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ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN
Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 92, (NCJR) Quezon City
Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 5, Lemery, Batangas
Judge Designate, RTC, Br. 39, Calapan City, Or. Mindoro
Judge Designate, RTC, Br. 40, Calapan City, Or. Mindoro
Former Executive/Presiding Judge, MTCC, Br. 2, Batangas City
Former Acting Judge: MTCC, Br. 1, Batangas City; MTC, Lian,
Batangas; Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro;
Former Judge Designate, MTC, Romblon, Romblon
Law Professor, Remedial Law Review and Political Law
University of Batangas (U.B.) (Batangas & Lipa City Campuses)
MCLE Lecturer
Author, Handbook on Local Governance (Rex Book Store, Inc.)
Awardee, Judicial Excellence (2014), Rotary Club of Sta. Mesa
District 3780, Quezon City
Outstanding Graduate (2014), SSC-R, College of Law
Awardee, Quezon City RTCJA 2012 Outstanding Judge
Former Member, Sangguniang Bayan, San Jose, Batangas
Former Law Practitioner
A.B.; Ll.B., San Sebastian College-R (Manila)
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EXCEPTIONS:
Only when the court issues an order outside or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, will certiorari be
considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (Heirs of
Hinog vs. Melicor,).
If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss, acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or is not the court of proper venue, or
if the denial of the motion to dismiss is made with grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such
cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The
following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule
(Newsweek, Inc vs. IAC,).
In De Jesus vs. Garcia, , upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the High Court
granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of
Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
However, in Bank of America vs. CA, , it was held that the remedy
of the defendant is to file an answer to the complaint, proceed to trial and
await judgment before making an appeal instead of petition of certiorari
under Rule 65.
The High Court in Bank of America:
It is a well-settled rule that the order denying the
motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of petition for
certiorari. Petitioners should have filed an answer to the
complaint, proceed to trial and await judgment before
making an appeal. As repeatedly held by this Court:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the
extraordinary petition for certiorari or
mandamus. The remedy of the aggrieved party
is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses
the objections raised in his motion to dismiss,
proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse
decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in
due course. xxx Under certain situations,
recourse to certiorari or mandamus is
considered appropriate, i.e., (a) when the trial
court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave
abuse of discretion by the trial court; or (c)
EFFECT OF DISMISSAL
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
C. Contents of answer
B. Case No. 1
Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that defendant is indebted to the
former in the amount of P1M attaching in the complaint several annexes
including the photocopy of the promissory note. In his answer, he alleged
that he has never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in
his personal and/or individual capacity, thus ineffective, unenforceable
and void for lack of valid consideration. In his verification, he stated that:
(1) that the defendant, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with
law, hereby depose and declare that she is the named defendant in the
above-entitled case; he has cause the preparation of the answer upon facts
and figures supplied by his to his retained counsel; have read each and
every allegations contained therein and hereby certify that the same are
true and correct of her own knowledge and information.
At the pre-trial, plaintiff was able to prove that the defendant
received the amount of P1M as loan after signing the Promissory Note
(Annex A), that defendant, upon receipt of the demand letter made a reply
seeking an extension to pay her obligation. On the Formal Offer of
Exhibits Plaintiff sought the admission of the duplicate original of the PN
on the ground that the original copy could no longer be found. The trial
court initially admitted into evidence the duplicate original of the PN, and
allowed Defendant to amend her answer to conform with this new
evidence. Upon Defendants motion for reconsideration arguing that the
duplicate Original PN was not properly identified and there were markings
in the photocopy which were not contained in duplicate original, the trial
court granted the MR and dismissed the case on the ground that Plaintiff
had no longer possessed any proof of Defendants alleged indebtedness.
The trial court found that there can be no dispute to the fact that the
allegations in the answer of defendant, she denied generally and
specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
promissory note and by way of special and affirmative defenses herein
states that she never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint
in his personal and/or individual capacity. She also deny generally and
specifically the rest of the allegations. It would be considered that there is
a sufficient compliance of the requirement of the law for specific denial.
Is the denial specific?
COUNTERCLAIM
A. What is a counterclaim?
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have
against an opposing party (Section 6, Rule 6, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure). This may be a claim for money or other relief (See Sapugay
vs. CA,).
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction
or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be
within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature
thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court,
the counter-claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount
(Section 7, Rule 6, 1997 Revised rules of Civil Procedure).
