TAN v.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

FACTS:

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a
New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective
December 3, 1985 (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava,
Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite in
January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P.
Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code
because:

1. The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included I the plebiscite.
2. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing
statute.
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite
sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plebiscite was legal and complied
constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution

with

the

HELD: NO

In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whether a province is
created, divided, or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval
of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first
would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially

altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes v. Hon.
Executive Secretary to the President, et. al. (128 SCRA 6), which respondents used to support
their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, it held that the
dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the
applicable ruling, quoting that: when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected, it
means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case
at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in
the Constitutional provision.
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that the plebiscite shall
be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the
approval of this Act. However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, there was an
unexplained change from areas affected to the proposed new province, which are the areas
affected. The Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new
province constitutes the area affected.
Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading,
erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area
affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.
Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986
has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
Wherefore, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials
thereof are also declared null and void. SO ORDERED.

LCP vs COMELEC
November 18, 2008

Facts:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on
June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income
requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the
11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No.
29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate
again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives
approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The
Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners
filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners
also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount
of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:

1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.

2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from
another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion
mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose
of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.