Art. 9 Grave felonies, less grave felonies, and light felonies.

- Grave felonies are

those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of
their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Article 25 of the code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their
maximum period are correctional, in accordance with above mentioned article.
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty
of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both is provided.
Classification of felonies according to their gravity.
Art. 9 classifies felonies according to their gravity. The gravity of the felonies is
determined by the penalties attached to them by law.
The afflictive penalties in accordance with Art. 25 of this code are:
Reclusion perpetua,
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prision mayor.
The following are correctional penalties;
Prision correccional,
Arresto mayor,
suspension,
Destierro
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of
this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
Are offenses punishable under special laws subject to the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code?
Article 10 is composed of two clauses. In the first, it is provided that offenses under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Code. The second makes the
Code supplementary to such laws.
The two clauses of Article 10, reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the Penal Code is not
intended to supersede special penal laws. The latter are controlling with regard to
offenses therein specially punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of
statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. The
second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the
article is embodied in the provision that the "Code shall be supplementary" to special
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary

IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES.

1. "Special laws."
A "special law" defined in U.S. v. Serapio, 23 Phil. 584, as a penal law which
punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Penal Code. Special law is a statute
enacted by the Legislative branch, penal in character, which is not an amendment
to the Revised Penal Code. Special laws usually follow the form of America i1 penal
law. The penal clause, for example, provides a penalty of from five to ten years or a
fine not exceeding P5,000.00, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on penalties cannot be applied to offenses
punishable under special laws.
Article 6 relative to attempted and frustrated stages of execution, Articles 18 and 19
regarding accomplices and accessories, and Articles 50 to 57 which provide that the
penalty for the principal in an attempted felony is two degrees and in a frustrated
felony one degree lower than the penalty the consummated felony, that the penalty
for the accomplice is one degree lower and for the accessory two degrees lower than
that for the consummated felony, Articles 13 and 14 which provide for mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, respectively, and Article 64 which provides for the
rules for the application of penalties with three periods, cannot be applied to offenses
punishable under special laws. The reasons are that the special laws do not provide
for u scale of penalties, as that in Article 71 of the Code, where a given penalty could
be lowered by one or two degrees, and that the penalty provided by the special law
does not contain three periods.
The term "imprisonment" and not "prision correccional" should be used in reference
to the pena1lty for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and other crimes
punished by special laws, because the term "prision correccional," prision mayor," or
"arresto mayor" is peculiar to penalties for crime punished by the Revised Penal
Code.
Penal Code, the rules for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper
period should be applied. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the
Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper
period should be applied. Thus, where the special law adopted penalties from the
Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in
felonies. In People v. Simon, G.R. No 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555, the
Court applied the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of Appeals (371 Phil. 627 [1999]), the Court
applied the same principle to cases involving illegal possession of firearms. In those
instances, the offenses were also penalized under special laws. Finally, inDulla v.
Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 791 (2000), a case involving sexual abuse of a child as
penalized under Section 5(b), Article III ofR.A. No. 7610, the Court likewise applied
the same first clause of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This case should be no
exception. (Sanchez v. People and CA, G.R. No. 179090, June 5,
2009)

Article 6 of the RPC Cannot be applied to offenses punished by special laws. The
subjective phase in the commission of a felony is that portion of its execution
starting from the point where the offender begins by overt acts to pursue the crime
until he is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of
the acts which would produce the offense. If the subjective phase has not yet passed,
then the crime is only attempted. If that phase has been done but the felony is not
produced, the crime is frustrated (U.S. v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209)-The crime is
consummated if, following the subjective phase, the last of the elements of the felony
meets to concur. These rules are inapplicable to offenses governed by special laws.
(People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 99838, October 23, 1997) In U.S. v. Basa, G.R. No.
3540, March 19, 1907, 8 Phil. 89, the Supreme Court held that Section 28 of the
Municipal Code (Act No. 82) "does not punish an attempt to commit this crime. In
offenses created by acts of the Commission, the last paragraph of Article 3 of the
Penal Code relating to attempts to commit crimes is not applicable."
In People v. Ngan Te, G.K No. L-42574, December 12, 1935, 62 Phil. 588, the Court
found 'no merit in the prosecuting officer's contention that the appellant can be
sentenced for a frustrated violation of the Act of Congress by applying the Revised
Penal Code. The Philippine Legislature cannot alter this Act of Congress by
extending its scope beyond that which Congress intended, and this not only on
grounds of principle, but because in its Section 16, Congress expressly reserved its
right to alter, amend, or repeal the same."
Offenses under special laws, not subject to the provisions of this Code relating
to attempted and frustrated crimes.
By virtue of the provision of the first part of this article, it was held that the
attempted or the frustrated stage of the execution of an offense penalized by a special
law is not punishable, unless the special law provides a penalty therefore.
The ruling in the case or U.S. v. Basa, supra, is still good, notwithstanding the case
of Navarra v. People, 96 Phil. 851, where it is stated that the prohibit ion against the
interest in municipal contracts includes all the step:; taken to consummate the
contract, that is, frustrated and attempted stages are included. In the Navarra case,
the exchange of the property of the husband of a woman councilor and that of the
municipality was approved by the municipal council. The provisions of the
Administrative Code charged to have been violated by the councilor do not require
that the contract be approved by the provincial governor. In the Basa case, the
written proposal of Councilor Basa, offering to furnish street lamps to the
municipality, at the price named therein, was not accepted by the municipal council,
it bring a violation of the law, prohibiting public officers from becoming interested in
any transaction in which it is their official duty to intervene. In the Navarra case, the
transaction in which the councilor became interested having been approved by the
municipal council, the offense was consummated. In the Basa case, the proposal, not
having been accepted by the Municipal council, the offense was only in the
attempted stage.