It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the
court. It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the
future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any
other counterclaim is permissive (Cruz-Agana vs. Judge SantiagoLagman,).
A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an
initiatory or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiffs
complaint. A defendant
has no choice but to raise a compulsory
counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint, otherwise
defendant waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory
counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to
an initiatory pleading which is the complaint (Cruz-Agana vs. Judge
Santiago-Lagman,).
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing partys
claim (Lopez v. Gloria,). It is essentially an independent claim that may
be filed separately in another case (Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc., et
al, vs. Continental Cement Corporation,), or is capable of proceeding
independently of the main case (Bungcayao, Sr. vs. Fort Ilocandia
Property Holdings and Development Corporation,).
B. Set-off (Compensacion)
distinguished
and
recoupment
(reconvencion)
otherwise provided (See Section 5(2) Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
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A. The rule
Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. xxx xxx xxx
(Section 1, Rule 34, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
B. Concept
Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint
tenders several issues. It is proper when the answer admits all the material
averments of the complaint. But where several issues are properly
to have admitted the material and relevant averments of the complaint, and
to rest her motion for judgment based on the pleadings of the parties
(Rodriguez vs. Llorente,).
If the plaintiff asks the court for judgment on the pleadings and
defendant has consented to it, and if judgment is not favorable to the
defendant, he can no longer question the validity of the judgment. In
Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. CA, , the High Court said:
As to the amount of damages awarded as a
consequence of this violation of plaintiffs rights, the lower
court based its award from the allegations and prayer
contained in the complaint. The defendant, however,
questions this award for the reason that, according to the
defendant, the plaintiff, in moving for judgment on the
pleadings, did not offer proof as to the truth of his own
allegations with respect to the damages claimed by him,
and gave no opportunity for the appellant to introduce
evidence to refute his claims. We find this objection
without merit. It appears that when the plaintiff moved to
have the case decided on the pleadings, the defendant
interposed no objection and has practically assented
thereto. The defendant, therefore, is deemed to have
admitted the allegations of fact of the complaint, so that
there was no necessity for plaintiff to submit evidence of
his claim.
If the court can resolve the issues presented by the complaint and
the answer can be resolved within the four corners of said pleadings
without need to conduct further hearings, and what remains to be done is
the proper interpretation of the contracts or documents attached to the
pleadings, then judgment on the pleadings is proper (Pacific Rehouse
Corporation vs. EIB Securities, Inc.,).
In an action for sum of money and defendants have admitted that
they obtained the loan; have admitted the due execution of the loan
documents and their receipt of the demand letter made by the plaintiff, and
only issue is whether the obligation is matured or not, the High Court held
that the case can be decided summarily, because when plaintiff made its
for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for
summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face
appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented
by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
The law itself determines when a summary judgment is proper.
Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a fullblown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues,
when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are
not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must
ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial for determination, therefore, is
the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact (Vadel
Realty and Development Corporation vs. Spouses Soriano,).
The the amount of damages is excluded in the coverage,
because in order to prove the issue as to amount of damages, presentation
of evidence is necessary.
In Bungcayao, Sr. vs. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings, the trial
court in an action for declaration of nullity of contract noted the stipulated
issues and admissions been made by both parties, made to confirm the
agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim and the return of the money to the respondent, and
summarily decided the case dismissing the plaintiffs claim for damages
for want of legal basis, and directed to immediately vacate the premises
subject of the case.
In Calubaquib vs. Republic, , it was held that when the trial court
proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion
therefor it disragarded and ignored the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition
of a summary judgment thereby violating the defendants due process right to a
trial where they can present their evidence and prove their defense. In this case, it
was the trial court that directed the plaintiff to file a motion for summary
judgment which was opposed by the defendant.
Also in Calubaquib vs. Republic, , it was held that it was improper for
the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment; to make a
baseless assumption is premature and unfair.
Municipality of Bian, Laguna vs. CA, 219 SCRA 69, February 17, 1993 and Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, pp. 163-164 (1993) cited in California and
Hawaiian Sugar Company vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, G.R. No.
139273, November 28, 2000.
RULE ON DEFAULT
There are times that a defendant after service of summons fails to
file answer to the complaint. This maybe because he does not know what
to do, or maybe because he is not really interested in the suit, he will
deliberately disregards the complaint by his inaction because he opt not to
be bothered by it.
