua vigncia; b) tambm no
Volume2_CS4.indb 266
6/16/11 4:11 PM
267
incidem as Smulas 282, 283 e 356/STF, uma vez que os temas relativos
existncia no contrato de clusula de arbitragem e atinentes prescrio
foram devidamente prequestionados na instncia de origem, assim como
todos os fundamentos essenciais do acrdo recorrido, inerentes a essa
questo, foram impugnados na petio recursal; e c) houve a correta
comprovao da divergncia jurisprudencial, inclusive com a juntada
de acrdos paradigmas que demonstravam a similitude ftica entre os
casos confrontados. 4. Lado outro, as referncias superficiais constantes
das notas taquigrficas em relao a efetividade das clusulas contratuais
de arbitramento hiptese, o foram de forma meramente incidental e
concisa, verdadeiro obiter dictum, no integrando o decisum, este, sim,
representado pelo voto claro e preciso do relator em seu fundamento
nuclear, qual seja, a no aplicao da Lei de Arbitragem ao caso por
ter sido o contrato celebrado anteriormente sua vigncia. 5. Uma
vez reformado o acrdo recorrido, e impossibilitado a este Tribunal
Superior examinar clusulas contratuais, por bice da Smula 5/STJ,
devem os autos retornar ao Tribunal de origem para pronunciamento
explicito quanto ao fundamento primordial adotado na sentena de
procedncia, afastando, assim, inclusive, eventual risco de supresso
de grau jurisdicional, diante da dvida, plausvel, quanto ao exame, ou
no, de tal aspecto pelo TRF2. 5. Recurso Especial parcialmente provido
para afastar o fundamento da irretroatividade da Lei de Arbitragem ao
contrato celebrado anteriormente sua vigncia e determinar o retorno
dos autos ao TRF2 para novo Data do julgamento do recurso de apelao,
no ponto em foco. Prejudicadas demais questes.
REsp 1143398 / PR
RECURSO ESPECIAL 2009/0106481-6
Relator(a): Ministro HERMAN BENJAMIN
rgo Julgador: T2 - SEGUNDA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 02/09/2010
Ementa: PROCESSUAL CIVIL E TRIBUTRIO. AUSNCIA DE
PREQUESTIONAMENTO. SMULA 211/STJ. SERVIOS DE
TELECOMUNICAES PRESTADOS ITAIPU BINACIONAL.
ICMS. ISENO PREVISTA EM TRATADO INTERNACIONAL.
NO-OCORRNCIA. 1. Controverte-se a respeito da constituio
de crdito tributrio contra Brasil Telecom S/A, decorrente do
inadimplemento de ICMS incidente sobre servios de telecomunicaes
prestados Itaipu Binacional. 2. A tese defendida pelas recorrentes a de
que o art. XII do Tratado Internacional que resultou na criao da empresa
binacional prev iseno de impostos, taxas e emprstimos compulsrios.
A prestadora de servios de telefonia alega, ainda, violao do art. 98
Volume2_CS4.indb 267
6/16/11 4:11 PM
268
Volume2_CS4.indb 268
6/16/11 4:11 PM
269
Volume2_CS4.indb 269
6/16/11 4:11 PM
270
REsp 1037400/SC
Relator: Ministro LUIZ FUX
Turma: PRIMEIRA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 19/10/2010
Ementa: ADMINISTRATIVO. LICENCIAMENTO DE IMPORTAO
OBTIDO PREVIAMENTE, COM ANUNCIA DAS AUTORIDADES
ADUANEIRAS. POSTERIOR CELEBRAO DE ACORDO ENTRE
BRASIL E CHINA. CONTROLE DE COTA DE IMPORTAO DE
PRODUTOS TXTEIS. IRRETROATIVIDADE DA LEGISLAO.
1. O licenciamento da importao, em regra, ocorre de forma automtica,
quando da formulao da Declarao de Importao (DI), sendo certo
que h casos de mercadoria sujeita a licenciamento no-automtico, cujo
procedimento de importao inicia-se com a solicitao, via Siscomex,
do licenciamento prvio da importao (art. 490 do Regulamento
Aduaneiro). 2. In casu, as empresas recorridas obtiveram as licenas
de importao previamente, ressoando inequvoca, portanto, a presena
de todos os requisitos exigidos poca da celebrao do contrato de
importao, consoante assentado no acrdo recorrido, verbis: Ao que
se verifica dos documentos apresentados s fls. 108-197, as anuncias
para importao emitidas pelo DECEX (rgo competente para emitir
as licenas de importao e exportao, nos termos do art. 165, I, do
Decreto n. 99.244/90), referentes aos bens importados, foram emitidas
no perodo de 02/03/2006 a 28/03/2006. No entanto, a norma que
dispe acerca das cotas de importao relativas a produtos txteis e de
vesturio oriundas da China foi publicada no Dirio Oficial da Unio
em 11/04/2006 (fls. 199-200). 3. Destarte, as licenas de importao
foram obtidas no perodo de 02/03/2006 a 28/03/2006, tendo a norma
que impunha o controle de cotas de importao entrado em vigor
posteriormente, em 11/04/2006. Por isso que, configurado o ato jurdico
perfeito (licenciamento da importao dos produtos txteis), no pode a
autoridade fazendria pretender aplicar, retroativamente, legislao que
prev condies adicionais quelas vigentes poca do licenciamento
prvio pela autoridade aduaneira, qual seja, o respeito s cotas de
produtos txteis de origem chinesa. 4. Deveras, a hiptese no de
aplicao da legislao tributria, porquanto o cerne da controvrsia
situa-se no procedimento administrativo tendente importao, por isso
que impertinente o argumento central da Fazenda Nacional, qual seja, a
legitimidade de aplicao do controle de cota de importao institudo
pela Portaria SECEX n 10/2006, em face da no ocorrncia do Registro
da Declarao de Importao, que configura o fato gerador da obrigao
tributria. 5. O art. 535 do CPC resta inclume se o Tribunal de origem,
embora sucintamente, pronuncia-se de forma clara e suficiente sobre
Volume2_CS4.indb 270
6/16/11 4:11 PM
271
Volume2_CS4.indb 271
6/16/11 4:11 PM
272
Volume2_CS4.indb 272
6/16/11 4:11 PM
Volume2_CS4.indb 273
273
6/16/11 4:11 PM
274
Volume2_CS4.indb 274
6/16/11 4:11 PM
275
REsp 914.077/RS
Relator: Ministro JORGE MUSSI
Turma: QUINTA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 07/12/2010
Ementa: PENAL. CRIME CONTRA O SISTEMA FINANCEIRO NACIONAL.
