RULE 65 Certiorari, Prohibition and

Mandamus
A.1. Definition and Purpose of Certiorari
Araullo v. Aquino, G.R No. 209287, 1 July
2014
FACTS: This is a consolidated petition for
the Constitutionality of the DAP.
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and include applications for the
issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or temporary restraining orders.
The respondents aver that the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition are not
proper actions for directly assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC
No. 541, and the other executive issuances
implementing the DAP
RULING:The sole office of the writ of certiorari
isthe correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In
this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
The abuse of discretion must be grave, which
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial
power was exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion or lersonal hostility, or that
therespondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when the judge
ortribunal or board exercising judicial or quasijudicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
qpropriate remedies to raise Constitutional
issues and to review and or prohibit or nullify
the acts of legislative and executive offiials.
Triplex Enterprises, Inc v. PNB-Republic
Bank, G.R. No. 151007, July 17, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner sought to annul the sale of
two parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City
by PNB-Republic Bank to Solid Builders, Inc.
and to compel PNB-Republic Bank to award
instead the sale to it as the highest bidder.
Petitioner's claim was rejected by PNBRepublic Bank due to the sale of the
properties to Solid Builders, Inc.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of

the court a quo's refusal to admit its evidence
but it was denied in an order dated February
26, 1999. The order disallowed the
presentation and admission in evidence of
any testimony referring to the December 7,
1994 opinion of the OGCC. The prohibition
was based on the ground that the testimony
was in violation of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client,
i.e., the OGCC and PNB-Republic Bank.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for

certiorari with the Court of Appeals. However,
the appellate court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in disallowing the presentation and
admission in evidence of Roque's testimony.
RULING: The petition has no merit.

Certiorari as a special civil action is

proper when any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law. The writ may be
issued only where it is convincingly proved
that the lower court committed grave abuse
of discretion, or an act too patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
act in contemplation of law, or that the trial
court exercised its power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.

While certiorari may be maintained as an

appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order in cases where the tribunal has issued
an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, it does not lie
Page 1 of 26

to correct every controversial interlocutory

ruling.

respondent refused
repeated demands.

Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial

court disallowing the admission in evidence of
the testimony of Roque on the opinion of the
OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of
discretion could be imputed to the trial court.
Furthermore, the said order was not an error
of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was
erroneous, the mistake was an error in
judgment not correctable by the writ of
certiorari. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED.

On September 28, 1995, the MCTC rendered

its Decision ordering the respondent to vacate
the subject land. The court found that there
was a dearth of evidence supportive of the
respondents claim that the land is
agricultural or that it is devoted to agricultural
production. Further, it ruled that the
petitioners as the registered owners have a
better right to possession of the subject land.

A.2.
Definition
Prohibition

and

Purpose

of

David v. Rivera, G.R. Nos. 139913 &

140159, January 16, 2004
FACTS: Claiming to be the owner of an
eighteen thousand (18,000)- square meter
portion (hereafter, "subject land") of Lot No.
38-B,1 a five (5)-hectare lot situated at
MacArthur
Highway,
Dau,
Mabalacat,
Pampanga, herein respondent Agustin Rivera
filed on May 10, 1994 a Complaint 2 for
"Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with
Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction" before the Provincial Adjudication
Board (PARAB) of San Fernando, Pampanga
against petitioners heirs of Spouses Cristino
and Consolacion David. The respondent
averred that the petitioners had been
harassing him for the purpose of making him
vacate the subject land although it had
already been given to him sometime in 1957
by the parents of the petitioners as
"disturbance compensation", in consideration
of his renunciation of his tenurial rights over
the
original
eighteen
(18)-hectare
farmholding.

For their part, the petitioners filed a

Complaint for ejectment before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and
Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that the
respondent was occupying the subject land
without
paying
rentals
therefor.
The
petitioners also averred that they need the
subject land for their personal use but the

to

vacate

it

despite

Without appealing the MCTC Decision but

within the period to appeal, the respondent
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City a Petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, seeking the nullification of
the MCTC Decision. The thrust of the petition
was that the MCTC had no jurisdiction as the
issue before it was agrarian in nature.

On February 25, 1998, the RTC issued an

Order14 denying the motion to dismiss. The
court ruled that the motion, which was filed
after the presentation of the plaintiffs
evidence, partakes of a demurrer to evidence
which under Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court, 15 may be granted only upon a
showing that the plaintiff has shown no right
to the relief prayed for. Noting that "the
evidence presented by
the
petitioner
establishes an issue which is addressed to
[the] court for resolution. . . whether or not
the respondent court
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case filed before it", the RTC ruled that the
denial of the motion to dismiss is proper. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration16 but
was denied in an Order17 dated June 23,
1998.
ISSUE: whether the denial of the motion to
dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was
afflicted with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: The SC upheld the CAs Decision.
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a
question of jurisdiction, it follows that the
respondent has availed of the proper, speedy
Page 2 of 26

and adequate remedy which is the special

civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule
that prohibition is the
proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly
within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it
by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such
relief can be obtained. The purpose of a
writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to
maintain the administration of justice in
orderly channels. Also noteworthy is the fact
that the petition for prohibition was filed
within the reglementary period to appeal;
hence, it cannot be claimed that the same
was used as substitute for a lost appeal.

It should be pointed out that the petitioners

elevated to the appellate court the Order of
the RTC denying their motion to dismiss by
way of demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to
evidence is an objection by one party to the
adequacy of the evidence of his adversary to
make out a case. Otherwise stated, the party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of the
whole evidence to sustain a verdict. In this
case, the trial court ruled that respondents
evidence in support of his application for a
writ of prohibition was sufficient to require the
presentation of petitioners contravening
proof. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in so ruling. The Court of Appeals is
therefore correct in upholding the lower
courts denial of the petitioners motion to
dismiss.

Esquivel v. Ombudsman,
137237, September 17, 2002

G.R.

No.

FACTS:
In their respective
complaint
affidavits, filed before the Philippine National
Police Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG), Third Regional Office,
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein
petitioners
Antonio
Prospero
Esquivel,
municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark
Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain of

barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal

arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment,
attempted murder, and grave threats. Also
included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo
Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO
Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo and SPO1
Catacutan likewise accused P/S
Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio
P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police Force
of dereliction of duty.

The initial investigation conducted by the

PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30 p.m. of
March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to
eat lunch at his parents house at Sta. Monica
Village, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when
petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2
Almayda, LTO Officer Diaz, and several
unidentified persons accompanied them.
Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2
Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol, which
was covered by a Memorandum Receipt and
COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then
forced him to board petitioners vehicle and
brought him to the Municipal Hall.

Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman

committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to consider the exculpatory evidence in
their favor, namely, the admission of PO2
Eduardo that he was in good physical
condition when he left the police station in
Jaen, Nueva Ecija. With such admission, PO2
Duardo is now estopped from claiming that he
was injured since it is conclusive evidence
against him and need not be proven in any
other
proceeding.
Public
respondents,
represented by the Office of the Ombudsman
through the OSP, counter that petitioners
raise a factual issue which is not a proper
subject of a certiorari action. They further
postulate that this is the very same defense
advanced by petitioners in the charges
against them and being evidentiary in nature,
its resolution can only be threshed out in a
full-blown trial.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the offenses and committed grave abuse
of discretion.
RULING:
Page 3 of 26

Being
an
extraordinary
remedy,
prohibition cannot be resorted to when
the ordinary and usual remedies
provided by law are adequate and
available. Prohibition is granted only
where no other remedy is available or
sufficient to afford redress. That the
petitioners have another and complete
remedy at law, through an appeal or
otherwise, is generally held sufficient
reason for denying the issuance of the
writ. In this case, petitioners were not
devoid of a remedy in the ordinary
course of law. They could have filed a
motion to quash the information at the
first instance but they did not. They
have only themselves to blame for this
procedural lapse as they have not
shown any adequate excuse for their
failure to do so. Petitioners did make a
belated oral motion for time to file a
motion to quash the information,
during
their
much
delayed
arraignment, but its denial is not a
proper subject for certiorari or
prohibition as said denial is merely an
interlocutory order.
A writ of prohibition will not be
issued against an inferior court
unless the attention of the court
whose proceedings are sought to
be stayed has been called to the
alleged
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction. The foundation of this
rule is the respect and consideration
due to the lower court and the
expediency of preventing unnecessary
litigation; it cannot be presumed that
the lower court would not properly rule
on a jurisdictional objection if it were
properly presented to it. The records
show that petitioners only raised the
issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction
by the Sandiganbayan before this
Court.

