Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates

Author(s): Bernard Bosanquet

Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Jul., 1905), pp. 432-443
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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432

InternationalJournal of Ethics.

XENOPHON'S

MEMORABILIA

OF SOCRATES.

This articleis an attemptto put togetherthe thoughts

whichit appears to me thatXenophon intendedto attribute
to Socrates on the centralthemeof Wisdom or Science in
relationto Life and Goodness. There is at least a certain
interestin tryingto tracein some detailthe impressionwhich
Socrates had made on the mindof a disciplewho, although
no philosopher,was not destituteof sagacity,and I do not
conceal my belief that the slightnessof the consideration
usually accorded to the Memorabilia' arises froma deepseated prejudice against the truthwhich appears to me to
be the mainthesisof thatwork. I shouldlike to combatthis
prejudice by a simple statementof what it appears to me
thatWisdomor KnowledgemeantforSocrates,or forXenophon, or forthe AthenianmindbeforePlato-whichever it
maybe held thatwe shall reallyhave been discussing.
For I am not going to be highlycritical. It does not
seem to me indeed a dangerous assumptionthat on the
whole the best ideas in the Memorabilia belong substantiallyto Socrates,just as it is easy to see thatthe detailsand
argumentsthroughoutbelong in great measure to Xenophon. Let the views and ideas, of whichI am to speak, be
credited,ifanyonethinksit morecritical,to Xenophon himself. The importantpointis that,as I understand,it is not
suggestedthatXenophon could have borrowedfromPlato.
For the interestis to see how near we get to Plato, not by
reading philosophyinto Xenophon, but by rectifyingthe
currentconceptionof Socrates' simple point of departure.
Perhaps it is not merely Socrates, but the Greek mind
common to Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato, that we are
reallytryingto reEstimate.
I will set out the theoryof so-calledWisdom and Knowledge as I findit in Xenophon withas littlecommentaryas
possible.
Wisdom or Science involvesfromthe earliestGreektimes
1I

have Gomperzparticularlyin mind.

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Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates.

433

what we should call the two sides of theoryand practicein

the closest fusion with one another. When Xenophon's
Socrates begins to defineits nature,we are inclinedto separate these aspects,and to say that some of his tests apply
to theoryor science,and othersto practiceor conduct. But
this is just what I urge thatwe mustnot do. His testsfor
rightpreference,and true
thinking,namely,discrimination,
apply no less to conduct,and the conditions
classification,
for masteryof conduct apply equally to thinking. Unlderstandingthis to be so, and that we are distinguishingthe
two sides of an indivisibleenergy,by which mind deals
with the World, we may say that Xenophon's Socrates or
both
the Socratic Xenophon has distincttests or definitions
applicable to the same energy called Wisdom or Science,
some fromthe theoreticaland some fromthe practicalpoint
of view.
As a masteryof the theoryof anything,knowledgemust
fulfilthe conditionof abilityto expoundor define;or as I
suggest we ought more strictlyto say, as the masteryof
anything,knowledgeor wisdommust fulfilon the one side
the theoreticalconditionof abilityto expound or define.
and the recognizedSocraticconcept,
This gives us definition
and runs us into Dialectic with all its implications,which,
however,belong in partto the practicalside. But again, as
the masteryof anything,knowledge(if it is to be called so)
must fulfilthe conditionthat one must have power to do,
one mustnot make mistakesin action; a conditionwhichis
explainedto demandcontinuedtrainingor ascesis, of which
the elementsare "learning"and "practice" or "rehearsal,"
elementsequally applicable to violin playing and to geometricalreasoning. It is thereforeto be observedthat our
narrowtermsKnowleldgeor Wisdom,thoughtheyare current renderingsof the Greek noun in question,are really
unfittedto be the subject of the predicatesthus developed,
which apply equally and alike to what we call knowledge
and to creative action or conduct. The craftsman'sor
artist'sinfalliblemind, eye, and hand are, I imagine, the
original conditions of the conceptionwith which we are