If this happens, the plaintiff is on the advantageous position
because if the case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure
judgment can be rendered as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint under Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure; and if the case is governed by the regular the defendant can be
declared in default under Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. In either, his case can be expeditiously disposed of.
F. The claiming party must prove that the defending party has
failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule
To prove this element, the plaintiff must prove that the fifteen day
period, or the period fixed by the court for the defendant to file responsive
pleading has expired or lapsed. This can be done by giving emphasis to the
Sheriffs Return of Summons as proof that the fifteen day period, or the
period fixed by the court for the defendant to file responsive pleading has
expired or lapsed.
Not only that, the only evidence that may be allowed by the trial
court are those evidence that will tend to support the relief sought and
specified in the complaint (Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. CA), and
no award greater than or different in kind from that specified in the
complaint can be granted (Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. CA,), and
if a relief other than that specifically prayed for in the complaint is
awarded in a judgment by default, such an award is null and void because
the court is bereft of jurisdiction to grant such an award (Policarpio vs.
RTC of Quezon City,).
Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. CA (made to emphasize that
without a declaration that petitioner is in default as required in Section 1,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has no authority to order the
presentation of evidence ex parte against petitioner to render judgment
against it by default.
Once the defendant is declared in default the plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The court can grant the
favorable relief sought only after it has ascertained that the evidence
offered and the facts proven by the presenting party warrant the grant of
the same (Pascua vs. Florendo cited in Luxuria Homes and/or Posadas
vs. CA,), because it would be meaningless to require presentation of
evidence if everytime the other party is declared in default, a decision
would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and
exactly according to the tenor of his prayer (Luxuria Homes and/or
Posadas vs.).
A defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. The
rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with
law. The evidence to support the plaintiffs cause is, of course, presented
in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is
basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position
to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be
considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient
to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed.
And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed the
amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint
(Luxuria Homes and/or Posadas vs. CA,).
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
A. Demurrer to evidence, definition, concept and purpose
C. When to file?
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is
denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence (Section 1, Rule 33, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure).
for dismissal. Properly speaking, the movants for demurral who wish to
rely on a controlling value of a settled case as a ground for demurrer
should invoke the ground of stare decisis in lieu of res judicata (Republic
vs. Tuvera, G).
and permitted to elevate the matter on appeal. This is the reason why the
remedy available to the aggrieved party is appeal and not certiorari under
Rule 65.
On the other hand, an order denying a demurrer to evidence is
interlocutory order. The constitutional provision does not apply to
interlocutory order, because after the issuance of the order of denial there
will be continuing proceedings that will takes place, i.e.,
actions/proceedings left to be done by the court, such as such as
presentation of defense evidence. This is the reason why the remedy
available under paragraph 2 (c), in relation to paragraph 3, Section 1,5 Rule
41, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is certiorari, and not appeal.
Besides, the order of denial is not subject to the requirement of
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, because as what the
High Court held in Dandoy vs. CA, the order of denial neither terminate
nor finally dispose of the case as there are proceedings still left to be done
by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
David vs. Rivera, 464 Phil. 1006; Tadeo vs. People, 360 Phil. 914, 919 (1998); Cruz vs.
People, 363 Phil. 156; Katigbak vs. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 515 cited in Nicolas vs.
Sandiganbayan and the companion case, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, February 11, 2008.
9
People vs. Ong, G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000 citing Cruz vs. People (303 SCRA
533 [1999]).
10
Choa vs. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002.
11
Five Star Bus, Co, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 120496, July 17, 1996.
execution of judgment
appeal
motion for reconsideration
motion for new trial
petition for relief from judgment
annulment of judgment
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
(Rule 39)
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it
is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once
a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict (Li Kim Tho vs. Sanchez,).
Once a judgment becomes final, it is basic that the prevailing party
is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which
is the trial courts ministerial duty (Torno vs. IAC,).
Final and executory judgments are enforced by a writ of execution
not by mandamus.12 Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is very
aptly called the life of the law.13 It is the process which carries into effect
a decree or judgment.14
Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the
action and not against one who did not have his day in court (St. Dominic
Corporation vs. IAC,), and therefore, a strangers to a case are not bound
by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not divest the rights of a party
12
who has not and never been a party to a litigation (Panotes vs. City
Townhouse Development Corporation,).
The court can require the sheriff to restore the property to the
claimants possession if warranted by the evidence; if claimants proofs do
not however persuade the court his title or right of possession thereof, his
claim will be denied (Ong vs. Tating, G).
