100 Phil.

683

[ G.R. Nos. L-10360 and L-10433, January 17, 1957 ]

JULIANO A. ALBA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING VICE MAYOR
OF ROXAS CITY, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JOSE D.
EVANGELISTA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CAPIZ AND VIVENCIO C. ALAJAR, RESPONDENTS. VIVENCIO
C. ALAJAR, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. JULIANA A.
ALBA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
FELIX, J.:
On January 1, 1964, the President of the Philippines appointed
Vivencio Alajar as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas (Annex D). He
took his oath and assumed office on January 6, 1954; on March 31
of that year, his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment (Annex D-1) and he continued holding office until
November, 1955, when he received a communication from
Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema informing him that
the President had designated. Juliano Alba in his stead as Acting
Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas and requesting him to turn over his
said office to Mr. Alba effective immediately. This communication
wherein the President directed the writer thereof to convey to Mr.
Alajar his appreciation for the invaluable services he had rendered
as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas (Annex C), was confirmed by a
telegram that Alajar received from the President dated November
23, 1955 (Annex B).
On the other hand, Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro addressed
Juliano A. Alba a communication through the Mayor of the City of
Roxas wherein Alba was informed that the President has designated

him as Acting Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas vice Vivencio Alajar,

and instructed/him to qualify and enter upon the performance of
the office, furnishing the Commissioner of Civil Service with the
copy of his oath (Annex A). On November 19, 1955, Juliano A. Alba
took his oath and assumed office (Annex A-l).
Not satisfied with the action of the President, Vivencio C. Alajar
instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Capiz against Juliano A. Alba (Civil Case No. V-2041), contending:
(a) That he was appointed Vice-Mayor of Roxas City on 1 January
1954 and his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on 31 March 1954 and that on 19 November 1955,
Juliano A. Alba usurped the office of Vice Mayor of Roxas City;
(b) That there existed no vacancy of said office at the time oof the
designation by the President of the Philippines of Juliano A. Alba as
Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City; and (c) That there existed no legal
cause or reason whatsoever for the removal or disqualification of
said Vivencio C. Alajar by the appointment of Juliano Alba by the
President of the Philippines as Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City.
After proper proceedings and hearing, the parties submitted the
case for decision on the only issue of whether the
alleged removal of the petitioner and the designation in his place of
respondent as Vice-Mayor of Roxas Gity was legal or illegal. On this
point, the lower court held; that the petitioner (Vivencio C. Alajar)
was "entitled to remain in office as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas
with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto
until he resigns, dies or is removed for cause. Without costs."
(Decision, Annex C).
From this decision, Juliano A. Alba appealed to Us by filing a notice
of appeal dated February 3, 1956. Four days later, the appeal
notwithstanding, Vivencio Alajar filed a petition (Annex D) praying
for immediate execution of the judgment, and despite the strong
opposition of appellant, the motion was granted by the Court on

February 18, 1956 (Annex E), based on the special reasons

adduced by the petitioner and
"Moreover, to uphold the supremacy of the law and constitution,
which is the supreme and fundamental authority, pertinent
provisions of which are involved in this case, and considering that
the immediate and positive effect of the motion, if the same is
denied, is to prolong the status of illegality of the appointment of
the second appointee and present incumbent to the position of
Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas and the question of who is entitled
to occupy the same and to exercise the public function of the office
which affects public interest and public service, this Court, if it is to
be consistent with its pronouncement, conclusion or judgment, as it
should be, is constrained to grant said motion."
The decision, however, was not executed because the herein
petitioner, Juliano A Alba, brought the matter up to this Superiority
praying:
(1) That pending the determination of the validity of the order of
immediate execution, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued,
upon previous filing of the bond fixed by this Honorable Court by
the herein petitioner, restraining the herein respondent Vivencio C.
Alajar from discharging the duties and functions of the Vice-Mayor
of Roxas City in order that the herein petitioner shall continue
unmolested as acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City until the final
determination of the question of the validity of the order for the
immediate execution of the decision of the trial court; (2) That after
hearing, judgment be rendered declaring null and void the order of
respondent, Hon. Jose D. Evangelista, dated 18 February 1956 for
the immediate execution of his decision in the Quo Warranto Case
(Alajar vs. Alba) on the ground that the same was improperly issued
as there existed no good reason for its issuance as contemplated
and provided by Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. (3) For
such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
In this instance, the Solicitor General requested permission to
intervene in the certiorari case (G. R. No. L-10360), alleging that
the order of immediate execution issued by the trial judge deprived

him of the opportunity to be heard and defend the constitutionality

of Republic Act No. 603 in the lower court and he desires to be
heard by this Court before We proceed to determine the
constitutionality of section of Republic Act No. 603 by the
affirmative vote of 8 Justices thereof (section 23, Rule 3 of the Rules
of CourtI Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1953 ed., p.
111). The stand of the Solicitor General is that said section, 8 is
constitutional (Article VI, section 1 and Article XII, section 1 of the
Constitution of the Philippines; Jover vs. Borra, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765
and enactments of Congress subsequent to the case of
Santos vs. Mallare, 48 Off. Gaz., 1793, etc, decclaring certain
position to be terminable at the pleasure of the appointing
authoritysection 2545 Revised Administrative Code;
Commonwealth Act Nos. 39, 51, 520, 547 and 592; Republic Acts
Nos. 162, 170, as amended; 179, as amended; 183, 288, as
amended; 305, 306, 327, 328, 521, 523, 525, as amended; 537,
and 603) The motion for intervention of the Solicitor General was
granted by this Court.
In the meanwhile, the appeal of Juliano A. Alba in said case V-2041,
was given due course and reached this Court. In this Instance the
parties have already filed their respective briefs and the case was
submitted for decision at the hearing held on August 3, 1956.
Appellant's counsel maintains that the trial Court erred:
1. In predicating its decision on the mistaken
assumption that the petitioner-appellee belongs to
the unclassified civil service, an assumption which
begs the very issue; whether the vice-mayor of Roxas
City belongs to the unclassified service as claimed by
the petitioner-appellee;
2. In not declaring without the necesity of making a
pronouncement of its validity, that section 8 of
Republic Act 603 was precisely intended by the
Congress to exclude the office of vice-mayor of Roxas

City from persons belonging to the unclassified

service under section 671 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended;
3. In not declaring that in the case of Jover vs. Borra (49
Off. Gaz., 2767) the Supreme Court passed upon the
validity of section 8 of Republic Act No. 603;
4. In holding that the office of vice-mayor of Roxas City
is neither primarily confidential nor policydetermining, and
5. In not holding that section 8 of Republic Act No. 603
is a valid exercise of the broad legislative powers
vested in the Congress of the Philippines by our
Constitution.
As the petition for certiorari was admitted and given due course by
this Court and the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was
issued, We shall confine ourselves to the statement that appeal
from a decision of the Court of First Instance in quo
warranto proceedings is perfected by the mere presentation of the
notice of appeal (sections 16 and 17, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court),
and from that moment "the trial court losses its jurisdiction over
the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation
of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal, and to approve compromises offered by the
parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal (which is not
required in cases of quo warranto) to the appellate court" (section
9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). Hence, in the case at bar, the trial
court had no jurisdiction to provide for the issuance of the writ for
the advance execution of its judgment, as it did by order of
February 18, 1956 (Annex E). Consequently, We have to declare
that said order is null and void and of no force and effect and to
make permanent the writ of preliminary injunction iVe have issued
at the instance of the herein petitioner.

We will now consider the merits of respondent's appeal in case G.

R. No. L-10433. The solution of the controversy hinges on the main
question at issue, which may be propounded as follows:
"Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 creating1 the City of Boxaa
provides that the Vice-Mayor shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments and shall hold office at the pleasure of the President.
In view of this provision of the law, could the President of the
Philippines legally replace respondent Vivencio C Alajar, with or
without cause, by petitioner Juliano A. Alba?"
Vivencio C. Alajar and judge Jose D. Evangelista maintain of course
the negative side alleging that in the case of De Ios Santos vs.
Mallare, 48 Off. Gaz., 1791, a similar provision of the Administrative
Code which prescribes:
"SEC. 2545. Appointment of City Officials.The President of the
Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor,
the vice-mayor * * * and he may REMOVE at pleasure any cf the
said officers * * * ",
has been declared incompatible with the constitutional inhibition
that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law", because the two
provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable. In
express terms, one permits what the other in similar manner
prohibits. And the Supreme Court then said "that the particular
provisions of law (section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code)
which gives the Chief Executive power to remove an officer at
pleasure (though not unconstitutional) have been repealed by the
Constitution and ceased to be operative from the time the latter
went into effect."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General in his reply memorandum
considers the matter from a different angle. The views expressed

by him therein refer to the tenure of office of public officials. We

quote from said memorandum the following:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign function.of
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
The individual so invested is a public officer" (7Mechem, Public
Officers, section 1).
"The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or
during good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in
his office, of which Congress could not deprive him. The question is
not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that
there was no such interest or right (Grenshaw vs. United States,
134, U. S. 99, 104).
*******
"Admittedly, the act of Congress in creating a public office, defining
its powers, functions and fixing the "term" or the period during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the
"tenure" or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power
(Article VI, section 1, Constitution of the Philippines; Jover vs. Borra,
G. R. No. L-6782, July 25, 1953; Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12;
Francia vs. Pecson and Subido, 47 Off. Gar., 12 Supp. p. 296). In the
exercise of that power, Congress enacted Republic-Act No. 603 on
April 11, 1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among
others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during
which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the
President (section 8, article II, Republic Act No. 603).
"In Jover vs. Borra, supra, this Court through Mr. Justice Padilla, held
that;
'The legislative intent to provide for a fixed period of office tenure
for the Mayor of the City of Iloilo and not to make him removable at

the pleasure of the appointing authority may be inferred from the

fact that whereas the appointment of the Vice-Mayor of the same
city, as provided for in an amendatory act (Republic Act No. 365),
and those of the Mayors and Vice-Mayors of other cities (section
2545, Rev. Adm. Code; Commonwealth Acts Nos. 39, 51, 338, 520,
547 and 592; Republic Acts Nos. 162, 170, as amended, 179, as
amended; 183, 288, as amended; 305, 306, 327, 328, 521, 523,
525, as amended; 537 and 603) are at pleasure, that of the Mayor
of the City of Iloilo is for a fixed period of time, as provided for in
the original charter (Commonwealth Act No. 57), and in this
continued unchanged despite subsequent amendatory acts
(Commonwealth Act No. 158; Republic Act Nos. 276 and 365). "So,
the logical inference from the above quoted excerpt of the decision
of this Court promulgated long after the decision rendered in the
case of De los Santos vs. Mallare, supra, is that Congress can
legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials
dependent upon the pleasure of the President.
*******
"The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they
insist on the act of the President in designating petitioner Alba in
the place of respondent Alajar as one of removal. The replacement
of respondent Alajar is not removal, but an expiration of its tenure,
which is one of the ordinary modes of terminating official relations.
On this score, section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code
which was declared inoperative in the Santos vs. Mallare case, is
different from section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, Section 2545 refers
to removal at pleasure while section 8 of Republic Act No. 603
refers to holding office at the pleasure of the President.
"Clearly, what is involved here is not the question of removal, or
whether legal cause should precede or not that removal. What is
involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure of such
office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the
pleasure of the President.
"The cases relied upon by respondents are, therefore, inopposite to

the instant proceedings. For all of them relate to removal of officials

in violation of laws which prescribe fixity of term.
"Even assuming for the moment that the act of replacing Alajar
constitutes removal, the act itself is valid and lawful, for under
section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no fixity of tenure has been
provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised
in accordance with the policy laid down by Congress therein.
"Thus, in Lacson vs. Roque (49 Off. Gaz., 93, 101-102), this Court
made clear that:
'The most liberal view that can be taken of the power of the
President to remove the Mayor of the City of Manila is that it must
be for cause. Even those who would uphold the legality of the
Mayor's, suspension do not go so far as to claim power in the Chief
Executive to remove or suspend the Mayor at
pleasure. Untramelled discretionary power to remove does not
apply to appointed officers whose term of office is definite, much
less elective officers. As has been pointedly stated: "Fixity of
tenure destroys the power of removal at pleasure otherwise
incident to the appointing power; the reason of this rule is the
evident repugnance between the fixed term and the power of
arbitrary removal. * * *
'An inferential authority to remove at pleasure cannot be declared,
since the existence of a defined term, ipso facto, negatives such
an inference, and implies a contrary presumption, i.e.,that the
incumbent shall hold office to the end of his term subject to
removal for cause'. (State ex rel. Gallaghar vs. Brown, 57 Mo. Ap.,
302, expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. vs.
Maroney, 191 Mo., 548; etc.)
'It is only in those cases in which the held at the pleasure of the
appointing power and where the power of removal is exercisable at
its mere discretion, that the officer may be removed without notice
or hearing.'"

"Thus, in Jover vs. Borra, supra, the same rule was reiterated:
'The legislative intent to provide for a fixed period of office tenure
for the Mayor of the City of Iloilo and not to make him removable at
the pleasure of the appointing authority may be inferred from the
fact that whereas the appointment of the Vice-Mayor of the same
city, as provided for in an amendatory act (Republic Act No. 365),
and those of the Mayors and Vice-Mayors of other cities (section
2545, Revised Administrative Code; Commonwealth Acts Nos. 39,
51 338, 520, 547 and 592; Republic Acts Nos. 162; 170, as
amended; 179, as amended; 183, 288, as amended; 305; 306; 327;
328; 521; 523; 525, as amended; 537; and 603) are at pleasure,
that of the Mayor of the City of Iloilo is for a fixed period of time, as
provided for in the original charter (Commonwealth Act No. 57),
and this continued unchanged despite subsequent amendatory acts
(Commonwealth Act No. 153; Republic Acts Nos. 276 and 365).'
"It is an established rule that when the law authorizes a superior
officer to remove a subordinate at pleasure his discretion in the
exercise of the power of removal is absolute. As long as the
removal is effected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law, it may not be declared invalid by the courts, no matter how
reprehensible and unjust the motives of the removal might be
(State vs. Kennelly, 55 Atl. 555).
"For respondent judge to ignore these judicial doctrines brought to
his attention by petitioner Alba even during the quo warranto
proceedings and in the face of their impressive clarity to rashly
resolve his doubt against the constitutionality of section 8 of
Republic Act No. 603 is to exert his discretion with the greatest
measure of abuse as to amount to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos,
vs. Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz., 830).
'After all the foregoing circumstances are found to be present, it
must be shown that the statute violates the constitution dearly,
palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt or
hesitation in the mind of the court (Sharpless vs. Mayer, 21 Pa.

