EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21325. October 29, 1971.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLEO DRAMAYO, PATERNO ECUBIN,
PRIOLO BILLONA, FRANCISCO BILLONA, MODESTO RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDAL and
SEVERENO SAVANDAL, defendants; PABLEO DRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN, defendants-appellants.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Arturo G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for
plaintiff-appellee.
Arturo E. Balbastro for defendants-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE; ACCUSATION NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies.
Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of
the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge
below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person
on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid
the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of
possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law
to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense. We feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt,
even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who
may be innocent.
3.
ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL JUDGE; GENERALLY RESPECTED ON APPEAL.
With the testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by appellants, the
effort of their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not
be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected the
findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when, as
was not shown in this case, circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novelty in the plea made by counsel de oficio in this appeal of the accused
Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, who were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The
claim is vigorously pressed that because the information alleged conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with only the
two appellants being convicted, two having been utilized as state witnesses and the other three having been acquitted on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to their culpability, the judgment of conviction against the appellants cannot
stand, there being a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. To bolster such a contention, certain alleged deficiencies in the
proof offered by the prosecution were noted. A careful study of the evidence of record would leave no other rational
conclusion but that the deceased met his death at the hands of the appellants in the manner as found by the lower court.
Hence the appeal cannot prosper. We affirm.
The gory incident which was attended by a fatality started on the morning of January 9, 1964. The two accused, now
appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio
Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to shed light on a
robbery committed in the house of the deceased five days before by being available as witnesses. The response was
decidedly in the negative as they themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least two individuals who
had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house of their co-accused Priolo Billona, the
accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused Francisco Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, Crescencio
and Savero Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion that
Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery case. The idea was for
Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. 1
Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It was then that
Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of
repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned
the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for
early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just
seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing
blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was
the cause thereof. 2

The death was due to the wounds inflicted, two in the epigastric region, one in the right lumbar region, and another in the
left breast.
It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower court reached its decision. Its
dispositive portion found the accused, now appellants. Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty "beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of [murder], defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by the
circumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused, Pableo
Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, the penalty of [reclusion perpetua]." 3 Reference was likewise made in such decision as to
why the other co-accused were not convicted, two of them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as
state witnesses, and the other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Ronquilla acquitted.
Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed decision thus: "From the beginning the accused
Modesto Ronquilla maintained that he was not with the group but that he was fishing in the sea during the night in
question. These facts that is, that none of the prosecution witnesses has testified that any of these three accused actually
helped in the killing of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza; that these three accused were included in the case only much later
after the filing of this case against Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin; the consistent Contention of the accused
Modesto Ronquilla that he was out in the sea fishing during the night in question; and the testimonies of the accused
Priolo Billona [and] Francisco [and their witnesses,] Juan Billona, Esperanza Oposa-Billona, Guillerma Ponce, and
Anselmo Lisondra, given in a straight-forward manner, without hesitation, revealing a clear conscience, and the fact that
the testimonies of these witnesses have not been refuted by the PC soldiers [whom they accused of maltreatment] when
they were available to the prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a very serious doubt as to the guilt of the said
accused." 4
The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now appellants Dramayo and Ecubin, and it
must have been their lack of persuasive character that must have led to the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E.
Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be implied from
the fact that while conspiracy was alleged," only two of the seven accused were held culpable. To repeat, a meticulous
appraisal of the evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the appellants for the offense charged, thus calling for the
affirmance of the decision.
1.
It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. 5 That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even
called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state,
both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under
such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility
for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. 6 United States v. Lasada, 7 decided in 1910, yields
this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of
guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is
required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense." 8 To the same
effect is an excerpt from the opinion of the late Justice Tuason in People v. Esquivel. 9 Thus; "In this connection it may
not be out of place to bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the
pertinent facts as their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps
and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not
suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the
accused, and to the state." 10
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of appellants
beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied
though that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by the
trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required
that the other three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite quantum of proof
to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other two who testified for the state
being like-vise no longer subject to any criminal liability. The reference then to an opinion of the late Justice Laurel,
stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable
doubt could be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident from the very citation in the brief of appellants of the opinion of
Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. 11 Thus: "Upon the other hand, there are certain facts which if taken together are
sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered
by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty
of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.) The finding of the two gold teeth of the deceased in the suitcase of
Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that he gave that hat . . . to Maradani not only engender serious doubt in our
minds as be the guilt of the appellant, but also seems to sustain the theory of the defense and strengthen the suspicion of
the trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In the light
of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt,

even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who
may be innocent. . . . " 12 The facts of the present case certainly do not fit within the above mold. Reliance on the part of
appellants on the above decision is therefore futile.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the
evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of
innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the
prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being
entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons
above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated
likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a
majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party
or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainly having arisen as to their culpability.