Nos. 53066-A, 53067 and 53068, all derived

from TCT No. 71357 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City. Twenty-four (24)
squatter families live in these lots. In 1975,
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 13152 expropriating forty (40)
hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City.

The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue

"to look into the possibility of amicably
settling the eviction problem and/or to find
out why a clearance should be issued or not
for the removal/demolition of all the illegal
structures in the said property." The squatters
did not attend the meeting. In view of their
failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting
Division Manager, Resettlement Division,
NHA,
wrote
a
memorandum
to
the
Department
Manager,
Resettlement
Department,
NHA,
recommending
the
issuance
of
a
demolition
clearance.
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA
Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to
implement the clearance to eject the
squatters on petitioner's land. At the
conference of February 13, 1991, Carangdang
claimed that petitioners land had already
been declared expropriated by P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent
Court of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus with Declaration as Inexistent
and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No.
1315" against the NHA and Carangdang.

ISSUE: WON Carangdang can be compelled

to effect the directive/ memorandum of
relocation/ resettlement subjecting the said
24
squatter
families
from
unlawfully
occupying
petitioners
subject
property
without declaring PD 1315 as void and
unconstitutional.

A.3. Mandamus
Militante v. CA, G.R. No. 107040, April
12, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner Pilo Militante is the
registered owner of three (3) contiguous
parcels of land with an aggregate area of
1,590 square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan
City. The three parcels are covered by TCT

RULING:
In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray
that respondent Carangdang should be
ordered to desist from relocating the
squatters. What petitioner challenges is
respondent
Carangdang's
refusal
to
implement the demolition clearance issued by
Page 4 of 26

her administrative superiors. The remedy for

a refusal to discharge a legal duty is
mandamus, not prohibition.
As to purpose
Second. The petitioner is not also entitled to a
writ of mandamus. Mandamus is a writ
commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board, or person to do the act required
to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or
station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled,
there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that

he has a well-defined, clear and certain right
to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.
He failed to discharge this burden. The
records show that there is no direct order
from the NHA General Manager addressed to
respondent Carangdang to evict the squatters
and demolish their shanties on the subject
property. The NHA demolition clearance
issued by General Tobias on January 21, 1982
was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor of
Caloocan City. The clearance's revalidation by
NHA General Manager Monico Jacob was
likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.

B. Distinguished From Each Other

Pamana vs Court of Appeals (Certiorari
vs Prohibition)
Against whom directed?

judicial but
are
purely
ministerial
functions.
aimed at "annulling or
modifying" a proceeding

Enriques vs Macadaeg (Prohibtion vs

Mandamus)
Case Type

PROHIBITION
a case where a judge is
proceeding in defiance of the
Rules of Court by refusing to
dismiss an action which would
not be maintained in his court.
The remedy in such case is
prohibition.

C. Certiorari and appeal; distinguished

Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday Holdings
Corp., G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner filed for VoluntaryInsolvency.
Subsequently, it filed a Complaint for damages
against respondents for breach of their joint
venture agreement.
The insolvency court then declared petitioner
respondent. With that, respondents filed their
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a cause of Action which was granted by
the court. The court ruled that the petitioner
lost the right to institute the Complaint for
Damages because the exclusive right to
prosecute the actions belonged to the courtappointed assignee.

CERTIORARI
filed for an MR but was denied and
directed only against Petitioner
a
subsequently
filed a Petition for Certiorari with
tribunal, board or officer
the CA.
exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.
The CA took the case as an exception to the
general rule that certiorari will not apply when
It is not available asappeal
a
is available but later on dismissed upon
remedy for the correctionrespondents
of
MR.
acts performed by a sheriff
during
the
execution
RULING:
process, which acts are
neither judicial nor quasiPage 5 of 26

The special civil action for certiorari and

appeal are two different remedies that
are mutually exclusive; they are not
alternative or successive. Where appeal
is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion. Basic is the rule
that certiorari is not a substitute for the
lapsed remedy of appeal.
Appeal and Certiorari
Distinguished
As to the Purpose
As to the Manner of Filing

As to the Subject Matter

As to the Period of Filing

D. Certiorari under Rule 45 and 65;

distinguished
Aquino vs Court of Appeals (Certiorari
under Rule 65 and 45 distinguished)

Rule 65 - Certiorari
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
only jurisdictional issues may be raised, as
when a court or tribunal has acted
"without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction." The
extraordinary
writ of certiorari cannot
Correction of Errors
of
Jurisdiction
legally
Higher courts exercises
its any other purpose.
be used for
appellate jurisdiction and
power of review
In a special civil action for certiorari, the
Court cannot correct errors of fact which
the
lower court or tribunal may have
committed.
Only judgments or final orders
and those that E.
theProhibition
Rules of
distinguished from
Court so declare are
injunction
appealable

Rule 45 - C
A party des
a judgment
Court of A
Regional Tr
authorized
Court a v
certiorari.
questions o
forth.

Prohibition
Prohibition is a special civil action seeking a
judgment
commanding
a
tribunal,
corporation, board, or officer to desist from
further proceeding in the action because it
has no jurisdiction, is acting in excess of
jurisdiction
or has gravely abused its
Ordinary appeals
= within 15
discretion
days from the notice
of amounting to lack of jurisdiction
(Sec.2,
judgment or final
orderRule 65, Rules of Court).
appealed from
Petition for Review = within 15
days from the notice of denial
of the decision, or of the
petitioners timely
filed motion vis--vis quo warranto
F. Prohibition
for new trial or motion for
reconsiderationTopacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895,
December 18, 2008
Appeal by Certiorari =
15 days from the
notice Ferdinand
of
FACTS:
Topacio (petitioner) via the
judgment or final
order,
or
of for certiorari and prohibition
present petition
the denial of the
petitioners
seeks,
in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory
motion for newOng
trial(Ong)
or motion
from further exercising the powers,
for reconsideration.
duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.

As to the Need for a Motion

for Reconsideration

MR is necessary
Petitioner points out that natural-born
citizenship is also a qualification for
appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan
and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship
requirement from the time of his appointment
as such in October 1998.
Page 6 of 26

Preliminar
any stage
to the jud
executory
agency o
particular
the perfor
in which
preliminar
Rule 58).

reinstatement. The court issued a writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction.

Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan

Foundation v. Ermitadid not annul or declare
null his appointment as Justice of the Supreme
Court, but merely enjoined him from accepting
his appointment, and that there is no definitive
pronouncement therein that he is not a
natural-born Filipino. He informs that he,
nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the
appointment to the Supreme Court out of
judicial statesmanship.
RULING:
Prohibition
The writ of prohibition, even when directed
against persons acting as judges or other
judicial officers, cannot be treated as a
substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully
called upon to perform any of the functions
of the writ. If there is a court, judge or
officer de facto, the title to the office and
the right to act cannot be questioned by
prohibition. If an intruder takes possession
of a judicial office, the person dispossessed
cannot obtain relief through a writ of
prohibition
commanding
the
alleged
intruder to cease from performing judicial
acts, since in its very nature prohibition is
an improper remedy by which to determine
the title to an office.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment

finding that the dismissal from the service of
Afuang is unlawful and violates section 13 of
the Minimum Wage Law, because the fact that
he testified at the investigation is not a valid
ground for his dismissal from the service. The
court, however, refused to grant an order for
the reinstatement of said Afuang on the
ground that this remedy, which it considers as
an injunction, is available only against acts
about to be committed or actually being
committed, and not against past acts; that
injunctionproceeding
is preventive
nature
only; and
A quo warranto
is in
the
proper
that astothe
law has the
already
violated, the
legal remedy
determine
rightbeen
or title
remedy now
available
for the
prosecution of
to the contested
public
officeisand
to oust
the
employer
for
the
violation
of
the Minimum
the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought
Wage
Law,
and
not
for
the
reinstatement
of
against the person who is alleged to have
Afuang.
usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held
or exercised the public office, and may be
RULING:
commenced by the Solicitor General or a
The action ofthe petitioner is not an action of
public prosecutor, as the case may be, or
injunction but one of mandamus, because it
by any seeks
person
claiming to beofentitled
to
theperformance
a legal duty,
the
the public
office
or
position
usurped
reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang.or
unlawfully held or exercised by another.