147).; The court presumes that every statute is valid. This

presumption is based upon the theory of separation of powers
which makes the enactment and repeal of laws exclusively a
legislative function. As Chief Justice Marshall said: "It is but a
decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism
of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in
favor of its validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved
beyond all reasonable doubt." (Darmouth College vs. Woodward, 4
Wheat, 625.)
"It should be remembered in this connection that before a
legislature passes.a bill, it is presumed that it has decided the
measure to be constitutional; and when the executive approves
that bill it is also presumed that he has been convinced of its
validity. Under these conditions, therefore, if a statute is reasonably
susceptible of two interpretations, one making it unconstitutional
and other valid, it is the duty of the court to adopt the second
construction in order to save the measure. (U. S. vs. Delaware &
Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366.) Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 10 ed.,
pp. 525-526; Italics supplied.'"
We certainly agree with the foregoing views of the Solicitor General
because they constitute a clear and fair exposition of the law on
the matter. Anyway, the provision of Section 8 of Republic Act No.
603 empowering the President of the Philippines to appoint, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the Vice-Mayor of
Roxas City, the latter to hold office at the pleasure of the President,
can not by any stretch of imagination, be considered
unconstitutional and void.
Wherefore, on the strength of the foregoing considerations, and
upon declaring the order of the Court of February 18, 1956 (Annex
E) null and void and of no effect and upon making permanent the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court in the present
case, We hereby dismiss the quo warranto proceedings, for
respondent Vivencio C. Alajar has no right to continue occupying

the office of Vice-Mayor of Roxas City after the President of the

Philippines, in the exercise of his power of allowing said respondent
to hold office, at his pleasure, displaced him from said office and
designated petitioner Juliano A. Alba as Acfing Vice-Mayor of said
City. Costs in both cases are taxed against Vivencio C. Alajar.
Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B.
L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING Concepcion, J.:

The majority opinion quotes, with approval, from the memorandum
of the Solicitor General, who states, among other things, "* * * that
Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of
certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President"; that
"the replacement of respondent Alajar is not removal but an
expiration of its tenure, which is one of the ordinary modes of
terminating official relations"; and that "what is involved here is the
creation of an office and the tenure of such office, which has been
made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the President".
(Italics supplied.) I believe that the word "tenure" in the foregoing
expressions should be submitted by "term", for:
"* * * the term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of
the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over.
The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent." Topacio Nueno et
al. vs. Angeles, 76 Phil,, .12, 21-22; italics supplied.)
The distinction between "term" and "tenure" is important, for,
pursuant to the Constitution, "no officer or employee in the Civil

Service may be removed or suspended except for cause, as

provided by law" (Art. XII, section 4), and this fundamental principle
would be defeated if Congress could legally make the tenure of
some officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President, by
clothing the latter with blanket authority to replace a public officer
before the expiration of his term.
In the case at bar, the term of respondent Alajar as Vice-Mayor of
the City of Roxas is not fixed by law. However, the latter, in
effect, vests in the President the power to fix such term. When, in
November, 1955, petitioner Alba was designated as Acting ViceMayor of said City, the term of respondent Alajar was, thereby,
fixed implicitly by the President, in the exercise of his
aforementioned authority. Thus, the term of office of Alajar expired
and his right to hold office was extinguished, with the same legal
effect as if the term had been fixed by Congress itself. In other
words, Alajar was not removed from office, for "to remove an officer
is to oust him from office before the expiration of his term"
(Manalang vs. Quitoriano et aL, 50 Off. Gaz., 2515). Alajar merely
lost the right to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas
by expiration of his term as such.
Subject to the foregoing qualifications, I concur in the opinion
penned by Mr. Justice Felix.
Paras, C. J.,and Montemayor, J.,concur.

130 Phil. 415

[ G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968 ]

JESUS P. MORFE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AMELITO R. MUTUC, AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act[1] to deter public officials and employees from committing acts
of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. It
was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a
public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto."[2] Nor was it the first statute
of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public service
that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war
era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of
any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public
officer or employee.[3]
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within thirty
(30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well
as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare end file with
the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of
the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid
for the next preceding calendar year; * * *."[4]

In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission

"within the month of January of every other year thereafter" of such
sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or
employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption
of office was challenged for being violative of due process as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of
the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the
decision appealed from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a
judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, such requirement
of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is
thus offensive to the due process clause.
We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower
court.
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to
rebut the presumption of validity. For in this action for declaratory
relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on January
31, 1962, plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a
reasonable requirement for employment that a public officer make
of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office and
thereby make it possible thereafter to determine whether, after
assuming his position in the public service, he accumulated assets
grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, (sic) the herein
plaintiff [having] filed within the period of time fixed in the
aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the prescribed sworn
statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities, * *
*,"[5]maintained that the provision on the "periodical filing of sworn
statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities after
an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition, upon
assumption of office, is oppressive and unconstitutional."[6]

As earlier noted, both the protection of due profess and the

assurance of the privacy of the individual as may be inferred from
the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure and selfincrimination were relied upon. There was also the allegation that
the above requirement amounts to "an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity" of public officials, premised as it is "on
the unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that they are "corrupt
at heart" and unless thus restrained by this periodical submission of
the statements of "their financial condition, income, and expenses,
they cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt
practice defined * * *."[7] It was further asserted that there was no
need for such a provision as "the income tax law and the tax
census law also require statements which can serve to determine
whether an officer or employee in this Republic has enriched
himself out of proportion to his reported income."[8]

On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the

pleadings as in his opinion all his material allegations were
admitted. Then on March 10, 1962, an order was issued giving the
parties thirty days within which to submit memoranda, but with or
without them, the case was deemed submitted for decision the
lower court being of the belief that "there is no question of facts, * *
* the defendants [having admitted] all the material allegations of
the complaint."[11]

Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive

Secretary and the then Secretary of Justice as defendants, where
after practically admitting the facts alleged, they denied the
erroneous conclusion of law and as one of the special affirmative
defenses set forth: "1. That when a government official, like
plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily
assumed the obligation to give information about his personal
affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the
time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life * * *." [9] The
answer likewise denied that there was a violation of his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as
unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that "the
provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that
it impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and
liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable
measure of insuring the interest of general welfare in honest and
clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the
police power."[10]

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The

Mayor of Manila,[13] it was the holding of this Court that in the
absence of a factual foundation, the lower court deciding the
matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail." In the present case likewise
there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of this
section of the statute could be based. Hence am noted the
decision of the lower court could be reversed on that ground.

The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower
court declaring " Constitutional, null and void ` Section 7, Republic
Act No. 3019, in so far as it required periodical submittal of sworn
statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official
or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a
sworn statement upon assuming office; * * *."[12]

A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as

likewise made clear in the above Ermita-Malate Hotel case "What
cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind for the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where
the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider."
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration
in the above case, we expressly affirmed: "This is not to discount
the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute, executive

order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to

constitutional rights, especially those involving the freedom of the
mind, present and ominous,"[14] In such an event therefore, "there
should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence
be presented." Also, in the same Resolution Professor Freund was
quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by
law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when
property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands
respect. This duals standard may not precisely reverse the
presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but
obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values with the due process
clause."[15]
2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above
requirement for a periodical submission of sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the
due process clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of
policy[16] and definition of terms[17] there is an enumeration of
corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law. They include
persuading, inducing, or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection
with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself, or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity, has to intervene under the law; requesting or
receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, or other pecuniary
or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for
whom the public officer, in an manner or capacity, has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or

license, in consideration for the help given or to be given; accepting

or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has pending official business with him during
the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination;
causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; neglecting or refusing, after due demand
or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose
of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in
favor of or discriminating against any other interested party;
entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby;
having directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interests; becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal
gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act
requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a
member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if
he votes against the same or does not participate in such action;
approving or granting knowingly any license, permit, privilege or
benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled
to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere
representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled
and divulging valuable information of a confidential character,
acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of
its authorized release date.[18]

After which come the prohibition on private individuals,

[19]
prohibition on certain relatives,[20] and prohibition on Members of
Congress.[21] Then there is this requirement of a statement of assets
and liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission being
challenged here.[22] The other sections of the Act deal with dismissal
due to unexplained wealth, reference being made to the previous
statute,[23] penalties for violation,[24] the vesting of original
jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance as the competent court,
[25]
the prescription of offenses,[26] the prohibition against any
resignation or retirement pending investigation, criminal or
administrative or pending a prosecution,[27] suspension and loss of
benefits,[28] exception of unsolicited gifts or presents of small or
insignificant value as well as recognition of legitimate practice of
one's profession or trade or Occupation,[29] the separability clause,
[30]
and its effectivity.[31]
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of
1960 like the earlier statute[32] was precisely aimed at curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining
a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further
promote morality in public administration. A public office must
indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal
to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then
prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded
such a remedial device.
The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive
in character, sufficiently detailed and explicit to make clear to all
and sundry what practices were prohibited and penalized. More
than that, an effort was made, so evident from even a currency
perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. Our such
feature is the challenged section. Thereby it become much more
difficult, by those disposed to take advantage of their positions to
commit acts of graft and corruption.

While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of

constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear,
categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns,
the statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only question
raised, is that portion of the statute requiring periodical submission
of assets and liabilities, after an officer or employee had preciously
done so upon assuming office, so infected with infirmity that it
cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of
the police power? In the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision,
[33]
there is a reaffirmation off its nature and scope as embracing
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that
inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." [34]
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to
promote the general welfare and public interest;[35] to enact such
laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public
health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of, each
inhabitant;[36] to preserve public order and to prevent offenses
against the state and to establish for the intercourse of citizen with
citizen those rules of good manners and good neighborhood
calculated to prevent conflict of rights.[37] In his work on due
process, Mott[38] stated that the term police power was first used by
Chief Justice Marshall.[39]
As currently in use both in Philippine and American decision then,
police power legislation usually has reference to regulatory
measures restraining either the rights to property or liberty of
private individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its earliest
definitions, valid then as well as now, given by Marshall's
successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope to
curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property of private

individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers of a

State? They are nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law
to punish offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring
certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within
its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to
say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things
within the limits of its domain."[40] Text writers like Cooley and
Burdick were of a similar mind.[41]
What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police
power of the state to promote morality in public service necessarily
limited in scope to officialdom. May a public office claiming to be
adversely affected rely on the due process clause to annul such
statute or any portion thereof? The answer must be in the
affirmative the police power extends to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged
grievance can invoke the protection of due process which permits
deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is
observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is public
office trust and as such not amounting to property in its usual
sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the proposition
that from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by
the Constitution the mantle of protection afforded by due process
could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson v.
Romero,[42] in line with the then pertinent statutory
provisions[43] that procedural due process in the form of an
investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an
opportunity to defend himself must be observed before a civil
service officer or employee may be removed. There was a reaffirmation of the view in even stronger language when this Court
through Justice Tuason Lacson v. Roque,[44]declared that even
without express provision of law, "it is established by the great

weight of authority that the power of removal or suspension for

cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be exercised
without notice and hearing." Such is likewise the import of a
statement from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion,
speaking for the Court in Meneses v. Lacson,[45] "At any rate, the
reinstatement directed in the decision appealed from does not bar
such appropriate administrative action as the behaviour of
petitioners herein may warrant, upon compliance with the
requirements of due process."
To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle
of the security of tenure provision to employees of governmentowned or controlled corporations entrusted with governments
functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano,[46] it
stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of security that
they would hold their office or employment during good behavior
and would not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be
determined in an investigation, where an opportunity to be heard
and defend themselves in person or by counsel is afforded them,
would bring about such a desirable condition." Reference was
there made to promoting honesty and efficiency through an
assurance of stability in their employment relation. It was to be
expected then that through Justice Labrador in Unabia v. City
Mayor,[47] this Court could categorically affirm: "As the removal of
petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void ** *."
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the
applicability of due process guaranty to be forthcoming. It did
in Cammayo v. Via,[48] where the opinion of Justice Endencia for
the Court contained the following unmistakable
language: "Evidently, having these facts in view, it cannot be
pretended that the constitutional provision of due process a law for
the removal of the petitioner has not been complied with."

Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice
J. B. L. Reyes: "We are thus compelled to conclude that the
positions formerly held by appellees were not primarily confidential
in nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the
confidence reposed in them. The inevitable corollary is that
respondents-appellees, Leon Piero, et al., were not subject to
dismissal or removal, except for cause specified by law and with
due process * * *."[49] In a still later decision, Abaya v. Subido,[50] this
Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of the
constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken
by sanctioning cancellation" of an employee's eligibility or "of his
dismissal from service - without hearing - upon a doubtful
assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against
Civil Service rules" Equally emphatic is this observation from the
same case: "A civil service employee should be heard before he is
condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such
unrelenting grasp that by now it would appear trite to make
citations thereof."
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process
may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in that limited sense in analogous to property, could
he not likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to
strike down what he considers to be an infringement of his
liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must
be in the affirmative. Even a public official has certain rights to
freedom the government must respect. To the extent then, that
there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the
due process mandate is not disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and
restraint the exception, the question raised cannot just be brushed
aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi v. Provincial Board,
[51]
liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be

dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of

the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In
accordance with this case therefore, the rights of the citizens to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty, This
Court in the same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as
understood in democracies, is not license. Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater
good, the peace and order of society and the general wellbeing. No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as quoted by
Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it
is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience
of the individual."
The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice
Hughes, liberty in a social organization,[52] implying the absence of
arbitrary restraint not immunity from reasonable regulations and
prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. [53] It was
Linton's view that "to belong to a society is to sacrifice some
measure of individual liberty, no matter how slight the restraints
which the society consciously imposes."[54] The above statement
from Lipton, however, should be understood in the sense that
liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of
general welfare, in other words through the proper exercise of the
police power, may be regulated. The individual though, as
Justice Cardoso pointed out, has still left a "domain of free activity
that cannot be touched by government or law at all, whether the
command is specially against him or generally against him and
others."[55]
Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of
assets and liabilities after he had filed one upon assumption of

office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly

without the challenged provision, a public officer would be free
from such a requirement. To the extent then that there is a
compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot
be denied however that under the Constitution, such a restriction is
allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an
observance of due process. That leads us to an inquiry, into its
significance. "There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and
as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal
infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardoso, must not outrun the bounds of reason and
result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any
official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it
been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings
for justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in
the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is
not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances, decisions based on such a
clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases."[56]
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the
harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-

present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to

condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed on public officials and employees to file such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not
susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.
4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of
liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the
objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to
be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be
a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom."[57] As a matter of fact, this right to be let
alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."[58]
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As Laski so
very, aptly stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing
reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible;
indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which
his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
experience is private, and the will built out that experience
personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he
surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of others, he
ceases to be master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no
longer master of himself is in any real sense free."[59]

Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition

of privacy, specifically that of communication and correspondence
which "shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or when
public safety and order"[60] may otherwise require, and implicitly in
the search and seizure clause,[61] and the liberty of abode,[62] the
alleged repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further
periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
deserves to be further looked into.
In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous
decision having been rendered by this Court. It is not so in the
United States where, in the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut,
[63]
Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court,
stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of solders 'in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that
privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people. "After referring to various American Supreme Court
decisions, [64] Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness
that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a
legitimate one."
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made
the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of
married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional

guarantees."[65] It has wider implications though. The constitutional

right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself, it in fully deserving of constitutional protection. The
language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of
limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate
and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safe guards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the
state can control. Protection of this private sector - protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual - has
become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age - industrialization,
urbanization, and organization - operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."[66]
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the
challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information
which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be
denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses
with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a
public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting
him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and
liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of
income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year,

there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be

a private sphere.
5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that in so far as
the challenged provisions requires the periodical filing of a sworn
statement of financial condition, it would be violative of the
guarantees against unreasonable search end seizure and against
self-incrimination?
His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States,[67] In that
case, petitioner Davis was convicted under an information charging
him with unlawfully having in his possession a number of gasoline
ration coupons representing so many gallons of gasoline, an
offense penalized under a 940 statute.[68] He was convicted both in
the lower court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the
objection that there was an unlawful search which resulted in the
seizure of the coupons and that their use at the trial was in
violation of Supreme Court decisions.[69] In the District Court, there
was a finding that he contented to the search and seizure. The
Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb that finding although
expressed doubt concerning it, affirming however under the view
that such seized coupons were properly introduced in evidence, the
search and seizure being incidental to an arrest, and therefore
reasonable regardless of petitioner's consent.
In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court,
through justices Douglas emphasized that the Court was dealing in
this case "not with private papers or documents, but with gasoline
ration coupons which never became the private property of the
holder but remained at all times the property of the government
and subject to inspection and recall by it."[70] He made it clear that
the opinion was not to be understood as suggesting "that officers
seeking to reclaim government property may proceed lawlessly and
subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the right to
inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general search
of his papers for the purpose of learning whether he has any

coupons subject to inspection and seizure. The nature of the

coupons is important here merely as indicating that the officers did
not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in obtaining
them."[71]
True, there was strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in
which Justice Murphy joined, critical of what it considered "a
process of devitalizing interpretation" which in this particular case
gave approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and
expressing the regret that the Court might be "in danger of
forgetting that the Bill of Rights reflects experience with police
excesses."
Even this opinion however conceded that the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure "does not give
freedom from testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar
qualifications every man is under obligation to give testimony. But
that obligation can be exacted only under judicial sanctions which
are deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely
because there may be the duty to make documents available for
litigation does not mean that police officers may forcibly or
fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be let
alone except under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely
what the Fourth Amendment meant to express and to
safeguard."[72]
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation
that this statutory provision offends against the unreasonable
search and seizure clause would be futile and unavailing. This is
the more so in the light of the latest decision of this Court
in Stonehill v. Diokno.[73] where this Court, through Chief
Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional
requirements must be strictly complied with, and that it would be
"a legal heresy of the highest order to convict anybody of a
violation of certain statutes without reference to any of it its
determinate provisions delimited its scope as "one of the most

fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding

"the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence * * *." Such is precisely the evil sough to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw
the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist by such
requirement of further periodical submission of one's financial
condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much
less licit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-incrimination
clause. According to the Constitution: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against him self."[74] This constitutional
provision gives the accused immunity from any attempt by the
prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him
to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but
only if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only if
he freely chooses to.[75] Or he could remain silent, and the
prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk.[76] Proof is not
solely testimonial in character. It may be documentary. Neither
then could the accused be ordered to write, when what comes from
his pen may constitute evidence of guilt or innocence.[77] Moreover,
there can be no search seizure of his house, papers or effects for
the purpose of locating incriminatory matter. [78]
In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the
guaranty against self-incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to
note what Justice Tuason stated: "What the above inhibition seeks
to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts."[79] Necessarily then, the protection it affords will have to
await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the existence of
actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative."[80] Prior to
such a stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of
the fear sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the non-

incrimination clause. What was said in an American State decision

is of relevance. In that case, a statutory provision requiring any
person operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been
caused a person or property, to stop and give his name, residence,
and his license number to the injured party or to a police officer
was sustained as against the contention that the information thus
exacted may be used as evidence to establish his connection with
the injury and therefore compels him to incriminate himself. As
was stated in the opinion: "If the law which exacts this information
is invalid, because such information, although in itself no evidence
of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the
informant then all police regulations which involve identification
may be questioned on the same ground. We are not aware of any
constitutional provision designed to protect a mans conduct from
judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a
constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to invalidate the
statute to secure its protection. If, in this particular case, the
constitutional privilege justified the refusal to give the information
exacted the statute, that question can be raised in the defense to
the pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called
upon to decide in this proceeding."[81]
6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it
constitutes "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity"
of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to
its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."[82] As expressed by
Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern."[83]There can be no possible objection then to the
observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate
any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply
them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary." [84] For
they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override

legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the

law."[85]
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,[86] that only congressional
power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be
the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to
be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely
allocated the respective authority of each department and confined
its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion
of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If
there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last
offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the
validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962
"declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act.
No. 3019, insofar as it requires periodical submittal of sworn
statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official
or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a
sworn statement * * * is reversed." Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Castro, JJ., in the result.
Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.

230 Phil. 528

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general

applicability"?
EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986 ]

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, ARID
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
JUAN C. TUVERA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees, declaring in the dispostive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect."
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision.[1] Specifically, they ask
the following questions:

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general

applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there
should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not; that publication means complete publication;
and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette.[2]
In the Comment[3] required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed
first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant
that the publication required therein was not always imperative;
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was
concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding.
This elicited a Reply[4] refuting these arguments. Came next the
February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor
General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted
that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under
reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by
eight members of this Court.[5]

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as

follows:
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the
parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it
is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may
in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,
[6]
is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days
from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication
may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall
become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its

existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is

commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures,
like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the
persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person
knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all.
It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, [the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed
instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does
not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of
public interest which any member of the body politic may question
in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts
of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders

promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers

whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by
the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act
which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by,
say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made
in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention
of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree,

its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date

of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which
the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration.[7] The evident purpose was to withhold
rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices
were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette [8] and that
six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
the people were sufficiently informed.[9] One reserved his
vote[10] and another merely acknowledged the need for due
publication without indicating where it should be made. [11] It is
therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to
arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a
binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not
be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that
this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by
existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of
Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it
obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of
a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not
our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved
by the political departments of the government in accordance with

the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to

pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at
least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the
said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties, that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever
reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant
motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over.
This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain
the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or
reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the
acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure

and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article
2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J., concurs, added a few observations in a separate opinion.
Feliciano, J., see separate opinion.

75 Phil. 113

[ G.R. No. L-5.[1], September 17, 1945 ]

CO KIM CHAM (ALIAS CO CHAM), PETITIONER, VS. EUSEBIO
VALDEZ TAN KEH AND ARSENIO P. DIZON, JUDGE OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the
respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were
initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of
these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue
the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation
issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the
effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the Philippines under the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation, and that,
furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of
an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent,
in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that
the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation were not de facto governments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City
of Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief

proclaimed "the Military Administration under martial law over the

districts occupied by the Army." In said proclamation, it was also
provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the
laws now inforce in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and
judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being
as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present
posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administrative organization under the
name of "Philippine Executive Commission" was organized by Order
No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of
the Japanese Forces1 in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who
was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the
immediate coordination of the existing central administrative
organs and of judicial courts, based upon what had existed
theretofore, with the approval of the said Commander in Chief, who
was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central
administrative organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4,
dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the
justices of the peace and municipal courts under the
Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction, in
conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the
Executive Commission by the Commander in Chief of Japanese
Forces in the Philippines in the latter's' Order No. 3 of February 20,
1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine
Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and
judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of
the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall
be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and
customs * * *."
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was
inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby in the

organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned

during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they
administered and enforced.
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte,
General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of
the Philippines which declared:
"1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the
United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control;
"2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding
upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control; and
"3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippine
free of enemy occupation and control."
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and
on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the
Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full
powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the
Commonwealth whose seat is here re-established as provided by
law.
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the
principal questions to be resolved in the present case may be
reduced to the following: (1) Whether the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines

were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino
forces; (2) Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944,
by General Douglas McArthur, Commander in Chief of the United
States Army, in which he declared that all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,
has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of
the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings
have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the
present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same courts
existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military
occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings
pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied
and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is,
whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under
the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United
States and Filipino forces.
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts
and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The
question to be determined is whether or not the governments
established in these Islands under the names of Philippine
Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments.
If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or

government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government
that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the
voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains
itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of
England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by
Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and
maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine,
which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of
Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the
troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an
independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise
in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of
the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the
war of secession. We are not concerned in the present case with
the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de
factogovernments.
Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another
description of government, called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly
denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active
military power within the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that
while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by
private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission
to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
Actual governments of this sort are established over districts
differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually

administered directly by military authority, but they may be

administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less
directly by military force * * *. One example of this sort government
is found in the case of Castine, in Maine, reduced to British
possession in the war of 1812 * * *. U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253).
A like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during the
war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States * * *.
Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary
possession of territory by lawful and regular governments at war
with the country of which the territory so possessed was part.
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description
are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907,
which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of
1899 on the same subject of Military Authority over Hostile
Territory. Article 43 of said Section III provides that "the authority of
the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish
and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."
According to these precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the
belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to
insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he
possesses all the powers of a de facto government, and he can
suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such
changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the
occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that
is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate the social
and commercial life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a
political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among
others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom
of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied,
are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military

occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is

suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily
occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary
tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and the
judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they
accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to
continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or
civil authorities appointed by the Commander in Chief of the
occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all
publicists who have considered the subject, and have been
asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the Presidents of the
United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his
work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in
its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows
directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the
Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority
to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by
which the powers of such government are regulated and limited.
Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws of
war, as established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the
writings of publicists and decisions of courtsin fine, from the law
of nations * * *. The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the
laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, except so far as they are suspended or changed by the
acts of the conqueror * * *. He, nevertheless, has all the powers of
a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones."
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in
an occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said Hague
Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the

Secretary of War of May 19, 1898, relating to the occupation of the

Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the
powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitant,
the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private
rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of
crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended
or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they
are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to
be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they
were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and
the other officials connected with the administration of justice may,
if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to
administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man
under the supervision of the American Commander in Chief."
(Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)
As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of
the United States, in the same case of Thorington vs. Smith, supra,
recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as
a de facto government. In that case, it was held that "the central
government established for the insurgent States differed from the
temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the
circumstance that its authority did not originate in lawful acts of
regular war; but it was not, on that account, less actual or less
supreme. And we think that it must be classed among the
governments of which these are examples * * *."

In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme
Court of the United States, discussing the validity of the acts of the
Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government,
the same general laws for the administration of justice and the

protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to

the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As
far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the
supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens
under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as valid
and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall, 570; 21 Law.
ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not
loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or
the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved,
police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property
protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates
settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated,
precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware
of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in
the insurrectionary States touching these and kindred subjects,
where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of
enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did
not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution'. The same
doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388,
400), held: "That what occurred or was done in respect of such
matters under the authority of the laws of these local de
factogovernments should not be disregarded or held to be
invalid merely because those governments were organized in
hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution; this,
because the existence of war between the United States and the
Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the
insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor
destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or
the regular administration of the laws, and because transactions in
the ordinary course of civil society as organized within the enemy's
territory although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted
the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized to effect
a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except when proved
to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or

insurrection;'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the

respective states composing the so-called Confederate States
should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their
purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National
Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive
Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on
January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a
civil government established by the military forces of occupation
and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not
different from the government established by the British in Castine,
Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says,
"The government established over an enemy's territory during the
military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws
of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all
restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence
whether such government be called a military or civil government.
Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same.
In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and
so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of
the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its
acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive
Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run
by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In
1806, when Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he
retained the existing administration under the general direction of a
French official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the
same way, the Duke of Wellington, on invading France, authorized
the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions,
apparently without appointing an English superior. (Wellington
Despatches, XI, 307.) The Germans, on the other hand, when they
invaded France in 1870, appointed their own officials, at least in
Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of
every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed.,

p. 505, note 2.)

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established
and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other
government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a
government established by the belligerent occupant or the
Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the
Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its
authority was the samethe Japanese military authority and
government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of
October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted,
"under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the
'Republic of the Philippines was established on October 14, 1943,
based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the
sanction of the Government of the United States." Japan had no
legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the
sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent
sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation
and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and
permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other
means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established
doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population
of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power),
that belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not
serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although
the de juregovernment is during the period of occupancy deprived
of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of
Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat.,
246; Flemingvs. Page, 9 Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.
S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a
scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into
believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of
transferring or turning over the rights of government into the hands
of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that by
doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the

neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States
and other allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established
by the free will of the Filipino people who, taking advantage of the
withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the
occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had
organized an independent government under that name with the
support and backing of Japan, such government would have been
considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or
rebellion against the parent state or the United States. And, as
such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that
organized by the confederate states during the war of secession
and recognized as such by the Supreme Court of the United States
in numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith,
Williamsvs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar
to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents
in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized
as ade facto government by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416).
According to the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces
evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first
appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the
Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of
the Island and established a republic, governing the Island until
possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on
February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case
that "such government was of the class of de facto governments
described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, * * * 'called
also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps,
be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force * *
*." That is to say, that the government of a country in possession
of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent
state, rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied
by the hostile army of an enemy at regular war with the legitimate
power.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the

Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments,
which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and,
by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in
international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces
under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to
that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a
territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into
the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty, "does not,
except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an
invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence
to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not
of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent
that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the
various acts done during the same time by private persons under
the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the
whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion;
and as between the state and individuals' the evil would be
scarcely less,it would be hard for example that payment of taxes
made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to
the general interest that sentences passed upon criminals should
be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government."
(Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation
and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war
as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the
occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his
own sovereignty, as the Japanese intended to do apparently in
granting independence to the Philippines and establishing the socalled Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p.
615.)
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de

facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and

remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied, by a
belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by
General Douglas1 MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares
null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the
governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said
proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the
phrase "processes of any other government" as used in the abovequoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23,
1944that is, whether it was the intention of the Commander in
Chief of the American Forces to annul and avoid thereby all
judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may
refer not only to judicial processes, but also to administrative or
legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of
the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the
Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration
the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known
principles of international law all judgments and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de
facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were
good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory
had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be
presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of
General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any
other government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial
processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The
only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to
governmental processes other than judicial processes or court
proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory
construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never

to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible

construction remains."
It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of
occupation, as an agent of his government, may not unlawfully
suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied
territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation
demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of
nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of military
forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been
occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the
restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the
commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and
occupation (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are
evidently less than those of occupation), it is to be presumed that
General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a
representative of the Government and the President of the United
States, constitutional commander in chief of the United States
Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of
nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from
the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the
United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of
1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of
October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines full
respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, should not only reverse the international policy
and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same
breath the provisions of section 3, Article II, of our Constitution,
which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."
Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and
public hardship would result, and great public interests would be
endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged

would have to be again settled, accrued or vested rights nullified,

sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily
become immune for evidence against them may have already
disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost
all court records in the Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a
consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of
statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result
from a particular construction, or great public interests; would be
endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction
is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless
required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R.C. L., pp. 1025,
1027.)
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular
sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a territory
occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts
or proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent occupant had
the right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and
safety during military occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze
the social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have
to be expected that litigants would not willingly submit their
litigation to courts whose judgments or decisions may afterwards
be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing
crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escape the
penalty if judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set
aside.
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgments and
proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese regime, is
impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force
of law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10,
1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him
by the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Said Executive Order abolished the Court of Appeals,
and provided "that all cases which have heretofore been duly

appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the

Supreme Court for final decision." This provision impliedly
recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during
the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the
proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said
Order does not say or refer to cases which had been duly appealed
to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which
had theretofore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed
to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if
not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the
Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had
been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all,
appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945 in the Court of Appeals
were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during
the Japanese regime.
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International
Law which say: "Moreover when it is said that an occupier's acts are
valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the
subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that no crucial
instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any
international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that
most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but
the matter can hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton,
International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And
from this quotation the respondent judge "draws the conclusion
that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or
not, is a question that is up to the restored government to decide;
that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored
government the right to exercise its discretion on the matter,
imposing upon it in its stead the obligation of recognizing and
enforcing the acts of the overthrown government.
There is no doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to
abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws,

regulations and processes other than judicial of the government

established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that
the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other
government" and not "judicial processes" precisely, it is not
necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur
had power to annul and set aside all judgments and proceedings of
the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be
determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative
of the President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the
proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared
null and void the judicial processes of any other government, it
would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case
whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare
them null and void. But the proclamation did not so provide,
undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the
limitations of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Military
Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established
between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of the public conscience, constitute or form the law of
nations, (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake,
International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of
the Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already
quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant
the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of
the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to
declare * * * suspended * * * in a Court of Law the rights and action
of the nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any
declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to
assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of Appeals
of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L. R. [1915], 1 K.
B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of
justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the
nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing therein their civil

rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the

forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from
nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in
their litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the
purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be
thwarted, for to declare them null and void would be tantamount to
suspending in said courts the rights and action of the nationals of
the territory during the military occupation thereof by the enemy. It
goes without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do
something will not at the same time empower another to undo the
same. Although the question whether the President or commanding
officer of the United States Army has violated restraints imposed by
the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic
nature, yet, in construing and applying limitations imposed on the
executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
case of Ochoa vs. Hernandez (230 U. S., 139), has declared that
they "arise from general rules of international law and from
fundamental principles known wherever the American flag flies."
In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U. S., 712), a special order
issued by the officer in command of the forces of the United States
in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a
decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state in a case
within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the
acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July
19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which denned the powers and
duties of military officers in command of the several states then
lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said: "We
have looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July
19, 1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military
commanders designated, within the States committed respectively
to their jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order
here in question * * *. The clearest language would be necessary to
satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these
acts should be so exercised * * *. It was an arbitrary stretch of
authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether

Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act is a

question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule
of law that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the
citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the
exigency requires. (Mitchell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115;
Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp.,
161; s. C., 1 Smith's L. C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before
us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that the order was void."
It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur
of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has
not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not of a
political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that
were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation,
and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid
before and are now good and valid after the reoccupation or
liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the
Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to, and
continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the
Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings
in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands
were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces,
and the Commonwealth Government was restored.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not
usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of

the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to

respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President
McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice,
they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed
to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical
point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the
right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of
government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the standpoint of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to
continue local laws and institutions so far as military necessity will
permit." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 596.) Undoubtedly, this
practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and
business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch
as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient character.
Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, the
Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January
3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration
under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and
ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as
well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials
shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their
duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was
organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on
January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5,
respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court
of First Instance, and justices of the peace courts, with the same
jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given by the
Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3

of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called
Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were
continued with no substantial change in the organization and
jurisdiction thereof.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands
prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which have
become reestablished and conceived of as having been in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the
Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in
cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a
law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.
As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principle "a
state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign
military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired * * *. Such political resurrection is the
result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to
regain their original shape upon the removal of the external force,
and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of
the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.
615.)
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution
in support of his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of
Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance
of, and continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment
until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines * * * shall have provided for the transfer of the
jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the
Philippines, and the cases commenced and left pending therein," is
"that said courts were of a government alien to the Commonwealth
Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of the

Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become

the lawsand the courts had become the institutionsof Japan by
adoption (U. S. vs. Reiter, 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became
later on the laws and institutions of the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines.
The court in the said case of U. S. vs. Reiter did not and could not
say that the laws and institutions of the country occupied, if
continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the
courts, by adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily
occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or
military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to
transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the
occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and
institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his
and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may continue
or set them aside. The laws and institutions or courts so continued
remain the laws and institutions or courts of the occupied territory.
The laws and courts of the Philippines, therefore, did not become,
by being continued as1 required by the law of nations, laws and
courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 which prohibits any compulsion of the
population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile
power, "extends to prohibit everything which would assert or imply
a change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This
duty is neither to innovate in the political- life of the occupied
districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life.
Hence, so far as the courts of justice are allowed to continue
administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give
their sentences in the name of the legitimate sovereign" (Westlake,
Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton,
however, the victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate
government. When in 1870, the Germans in France attempted to
violate that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon,
the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High
German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the ground

that the exercise of their powers in the name of the French people
and government was at least an implied recognition of the
Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting.
Germany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German
Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow
the use of the name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton,
International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political
nature, "Law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by change of
sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III,
Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met.,
68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws
(Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can be no break or
interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence
with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last
until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it
persists until a change takes place, and when changed it continues
in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever.
Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite
of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change."
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence depends
upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their
jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being of a political
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue
in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative
acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly
continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force.
Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of
respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming
that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands,
which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands

had become the courts of Japan, as the said courts and the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in
force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may
continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending
therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government,
unless and until they are abolished or the laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said
government.
As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings
pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another
court, are not required by the mere change of government or
sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are
abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer
continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings
commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts
having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings.
When the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and
the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the
"Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued and did not cease to
exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending
therein upon the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the said
"Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme
Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu
thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the
Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending
therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the
same Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the
present Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former.
Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese
occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts in the
Islands were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of
Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the
provost courts created by the military government of occupation in

the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the same

section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending
in the said provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the
justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme
Court having jurisdiction over them according to law. And later on,
when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila
was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section
provided that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction
of the municipal courts created by Act No. 183 were transferred to
the latter.
That the present courts are the same courts which had been
functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can
continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the
restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by
Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of
our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said
Executive Order provides "(1) that the Court of Appeals, created
and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3, as amended, be
abolished, as it is hereby abolished, and "(2) that all cases which
have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. * * *" In so
providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals
abolished was the same that existed prior to, and continued after,
the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; for, as we have
stated in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of
the cases pending therein, or which had theretofore (that is, up to
March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been
cases coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called
Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the
said Executive Order was not the same one which had been
functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to
the time of the Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all
the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January
2, 1942, been duly appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to

continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of
political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration
of the Commonwealth Government.
Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of
First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves
civil rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth
Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration of
the said Government; and that the respondent judge of that court,
having refused to act and continue the said proceedings, which the
law specifically enjoins him to do as a duty resulting from his office
as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is the speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking
into consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction herein
involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other
cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands.
In view of all the foregoing, it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of
mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of
said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, and Pablo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 98382

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 98382, May 17, 1993 ]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The notices of sale under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, on extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
are required to be posted for not less than twenty days in at least
three public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred
pesos, such notices shall also be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city.
Respondent court, through Justice Filemon Mendoza with whom
Justices Campos, Jr. and Aldecoa, Jr. concurred, construed the
publication of the notices on March 28, April 11 and 12, 1969 as a
fatal announcement and reversed the judgment appealed from by
declaring void, inter alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces
of realty, the final deed of sale, and the consolidation of ownership
(p. 27, Rollo).
Hence, the petition at bar, premised on the following backdrop
lifted from the text of the challenged decision:
The facts of the case as related by the trial court are, as follows:

"This is a verified complaint brought by the plaintiff for the

reconveyance to him (and resultant damages) of two (2) parcels of
land mortgaged by him to the defendant Philippine National Bank
(Manila), which the defendant allegedly unlawfully foreclosed. The
defendant then consolidated ownership unto itself, and
subsequently sold the parcels to third parties. The amended
Answer of the defendant states on the other hand that the
extrajudicial foreclosure, consolidation of ownership, and
subsequent sale to the third parties were all valid, the bank
therefore counterclaims for damages and other equitable remedies.
xxx
From the evidence and exhibits presented by both parties, the
Court is of the opinion that the following facts have been proved:
Two lots, located at Bunlo, Bocaue, Bulacan (the first covered by
Torrens Certificate No. 16743 and possessed of an area of
approximately 3,109 square meters: the second covered by Torrens
Certificate No. 5787, possessed of an area of around 610 square
meters, and upon which stood a residential-commercial building
were mortgaged to the defendant Philippine National Bank. The lots
were under the common names of the plaintiff (Epifanio dela Cruz),
his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria). The mortgage was made
possible because of the grant by the latter two to the former of a
special power of attorney to mortgage the lots to the defendant.
The lots were mortgaged to guarantee the following promissory
notes:
(1) a promissory note for P12,000.00, dated
September 2, 1958, and payable within 69 days
(date of maturity - Nov. 10, 1958);
(2) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated September
22, 1958, and payable within 49 days (date of
maturity - Nov. 10, 1958);

(3) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated June 30,

1958 1/ and payable within 120 days (date of
maturity-Nov. 10, 1958) See also Annex C of the
complaint itself).
[1/ This date of June 30, 1958 is disputed by the plaintiff who claims
that the correct date is June 30, 1961, which is the date actually
mentioned in the promissory note. It is however difficult to believe
the plaintiff's contention since if it were true and correct, this would
mean that nearly three (3) years elapsed between the second and
the third promissory note; that at the time the third note was
executed, the first two had not yet been paid by the plaintiff
despite the fact that the first two were supposed to be payable
within 69 and 49 days respectively. This state of affairs would have
necessitated the renewal of said two promissory notes. No such
renewal was proved, nor was the renewal ever alleged. Finally, and
this is very significant: the third mentioned promissory note states
that the maturity date is Nov. 10, 1958. Now, then, how could the
loan have been contracted on June 30, 1961? It will be observed
that in the bank records, the third mentioned promissory note was
really executed on June 30, 1958 (See Exhs. 9 and 9-A). The Court
is therefore inclined to believe that the date "June 30, 1961" was
a mere clerical error and that the true and correct date is June 30,
1958. However, even assuming that the true and correct date is
June 30, 1961, the fact still remains that the first two promissory
notes had been guaranteed by the mortgage of the two lots, and
therefore, it was legal and proper to foreclose on the lots for failure
to pay said two promissory notes.]
On September 6, 1961, Atty. Ramon de los Reyes of the bank (PNB)
presented under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure petition of the
two mortgaged lots before the Sheriff's Office at Malolos, Bulacan;
accordingly, the two lots were sold or auctioned off on October 20,
1961 with the defendant PNB as the highest bidder
for P28,908.46. On March 7, 1963, Sheriff Leopoldo Palad executed
a Final Deed of Sale, in response to a letter-request by the Manager

of the PNB (Malolos Branch). On January 15, 1963, a Certificate of

Sale in favor of the defendant was executed by Sheriff Palad. The
final Deed of Sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of
Property on March 19, 1963. Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not
volunteer to buy back from the PNB the two lots, the PNB sold on
June 4, 1970 the same to spouses Conrado de Vera and Marina de
Vera in a "Deed of Conditional Sale". (Decision, pp. 3-5; Amended
Record on Appeal, pp. 96-98).
After due consideration of the evidence, the CFI on January 22,
1978 rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant complaint
against the defendant Philippine National Bank is hereby ordered
DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiff. The counterclaim
against the plaintiff is likewise DISMISSED, for the Court does not
believe that the complaint had been made in bad faith.
SO ORDERED." (Decision, p. 8; Amended Record on Appeal, p. 100)
Not satisfied with the judgment, plaintiff interposed the present
appeal assigning as errors the following:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING IN FOOTNOTE 1 OF ITS
DECISION THAT IT IS THEREFORE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE
DATE "JUNE 30, 1962" WAS A MERE CLERICAL ERROR AND THAT
THE TRUE AND CORRECT DATE IS JUNE 30, 1958. IT ALSO ERRED IN
HOLDING IN THE SAME FOOTNOTE 1 THAT "HOWEVER, EVEN
ASSUMING THAT THE TRUE AND CORRECT DATE IS JUNE 30, 1961,
THE FACT STILL REMAINS THAT THE FIRST TWO PROMISSORY
NOTES HAD BEEN GUARANTEED BY THE MORTGAGE OF THE TWO
LOTS, AND THEREFORE, IT WAS LEGAL AND PROPER TO
FORECLOSE ON THE LOTS FOR FAILURE TO PAY SAID TWO
PROMISSORY NOTES". (page 115, Amended Record on Appeal)

II

VII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITION

FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS PREMATURELY FILED AND
IS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER BECAUSE IT MERELY FORECLOSED THE
ORIGINAL AND NOT THE AMENDED MORTGAGE.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING DEFENDANT TO

RECONVEY TO PLAINTIFF THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY T.C.T.
NOS. 40712 AND 40713 OF BULACAN (page 8, Amended Record on
Appeal)

III

VIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "IT IS CLEAR THAT

THE AUCTION SALE WAS NOT PREMATURE". (page 117, Amended
Record on Appeal)

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY

TO PLAINTIFF REASONABLE AMOUNTS OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES (page 8, Amended Record on
Appeal).

IV
IX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "SUFFICE IT TO STATE
THAT ACTUALLY THE POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN TO THE PNB WAS
EMBODIED IN THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE (EXB. 10) WHICH WAS
REGISTERED IN THE REGISTRY OF PROPERTY OF BULACAN AND
WAS ANNOTATED ON THE TWO TORRENS CERTIFICATES INVOLVED"
(page 118, Amended Record on Appeal).
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE NOTICES
REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 3 OF ACT NO. 3135 WERE ALL COMPLIED
WITH" AND "THAT THE DAILY RECORD x x x IS A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION (pages 117-118, Amended Record on
Appeal).
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE CERTIFICATE OF
SALE, FINAL DEED OF SALE AND AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION,
NULL AND VOID.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT COMPLAINT

AGAINST THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, WITH COSTS AGAINST
THE PLAINTIFF. (page 118, Amended Record on Appeal)." (Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 1-4) (pp. 17-21, Rollo)
With reference to the pertinent issue at hand, respondent court
opined:
The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were
published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the
newspaper "Daily Record" (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 108).
The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the dates April 11
and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3
of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be
"published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks".
Evidently, defendant-appellee bank failed to comply with this legal
requirement. The Supreme Court has held that:
"The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice
of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and

that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and
render the sale at least voidable (Jalandoni vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil.
1058, G.R. No. 42589, August 31, 1937 and October 29, 1937).
Interpreting Sec. 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure (reproduced in
Sec. 18(c) of Rule 39, Rules of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135)
in Campomanes vs. Bartolome and German & Co. (38 Phil. 808,
G.R. No. 1309, October 18, 1918), this Court held that if a sheriff
sells without the notice prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure
induced thereto by the judgment creditor, and the purchaser at the
sale is the judgment creditor, the sale is absolutely void and no title
passes. This is regarded as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction
whatever the rule may be elsewhere (Borja vs. Addison, 14 Phil.
895, G.R. No. 18010, June 21, 1922).
x x x. It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage
foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements
constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and that a
substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the
notice insufficient and vitiate the sale (59 C.J.S. 1314)."
(Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals, L-48278, November 8, 1988; 167
SCRA 16, 23-24).
In view of the admission of defendant-appellee in its pleading
showing that there was no compliance of the notice prescribed in
Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act 4118, with respect to
the notice of sale of the foreclosed real properties in this case, we
have no choice but to declare the auction sale as absolutely void in
view of the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser in said
auction sale was defendant-appellee bank. Consequently, the
Certificate of Sale, the Final Deed of Sale and Affidavit of
Consolidation are likewise of no legal efffect. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Before we focus our attention on the subject of whether or not
there was valid compliance in regard to the required publication,
we shall briefly discuss the other observations of respondent
court vis-a-vis herein private respondent's ascriptions raised with

the appellate court when his suit for reconveyance was dismissed
by the court of origin even as private respondent does not impugn
the remarks of respondent court along this line.
Although respondent court acknowledged that there was an
ambiguity on the date of execution of the third promissory note
(June 30, 1961) and the date of maturity thereof (October 28,
1958), it was nonetheless established that the bank introduced
sufficient proof to show that the discrepancy was a mere clerical
error pursuant to Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Anent
the second disputation aired by private respondent, the appellate
court observed that inasmuch as the original as well as the
subsequent mortgage were foreclosed only after private
respondent's default, the procedure pursued by herein petitioner in
foreclosing the collaterals was thus appropriate albeit the petition
therefor contained only a copy of the original mortgage.
It was only on the aspect of publication of the notices of sale under
Act No. 3135, as amended, and attorney's fees where herein
private respondent scored points which culminated in the reversal
of the trial court's decision. Respondent court was of the impression
that herein petitioner failed to comply with the legal requirement
and the sale effected thereafter must be adjudged invalid following
the ruling of this Court in Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals (167
SCRA 16 [1988]); p. 8, Decision, p. 24, Rollo). In view of
petitioner's so-called indifference to the rules set forth under Act
No. 3135, as amended, respondent court expressly authorized
private respondent to recover attorney's fees because he was
compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.
Immediately upon the submission of a supplemental petition, the
spouses Conrado and Marina De Vera filed a petition in
intervention, claiming that the two parcels of land involved herein
were sold to them on June 4, 1970 by petitioner for which transfer
certificates of title were issued in their favor (p. 40, Rollo). On the
other hand, private respondent pressed the idea that the alleged

intervenors have no more interest in the disputed lots in view of the

sale effected by them to Teresa Castillo, Aquilino and Antonio dela
Cruz in 1990 (pp. 105-106, Rollo).
On March 9, 1992, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda (p. 110, Rollo).
Now, in support of the theory on adherence to the conditions
spelled in the preliminary portion of this discourse, the
pronouncement of this Court in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125
SCRA 122 [1983]; p. 135, Rollo) is sought to be utilized to press the
point that the notice need not be published for three full weeks.
According to petitioner, there is no breach of the proviso since after
the first publication on March 28, 1969, the second notice was
published on April 11, 1969 (the last day of the second week), while
the third publication on April 12, 1969 was announced on the first
day of the third week. Petitioner thus concludes that there was no
violation from the mere happenstance that the third publication
was made only a day after the second publication since it is enough
that thesecond publication be made on any day within the second
week, and the third publication, on any day within the third week.
Moreover, in its bid to rectify its admission in judicio, petitioner
asseverates that said admission alluded to refers only to the dates
of publications, not that there was non-compliance with the
publication requirement.
Private respondent, on the other hand, views the legal question
from a different perspective. He believes that the period between
each publication must never be less than seven consecutive days
(p. 4, Memorandum; p. 124, Rollo)

We are not convinced by petitioner's submissions because the

disquisition in support thereof rests on the erroneous impression
that the day on which the first publication was made, or on March
28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to the third paragraph of
Article 13 of the New Civil Code.
It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the
definition of what is a "week". In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G.
3139 [1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972,
p. 660), this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time
consisting of seven consecutive days - a definition which dovetails
with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al. (38
Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated, Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 1990, p. 46). Following the
interpretation in Derby as to the publication of an ordinance for "at
least two weeks" in some newspaper that:
. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of
the first day's publication from the computation, and the cases
above cited take this case out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code
Civ. Proc. which excludes the first day and includes the last;
the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as
sufficient advertisement for the second week because the period
for the first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until
April 3, 1969 while the second week should be counted from April
4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on
April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and physically accomplished
during the first day of the third week and cannot thus be equated
with compliance in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as a
measure of duration of time and without reference to the calendar,
it means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the
day of the week on which it begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467
citing Derby).

