Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Final Draft
August 2012
CIGRE WG B5.37
2012-08-23
Regular Members
Stefan Roxenborg (Convenor)
Pouria Naisani
Gheorghe Moraru
Stein Ingebrigtsen
Javier Martin
Simon Chano
SE
CA
RO
NO
ES
CA
Corresponding Members
Anita Oommen
Kevin Stephan
Antonio Carlos da Rocha Duarte
Loi Lei Lai
Mikio Shintani
Ji-Feng Wen
Bapuji S Palki
ZA
US
BR
UK
JP
CN
IN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 12
Description of shunt reactors .................................................................................... 13
2.1
Design of shunt reactors.................................................................................... 13
2.2
Electrical characteristics ................................................................................... 18
2.2.1 Air-gap of the shunt reactor core .................................................................. 18
2.2.2 Inrush ............................................................................................................ 18
2.2.2.1 Switching in air core reactors ............................................................... 18
2.2.2.2 Switching in oil immersed iron core reactors ....................................... 22
2.2.3 Shunt reactor disconnection .......................................................................... 27
2.2.4 Harmonics ..................................................................................................... 28
2.2.4.1 Zero Harmonic (DC) ............................................................................. 31
2.2.4.2 2nd Harmonic ......................................................................................... 31
2.2.4.3 3rd Harmonic ......................................................................................... 32
2.2.5 Hysteresis ...................................................................................................... 33
2.2.6 Losses ............................................................................................................ 33
3 Application of shunt reactors .................................................................................... 34
3.1
Connection to the Power System and Grounding Methods .............................. 34
3.1.1 Line and Bus connected reactors .................................................................. 34
3.1.2 Tertiary winding connected reactors ............................................................. 35
3.2
Effects of Shunt Reactors on Transmission Line Voltage ................................ 36
4 Shunt reactor faults and abnormal conditions ........................................................... 40
4.1
Fault types in Dry-type reactors ........................................................................ 40
4.2
Fault types in oil immersed reactors ................................................................. 40
4.3
Failure rates of shunt reactors ........................................................................... 41
4.4
Turn to turn faults ............................................................................................. 41
4.5
Bushing failure .................................................................................................. 43
5 Shunt reactor protections .......................................................................................... 44
5.1
Protection for bus connected oil immersed shunt reactors ............................... 45
5.1.1 Differential protection (87R / I) ................................................................. 46
5.1.1.1 Low impedance phase differential protection basic principles .......... 46
5.1.1.2 High impedance phase differential protection basic principles ......... 48
5.1.1.3 Application notes differential protection .............................................. 50
5.1.2 Restricted Earth Fault protection (87N / I) ................................................. 54
5.1.2.1 Low impedance Restricted Earth Fault protection- basic principles .... 54
5.1.2.2 High impedance Restricted Earth Fault protection- basic principles.... 56
5.1.2.3 Application notes REF protection ......................................................... 57
5.1.3 Phase overcurrent protection (50 and 51 / I>> and I>, t) .............................. 58
5.1.3.1 Application notes phase overcurrent protection ................................... 59
5.1.4 Earth fault overcurrent protection (51N or 51G / IE>, t) ............................... 60
5.1.4.1 Application notes Earth fault overcurrent protection......................... 61
5.1.5 Distance protection (21 / Z<) ........................................................................ 62
5.1.5.1 Application notes distance protection ................................................... 62
5.1.6 Protection schemes dedicated to the detection of turn to turn faults ............ 66
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Three-leg shunt reactor core ............................................................................... 14
Figure 2 Five-leg shunt reactor core with three wound limbs .......................................... 14
Figure 3 Reactor construction, Core type (A), Shell type (B). ......................................... 17
Figure 4 Simple shunt reactor model ................................................................................ 19
Figure 5 Aircore reactor .................................................................................................... 21
Figure 6 Typical magnetizing characteristic of a gapped core shunt reactor ................... 22
Figure 7 Test result of inrush ............................................................................................ 25
Figure 8 Bus connected, 300kV, 150MVAr, oil immersed shunt reactor ........................ 26
Figure 9 Bus connected, 420kV, 200MVAr, oil immersed shunt reactor ........................ 27
Figure 10 Phase C winding currents during shunt reactor switching in and tripping out . 28
Figure 11 Shunt reactor characteristics for a gapped and air core reactor ........................ 28
Figure 12 Idealized inrush currents for an air core reactor ............................................... 29
Figure 13 Idealized inrush currents for an iron core reactor ............................................. 29
Figure 14 Example of harmonic content in an idealized inrush current for an iron core
reactor ....................................................................................................................... 30