G. Mandamus distinguished from

injunction
Morabe v. Brown, G.R. No. L-6018, May
31, 1954
FACTS: Morabe, the chief of the Wage
Administration Service, filed a petition for the
reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang by the
respondent William Brown. The petition alleged
that respondent had dismissed Afuang
because in an investigation conducted by the
petitioner of charges against the respondent
that the latter paid his employees beyond the
time fixed in Republic Act No. 602, the said
Afuang was one of the complainants; that the
respondent discharged the said employee in
violation of section 13 of said Act.
The petitioner likewise prayed that a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issue for his

The writ known as preliminary mandatory

injunction is also a mandamus, though merely
provisional in character.

In the case at bar, Pablo S. Afuang was entitled

to continue in the service of respondent,
because his act is expressly provided to be no
ground or reason for an employee's dismissal.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 602 states that
"it shall be unlawfulfor any person to discharge
or in any other manner to discriminate against
any employeebecause such employee has filed
any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted anyproceeding under or related to
this Act, ...." Pablo S. Afuang was, therefore,
unlawfullydeprived of his right or privilege to
continue in the service of the respondent,
because hisdismissal was unlawful or illegal.
Having been deprived of such right or
privilege, it iswithin the competence of courts
to compel the respondent to admit him back to
hisservice.
H. Mandamus distinguished from quo
warranto
Mandamus
The action of the petitioner is not an action of
injunction but one of mandamus, because it
seeks the performance of a legal duty, the
Page 7 of 26

An injun
about to
committ

reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ

known as preliminary mandatory injunction is
also amandamus, though merely provisional
in character.

loaded software
programs owned by Microsoft
that injunction
is
only into computer units sold by them to their
customers in violation of its intellectual
property rights.

K. Jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction

distinguished

The trial court denied petitioners application

for an ex parte order for a temporary
restraining order. Petitioners MR was likewise
denied.

Herrera v. Barretto, GR No. 8692,

September 10, 1913

Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner

allegedly resorted to the instant recourse
because it had no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It automatically invoked the jurisdiction of
this Court supposedly because of the
importance of the issue involved.

FACTS: Joaquin filed for a Petition for

Mandamus compelling Herrera (the municipal
president of Caloocan) to issue cockpit license
in his favor.
Pending the proceedings, Joaquin asked that
the court issue a mandatory injunction
directed to Herrera requiring him to issue a
provisional license under which he might
conduct his cockpit during the pendency of the
action. The court issued an order ex parte
granting Joaquins relief without notice of the
defendant.

RULING: The sole office of the writ of

certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does notinclude correction of
public respondent's evaluation of the evidence
and factual findings thereon.

Herrera instituted a Petition for Certiorari

against the judge of the CFI Hon. Barretto) who
issued the mandatory injunction.
RULING:
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a cause the right to act in a
case. The power to hear and determine.
The authority to decide a cause at all
It does not depend either upon the
regularity
of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decisions made.
L. Error of jurisdiction and error of
judgment distinguished
Microsoft Corp. v. Best Deal Computer
Center Corp., G.R. No. 148029,
September 24, 2002
FACTS:Petitioner filed a complaint for
Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte
Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and the Provisional Measure ofPreservation of
Evidence against Best Deal Computer Center
Corporation, Perfect Deal Corporation and
Marcos C. Yuen doing business as Perfect Byte
Computer Center. It alleged that defendants
without authority or license copied,
reproduced, distributed, installed and/or

Error of Jurisdiction
For certiorari to lie, it must be shown that
the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting
to lack
or excess
of jurisdiction,
The decision
of all other
questions
arising
in
the caseand
where
thatthere
thereisisjurisdiction
no appeal of
northe
any plain,
person and
subject
speedy
and matter.
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the purpose of amending or
Dependsnullifying
either upon
the regularity of the
the proceeding.
exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness
of the
decisions
The sole
office
of themade.
writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdictionincluding the
commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not
include correction of public respondent's
evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings thereon.

M. Conclusiveness of courts finding as to

its jurisdiction
Campos v. Wislizenus, GR No. 12083,
November 27, 1916
FACTS: Respondent Teodoro Aldanese was
declared elected to the position of municipal
president of Sibonga, Province of Cebu.
petitioner filed a protest against such election.
Page 8 of 26

-error c
ofjurisd

The petit
on
jurisdicti
the respo
any
error com
exerciset
more tha
may be r
appeal. E
sufficien
of a writ

The court dismissed the protest on the ground

that the court acquired no jurisdiction of the
proceedings because no service of the protest
had been made on the respondent Teodoro
Aldanese in the manner requires by law
RULING: The general rule is that, where the
jurisdiction of the court depends upon
the existence of facts, and the court
judicially considers and adjudicates the
question of its jurisdiction, and decides
that the fact exist which are necessary to
give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is
conclusive and cannot be controverted
in a collateral proceeding.

The rule applies to a case where the proper

service of notice on the candidates voted for
was challenged and the court determined
upon the facts presented, after hearing the
allegations of the parties and their arguments
based thereon, that service had not been
made as required by law. Such a determination
involves a mixed question of law and fact; and
it is a rule, as stated in the case cited, that,
where the jurisdiction of the court depends
upon the determination of a question of fact
and that question has been determined by the
court after a hearing, that determination is
conclusive and cannot be attacked collaterally.
In the case before us evidence as to the fact of
service was introduced by the petitioner and
the sufficiency of that evidence was
challenged by the respondent. The petitioner
did not take advantage of the opportunity
given him by the challenge to present other
and further evidence in relation to the service
but stood squarely upon the facts already
presented and accepted a decision of the court
thereon. Under such circumstances there was
nothing left for the court to do except to
decide the question upon the facts as they
were. The court did so; and although to say so
is unnecessary to a decision of this case, we
are of the opinion that its finding on the facts
as they existed of record at the time was well
founded.
O. Without jurisdiction; lack of
jurisdiction; excess of jurisdiction; grave

parcels of land for the construction of the

Capas-Murcia diversion road, a compromise
was entered into between said province and
the petitioners herein for the payment to the
latter of the agreed value of their lands. The
respondent judge approved the compromise in
a partial decision rendered by him on
September 27, 1937, and ordered the parties
to comply with the conditions therein set forth.
On October 2, 1937, the provincial fiscal, in
behalf of the Province of Tarlac, moved for the
reconsideration of the decision on the ground
that in giving his assent to the compromise, he
acted under the mistaken belief that the prices
fixed therein had been approved by the
appraisal committee of the provincial
government, composed of the provincial
treasurer, district engineer and provincial
auditor, and that the Province of Tarlac, at the
time of the compromise, had no longer any
authority to expropriate the lands, because in
virtue of Executive Order No. 71, the CapasMurcia Diversion road was declared a national
highway under the authority of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. The
respondent judge acceded to his motion and,
setting aside it decision, ordered the reopening
of the case and authorized the substitution of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the
Province of Tarlac as party plaintiff, in
accordance with the petition of the SolicitorGeneral to that effect. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the respondent judge
was without power to set aside his partial
decision which was founded upon a
compromise duly approved by him.
RULING:

WITHOUT JURISDICTION- means

that the court acted with absolute lack
of authority

LACK OF JURISDICTION- An act of a

court or tribunal may only be
considered as in grave abuse of
discretion when it is performed in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.

Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, GR No.

L-46330, April 22, 1939

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION - when

the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority.

FACTS: In an action instituted by the Province

of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONimplies such capricious and whimsical

Page 9 of 26

exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner
by
reason
of
passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and
such exercise is so patent or so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal
either to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.

show a cause of action some sort; and

when the statue declares that the
attachment may issue in an action
arising upon contract, the express or
implied, it announces a criterion which
may be determined from an inspection
of the language of the complaint. The
determination of this question is purely
a matter of law. On the other hand,
when the stature declares that an
attachment may be issued when the
defendant is about to depart from the
Islands, a criterion is announced which
is wholly foreign to the cause of action;
and the determination of it may involve
a disputed question of fact which must
be decided by the court. In making this
determination, the court obviously acts
within its powers; and it would be idle
to suppose that the writ of certiorari
would be available to reverse the action
of a Court of First Instance in
determining the sufficiency of the proof
on such a disputed point, and in
granting or refusing the attachment
accordingly.

P. Excess of jurisdiction distinguished

from lack of jurisdiction
Leung Ben v. OBrien, 38 Phil 182
FACTS: OBrien instituted an action for the
recovery of the sum of 15,000.00 which have
been lost by the latter to the defendant in a
series of gambling, banking and percentage
games. In his verified complaint, OBrien
asked for an attachment against the property
of Leung Ben on the ground that the latter
was about to depart the Phils. with intent to
defraud his creditors.