EVASO DE DIVISAS. EXPORTAO DE MERCADORIAS.
AUSNCIA DE LIQUIDAO DO CONTRATO CAMBIAL.
DEPSITO NO DECLARADO NO EXTERIOR. PRESUNO.
IMPOSSIBILIDADE. NUS DA PROVA. RECURSO DESPROVIDO.
1. O crime de evaso de divisas previsto na ltima parte do pargrafo
nico do art. 22 da Lei n 7.492/86 - manuteno de depsito no exterior
- pressupe a identificao da instituio e dos valores guardados ao
arrepio da autoridade monetria brasileira. 2. O mero fato de no ter
sido liquidado no Brasil o contrato de cmbio incapaz de gerar a
presuno de que a empresa exportadora recebeu o pagamento objeto
do acordo e o mantm em instituio financeira situada fora do pas. 3.
No pode o intrprete estender o sentido da norma contida na primeira
parte do pargrafo nico da lei em comento, a fim de considerar tpica a
ausncia de internalizao do pagamento recebido, sob pena de absoluto
desvirtuamento do comando normativo, o qual apenas criminaliza a sada
de divisas do territrio nacional. 4. O conceito de divisas no inclui,
segundo a doutrina majoritria e precedentes dos tribunais superiores,
mercadorias destinadas exportao.
10. Recurso Ordinrio
RO 100 / RS
RECURSO ORDINARIO 2009/0185757-2
Relator: Ministro ALDIR PASSARINHO JUNIOR
rgo Julgador: T2 - SEGUNDA TURMA
Data do julgamento: 04/03/2010
Ementa: RECURSO ORDINRIO AO CAUTELAR DE EXIBIO
DE DOCUMENTOS DIREITO INTERNACIONAL PBLICO
DOCUMENTOS EM PODER DA REPBLICA DA ITLIA
ALEGAO DE SEGREDO DE ESTADO CLASSIFICAO
PAUTADA EM ATO DE IMPRIO SOBERANIA IMUNIDADE
ABSOLUTA INDEFERIMENTO DA INICIAL DESNECESSIDADE
DE CITAO DA RECORRIDA. 1. A adoo de critrios para conferir
segredo de Estado a documentos faz parte da soberania de qualquer
nao independente dotada de organizao jurdica e poltica. 2.
Apesar de defasada a classificao dos atos do Estado como de imprio
Volume2_CS4.indb 275
6/16/11 4:11 PM
276
Volume2_CS4.indb 276
6/16/11 4:11 PM
277
Volume2_CS4.indb 277
6/16/11 4:11 PM
278
Volume2_CS4.indb 278
6/16/11 4:11 PM
279
Volume2_CS4.indb 279
6/16/11 4:11 PM
280
Volume2_CS4.indb 280
6/16/11 4:11 PM
281
Volume2_CS4.indb 281
6/16/11 4:11 PM
282
Volume2_CS4.indb 282
6/16/11 4:11 PM
283
Volume2_CS4.indb 283
6/16/11 4:11 PM
284
Volume2_CS4.indb 284
6/16/11 4:11 PM
285
SEC 2.611/PL
Relator: Ministra LAURITA VAZ
Turma: CORTE ESPECIAL
Data do julgamento: 15/12/2010
Publicao: 16/02/2011
HOMOLOGAO DE SENTENA ESTRANGEIRA. POLNIA. ALIMENTOS
PARA OS FILHOS. REQUISITOS PREENCHIDOS. 1. A pendncia de Data do
julgamento, no Brasil, de apelao contra sentena proferida em ao que discute
alimento dos filhos dos ex-cnjuges no impede a homologao da sentena
estrangeira que teve o mesmo objeto, na medida em que, conforme dispe o art. 90
do Cdigo de Processo Civil, A ao intentada perante tribunal estrangeiro no
induz litispendncia, nem obsta a que a autoridade judiciria brasileira conhea
da mesma causa e das que lhe so conexas. Precedente do STF. 2. Restaram
atendidos os requisitos regimentais com a constatao da regularidade da citao
para processo julgado por juiz competente, cuja sentena, transitada em julgado,
foi autenticada pela autoridade consular brasileira e traduzida por profissional
juramentado no Brasil, com o preenchimento das demais formalidades legais. 3.
Pedido de homologao deferido. Custas ex lege.
12. SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL: Jurisprudncia (01/01/2010 a
31/12/2010)
1. AO CVEL ORIGINRIA
ACO 1112 / DF - DISTRITO FEDERAL
AO CVEL ORIGINRIA
Relator(a): Min. GILMAR MENDES
Data do julgamento: 27/05/2010
Deciso Monocrtica: Trata-se de execuo fiscal proposta pela Unio contra a
Embaixada da Repblica Federal da Nigria, decorrente de dbito relativo a multa
substitutiva da pena de perdimento, em virtude da transferncia a terceiros, sem o
pagamento de tributos e outros gravames, desembaraados com iseno (art. 618,
XIII, 1, do Decreto n. 4.543/2002). A Juza Federal Substituta da 11 Vara da
Seo Judiciria do Distrito Federal declinou de sua competncia, determinando
a remessa dos autos ao Supremo Tribunal Federal, com base no art. 102, I, e,
da Constituio. Ajuizada execuo dessa natureza, os precedentes desta Corte
(ACO 1450, Min. Eros Grau, DJe 24.4.2010; ACO 1446, Min. Ellen Gracie,
DJe 20.11.2009; ACO 973, Min. Cezar Peluso, DJe 25.5.2007) so no sentido de
consultar-se o Estado estrangeiro acerca de sua eventual submisso jurisdio
brasileira. Ocorre que, citada em primeira instncia para a presente execuo, a
executada apresentou exceo de pr-executividade arguindo justamente sua
imunidade jurisdio brasileira, para justificar pedido de extino da execuo
Volume2_CS4.indb 285
6/16/11 4:11 PM
286
Volume2_CS4.indb 286
6/16/11 4:11 PM
287
Volume2_CS4.indb 287
6/16/11 4:11 PM
288
juiz e apenas uma por rgo de segundo grau, em sede de agravo. Registro que no
consegui identificar cpias de decises similares nos dois processos restantes. 15.
Entretanto, ainda que fosse desconsiderado o vcio formal da demanda -vcio que
consiste na no-indicao precisa de todos os atos questionados -, as informaes
revelam que a quase totalidade das decises tem sido favorvel aos interesses
defendidos pela autora. Donde se concluir pelo no-cabimento desta ao, mesmo
que fosse proposta com fundamento no inciso I do pargrafo nico do art. 1 da Lei
9.882/99. Isso porque no houve demonstrao de controvrsia judicial relevante
sobre a matria, requisito previsto no inciso V do art. 3 da mesma Lei 9.882. Ante
o exposto, nego seguimento presente ao. O que fao com base no art. 4 da Lei
9.882/99 e no 1 do art. 21 do RISTF.
3. AO DIRETA DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDADE (ADI)
ADI 3939 / DF - DISTRITO FEDERAL
AO DIRETA DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDADE
Relator(a): Min. CRMEN LCIA
Data do julgamento: 24/06/2010
Deciso Monocrtica: AO DIRETA DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDADE.
PORTARIA N. 35/2006, DA SECRETARIA DE COMRCIO EXTERIOR.
IMPORTAO DE PNEUS USADOS. REVOGAO SUPERVENIENTE
DO DISPOSITIVO QUESTIONADO. PERDA DE OBJETO. AO DIRETA
PREJUDICADA. Relatrio 1. Ao Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, com pedido
de medida cautelar, ajuizada pelo Governador do Estado do Paran, em 3.8.2007,
em que se questiona o art. 41, caput, da Portaria n. 35, de 24 de novembro de
2006, da Secretaria de Comrcio Exterior, que probe a importao de pneus
usados, como matria-prima... (fl. 2). O Caso 2. O Autor assevera que a norma
impugnada afrontaria os arts. 3, inc. I a III, 5, inc. II e XIII, 170, inc. II, IV, V, VII
e VIII, da Constituio da Repblica. Argumenta que, no havendo lei que proba
a importao de pneu usado ou recauchutado, no poderia uma Portaria inovar
a ordem jurdica proibindo uma atividade lcita (fl. 2). Assevera que no se
pode[ria] garantir a um determinado segmento (pneus) exclusividade na explorao
da atividade (pneus novos), quando [seria] possvel oferecer ao consumidor uma
opo (pneus usados ou reformados) que tambm corresponde[ria] a uma atividade
lcita e que pode[ria] perfeitamente adequar-se legislao ambiental... (fls. 4-5).
Enfatiza que ... as indstrias do Mercosul podem importar pneus usados para
export-los remoldados para o Brasil enquanto que as indstrias brasileiras no
podem importar pneus usados como matria-prima para disputarem o mercado
brasileiro em igualdade de condies com as indstrias estrangeiras... (fl. 15).
Requer o deferimento de medida liminar para suspen[der] a vigncia do caput do
art. 41 da Portaria n. 35/2006... da Secretaria de Comrcio Exterior (fl. 18). Pede
seja declara[da] a inconstitucionalidade do caput do art. 41 da Portaria SECEX
n. 35/2006 desde sua edio, confirmando a liminar (fl. 20). 3. Em 14.8.2007,
Volume2_CS4.indb 288
6/16/11 4:11 PM
289
Volume2_CS4.indb 289
6/16/11 4:11 PM
290
Volume2_CS4.indb 290
6/16/11 4:11 PM
291
5, XXXVI, mas na lei ordinria, art. 6 da LICC. Assim, a deciso que d pela
ocorrncia, ou no, no caso concreto, de tais institutos situa-se no contencioso
de direito comum, que no autoriza a admisso do recurso extraordinrio (AI n
520.942, Rel. Min. CARLOS VELLOSO, DJ de 5.8.2005). E, quanto alegao
de ofensa ao art. 93, IX, da Constituio da Repblica, observo que o acrdo
est devidamente fundamentado, e o que basta, pois, como se decidiu no RE
n 140.370 (Rel. Min. SEPLVEDA PERTENCE, DJ de 21.5.93): (...) O que
a Constituio exige, no art. 93, IX, que a deciso judicial seja fundamentada;
no, que a fundamentao seja correta, na soluo das questes de fato ou de
direito da lide: declinadas no julgado as premissas, corretamente assentadas ou
no, mas coerentes com o dispositivo do acrdo, est satisfeita a exigncia
constitucional. 3. Ante o exposto, dou provimento ao agravo, convertendo-o
em recurso extraordinrio, a que nego seguimento (arts. 21, 1, do RISTF, 38
da Lei n 8.038, de 28.5.90, e 557 do CPC).
