State vs.

Metzger

Douglas Metzger was seen standing naked in front of his apartment window
eating a bowl of cereal. (Mid-thigh up was visible)
Lincoln, Nabraska
Lincoln Municipal Code It shall be unlawful for any person within the City of
Lincolnto commit any indecent, immodest, or filthy act in the presence of
any person.

WoN the ordinance is so vague as to be unconstitutional

o YES
o Ordinance is criminal in nature; fundamental requirement of due
process of law that such criminal ordinance be reasonably clear and
definite
o A statute which forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and
differ as to its application violates the first essential elements of due
process of law
o TEST:
Whether language may apply not only to a particular act about
which there can be little or no difference of opinion
Dividing line not left to conjecture
o Immodest? Subjective
SEC 9.52.100 of London Municipal Code invalid
White Light Corp vs. City of Manila

December 23, 1993 Mayor Lim issued Ordinance No 7774

An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.
Prohibits motels and inns from offering short time admission. Wash up rates
and renting out room 2x in one day
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint (later
withrew)
White light Corp, filed motion to intervene (affects their business)

RTC: Ordinance void. Strikes at personal libery

CA: reversed RTC; did not violate right to privacy and freedom of movement, as it
only penalizes owners. There is also a lawful method (establishments still allowed to
operate). Justified by well-being of constituents.
Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling:

Due process prevent arbitrary govt enroachments against life libery, and
property
Procedural due process procedures government must follow
Substantive due process inquires whether govt has sufficient justification
for depriving a person of life, liberty, and property
There is legitimate sexual behavior (between married couples and consenting
singles) constitutionally protected
Very legitimate uses for wash rate (families traveling
Ordinance prevents lawful uses and petitioners of lucrative business. You
cannot legislate morality

PETITION GRANTED Ordinance UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Barnes vs. Glen Theatre

Facts: Indiana statute: It is a misdemeanor to appear in a state of nudity in a public
place and female dancers are required to wear at least pasties and a G-string
when they dance. 2 establishments (Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre) wish to
provide totally nude dancing as entertainment and brought an action to court that
the statute impinges on the freedom of expression under the First Amendment.
Court of Appeals held that non-obscene nude dancing performed for entertainment
is an expression protected by the First Amendment and that the statute was an
improper infringement because its purpose was to prevent the message of eroticism
and sexuality.
Issue: The Indiana public indecency law violates free expression as guaranteed in
the First Amendment.
Held: The statute does not violate the First Amendment. Judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.
Test whether government regulation is sufficiently justified:
(1) Government regulation is within the governments constitutional power
(2) Regulation furthers an important governmental interest
(3) Governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
(4) Incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest

Nude dancing as entertainment is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of

the First Amendment but application of the Indiana statute is justified. (1) It is within
the states constitutional powers. (2) Although its impossible to discern exactly
what the governmental interests are in this case, the statutes purpose of protecting
societal order and morality can be traced from its text and history illustrates that
the Indiana statue furthers a substantial government interest. (3) It may be
contended that prohibiting nudity does not suppress expression, but prohibiting
nude dancing does. The statute does not prohibit nude dancing because of the
message of eroticism it conveys but it seeks to address the evil of public nudity. (4)
There is a fit with the requirement that dancers wear a least pasties and a Gstring. This is the bare minimum necessary to achieve the states purpose.
Statute did not regulate expression, it merely regulated conduct
Estrada vs. Escritor
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five
years and had a son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein
for
it
will
appear
as
if
the
court
allows
such
act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe
Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible
for
a
couple
to
legalize
their
union.

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
arrangement.

Held:
No.
The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most

inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the
symbolic
preservation
of
an
unenforced
prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public
and
secular
morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation
of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

People vs. Dela Cruz

Facts:
Facts:

In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La
Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of
"Carnation" milk for thirty centavos.

As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good
terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and
resulted in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued
by authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum
price for that kind of commodity.

Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows:

SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more
than twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor
more than ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
person who sells any article, goods, or commodity in excess of the
maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . .

In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons,

corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation
of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the president
pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the wholesome and retail
business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be
permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses.

Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price,
Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of
Manila, to imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand
pesos plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail
business for five years.

Issue/s:
1. WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate
to the offence
2. WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it
prescribed excessive penalties.
1. Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too
excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings
established in the Executive Order?
2. Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation
that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?
Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts
by the same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six
months and the fine to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision
in
all
other
respects.