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434

InternationalJournal of Ethics.

dealing,and even"skill,"or,as I prefer,"mastery"-themind

of the master-would reallygive us a fartruerpoint of departurethandoes our own depreciatedterminology-depreciated not by so-called "intellectual"idealism,but by the
views of cognition which have accompanied empiricism.
This trainingor ascesis, whichgives the power to do, and
in act, the preferencethat never misses
involvesinfallibility
the right,and is testedby "right"or "fine"dealingwhether
with situationsor with arguments,impliesfurtherthe care
of one's self,thenotlettingone's selfrundown,likean athlete
gettingout of training,the not being ignorantof one's self,
but continuouslyattendingto one's powers and theirapplication. Thus, too, wisdomor masteryis one withtemperance and continence,and is incompatiblewithwant of selfcontrol,though this perhaps is compatiblewith a certain
transientperceptionof the good, unconfirmedwe are to
suppose by studyand by training.
And thus completedKnowledgeor Masteryis possession
told
ofthe art or craftof "living." This we are emphatically
-we are pointedto the science,the trainedskill or profeswhose object matter,on one side (i), is
sional infallibility,
"living." And thisto beginwith,as the reactionof the individual masteryor capacityto a test at once theoreticaland
practical,consists in the power and habit of "dialectic."
Dialectic involves,as throughoutGreek philosophy,the inof good and
and the discrimination
of friends,
tercommunion
bad things. Intercommunionof friends,we may observe,
is itselfa formof ascesis or practicaltraining,showinghow
inseparableare the sides of the conceptionwe are analyzing.
And, on the otherhand,seriousstudyof the most important
thingsin lifeis what Socrates' man of masterypossesses,by
contrastwiththe man of no mastery,the incontinent. The
latterdoes not and the formerdoes studyor pay attention
to "the most importantthings." I confessthatbeforethis
simpleand fundamentalexpressionof what wisdomor mastery connoted in the Socratic circle, the controversiesof
and pragmatismseem to me extremelytrivial
intellectualism
and shadowy. With this discriminationof good and bad

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Xenophon'sMemorabiliaof Socrates.

435

thingswe may compare Herodotus' briefsummaryof the

speechofThemistoclesbeforeSalamis. "Now his argument
was a reviewand a contrastof the betterand the worse in
all that is possible for man's nature and situation;and of
these having exhorted them in every case to choose the
better,he toldthemto go on board theirships." The nature
of theobjectmatterofthismasteryand discrimination,
above
designatedby the simpleverb "to live," is oftenset out at
greater length. For example, "All learningwherebyone
may cause to live well a household or a city-stateand may
deal rightlywithhumanaffairs";and in everythingit confersthe power-not as I understand,the chance or liberty
or potentialitybut the positive ability-of the disciplined
mindto choose therightand abstainfromthewrong. Thus,
in general,wisdom,knowledge,or masteryis the attribute
by which all splendidand profitablethings are done, and
moralityis includedamong these.
I interpolatethat the distinction,sometimesinsistedon
in laterthought,betweenthe craftsman's
abilityas a capacity
ofalternatives,
and moraldispositionas habituatedin a single
direction,was not stronglypresentto Xenophon's Socrates.
"'So muchthe worse forhis theory,"it maybe replied. "It
is just thisneglectby whichhe omits,fromthe comparison
of wisdomand virtue,the essentialfeatureof the one-sided
moralchoice." But it mustbe rememberedthatwe are certainlyfalsifying
the factsif we makethisdistinction
absolute,
as, also, perhaps,if we maintaina complete
identification
in
principle. It seems clear to me thatthe craftsman'sability
is not reallya bare capacityof alternatives,
and the instances
whichwe are apt to allege confusethe issue. If the doctor
can poison as skilfullyas he can cure, even this would not
mean thathe can whollylay his habitualart aside-the contrastto prove thisshouldbe betweenskilland want of skill,
not between different
applicationsof his usual skill,which
presupposeits retention. There is here no capacityof opposites so far as the employmentof the art is concerned.
If, however,such an argumentwere taken to mean that to
help and to injurewere to the physician,as such,indifferent