AI 762165 / PE - PERNAMBUCO
AGRAVO DE INSTRUMENTO
Relator(a): Min. CRMEN LCIA
Data do julgamento: 01/02/2010
Deciso Monocrtica: REPERCUSSO GERAL DA QUESTO
CONSTITUCIONAL. QUESTO SUSCETVEL DE REPRODUZIR-SE EM
MLTIPLOS FEITOS. ART. 543-B DO CDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL. ART.
328, PARGRAFO NICO, DO REGIMENTO INTERNO DO SUPREMO
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL. DEVOLUO DOS AUTOS ORIGEM. Relatrio
1. Discute-se nos autos se o Cdigo de Defesa do Consumidor prevalece sobre
a Conveno de Varsvia e o Cdigo Brasileiro de Aeronutica, nas aes de
indenizao por danos morais e materiais decorrentes de extravio de bagagem.
Apreciada a matria posta em exame, DECIDO. 2. No Data do julgamento
eletrnico do Agravo de Instrumento n. 762.184, Relator o Ministro Cezar
Peluso, o Supremo Tribunal Federal reconheceu a existncia de repercusso
geral da questo constitucional suscitada neste recurso extraordinrio. 3. O
reconhecimento da repercusso geral do tema constitucional torna dispensvel a
determinao de subida do recurso extraordinrio ou de converso deste agravo
de instrumento naquele recurso, pois os autos principais devero aguardar na
origem o Data do julgamento de mrito do Agravo de Instrumento n. 762.184,
a teor do que dispe o art. 543-B do Cdigo de Processo Civil. 4. Pelo exposto,
dou provimento ao agravo de instrumento para admitir o recurso extraordinrio,
devendo ser observado quanto a este o art. 543-B do Cdigo de Processo Civil,
nos termos do art. 328, pargrafo nico, do Regimento Interno do Supremo
Tribunal Federal. Retornem os autos deste agravo de instrumento origem para
que sejam apensados aos autos principais.
Volume2_CS4.indb 291
6/16/11 4:11 PM
292
Volume2_CS4.indb 292
6/16/11 4:11 PM
293
Volume2_CS4.indb 293
6/16/11 4:11 PM
294
Volume2_CS4.indb 294
6/16/11 4:11 PM
295
AI 667348 / SP - SO PAULO
AGRAVO DE INSTRUMENTO
Relator(a): Min. ELLEN GRACIE
Data do julgamento: 19/08/2010
Deciso Monocrtica: 1. Trata-se de agravo de instrumento de deciso que
inadmitiu recurso extraordinrio interposto contra acrdo do TRF da 3 Regio
assim ementado: TRIBUTRIO PROCESSUAL CIVIL ADICIONAL
AO FRETE PARA RENOVAO DA MINHA MERCANTE (AFRMM)
DECRETOS-LEIS 2.404/87 E 2.414/88 PEDIDO DE ISENO AUSNCIA
DE ENCAMINHAMENTO AO MINISTRIO COMPETENTE EXTINO
DO FEITO SEM DATA DO JULGAMENTO DO MRITO. 1 A legislao
brasileira exige o encaminhamento do pedido de iseno ao rgo administrativo
competente para analisar se a importao est abrigada por Acordo internacional.
2 No cumprida a exigncia legal, inafastvel a extino do feito sem anlise
do mrito, em face de ausncia de uma das condies da ao mandamental. 3
Apelao e remessa oficial providas (fl. 68). 2 A empresa agravante alega, nas
razes do recurso extraordinrio, afronta ao art. 5, 2, da CF, sustentando, em
sntese, o seguinte: ... o que se pretende no presente feito justamente assegurar
que a ora recorrente possa exercer plenamente o seu direito iseno em causa, sem
se submeter ilegal e inconstitucional exigncia de requerimento ao Sr. Ministro das
Relaes Exteriores, da forma que, ao decidir como decidiu, o v. acrdo contrariou
o disposto no art. 5, par. 2 da Constituio Federal de 1988, o que justifica o
conhecimento do presente apelo com fulcro na alnea a do permissivo constitucional
(fl. 105). 3. O recurso no merece prosperar. Verifico que a controvrsia limitou-se
ao exame do cumprimento dos requisitos necessrios para a obteno da iseno
prevista em tratado internacional, descritos no Decreto-lei 2.404/87 (redao dada
pelo Decreto-Lei 2.414/88), mostrando-se, portanto, insuscetvel de render ensejo
ao cabimento do recurso extraordinrio. Nesse sentido, o RE 205.962-AgR/SP, de
minha relatoria, 1 Turma, DJ 20.06.2003, assim ementado: ADICIONAL AO
FRETE DE RENOVAO DA MARINHA MERCANTE. ISENO. TRATADO
INTERNACIONAL. APROVAO PELO MINISTRIO DAS RELAES
EXTERIORES. ART. 5, 2, DA CF/88. OFENSA INDIRETA. A controvrsia
trazida no recurso extraordinrio envolve o cotejo entre tratado internacional e
sua regulamentao pela legislao brasileira, questo infraconstitucional que no
rende ensejo admisso do recurso extraordinrio, a ttulo de ofensa ao art. 5, 2,
da Constituio Federal. Agravo regimental improvido. 4. Ante o exposto, nego
seguimento ao agravo de instrumento (art. 577, caput, do CPC).