Certainly, it would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as

reckoning point, in line with the third paragraph of Article 13 of the
New Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week of
publication as to make the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969
because this will have the effect of extending the first week by
another day. This incongruous repercussion could not have been
the unwritten intention of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was
enacted. Verily, inclusion of the first day of publication is in keeping
with the computation in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA
122 [1983]) where this Court had occasion to pronounce, through
Justice Guerrero, that the publication of notice on June 30, July 7
and July 14, 1968 satisfied the publication requirement under Act
No. 3135. Respondent court cannot, therefore, be faulted for
holding that there was no compliance with the strict requirements
of publication independently of the so-called admission in judicio.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and intervention are
hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 17, 1991 is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58011-12 July 20, 1982
VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO
BISULA, RUBEN ARROZA, JUAN GACUTNO, LEONILO ATOK,
NILO CRUZ, ALVARO ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG, SIMPLICIO
BAUTISTA, ROMEO ACOSTA, and JOSE ENCABO, respondents.
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., for petitioner.
Solicitor General and Romeo M. Devera for respondents.

2. the wages corresponding to the

unexpired portion of their contracts, as
adjusted by the respondent Company
effective 1 March 1979;
3. the adjusted representation
allowances of the complainant Seamen
who served as officers and who have
not withdrawn from the case, namely:
Capt. Rogelio Bisula, Ruben Arroza,
Juan Gacutno, Leonilo Atok and Nilo
Cruz;
4. their vacation pay equivalent to
one-half () month's pay after six (6)
months of service and another one-half
() month's pay after the completion
of the one-year contract;
5. their tanker service bonus
equivalent to one-half () month's
pay; and

BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari seeking the annulment or setting aside, on the
grounds of excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, of
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in
consolidated NSB Cases Nos. 2250-79 and 2252-79 thereof, 1 the
dispositive portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from should be,
as it is hereby modified in this wise:
Respondent Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services,
Inc., is hereby ordered to pay the following to the
complainant Seamen who have not withdrawn from
the case, namely: Capt. Rogelio H. Bisula, Ruben
Arroza, Juan Gacutno, Leonilo Atok, Nilo Cruz, Alvaro
Andrada, Nemesio Adug, Simplicio Bautista, Romeo
Acosta and Jose Encabo:
1. their earned wages corresponding to
the period from 16 to 19 April 1979;

6. their earned overtime pay from l to

l9 April 1979.
The Secretariat of the National Seamen Board is also
hereby directed to issue within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision the necessary clearances to
the suspended Seamen. (pp. 86-87, Record.)
The factual and legal background of these cases is related most
comprehensively in the "Manifestation and Comment" filed by the
Solicitor General. It is as follows:
The records show that private respondents have a
manning contract for a period of one (1) year with
petitioner in representation of its principal Kyoei
Tanker Co. Ltd. The terms and conditions of said
contract were based on the standard contract of the
NSB. The manning contract was approved by the
NSB. Aware of the problem that vessels not paying
rates imposed by the International Transport Workers

Federation (ITF) would be detained or interdicted in

foreign ports controlled by the ITF, petitioner and
private respondents executed a side contract to the
effect that should the vessel M/T Jannu be required to
pay ITF rates when it calls on any ITF controlled
foreign port, private respondents would return to
petitioner the amounts so paid to them.
On March 23, 1979, the master of the vessel who is
one of the private respondents sent a cable to
petitioner, while said vessel was en route to Australia
which is an ITF controlled port, stating that private
respondents were not contented with the salary and
benefits stipulated in the manning contract, and
demanded that they be given 50% increase thereof,
as the "best and only solution to solve ITF problem."
Apparently, reference to "ITF" in private respondents'
cable made petitioner apprehensive since the vessel
at that time was en route to Australia, an ITF port,
and would be interdicted and detained thereat,
should private respondents denounce the existing
manning contract to the ITF and should petitioner
refuse or be unable to pay the ITF rates, which
represent more than 100% of what is stipulated in
the manning contract. Placed under such situation,
petitioner replied by cable dated March 24, 1979 to
private respondents, as follows:
... WE ARE SURPRISED WITH THIS
SUDDEN CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND
DEMANDS FOR WE HAVE THOROUGHLY
EXPLAINED AND DISCUSSED ALL
MATTERS PERTAINING TO YOUR
PRESENT EMPLOYMENT AND BELIEVED
THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTOOD EACH
OTHER ... WE SHALL SUFFER AND
ABSORB CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF
LOSSES WITH YOUR DEMAND OF FIFTY
PERCENT AS WE ARE ALREADY
COMMITTED TO PRINCIPALS
THEREFORE TO MINIMIZE OUR LOSSES
WE PROPOSE AN INCREASE OF
TWENTY FIVE PERCENT ON YOUR
BASIC PAYS PLUS THE SPECIAL

COMPENSATION FOR THIS PARTICULAR

VOYAGE ... (p. 7 Comment)
On March 26, 1979, petitioner wrote a letter to the
NSB denouncing the conduct of private respondents
as follows:
This is to inform you that on March 24, 1979, we
received a cable from Capt. Rogelio Bisula, Master of
the above-reference vessel reading as follows:
URINFO ENTIRE JANNU OFFICERS AND
CREW NOT CONTENTED WITH
PRESENT SALARY BASED ON VOLUME
OF WORK TYPE OF SHIP WITH
HAZARDOUS CARGO AND REGISTERED
IN A WORLDWIDE TRADE STOP WHAT
WE DEMAND IS ONLY FIFTY PERCENT
INCREASE BASED ON PRESENT BASIC
SALARY STOP THIS DEMAND THE BEST
AND ONLY SOLUTION TO SOLVE
PROBLEM DUE YOUR PRESENT RATES
ESPECIALLY TANKERS VERY FAR IN
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SHIPPING
AGENCIES IN MANILA.
to which we replied on March 24, 1979, as follows:
WE ARE SURPRISED WITH SUDDEN
CHANGE, OF ATTITUDE AND DEMANDS
FOR WE HAVE THOROUGHLY
EXPLAINED AND DISCUSSED ALL
MATTERS PERTAINING TO YOUR
PRESENT EMPLOYMENT AND BELIEVED
THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTOOD EACH
OTHER STOP FRANKLY SPEAKING WE
SHALL SUFFER AND ABSORB
CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF LOSSES
WITH YOUR DEMAND OF FIFTY
PERCENT AS WE ARE COMMITTED TO
PRINCIPALS THEREFORE TO MINIMIZE
OUR LOSSES WE PROPOSE AN
INCREASE OF TWENTY FIVE PERCENT
ON YOUR BASIC PAY STOP YOUR
UNDERSTANDING AND FULL

COOPERATION WILL BE VERY MUCH

APPRECIATED STOP PLS CONFIRM
SOONEST.
On March 25, 1979 we received the following
communication from the Master of said vessel:
OFFICERS AND CREW HESITATING TO
GIVE UP DEMAND OF FIFTY PERCENT
INCREASE BUT FOR THE GOOD AND
HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP ON
BOARD AND RECONSIDERING YOUR
SUPPOSED TO BE LOSSES IN CASE WE
CONDITIONALLY COOPERATE WITH
YOUR PROPOSED INCREASE AND
TWENTY FIVE PERCENT BASED ON
INDIVIDUAL BASIC PAY WITH THE
FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITION
STOP EFFECTIVITY OF TWENTY FIVE
PERCENT INCREASE MUST BE
MARCH/79 STOP INCREASE MUST BE
COLLECTIBLE ON BOARD EFFECTIVE
ABOVE DATE UNTIL DISEMBARKATION
STOP ALLOTMENT TO ALLOTEES
REMAIN AS IS STOP REASONABLE
REPALLOWS FOR ALL OFFICERS BE
GIVEN EFFECTIVE MARCH/79 STOP
BONUS FOR 6 MONTHS SERVICES
RENDERED BE COLLECTIBLE ON
BOARD STOP OFFICERS/CREW 30PCT
O/T SHUD BE BASED NEW UPGRADED
SALARY SCALE STOP
MASTER/CHENGR/CHMATE SPECIAL
COMPENSATION GIVE BY YOUR
COMPANY PRIOR DEPARTURE MANILA
REMAIN AS IS.
to which we replied on March 25, 1979, as follows:
WE AGREE ALL CONDITIONS AND
CONFIRM IT SHALL BE PROPERLY
ENFORCED STOP WILL PREPARE ALL
REQUIRED DOCUMENTS AND WILL BE
DELIVERED ON BOARD.

For your further information and guidance, the

abovementioned demands of the officers and crew
(25% increase in basic pay, increase in overtime pay
and increase in representation allowance) involve an
additional amount of US$3,096.50 per month, which
our company is not in a position to shoulder.
We are, therefore, negotiating with our Principals,
Messrs. Kyoei Tanker Company, Limited, for the
amendment of our agency agreement in the sense
that our monthly fee be increased correspondingly.
We have sent our Executive Vice-President, Mr.
Ericson M. Marquez, to Japan to represent us in said
negotiation and we will inform you of the results
thereof. (Annex "E" of Petition)
In view of private respondents' conduct and breach
of contract, petitioner's principal, Kyoei Tanker Co.,
Ltd. terminated the manning contract in a letter
dated April 4, 1979, which reads in part;
This is with reference to your letter of
March 26, 1979 and our conference
with Mr. Ericson Marquez in Tokyo on
March 29, 1979, regarding the
unexpected and unreasonable demand
for salary increase of your officers and
crew on the above vessel.
Frankly speaking, we fully agree with
you that this action taken by your
officers and crew in demanding
increase in their salaries and overtime
after being on board for only three
months was very unreasonable.
Considering the circumstances when
the demand was made, we believe
that their action was definitely abusive
and plain blackmail.
We regret to advise you that since this
vessel is only under our management,
we also cannot afford to grant your
request for an increase of US$3,096.50
effective March 1, 1979, as demanded

by your crew. Your crew should respect

their employment contracts which was
approved by your government and
your National Seamen Board should
make sure that all seamen should
follow their contracts.
For your information, we have
discussed this matter with the owners
of the vessel, particularly the attitude
and mentality of your crew on board.
Our common and final decision is not
to grant your request but also to
terminate our Manning Agreement
effective upon crew's change when the
vessel arrives at Japan or at any
possible port about end April, 1979.
We regret that we have to take this
drastic step in order to protect
ourselves from further problem if we
continue with your present officers and
crew because if their demand is
granted, there is no guarantee that
they will not demand further increase
in salaries in the future when they
have chance. Also, as you know the
present freight market is very bad and
we cannot afford an unexpected
increase in cost of operations and
more so with a troublesome and
unreliable crew that you have on
board.
In view of the circumstances
mentioned above, please consider this
letter as our official notice of
cancellation of our Manning Agreement
effective upon the date of crew's
change. (Annex "F" of Petition).
On April 6, 1979, petitioner wrote the NSB asking
permission to cancel the manning contract with
petitioner, said letter reading as follows:

This is with reference to our letter of

March 26, 1979, informing you of the
sudden and unexpected demands of
the officers and crew of the above
vessel for a twenty five percent (25%)
increase in their basic salaries and
overtime, plus an increase of the
officers' representation allowances,
involving a total of US$3,096.50 per
month.
As we have advised in our aforementioned letter, we have negotiated
with our Principals, Messrs. Kyoei
Tanker Co., Ltd., to amend our Agency
Agreement by increasing our monthly
fee by US$3,096.50, and attached
herewith is copy of our letter dated
March 26, 1979 duly received by our
Principals on March 31, 1979.
In this connection, we wish to inform
your good office that our Principals
have refused to consider our request
for an increase and have also advised
us of their final decision to terminate
our Manning Agreement effective upon
vessel's arrival in Japan on or about
April 17, 1979.
For your further information, we
enclose herewith xerox copy of the
Kyoei Tanker Co., Ltd. letter dated April
4, 1979, which we just received today
via airfreight.
This is the first time that a cancellation
of this nature has been made upon us,
and needless to say, we feel very
embarrassed and disappointed but we
have no other alternative but to accept
the said cancellation.
In view of the foregoing, we
respectfully request your authority to

cancel our Contracts of Employment

and to disembark the entire officers
and crew upon vessel's arrival in Japan
on or about 17th April, 1979. (Annex
"G", of Petition).
On April 10, 1979, the NSB through its Executive
Director Cresencio C. Dayao wrote petitioner
authorizing it to cancel the manning contract. The
NSB letter to petitioner reads:
We have for acknowledgment your
letter of 6 April 1979 in connection
with the above-captioned subject.
Considering the circumstances
enumerated in your letter under reply
(and also in your letter of March 1979),
we authorize you to cancel your
contracts of employment with the
crew/members of the M/T "Jannu" and
you may now disembark the whole
compliment upon the vessel's arrival in
Japan on or about April 17, 1979.
We trust that you will not encounter
any difficulty in connection with the
disembarkation of the crew/members.
(Annex "H" of Petition).
The seamen were accordingly disembarked in Japan
and repatriated to Manila. They then filed a
complaint with the NSB for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of wages. After trial, the NSB found that the
termination of the services of the seamen before the
expiration of their employment contract was justified
"when they demanded and in fact received from the
company wages over and above the contracted rates
which in effect was an alteration and modification of
a valid and existing contract ..." (Annex "D", Petition).
The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which
reversed the decision of the NSB and required the
petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary
benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of
the manning contract on the ground that the

termination of the said contract by petitioner was

without valid cause. Hence, the present petition. (Pp.
2-9, Manifestation & Comment)
In its petition which contains practically the same facts and
circumstances above-quoted, petitioner submits for Our resolution
the following issues:
I. That the respondent NLRC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion in said NSB Cases Nos. 2250-79 and 225279 when it adjudged the petitioner Vir-jen liable to
the respondents-seamen for terminating its
employment contracts with them despite the fact
that prior authorization to terminate or cancel said
employment contracts and to disembark the said
respondents was first secured from and was granted
by, the National Seamen Board, the government
agency primarily charged with the supervision and
discipline of seamen and the approval and
enforcement of employment contracts;
II. That the respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse
of discretion, or without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or contrary to law and the evidence
when it concluded that "there is nothing on record to
show that respondents-seamen made any threat that
they would complain or report to the ITF their low
wage rates if their demand or proposal for a wage
increase was not met", despite the fact that in their
cable of March 23, 1979 to the petitioner, the said
respondents made the following threats and
impositions: "WHAT WE DEMAND IS ONLY 50
PERCENT INCREASE BASED ON PRESENT BASIC
SALARY STOP THIS DEMAND THE BEST AND ONLY
SOLUTION TO SOLVE ITF PROBLEMS", that there are
other substantial and conclusive evidence to support
the existence of such threats and intimidation which
the respondent NLRC failed and refused to consider;
and that the evidence substantially and conclusively
shows that the petitioner Vir-jen was, in fact,
threatened and intimidated into giving such salary
increases due to such cabled threats and intimidation
of the private respondents;