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436

Journalof Ethics.
International

ends, and if we at the same time were to definehis art as

the art of healing,thenno doubtit would be shown,on conditionour illustrationstood, thatthe craftsman'sabilitycan
dissociate itselffromhis habit in a way whichwould be a
bad model to take for the theoryof morals. But surely,
if we thus appeal to the whole scope of the art of healing,
we lie open to the answer thatthe factsare otherwise,and
the physician,thus understoodin his full connotation,has
not the alleged moralversatility. The art,as we learn from
Plato, is a whole,and involvesas its end a conceptionof the
good of its object. The instinctof the healer is as normal
to the physicianas his skill,and I believeit to be absolutely
beyondquestionthatin everyart and craftthe possessor is
in some degree moralizedby its possession. Its difference
fromwhatwe call moralityis merelythatof partfromwhole.
It may in certaincases be foundcapable of being subordinated to bad aims, because there lie outside it unmoralized
regions of the man's naturewhichplay theirpart in a total
decisionof the will. But so faras it goes it is of the nature
of a moralhabit,and the idealizationof it by the Xenophontic Socratesis at least as true to humannatureas the later
attemptto relegateit to a lower level.
I repeat,then-wisdom or masteryis the qualityby which
all splendidand profitablethingsare done, and moralityis
counted among these. Wisdom is a masterlydealing with
lifeand theimportantthings. Its mainapplications,objects,
and effectsare firstsuch as happiness,welfare,or well-being,
distinguishedfromgood fortuneby the essentialcondition
ofwisdom,viz.,studyand practice;next the "royal" or "sovereign"art,the art of producinghappinessforcommunities,
whichsubsequentlyfiguressol splendidlyin Plato. and Aristotle as the architectonicart of life-further,Dialectic as
of good and evil; finallythe"good" par
the discrimination
excellence-theadvantageous as such-the organizationor
to the inclusive
totality
whichraisesrelativeadvantageousness
or positive advantageousnesswhich is one with the end.
For thisis really,I think,the relationof the partial,external,
whole
ambiguous,or relativegood to the singleself-sufficing

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Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates.

437

or balance of life,whichis true satisfactionand involvesthe

end ofliving. This contrastbetweenrelativeand positivenot to say absolute-good is hardly,I think,admittedas a
rule to be presentin the Memorabilia,and the reiterated
of particularor externalgoods
argumentfromthe relativity
is set down as a mere negativecriticism,implyingthat for
Socrates there was no good beyond "the conducive" as a
means to partial ends, which a change of circumstances
mightof course turnto evil. It seems to me that this is
a failureof identification.The argumentin question,which
infersthatall particularends and meansare capable of being
not-goodequallyas of being good, is surelyjust the familiar
doctrineof Plato (or Aristotle)thatall particulargoods are
relative,liableto turnto evil,and not stablenor self-sufficing,
whilethe true good alone can containits own context,that
thatis to say,can possess the
is, be positiveor self-sufficing;
whole. Socrates' contentionis
characterofa self-subsistent
just the familiarintroductionto this argument. All particular goods are "ambiguous." Even happiness, if you
misconstrueit as an aggregateof"ambiguous"goods, "health,
wealth,strength,glory,"and the like,is itselfan ambiguous
of this nature are
good. It is plain that misconstructions
meantto be opposed throughoutSocrates' discussionto the
unityand masteryinvolvedin wisdom or the professional
science of life. The broken conversationswhich insist on
the mere relativityof good, as, the conduciveor expedient
forthe individual,are plainly,to my reading,argumentsof
which the conclusion is omitted; their conclusion being
obvious fromthe whole spiritand tone of the conversations,
as importing
that,in wisdomand mastery,absoluterelativity
or the unambiguousand self-sufficing
good or happinessis
presentedas theonlycompleteand adequate end. The depth
of Socrates' insightintothe antithesisthusinvolvedbetween
the point of view of characterand the point of view of circumstance-the mainprincipleof the unambiguousand ambiguous goods respectively-is illustratedby the fact that
he actuallypointsout thedistinction
and connectionofwhich
modern statisticiansshow but a feeble grasp, between