Leung Ben moved to quash the attachment

which was dismissed by the CFI. With such
dismissal, he filed a Petition for Certiorari
against OBrien and the judges of the CFI
(City of Manila)
Leung Bens contention: The statutory action
to recover money lost at gaming is not a
ground that would warrant the issuance of an
attachment. Hence, the Court of First Instance
actedin excess of its jurisdiction in granting
the writ of attachment.
RULING:

When a court issues a writ of

attachment for whichthere is no
statutory authority, it is acting
irregularly and in excess of its
jurisdiction, in the sense necessary to
justify the Supreme Court in granting
relief by the writ of certiorari.

In applying this proposition it is of

course necessary to take account of the
difference between a ground of
attachment based on the nature of the
action and aground of attachment
based on the acts or the conditions of
the defendant. Every complaint must

Conclusion: the cause of action stated

in the complaints in the court below is
based on a contract, express or implied
and is therefore of such nature that the
court had authority to issue writ of
attachment. The application for the writ
of certiorari must therefore be denied
and the proceedings dismissed.

Herrera v. Barretto, GR No. 8692,

September 10, 1913
FACTS: Joaquin filed for a Petition for
Mandamus compelling Herrera (the municipal
president of Caloocan) to issue cockpit license
in his favor.
Pending the proceedings, Joaquin asked that
the court issue a mandatory injunction
directed to Herrera requiring him to issue a
provisional license under which he might
conduct his cockpit during the pendency of the
action. The court issued an order ex parte
granting Joaquins relief without notice of the
defendant.
Herrera instituted a Petition for Certiorari
against the judge of the CFI Hon. Barretto) who
issued the mandatory injunction.

Page 10 of 26

RULING:

R. Erroneous exercise of jurisdiction

Napa v. Weissenhagen, GR No. L-9698,
January 6, 1915
FACTS:The petition stems from an action for
the summary recovery of the possession of
land under section 80 and following sections of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff in the
case at bar being the defendant there and the
defendants Julian Larong and
HermenegildoBayla being the plaintiffs.
The court ruled in favor of plaintiff and ordered
delivery of possession. An appeal was taken. A
Motion to Dismiss the appeal was filed on the
ground that it had not been perfected within
the time required by law. The court granted
the Motion and dismissed the appeal.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
RULING:

The writ of certiorari in so far as it was

a method by which mere errors of an
inferior court could be corrected no
longer exists. Its place is now taken by
the appeal. So long as the inferior
court maintains jurisdiction, its
errors can be corrected only by
that method (APPEAL). The writ in
this country has been confined to the
correction of defects of jurisdiction
solely and cannot be legally used for
any other purpose.
If the judgment of the justice's court
was
void,
it
was
nevertheless
appealable, although the losing party
might have been able to rid himself of
it by other means. Having been
appealed, it stands upon substantially
the same footing in the appellate
court, so far as the appeal itself is
concerned, as any other judgment of a
justice's court and the jurisdiction of
the appellate court in that appeal is as
full and complete as it is any other.

T. Plain, speedy, adequate remedy

Definition

San Pedro v. Hon. Aspala, G.R. No.

164560, July 22, 2009
FACTS: Private respondents, heirs of spouses
Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio filed a
Complaint against herein petitioners and Wood
Crest Residents Association, Inc., for Accion
Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages,
with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.
Private respondents alleged that subject
property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
with an assessed value of P32,100.00, was
titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and
Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice
and evident bad faith, claimed that they were
the owners of a parcel of land that
encompasses and covers subject property.
Private respondents had allegedly been
prevented from entering, possessing and using
subject property.
Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to
Dismiss said complaint on the ground that the
MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, as the subject of litigation
was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The MeTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling
that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended, the MeTC had exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property of small value.
Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order
by filing a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 87. However, in its Decision dated
March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the
petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals
another petition for certiorari, insisting that
both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of the
complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of
jurisdiction over the same.
RULING:

A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a

motion for reconsideration of the
assailed order or resolution, the filing
of which is an indispensable condition
to the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari. This is to give the lower
court the opportunity to correct itself.
Page 11 of 26

If petitioner had an adequate

remedy, namely, a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, a special
civil action for certiorari was,
therefore, not the correct remedy.
(CAMUTIN VS SPOUSES POTENTE)

There are, of course, exceptions to the

foregoing rule, to wit (SIM VS NLRC):
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in
the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or public interest is involved.

Camutin v. Spouses Potente, G.R. No.

181642, January 29, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners were the registered owners
of parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
1117266, 1117267 and 1117268 in their
names issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cavite. Petitioners, who reside abroad,
discovered upon coming back to the
Philippines in 1998 that the house and

warehouse of respondents Spouses Norberto

and Pascuala Potente were erected on the
subject lots. Thereupon, respondents agreed to
pay petitioners a P1,000.00 monthly rental
starting 1 January 1998 for the use of the lots.
They also agreed that should the properties be
sold, respondents would have the right of first
refusal and should respondents be unable to
purchase the properties, they would peacefully
vacate the premises.
However, respondents failed and refused to
pay the agreed rentals. Neither were they able
to purchase the lots. Consequently, petitioners
sold a portion of the lots to a third party who
had it fenced.
Petitioners thus come before this Court,
arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari and that the MTC likewise
erred in suspending the proceedings in the
case for unlawful detainer until the final
resolution of Civil Case No. TMSCA-0023-06
before the RTC. They allege that the MTC
erroneously interpreted the barangay
agreement differently from the clear testimony
of the Barangay Chairperson and acted
capriciously and whimsically in ordering the
case archived without basis. Consequently, it
was only proper for them to file the petition for
certiorari before the RTC, which should have
exercised its authority over the MTC and
corrected the error that the inferior court had
committed instead of dismissing their petition.
Petitioners thus prayed that the RTCs order be
annulled and declared null and void.
RULING: Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy
available only when there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. While a petition for
certiorari is not allowed against any
interlocutory order issued by the court in the
unlawful detainer or ejectment case, in the
case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari
challenging the MTCs Orders dated 5 June
2007 and 16 August 2007 cannot be deemed a
dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. On
the contrary, sustaining the MTCs orders would
unnecessarily and unfairly delay the unlawful
detainer case, a result contrary to the rules
objective of speedy disposition of cases.
Petitioners could also not appeal from the
orders of the MTC because these only ordered
the indefinite suspension and archiving of the
case. The case was not resolved on the merits
so there is actually no decision from which
petitioners can appeal. Thus, the RTC could
have validly ruled on the petition for certiorari
Page 12 of 26

instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is

a prohibited pleading.
Sim v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157376, October 2,
2007
FACTS: Corazon Sim (petitioner) filed a case
for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter,
alleging that she was initially employed by
Equitable PCI-Bank (respondent) in 1990 as
Italian Remittance Marketing Consultant to the
Frankfurt Representative Office. Eventually,
she was promoted to Manager position, until
September 1999, when she received a letter
from Remegio David -- the Senior Officer,
European Head of PCIBank, and Managing
Director of PCIB- Europe -- informing her that
she was being dismissed due to loss of trust
and confidence based on alleged
mismanagement and misappropriation of
funds.
Respondent denied any employer-employee
relationship between them, and sought the
dismissal of the complaint.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for want
of jurisdiction and/or lack of merit because
labor relations system in the Philippines has no
extra-territorial jurisdiction.

certiorari is available only when there is

no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. A plain and adequate
remedy is a motion for reconsideration
of the assailed order or resolution, the
filing of which is an indispensable
condition to the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari.

Exceptions:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be
useless;

On appeal, the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's Decision and dismissed petitioner's
appeal for lack of merit.

(e) where petitioner was deprived of

due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;

Without filing a motion for reconsideration with

the NLRC, petitioner went to the Court of
Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from

an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable;

the CA dismissed the petition due to

petitioner's non-filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the NLRC. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration but it was
nonetheless denied by the CA.

(g) where the proceedings in the lower

court are a nullity for lack of due
process;

Hence, the present recourse under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court.

(h) where the proceeding was ex parte

or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or public interest is involved.

RULING:

General Rule: Under Rule 65, the

remedy of filing a special civil action for

U. Prohibition against accomplished acts

Page 13 of 26

Alcantara et al. v. Ermita, G.R. No.