AI 786536 / RJ - RIO DE JANEIRO
AGRAVO DE INSTRUMENTO
Relator(a): Min. MARCO AURLIO
Data do julgamento: 07/10/2010
Volume2_CS4.indb 295
6/16/11 4:11 PM
296
Volume2_CS4.indb 296
6/16/11 4:11 PM
297
AI 829815 / PR - PARAN
AGRAVO DE INSTRUMENTO
Relator(a): Min. CRMEN LCIA
Data do julgamento: 06/12/2010
Deciso: A
GRAVO DE INSTRUMENTO. TRABALHISTA E PROCESSUAL
TRABALHISTA. IMPOSSIBILIDADE DE REEXAME DE LEGISLAO
INFRACONSTITUCIONAL, FATOS E PROVAS: SMULA 279 DO
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL. ALEGADA OFENSA AO PRINCPIO
DA LEGALIDADE: SMULA N. 636 DO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL
FEDERAL. AGRAVO AO QUAL SE NEGA SEGUIMENTO. Relatrio 1.
Agravo de instrumento contra deciso que no admitiu recurso extraordinrio,
interposto com base no art. 102, inc. III, alnea a, da Constituio da
Repblica. 2. O recurso inadmitido tem por objeto o seguinte julgado do
Tribunal Superior do Trabalho: RECURSO DE REVISTA. AUXLIOALIMENTAO. A teor da OJ/133/SBDI-1/TST, -A ajuda alimentao
fornecida por empresa participante do programa de alimentao ao
trabalhador, institudo pela Lei n. 6.321/76, no tem carter salarial. Portanto,
no integra o salrio para nenhum efeito legal-. Estando a deciso recorrida
em dissonncia com referida orientao jurisprudencial, deve o recurso de
revista ser conhecido e provido no aspecto para se declarar a natureza
indenizatria da vantagem, que no se integra remunerao. Recurso de
revista conhecido e provido quanto ao tema (fl. 110). 3. No recurso
extraordinrio, a Agravante afirma que o Tribunal a quo teria contrariado os
arts. 5, inc. II e 2, 22, 49, inc. I, 61 e 84, inc. VIII, da Constituio da
Repblica. Argumenta que a Recorrente tentou demonstrar (...) que a
matria constante do Recurso de Revista quanto ao vnculo de emprego
entre a ora Recorrente e o Recorrido fosse analisada sob outro prisma, qual
seja, que a ora Recorrente obrigada a contratar conforme o estipulado
pelos Decretos ns. 74.431/74 e 75.242/75 e que tais Decretos devem,
imperativamente, ser obedecidos e todos os contratos de servios por ela
celebrados (fl. 134, grifos no original). 4. A deciso agravada teve como
fundamento para a inadmissibilidade do recurso extraordinrio a ausncia
de prequestionamento dos arts. 22,49, inc. I, 61 e 84, inc. VIII e a ausncia
de ofensa constitucional direta (fls. 152-154). Analisados os elementos
havidos nos autos, DECIDO. 5. Razo jurdica no assiste Agravante. 6.
No voto condutor do acrdo recorrido, o Ministro Relator afirmou: A
Reclamada no se conforma com o acrdo recorrido no tocante
manuteno da sentena quanto formao do vnculo de emprego
diretamente com ela, aduzindo que: em razo de ser pessoa jurdica
internacional, submete-se ao Decreto 75.242/75, possuindo normas prprias
que regem sua relao com as empreiteiras; foram violados os arts. 5., 2.,
37, II, da CF, 82 do CCB, 2., 2., da LICC; quando o Tribunal Regional
Volume2_CS4.indb 297
6/16/11 4:11 PM
298
Volume2_CS4.indb 298
6/16/11 4:11 PM
299
Volume2_CS4.indb 299
6/16/11 4:11 PM
300
Volume2_CS4.indb 300
6/16/11 4:11 PM
301
Volume2_CS4.indb 301
6/16/11 4:11 PM
302
Volume2_CS4.indb 302
6/16/11 4:11 PM
303
conhecimento do recurso extraordinrio. No agravo regimental, sustentase, em sntese, que h discusso constitucional j que o Brasil integra o
acordo G.A.T.T., e o artigo 5, 2, da Constituio Federal ordena o
respeito e o cumprimento aos compromissos internacionais ratificados
pelo Estado Brasileiro. (...)
AI 726043 AgR / RJ - RIO DE JANEIRO
AG.REG. NO AGRAVO DE INSTRUMENTO
Relator(a): Min. GILMAR MENDES
Data do julgamento: 14/10/2010
Deciso: Trata-se de agravo regimental contra deciso monocrtica que negou
seguimento a agravo de instrumento, ao fundamento de que a matria
tratada nos autos tem ndole infraconstitucional. No agravo regimental,
sustenta-se, em sntese, que h discusso constitucional j que o Brasil
integra o acordo G.A.T.T., e o artigo 5, 2, da Constituio Federal
ordena o respeito e o cumprimento aos compromissos internacionais
ratificados pelo Estado Brasileiro. (...)
AI 662050 AgR / MG - MINAS GERAIS
AG.REG. NO AGRAVO DE INSTRUMENTO
Relator(a): Min. ELLEN GRACIE
Data do julgamento: 22/10/2010
Deciso: 1. Trata-se de agravo regimental (fls. 98-105) interposto por Megafort
Distribuidora, Importao e Exportao Ltda. contra deciso proferida
pelo meu antecessor, Ministro Gilmar Mendes (fl. 85), que, com
fundamento em deciso proferida pelo Plenrio desta Corte (RE
206.069/SP, de minha relatoria, DJ 01.09.2006), considerou devido o
recolhimento de ICMS, independentemente da natureza do contrato
internacional que motive a importao. (...)