13
2.
The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilty not having been sufficiently de
monstrated with the contention that the lower court over looked or did not properly consider material and significant facts
of record that ought to have substantially affected or altered the judgment. Even the most careful reading of such brief,
however, with due recognition of the vigor in which this particular point is pressed, would not destroy the credibility of
the facts as testified to concerning the manner in which the deceased was killed and the motive that prompted appellants
to put an end to his life. That such a version could not have been concocted is shown by the undeniable fact that the two
appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as the offended party. It was understandable then why they
would want to do away with the principal witness against them. There was thus a strong inducement for the appellants to
have committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion except the
perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense
of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that
this Court has invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise the
testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this case, circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or
disregarded by him. 14
WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 is affirmed with the modification that the indemnification to the heirs
of Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sum of P12,000.00. With costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Footnotes
1.
Transcript of stenographic note, pp. 21-22, 24-27, 44-47, 155-157, 207-209.
2.
Ibid, pp. 24-27, 45-46.
3.
Decision, Appendix to Brief for Accused-Appellants, p. 19. It was further adjudged that the accused
appellants who in the meanwhile, had already been convicted for robbery, with the deceased as the offended party, should
serve the sentences imposed on them of from four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum to not more
than ten years of prision mayor as maximum before commencing to serve the sentence imposed upon them for murder.
The indemnity imposed was in the sum of P10,000.00.
4.
Ibid, pp. 18-19.
5.
According to Section 1, paragraph 17 of Article III of the Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, . . ."
6.
3 Phil. 3 (1903). Later cases that speak to the same effect are: United States v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910);
People v. Lanas, 93 Phil. 147 (153); People v. Lavarias, L-24339, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1301.
7.
18 Phil. 90.
8.
Ibid, pp. 96-97.
9.
92 Phil. 453 (1948). Cf. United States v. Garces, 31 Phil. 637 (1915); People v. Gallego, 44 Phil. 192 (1922);
People v. Tayag, 59 Phil. 606 (1934); People v. Abana, 76 Phil. 1 (1946); People v. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463 (1946); People
v. Somera, 83 Phil. 548 (1949); People v. Lanas, 93 Phil. 147 (1953); People v. Sy Pio, 94 Phil. 885 (1954); People v.
Palo, 101 Phil. 963 (1957); People v. Del Rosario Murray, 105 Phil. 591 (1959); People v. Delimios, 105 Phil. 845
(1959); People v. Saik, 106 Phil. 957 (1960); People v. Corpuz, 107 Phil. 44 (1960); People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188
(1960); People v. Fraga, 109 Phil. 241 (1960); People v. Magborang, L-16937, Sept. 30, 1963, 3 SCRA 108; People v.
Argana, L-19448, Feb. 28, 1964, 10 SCRA 311; People v. Contante, L-14639, Dec. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 653; People v.
Cunanan, L-17599, April 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 769; People v. Baquiran L-20153, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 451; Ramos v.
People, L-22348, Aug. 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 1109; People v. Parayno, L-24804, July 5, 1968, 24 SCRA 3; People v.
Pagaduan, L-26948, Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 54; People v. Gallora, L-21740, Oct. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 780; People v.
Madarang, L-22295, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 148; People v. Gallema, L-30588-89. June 10, 1970, 33 SCRA 440.
10.
Ibid, p. 459.
11.
68 Phil. 471 (1939).
12.
Ibid, p. 475.
13.