III. That the respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse

of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction
when it concluded, in effect, that the respondentsseamen acted within their rights when they imposed
upon their employer, the herein petitioner, their
demands for salary and wages increases, in
disregard of their existing NSB-approved contracts of
employment, notwithstanding the substantial and
conclusive findings of the NSB, the trier of facts
which is in the best position to assess the special
circumstances of the case, that the said respondents
breached their respective contracts of employment
with the petitioner, without securing the prior
approval of the NSB as required by the New Labor
Code, as amended, and with the use of threats,
intimidation and coercion, when they demanded and,
in fact, received from the petitioner salaries or wages
over and above their contracted rates which the
petitioner was "constrained to make" in order "to
prevent the vessel from being interdicted and/or
detained by the ITF because at the time the demand
for salary increase was made the vessel was en route
to Kwinana, Australia (via Senipah, Indonesia), a port
were the ITF is strong and militant," "for in the event
the vessel would be detained and/or interdicted the
company (petitioner) would suffer more losses than
paying the seamen 25 % increase of their salary";
IV. That respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse
of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction or acted
contrary to law when it failed and refused to admit
and take into account the ADDENDUM AGREEMENT,
dated December 27, 1978, entered into between the
petitioner and the private respondents, which would
have further enlightened the respondent NLRC on the
"ITF PROBLEMS" insinuated by the private
respondents in their cable of March 23, 1979 to
threaten and intimidate the petitioner into granting
the salary increases in question;
V. That respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of
discretion or acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or contrary to law when it ordered the
petitioner Vir-jen to pay, among others, to the private
respondents their "wages corresponding to the

unexpired portion of their contracts" the said

petitioner having already lost its trust and confidence
on the private respondents; that the employer
cannot be legally compelled to continue with the
employment of persons in whom it has already lost
its trust and confidence; that payment to the private
respondents of their wages corresponding to the
unexpired portion of their contract would be
tantamount to retaining their services after their
employer, petitioner herein, had already lost its faith
and trust in them;
VI. That the respondent NLRC committed a grave
abuse of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction in still
including and considering ROMEO ACOSTA as one of
the appellants in the two (2) aforementioned NSB
cases and making him a beneficiary of its decision,
dated July 8, 1981, modifying the NSB decision,
dated July 2, 1980, despite the fact that way back on
October 23, 1980, Acosta had already filed in said
NSB cases a pleading, entitled "SATISFACTION OF
JUDGMENT" in which he manifested that he was not
appealing the NSB decision anymore as the judgment
in his favor was already fully satisfied by the
petitioner Vir-jen;
VII. That the respondent NLRC had no more
jurisdiction to entertain private respondents' appeal
because the NSB decision became final and
executory for failure of said respondents to serve on
he petitioner a copy of their "APPEAL AND
MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL" within the ten (10) day
reglementary period for appeal and even after the
expiration of said period;
VIII. That the respondent NLRC had no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal by the private respondents
based on the supposedly verified "APPEAL AND
MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL" because the supposed
signature of the person purportedly verifying the
same is forged; and that the new counsel appearing
for the private respondents on appeal was not even
authorized by some of the private respondents to
appear for them;

IX. That the respondent NLRC committed a grave

abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or contrary to law when it misconstrued,
misinterpreted and misapplied to the instant case the
ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in Wallem
Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. The Hon. Minister of
Labor, et al., G.R No. 50734, prom. February 20,
1981, despite distinct and fundamental differences in
facts between the Wallem Case and the instant case;
X. That the respondent NLRC committed a grave
abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or acted contrary to law when it failed
and refused to consider and pass upon the
substantial issues of jurisdiction, law and facts and
matters of public interests raised by the petitioner in
its URGENT MOTION/APPELLEE'S MEMORANDUM ON
APPEAL, dated April 24, 1981, and in its MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL, dated July
20, 1981, filed in the two (2) cases;
XI. That the respondent NLRC committed a grave
abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or contrary to law when it failed and
refused to reconsider and set aside its decision
subject-matter of this petition for certiorari,
considering Chat if allowed to stand, the said
decision will open the floodgates for Filipino seamen
to disregard NSB-approved contracts of employment
with impunity, leading to the destruction of the
Philippine manning industry, which is a substantial
source of revenue for the Philippine government, as
well as the image of the Filipino seamen who will
undoubtedly become known far and wide as one
prone to violate the solemnity of employment
contracts, compounded with the use of threats,
intimidation and blackmail, thereby necessitating a
policy decision by this Honorable Supreme Court on
the matter for the survival of the manning industry.
(Pp. 5-9, Record.)
We shall deal first with the jurisdictional issue (No. VII above) to the
effect that the appeal of private respondents from the decision of
the National Seamen's Board against them was filed out of time,
considering that copy of said decision was received by them on July

9, 1980 and they filed their memorandum of appeal only on July 23,
1980 or fourteen (14) days later, whereas under article 223 of the
Labor Code which governs appeals from the National Seamen's
Board to the National Labor Relations Commission per Article 20(b)
of the Code provides that such appeals must be made within ten
(10) days.
In this connection, it is contended in the comment of private
respondents that petitioner has overlooked that under Section 7,
Rule XIII,, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the
ten-day period specified in Article 223 refers to working days and
that this Court has already upheld such construction and manner of
computation in Fabula vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 54247, December 19,
1980. Now, computing the number of working days from July 9 to
July 23, 1980 We find that there were exactly ten (10) days, hence,
if We adhere to Fabula, the appeal in question must be held to have
been made on time.
But petitioner herein maintains that the Minister of Labor may not,
under the guise of issuing implementing rules of a law as
authorized by the law itself, go beyond the clear and unmistakable
language of the law and expand it at his discretion. In other words,
since Article 223 of the Labor Code literally provides thus:
Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any
or both of the parties within ten (10) days from
receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the labor Arbiter or
compulsory arbitrator;
(b) If the decision, order, or award was secured
through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and

(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised

which would cause grave or irreparable damage or
injury to the appellant.

much so that they could rationally to our mind, be decided either

way, may be dispensed with in order that We may go to the more
transcendentally important main issues before Us.

To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the

Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall impose
reasonable penalty, including fines or censures, upon
the erring parties.

As far as issue No. VI above regarding the inclusion of Romeo

Acosta among the beneficiaries of the decision herein in question,
there can be no reason why petitioner should not be sustained. It is
undenied that Acosta has filed a formal satisfaction of judgment.
Indeed, it is quite relevant to mention at this point that originally,
there were twenty-eight (28) claimants against petitioner, This
number was first reduced to fifteen (15) then to ten (10) and finally
to nine (9) now, by withdrawal of the claimants themselves. These
series of withdrawals lend no little degree to added enlightenment
of the discussion hereunder of the adverse positions of the
remaining claimants, on the one hand, and the petitioner, on the
other.

the implementing rules may not provide that the said period should
be computed on the basis of working days. This, indeed, is a legal
issue not brought up nor passed upon squarely in Fabula, and
petitioner prays that this Court rule on the point once and for all.
After mature and careful deliberation, We have arrived at the
conclusion that the shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by
Article 223 contemplates calendar days and not working days. We
are persuaded to this conclusion, if only because We believe that it
is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded
that labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, dispose of. Long
periods for any acts to be done by the contending parties can be
taken advantage of more by management than by labor. Most labor
claims are decided in their favor and management is generally the
appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the employers more
opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what with
well-paid talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the
efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the point that not
infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less than
what is due them.
All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the peculiar
circumstances of this case, particularly, the fact that private
respondents must have been misled by the implementing rules
aforementioned. We have opted to just the same pass on the
merits of the substantial issues herein, even as We admonish all
concerned to henceforth act in accordance with our foregoing view.
Verily, the Minister of Labor has no legal power to amend or alter in
any material sense whatever the law itself unequivocally specifies
or fixes.
We need not ponder long on the contention of petitioner regarding
the alleged forgery of the signature of respondent Rogelio Bisula
and the alleged lack of authority of the new counsel of
respondents, Atty. B. C. Gonzales, to appear for them. Resolution of
these minor points, considering their highly controversial nature, so

To begin with, let it be borne in mind that seamen's contracts of the

nature We have before Us now are not ordinary ones. There are
specie, laws and rules governing them precisely due to the peculiar
circumstances that surround them. Relatedly, We quote from the
Manifestation and Comment of the Solicitor General:
The employment contract in question is unlike any
ordinary contract of employment, for the reason that
a manning contract involves the interests not only of
the signatories thereto, such as the local Filipino
recruiting agent (herein petitioner), the foreign owner
of the vessel, and the Filipino crew members (private
respondents), but also those of other Filipino seamen
in general as well as the country itself. Accordingly,
Article 12 of the Labor Code provides that it is the
policy of the State not only "to insure and regulate
the movement of workers in conformity with the
national interest" but also "to insure careful selection
of Filipino workers for overseas employment in order
to protect the good name of the Philippines abroad".
The National Seamen Board (NSB), which is the
agency created to implement said state policies, is
thus empowered pursuant to Article 20 of the Labor
Code "to secure the best possible terms and
conditions of employment for seamen, and to insure
compliance thereof" not only on the part of the
owners of the vessel but also on the part of the crew
members themselves.

Conformably to the power vested in the NSB, the law

requires that all manning contracts shall be approved
by said agency. It likewise provides that "it shall be
unlawful to substitute or alter any previously
approved and certified employment contract without
the approval of NSB" (Section 35, Rules and
Regulations in the recruitment and placement of
Filipino seamen aboard foreign going ships) and
authorizes the employer or owner of the vessel to
terminate such contract for just causes (Section 32,
Ibid). Among such just causes for termination are
"bad conduct and unwanted presence prejudicial to
the safety of the ship" (Guidebook for shipping
employers, page 8) and material breach of said
contract.
The stringent rules governing Filipino seamen aboard
foreign, going ships are dictated by national interest.
There are about 120,000 registered seamen with the
NSB. Only about 50,000 of them are employed and
70,000 or so are still hoping to be employed. Those
Filipino seamen already employed on board foreigngoing ships should accordingly conduct themselves
with utmost propriety and abide strictly with the
terms and conditions of their employment contract,
and the NSB should see to that, in order that owners
of foreignowned vessels will not only be encouraged
to renew their employment contract but will
moreover be induced to hire other Filipino seamen as
against other competing foreign sailors. (Pp. 15-17,
Manifestation & Comment of the Solicitor General)
Pertinently, the Labor Code of the Philippines provides for the
creation of a National Seamen Board (NSB) thus:
ART. 20. National Seamen Board.(a) A National
Seamen Board is hereby created which shall
developed and maintain a comprehensive program
for Filipino seamen employed overseas. It shall have
the power and duty:
(1) To provide free placement services
for seamen;

(2) To regulate and supervise the

activities of agents or representatives
of shipping companies in the hiring of
seamen for overseas employment; and
secure the best possible terms of
employment for contract seamen
workers and secure compliance
therewith; and
(3) To maintain a complete registry of
all Filipino seamen.
(b) The Board shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money
claims, involving employer-employee relations,
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts
involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
The decision of the Board shall be appealable to the
National Labor Relations Commission upon the same
grounds provided in Article 223 hereof. The decisions
of the National Labor Relations Commission shall be
final and inappealable.
The finality and unappealability of the decisions of the National
Labor Relations Commission conferred by the above provisions in
cases of the nature now before Us necessarily limits Our power in
the premises to the exercise of Our plenary certiorari jurisdiction.
And under the scheme of said Article 20, in relation to Article 223 of
the same Code, the reviewing authority of the Commission is
limited only to the following instances:
Appeal.Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any
or both of the parties within ten (10) days from
receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter or
compulsory arbitrator;

(b) If the decision, order or award was secured

through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law;and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised
which would cause grave or irreparable damage or
injury to the appellant.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the
Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall impose
reasonable penalty, including fines or censures, upon
the erring parties.
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the
memorandum of appeals to the other party who shall
file an answer not later than ten (10) days from
receipt thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
In the light of the foregoing perspective of law and policy, all the
other issues raised by petitioner may be disposed of together.
Anyway they revolve basically around the following questions:
1. In the event of conflict in the conclusions of the National Seamen
Board, on the one hand, and the National Labor Relations
Commission on the other, on a matter that is fundamentally an
issue of fact, which one should prevail?
2. Under the facts of this case, was it legally proper for the
Commission to disregard the permission granted by the NSB to the
petitioner to disembark and discontinue the employment of herein
respondents?
3. As a matter of fact, did respondent breach their contract with
petitioner, so as to entitle the latter to take the punitive action
herein complained of?
4. Was the conformity of petitioner to pay respondents additional
compensation of 25% secured by said respondents thru threats of
grave injury to petitioner who, therefore, acceded to such increase
involuntarily?

We feel that the resolution of the instant controversy hinges on

whether or not it was violative of law and policy in the light of the
peculiar nature of the contracts in question as already explained at
the outset of this opinion, for the respondents to make the demand
for an increase of 50% of their respective wages stipulated in their
NSB approved contracts while they were already in the midst of the
voyage to Kwinana, Australia (an ITF controlled post), pointedly
mentioning in their cablegram that such "demand (was) the best
and only solution to solve ITF problem"?
On these questions, the NSB found and held:
1. Whether or not the Seamen breached their
respective employment contracts;
2. Whether or not the Seamen were illegally
dismissed by the Company;
3. Whether or not the monetary claims of the
seamen are valid and meritorious;
4. Whether or not the monetary claims of the
Company are valid and meritorious;
5. Whether or not disciplinary action should be taken
against the Seamen.
With respect to the first issue, the Board believes
that the answer should be in the affirmative. This is
so for the Seamen demanded and in fact received
from the Company wages over and above their
contracted rates, which in effect is an alteration or
modification of a valid and subsisting contract; and
the same not having been done thru mutual consent
and without the prior approval of the Board the
alteration or modification is contrary to the
provisions of the New Labor Code, as amended, more
particularly Art. 34 (i) thereof which states that:
Art. 34. Prohibited practices.It shall be unlawful for
any individual, entity, licensee or holder of authority:
xxx xxx xxx

(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts

approved and verified by the Department of Labor
from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties
up to and including the period of expiration of the
same without the approval of the Department of
Labor;
xxx xxx xxx
The revision of the contract was not done thru
mutual consent for the Company did not voluntarily
agree to an increase of wage, but was only
constrained to make a counter-proposal of 25%
increase to prevent the vessel from being interdicted
and/or detained by the ITF because at the time the
demand for salary increase was made the vessel was
enroute to Kwinana, Australia (via Senipah,
Indonesia), a port where the ITF is strong and
militant. However, a perusal of the Cables (Exhs. "D"
& "F", "3" & "5") coming from the Seamen addressed
to the Company would show the threatening manner
by which the desire for a salary increase was
manifested, contrary to their claim that it was merely
a request. Aforesaid cables are hereby quoted for
ready reference:
RYCV-11-12-13-14 RECEIVED URINFO ENTIRE JANNU
OFFICERS AND CREW NOT AGREEABLE WITH YOUR
SUGGESTIONS THEY ARE NOT CONTENTED WITH
PRESENT SALARY BASED IN VOLUME OF WORKS TYPE
OF SHIP WITH HAZARDOUS CARGO AND REGISTERED
IN A WORLD WIDE TRADE STOP REGARDING URCABV14 OFFICERS AND CREW NOT INTERESTED IN ITF
MEMBERSHIP IF NOT ACTUALLY PAID WITH ITF RATE
STOP WHAT WE DEMAND IS ONLY 50 PERCENT
INCREASE BASED ON PRESENT BASIC SALARY STOP
THIS DEMAND THE BEST AND ONLY SOLUTION TO
SOLVE ITF PROBLEM DUE YOUR PRESENT RATE
ESPECIALLY IN TANKERS VERY FAR IN COMPARISON
WITH OTHER SHIPPING AGENCIES IN MANILA STOP
LET US SHARE EQUALLY THE FRUITS OF LONELINESS
SACRIFICES AND HARDSHIP WE ARE ENCOUNTERING
ON BOARD WE REMAIN ...