Figure 15 Example of the relative content of the second harmonic and inrush peak current
for different degree of offset. The slope of the saturated part is 30 % of the
unsaturated slope ....................................................................................................... 30
Figure 16 Example of the relative content of the second harmonic and inrush peak current
for different degree of offset. The slope of the saturated part is 50 % of the
unsaturated slope ....................................................................................................... 31
Figure 17 Shunt reactor current for operation with over voltage...................................... 32
Figure 18 Harmonics in the reactor current in case of over voltage ................................. 32
Figure 19 Solidly grounded three phase reactor directly connected to line ...................... 35
Figure 20 Three phase and neutral reactor connected to bus or line via circuit switcher or
circuit breaker ........................................................................................................... 35
Figure 21 Shunt reactor connected to transformer tertiary winding switching via circuit
switcher or circuit breaker on supply side ................................................................ 36
Figure 22 Shunt reactor connected to transformer tertiary winding switching via circuit
switcher or circuit breaker on neutral side ................................................................ 36
Figure 23 Nominal- circuit of a transmission line .......................................................... 37
Figure 24 Nominal- circuit with shunt reactors added to both end of the transmission
line............................................................................................................................. 38
Figure 25 Equilibrium chart relating water vapor pressure over oil to water concentration
in insulation (kraft) paper vs. temperature. ............................................................... 42
Figure 26 Typical shunt reactor connections .................................................................... 45
Figure 27 Principle of low impedance phase differential protection ................................ 46
Figure 28 Tripping characteristic - Example .................................................................... 47
Figure 29 Principle of high impedance phase differential protection ............................... 49
Figure 30 High impedance differential protection - stabilizing principle......................... 50
Figure 31 Differential currents of a 1% turn to ground fault in phase L1 at the neutral
point of a 150 MVA, 220 kV, 50Hz shunt reactor.................................................... 51
Figure 32 Example - Tripping characteristic for a two stage numerical low impedance
differential protection applied to a shunt reactor. ..................................................... 53
Figure 33 Shunt reactors inrush current in phase C with fully DC offset response of two
different types of digital filters. ................................................................................ 54
Figure 34 Low impedance restricted earth fault during external fault condition ............. 55
Figure 35 Low impedance restricted earth fault during internal fault condition .............. 55
Figure 36 High impedance restricted earth fault during external fault condition ............. 56
Figure 37 Restrained low impedance restricted earth fault during energizing and one
phase CT saturated .................................................................................................... 58
Figure 38 Terminal side connected phase overcurrent protection .................................... 59
Figure 39 Earth fault overcurrent protection alternatively connected to CT in the neutral
to ground connection or phase CTs on terminal side. ............................................. 61
differential protection sees these currents as shown in the figure. As a result, the
differential protection calculates (false!) instantaneous differential currents as shown
in the figure. These false differential currents might cause an unwanted trip of the
reactor. .................................................................................................................... 117
Figure 78 An example of a good operate restrain characteristic. Under heavy external
fault condition with current transformer saturation, the spurious false differential
current does not enter the operate region. ............................................................... 118
Figure 79 Internal/external fault discriminator. .............................................................. 119
Figure 80 Example of an internal fault using internal / external fault discriminator. ..... 120
Figure 81 VT and CT used for the turn-turn protection.................................................. 121
Figure 82 Zero sequence network at external phase-ground fault .................................. 122
Figure 83 Zero sequence voltage and current at external phase-ground fault ................ 122
Figure 84 Zero sequence network for internal turn-turn fault ........................................ 123
Figure 85 Zero sequence voltage and current for internal turn-turn fault....................... 123
Figure 86 External respective internal fault to ground ................................................... 124
Figure 87 To improve sensitivity for internal turn-turn faults ........................................ 125
Figure 88 Voltage waveform .......................................................................................... 125
Figure 89 Example of logical diagram for shunt reactor automation ............................. 138
Figure 90 Block diagram for principle of controlled switching ..................................... 140
Figure 91 Point -on-wave general operating principle ................................................... 140
Figure 92 Voltage across shunt reactor at de-energizing without re-ignition ................. 141
Figure 93 Voltage across shunt reactor in event of re-ignition ....................................... 142
Figure 94 Target for contact separation in order to eliminate re-ignitions ..................... 142
Figure 95 Point-of-wave block diagram for opening ...................................................... 144
Figure 96 Point-of-wave block diagram for opening and closing .................................. 145
Figure 97 Example on point-of-wave selection tree. ...................................................... 146