The special law has to fix penalties for attempted and frustrated crime.
The penalty for the consummated crime cannot be imposed when the stage of the
acts of execution is either attempted or frustrated, because the penalty for the
attempted and frustrated crime is two degrees or one degree lower, respectively. The
special law does not provide for penalty one or two degrees lower than that provided
for the consummated stage. The special law has to fix a penalty for the attempt and a
penalty for the frustration of the crime defined by it, in order that the crime may be
punished in case its commission reached only the attempted or frustrated stage of
execution.
Article 10 is not applicable to punish an accomplice under the special law.
The offense involved is punished by C.A. No. 466, Section 174. The penalty
imposed is clearly intended only for the "person who is found in possession" of the
prohibited article. No punishment for a mere accomplice is provided. Although by
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, its provisions may be applied to offenses
punished by special laws in a supplementary manner, the pertinent provisions thereof
on accomplices simply cannot be given effect in the case at bar. To be able to do so,
the rules on graduation of penalties must be resorted to. Thus, Article 6, thereof
prescribes for the accomplice in a consummated offense a penalty one degree lower
than that prescribed for the principal therein. But, the penalty provided in Section
174 of the National Internal Revenue Code here involved, is a single penalty
standing by itself without any provision therein as to degrees of penalties imposable.
No room for the application of the rule of graduation of penalties therefore exists. It
would be a legal impossibility to determine what penalty is to be imposed upon a
mere accomplice. The combined provisions of both the Revised Penal Code and the
National Internal Revenue Code do not provide any such penalty or at least lay down
the basis or the manner of its determination. The rule i~ and has always been nullum
crimen nulla poena sine lege. Hence, even if appellant is conceded to have
performed acts which would make of him an accomplice, it would nevertheless be
impossible to impose any penalty upon him because of the demonstrated
inapplicability of the principles of the Revised Penal Code on accomplices to the
case at bar. (Dissenting opinion,People v. Padaong, 10 C.A. Rtp. 979)
Plea of guilty is not mitigating in illegal possession of firearms punished by
special law.
The plea of guilty as mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 13,
par. 7) is not available to offenses punishable under special laws. (People v. Noble,
77 Phil. 1086) Offenses which are punishable under the special laws are not subject
to the provisions of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, and it has been held that
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, relative to the application of the
circumstances modifying the criminal liability of the accused are not applicable to
special laws.
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing the rules for the graduation of
penalties containing three periods when mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the crime, was held inapplicable to offenses penalized by
special laws, because the penalty prescribed by special law is usually indeterminate

and does not contain three periods. For this reason, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty is not considered to mitigate the liability of one accused of
illegal possession of firearms.
Indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment in the Revised Penal Code applied to
violation of Motor Vehicle Law.
People v. Moreno (60 Phil. 712)
Facts: The accused drove a car in a reckless manner, and in going around a curve
leading to a concrete bridge, he violently struck the railing of the bridge and crushed
the left side of the car. The person who was seated on the left side of the car received
injuries from which he died the same day. The accused was convicted of homicide
thru reckless imprudence and violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992).
That special law has no provision regarding indemnity to heirs of the deceased and
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In Articles 39 and 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, indemnity to heirs and subsidiary imprisonment are, respectively,
provided.
Held: Articles 39 and 100 of the Revised Penal Code are supplementary to the Motor
Vehicle Law.
No accessory penalty, unless the special law provides therefor.
In the case of People v. Santos, 44 O.G.1289, the Court of Appeals refused to impose
accessory penalty upon the accused found guilty of a violation of Act 3992, because
that law does not provide for any.
Article 12, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, applied to minor over nine
but less than fifteen years old who violated a special law.
People v. Navarro (C.A., 51 O.G. 4062)
Facts: A girl, 13 years, 11 months, and 3 days old, was prosecuted for selling cocoa
P0.ll more than the selling price fixed by the government. The prosecution failed to
establish that she acted with discernment.
Held: The state has the burden of proving that the minor acted with discernment,
otherwise, such minor shall be adjudged to be criminally irresponsible solely by
reason of her age showing lack of intelligence. Article 12, paragraph 3, of the
Revised Penal Code applied.
In the above-mentioned case, the accused was prosecuted under a special law. Intent
is immaterial in crimes mala prohibita. But even in crimes mala prohibita, the
prohibited act must be voluntarily committed. The offender must act with
intelligence. In said case, the accused acted without intelligence.
Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal Code.
The suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of
Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are
silent on a particular matter. Thus, in the following cases, the Supreme Court applied
suppletorily the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to offenses under special laws:

