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SECONDDIVISION
[G.R.No.142244.November18,2002.]
ATLASFARMS,INC.,Petitioner,v.NATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSION,JAIMEO.DELAPEAand
MARCIALI.ABION,Respondents.
DECISION

QUISUMBING,J.:

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision 1 dated January 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.
52780, dismissing its petition forcertiorariagainst the NLRC, as well as the resolution 2 dated February 24, 2000,
denyingitsmotionforreconsideration.
Theantecedentfactsofthecase,asfoundbytheCourtofAppeals,3areasfollows:

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PrivaterespondentJaimeO.delaPeawasemployedasaveterinaryaidebypetitionerinDecember1975.Hewas
among several employees terminated in July 1989. On July 8, 1989, he was rehired by petitioner and given the
additionaljoboffeedmilloperator.Hewasinstructedtotrainselectedworkerstooperatethefeedmill.
OnMarch13,1993,4Peawasallegedlycaughturinatinganddefecatingoncompanypremisesnotintendedforthe
purpose. The farm manager of petitioner issued a formal notice directing him to explain within 24 hours why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for violating company rules and regulations. Pea refused,
however, to receive the formal notice. He never bothered to explain, either verbally or in writing, according to
petitioner.Thus,onMarch20,1993,anoticeofterminationwithpaymentofhismonetarybenefitswassenttohim.
HedulyacknowledgedreceiptofhisseparationpayofP13,918.67.
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From the start of his employment on July 8, 1989, until his termination on March 20, 1993, Pea had worked for
seven days a week, including holidays, without overtime, holiday, rest day pay and service incentive leave. At the
time of his dismissal from employment, he was receiving P180 pesos daily wage, or an average monthly salary of
P5,402.
CorespondentMarcialI.Abion5wasacarpenter/masonandamaintenancemanwhoseemploymentbypetitioner
commenced on October 8, 1990. Allegedly, he caused the clogging of the fishpond drainage resulting in damages
worthseveralhundredthousandpesoswhenheimproperlydisposedofthecutgrassandotherwastematerialsinto
the ponds drainage system. Petitioner sent a written notice to Abion, requiring him to explain what happened,
otherwise,disciplinaryactionwouldbetakenagainsthim.Herefusedtoreceivethenoticeandgiveanexplanation,
accordingtopetitioner.Consequently,thecompanyterminatedhisservicesonOctober27,1992.Heacknowledged
receiptofawrittennoticeofdismissal,withhisseparationpay.
LikePea,Abionworkedsevendaysaweek,includingholidays,withoutholidaypay,restdaypay,serviceincentive
leave pay and night shift differential pay. When terminated on October 27, 1992, Abion was receiving a monthly
salaryofP4,500.
Pea and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated. Both claimed that their
termination from service was due to petitioners suspicion that they were the leaders in a plan to form a union to
competeandreplacetheexistingmanagementdominatedunion.
OnNovember9,1993,thelaborarbiterdismissedtheircomplaintsonthegroundthatthegrievancemachineryinthe
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had not yet been exhausted. Private respondents availed of the grievance
process,butlateronrefiledthecasebeforetheNLRCinRegionIV.Theyalleged"lackofsympathy"onpetitioners
parttoengageinconciliationproceedings.
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TheircaseswereconsolidatedintheNLRC.Attheinitialmandatoryconference,petitionerfiledamotiontodismiss,
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging private respondents themselves admitted that they were members of
the employees union with which petitioner had an existing CBA. This being the case, according to petitioner,
jurisdictionoverthecasebelongedtothegrievancemachineryandthereafterthevoluntaryarbitrator,asprovidedin
theCBA.
InadecisiondatedJanuary30,1996,thelaborarbiterdismissedthecomplaintforlackofmerit,findingthatthecase
wasoneofillegaldismissalanddidnotinvolvetheinterpretationorimplementationofanyCBAprovision.Hestated
thatArticle217(c)oftheLaborCode6wasinapplicabletothecase.Further,thelaborarbiterfoundthatalthough
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both complainants did not substantiate their claims of illegal dismissal, there was proof that private respondents
voluntarilyacceptedtheirseparationpayandpetitionersfinancialassistance.