J. Supersedeas Bond
REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT
A. The principle and Rule
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural
means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has
become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed
upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue
affecting the merits of the judgment debtors case nor the propriety or
correctness of the first judgment (Panotes, vs. City Townhouse
Development Corporation,).
It is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived,
either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory
(Saligumba vs. Palanog,).
A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by
action before it is barred by the statute of limitations (Section 6, Rule 39,
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure [Execution by motion or by
independent action]).
The period within which to file action for revival of judgment was
explained by the High Court in Shipside Incorporated vs. CA, , thus:
The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the
trial court is one for revival of judgment which is governed
by Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Article 1144(3)
provides that an action upon a judgment must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues."
On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final
and executor judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry, but that after
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute
of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
Taking these two provisions into consideration, it is plain
that an action for revival of judgment must be brought
within ten years from the time said judgment becomes
final.
In this case (Shipside Incorporated), the High Court
said that:
From the records of this case, it is clear
that the judgment sought to be revived became
final on October 23, 1973. On the other hand,
the action for revival of judgment was instituted
only in 1999, or more than twenty-five (25)
years after the judgment had become final.
Hence, the action is barred by extinctive
prescription considering that such an action can
be instituted only within ten (10) years from the
time the cause of action accrues.
0-0-0
In Villeza vs. German Management and Services, Inc, , made to
emphasize that an action for revival of judgment is governed by Article
1144 (3), Article 1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court; and that judgment must be enforced by the institution of a
complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment
becomes final.
The High Court said:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues:
xxxx
(3) Upon a judgment
Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of
actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations
declared by a judgment commences from the
time the judgment became final.
Apropos, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 6.
Execution by motion or by
independent action. A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry
and thereafter by action before it is barred by
the statute of limitations. (emphasis supplied)
The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes final
and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as
a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the
date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to
have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of
15
Villeza vs. German Management and Services, Inc, G.R. No. 182937, August 8, 2010.
Villeza vs. German Management and Services, Inc, G.R. No. 182937, August 8, 2010.
16
(3). When the oblior moves for the suspension of the writ of
execution, or when the obligee was not in delay because he exhausted all
legal means within his power to eject the obligor from his land; or where
the writs of execution issued by the lower court were not complied with
and/or were suspended by reason of acts or causes not of obligees own
making and against his objections (Casela vs. CA).
xxxx
Section 2.
Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may
be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination
of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a
real action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted
rules on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects
title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of
the place where the real property is located. If such action
does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a
personal action that may be filed with the court of the place
where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
In support of her contention that the action for revival
of judgment is a personal action and should be filed in the
court of the place where either the plaintiff or defendant
resides, petitioner cites the statements made by the Court in
Aldeguer v. Gemelo and Donnelly v. Court of First Instance
of Manila. Petitioner, however, seriously misunderstood
the Court's rulings in said cases.
In Aldeguer, what the Court stated was that [t]he
action for the execution of a judgment for damages is a
personal one, and under section 377 [of the Code of Civil
Procedure], it should be brought in any province where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). Petitioner
apparently took such statement to mean that any action for
revival of judgment should be considered as a personal one.
This thinking is incorrect. The Court specified that the
judgment sought to be revived in said case was a judgment
for damages.
The judgment subject of the action for
revival did not involve or affect any title to or possession of
real property or any interest therein. The complaint filed in
the rivival case did not fall under the category of real
actions and, thus, the action necessarily fell under the
category of personal actions.
In Donnelly, the portion of the Decision being relied
upon by petitioner stated thus:
Petitioner raises before this Court two (2)
issues, namely: (a) whether an action for revival
of judgment is one quasi in rem and, therefore,
service of summons may be effected thru
publication; and (b) whether the second action
for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 76166)
has already prescribed. To our mind, the first
is not a proper and justiciable issue in the
present proceedings x x x. Nevertheless, let it
be said that an action to revive a judgment is a
personal one. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court clearly pointed out that in said case, the
issue on whether an action for revival of judgment is quasi
in rem was not yet proper and justiciable. Therefore, the
foregoing statement cannot be used as a precedent, as it
was merely an obiter dictum. Moreover, as in Aldeguer,
the judgment sought to be revived in Donnelly involved
judgment for a certain sum of money. Again, no title or
interest in real property was involved.
It is then
understandable that the action for revival in said case was
categorized as a personal one.