(1) Subsidiary Penalty - The Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not contain
any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. (People v. Moreno, 60 Phil. 712 [1934])
(2) Civil Liability - The Court applied suppletorily the provision on Article 100 (civil
liability) of the Revised Penal Code to a case for violation of the Revised Motor
(3) Rules on Service o( Sentence - The Court applied suppletorily the rules un the
service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the R1 c in favor of the accused who
was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, considering the lack ol similar rules under the special
law.
(4) Definition on Principals, Accomplices and Accessories the Court applied
Suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words principal,
accomplices and accessories under R.A . No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because said words were not defined
therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the
persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment .
(5) Principle of Conspiracy - The Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
Special laws amending the Revised Penal Code are subject to its provisions.
P.D. No. 533 is not a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised
Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code,
which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems
clear that P.D. No. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code,
with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be
subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree,
but which could not have been intended to be' discarded or eliminated by the decree.
Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the
presence of two mitigating circumstances, that of plea of
Chapter Two
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT
FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by

affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the
first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Art. are present
and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes
damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.
Art.11(1) Self-defense Reason why penal laws make self-defense lawful - because it
would be quite impossible for the State in all case to prevent aggression upon its
citizens and offer protection to the person unjustly attacked.
Requisites of self-defense:
1. Unlawful aggression, (indispensable)
ACTUAL
SUDDEN
Attack
UNEXPECTED
Immediate or Imminent
Possible exception: LIBEL (varying opinion)
Threat is not an unlawful aggression.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression, and
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of
selfdefense. It contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent
danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The person
defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with
actual use of weapon. Of all the elements, unlawful aggression, i.e., the sudden
unprovoked attack on the person defending himself, is indispensable. People vs.
Rubiso, 399 SCRA 267 (2003)
It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of ones hand into his pocket as if for the
purpose of drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking of a rifle

without aiming the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that
ones life was in imminent danger.
Retaliation is different from self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In
self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the
accused. People vs. Vicente, 405 SCRA 40 (2003)
When there is a second stage of the incident as in this case, treachery should be
considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance if used as a means to insure the
success of an attack against a fellow protagonist during the said second stage of the
incident.
Art.11(2) Defense of Relatives The natural impulse of any person who has killed
someone in defense of his person or relative is to bring himself to the authorities and
try to dispel any suspicion of guilt that the authorities might have against him.
Balunueco vs. CA, 410 SCRA 76 (2003)
In the case at bar, petitioner (Ricardo) utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of the
existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the deceased
(Senando), with the exception of his self-serving allegations.
Art.11(3) Defense of Stranger With the absence of unlawful aggression that can
be attributed to the victim, it becomes unnecessary to determine the remaining
requisites for they obviously have no leg to stand on. Thus, in this case, the defense
of stranger will not lie, complete or incomplete. Almeda vs. CA, 80 SCRA 575
[W]hen the victim fell down and staggered after petitioner shot him pointblank in the
head, any supposed unlawful aggression by the former, assuming that it has begun,
had ceased. If so, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound
the former aggressor.
Art.11(4) State of Necessity Doctrine Requisites:
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
3. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
Art.11(5) Fulfillment of a Duty/ Lawful Exercise of a Right or Office
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying
circumstance of self defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article
11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window,
killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack. People vs.
Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)
Art. 429 of the New Civil Code provides: The owner or lawful possessor of a thing
has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent
an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property
(Emphasis supplied).

Art.11(6) Obedience to a Lawful Order of a Superior

An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a
superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1,
1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng
Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such
violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means
used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. People vs. Tulin, 364
SCRA 10 (2001) Starting year 2004 thru R.A. 9262, additional justifying
circumstance:
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (see p.18)

[I]t is equally important to determine whether appellant Genosa had acted freely,
intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot
properly evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on
her mental and emotional state at the time of the killing and the possible
psychological cause and effect of her fatal act. People vs. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493
(2000)

To consider a valid battered woman syndrome at least 2 cycles of the following are
completed:
1. Tension building phase
2. (Acute) physical aggression
3. Reconciliation (tranquility)

BURDEN OF PROOF
In ordinary cases, the accuser is the first to present evidence.
In cases of self-defense, defense of relatives, or defense of stranger, the accused has
the burden of proof.
This is called Reverse Trial
(Admission and Avoidance)

The Supreme Court in the Marivic Genosa case only appreciated battered womans
syndrome only as a mitigating circumstance that diminishes will power. After the
Genosa case RA 9282 was enacted and now a new Justifying Circumstance. The
battered woman does not incur both criminal and civil liabilities.