169813, September 5, 2006
FACTS: On October 13, 2005, lawyers
Samson S. Alcantara, Ed Vincent S. Albano,
and Rene B. Gorospe, herein petitioners, filed
with this Court the instant petition for
prohibition in their capacity as Filipino citizens
and taxpayers. They alleged that under
Article XVII of the Constitution, President
Macapagal- Arroyo has no authority to
participate in the process to amend or revise
the Constitution. Likewise, she has no power
to create a Consultative Commission to study
and propose amendments and allocate public
funds for its operations.
RULING: From the foregoing, it is evident
that the writ of prohibition is one which
commands the person to whom it is directed
not to do something which he is about to do.
If the thing is already done, it is obvious that
the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that
would require an affirmative act, and the only
effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all
action, and to prevent any further proceeding
in the prohibited direction.[4] In other words,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain
future action. Prohibition, as a rule, does not
lie to restrain an act that is already afait
accompli. The Consultative Commission has
been dissolved. Consequently, we find no
more reason to resolve the constitutional
issues raised by petitioners.

W. Ministerial Acts
The Special Audit Team, Commission on
Audit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
174788, 11 April 2013
FACTS:
RULING:

FACTS: Former DECS Secretary Ricardo T.

Gloria filed a complaint against respondent
Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian,
Catalog Division, of the National Library for
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The complaint charged respondent Moral with
the pilferage of some historical documents
from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian
Division (FAD) of the National Library which
were under her control and supervision as
Division Chief and keeping in her possession,
without legal authority and justification, some
forty-one (41) items of historical documents
which were missing from the FAD vaults of the
National Library.
Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding
respondent "guilty of the administrative
offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, for the commission of pilferage of
historical documents of the national library, to
the prejudice of the national library in
particular, and the country in general." She
was ordered dismissed from the government
service with prejudice to reinstatement and
forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and
other remunerations.
Respondent filed a Petition for the Production
of the DECS Investigation Committee Report
purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action
would be most appropriate to take under the
circumstances." Her petition was, however,
denied.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but the
motion was merely "noted". Respondent did
not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September
1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead,
she instituted an action for mandamus and
injunction before the regular courts against
Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished
a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report and that the DECS Secretary be
enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal
until she received a copy of the said report.
RULING:

Pefianco v. Moral,
January 19, 2000

G.R.

No.

132248,

Mandamus is employed to compel the

performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main
objective.
Page 14 of 26

"Purely ministerial" are acts to be

performed in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority without
regard to the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. While the
discretion
of
a
Constitutional
Commission cannot be controlled by
mandamus . . . . the court can decide
whether the duty is discretionary or
ministerial
It is settled that mandamus is
employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty,
this being its main objective. It does
not lie to require anyone to fulfill a
discretionary duty. It is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that
petitioner should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act
required.
In her petition for mandamus,
respondent miserably failed to
demonstrate that she has a clear legal
right to the DECS Investigation
Committee Report and that it is the
ministerial duty of petitioner DECS
Secretary to furnish her with a copy
thereof. Consequently, she is not
entitled to the writ prayed for.

In fine, the trial court's Order of 23

April 1997 denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss is not a mere error of
judgment as the Court of Appeals held,
but a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the
Order is a patent nullity for failure to
comply with the provisions of the rules
requiring that a resolution on a motion
to dismiss should clearly and distinctly
state the reasons therefor; and,
respondent is clearly not entitled to
the writ of mandamus as she did not
appeal the DECS resolution dismissing
her from service, and there is no law
or rule which imposes a ministerial
duty
on
petitioner
to
furnish
respondent with a copy of the

investigation report, hence her petition

clearly lacked a cause of action. In
such instance, while the trial court's
order is merely interlocutory and
nonappealable, certiorari is the proper
remedy to annul the same since it is
rendered
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
Pimentel, et al. v. Executive Secretary,
et al., G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus filed
by petitioners to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its
concurrence in accordance with Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Statute was opened for signature by all
states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had
remained open for signature until December
31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters
in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute
on December 28, 2000 through Charge d
Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine
Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions,
however, require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel
the respondents the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty
to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that
ratification of a treaty, under both domestic
law and international law, is a function of the
Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive
department to transmit the signed copy of the
Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion with respect to
ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners
submit that the Philippines has a ministerial
duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty
law and customary international law.
RULING: It should be emphasized that under
our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested
in the President, subject to the concurrence of
the Senate. The role of the Senate, however,
is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Hence, it is within the authority of the
Page 15 of 26

President to refuse to submit a treaty to the

Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the
refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has
been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is
within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via
a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the
writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to
compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of
Rome Statute to the Senate.

X. Mandamus to direct exercise

judgment in a particular way
Hipos, Sr. v. Judge Bay,
174813-15, March 17, 2009

G.R.

of

Nos.

FACTS: Two Informations for the crime of rape

and one Information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners
and two others.
Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to
order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
study if the proper Informations had been filed
against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge
Bay granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases.

Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw

Informations before Judge Bay.
Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw
Informations in an Order of even date.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the
above assailed Order, petitioners filed the
present Petition for Mandamus.
RULING:There is indeed an exception to the
rule that matters involving judgment and
discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of
mandamus, for such writ may be issued to
compel action in those matters, when
refused. However, mandamus is never
available to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular
way or the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of
either. In other words, while a judge refusing
to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations
can be compelled by mandamus to act on the
same, he cannot be compelled to act in a
certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not
refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw
Informations; he had already acted on it by
denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is
not available anymore. If petitioners believed
that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of such Order
denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations,
the proper remedy of petitioners should have
been to file a Petition for Certiorari against
the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to

Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor.
They claimed that there was no probable
cause to hold them liable for the crimes
charged.

Y. Mandamus
obligations

On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City

Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the
reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed
against petitioners and their co-accused.

FACTS: PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City a petition
for mandamus, prohibition and damages (with
prayer for temporary restraining order,
preliminary
prohibitory
injunction
and
preliminary mandatory injunction) against the
COMELEC and all its Commissioners, docketed
as Special Civil Action No. Q- 01- 45405.
PHOTOKINA alleged three causes of action:
first,
the
deliberate
refusal
of
the
COMELEC and its Commissioners to formalize
the contract rendered nugatory the perfected

Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera,

treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the
Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004
Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10
August 2004, holding that there was lack of
probable cause. On the same date, the City

to

enforce

contractual

COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, G. R.

No. 151992, September 18, 2002

Page 16 of 26

contract between them;

second, in
announcing that the VRIS Project has been
junked and that he has plans to re-engineer
the
COMELECs
entire
modernization
program, Chairman Benipayo committed
grave abuse of discretion; and third, the
COMELECs failure to perform its duty under
the contract has caused PHOTOKINA to incur
damages since it has spent substantial time
and resources in the preparation of the bid
and the draft contract.

agreed price or to pay damages for the

breach of contract.
Z. Continuing Mandamus
Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority, et al. v. Concerned Residents
of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48,
December 18, 2008

Cleaning
or
Rehabilitation
of
Manila Bay Can be Compelled by
Mandamus.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs

duty to take measures and maintain
adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal systems necessarily involves
policy evaluation and the exercise of
judgment on the part of the agency
concerned. They argue that the MMDA,
in carrying out its mandate, has to
make decisions, including choosing
where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and
cost estimates, all of which entail the
exercise of discretion.

RULING:

PHOTOKINA, though the winning

bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC
to formalize the contract. Since
PHOTOKINAs bid is beyond the
amount appropriated by Congress for
the VRIS Project, the proposed
contract is not binding upon the
COMELEC and is considered void; and
that
in
issuing
the
questioned
preliminary writs of mandatory and
prohibitory injunction and in not
dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q01-45405, respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners cannot be compelled by a
writ of mandamus to discharge a duty
that involves the exercise of judgment
and
discretion,
especially
where
disbursement of public funds is
concerned.
No rule of law is better settled than
that mandamus does not lie to enforce
the
performance
of
contractual
obligations. As early as 1924, Justice
Street, in Quiogue vs. Romualdez,
already set forth the justification of
this
rule,
thus:
Upon the facts above stated we are of
the opinion that the writ of mandamus
is not the appropriate, or even an
admissible remedy. It is manifest that
whatever rights the petitioner may
have, upon the facts stated, are
derived from her contract with the
city; and no rule of law is better
settled than that mandamus never lies
to enforce the performance of private
contracts.
x xx
The petitioners
remedy, if any she has, is by an
original action in the Court of First
Instance to compel the city to pay the

Respondents, on the other hand,

counter that the statutory command is
clear and that petitioners duty to
comply with and act according to the
clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion.
According to respondents, petitioners,
the MMDA in particular, are without
discretion, for example, to choose
which bodies of water they are to
clean up, or which discharge or spill
they are to contain. By the same
token, respondents maintain that
petitioners are bereft of discretion on
whether or not to alleviate the
problem of solid and liquid waste
disposal; in other words, it is the
MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to
such services.
The Supreme Court agreed with the
respondents.
First off, the petitioners obligation to
perform their duties as defined by law,
on one hand, and how they are to
carry out such duties, on the other, are
two different concepts.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the
Manila Bay is only an aspect and the
Page 17 of 26

initial stage of the long-term solution.