Clearly, the Court's classification in Aldeguer and
Donnelly of the actions for revival of judgment as being
personal in character does not apply to the present case.
Sec. 18.
Authority to define territory
appurtenant to each branch. - The Supreme
Court shall define the territory over which a
branch of the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, as well as determining the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over
which the said branch may exercise appellate
jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be
exercised with a view to making the courts
readily accessible to the people of the different
parts of the region and making the attendance of
litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as
possible. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only
over a particular territory defined by the Supreme
Court.
Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the
territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However,
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to
Amend Section Fourteen of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,
Otherwise Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981, took effect on September 4, 1991. Said law provided
for the creation of a branch of the Regional Trial Court in
Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court in
Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or
authority to validly issue orders and processes concerning
real property within Muntinlupa City.
Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 276 when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss;
and the CA did not commit any error in affirming the same.
When the records of the original case were destroyed in the fire
during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the disapproval
of the record on appeal, a motion for reconsideration has the effect of
suspending the statutory period after which an order, decision, or
judgment, in connection with which said motion was filed, becomes final.
The motion for reconsideration prevents the decision from attaining
finality. Cannot therefore be a proper subject of an action for revival of
judgment (Juco vs. Heirs of Tomas Siy Chung Fu,).
Juco said:
As pointed out by the appellate court, an action for
revival of judgment is a new and independent action,
different and distinct from either the recovery of property
case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action
is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon
which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered.
However, revival of judgment is premised on the
assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion
or by independent action, is already final and executory.
Hence, the need to make a determination of whether or not
the decision in Civil Case No. 7281 has indeed become
final and executory. For if the subject decision has already
reached finality, then the conclusion of the appellate court
is correct that the dismissal of the reconstitution case would
not prevent respondents from reviving and thereafter
executing the said decision.
A decision issued by a court is final and executory
when such decision disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined by the court, such as when after
the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, no appeal
---0---
APPEAL
A. Right to appeal is a statutory privilege
The right to appeal is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin,
not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. Therefore, available only if
granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of the law. The period to appeal is
specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP
129), as amended amd Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (Yu vs. Judge Samson-Tatad,).
B. When to appeal?
The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from (Section 39, BP 129, as amended).
Under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, the
petitioners had fifteen (15) days within which to file their notice of appeal,
from the time their counsel received notice or was served a copy of the
trial courts decision. The fifteen-day period provided therein is mandatory
and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process. It is a procedural remedy of statutory origin
and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and within the time
frame provided by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. Failure
of a party to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders the
decision sought to be appealed final and executory. As a result, no court
could exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. After a
decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party who has the right to enjoy the finality of the case (Alon vs.
CA, ).
Section 39, BP 129, as amended, is the substantive source of the
remedy of appeal, while Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is the procedural source.
APPEALS
FROM FIRST TO SECOND LEVEL COURT
A. How, where and when to appeal?
The appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The notice of appeal
shall indicate the parties to the appeal, the judgment or final order or part
thereof appealed from, and state the amterial dates showing the timeliness
of the appeal (Section 3, Rule 40, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
An appeal from a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial
Court may be taken to the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the area to which the former pertains. The title of the case shall
remain as it was in the court of origin, but the party appealing the case
shall be further referred to as the appellant and the adverse party as the
appellee (Section 1, Rule 40, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
An appeal may be taken within fifteen (15) days after notice to the
appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days after notice of the judgment or final order
(Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of
the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the
errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by
him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure
of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of
the appeal (Section 7 (b), Rule 40, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the
expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted
for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of original and such
memoranda as are filed (Section 7 (c), Rule 40, 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure).
F. Appeal of dismissed case without trial or for lack of jurisdiction
If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing
the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm
or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of
dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial
Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if
the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be
remanded for further proceedings (Section 8, Rule 40, 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure).
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal
shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall
decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without
prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence
in the interest of justice (Paragraph 2, Section 8, Rule 40, 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure).
B. Subject of appeal
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable (Section 1, Rule 41, 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order (Section
3, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed (Paragraph 2,
Section 3, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
xxx
xxx
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17
Viking Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143794, July 13, 2004
cited in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. CIR, G.R. Nos.
141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007.
order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself (Silverio, Jr. vs.
CA,).
Santo Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla, G.R. No. 129718, August 17, 1998 citing
Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 334; Denso (Phils.,) Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 280.