Figure 98 Shunt reactor energizing with current start feedback loop ............................. 147
Figure 99 Circuit breaker and half scheme with CT outside reactor bays. ..................... 148
Figure 100 Shunt reactor installation in a CB and a half scheme substation. ................. 149
Figure 101 Single phase test circuit for interrupting 500kV reactor current. ................. 170
Figure 102 Oscillograms obtained in interruption test. .................................................. 171
Figure 103 Relation between probability of re-ignition and T0. ..................................... 172
Figure 104 Voltage between contacts at re-ignition. ...................................................... 172
Figure 105 Illustration of re-ignition suppression by controlled switching. ................... 173
Figure 106 Opening phase control achieved on 550kV one-break circuit breaker......... 175
Figure 107 Shunt reactor installed in the substation. ...................................................... 176
Figure 108 Single line diagram 765 kV substation ......................................................... 178
Figure 109 Three line diagram 765 kV substation.......................................................... 180
Figure 110 Grounded-wye Auxiliary Power Winding for Low-voltage Distribution .... 181
Figure 111 Ungrounded Auxiliary Power Winding for Low-voltage Distribution ........ 182
Figure 112 Automatic Reactive Switching (ARS), relationship of thresholds and deadbands for Coarse and Fine Voltage Control Modes of the combined HV/LVARS 188
TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1 Requirements met, on bus connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 1
................................................................................................................................... 75
Table 2 Requirements met, on bus connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 2
................................................................................................................................... 76
Table 3 Requirements met, on bus connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 3
................................................................................................................................... 77
Table 4 Requirements met, on tertiary connected shunt reactor protection scheme number
1................................................................................................................................. 92
Table 5 Requirements met, on tertiary connected shunt reactor protection scheme number
2................................................................................................................................. 93
Table 6 Requirements met, on tertiary connected shunt reactor protection scheme number
3................................................................................................................................. 94
Table 7 Components used in a typical system for shunt reactor fire protection ............. 102
Table 8 Key gases and fault types................................................................................... 106
Table 9 List proposed of main parameters for shunt reactors monitoring ...................... 109
Table 10 Monitored components and health condition................................................... 113
Table 11 Voltage levels .................................................................................................. 151
Table 12 Shunt reactor connection to the power system ................................................ 152
Table 13 Shunt reactor design......................................................................................... 154
Table 14 Electrical protections - directly connected reactors ......................................... 155
Table 15 Electrical protection used for tertiary connected reactors ............................... 155
Table 16 Non electrical protections- directly connected reactors ................................... 156
Table 17 Non electrical protections - tertiary connected reactors .................................. 157
Table 18 Redundancy for directly connected reactors .................................................... 158
Table 19 Redundancy for tertiary connected reactors .................................................... 159
Table 20 Types of faults on directly connected shunt reactors ....................................... 160
Table 21 Types of faults on tertiary connected shunt reactors ....................................... 161
Table 22 Protection performance- directly connected shunt reactors ............................. 162
Table 23 Protection performance- tertiary connected shunt reactors ............................. 163
Table 24 New solutions for directly connected shunt reactors ....................................... 163
Table 25 Types of control - directly connected shunt reactors ....................................... 164
Table 26 Frequency of switching - directly connected shunt reactors............................ 166
Table 27 Frequency of switching - tertiary connected shunt reactors ............................ 166
Table 28 Point on wave switching - directly connected shunt reactors .......................... 167
Table 29 Reactor parameters monitored - direct connected shunt reactors .................... 168
Table 30 Reactor parameters monitored - tertiary connected shunt reactors.................. 169
Table 31 Test conditions for single phase circuit for interrupting 500kV reactor current.
................................................................................................................................. 171
Table 32 Function descriptions with ANSI, IEC61850-5, IEC61850-7-4 and IEC
Symbols................................................................................................................... 191
Table 33 Abbreviations used .......................................................................................... 193
INTRODUCTION
Cigre Working Group B5-37 was formed to determine the present state of the art of
protection, monitoring, and control of shunt reactors. The work of this working group
includes reviewing schemes for protecting shunt reactors, especially those advancements
resulting from use of numerical relays. Recommendations for using modern protection
techniques are provided. Advancements in integrated control and monitoring of shunt
reactors are reported and recommendations for application are provided.