Ratio:

The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted."

The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed

at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never
existed in America of which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or

obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the
wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A.
p. 561).

Fine and imprisonment

prohibition.

would

not

thus

be

within

the

However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies
as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be
so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178)

For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding,
that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But
that brings up again two opposing theories

we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the
courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15
Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526).

the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is

excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being
entirely out of proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed

Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand

pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at
prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive
Order?

NO. because in overstepping the price barriers Dela Cruz

might derive, in some instances, profits amounting to
thousands of pesos

The prison term must be so disproportionate to the

offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the
circumstances (lb.).

authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental

prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority

The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the

court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor,
and if notable disparity results, it would apply the constitutional
brake, even if the statute would, under other circumstances, be
not extreme or oppressive.

Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a
violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?

NO.

In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured

exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as
one violation would mean others, and the consequential
breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls.

PEOPLE VS. ECHEGARAY

Facts:
On June 25, 1996, SC rendered its decision in convicting Echegaray for the
rape of his 10 yr old daughter
Death Penalty Act (RA 7659) Echegaray was given the death sentence
Issue: Whether or not RA 7659 is violative of the constitutional prescription against
cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment.
Held:
No.
The gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty, is NOT
death on the part of the victim
Eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth is not the defining essence of the death
penalty
Death penalty imposed because in heinous crimes, perpetrators have
committed crimes with destructive effects to society, that its repetition is a
great threat to the safety of individuals
THEY ARE PERMANENTLY PREVENTED FROM DOING THE CRIME AGAIN.
Capital punishment is necessary for maintenance of social tranquility

PEOPLE vs. FERRER

Facts:
Anti Subversion Act
o outlaws the CPP and other subversive associations

punishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by overt acts

affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Party or
of other similar subversive organization.
(March 5, 1970) Criminal complaint for violation of Sec 4 of ASA, filed against
Feliciano Co (officer of CPP)
o Co moves to squash BILL OF ATTAINDER
(May 25, 1970) Criminal Complaint filed against Nilo Tayag and 5 others
with subversion (KABATAANG MAKABAYAN and CPP)
o Moves to squash: (1) bill of attainder
Trial Court (Judge Ferrer) declared statute void on the grounds that it is a bill
of attainder.
o

Issue:
Whether or not the Anti Subversion Act is a Bill of Attainder.
Held:
No.
It does not specify the CPP or their members for purpose of punishment (used
solely for definition, for the purposes of prohibition against membership)
Focus not on individuals but on conduct
o Compared to US vs Brown: statute specifies the Communist Party and
imposes disability and penalties on its members. (Membership without
more, disqualifies a person from becoming an officer)
If it were a Bill of Attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court
o Guilt still has to be judicially established (joined knowingly, willfully,
and by over acts, with specific intent to further its objectives)
Would have been Bill of Attainder if it punished mere membership devoid of
intent
Only when a statute applied either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them w/o judicial trial does it become a BOA.
Does not have retroactive effect (Bill of Attainder is also an ex-post facto law)
Legislative fact vs. adjudicative fact
DISSENT:

It is a Bill of Attainder
Apply to named or ascertainable members of the group
In Cummings there was still a trial
Need to protect separation of powers

US vs. Diaz-Conde
Facts:
December 30, 1915 -Bartolome Oliveros and Engrasia Lianco executed a
contract showing that they borrowed from the defendants 300 pesos, 5%
interest/mo.
May 1, 1916 Usury Law (Act 2655) became effective
May 6, 1921 complaint was presented in Court charging defendant for a
violation of the Anti Usury Law. Judge found defendants guilty (pay 120
pesos, if insolvent subsidiary imprisonment)
Case brought before SC
Issue:
Whether or not defendants should be held liable for violating the Anti-Usury
Law.
Held:
NO.
Prohibition on legislature from giving to any penal law a retroactive effect
unless favorable to the accused (Art 21 and 22 of Penal Code)
New penalty, New Liability, New right of action not be construed as having a
retroactive effect.
Act is legal at its commission, cannot be rendered illegal by subsequent
legislation. (involves impairment of contract as well)
Every law that makes an innocent action done before passage of law, criminal
and punishes it, is an ex-post facto law
Ex post facto laws are prohibited unless retroactive effect is favorable to the
defendant

People vs. Sultan

Facts:
Judith Bautista (victim) was on her way home at 9 pm, when accosted by
defendant with a sharp instrument in a dark alley.
Was brought inside his house, and divested of her valuables (necklace,
earrings, rings, watch)
Was raped but was let go the following afternoon after agreeing to elope
with him. On the false premise, of getting things to meet defendant later,
victim went home and reported incident to her sister, who in turn reported to
her brother (SPO1 Fernando Bautista).