The preservation of the water quality
of the bay after the rehabilitation
process is as important as the cleaning
phase. It is imperative then that the
wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of
water be stopped from reaching the
Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup
effort would just be a futile, cosmetic
exercise, for, in no time at all, the
Manila Bay water quality would again
deteriorate below the ideal minimum
standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275,
and other relevant laws. It thus
behooves the Court to put the heads
of the petitioner-department-agencies
and the bureaus and offices under
them on continuing notice about, and
to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning
up the Manila Bay and preserving the
quality of its water to the ideal level.
Under what other judicial discipline
describes
as
continuing
mandamus,[36] the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was
used to enforce directives of the court
to clean up the length of the Ganges
River from industrial and municipal
pollution.
The heads of petitioners-agencies
MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH,
DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG,
and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in
line with the principle of continuing
mandamus, shall, from finality of this
Decision, each submit to the Court a
quarterly progressive report of the
activities undertaken in accordance
with this Decision.

AA. Clear and Defined Right

Manalo v. PAIC Savings Bank, G.R. No.

146531, March 18, 2005
This is a case involving a writ of mandamus
compelling respondent bank (1) to allow him
to redeem and/or repurchase the subject lots
for P18,000,000.00; and (2) to release to him
TCT No. 6076.
On June 29, 1997, when
Angsico sold the lot to Manalo, Angsico was
not the owner of the subject property simply
because at the time he (Angsico) purchased
the same property from Vargas and/or S.
Villanueva on December 23, 1992, said sellers
were no longer the lawful owners of the
property.

As correctly pointed out by the appellees,

after the expiration of the one (1) year
redemption period and no redemption was
made on December 5, 1985, PAIC Bank ipso
facto became the legal owner in fee simple of
the subject lot and its improvements, being
the highest bidder in the auction sale and the
vendee in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale duly
registered a year before and which entitles it
to the issuance of a new certificate of title in
his name.

Mandamus is not the proper recourse to

enforce
petitioners
alleged
right
of
redemption.
To begin with, mandamus
applies as a remedy only where petitioners
right is founded clearly in law and not when it
is doubtful.[3]
In varying language, the
principle echoed and reechoed is that legal
rights may be enforced by mandamus only if
those rights are well-defined, clear and
certain.

On December 4, 1985 or when respondent

Vargas failed to exercise her right of
redemption within the one (1) year
redemption period, respondent bank ipso
facto became the absolute owner of the lots.
Surprisingly, however, on December 23,
1992,
she
sold
the
property
for
P18,000,500.00 to Angsico, who eventually
transferred his rights to petitioner. Not only
that, on August 24, 1994, respondent Vargas
still leased to petitioner a portion of the
subject lots.
Page 18 of 26

Verily, when respondent bank became the

owner of the lots on December 4, 1985,
respondent Vargas could no longer legally
transfer, cede and convey the property to
petitioner.
Moreover, mandamus cannot be availed of as
a remedy to enforce the performance of
contractual obligations.
UP Board of Regents v. CA, G.R. No.
134625, August 31, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent herein is a citizen
of India and a holder of a Philippine visitors
visa. She enrolled in a doctoral program in
anthropology of the University of the
Philippines. After completing her units of
course work required in her doctoral program,
she left the country to work in Rome. After
two years, she returned to the Philippines to
work on her dissertation.
Upon
her
presentation of her dissertation for approval
to the panel, Dr. Medina, a deans
representative to the panel, noticed that
some portions of her work were lifted from
other
works
without
the
proper
acknowledgement. Nonetheless, she was
allowed to defend her dissertation. She
passed her oral defense, which was approved
by four of the five panelists with the condition
that
she
shall
incorporate
certain
amendments to the final copy of her
dissertation. However, in her final submission
of the copy of her dissertation, she failed to
incorporate the necessary revisions. With this
development, Dr. Medina formally charged
her with plagiarism and recommended that
the doctorate granted upon her be withdrawn.
After an investigation, the College of Social
Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) College
Assembly recommended the withdrawal of
her doctorate degree, which was approved by
the U.P. Board of Regents. Private respondent
filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction and damages
against petitioners herein, alleging that they
had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without
justification. The trial court dismissed her
petition. However, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the lower courts decision.
Hence, this petition.

The narration of facts showed that various

committees were formed to investigate the
charges that private respondent committed
plagiarism. In all investigations held, she was
heard in her defense. Where it was shown
that the conferment of an honor or distinction
was obtained through fraud, a university has
the right to withdraw the honor or distinction
it has conferred. Under the U.P. Charter, the
Board of Regents is the highest governing
body of the U.P. In the case at bar, the Board
of Regents decision to withdraw private
respondents doctorate degree was based on
records, including her admission that she
committed the offense. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals
and the petition for mandamus was
dismissed.
RULING:
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
MANDAMUS, DEFINED; NOT AVAILABLE
TO
RESTRAIN
THE
EXERCISE
OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM; CASE AT BAR. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, there being no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. In University of the Philippines Board of
Regents vs. Ligot-Telan, 227 SCRA 342 (1993),
this Court ruled that the writ was not
available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of
its academic freedom. In that case, a student
who was found guilty of dishonesty and
ordered suspended for one year by the Board
of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and
obtained from the lower court a temporary
restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying
out the order of suspension. In setting aside
the TRO and ordering the lower court to
dismiss the students petition, this Court said:
[T]he lower court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of
the said writ was based on the lower courts
finding that the implementation of the
disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal
would work injustice to the petitioner as it
Page 19 of 26

would delay him in finishing his course, and

consequently, in getting a decent and good
paying job. Sadly, such a ruling considers
only the situation of Nadal without taking into
account the circumstances, clearly of his own
making, which led him into such a
predicament. More importantly, it has
completely disregarded the overriding issue
of academic freedom which provides more
than ample justification for the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction upon an erring student
of an institution of higher learning. From the
foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower
court should have restrained itself from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by
the Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in
doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and
certain right on the part of the petitioner
being required. It is of no avail against an
official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment.

AB. When and Where filed (4, A.M. No.

07-7-12-SC)
Laguna Metts Corporation v. Caalam, et
al., G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009
FACTS:Private respondents Aries C. Caalam
and Geraldine Esguerra filed a labor case
against petitioner Laguna Metts Corporation
(LMC).The labor arbiter decided in favor of
private respondents. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision of the labor arbiter.
Private
respondents
motion
for
reconsideration was denied.
Counsel for respondents filed a motion for
extension of time to file petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; a 15-day
extension period was prayed for. In a
resolution dated August 7, 2008, the CA
granted the motion and gave private
respondents a non-extendible period of 15
days within which to file their petition for
certiorari. LMC moved for the reconsideration
of the said resolution claiming that extensions
of time to file a petition for certiorari are no
longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-712-SC. This was denied by the CA.

Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions

dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted private
respondents motion for extension of time to
file petition for certiorari.
RULING: Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a
period of 60 days within which to file a
petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is
deemed reasonable and sufficient time
for a party to mull over and to prepare a
petition asserting grave abuse of
discretion by a lower court. The period
was specifically set to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate
the constitutional rights of the parties to
a speedy disposition of their case.
While the proper courts previously had
discretion to extend the period for filing a
petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day
period, the amendments to Rule 65 under
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of
time to file a petition for certiorari with the
deletion of the paragraph that previously
permitted such extensions.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of
the proper courts to grant extensions under
Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing
for such authority would have been
preserved. The removal of the said paragraph
under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there
can no longer be any extension of the 60-day
period within which to file a petition for
certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the
use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat
the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph
allowing extensions to file petition on
compelling grounds did away with the filing of
such motions. As the Rule now stands,
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly
within 60 days from notice of judgment or
from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.