This report is arranged beginning with descriptions and applications of shunt reactors,
reactor fault types and abnormal conditions encountered, protection (both electrical and
mechanical) including monitoring and adaptation to instrument transformer performance,
and recommendations for using protection. Control and monitoring is then discussed
including recommendations. Control includes rate of recurrence of switching and
techniques to minimize system impact during energization/denergizations. Monitoring
includes dissolved gas and fire detection (deluge).
The working group issued a questionnaire on existing practices to the participating Cigre
countries. The survey asked for information on the voltage levels utilized, types of
connections to the power system, grounding methods, reactor design, protection and
redundancy used including use of primary and backup schemes, types of faults
experienced and protection performance, types of control (automatic and/or manual), use
of synchronized switching, and reactor parameters monitored. The results of the survey
responses, knowledge and experience of the B5-37 working group members, and industry
publications and standards were all used to develop this final report.
General statement
Shunt reactors are inductive loads that are used to absorb reactive power to reduce the
over voltages generated by line capacitance.
An inductive load consumes reactive power versus a capacitive load generates reactive
power.
A transformer, a shunt reactor, a heavy loaded power line, and an under magnetized
synchronous machine are examples of inductive loads. Examples on a capacitive load are
a capacitor bank, an open power line and an over magnetized synchronous machine.
Although shunt reactors are inductive loads similar to transformers but they are different
than transformers in terms of construction and some electrical characteristics.
To describe the shunt reactors better, we need to look at the different designs of shunt
reactors and their electrical characteristics.
core less concept. The gapped core gives compact design with low losses and low total
mass, low sounds and low vibrations.
Higher energy density can be achieved in a gapped core compared to an air core.
The slope of the permeability is greater in a gapped core versus an air core reactor.
The primary advantages of dry-type air-core reactor, compared to oil-immersed types, are
lower initial and operating costs, lower weight, lower losses, and the absence of
insulating oil and its maintenance. The main disadvantages of dry-type reactors are
limitations on voltage and kVA rating and the high-intensity magnetic field. There is no
magnetizing inrush current when the reactor is energized.
Unit ratings for existing single phase or three phase shunt reactors are:
Three phase up to: 250 Mvar
Single phase up to: 130 Mvar
System voltages up to: 800 kV
As for transformers, a high zero sequence reactance requires a low reluctance unwound
return path in the magnetic circuit, leads to smaller zero sequence current which is
achieved with a five-limb core. In a reactor this will result in a next to absolute
decoupling of the phase limbs from each other because the wound limbs are gapped and
the outer limbs are not. This is easily verified by measuring non-induced voltage on the
other phases when one phase is energized [ref 24].
Split winding
The split winding is used when the current have exceeded the maximum of mechanical
reasons in the construction, then two windings per phase will be parallel in the reactor.
switching in and out of traditional fixed reactors, - flexibility for future (today unknown)
load and generation patterns, - improved interaction with other transmission equipment
and/or systems such as coarse tuning of SVC (Static Var Compensation) equipment, limiting the foot print of a substation if parallel fixed shunt reactors can be replaced with
one VSR, - a VSR can be used as flexible spare unit and be moved to other locations in
the power grid if needed.
This simple definition does not always hold. The way reactors are built today; a
description as follows would be more adequate:
In a core type reactor the core limb has a shape of a cylinder around which the
coils are arranged. For normal core type power reactors the coils too are
cylindrical and arranged concentrically. Each terminal is connected to one coil or
several coils in series. Further the coils are slid down around a pre-made core
limb to which yokes are connected after the windings are in position. Most often
the core limbs and yokes are in vertical position.
In the shell type reactor the separate coils have rectangular cross section and they
are wound in one plane. After the winding work the coils for one terminal are
stacked up on each other and connected together. The groups of coils are then in
turn, stacked together to form a winding packet for the complete circuit. The
packets for each phase are then raised to the upright and adjusted position it has in
the reactor. In and around these packets the core is now built up.
A five leg shunt reactor of core type has similar characteristics as a three leg shell type
reactor (to have a low vibration and noise level, low zero sequence current), so the reason
for a manufacturer to keep to a certain concept may today be historical.
2.2.2 Inrush
When switching in air core or iron core reactors, long DC components up to 1 second can
occur, some differences distinguishes between inrush in air respective iron core reactors.
e E sin(t )
AC
e uL
iL
R
di
uL L L
dt
di
eL L
dt i
L
R
R
e
i L i L 0
L
L
eq. 1
eq. 2
eq. 3
eq. 4
0
t
R
t
E
i L i AC i DC sin( t ) sin( ) e L
Z
Z R 2 (L) 2
eq. 7
eq. 8
The first term in eq. 7 states the time function for the steady state condition which is an
AC current and the second term indicates the transient condition which is a damped DC
current.