Cf. People v. Bernal, 91 Phil. 619 (1952); People v. Hufana, 103 Phil. 304 (1958); People v. Amajul, L14626-27, Feb. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 682; People v. Dueas, L-15307, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 221, People v. Hernandez, L6025, May 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 223; People v. Sagario, L-18659, June 29, 1965, 14 SCRA 468; People v. Chaw Yaw
Shun, L-19590, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 127; People v. Wong, L-22130-32, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 146; People v.
Provo, L-28347, Jan. 20, 1971, SCRA 19.
14.
Cf. People v. Sabandal, L-31129, Sept. 30, 1971 citing People v. Beraces, L-25016, March 27, 1971, 38
SCRA 127; People v. Gumahin, L-22357, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 729; People v. Tila-on, L-12406, June 30, 1961, 2

SCRA 653; People v. Curiano, L-15256-57, Oct. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 323; People v. Lumayag, L-19142, March 31, 1965,
13 SCRA 502.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 112889. April 18, 1995.]
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T.
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza and Villareal Law Offices for petitioner.
Balgos and Perez for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
POLITICAL LAW; THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR ANY
ELECTIVE LOCAL POSITION; FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE, DEFINED. The Oversight Committee finally came
out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: "Art.
73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: "(a) . . .
"(b) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who
has been convicted by final judgment. " Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no
obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or
regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds,
albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Courts en banc deliberations), that Article 73
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term
"fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
DAVIDE, JR., J., separate opinion:
1.
POLITICAL LAW; SEC. 40; R.A. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991); ART. 73, RULES
AND REGULATIONS; UNREASONABLY EXPANDS THE SCOPE OF DISQUALIFICATION. Section 40 of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 enumerates those who are disqualified from running
for any elective local position, among whom is a: (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad. The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also to
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition
given to it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as appearing in Article
73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and an undue
circumscription of the law. Justice Davide agrees and further submits that it also unreasonably expands the scope of the
disqualification in the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final
judgment, regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served or are serving their sentences
or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for another country. The definition thus disregards the true
and accepted meaning of the word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislative debates has
been shown to sustain it and the clear language of the law leaves no room for a reexamination of the meaning of the term.
2.
ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATIONS, JUSTIFIED. There are certain fundamental considerations which do
not support the application of the presumption of innocence under the Bill of Rights which support disqualification.
Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress to determine who are disqualified
from exercising the right of suffrage. Since the minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be
a qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has the plenary power to determine who are disqualified to seek
election for a public office. Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution expressly
so provides. A public office is not property. (ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., 101; JOAQUIN
BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987 ed., 40, citing Cornejo vs. Gabriel,
41 Phil. 188 [1920]). Accordingly, stricter qualifications for public office may thus be required by law. Thirdly, the
disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence. Elsewise stated, one is not
disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. He is
disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he
had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he
has successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he
has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on
his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that
it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather the disqualified
person himself who has proven his guilt. Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA 392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to
case doubt on the validity of the challenged disqualification. Dumlao struck out as violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence that portion of the second paragraph, Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 providing that "the filing of
charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact." It is clear that the law challenged therein did in fact establish a presumption of guilt
from the mere filing of the information or criminal complaint, in violation of the constitutional right to presumption of
innocence.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the meaning of
the term "fugitive from justice" as that phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government
Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:

"Sec. 40.
Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"(e)
Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)"
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position of Governor in the Province of Quezon in the 11th
May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private
respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. prLL
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10)
counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles
Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is
claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate of candidacy, on
the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner
with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992 resolution of COMELEC
was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding
against private respondent. The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:
"Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. Since the private respondent had
already been proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petitioner below for disqualification
has ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63 and
Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court
held that a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and should be dismissed. The proper
remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification suit in a separate proceeding. llcd
"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within ten (10) days from notice." 1
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo
warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution,
the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a
reconsideration of the resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected, focuses on whether private respondent
who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a
foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section
40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from
holding on to, an elective local office.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no further interpretation and
construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitives from
justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad" from seeking any elective local office. The Solicitor General,
taking the side of petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes that the phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by
F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes
vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the Oversight Committee which, conformably
with Section 533 2 of RA. 7160, was convened by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to ensure
compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy." cdll
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
"'CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.