6. EMBARGOS DE DECLARAO
AI 448572 ED / SP - SO PAULO
EMB.DECL. NO AGRAVO DE INSTRUMENTO
Relator(a): Min. CELSO DE MELLO
Data do julgamento: 30/11/2010
rgo Julgador: Segunda Turma
Publicao: DJe-247 DIVULG 15-12-2010 PUBLIC 16-12-2010
Ementa: EMPREGADA GESTANTE - ESTABILIDADE PROVISRIA (ADCT,
ART. 10, II, b) CONVENO OIT N 103/1952 - PROTEO
MATERNIDADE E AO NASCITURO - DESNECESSIDADE
Volume2_CS4.indb 303
6/16/11 4:11 PM
304
Volume2_CS4.indb 304
6/16/11 4:11 PM
305
Volume2_CS4.indb 305
6/16/11 4:11 PM
306
Volume2_CS4.indb 306
6/16/11 4:11 PM
307
Volume2_CS4.indb 307
6/16/11 4:11 PM
308
Volume2_CS4.indb 308
6/16/11 4:11 PM
309
Volume2_CS4.indb 309
6/16/11 4:11 PM
310
Volume2_CS4.indb 310
6/16/11 4:11 PM
311
Volume2_CS4.indb 311
6/16/11 4:11 PM
312
Volume2_CS4.indb 312
6/16/11 4:11 PM
313
Volume2_CS4.indb 313
6/16/11 4:11 PM
314
Volume2_CS4.indb 314
6/16/11 4:11 PM
315
Volume2_CS4.indb 315
6/16/11 4:11 PM
316
Volume2_CS4.indb 316
6/16/11 4:11 PM
317
Volume2_CS4.indb 317
6/16/11 4:11 PM
318
Volume2_CS4.indb 318
6/16/11 4:11 PM
319
Volume2_CS4.indb 319
6/16/11 4:11 PM
320
Volume2_CS4.indb 320
6/16/11 4:11 PM
321
Volume2_CS4.indb 321
6/16/11 4:11 PM
322
Volume2_CS4.indb 322
6/16/11 4:11 PM
323
Volume2_CS4.indb 323
6/16/11 4:11 PM
324
Volume2_CS4.indb 324
6/16/11 4:11 PM
325
Volume2_CS4.indb 325
6/16/11 4:11 PM
326
Volume2_CS4.indb 326
6/16/11 4:11 PM
327
Volume2_CS4.indb 327
6/16/11 4:11 PM
328
HC 103515 / SP - SO PAULO
HABEAS CORPUS
Relator(a): Min. CEZAR PELUSO
Data do julgamento: 16/04/2010
Deciso Monocrtica: 1. Trata-se de habeas corpus preventivo, com pedido de
liminar, impetrado em favor de CARLOS MASSETTI
ou LEONARDO BADALAMENTI ou RICARDO
CAVALCANTE VITALE. O impetrante requer a expedio
de salvo conduto em favor do paciente, que j esteve preso
por ordem do Min. RICARDO LEWANDOWSKI, nos
autos da PPE n 622. O governo da Itlia, requerente desse
pedido de priso preventiva, solicitou a desistncia da ao,
por no ter mais interesse na extradio de seu nacional.
(...)2. Invivel o pedido. O habeas corpus ao autnoma,
preordenada exclusivamente proteo da liberdade de
locomoo ir, vir e ficar contra ilegalidade ou abuso de
poder (...) que no est em questo a liberdade do paciente,
que no est preso, nem se v na iminncia de s-lo. Em
outras palavras, no h ameaa a liberdade do paciente que
justifique sequer o conhecimento da presente ordem, no
obstante o receio do paciente de que, uma vez reinstaurado
contra ele processo perante a Justia italiana, talvez aquele
governo requeira novamente a sua priso preventiva.
O mero temor infundado no capaz de configurar o
cabimento do habeas corpus neste caso. Ademais, no h
nenhum ato coator que busque ser impugnado por meio
deste writ. O paciente no responde a processo penal, nem
alvo de investigao policial. H to-somente o temor de
que a sua condio de ex-investigado na Itlia seria capaz
de dar ensejo alegada perseguio que vem sofrendo. Mas
no h deciso de nenhuma autoridade que ameace ou tolha
a sua liberdade ambulatorial, pelo que considero invivel
este habeas corpus. 3. Ante o exposto, nego seguimento ao
pedido, por ser manifestamente inadmissvel (art. 21, 1,
do RISTF, e 38 da Lei n 8.038, de 28.05.1990). (...)
HC 99400 / RJ - RIO DE JANEIRO
HABEAS CORPUS
Relator(a): Min. CRMEN LCIA
Data do julgamento: 27/04/2010
Ementa: HABEAS CORPUS. EXECUO PENAL. DECRETO DE EXPULSO
DE ESTRANGEIRO. PEDIDO DE LIVRAMENTO CONDICIONAL.