Thus,privaterespondentsbroughtthecasetotheNLRC,whichreversedthelaborarbitersdecision.Dissatisfiedwith
theNLRCruling,petitionerwenttotheCourtofAppealsbywayofapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule65,
seekingreinstatementofthelaborarbitersdecision.TheappellatecourtdeniedthepetitionandaffirmedtheNLRC
resolutionwithsomemodifications,thus:
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The resolution in NLRC CA No. 01052096 is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
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1) The private respondents can not be reinstated, due to their acceptance of the separation pay offered by the
petitioner
2)Theprivaterespondentsareentitledtotheirfullbackwagesand,
3)Theamountoftheseparationpayreceivedbyprivaterespondentsfrompetitionershallnotbedeductedfromtheir
fullbackwages.
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Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.7
Petitioner forthwith filed its motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a resolution dated February 24, 2000,
whichreads:
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ActingontheMotionforReconsiderationfiledbypetitioner[s]whichdrewanoppositionfromprivaterespondents,the
CourtresolvedtoDENYtheaforesaidmotionforreconsideration,astheissuesraisedthereinhavebeenpassedupon
bytheCourtinitsquestioneddecisionandnosubstantialargumentswerepresentedtowarrantitsreversal,letalone
modification.
SOORDERED.8
Inthispetitionnowbeforeus,petitionerallegesthattheappellatecourterredin:

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I. . . . DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND IN EFFECT AFFIRMING THE RULINGS OF THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENTNLRCTHATTHEPRIVATERESPONDENTSWEREILLEGALLYDISMISSED
II....RULINGTHATTHEPRIVATERESPONDENTSAREENTITLEDTOSEPARATIONPAYANDFULLBACKWAGES
III....RULINGTHATPETITIONERISLIABLEFORCOSTSOFSUIT.9
Petitioner contends that the dismissal of private respondents was for a just and valid cause, pursuant to the
provisionsofthecompanysrulesandregulations.Italsoallegeslackofjurisdictiononthepartofthelaborarbiter,
claiming that the cases should have been resolved through the grievance machinery, and eventually referred to
voluntaryarbitration,asprescribedintheCBA.
Fortheirpart,privaterespondentscontendthattheywereillegallydismissedfromemploymentbecausemanagement
discoveredthattheyintendedtoformanotherunion,andbecausetheywerevocalinasserting,theirrights.Inany
case,accordingtoprivaterespondents,thepetitioninvolvesfactualissuesthatcannotbeproperlyraisedinapetition
forreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.10
Infine,therearethreeissuestoberesolved:1)whetherprivaterespondentswerelegallyandvalidlydismissed2)
whether the labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction to decide complaints for illegal dismissal and 3) whether
petitionerisliableforcostsofthesuit.
The first issue primarily involves questions of fact, which can serve as basis for the conclusion that private
respondentswerelegallyandvalidlydismissed.Theburdenofprovingthatthedismissalofprivaterespondentswas
legalandvalidfallsuponpetitioner.TheNLRCfoundthatpetitionerfailedtosubstantiateitsclaimthatbothprivate
respondentscommittedcertainactsthatviolatedcompanyrulesandregulations,11hencewefindnofactualbasisto
saythatprivaterespondentsdismissalwasinorder.WeseenocompellingreasontodeviatefromtheNLRCruling
that their dismissal was illegal, absent a showing that it reached its conclusion arbitrarily. 12 Moreover, factual
findingsofagenciesexercisingquasijudicialfunctionsareaccordednotonlyrespectbutevenfinality,asidefromthe
considerationherethatthisCourtisnotatrieroffacts.13
Anent the second issue, Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor arbiters have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over termination disputes. A possible exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code, which
providesthat
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreementandthosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpoliciesreferredtointhe
immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are
grossincharacter,shallnolongerbetreatedasunfairlaborpracticeandshallberesolvedasgrievancesunderthe
Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement
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shallmeanflagrantandormaliciousrefusaltocomplywiththeeconomicprovisionsofsuchagreement.