19
Santo Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla, G.R. No. 129718, August 17, 1998 citing
Bairan vs. Tan Siu Lay, 18 SCRA 1235.
and was found out by the High Court that the same was filed within the
reglementary period. According to the High Court, citing Section 1, Rule
41, that certiorari under Rule 65 is applicable because no appeal may be
taken from an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
The High Courts observation in Uy:
A scrutiny of the records discloses that while the
Motion for New Trial was received by the trial court on
April 28, 2003, the date on the Registry Receipt attached to
the Affidavit of Service as well as that stamped on the
envelope which contained the copy of the motion, reveals
that it was filed and served by registered mail on April 21,
2003, a Monday, because April 19, 2003, the last day for
filing the same was a Saturday. Section 1, Rule 22 of the
Rules of Court states in no uncertain terms that if the last
day of the period thus computed falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day. Thus, the
motion was actually filed on time it having been filed on
April 21, 2003, the next working day, following the last day
for filing which fell on a Saturday.
Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court which provides
that the remedy to an order denying a motion for new trial is
to appeal the judgment or final order, must be read in
conjunction with Section 1, Rule 41 which provides that:
SEC. 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal
may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these
rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a)
An order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the
judgment or final order is not appeasable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65.
(Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the filing by the petitioner of a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the denial of the
motion for new trial by the trial court is proper.
set aside and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final
order has been entered or such proceeding has been taken.
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court only applies when the one deprived
of his right is a party to the case. If the movant is not a party or never been
a party to the case or even summoned to appear in case the remedy of
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is
not proper. The word used is against a party (Lagula vs. Casimiro,).
A petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public
policy of immutability of final judgments (Madarang vs. Morales,). It is
premised on equity; an act of grace and not regarded with favor, and
granted only in exceptional cases (Dirige vs. Biranya,), especially to any
person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence (Somoso vs. CA,). It is
dismissible outright if filed beyond the reglementary period (Madarang
vs. Morales,). Good and substantial defense are also included as
requirements sine qua non conditions for its proper allowance (Dirige vs.
Biranya,).
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be
either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail
himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who
seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for
relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru
inexcusable negligence (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,).
If a party has another adequate remedy available to him, which was
either a motion for new trial or appeal from adverse decisions of the lower
court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking the appeal he cannot avail
himself of the relief provided in Rule 38 (Somoso vs. CA,).
A party is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2, of the
Rules of Court if he was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Such relief will not be
was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have
committed in the trial. Such error may be corrected by means of an appeal
(Agan vs. Heirs of Sps. Andres Nueva and Diosdada Nueva,), and not by
petition for relief form judgment.
In Madarang vs. Morales, , it was held that a failure of petitioners
former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period
is not excusable negligence. The High Court said that that kind of an
argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens. According to the High
Court, this cannot be done as it asked to assume that a person with
advanced age is prone to incompetence.
It must be filed in the same court that that rendered the judgment
and in the same cause wherein the judgment was rendered. If the court
finds the allegations of the petition to be true, it shall set aside the
judgment and try the principal case upon its merits as if a timely motion
for new trial had been granted therein (Braca vs. Tan,).
G. Petition is deniable when the loss of the remedy at law was due
to his own negligence or mistake
The petition for relief from judgment will not be granted to a party
who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or to a mistaken mode of
procedure for that matter, because if it will be granted the petition for
relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal, a remedy which
has already been lost either due to inexcusable negligence or due to a
mistake of procedure by counsel (Fukuzumi vs. Sanritsu Great
International Corporation,).
H. Cases:
When a petition for relief is filed 61 days from receipt of the notice
of dismissal or one day late, the petition for relief must be ordered denied.
While it is true that the law gives an exception or last chance of a timely
petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period (within
I. Petition for relief will not lie when plaintiff filed to personally
notify defendant of court processes
Petition for relief will not lie if plaintiff fails to notify the
defendant of court processes and/or fails to search for the address of
defendant so that he may be properly notified by the Court. Plaintiff is not
duty bound to personally notify the defendant of court processes. It is not
the plaintiffs duty to search for the defendants address so that they may
be properly notified by the Court. This is not the kind of fraud
contemplated by law. Bad faith cannot be presumed from inaction where
there is no duty to act. The grounds not having been clearly established,
petition for relief will not lie (David vs. CA,).