Volume2_CS4.indb 328
6/16/11 4:11 PM
329
Volume2_CS4.indb 329
6/16/11 4:11 PM
330
Volume2_CS4.indb 330
6/16/11 4:11 PM
331
Volume2_CS4.indb 331
6/16/11 4:11 PM
332
Volume2_CS4.indb 332
6/16/11 4:11 PM
333
Volume2_CS4.indb 333
6/16/11 4:11 PM
334
Volume2_CS4.indb 334
6/16/11 4:11 PM
335
Volume2_CS4.indb 335
6/16/11 4:11 PM
336
Volume2_CS4.indb 336
6/16/11 4:11 PM
337
Volume2_CS4.indb 337
6/16/11 4:11 PM
338
Volume2_CS4.indb 338
6/16/11 4:11 PM
339
Volume2_CS4.indb 339
6/16/11 4:11 PM
340
Volume2_CS4.indb 340
6/16/11 4:11 PM
341
Volume2_CS4.indb 341
6/16/11 4:11 PM
342
Volume2_CS4.indb 342
6/16/11 4:11 PM
343
Volume2_CS4.indb 343
6/16/11 4:11 PM
344
Volume2_CS4.indb 344
6/16/11 4:11 PM
345
Volume2_CS4.indb 345
6/16/11 4:11 PM
346
Volume2_CS4.indb 346
6/16/11 4:11 PM
347
Volume2_CS4.indb 347
6/16/11 4:11 PM
348
Volume2_CS4.indb 348
6/16/11 4:11 PM
349
Volume2_CS4.indb 349
6/16/11 4:11 PM
350
Volume2_CS4.indb 350
6/16/11 4:11 PM
351
Volume2_CS4.indb 351
6/16/11 4:11 PM
352
Volume2_CS4.indb 352
6/16/11 4:11 PM
353
Volume2_CS4.indb 353
6/16/11 4:11 PM
354
Volume2_CS4.indb 354
6/16/11 4:11 PM
355
Volume2_CS4.indb 355
6/16/11 4:11 PM
356
Volume2_CS4.indb 356
6/16/11 4:11 PM
357
Volume2_CS4.indb 357
6/16/11 4:11 PM
358
Volume2_CS4.indb 358
6/16/11 4:11 PM
359
Volume2_CS4.indb 359
6/16/11 4:11 PM
360
Volume2_CS4.indb 360
6/16/11 4:11 PM
361
Volume2_CS4.indb 361
6/16/11 4:11 PM
362
Volume2_CS4.indb 362
6/16/11 4:11 PM
363
improvimento do recurso (folhas 966 a 972). Decido. Anotese, inicialmente, que o acrdo referente ao ltimo dos
embargos de declarao interpostos pela recorrente foi
publicado em 4/3/02, conforme expresso na certido de folha
922, no sendo exigvel a demonstrao da existncia de
repercusso geral das questes constitucionais trazidas no
recurso extraordinrio, conforme decidido na Questo de
Ordem no Agravo de Instrumento n 664.567/RS, Pleno,
Relator o Ministro Seplveda Pertence, DJ de 6/9/07. A
irresignao no merece prosperar, no devendo o presente
recurso sequer ser conhecido, pois os dispositivos
constitucionais indicados como violados no recurso
extraordinrio carecem do necessrio prequestionamento,
sendo certo que o acrdo proferido pelo Superior Tribunal de
Justia no cuidou explicitamente das referidas normas, nem
mesmo depois de interpostos embargos de declarao para
sanar essa eventual omisso. Incide, na espcie, a Smula n
282 desta Corte. Quanto a tal aspecto, convm assinalar que,
muito embora a deciso proferida no primeiro dos embargos
de declarao que a recorrente interps tenha feito breve
meno matria constitucional objeto do presente recurso, o
certo que tal referncia, porque por demais singela, in verbis:
A primeira embargante, American Airlines Inc. alega e
procura impor o seu entendimento no sentido de que o v.
acrdo est a conflitar abertamente com dispositivos da
Conveno de Varsvia, do Cdigo de Defesa do Consumidor
e da prpria Constituio Federal (fls. 700). Flagrantemente,
a primeira embargante busca reapreciar a questo jurdica
relativa ao valor da indenizao, j decidida,
fundamentadamente, no Acrdo embargado no sentido de
que, tendo o extravio da mercadoria ocorrido por motivos no
inerentes aos riscos de transporte areo, aplica-se o Cdigo de
Defesa do Consumidor, afastada a Conveno de Varsvia
quanto indenizao tarifada. No voto, invoquei precedentes
desta Turma (REsp n 154.943/DF e REsp n 158.535/PB) e
reproduzi os fundamentos que lancei no REsp n 154.943/DF,
aplicveis presente demanda, ante os seguintes fatos
demonstrados na sentena, verbis: (...) A sentena deixou
muito claro, que as respostas no infirmaram o extravio,durante
o transporte, por motivos outros que no aqueles inerentes de
riscos de transporte areo. Nenhum motivo de fora maior ou
de caso fortuito, para justificar o inexplicvel extravio da
Volume2_CS4.indb 363
6/16/11 4:11 PM
364
Volume2_CS4.indb 364
6/16/11 4:11 PM
365
Volume2_CS4.indb 365
6/16/11 4:11 PM
366
Volume2_CS4.indb 366
6/16/11 4:11 PM
367
Volume2_CS4.indb 367
6/16/11 4:11 PM
368
Volume2_CS4.indb 368
6/16/11 4:11 PM
369
Volume2_CS4.indb 369
6/16/11 4:11 PM
370
Volume2_CS4.indb 370
6/16/11 4:11 PM
371
Volume2_CS4.indb 371
6/16/11 4:11 PM
372
Volume2_CS4.indb 372
6/16/11 4:11 PM
373
Volume2_CS4.indb 373
6/16/11 4:11 PM
374
Volume2_CS4.indb 374
6/16/11 4:11 PM
375
Volume2_CS4.indb 375
6/16/11 4:11 PM
376
Volume2_CS4.indb 376
6/16/11 4:11 PM
377
Volume2_CS4.indb 377
6/16/11 4:11 PM
378
Volume2_CS4.indb 378
6/16/11 4:11 PM
379
ora guerreado, pelas razes acima expostas, reconhecendose a contrariedade ao dispositivo constitucional apontado
de modo a, julgando-se improcedente o pleito autoral,
preservar-se a escorreita interpretao e aplicao das
normas constitucionais (fl. 130). Analisados os elementos
havidos nos autos, DECIDO. 3. Razo jurdica no assiste
Recorrente. 4. O Tribunal a quo reconheceu que o ora
Recorrido teria cumprido os requisitos para a aquisio da
nacionalidade, nos termos do art. 145, inc. I, alnea c, da
Constituio de 1967, no momento em que foi registrado
em Consulado brasileiro na cidade de Hannover, e no
seria necessrio, portanto, cumprir os requisitos do art.