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The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall
notentertaindisputes,grievancesormattersundertheexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictionoftheVoluntaryArbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance Machinery or
ArbitrationprovidedintheCollectiveBargainingAgreement.
ButasheldinViverov.CA,14"petitionercannotarrogateintothepowersofVoluntaryArbitratorstheoriginaland
exclusivejurisdictionofLaborArbitersoverunfairlaborpractices,terminationdisputes,andclaimsfordamages,in
theabsenceofanexpressagreementbetweenthepartiesinorderforArticle262oftheLaborCode[Jurisdictionover
otherlabordisputes]toapplyinthecaseatbar."
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Moreover,perJusticeBellosillo:

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ItmaybeobservedthatunderPolicyInstructionNo.56oftheSecretaryofLabor,dated6April1993,"Clarifyingthe
Jurisdiction Between Voluntary Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters Over Termination Cases and Providing Guidelines for
theReferralofSaidCasesOriginallyFiledwiththeNLRCtotheNCMB,"terminationcasesarisinginorresultingfrom
the interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation and enforcement of
company personnel policies which were initially processed at the various steps of the plantlevel Grievance
Proceduresunderthepartiescollectivebargainingagreementsfallwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofthe
voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Art. 217 (c) and Art. 261 of the Labor Code and, if filed before the Labor Arbiter,
these cases shall be dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of jurisdiction and referred to the concerned NCMB
RegionalBranchforappropriateactiontowardsandexpeditiousselectionbythepartiesofaVoluntaryArbitratoror
PanelofArbitratorsbasedontheproceduresagreeduponintheCBA.
Asearlierstated,theinstantcaseisaterminationdisputefallingundertheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofthe
LaborArbiter,anddoesnotspecificallyinvolvetheapplication,implementationorenforcementofcompanypersonnel
policiescontemplatedinPolicyInstructionNo.56.Consequently,PolicyInstructionNo.56doesnotapplyinthecase
atbar.15...
Recordsshow,however,thatprivaterespondentssoughtwithoutsuccesstoavailofthegrievanceprocedureintheir
CBA.16Onthispoint,petitionermaintainsthatbysodoing,privaterespondentsrecognizedthattheircasesstillfell
under the grievance machinery. According to petitioner, without having exhausted said machinery, the private
respondentsfiledtheiractionbeforetheNLRC,inaclearactofforumshopping.17However,itisworthpointingout
that private respondents went to the NLRC only after the labor arbiter dismissed their original complaint for illegal
dismissal.Underthesecircumstancesprivaterespondentshadtofindanotheravenueforredress.Weagreewiththe
NLRCthatitwaspetitionerwhofailedtoshowproofthatittookstepstoconvenethegrievancemachineryafterthe
labor arbiter first dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and directed the parties to avail of the grievance
procedure under Article VII of the existing CBA. They could not now be faulted for attempting to find an impartial
forum,afterpetitionerfailedtolistentothemandaftertheintercessionofthelaborarbiterprovedfutile.TheNLRC
had aptly concluded in part that private respondents had already exhausted the remedies under the grievance
procedure.18Iterredonlyinfindingthattheircauseofactionwasripeforarbitration.
InthecaseofManejav.NLRC,19weheldthatthedismissalcasedoesnotfallwithinthephrase"grievancesarising
from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies."InManeja,thehotelemployeewasdismissedwithout
hearing. We ruled that her dismissal was unjustified, and her right to due process was violated, absent the twin
requirementsofnoticeandhearing.Wealsoheldthatthelaborarbiterhadoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverthe
terminationcase,andthatitwaserrortogivethevoluntaryarbitratorjurisdictionovertheillegaldismissalcase.