'So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
'REP. CUENCO. What does he want?
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito
before the Supreme Court later on.
'REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
'Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad."
'Mabigat 'yung abroad.' One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of arrest pending, unserved. . .
'HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, and what is a fugitive? It is not defined. We have loose
understanding. . .
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong 'fugitive.'
'Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.'
"THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a fugitive from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run
at this point and I have held that for a long time ago. So can. . .
"MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
"MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .

"THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very important. Manny, can you come up?
"MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Okay, Fugitive means a person
convicted by final judgment. Insert that on Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved (TSN,
Oversight Committee, 07 May 1991).
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba ang gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2, lines
43 and 44, 'fugitive from justice.' What 'fugitive?' Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
"MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the word what is meant by the word
'fugitive.'
"THE CHAIRMAN. 'Fugitive from justice means a person' ba ito, ha?
"MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
"HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean or means one who has been
convicted by final judgment. It means one who has been convicted by final judgment.
"HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.
"HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
"THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted by final judgment, meaning that if he is
simply in jail and because he put up, post bail, but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final
judgment." 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section
40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely
were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R.A.V. Saguisag who during the bicameral
conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation:
". . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a." 4
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991. It provided:
"Art. 73.
Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
"(a)
...
"(b)
Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a
person who has been convicted by final judgment." 5 (Italics supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the officials in charge of its enforcement
deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,
181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must
merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law
but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente
(expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the
fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a
"fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus
constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. prLL
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch
conformably with the foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Bellosillo and Mendoza, JJ., join J. Davide in his separate opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) states that the qualifications for elective provincial, city,
municipal, and barangay officials shall be those provided for in the Local Government Code. The quondam Local
Government Code was B.P. Blg. 337, which was superseded by R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. Section 39 of the latter provides for the qualifications and election of local elective officials.
Section 40 enumerates those who are disqualified from running for any elective local position, among whom is a:
(e)
Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also to those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition given to
it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as appearing in Article 73 of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and an undue
circumscription of the law. I agree.

But this is only one side of the coin. I further submit that it also unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification in
the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final judgment, regardless
of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served or are serving their sentences or have evaded
service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for another country. The definition thus disregards the true and accepted
meaning of the word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislative debates has been shown to
sustain it and the clear language of the law leaves no room for a reexamination of the meaning of the term.
I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on the constitutionality of the disqualification based on the presumption of
innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. There are certain fundamental considerations which do not support the application
of the presumption. LLpr
Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress to determine who are disqualified
from exercising the right of suffrage. Since the minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be
a qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has the plenary power to determine who are disqualified to seek
election for a public office.
Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 1.
Public office is public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
A public office is not property. (ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., 101; JOAQUIN BERNAS, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987 ed., 40, citing Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188
[1920]). Accordingly, stricter qualifications for public office may thus be required by law.
Thirdly, the disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence. Elsewise
stated, one is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against
him. He is disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court
because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and
convicted, he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification
then is based on his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even
be truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but
rather the disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt. LibLex
Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA 392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to cast doubt on the validity of the challenged
disqualification. Dumlao struck out as violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence that portion of the second
paragraph, Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact." It is clear that the law
challenged therein did in fact establish a presumption of guilt from the mere filing of the information or criminal
complaint, in violation of the constitutional right to presumption of innocence.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74259. February 14, 1991.]
GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated February 27, 1986, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12) Years and One (1)
Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the
provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the amount misappropriated, and to pay the
costs of this suit. Further, the accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a
fine equal to the amount embezzled.
SO ORDERED.
As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was
designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and
made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. llcd
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on April 22, 1981, a Transfer of
Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in
the amount of P72,823.08. 1
A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the missing amount but he was able to pay
only P10,159.50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated October 12, 1981. This was subsequently reduced by
P12,067.51 through the payment to the petitioner of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary
before his dismissal from the service. 2
On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to the petitioner. The
demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the
respondent court on October 11, 1983.