12, inc. I, alnea c, da Constituio da Repblica, nos
termos seguintes: impende esclarecer que o Impetrante,
poca de seu nascimento na Alemanha (Hannover), fora
registrado em Consulado brasileiro, conforme se depreende
de documento de folha 21, traduzido no documento de
folhas 22/23. poca, vigorava o art. 145, I, alnea c, da
Constituio de 1967, modificada pela Emenda n. 1/69.
Dizia este dispositivo: Art. 145. So brasileiros: I natos:
(...) c) os nascidos no estrangeiro, de pai brasileiro ou
me brasileira, embora no estejam estes a servio do
Brasil, desde que registrados em repartio brasileira
competente no exterior ou, no registrados, venham a
residir no territrio nacional antes de atingir a maioridade;
neste caso, alcanada esta, devero, dentro de quatro anos,
optar pela nacionalidade brasileira.(grifei) Percebe-se que
o nascimento do Impetrante regia-se, fundamentalmente,
por esta norma. Interpretando a sua redao, percebo que a
CR/67 colocava duas situaes distintas: 1) a dos nascidos
no estrangeiro, de pai brasileiro ou me brasileira, embora
no estejam estes a servio do Brasil, desde que registrados
em repartio brasileira competente no exterior; e 2)
a dos nascidos no estrangeiro, de pai brasileiro ou me
brasileira, embora no estejam estes a servio do Brasil,
no registrados que venham a residir no territrio nacional
antes de atingir a maioridade. Percebe-se que o termo
neste caso acima grifado no art. 145, I, alnea c, da CR/67
referia-se to somente ao caso do nascido no estrangeiro
no registrado que venha a residir no territrio nacional
antes de atingir a maioridade. Por esta interpretao,
somente se exigia a OPO DE NACIONALIDADE
Volume2_CS4.indb 379
6/16/11 4:11 PM
380
Volume2_CS4.indb 380
6/16/11 4:11 PM
381
RE 286754 / AL - ALAGOAS
RECURSO EXTRAORDINRIO
Relator(a): Min. DIAS TOFFOLI
Data do julgamento: 23/02/2010
Deciso Monocrtica: Vistos. S/A USINA CORURIPE ACAR E LCOOL
interpe recurso extraordinrio, com fundamento na alnea
a do permissivo constitucional, contra acrdo da Terceira
Turma do Tribunal Regional da 5 Regio, assim ementado:
CONSTITUCIONAL E TRIBUTRIO. IMPOSTO
IMPORTAO. MAJORAO DE ALQUOTA.
LCOOL
CARBURANTE.
DESEMBARAO
ADUANEIRO. MERCOSUL. DECRETO N. 1.343/94.
TEC TARIFA EXTERNA COMUM. INEXISTNCIA
DE DESVIO DE FINALIDADE DO ATO DE
ALTERAO DA ALQUOTA. DESNECESSIDADE
DE LEI COMPLEMENTAR. LEGALIDADE. 1. A
alterao de alquota do Imposto de Importao incidente
sobre combustveis (lcool carburante, no caso), tal como
veiculada no Decreto n 1.343/94, dispensaria a edio
de Lei Complementar, para ser validamente efetuada. 2.
A aplicao da Tarifa Externa Comum, exatamente por
ser externa, no visa aos pases integrantes do prprio
MERCOSUL, mas apenas a outros pases, como os
Estados Unidos da Amrica (TRF 5 Regio, Pleno,
MS n 49206-PE, Rel. p/ acrdo Juiz Castro Meira). 3.
Tanto o Decreto n 1.471, de 27-4-93, como a Portaria n
201, de 10-8-95, que alteraram as alquotas do Imposto de
Importao dos produtos relacionados nos anexos 2 e 3
daquele Decreto, tiveram como motivao o compromisso
assumido pelo Brasil no mbito do MERCOSUL, em razo
da Conveno da Taxa Externa Comum, pactuada entre
as partes integrantes daquele Organismo, no havendo,
de conseqncia, qualquer desvio de finalidade no ato
veiculador da novidade. 4. Possibilidade de alterao da
alquota do imposto sob enfoque, mediante a edio de
simples ato administrativo normativo; aquela, quando
ocorrente, incide em percentual ad valorem, e no
sobre o valor global da operao. 5. Apelao e Remessa
Oficial, tida por interposta, providas. (fl. 204) Opostos
embargos de declarao (fls. 207 a 212), foram rejeitados
(fls.214 a 223). Alega a recorrente vulnerao dos artigos
5, inciso XXXVI; 150, incisos IV e III, alnea a; 153,
Volume2_CS4.indb 381
6/16/11 4:11 PM
382
Volume2_CS4.indb 382
6/16/11 4:11 PM
383
Volume2_CS4.indb 383
6/16/11 4:11 PM
384
Volume2_CS4.indb 384
6/16/11 4:11 PM
385
Volume2_CS4.indb 385
6/16/11 4:11 PM
386
Volume2_CS4.indb 386
6/16/11 4:11 PM
387
Volume2_CS4.indb 387
6/16/11 4:11 PM
388
Volume2_CS4.indb 388
6/16/11 4:11 PM
389
Volume2_CS4.indb 389
6/16/11 4:11 PM
390
Volume2_CS4.indb 390
6/16/11 4:11 PM
391
Volume2_CS4.indb 391
6/16/11 4:11 PM
392
Volume2_CS4.indb 392
6/16/11 4:11 PM
393
Volume2_CS4.indb 393
6/16/11 4:11 PM
394
Volume2_CS4.indb 394
6/16/11 4:11 PM
395
Volume2_CS4.indb 395
6/16/11 4:11 PM
396
Volume2_CS4.indb 396
6/16/11 4:11 PM
Volume2_CS4.indb 397
397
6/16/11 4:11 PM
398
Volume2_CS4.indb 398
6/16/11 4:11 PM