In Vivero v. CA, 20 private respondents attempted to justify the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator over a
terminationdisputeallegingthattheissueinvolvedtheinterpretationandimplementationofthegrievanceprocedure
in the CBA. There, we held that since what was challenged was the legality of the employees dismissal for lack of
causeandlackofdueprocess,thecasewasprimarilyaterminationdispute.Theissueofwhethertherewasproper
interpretationandimplementationoftheCBAprovisionscameintoplayonlybecausethegrievanceprocedureinthe
CBA was not observed, after he sought his unions assistance. Since the real issue then was whether there was a
validtermination,therewasnoreasontoinvoketheneedtointerpretnorquestionanimplementationofanyCBA,
provision.
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One significant fact in the present petition also needs stressing. Pursuant to Article 260 21 of the Labor Code, the
parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the
grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in
advancebythepartiestoaCBA.Consequentlyonlydisputesinvolvingtheunionandthecompanyshallbereferred
tothegrievancemachineryorvoluntaryarbitrators.Intheseterminationcasesofprivaterespondents,theunionhad
noparticipation,ithavingfailedtoobjecttothedismissaloftheemployeesconcernedbythepetitioner.Itisobvious
thatarbitrationwithouttheunionsactiveparticipationonbehalfofthedismissedemployeeswouldbepointless,or
evenprejudicialtotheircause.
Comingtothemeritsofthepetition,theNLRCfoundthatpetitionerdidnotcomplywiththerequirementsofavalid
dismissal.Foradismissaltobevalid,theemployermustshowthat:(1)theemployeewasaccordeddueprocess,and
(2) the dismissal must be for any of the valid causes provided for by law. 22 No evidence was shown that private
respondents refused, as alleged, to receive the notices requiring them to show cause why no disciplinary action
shouldbetakenagainstthem.Withoutproofofnotice,privaterespondentswhoweresubsequentlydismissedwithout
hearing were also deprived of a chance to air their side at the level of the grievance machinery. Given the fact of
dismissal,itcanbesaidthatthecaseswereeffectivelyremovedfromthejurisdictionofthevoluntaryarbitrator,thus
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placing them within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the dispute is just in the interpretation,
implementationorenforcementstage,itmaybereferredtothegrievancemachinerysetupintheCBA,orbroughtto
voluntaryarbitration.But,wheretherewasalreadyactualtermination,withallegedviolationoftheemployeesrights,
itisalreadycognizablebythelaborarbiter.23
In sum, we conclude that the labor arbiter and then the NLRC had jurisdiction over the cases involving private
respondents dismissal, and no error was committed by the appellate court in upholding their assumption of
jurisdiction.
However,wefindthatamodificationofthemonetaryawardsisinorder.Asaconsequenceoftheirillegaldismissal,
private respondents are entitled to reinstatement to their former positions. But since reinstatement is no longer
feasiblebecausepetitionerhadalreadycloseditsshop,separationpayinlieuofreinstatementshallbeawarded.24A
terminatedemployeesreceiptofhisseparationpayandothermonetarybenefitsdoesnotprecludereinstatementor
fullbenefitsunderthelaw,shouldreinstatementbenolongerpossible.25AsheldinCariov.ACCFA:26
Acceptanceofthosebenefitswouldnotamounttoestoppel.Thereasonisplain.Employerandemployee,obviously,
donotstandonthesamefooting.Theemployerdrovetheemployeetothewall.Thelattermusthavetogetholdof
themoney.Becauseoutofjob,hehadtofacetheharshnecessitiesoflife.Hethusfoundhimselfinnopositionto
resistmoneyproffered.His,then,isacaseofadherence,notofchoice.Onethingsure,however,isthatpetitioners
did not relent their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived their rights. Renuntiato non
praesumitur.
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Conformably, private respondents are entitled to separation pay equivalent to one months salary for every year of
service,inlieuofreinstatement.27Asregardstheawardofdamages,inordernottofurtherdelaythedispositionof
thiscase,wefinditnecessarytoexpresslysetforththeextentofthebackwagesasawardedbytheappellatecourt.