REURVIR-JEN-15 OFFICERS AND CREW

HESITATING TO GIVE UP DEMAND OF
50 PERCENT INCREASE BUT FOR GOOD
AND HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP
ONBOARD AND RECONSIDERING YOUR
SUPPOSE TO BE LOSSES IN CASE WE
CONDITIONALLY COOPERATE WITH
YOUR PROPOSE INCREASE OF 25
PERCENT BASED ON INDIVIDUAL
MONTHLY BASIC PAY WITH FOLLOWING
TERMS AND CONDITIONS AA
EFFECTIVITY OF 25 PERCENT INCREASE
MUST BE MARCH/79 PLUS SPECIAL
COMPENSATION MENTIONED URCAB
VIRJEN-14 BB NEW COMPANY
CIRCULAR ON UPGRADED NEW SALARY
SCALE DULY SIGNED AND APPROVED
BE FORWARDED KWINANA AUSTRALIA
OR HANDCARRIED BY YOUR
REPRESENTATIVE TO DISCUSS
MATTERS OFFICIALLY CC 25 PERCENT
INCREASE MUST BE COLLECTABLE
ONBOARD EFFECTIVE ABOVE DATE
UNTIL DISEMBARKATION STOP
ALLOTMENT TO ALLOTTEES REMAIN AS
IS DD REASONABLE REPALLOWS FOR
ALL OFFICERS BE GIVEN EFFECTIVE
MARCH/79 EE BONUS FOR 6 MONTHS
SERVICE RENDERED BE COLLECTIBLE
ONBOARD FF OFFICERS/CREW 30
PERCENT' OT SHOULD BE BASED NEW
UPGRADED SALARY SCALE GG
MASTER/CHENGR/CHMATE SPECIAL
COMPENSATION GIVE BY YOUR
COMPANY PRIOR DEPARTURE MANILA
BE REMAIN AS IS STOP THE ABOVE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS SHOULD BE
PROPERLY ENFORCE AND
DOCUMENTED ALSO COPIES AND
FORWARDED ONBOARD ON ARRIVAL
KWINANA AUSTRALIA CONFIRM ...
While the Board recognizes the rights of the Seamen
to seek higher wages provided the increase is arrived
at thru mutual consent, it could not however,
sanction the same if the consent of the employer is

secured thru threats, intimidation or force. In the

case at bar, the Company was compelled to accede
to the demand of the Seamen for a salary increase to
forestall the possibility of the vessel being interdicted
by the ITF at Kwinana, Australia, for in the event the
vessel would be detained and/or interdicted the
Company would suffer more losses than paying the
Seamen 25% increase of their
With respect to the second issue, the Board believes
that the termination of the services of the Seamen
was legal and in accordance with the provisions of
their respective employment contracts. Considering
the findings of the Board that the Seamen breached
their contracts, their subsequent repatriation was
justified. While it may be true that the Seamen were
hired for a definite period their services could be
terminated prior to the completion of the fun term
thereof for a just and valid cause.
It may be stated in passing that Vir-jen Shipping &
Marine Services, Inc., despite the fact that it was
compelled to accede to a 25% salary increase for the
Seamen, tried to convince its principal Kyoei Tanker,
Ltd. to an adjustment in their agency fee to answer
for the 25% increase, but the latter not only denied
the request but likewise terminated their Manning,
Agreement. The Seamen's breach of their
employment contracts and the subsequent
termination of the Manning Agreement of Vir-jen
Shipping & Marine Services, Inc. with the Kyoei
Tanker, Ltd., justified the termination of the Seamen's
services.
With respect to the third issue the following are the
findings of the Board:
As regards the claim of the Seamen for the payment
of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts the same should be denied.
This is so because of the findings of the Board that
their dismissal was legal and for a just cause. Awards
of this nature is proper only in cases where a seafarer
is illegally dismissed. (Pp. 148-151, Record)

Disagreeing with the foregoing findings of the NSB, the NLRC held:
The more important issue to be resolved in this case,
however, is the question of whether the Seamen
violated their employment contracts when they
demanded or proposed and in fact accepted wages
over and above their contracted rates. Stated
otherwise, could the Seamen rightfully demand or
propose the revision of their employment contracts?
While they concede that they are bound by their
contracts, the Seamen claim that their cable asking
for the revision of their contract rates was a valid
exercise of their right to grievance.
The right to grievance is recognized in this
jurisdiction even if there is a valid and subsisting
contract, especially where there are supervening
facts or events of which a party to the contract was
not apprised at the time of its conclusion. As pointed
out by the Supreme Court in the Wallem case, supra,
it "is a basic right of all working men to seek greater
benefits not only for themselves but for their families
as well ..." and the "Constitution itself guarantees the
promotion of social welfare and protection to labor."
In this care, records show that it was impressed on
the Seamen that their vessel would be trading only in
Caribbean ports. This was admitted by the Company
in its cable to the Seamen on 10 January 1979. After
the conclusion of their contracts, however, and after
they had boarded the vessel, the principals of the
Company directed the vessel to can at different ports
or to engage in "worldwide trade" which is
admittedly more difficult and hazardous than trading
in only one maritime area. This is a substantial
change in the original understanding of the parties.
Thus, in their cable asking for a wage increase, the
Seamen expressed their dissatisfaction by informing
the Company that they were "not contented with
(their) present salary based on volume of work, type
of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in world
wide trade."(emphasis supplied.) With such change
in the original agreement of the parties, we find that
the Seamen were well within their rights in
demanding for the revision of their contract rates.

We also note that the Company was not exactly in

good faith in contracting the service of the Seamen.
During his briefing in Manila, the Company instructed
the master of the vessel, complainant Bisula, to
prepare two (2) sets of payrolls, one set reflecting the
actual salary rates of the Seamen and the other
showing higher rates based on Panamanian Shipping
articles which approximate those prescribed by ITF
for its member seafarers. In compliance with this
instruction, Bisula prepared the latter payrolls. These
payrolls were intended for the consumption of ITF if
and when the vessel called on ports where ITF rates
were operational, the evident purpose being to show
ITF that the Company was paying the same rates
prescribed by said labor federation and thereby
prevent the interdiction of the vessel. And when the
vessel was en route to Australia, an ITF-controlled
port, the Company arranged for the Seamen's
membership with ITF and actually paid their
membership fees without their knowledge and
consent, thereby exposing them to the danger of
being disciplined by the NSB Secretariat for having
affiliated with ITF. All these have to be mentioned
here to better understand the feelings of the Seamen
when they asked for the revision of their wage
rates. 2 (Pp. 83-85, Record)
Comparing these two decisions, We do not hesitate to hold that the
NLRC overstepped the boundaries of its reviewing authority and
was overlenient. Whether or not respondents had breached their
contract wit petitioner is a factual issue, the peculiar nuances of
which were better known to the NSB, the fact-finding authority.
Indeed, even if it was nothing more than the interpretation of the
cablegram sent by respondents to petitioner on March 23, 1979
that were the only question to be resolved, that is, whether or not it
carried with it or connoted a threat which naturally panicked
petitioner, which, to be sure, could be a question of law, still, as We
see it, the conclusion of the NLRC cannot be justified.
The NLRC ruled that in the exercise of their right to present any
grievances they had and in their desire to alleviate their condition,
it was but well and proper for respondents to make a proposal for
increase of their wages, which petitioner could accept or reject. We
do not see it that way.

Definitely, the reference in the cablegram to the conformity of

petitioner to respondents' demand was "the best and only solution
to ITF problem" had an undertone which naturally placed petitioner
hardly in a position to answer them with a flat denial. It would be
the acme of naivete for Us to go along with the contention that the
cablegram of March 23, 1979 was a mere proposal and had no
trace nor tint of threat at all. Indeed, it is alleged in the petition and
there is no denial thereof that on April 23, 1979, Chief Mate Jacobo
Catabay of the M/T Jannu, who was among the claimants at first,
revealed that:
On April 23, 1979, Chief Mate Jacobo H. Catabay of
the M/T Jannu, in a signed statement-report to the
petitioner, marked and admitted in evidence as Exh.
"10-A" during the trial stated, as follows:
On our departure at Keelung, we did
not have destination until three (3)
days later that Harman cabled us to
proceed to Senipah, Indonesia to load
fun cargo to be discharged at
Kwinana , Australia. Captain told
everyone that if only we stayed so
long with the ship, he will report to ITF
personally in order to get back wages.
In view that we only worked for three
months so the back wages is so small
and does not worth. From that time
on, Chief Engr. and Captain have a
nightly closed door conference they
arrived at the conclusion to ask for
50% salary increase and they have
modified a certain platforms. They
certainly believe that Vir-jen have no
choice because the vessel is going to
ITF port so they called a general
meeting conducted at the bridge
during my duty hours in the
afternoon. All engine and deck
personnel were present in that
meeting. (Pp. 19-20, Record.)
Well taken, indeed, is the Solicitor General's observation that:

Private respondents'conduct is uncalled for. While

employees may be free to request their employers to
increase their wages, they should not use threat of
such a nature and in such a situation as to put the
employer at their complete mercy and with no choice
but to accede to their demands or to face
bankruptcy. This is what private respondents did,
which is an act of bad conduct prejudicial to the
vessel, and a material breach of the existing
manning contract. It has adverse consequences that
led not only to the termination of the existing
manning contract but to the rejection by Kyoei Tanker
Co. Ltd. of petitioner's offer to supply crew members
to three other vessels, thereby depriving
unemployed Filipino seamen of the opportunity to
work on said vessels. Thus, in a letter dated May 17,
1979, Kyoei Tanker Co. Ltd. wrote petitioner as
follows:
This is with reference to your letter of Feb. 23, 1979,
submitting your manning offers on our three (3)
managed vessels for delivery as follows:
1. M/V "Maya" crew,delivery end May, 1979,
2. M/T "Cedar" 28 crew, delivery end June, 1979,
3. M/T "Global Oath" 30 crew, delivery end, June
1979.
In this connection, we wish to advise you that, as a
result of our unpleasant experience with your crew
on the M/T "Jannu", owners have decided to give the
manning contracts on the above three vessels to
other foreign crew instead of your company.
We deeply regret that although your crew
performance on our other four (4) vessels have been
satisfactory, we were unable to persuade owners to
consider your Philippine crew because of the bad
attitude and actuation of your crew manned on board
M/T "Jannu".

As we have already advised you, owners have spent

more than US$30,000.00 to replace the crew of M/T
"Jannu" in Japan last April 19, 1979 which would have
been saved if your crew did not violate their
employment contracts.(Annex "K"of Petition),
In the light of all the foregoing and the law and policy
on the matter, it is submitted that there was valid
justification on the part of petitioner and/or its
principal to terminate the manning contract. (Pp. 1214, Manifestation and Comment of the Solicitor
General.)
At first glance it might seem that the judgment of the NLRC should
have more weight than that of NSB. Having in view, however, the
set up and relationship of these two entities framed by the Labor
Code, the NSB is not only charged directly with the administration
of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas
employment by seeing to it that our seamen "secure the best
possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and
secure compliance therewith." Its composition as of the time this
controversy arose is worth notingfor it is made up of the Minister
of Labor as Chairman, the Deputy Minister as Vice Chairman, and a
representative each of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National
Defense, Education and Culture, the Central Bank, the Bureau of
Employment Service, a worker's organization and an employee's
organization and the Executive Director of the Overseas
Employment Development Board. (Article 23, Labor Code) It is such
a board that has to approve all contracts of Filipino seamen (Article
18, Labor Code). And after such approval, the contract becomes
unalterable, it being "unlawful" under Article 34 of the Code "for
any individual, entity, licensee or holder of authority: (i) to
substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by
Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the
parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same
without the approval of the Department of Labor." In other words, it
is not only that contracts may not be altered or modified or
amended without mutual consent of the parties thereto; it is further
necessary to have the change approved by the Department,
otherwise, the guilty parties would be penalized.
The power of the NLRC in relation to the works and actuations of
the NSB is only appellate, according to Article 20 (b), read in
relation to Article 223, principally, over questions of law, since as to
factual matters, it may exercise such appellate jurisdiction only "if

errors in the findings of fact are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant." (par. d)
The NLRC has noted in its decision that respondents were originally
made to believe that their ship would go only to the Caribbean
ports and yet after completing trips to Inchon, Korea and Kuwait
and Keelung, Taiwan, it was suddenly directed to call at Kwinana,
Australia, an ITF controlled port. The record shows that this
imputation is more apparent than real, for respondents knew from
the very moment they were hired that world-wide voyages or
destinations were contemplated in their agreement. So much so
that corresponding steps had to be taken to avoid interference of or
trouble about the ITF upon the ship's arrival at ITF controlled ports.
As already stated earlier, the ITF requires the seamen working on
any vessel calling at ports controlled by them to be paid the rates
fixed by the ITF which are much higher than those provided in the
contract's signed here, to the extent of causing tremendous loss if
not bankruptcy of the employer.
And so, as revealed to the NLRC later, in anticipation precisely of
such peril to the employer and ultimate unemployment of the
seamen, in the instant case, the usual procedure undeniably known
to respondents of having two payroll's, one containing the actually
agreed rates and the other ITF rates, the latter to be shown to the
ITF in order that the ship may not be detained or interdicted in
Kwinana, was followed. But according to the NLRC, this practice
constitutes deception and bad faith, and worse, it is an effect within
the prohibition against alteration of contracts approved by the NSB,
considering there is nothing to show that NSB was made aware of
the so-called addendum or side agreement to the effect that should
the ship manned by respondents be made to call an any ITF
controlled port, the contract with ITF rates would be shown and, if
for any reason, the respondents are required to be actually paid
higher rates and they are so paid, the excess over the rates agreed
in the NSB contract shall be returned to petitioner later.