L
The time constant of the damping is .
R
The time constants for shunt reactors are longer than transformers and can be up to 1
second. Transformers have DC constants up to a couple of hundred milliseconds.
ik
2 I k cos( t ) cos( ) e L 0
R
t
ik
R
2 I k cos( t ) sin( ) e L 0
t
L
tan tan( )
L
R
0, , 2 ,
eq. 9
eq. 10
eq. 11
The maximum inrush current ik max appears when using realistic power system
impedances, approximately at the same time when the steady state current reaches its first
2
peak value, i.e. t
, see eq. 12 below:
L 2
ik 2 I k 1 sin( ) e
eq. 12
We observe that the current time derivative is zero in the short circuit moment and that
the DC component initial value is not the maximal imaginable, since
in the
expression of .
AC
Zs
AC
Zs
Shunt reactor
AC
*
Current
transforme
r
Shunt reactor
AC
Case 2
Voltage
transforme
r
Shunt reactor
Zs
AC
Zs
U0
*
Current
transforme
r
Shunt reactor
Zs
AC
Zs
fault
Voltage
transforme
r
I0
Shunt reactor
AC
Shunt reactor
In this case has the steady state short circuit current the (negative) top value in the short
circuit moment and the DC component has in consequence hereby largest possible value.
Installed in eq. 7 the short circuit current can be derived:
RL t
ik 2 I k e
cos( t )
eq. 13
Zs
AC
Zs
AC
U0
*
Current
transforme
r
and is:
I0
eq. 14
Voltage
transforme
r
I0
AC
Shunt reactor
Shunt reactor
Because the asymmetry in a certain (some) degree here is largest it is close to expect that
this maximum value not is much less then the theoretic correct value that can be derived
in the case 0 . This is also correct for a power network characteristic data and one can
with good approximation use this simple expression when deriving the inrush current.
I0
fault
fault
U0
I0
Int
U0
eq. 15
U0
A short circuit current with DC component is often called unsymmetrical short circuit
current, and speaks about greater or less degree of asymmetry that is dependent on the
instantaneous time of the short circuit. With maximum asymmetry it is meant a current
which DC component has the same value as the AC components un-damped top value.
Observe that the word symmetry and asymmetry here is used in another meaning then
three phase symmetry and three phase asymmetry.
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
2
Current [pu]
Description of parameters
L = inductance [H]
N = number of windings
l FE = length of flux in iron yoke and limb [m]
0 4 10 7 permeability in air [Vs/Am]
B
H
eq. 17
B AFE N
eq. 19
H l FE
eq. 20
N
d
eq. 21
L
di
By introducing the inductance in eq. 21 the magnetic flux over the inductance follows in
eq. 23:
di
di ~
eq. 22
(e Ri )
dt d
i
d
(e~ Ri ) u L
dt
eq. 23
To derive the magnetizing voltage and the total magnetic flux the recursive equations
(Euler equations [ref 3]) are used in eq. 24 and eq. 25:
Starting conditions:
, B1 BR , 1 BR AFE N
u L k e~k R iL k
eq. 24
k 1 k t u L k
eq. 25
The magnetic field intensity (H) can be derived from the graph in [ref 4] after calculating
of the magnetic flux density (B):
k 1
eq. 26
Bk 1
H k 1
AFE N
Calculate the magnetizing current iL :
H k 1
i L k 1
l FE
N
eq. 27
E [V]
500
0
-500
0.5
1.5
0.5
1.5
0.5
1.5
0.5
1.5
0.5
1.5
0.5
1.5
Im [A]
5
0
-5
Um [V]
500
0
B - [T=Vs/m2]
-500
5
0
-5
H [A/m]
5
0
-5
Phi [Vs]
5
0
-5
During inrush the permeability can move up over the threshold knee and cause a transient
current greater than 2 2 I k (3 to 5 I k ) and after several seconds reaching steady state
current, see Figure 6 and Figure 7.
As the shunt reactor is moving from saturation region to steady state region, the
permeability increases towards the constant value ( ) and the current decreases to steady
state value. The damping time also increases with less saturation as the permeability of
the shunt reactor moves towards steady state.