PursuanttoR.A.6715,asamended,privaterespondentsshallbeentitledtofullbackwagescomputedfromthetime
of their illegal dismissal up to the date of promulgation of this decision without qualification, considering that
reinstatementisnolongerpracticableunderthecircumstances.28
Having found private respondents dismissal to be illegal, and the labor arbiter and the NLRC duly vested with
jurisdictiontohearanddecidetheircases,weagreewiththeappellatecourtthatpetitionershouldpaythecostsof
suit.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIEDforlackofmerit.ThedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.52780is
AFFIRMEDwiththeMODIFICATIONthatpetitionerisorderedtopayprivaterespondents(a)separationpay,inlieuof
theirreinstatement,equivalenttoonemonthssalaryforeveryyearofservice,(b)fullbackwagesfromthedateof
theirdismissaluptothedateofthepromulgationofthisdecision,togetherwith(c)thecostsofsuit.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo,MendozaandCallejo,Sr.,JJ.,concur.
AustriaMartinez,J.,onleave.
Endnotes:

1.Rollo,pp.3245.
2.Id.at47.
3.Id.at3335.
4.ErroneouslystatedasMarch13,1995inNLRCResolutionandCADecision.
5.ReferredalsoasMarcialL.AbioninNLRCResolutionandCADecision.
6.ART.217.JurisdictionofLaborArbitersandtheCommission.
xxx
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpoliciesshallbedisposedof
by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as
maybeprovidedinsaidagreements.
7.Rollo,pp.4445.
8.Id.at47.
9.Id.at13.
10.Id.at910.
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11.CARollo,pp.101103.
12.SeeSanyoTravelCorporationv.NLRC,280SCRA129,139(1997).
13. Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 199, 209210 (1997) Aurora
LandProjectsCorporationv.NLRC,266SCRA48,5859(1997).
14.344SCRA268,281(2000).Emphasissupplied.
15.Id.at282.
16.CARollo,pp.6162.
17.Id.at14.
18.Idat23.
19.290SCRA603,616(1998).
20.344SCRA268(2000).
21.ART.260.GrievanceMachineryandVoluntaryArbitration.ThepartiestoaCollectiveBargaining
Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and
conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising
fromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.SeealsoManejav.NLRC,supra.
All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which are not settled within seven (7) calendar
daysfromthedateofitssubmissionshallautomaticallybereferredtovoluntaryarbitrationprescribed
intheCollectiveBargainingAgreement.
Forthispurpose,partiestoaCollectiveBargainingAgreementshallnameanddesignateinadvancea
VoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitrators,orincludeintheagreementaprocedureforthe
selection of such Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of
qualified Voluntary Arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the parties fail to select a
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the Board shall designate the Voluntary
Arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the selection procedure agreed upon in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, which shall act with the same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or panel of
Arbitratorshasbeenselectedbythepartiesasprescribed.
22. Magcalas v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 453, 470 (1997) PepsiCola Distributors of the Philippines, Inc. v.
NLRC,272SCRA267,274275(1997).
23. Maneja v. NLRC, 290 SCRA 603, 616 (1998), citing Sanyo Philippines Workers UnionPSSLU v.
Caizares,211SCRA361,368(1992).
24.AuroraLandProjectsCorp.v.NLRC,266SCRA48,66(1997)DelaCruzv.NLRC,268SCRA458,
471(1997)HinatuanMiningCorporationv.NLRC,268SCRA622,626(1997).
25.SeeLopezSugarCorporationv.FederationofFreeWorkers,189SCRA179,192(1990),citingAFP
MutualBenefitAssociation,Inc.v.AFPMBAIEU,97SCRA715(1980).
26.18SCRA183,190(1966).
27.IrigaTelephoneCo.,Inc.v.NLRC,286SCRA600,609(1998)KathyOEnterprisesv.NLRC,286
SCRA729,740(1998).
28.Mabezav.NLRC,271SCRA670,687(1997),citingBustamantev.NLRC,265SCRA61(1996).

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