K. Petition for relief from judgment filed out of time shall not be
granted, exceptions
The following are the exceptions:
(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law;
(2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or
L. Court can grant the relief different from that what is prayed in
the petition
Obviously, the court can grant relief which is different from that
what is prayed for in the petition. The prayer in a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the same prayer in the
petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading, because once a
petition for relief is granted and the judgment subject thereof set aside, and
further proceedings are thereafter had, the court in its judgment on the
merits may properly grant the relief sought in the petitioner's basic
pleadings, although different from that stated in his petition for relief
(Cheesman vs. IAC,).
---0---
PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100733, June 18, 1992 citing Saludes vs. Pajarillo,
78 Phil. 754; Liwanag vs. Castillo, Oct. 20, 1959; Occea vs. Jabson, Oct. 29, 1986,
Silvestre vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 885; Pachoco vs. Tumungday, May 25, 1960, Lopez vs.
Alvendia, Dec. 24, 1964, cited in Moran, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 177.
judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of
the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment
itself (Silverio, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 178933, September 16, 2009).
But if the order granting the petition for relief is believed to be
tainted with graved abuse of discretion, though not covered by Section
1(b), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as it only
covers a situation wherein a petition for relief from judgment is denied
allowing the aggrieved party to resort to special civil action under Rule 65,
if tainted with graved abuse of discretion, the adverse party may still resort
to filing a petition certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure by authority of Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the same Rules,
because the order interlocutory nature; an an order is one which does not
dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon
(Tan vs. Republic,). It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that
certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to (Silverio, Jr. vs. CA,).
---0---
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
(Rule 47)
A. Concept, where to file and grounds
City Government of Tagaytay vs. Judge Guerrero, G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745 and
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera vs. Judge Guerrero, G.R. Nos. 141451-52,
September 17, 2009.
vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The petitioner must show
not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction (Durisol Philippines, Inc. vs. CA,).
If a complaint is filed and there is absence, or lack, of jurisdiction,
and the trial court dismisses the case outright, the dismissal cannot be a
subject of annulment of judgment. Appeal or certiorari under Rule 65, as
the case may be, is the proper remedy, or to re-file the case to the
appropriate court having jurisdiction over the case or subject matter.
The High Court in Paulino vs. CA, , gave emphasis that if the case
is dismissed on ground of lack of jurisdiction, the dismissal cannot be a
subject of an annulment of judgment. And no need to allege in the petition
that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order
or judgment or appeal therefrom is no longer available through no fault of
his own, precisely because the judgment rendered or the final order issued
by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void. The High Court said in
Paulino:
The Court finds the petitions devoid of merit.
Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the only grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment
of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of
the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a
court should not take cognizance of the case.
In these cases, the petition for annulment was based
on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The rule is
that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject
matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void
judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights
are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which
neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts
performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a
decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never
become executory. It also follows that such a void
I. Cases
Demetriou case was permitted by the considered by the High
Court as annulment of judgment case but not on extrinsic fraud but on
lack of jurisdiction.
In Demetriou vs. CA, , petitioners and private respondent became
co-owners of the realty brought about by the execution of deeds of sale
executed by respondents co-owners in favor of the petitioner which at
that time the property was then under lease agreement. That time copy of
the title was delivered to petitioners, but because of the existing lease
agreement, petitioners waited for the lease agreement to expire. At the
registry of deeds, upon termination of the lease agreement, petitioners
tried to facilitate the transfer of the title over portions pertaining to them
but they failed because the duplicate owners copy of the title had already
been cancelled by virtue of a court order upon petitioners co-owners
petition for issuance of the second owners duplicate title by reason of its
loss as it was destroyed by the typhoon. Because the use of a false
affidavit of loss does not constitute extrinsic fraud to warrant the
invalidation of a final judgment, the CA dismissed the action. However,
the High Court reversed the Court of Appeals ruling and remanded the
case for further proceedings. The High Court said:
On the basis of these allegations the appellate court
ruled that the fraud alleged was, if at all, only intrinsic and
not extrinsic in character:
An action to annul a final judgment on the
ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. Extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent (Macabingkil vs. People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation, 72 SCRA 326 cited in
Canlas vs. CA, 164 SCRA 160). On the other
hand, intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a
party in a litigation during the trial such as the
use of forged or false document or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the presentation
of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case" (Libudan vs. Gil, 45
SCRA 17). In the present petition, the allegation
of fraud involves admission by the respondent
court of an alleged false affidavit of loss, which
alleged fraud is intrinsic in character. Thus, as
the alleged fraud committed by the private
respondent is not extrinsic in character, the
instant petition for annulment of the said
---0---
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket
and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30)
days only within which to file the petition.