It is of insubstantial moment that the side agreement or addendum

was not made known to or presented as evidence before the NSB.
We are persuaded that more or less the NSB knows that the
general practice is to have such side contracts. More importantly,
the said side contracts are not meant at all to alter or modify the
contracts approved by the NSB. Rather, they are precisely
purported to enforce them to the letter, making it clearer that even
if the ships have to call at ITF controlled ports, the same shall
remain to be the real and binding agreement between the parties,
in intentional disregard of whatever the ITF may exact.
We hold that there was no bad faith in having said side contracts,
the intent thereof being to put into effect the NSB directed
arrangements that would protect the ship manning industry from
unjust and ruinning effects of ITF intervention. Indeed, examining
the said side agreements, it is not correct to say that the
respondents were caught unaware, or by surprise when they were
advised that the ship would proceed to Kwinana, Australia, even
assuming they had been somehow informed that they would sail to
the Caribbean. Said side agreements textually provide:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Addendum Agreement entered into by and
between KYOEI TANKER CO., LTD., Principals, of the
vessel M.T. "JANNU", represented herein by VIR-JEN
SHIPPING & MARINE SERVICES, INC., Manila,
Philippines, as Manning Agents (hereinafter referred
to as the Company),

and

The herein-mentioned officers and crew, and

engaged by the Company as crewmembers of the
vessel M/T "JANNU" with their positions, seaman
certificate numbers and signatures (hereinafter
referred to as the Crewmember), hereunder shown:
W I T N E S S E T H that:
1. WHEREAS, the Crewmember is hired and recruited
as a member of the crew on board the vessel M/T

"JANNU" with the corresponding Contracts of

Employment submitted to, verified and duly
approved by the National Seamen Board; that the
employment contract referred to, has clearly defined
the rate of salary, wages, and/or employment
benefits for a period of one (1) year (or twelve (12)
months), and any extension thereof.
2. WHEREAS, the parties hereby further agree and
covenant that should the above-mentioned vessel
enter, dock or drop anchor in ports of other
countries, the Crewmember shall not demand, ask or
receive, and the Company shall have no obligation to
pay the Crewmember, salaries,, wages and/or
benefits over and above those provided for in the
employment contract submitted to, verified and
approved by the National Seamen Board, which shall
remain in full force and effect between the parties.
The Company as well as the Owners,, Charterers,
Agents shall neither be held accountable nor liable
for any amount other than what is agreed upon and
stipulated in the aforesaid NSB-approved Contracts
of Employment.
3. WHEREAS, the parties likewise agree that should
the vessel enter, dock or drop anchor in any foreign
port, and in the event that the Company (and/or its
Owners, Charterers, Agents), are forced, pressured,
coerced or compelled, in any way and for whatever
cause or reason, to pay the Crewmember either
directly or thru their respective allottees or other
persons, salaries and benefits higher than those
rates imposed in the NSB-approved contract, the
Crewmember hereby agrees and binds himself to
receive the said payment in behalf of, and in trust
for, the Company (and/or its Owners, Charterers,
Agents), and to return the said amount in full to the
Company or to its agent/s in Manila, Philippines
immediately upon his and/or his allottees receipt
thereof; the Crewmember hereby waives formal
written demand by the Company or its agent/s for
the return thereof. The Crewmember hereby fully
understands that failure or refusal by him to return to
the Company the said amount, will render him
criminally liable for Estafa, as provided for in the

Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, and in such

case, the parties hereby agree that any criminal
and/or civil action in connection therewith shall be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Philippine Courts.
4. WHEREAS, if, in order to avoid delays to the
vessels, the Company is forced, pressured, coerced
or compelled to sign a Collective Bargaining
Agreement or any other Agreement with any foreign
union, particularly ITF or ITF affiliated unions, and to
sign new crews' contract of employment stipulating
higher wages, salaries or benefits than the NSBapproved contract, the said agreements and
contracts shall be void from the beginning and the
Crewmember shall be deemed to have automatically
waived the increased salaries and benefits stipulated
in the said agreements and employment contracts
unto and in favor of the Company, and shall remain
unalterably bound by the rates, terms, and
conditions of the NSB-approved contract.
5. WHEREAS, the parties also agree that should the
Company, as a precautionary or anticipatory
measure for the purpose of avoiding costly delays to
the vessel prejudicial to its own interest, decide to
negotiate and/or enter into any agreement in
advance with any foreign based union, particularly
ITF or ITF affiliated unions, in any foreign port where
the vessel involved herein may enter, dock or drop
anchor, whatever increases in salaries or benefits to
the Crewmember that the Company may be
compelled to give, over and above those stipulated
in the NSB-approved employment contracts of the
Crewmember, shag, likewise, be deemed ineffective
or void from the beginning as far as the Crewmember
is concerned, and any such increases in salaries or
benefits which the Crewmember shall receive
pursuant thereto shall be held by the Crewmembers
in trust for the Company with the obligation to return
the same immediately upon receipt thereof, at the
Company's or its agent's office at Manila, Philippines.
It is fully understood that the rates of pay and all
other terms and conditions embodied in the NSBapproved employment contracts shall be of
continuing validity and effectivity between the

parties, irrespective of the countries or ports where

the said vessel shall enter, dock or drop anchor, and
irrespective of any agreement which the Company
may enter or may have entered into with any union,
particularly ITF or ITF affiliated unions.

THE
CREWME
MBERS

6. WHEREAS, it is likewise agreed that any

undertaking made by the Company and/or the
National Seamen Board upon the request of the
Company, imposed by any foreign union, particularly
ITF or ITF affiliated unions, which will negate or
render in effective any provisions of this agreement,
shall also be considered null and void from the
beginning.
7. WHEREAS, lastly, this Addendum Agreement is
entered into for the mutual interest of both parties in
line with the Company's desire to continue the
service of the Filipino crewmembers on board their
vessel and the Crewmembers'desire to keep their
employment on board the subject vessel, thus
maintaining the good image of the Filipino seamen
and contributing to the development of the Philippine
manning industry.

N
a
m
e

1.

8. That both the Company and the Crewmember

agree and bind themselves that this Agreement shall
be considered an addendum to, or as part of, the
NSB-approved employment contract entered into by
the Company and the Crewmember.

R
u
b
e
n
A
r
r
o
z
a

P
o
si
ti
o
n

SC
#

Si
g
n
at
ur
e

2
n
d
M
a
t
e

10
47
28

S
G
D
.

3
r
d
M
a
t
e

91
66
3

S
G
D
.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our

signatures this December 28, 1978 at Manila,
Philippines.
THE COMPANY
VIR-JEN SHIPPING & MARINE SERVICES, INC.
By:
(SGD.) CAPT. RUBEN R.
BALTAZAR
Operations Dept.

2.

C
r
e
s
e
n
c
i
a
n

o
A
b
r
a
z
a
l
d
o

3.

S
a
l
v
a
d
o
r
C
a
u
n
a
n

T
h
ir
d
E
n
g
r.

84
99
5

S
G
D
.

4.

N
i
l
o
C
r
u
z

4
t
h
E
n
g
r.

15
77
62

S
G
D
.

5.

P
a
c
i
f
i
c
o
L
a
b
i
o
s

A
/
B

13
90
45

S
G
D
.

6.

R
a
m
o
n

A
/
B

17
05
45

S
G
D
.

J
a
v
i
e
r

7.

J
o
a
q
u
i
n

9.

A
/
B

96
55
6

S
G
D
.

C
o
r
d
e
r
o

8.

R
o
d
o
l
f
o
C
r

i
s
o
s
t
o
m
o

16
21
21

S
G
D
.

O
/
S

13
71
32

S
G
D
.

O
/
S

14
96
35

S
G
D
.

O
l
i
v
e
r
o
s

10.

O
/
S

R
e
n
a
t
o

R
o
g
e
l
i
o
S
a
r
a
z

11.

N
e
m
e
s
i
o

P
u
m
p
m
a
n

15
72
15

u
f
i
n
o

S
G
D
.

14.
F
r
a
n
c
i
s
c
o

O
il
e
r

89
46
7

S
G
D
.

G
D
.

J
u
o
l
R
a
m

O
il
e
r

84
93
4

S
G
D
.

W
i
p
e
r

14
60
96

S
G
D
.

M
a
u
l

B
e
n
e
m
e
r
i
t
o

13.

36
63

G
u
t
i
e
r
r
e
z

A
d
u
g

12.

il
e
r

15.

17

S
t
e
v
e
M
a
r
i

16.

S
i
m
p
l
i
c
i
o
B
a
u
t
i
s
t
a

C
h
i
e
f
C
o
o
k

16
91
42

S
G
D
.

17.

R
o
m
e
o
A
c
o
s
t
a

18.

D
e
l
f
i
n

S
e
c
o
n
d
C
o
o
k

15
99
60

S
G
D
.

J
o
s
e
E
n
c
a
b

(Pp. 99-103, Annex D-1 of Petition)

The NLRC has cited Wallem Philippine Shipping Inc. vs. The Minister
of Labor, G. R. No. 50734-37, February 20, 1981 (102 SCRA 835).
No less than the Solicitor General maintains that said cited case is
not controlling:

M
e
s
s
m
a
n

14
40
96

S
G
D
.

M
e
s
s
m
a
n

17
95
51

S
G
D
.

D
a
g
o
h
o
y

19.

A careful examination of Wallem Philippine Shipping

Inc. vs. The Minister of Labor, G. R. No. 50734-37,
February, 20, 1981 shows that the same is dissimilar
to the case at bar. In the Wallem case, there was an
express agreement between the employer and the
ITF representative, under which said employer bound
itself to pay the crew members salary rates similar to
those of ITF. When the crew members in the Wallem
case demanded that they be paid ITF rates, they
were merely asking their employer to comply with
what had been agreed upon with the ITF
representative, which conduct on their part cannot
be said to be a violation of contract but an effort to
urge performance thereof. Such is not the situation in
the case at bar. In the case at bar, petitioner and
private respondents had a side agreement, whereby
private respondents agreed to return to petitioner
whatever amounts petitioner would be required to
pay under ITF rates. In other words, petitioner and
private respondents agreed that petitioner would not
pay the ITF rate. When private respondents used ITF
as threat to secure increase in salary, they violated
the manning contract. Moreover, in the case at bar,
petitioner terminated the manning contract only after
the NSB authorized it to do so, after it found the
grounds therefor to be valid. On the other hand, the
termination of the manning contract in the Wallem
case was without prior authorization from the NSB.
It will be noted that private respondents sent a cable
to petitioner demanding an increase of 50% of their
basic salary as the only solution to the ITF problem at
a time when the vessel M/T JANNU was enroute to

Australia, an ITF port. The fact that private

respondents mentioned ITF in their cable clearly
shows that if petitioner would not accede to their
demands, they would denounce petitioner to ITF.
Thus, Chief Mate Jacobo Catabay in his report dated
April 23, 1979 (Exh. 10-A) stated:
On our departure at Keelung, we did
not have destination until three days
later that Harman cabled us to proceed
to Senipah, Indonesia to load fun cargo
to be discharged at Kwinana, Australia.
Captain told everyone that if only we
stayed so long with the ship, he will
report to ITF personally in order to get
back wages. In view that we only
worked for three months so the back
wages is so small and does not worth.
From that time on, Chief Engr. and
Captain have a nightly closed door
conference until they arrived at the
conclusion to ask for 50% salary
increase and they have modified a
certain platforms. They certainly
believe that Vir-jen have no choice
because the vessel is going to ITF port
so they called a general meeting
conducted at the bridge during my
duty hours in the afternoon. All
engines and deck personnel were
present in that meeting. (Emphasis
supplied)
Reporting the wage scheme to the ITF would mean
that the vessel would be interdicted and detained in
Australia unless petitioner pay the ITF rates, which
represent more than 100% of what is stipulated in
the manning contract. Petitioner was thus forced to
grant private respondents an increase of 25% in their
basic salary. That such grant of a 25% increase was
not voluntary is shown by the fact that petitioner
immediately denounced the seamen's conduct to
NSB and subsequently asked said agency authority
to terminate the manning contract. (Pp. 10-12,
Manifestation & Comment of Solicitor General)

Summarizing, We are convinced that since the NSB, considering its

official role in matters like those now before Us, is the fact-finding
body, and there is no sufficient cogency in the NLRC's finding that
there was no threat employed by respondents on petitioner, and, it
appearing further that the well prepared Manifestation and
Comment of the Solicitor General supports the decision of the NSB,
which body, to Our mind, was in a better position than the NLRC to
appraise the relevant nuances of the actuations of both parties, We
are of the considered view that the decision of the NLRC under
question constitutes grave abuse of discretion and should be set
aside in favor of the NSB's decision.
In El Hogar Filipino Mutual Building and Loan Association vs.
Building Employees Inc., 107 Phil. 473, citing San Miguel Brewery
vs. National Labor Union, 97 Phil. 378, We emphasized:
Much as we should expand beyond economic
orthodoxy, we hold that an employer cannot be
legally compelled to continue with the employment
of a person who admittedly was guilty of
misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer,
and whose continuance in the service of the latter is
patently inimical to his interest. The law in protecting
the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither the
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.
(Page 3, Record) (Emphasis supplied)
It is timely to add here in closing that situations wherein employers
are practically laid in ambush or placed in a position not unlike
those in a highjack whether in the air, land or midsea must be
considered to be what they really are: acts of coercion, threat and
intimidation against which the victim has generally no recourse but
to yield at the peril of irreparable loss. And when such happenings
affect the national economy, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, they must be treated to be in the nature of economic
sabotage. They should not be tolerated. This Court has to be
careful not to sanction them.
WHEREFORE, the petition herein is granted and the decision of the
NLRC complained of hereby set aside; the decision of the NSB
should stand.
No costs.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ.,

concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.

G.R. No. 103982

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992 ]
ANTONIO A. MECANO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify
the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity)
embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying
his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of
P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to
April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming
from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S.
Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699[1] of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
"Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred
in performance of duty. -- When a person in the service of the
national government or in the service of the government of a
province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the

performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical

hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that
absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be
on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he
may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical
attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital
fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall
be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx
"In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the
performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head
may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary
hospital fees."
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement
dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice, along with the
comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of
the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof". Finding
petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the Committee on
Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a
4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's
claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the
Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September
1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy
of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991[2] dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary
of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating
that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to
repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code,
including the particular Section 699 of the latter".

On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement

transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2,
1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992,
however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699
of the RAC has been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987,
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor reenacted in the Administrative Code of 1967. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees'
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director
Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of
1987.
Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of
Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th
Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that
petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so
desires".
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987
repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was
brought for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as
amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of
Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim
is filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, as
suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a
claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or
not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated

to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative

Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of
the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the
intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA
questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary
of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that
employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered
by the Employees' Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such
that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on
account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the
Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not
by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The
lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a
repealing provision which expressly and specifically
cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are
intended to be repealed.[3] A declaration in a statute, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its
number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are
implied repeals.[4]
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature
to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the
scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This
provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
"Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. -- All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly."
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this
repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are

intended to be repealed.[5] Rather, it is an example of a general

repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old
laws.[6] This latter situation falls under the category of an implied
repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute
of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect.[7] Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent
in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention
to repeal must be clear and manifest;[8] otherwise, at least, as a
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. [9]
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. [10]
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the
two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is,
that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. [11]
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does
not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old

Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are
not founded the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations,
claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the
two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are
in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict
because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the
fact that Section699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of
1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It further
maintained that to allow the particular provisions not restated in
the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself.
The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the
1987 Code, which states:
"WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be
enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporates in
a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles and rules of governance; and
x x x x x x"
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code -the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause
an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute maymerely
be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.[12] What is necessary
is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. [13]
We come now to the second category of repeal -- the enactment of
a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject
matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was

intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect

system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed
to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter
of the former statute.[14] When both intent and scope clearly evince
the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act
that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.
[15]
Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this
category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later
act be the substitute to the prior act.[16]
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice,
what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of
government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this
opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch
as the body which had been entrusted with the implementation of
this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA
relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case
of Sison vs. Pangramuyen[17] that in the absence of palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute
its ownjudgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted
with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not
hold water. This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative
decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the
decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.[18] It has been
held that Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice
are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia.[19]
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not favored. [20] The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.[21]

This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows:

"Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy
between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless
the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or
unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure
renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand
and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the
later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.[22]
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject
section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees'
Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second
sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees'
Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor
Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the
payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery
of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code x x x whose benefits are administered by the
system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of
the government."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT
the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, and Melo,

JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.