Summary: Francisco vs.

House of Representatives
(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)
En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote
separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2
wrote concurring and dissenting separate opinions to
which 2 concur.
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings,
superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the
House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months
and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint
or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second

impeachment complaint was accompanied by a

"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives,
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing
of
the
second
impeachment
complaint
is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one
year."
Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to
those arising from impeachment proceedings.
Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred
on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1,
Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The
"moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts
as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks
and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of
our republican form of government and insures that its
vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves. The separation of powers is
a fundamental principle in our system of government.
It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within
its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely

unrestrained and independent of each other. The

Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the
government. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The major difference between the judicial power of
the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to
the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring
distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of
the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in
the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied
in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof.
These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official. The people
expressed their will when they instituted the abovementioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review. There

is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court

exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Finally, there exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the
calibrated
system
of
independence
and
interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No.
160261
FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment
proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in
this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent
filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of
impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is
constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a
political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives are
unconstitutional.
Consequently,
the
second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising
from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation
of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches must be given effect without

destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists

no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the
calibrated
system
of
independence
and
interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe
Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood
initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least
one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground
that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue
of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against
the
Chief
Justice
transgressed
the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable
issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the
government.
G.R. No. 83896
194 SCRA 317
February 22, 1991
Petitioner: Civil Liberties Union
Respondent: Executive Secretary

FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved

jointly as both seek for the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No.
284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on
July 25, 1987.
EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their
Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to hold
other than their government positions in addition to
their primary positions.

Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary

or Assistant Secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two (2) positions in the government
and government corporations and receive
corresponding compensation thereof.

Section 2: If they hold more than the

requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish
the excess position in favor of the subordinate
official who is next in rank but in no case shall
any officer hold not more than two (2)
positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the

boards of such corporation should either be a
Secretary,
Undersecretary
or
Assistant
Secretary.

Petitioners
are
challenging
EO
No.
284's
unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct
contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be
appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of
Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8,
Article VIII.
Constitutional provisions:

Section 13, Article VII: The President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet and
their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless

otherwise provided by the Constitution,

hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, directly or
indirectly, during their tenure, practice any
other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.

Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise

allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality
thereof,
including
government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.
It has been held that in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of
the times and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed.
The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions
is to prevent government officials from holding
multiple positions in the government for self
enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.
The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in
direct contradiction to the express mandate provided
by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec
8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of
the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute.
When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of
the highest law of the land. Thus, the Court held that
EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR
Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis
Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM

Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to

immediately relinquish their offices and employment.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the
petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is
hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set
aside.

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it

should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino
corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156,

February 3, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine

Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
participated:
petitioner
Manila
Prince
Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to
compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong
Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in
10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
II.

THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2.
Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is selfexecuting, whether the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State,
hence, mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution; and

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way
as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing
but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws
to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated
statute
squares
with
the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing

nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. The argument is flawed. If the first and
third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be
self-executing as it does not by its language require
any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-executing in
another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further

guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its

enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall
be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that
a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation.
In
its
plain
and
ordinary
meaning,
the
term patrimony pertains
to
heritage. When
the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx

xxx

xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated with
our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and management of
the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents
claim
that
the Filipino
First

Policy provision is not applicable since what is being

sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
3.
YES, GSIS is included in the term State,
hence, it is mandated to implement 10, paragraph
2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could
only be carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting
through
respondent
Committee
on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state
action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered
state action covered by the Constitution (1) when
the activity it engages in is a public function; (2)
when the government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It
is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51%
of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second
and third categories of state action. Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not
only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
4.
YES, GSIS should give preference to the
petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the

highest bidder shall only be declared the winning

bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the
Constitution
bestows
preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to
be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f

for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share.
Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason
enough not to award the block of shares immediately
to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of
a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot
conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of
a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will
have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so
if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic
law.