 Victim went ahead with planned elopement so brother and 2 companions

could stage an arrest
Defendant arrested on the bus and cases were filed. Charged with robbery
with rape
Lower Court: reclusion perpetua ( 50K moral damages and return of stolen
items)
Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC condemns a person to reclusion perpetua to
death when robbery shall have been committed with rape. In the present
case, the victim was raped TWICE but since additional rapes committed do
not count as aggravating circumstances1 (People v. Regala), the court must
construe the penal law to be in favor of the offender. Unless a law is passed
providing that additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered
aggravating, this will always be the case because:
Article 63, par. 2 of the same Code explicitly states that when the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, when there are
neither mitigating or aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. reclusion perpetua
RECLUSION PERPETUA and additional 50K (civil indemnity)
People vs. Valdez
Facts:
Defendants, including accused appellant Rolando Valdez, shot people
onboard a tricycle at *;30 pm, resulting 2 four deaths and serious injuries to 2
others (Montano and Tibule)
Defendant was charges with Multiple Murder with Double frustrated Murder
AND Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Caliber .30 carbine)
Lower Court:
o Guilty of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder punishable
under RA 7659, Heinous Crime Law. death
o Guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearm reclusion perpetua
Appeal to SC:
Whether or not there should be a separate conviction of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms.
Whether or not the use of unlicensed firearm may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance in Criminal Case (Multiple Murder.)
Held:
NO
There can be none under PD 1866, in view of the amendment introduced by
RA 8294

 Illegal possession of firearms is merely taken as an aggravating circumstance

(Sec 1, RA 8294)
RA 8294 (effective July 6, 1997) will have a retroactive effect on the case,
where crime committed (Sept 17, 1995)
May not be used as aggravating circumstance for murder case, because it
would raise the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. (not given
retroactive application)
RA 8294 retroactively applied to dismiss illegal possession case, but not
retroactively applied to murder case since this is not beneficial to him.
People vs. Formigiones
Facts:
On December 28, 1946, Abelardo Formigones caused his wife, Julia Agricola, lethal
injury with a bolo. Having done so, he then carried his wife to the living room and
lay down beside her. This was how he was found by the people summoned by his
eldest daughter, who witnessed the stabbing. He pleaded guilty to the Court of the
First Instance in Camarines Sur citing jealousy as his motive for he believed his wife
was being intimate with his brother. He received the sentence of reclusion perpetua
and the Solicitor General filed for an appeal on the grounds that he is an imbecile.
Issues:
WoN the defendant is an imbecile
WoN the questioned imbecilic nature of the defendant can affect his punishment.
Held and Ratio:
No, the defendant is not an imbecile, evidenced by his previous sixteen years of
sanity in his marriage. Though he has procured the sympathies of the court with the
circumstances of his situation.
No, the defendant is still charged with reclusion perpetua. The two mitigating
circumstances, his diminished will power and his act of passion driven by jealousy
(Art. 13 of Revised Penal Code) has been considered by the court but he is credited
with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone.
People vs. Veneracion
In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
with homicide committed against a seven year old girl. The Presiding judge was
Lorenzo Veneracion.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, the penalty imposable shall be death. However, Judge Veneracion refused
to impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion

perpetua. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the
penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused but the judge refused to act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser
penalty than that imposed by law.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an
adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the
law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the
judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the
Civil Code (Article 9 thereof) which provides that no judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Robinson vs. California
Facts. The Defendant was arrested by a police officer who observed the
Defendants arms to be in a condition consistent with heavy drug use, i.e. needle
marks, scabs, scar tissue. Further, the Defendant admitted to the occasional use of
narcotics. He was charged with violating a California statute that makes it a criminal
offense for a person to be addicted to the use of narcotics. The Defendant was
convicted by a jury.
Issue. Is a statute criminalizing drug addiction constitutional?
Held. No. The statute makes the status of being addicted to narcotics illegal at
any time before he reforms. Since addiction can properly be termed a disease, the
United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) likens this statute to making it a
crime to be mentally ill or to have a venereal disease. Certainly, criminalizing
having the disease would be universally thought to be cruel and unusual
punishment.