A. The Rule
Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. An error of judgment is
not correctible by certiorari, and as long as the public respondent acted
with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal (Lim vs. Judge Vianzon,).
The acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grant of
due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. It must be stressed that certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy,
the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid
down by the law and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as
mere technicality (Garcia, Jr. vs. CA,).
The rule is that when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings
of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require (Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure).
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46
(Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
In Lim vs. Judge Vianzon, , the held that the petition is
procedurally flawed as it is not accompanied by copies of relevant
pleadings mandated by the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
under Rule 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court (First paragraph,
Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC).
The Court may impose motu proprio, based on res ipso loquitur,
other disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently
dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari (Second paragraph,
Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC).
The use of the word "may" in the last sentence of the second
paragraph or Section 8, Rule 65, indicates that the assessment of treble
costs is not automatic or mandatory. It merely gives the court the
discretion and latitude to impose further sanctions where a petition is
dismissed for being "patently without merit," "prosecuted manifestly for
delay," or upon finding that the questions raised in the petition for
certiorari were "too to require consideration" (City of Davao vs. CA, G.R.
No. 200538, Augsut 13, 2014).
The court is afforded judicial discretion in imposing treble costs,
there remains a need to show that it is sound and with basis - that is
"taking all the pertinent circumstances into due consicleration.'' (Diaz vs.
People, 180677,).
beyond the period, he still opposed it despite the fact that the period was
suspended because of reasons attributable to him.
2. Treble costs were awarded because of the deplorable course
resorted to by the losing litigants in the hope of evading manifest
obligations. The Court stated that it viewed with disfavor the unjustified
delay in the enforcen1ent or the final decision and orders in the said case.
Once a judgment becomes tinal and executory, the prevailing party should
not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the
losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at
naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality
(Spouses Aguilar vs. The Manila Banking Corporation,).
3. Treble costs were imposed because the parties took the law into
their own hands or resorted to a wrong remedy (Uypitching vs.
Quiamco,).
In Uypitching vs. Quiamco, , instead of bringing the proper civil
action necessary to acquire legal possession of a motorcycle, the petitioner
took the law into his own hands and seized it without a search warrant or
court order. Worse, in the course or the illegal seizure or the motorcycle,
the petitioner even mouthed a slanderous statement. By doing so, he
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
4. In Solen vs. A-1 Investors., the party claimed that he was denied
due process when the court adjudged a case against him even if he was not
served the summons. He then resorted to filing a complaint for injunction
to stop the execution of the final judgment. The Court said that he should
have resorted to an action for annulment under Rule 47 and so awarded
treble costs against him.
In City of Davao vs. CA, G, the imposition of treble costs was
striken off by the High Court for failure of the Court of Appeals to explain
and/or to give any reason for such imposition.
The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion
(Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
The 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives
the assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion
for reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not (Vinuya vs. Secretary Romulo,).
To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of
receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of
the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition;
otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed. The importance of
the dates cannot be understated, for such dates determine the timeliness of
the filing of the petition for certiorari (Vinuya vs. Secretary Romulo).
not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than
fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate
the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly
disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction (Santos vs. CA,).
28
People vs. Ong, G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000 citing Cruz vs. People (303 SCRA
533 [1999]).
29
Choa vs. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002.
30
2. PROHIBITION
A. The Rule
personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real
property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. The choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court (GSIS Board of Trustees vs. Velasco,).
---0---
1. MANDAMUS
A. The Rule
When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the
act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent (Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46
(Paragraph 2, Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure).
exercise of his/her own judgment upon the propriety of the act done
(Symaco v. Hon. Aquino,).
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary
duty. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment. When an official is required
and authorized to do a prescribed act upon a prescribed contingency, his
functions are ministerial only, and mandamus may be issued to control his
action upon the happening of the contingency (Paloma vs. Mora,).
The remedy of mandamus is available only to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty. The distinction between a ministerial
and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment (Torregoza vs. CSC,).
For a writ of mandamus to be issued, it is essential that petitioner
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The writ
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed. Mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is
founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. The writ will not be
granted where its issuance would be unavailing, nugatory, or useless
(Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Primex Coco Products).
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT
AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
A. Doctrine of finality of judgment
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
A. The Rule
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding (Section 6, Rule 1,
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).