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InternationalJournal of Ethics.

primaryand secondarypoverty. The jesting proposal, in

determiningfor social purposes the meaning of the term
poor, to rank extravagantmonarchsbelow the povertyline
and good managersof smallincomesabove it, shows an appreciationof the unimportanceof income as comparedwith
characterwhichwould throwquite a new lighton our most
notoriousrecentstatisticsof poverty. Plato, of course, is
sensitiveenoughto the wretchednessof the ideal tyrant;but
the particulardeductionwhichSocrates so shrewdlymakes
in applyingthe principleof the relativityof povertyto the
problem of social classification,I hardly know if we find
again eitherin Plato or in Aristotle. That no sharp line
can be drawnbetweenrich or poor is reallya social factof
the very firsttruthand importance. There can be little
doubt, I think,that the conceptionof the effective,
unambiguous, and self-sufficing
good was present,as involving
the power of characterover circumstance,to the mind of
whoever wrote or talked in this strain. Finally and definitely,in contrast with ignorance, the object matter of
wisdomappearsto consistin the beautiful,the good, and the
just. Its masteryof "the importantthings" of life,that is
to say,gives it a contentwhichis mainlyethical,but perhaps
rathermore trulydefinedthan the contentof Ethics in the
modernsense.
So farwe have been dealing withone side of the object
matterof the mastery,skill, or knowledgewhich we may
call the science of life, understandingthat science is for
Socratesrequiredto answerat everymomentto practicalas
well as to theoreticaltests. It is, we have said, the architectonicscience,the scienceby whichwe knowand practice
"to live," to deal successfullywithall situations,and to set
before us self-sufficing
ends adequate to this organization
of life.
But our ethicalaspirations,trainedupon Kantianism,are
hardly satisfiedwith so "objective" an account, much as
it really involves of the good will, of characteras opposed to circumstance,
and of the adequate conceptionof
the self.

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Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates.

439

Let us turn to what Xenophon has to tell us of the

relationof Wisdom or masteryto the Perfectionof the
Self.
It is indeed (2) a commonplacethatthe selfwas the object
of Socratic science. Our only questionis in what formthe
problemwas raisedand considered.
To knowone'sself,then,is primarily
to attendto one'sselfboth in body and in mind; to care for one's self or keep in
training,notto let one's selfrundown-the phraseis applied
to men who, like Alcibiades,deterioratedin characterafter
partingcompanywith Socrates. More particularly
one is to
know-to consider-what good there is in one for human
service;and thewholeconception
of trainingor discipline,
with
its components
of learningand rehearsalor practice,appliesto
the masteryof the selfas to masteryof life.
This metaphorof the athleteand his trainingis one of the
great spiritualmetaphorsof the westernworld. We know
it in Plato's champions-the Knights of the Spirit in the
Commonwealth-who are athletes,competitors,prize winners in the greatestof all contests;whose carnal weapon is
but a type of theirspiritualwatch and ward. We know it
again in the New Testament: "Now theydo it to obtain a
corruptiblecrown,but we an incorruptible." "We wrestle
not withfleshand blood, but withprincipalities-withspiritual wickednessin high places." And last and best of all,
forthose who delightto recognizethe meetingof extremes
in the spiritualworld,the same idea has been impressedupon
us all fromboyhood in the figureof Mr. Greatheartof the
Pilgrim'sProgress. This, then,was Socrates' primaryview
of Wisdom and Mastery in relation to the Self. If men
would take care of themselves-attend to themselvesSocrates seems to have insisted,in the simple,directGreek
phraseswhichto mymindare so extraordinarily
impressive,
there was hope that they might turn out good. "Those
have lived best who have best given attentionto becoming
perfect." And distinctas is the note of disciplineand selfcultureand attentionto the aim of goodness, we have yet
no individualism,
ifindividualism
means separationfromthe