Page 20 of 26

In granting the private respondents motion

for extension of time to file petition for
certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The action amounted to
a modification, if not outright reversal, by the
Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so
doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated to itself
a power it did not possess, a power that only
this Court may exercise.For this reason, the
challenged resolutions dated August 7, 2008
and October 22, 2008 were invalid as they
were rendered by the Court of Appeals in
excess of its jurisdiction.

AC. Material Dates Rule

Lapid v. Laurea,
October 28, 2002

G.R.

No.

139607,

FACTS: Spouses Ramon Isidro P. Lapid and

Gladys B. Lapid are the parents of seven-yearold Christopher B. Lapid, who was a Grade 1
pupil of the respondent school, St. Therese of
the
Child
Jesus.
Private
respondents
Esperanza N. Prim, Norilyn A. Cruz, Flordeliza
C. Santos and Macario B. Binondo are its
directress,
teacher-in-charge,
guidance
counselor and principal, respectively.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages
against the private respondents before the
RTC. Petitioners averred that their son was
summarily dismissed from school sans notice
and
hearing.
Petitioners
denied
any
knowledge of the alleged letters of complaint
filed by the parents whose children were
allegedly offended by Christopher. As a result
of the strained relations between the Lapids
and the school management, Christopher was
transferred to a different school immediately
thereafter. According to petitioners, the
schools malicious imputation against their
son tarnished their good name and
reputation.
Eventually, petitioners filed a motion to
declare respondent school as in default, which
motion was denied by the trial court. With the
denial of their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for
failure to indicate the particular date of filing
the motion for reconsideration with the RTC.
On motion for reconsideration, petitioners still
failed to indicate said date thus, it was
likewise denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the

petition for certiorari filed by petitioners on
the ground of formal and procedural
deficiency, i.e., the petitioners failure to state
a material date in their petition for certiorari
RULING: After a careful consideration of the
submissions of the parties, particularly their
respective memoranda, we are constrained to
agree with the ruling of the respondent
appellate court which dismissed the instant
petition for certiorari. We find no reversible
error in the assailed resolutions of the Court
of Appeals because in filing a special civil
action for certiorari without indicating the
requisite material date thereon, petitioners
violated basic tenets of remedial law,
particularly Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
There are three material dates that must
be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65. First, the date when notice
of the judgment or final order or
resolution was received; second, the date
when a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration was filed; and third, the
date when notice of the denial thereof
was received. In the case before us, the
petition filed with the CA failed to indicate the
second date, particularly the date of filing of
their motion for reconsideration. As explicitly
stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to
comply with any of the requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
The rationale for this strict provision of the
Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As
stated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the
requirement is for purpose of determining the
timeliness of the petition, thus:
The requirement of setting forth the three (3)
dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
is for the purpose of determining its
timeliness. Such a petition is required to be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to
be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for
certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from
receipt of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court
of Appeals was not in any position to
determine when this period commenced to
run
and
whether
the
motion
for
Page 21 of 26

reconsideration itself was filed on time since

the material dates were not stated.
All told, no reversible error can be ascribed to
the Court of Appeals for dismissing the
petition for certiorari and later denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petition denied.

AF.1. Parties Persons Aggrieved

Concepcion, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
178624, June 30, 2009
FACTS: The National Citizens Movement for
Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a petition for
Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick
Count with the COMELEC. The petitioner was
the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay
Forbes Park, Makati City, was one of the
signatories of the NAMFREL petition in his
capacity as the National Chairman of
NAMFREL.

On the same date when the petition was filed,

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798
wherein it prohibited among others the
appointment of barangay officials which
includes the Punong Barangay, Barangay
Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay
Treasurer,
and
Barangay
Tanod,
as
Chairman/person and/or Member of the BEIs
or as official watcher of any candidate, duly
registered major political party, or any similar
organization, or any socio-civic, religious,
professional [sic], in the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections. The prohibition
extends to barangay officials, employees and
tanods, who are members of accredited
citizens arms.

The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs petition,

conditionally granting in the following tenor:
There is, however, one important
condition that must be fulfilled by the
petitioner before its accreditation as citizens
arm could legally take effect. Accordingly, Mr.
Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman
of NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a
member and overall Chairman of said
organization. This is explicitly provided for
in COMELEC Resolution No. 7798. Also, it

further subjected NAMFREL from enjoining

and encouraged by the Commission to reorganize.

Thereafter, NAMFREL filed a manifestation

and request for re-examination which contain
therein among others its re-organization and
new set of officers. COMELEC denied the
request for re-examination. NAMFREL did not
question the ruling.

Instead of direct reaction to NAMFREL,

petitioner Concepcion filed this petition for
certiorari raising issues with respect to
Resolution No. 7798.
ISSUE:
RULING: The first defect lies in the
petitioners personality to file a petition for
certiorari to address the adjudicatory
resolution of the COMELEC in which he was
not a party to, and where the direct party,
NAMFREL, does not even question the
assailed resolution.

Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a

person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.
An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65
is one who was a party to the original
proceedings that gave rise to the original
action for certiorari under Rule 65.

In Tang v. Court of Appeals where we said:

Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides
that the special civil action of certiorari
may be availed of by a "person
aggrieved" by the orders or decisions
of a tribunal, the term "person
aggrieved" is not to be construed to
mean that any person who feels
injured by the lower courts order or
decision can question the said courts
Page 22 of 26

disposition via certiorari. To sanction a

contrary interpretation would open the
floodgates to numerous and endless
litigations which would undeniably
lead to the clogging of court dockets
and,
more
importantly,
the
harassment of the party who prevailed
in the lower court.
In a situation wherein the order or
decision being questioned underwent
adversarial proceedings before a trial
court, the "person aggrieved" referred
to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can
avail of the special civil action of
certiorari pertains to one who was a
party in the proceedings before the
lower court. The correctness of this
interpretation can be gleaned from the
fact that a special civil action for
certiorari
may
be
dismissed
motuproprio if the party elevating the
case failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the questioned
order or decision before the lower
court. Obviously, only one who was a
party in the case before the lower
court
can
file
a
motion
for
reconsideration since a stranger to the
litigation would not have the legal
standing to interfere in the orders or
decisions of the said court. In relation
to this, if a non-party in the
proceedings before the lower court has
no standing to file a motion for
reconsideration, logic would lead us to
the conclusion that he would likewise
have no standing to question the said
order or decision before the appellate
court
via
certiorari.
(emphasis
supplied)

In Development Bank of the Philippines v.

Commission on Audit - a case that involves a
certiorari petition, under Rule 64 in relation
with Rule 65, of a ruling of the Commission on
Audit (a constitutional commission like
COMELEC):

The novel theory advanced by the OSG

would necessarily require persons not
parties to the present case the DBP
employees who are members of the

Plan or the trustees of the Fund to

avail of certiorari under Rule 65. The
petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
however, is not available to any
person who feels injured by the
decision of a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The "person aggrieved"
under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can
avail of the special civil action of
certiorari pertains only to one who was
a party in the proceedings before the
court a quo, or in this case, before the
COA. To hold otherwise would open the
courts to numerous and endless
litigations. Since DBP was the sole
party in the proceedings before the
COA, DBP is the proper party to avail
of the remedy of certiorari.

The real party in interest who stands to

benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit
must prosecute or defend an action. We have
held that "interest" means material interest,
an interest in issue that the decision will
affect, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.

AF.4. Parties Indispensable Parties

Golangco v. Fung, G.R. No. 157952,
September 8, 2009
FACTS:In a Criminal Case a prosecution for
libel initiated by the petitioner as the
complainant against the respondent, was
commenced
in
1995.
Allegedly,
the
respondent
had
issued
an
office
memorandum
dated
May
10,
1995
maliciously imputing against the petitioner
the commission of bribery and had sent
copies of the memorandum to the petitioners
superiors
in
the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) and to
other public officers and personalities not
connected with the POEA, causing damage
and prejudice to the petitioner.
After almost 6 years, the Prosecution had
presented only two witnesses in Criminal Case
No. 95-145703. On February 16, 2001, the
Prosecution requested that a subpoena ad
Page 23 of 26

testificandum be issued to and served on Atty.