The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. 3 He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the
shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the unliquidated withdrawal made by
Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate checks issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official
leave of absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer
Bernardo C. Aluning and he had no choice but to comply although he had not actually received the said amount. cdll
The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding vouchers dated are described as follows:
1.
Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid
by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December 22, 1980.
2.
Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and
paid by PNB Check No. SN958525 dated December 23, 1980.
3.
Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid
by PNB Check No. 956639J dated December 22, 1980.
4.
Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and
paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December 29, 1980.
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the amounts thereof were disbursed,
turning over to the petitioner the corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and payrolls, (which were all
submitted as exhibits). 4 He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question as alleged but was in
fact the one who prepared the said checks in the morning before attending to his sick wife in the hospital, returning to the
office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll payments made on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on
December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came back from the hospital. 5
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the petitioner was not on official
leave on the dates in question. He said that although Check No. 958525 had already been encashed on December 23,
1980, the encashment was not immediately recorded in the petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of temporarily
hiding the early detection of a shortage." It was only in March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when
confronted with it, the petitioner had no explanation to offer. 6
Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's cash book. He explained
that after receiving the bank statement from the PNB for December 1980, he discovered that although the amount of
P50,000.00 appeared to have been already encashed, the encashment was not reflected in the petitioner's cash book. As
his superior, he required the petitioner to make the proper entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was
already part of the latter's accountability. 7
After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice Amante Q. Alconcel, made the
following findings:
The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the amount of P595.87. Hence, the accused
must be held answerable for the misappropriation of the said amount.

As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his claim that same has not been liquidated by
the paymaster, for the following reasons:
First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for the same purpose, and that is, to pay
salary differentials as well as salaries and wages of provincial officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya
covering the period, January to December, 1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on December 23, 1980, and in fact,
another check (No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on the same day. The two (2) other checks (Nos. 956637 and
958526) were issued and encashed on December 22 and 29, 1980, respectively. Except for Check No. 958525, which was
only entered in accused's Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3) months after its issuance and encashment, all the
other three (3) were duly entered. Then Check No. 956639 which, as pointed out above, was issued and encashed on the
same day as Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle
way of camouflaging the embezzlement of its money equivalent.
Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks, Nos. 956639 and 958525, could not have been liquidated
together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay salary differentials of government officials and employees of
the province of Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed on the same day.
Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore that he duly liquidated the proceeds of the
four (4) checks as follows:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
q.
If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?
a.
I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support the vouchers paid by me or disbursed
by me.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q.
So that your cash advances will be liquidated?
a.
Yes, Your honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
q.
In the absence of the cashier, to whom do you give these documents?
a.
I give them to the cashier only, no other person.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO
q.
In his absence, do you keep these documents?
a.
Yes, Your Honor.
q.
For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you give these payrolls to the cashier?
a.
On December 29, sir.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q.
Duly accomplished?
a.
Duly accomplished, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
AJ ALCONCEL:
q.
Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?
a.
At the office, Your Honor.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:
q.
At what time?
a.
In the afternoon, sir.
AJ ALCONCEL:
q.
Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?
a.
He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was supposedly having a check-up but in
the afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n., March 29, 1985, pp. 16-18)
The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.
And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980. His witness,
Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. His Employee's Leave Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are indicated,
shows that during the month of December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is
the same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly from July 7, 1976 to October 1981. Moreover,
even if it were true that he was absent on December 23, 1980, the day when Check No. 958525 was issued and encashed,
yet, the other check which was issued and encashed on the same day was duly liquidated.
The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason to disturb them, absent
any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced
that the facts as established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:
Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated by the following factors:
First.
When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not make any notation that said
amount, though entered, was not actually received.
Second.
At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not make any certification that the
amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.
Third.
Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he did not file any case, whether
civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a preliminary requirement to
the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been established.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to

personal use. 8 And what determines whether the crime of malversation has been committed is the presence of the
following requirements under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:
(a)
That the offender be a public officer.
(b)
That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
(c)
That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.
(d)
That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed
is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to account for the missing money only
shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the
"untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the
supposed injustice on the petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as
an arrant presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in
which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such
equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his
nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding
that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction
must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.