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InternationalJournal of Ethics.

commonlife. The warning,"Do not be uncriticalof yourself,"goes hand in hand, in a remarkableparallelism,with

the exhortation,"Do not neglectthe service of your commonwealth."
And so we have here the distinctbasis of perhaps the
greatestthoughtin Greek Philosophy,the thoughtwhich
connectsthe intercourseof souls in friendshipat once with
the attainmentoftruthin discussionand withthe realization
ofthehighestlife. It is reportedto us in simpleand prosaic
words;the "becomingbetter"is constantlyviewedas a social
activity;we have seen thatascesis itselfhas intercoursewith
the good for one of its forms. And we naturallyconnect
with this the well-knownaccount, already referredto, of
the meaningwhichin Socrates' circleattacheditselfto the
term"dialectic." On the one hand it was spiritual"discernment"-the discrimination
of "the most importantthingsin
life,"steadyattentionto whichis the markand conditionof
the attainmentof self-mastery.On the other hand it was
"conversation,"the meetingtogetherto take counsel, an
activitycharacteristicof the bettermind,and all-important
forthe promotionof the!bettermind.
In appreciatingSlocrates'idea of the self,we must bear
in mindthathis attentionhad been caughtby the natureof
the invisible. He is aware of thegeneralfactsof symbolism,
and notes thatmind,itselfinvisible,is somethingwhichbecomes real for us in the look and action of the body. As
a firstcontributionalike to the theoryof expressionin art,
and to the analysis of what Hegel would call "the actual
soul," his ideas on this point are significant. And further,
he is aware of soul or mind not only as itselfinvisible,but
as a link with the invisibleworld, and a testimonyto its
value. "Do not despise the invisible,"Xenophon makes
him say, with naive earnestness. The mind,invisibleas it
is, is our bosom's lord,our monarch. I do not know ifwe
have an earlier expressionin Greek thoughtfor the conceptionof the royalor sovereignreason,whichwas to be so
fatefulin Platonic and laterphilosophy;again surelyone of
the great metaphorsof the world. And it is to be remem-

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Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates.

44I

bered that this link with the invisible,this sovereigntyof

mind,does not stop at itself. Here, as withPlato, the kinship of the whole invisibleworld has attractedthe thinker's
attention;and we are pointedfromthe soul to the worship
of the gods, and broughtback again fromthe gods to the
law of our State, which is the sanctionedand wholesome
link betweenthe deityand;ourselves. We seem in this to
catch the voice of Plato when he tells us thatmattersof religion are best settledby the Delphic oracle,to whose sanction it was thatSocrates appealed, or whenagain he warned
the worldthatthe establishment
of a religiousserviceis no
trivialmatter,and should not be leftopen to the personal
capriceofwomenand invalids. There is somethingstrange,
of course, in readingthe reiterationof Xenophon's strong
impressionthatthe City'suse and wontwas the guide which
Socrates recommendedin religiousmatters. We recall the
non-natural
warning,the privaterelationto God, whichwas
part at least of the innovationthatdrewhostilityupon Socrates. I could fancythat I detect,throughoutXenophon's
jottings,the note so commonwithgreat reformers,
"I come
not to destroybut to fulfil,"with its undertone,"you have
not the rightto claim the new privilege;for you have not
exhaustedthe old formula." The non-naturalsign, Socrates
is always desirousto impressupon us, is not a thingthat is
likelyto happen to anyoneelse.
The sayingthatthe body is to be trainedas a servantto
the mind,the root of Plato's applicationof gymnastics,is
given to Prodicus,but to Prodicus as repeatedby Socrates.
It is indeed a thoughtwhich followsin a completerform
fromthe whole of Socrates' conceptionof training;for in
the apologue of Prodicus it is mainlya directionfor the
attainmentof success in bodily tasks, though,especiallyin
this connection,a veryshrewdpiece of advice.
With thisside of wisdomor mastery,thecare of one's self,
the aspirationto betterlife,the sovereigntyof mind,we may
connectthe strikingapplicationof the notion of "slave" to
the man who findshimselfdevoid of the principleof "mastery." Especially "slavery"is the term for the conviction