Oscar Ramos, Resident Ombudsman of the
POEA, to compel him to testify in the criminal
case on February 20, 2001. The RTC did not
granted the request. The same was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
RULING:The petitioner did not join the People
of the Philippines as a party in his action for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He thereby
ignored that the People of the Philippines
were indispensable parties due to his
objective being to set aside the trial courts
order dated May 23, 2001 that concerned the
public aspect of Criminal Case No. 95-145703.
The omission was fatal and already enough
cause for the summary rejection of his
petition for certiorari.
We find that the trial judge did not act
capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically in
issuing the assailed order. Thus, the Court of
Appeals properly dismissed the petition for
certiorari. The petitioner now needs to be
reminded that certiorari is an extraordinary
remedy to correct a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when an appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law is not available. In this regard, grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction whenever the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Settled rule that certiorari does not lie to
review an interlocutory order, but only a final
judgment or order that terminates the
proceedings. Certiorari will be refused where
there has been no final judgment or order and
the proceeding for which the writ is sought is
still pending and undetermined in the lower
court.

exercise of its jurisdiction amounted to

nothing more than an error of judgment that
was reviewable by a timely appeal, not by a
special civil action of certiorari.

AK. DOJ rulings

Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 164715,
September 20, 2006
FACTS: August 11, 2000, 61-year-old Ramon
C. Gonzalez was driving his Nissan Cefiro car
with plate no. UPW-298 along the right
outermost
lane
of
the
South-Luzon
Expressway. He was on his way to Makati City
and had just passed the Sucat toll gate. Atty.
Arnel C. Alcaraz, a Customs Collector of the
Bureau of Customs, Batangas Port, was
driving his Nissan Infiniti car with plate no.
CNH-338. He was in the middle lane of the
South-Luzon Expressway, between the Sucat
and Bicutan Interchange, on his way to Manila
from Batangas City, armed with a .38 caliber
pistol and had with him Mission Order No.
699-2000, to expire on August 21, 2000.

Alcaraz intended to use the Skyway, he

signaled, and proceeded to the right-most
lane which was reserved for vehicles taking
the Skyway. Gonzalez, who was on the rightmost lane, was forced to swerve his car to the
right to avoid colliding with Alcaraz's vehicle
and nearly hit the concrete island. Gonzalez
chased after Alcaraz, opened his windows and
shouted at Alcaraz, demanding to know why
the latter suddenly cut into his lane. Alcaraz
retorted that he had signaled that he was
swerving to the right. Gonzalez reproved
Alcaraz and drove on. Upon nearing an island,
Alcaraz raised his pistol towards Gonzalez and
fired twice: the first bullet hit the right front
window of the vehicle and exited at the left
rear door; the second bullet hit the left rear
window of Gonzalez's car. Alcaraz hurriedly
drove away from the scene, but was
intercepted by the PNCC guards at the
Skyway toll gate. The guards confiscated from
Alcaraz the .38 pistol with 7 live bullets and 3
empty shells.

As long as the trial court acted within its

jurisdiction, its alleged error committed in the
Page 24 of 26

Gonzalez reported the matter to the

Paraaque City Police Station where he gave
a statement to the police investigator, and
filed a criminal complaint for attempted
homicide against Alcaraz.The PNP Crime
Laboratory examined Gonzalez's car to
determine the trajectory of the bullets. Report
No. PI-46-2000 was prepared in connection
with the investigation:

"putanginamo" with a dirty finger sign, but

also the throwing of coins that hit
respondent's face and his lady passenger. The
natural consequence was for respondent to
retaliate as what had transpired in the instant
case. There is no dispute that respondent
fired his gun. But as to whether or not he had
the intention to kill complainant is a different
issue. Respondent's argument that he had no
intention of hitting complainant and that his
objective was only to scare him finds merit.

CONCLUSION:

The entrance bullet holes and the exit bullet

hole were caused by bullets fired from right,
front side of the vehicle. Alfredo Tan Buraga,
Officer-in-Charge of the Paraaque Police
Station, filed a criminal complaint for
attempted homicide against Alcaraz in the
Office
of
the
City
Prosecutor
of
ParaaqueCity.On motion of Alcaraz, the MeTC
ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation.

Alcaraz claimed that he did not aim his gun at

Gonzalez; he had no intention of hitting
Gonzalez, and only wanted to scare him. At
the police station, Gonzalez identified himself
as the brother of Congressman Jose Mari
Gonzalez. Gonzalez insisted that Alcaraz
attempted to kill him. He denied having
thrown coins at Alcaraz and that he had a gun
at the time. Gonzalez pointed out that
Alcaraz's allegation that he was defending
himself when he fired his gun was in effect an
admission of intent to kill. Alcaraz filed a
motion for reconsideration, and when it was
denied, filed a petition for review with the City
Prosecutor's Office, Department of Justice.

Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez issued a

Resolution granting the petition and ordering
the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
Information.

Gonzalez failed to prove beyond reasonable

that Alcaraz had intended to kill him, thus:
Evidence
shows that respondent was
provoked by complainant's acts of repeatedly
hurling,
not
only
invectives
like

The element of intent to kill not having been

satisfactorily established, and considering
that complainant was unscathed, a finding of
probable cause against respondent for
attempted homicide is difficult to sustain.
Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Undersecretary of Justice denied on
January 29, 2003.Gonzalez then filed a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA,
seeking the reversal of the Justice Secretary's
Resolution.

He claimed that the Secretary acted beyond

his authority in finding no probable cause to
charge Alcaraz with attempted homicide and
for ordering the City Prosecutor to withdraw
the Information. He insisted that by invoking
self-defense, Alcaraz thereby admitted his
intention to kill him (Gonzalez). He claimed
that Alcaraz's claim of self-defense should be
ventilated during trial on the merits.

Alcaraz averred that the CA had no appellate

jurisdiction over the petition, and that
Gonzalez had no legal standing to file the
petition. He insisted that the remedy from an
adverse resolution of the Justice Secretary is
to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, grounded on
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, not one under Rule 43
of said Rule. He averred that the Justice
Secretary is not a quasi-judicial officer under
Rule 43 whose resolutions may thus be
reviewed by the CA. Alcaraz likewise pointed
out that the CA was without power to
substitute its own judgment for that of the
Justice Secretary regarding the existence or
Page 25 of 26

non-existence of probable cause to charge

him with attempted homicide.

empowered to substitute their own judgment

for that of the executive branch.

The CA ruled that the petition for review

under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, was meritorious. The appellate
court declared that, based on the evidence on
record, there was probable cause to file an
Information for attempted homicide against
Alcaraz. However, the CA failed to resolve the
issue of whether it had appellate jurisdiction
over the petition under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.

The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor

is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary
who, under the Revised Administrative Code,
exercises
the
power
of
control
and
supervision
over
said
Investigating
Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify,
reverse, or modify the ruling of such
prosecutor. While the CA may review the
resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do
so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of his discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction.

On July 19, 2004, the CA resolved to deny

Alcaraz's motion, holding that his grounds and
objections had already been considered and
passed upon by it in its decision.

OSG avers that the CA erred in granting the

petition of respondent, since the proper
remedy from an adverse resolution issued by
the Secretary of Justice is to file a petition for
certiorari under Ruler 65 of the Rules of Court,
not a petition under Rule 43.

Petitioner avers that conformably with the

resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the City
Prosecutor had filed a motion to withdraw the
information in the MeTC, and the court had
granted the motion per its Order dated March
7, 2003. He points out that respondent had
not appealed the said order of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was the proper
remedy of respondent?
RULING:
We
agree
with
petitioner's
contention that respondent resorted to an
improper remedy when he filed a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
instead of filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. The determination of probable cause
during the preliminary investigation, the
executive branch of government has full
discretionary authority. The decision whether
or not to dismiss the criminal complaint
against the private respondent is necessarily
dependent on the sound discretion of the
Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that
of the Secretary of Justice. Courts are not

The resolution of the Justice Secretary

affirming,
modifying
or
reversing
the
resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is
final. Under the 1993 Revised Rules on
Appeals (now the 2000 National Prosecution
Service Rules on Appeals), resolutions in
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations
from the Justice Secretary's resolution,
except the aggrieved party, has no more
remedy of appeal to file a motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution of
such motion if it is denied by the said
Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved
party is to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since
there is no more appeal or other remedy
available in the ordinary course of law.

Respondent filed a petition for review under

Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
resolutions of the Justice Secretary. Instead of
dismissing the petition, however, the CA gave
due course to it and thereafter granted the
petition, on its finding that the Justice
Secretary erred in reversing the resolution of
the Investigating Prosecutor which found
probable
cause
against
petitioner
for
attempted homicide. Patently, the ruling of
the CA is incorrect. The petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75589 are
NULLIFIED.

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