People vs. Sylvestre and Atienza

Facts:

Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage

Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in

Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan

On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong,
Bulacan a sworn complaint for adultery

After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the
municipal president of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him
to withdraw the complaint

The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised

not to live again in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)

On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his
complaint and the justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case

The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Nio, in Paombong

About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage,
Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo Nio and followed him home to Masocol (under
the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)

Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived
in the home of Nicolas

On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the
appellants were gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to
take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it

He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the
people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery
against him and Romana

Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him

Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late

The fire destroyed about 48 houses

Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire

The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson

Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8

months, and 1 day of cadena temporal)

Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio

mayor)

The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the

affirmance of the CFI decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with
reference to Romana:

The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice

The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient

evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt

Issue:

Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to

be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who
does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission
of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished,
yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous
actions.

In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation

and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere
presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute
cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin
Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm,
that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.

Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and
failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do
not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for
complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard
to which one has kept silent

Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to

Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.

People vs. Talingdan

Facts:

Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag

No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented

by the prosecution

They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra

Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa
had deserted her family home a couple of times and each time
Bernardo took time out to look for her

On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in

their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa
had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to go down the house
and leave them

Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between
Talingdan and Teresa

About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house
and did not come back for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo
came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of
Tayum Abra during that time

Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa
had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in
Theresa seeking the help of the police

Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's

house and called him to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead
left and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill him

On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house

The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations

Corazon's version:

Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother
Teresa meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo

She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"

When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your
father that we will kill him"

Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw
her mother go down the house to go to the yard where she again met with
the other appellants.

She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.

Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room.

Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the
presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no attention

Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door

He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan

The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that
Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again

Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to
call for helo, Bides warned her that he will kill her if she calls for help

Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she
recognized the killers, the former threatened to kill the latter if she reveals
the matter to anyone

The defendants'' version:

Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never
maltreated her.

Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in
Sallapadan; an illicit relationship never existed between them

Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he
escorted the Mayor in Bangued from June 22 to June 26

Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in
Sallapadan, 250-300 meters from the place of the killing

Issue:

Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder

It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually

joined in the conspuracy to kill her husband because there is no
showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-appellants in their
culpable acts that led to his death

It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence

or approval thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is
required for her conviction as a conspirator

Holding:

Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.

Ratio:

Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony.

It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond
reasonable doubt; she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants.
She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped
directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced
that she knew it was going to be done and did not object.

There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an
accessory to the offense committed.

She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone,
she also claimed to have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came
into their house later to investigate

Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her
attitude regarding the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became
active in her cooperation with her co-appellants

These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in

the crime"

Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa

Domogma, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision
correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.

People vs. Puno

Facts:

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is
the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in
Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs.
Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC

He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an
emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place

When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she
got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving

After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver

Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to
"get money" from her

Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused

But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked
Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000

Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check

Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed
his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga

According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the
other side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van,
her dress had blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground
and was injured when she jumped out of the car

The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except
that according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely
allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car

He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw
that his employer had gotten a ride

He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running
across the highway

Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as
charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under
PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
1. No.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,
nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation.

For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual
intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty

In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an

incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by
the offenders

This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation
of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since
the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such
moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin
of the law on highway robbery)

PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery

perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons
on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only
a predetermined or particular victim

The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car
which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD
No 532 applicable to the case

This is not justified by the accused's intention

Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2

months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused
to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

Padilla vs. Dizon

Facts:

Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and

accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate
the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of
US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.

Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International

Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the country.

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by
Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.

Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person

shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit
foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an
authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident
visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign
exchange brought in by them. Tourists and non-resident
temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or
its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their
foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage
in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in
violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central
Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign
exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal
(minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and
a fine of no less than P50,000.00.

At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman

from Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to
invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that
he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in
and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.

Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo

Chi Fai was urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring
the money out of the Philippines.

Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against

Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence

or gross ignorance of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that
the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.

Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign
currency instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was
apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not
correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the
trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to
other people.

In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the
release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central
Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release
the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

People vs. Pugay

FACTS
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term
ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as
maximum and for Samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay
and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was
held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay
and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started
making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of
gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay
not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of
him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident
gave their written statements.
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same
time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING
TO
HOMICIDE
SAMSON: Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record
establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the
mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. GUILTY
OF
HOMICIDE
HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS
LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.