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InternationalJournal of Ethics.

ofsin-we can call it no less-produced in a mannot without

promiseand good meaning,and havinggreat possessionsin
the way of books and study,by the dialectic of Socrates.
"He went away grieved, and despising himself,and convincedthatin good truthhe was a slave." "He went away
grieved,forhe had great possessions." In both cases, the
possessions were inadequate to the spiritualneed. Is it
possiblenot to recognizehere,as so oftenin the shrewdand
simple home-truthsof Greek thought,the logical framework and substantiveanticipationof the more intenseand
passionateutteranceofthe New Testament? Justso, surely,
we have the logical frameworkof the storyof the Temptation in the legend of how Crcesusthe rich claimed admiration fromSolon the wise for the contentsof his treasure
houses, and how the admirationwas refused.
We have had already the metaphorof the athlete and
asceticof the spirituallife,and the metaphorof the royalty
of reason; have we not herethe thirdof the great metaphors
which in all subsequent ages have appealed to the higher
of man? Man is born for freedom,says
self-consciousness
Rousseau; to renounce one's freedomis to renounce the
to repudiateeven its duties. Freedom
qualityof humanity,
is to think,says Hegel; he who rejectsthinkingand speaks
of freedomknows not what he says. To think,I suppose,
is to break down barriers,to exhibitthis and the other as
to let the mindfeel itself
a unityin spite of theirdifference,
in the world, and remodel the world as an unobstructed
expressionof the mind. This is why thinkingis freedom,
and whythe instinctofages has followedSocrates in holding
that essentiallyand in principleto be reasonable is to be
free,and be irrationalis to be a slave.
By what right,it maybe asked in conclusion,does Xenophon or his master,whicheverit may have been, couple the
science and methodof lifewiththe science and method of
ethical perfection? The answer lies close at hand in the
very meaningfor a Greek of such words as life and goodness; and we hardlyneed Plato to drawit out forus, and to
exhibitthe mindas the centreand focus of all things,such

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Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates.

443

that contradictions
in our environment
are also of necessity
contradictions
withinourselves.
I supposeit mightverynaturallybe said thatI have merely
taken commonplacesout of Platonic or later thought,and
read them into Xenophon by help of the common Greek
phrases and notions through which Greek Philosophy is
intimatelyrooted in the every-daymindand life of Greece.
And I submit,if that were all, the process is still not altogether withoutits interest. If we were reading Plutarch,
indeed, it would be of less importance,because then we
should be dealingwiththe debrisof the great systems,and
the only questionwould be how muchthe Greek language,
and the popular philosopheravailinghimselfof it, had succeeded in preserving. But here, as I understand,we are
beforethe great writtensystems,and thingswhichbecame
commonplacesafterthem are of considerableinterestand
value when hintedbeforethemwithany degree of definiteness, whetherowing to Socrates himselfor to Xenophon's
shrewdnessand the high level of Athenianculturein general; or not improbably,in part to Socrates, and in part to
that extraordinaryinspirationby which even average disciples seem to push forwardfromthe position bequeathed
themby theirmaster. Greatideas almostapplythemselves,
and verylikelymuchof Xenophon's suggestivenesswas due
to a communication
of the Socraticfermentof whichXenophon himselfcould not have told the origin. At any rate,
I have made myprotest,and triedto show thatthe Memorabilia deservesbettertreatmentthan of late it has received,
and that the connectionof virtue with knowledge,so far
frombeing an obsoleteplatitude,means somethingto which
our age is blind because thoughtand knowledgehave lost
for us the depth and sting of meaningwhich they had for
Xenophon's Socrates.
BERNARD BOSANQUET.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

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