Both above statements can be seen from the following equations:
lj
iN
eq. 28
0 r A
L
eq. 29
[pu]
2.08
4.17
6.25
8.33
10.42
12.5
Cycles
14.58
16.67
18.75
20.83
22.92
25
IC
IcN
Figure 10 Phase C winding currents during shunt reactor switching in and tripping out
2.2.4 Harmonics
The zero, 2nd and 3rd harmonics in a shunt reactor are described below.
Some figures and text under section 2.2.4 are used from the ongoing Cigre B5 WG24
Protection requirements on transient response of voltage and current digital acquisition
chain, to show the harmonic content during overload conditions and inrush conditions.
2,5
Voltage [pu]
2,0
1,5
Coreless
Gapped core
1,0
0,5
0,0
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
Current [pu]
Figure 11 Shunt reactor characteristics for a gapped and air core reactor
Based on the shunt reactor characteristics shown in Figure 11, the contents of harmonics
in idealized undamped inrush currents have been analyzed. A sinusoidal voltage has been
applied to the reactor at different inception angles which results in inrush currents with
different DC offset. As the damping is neglected the calculated contents of harmonics is
only valid for the initial part of the inrush.
As the reactor characteristic for an air core reactor is a straight line the inrush current will
be a sinusoidal current with different DC offset, see Figure 12. The inrush current
consists only of the fundamental frequency and in most cases a DC offset. Except for the
transient state there will not exist any harmonics. The maximum inrush peak is 2.8 times
the rated current.
3,5
3,0
Current [pu]
2,5
2,0
100 % offset
1,5
75 % offset
1,0
50 % offset
0,5
25 % offset
0,0
-0,5
-1,0
-1,5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time [ms]
6
5
Current [pu]
100 % offset
75 % offset
50 % offset
25 % offset
1
0
-1
-2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time [ms]
Figure 13 shows idealized inrush currents for an iron core reactor with the knee point at
125 percent of the rated voltage and the slope of the saturated part is 30 % of the
unsaturated slope. The content of the harmonics in relation to the fundamental harmonic
is shown in Figure 14. The second harmonic is predominant but very dependent of the
degree of the DC offset. The second harmonic has been analyzed further and Figure 15
shows the relative content of the second harmonic for different offset. The peak value of
the inrush is also shown in the figure. Figure 16 shows the peak value and the second
harmonic of the inrush current if the slope of the saturated part of the reactor
characteristic is 50 % of the unsaturated slope instead of 30 %. The peak current and the
harmonic content are reduced.
25
an/a1 [%]
20
40 % offset
15
70 % offset
100 % offset
10
0
2
10
nth Harmonic
Figure 14 Example of harmonic content in an idealized inrush current for an iron core reactor
30
25
I100p/Ipeak
Ipeak
20
15
10
I100/I50
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
20
I100p/Ipeak
15
3
10
2
5
Ipeak
I100/I50
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
130 % voltage
Current [pu]
135 % voltage
140 % voltage
0
-1
-2
-3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time [ms]
8
7
6
130 % voltage
an/a1 [%]
135 % voltage
140 % voltage
3
2
1
0
2
10
nth Harmonic
2.2.5 Hysteresis
There is practically no remanence in a shunt reactor compared to a transformer. The
small air gaps along the reactor winding create a thin hysteresis in the B-H curve for the
reactor and therefore very small remanence.
2.2.6 Losses
The fundamental losses in a shunt reactor are winding resistance and magnetization
losses, eddy current losses are also present but small in comparison.
The resistance loss is proportional to the weight of the winding material and to the square
of the current density. The magnetization loss in the core steel also rises by
approximately the square of the flux density.
The total loss is generally 0.2% active power (W) of the total reactive power of the shunt
reactor distributed as follows [ref 24]:
Resistance losses in winding, P RI 2
60-70%
Core steel loss
20-30%
Eddy current losses, winding
and mechanical parts
5-15%
Shunt reactors are used to compensate for large line charging capacitance of long high
voltage power transmission lines and cables.
Their major applications are:
Preventing over voltages that occur when the line is lightly loaded (Ferranti
Effect).
Providing voltage control.
Compensating for line charging reactive power demand of the open-circuit line.
Suppressing the secondary arc current for successful single pole reclosing.
Line
Reactor
Bus or Line
Switching
Equipment
Reactor
Neutral
Reactor
Figure 20 Three phase and neutral reactor connected to bus or line via circuit switcher or circuit breaker
Tertiary
Winding
Switching
Equipment
Reactor
Figure 21 Shunt reactor connected to transformer tertiary winding switching via circuit switcher or circuit
breaker on supply side
Tertiary
Winding
Reactor
Switching
Equipment
Figure 22 Shunt reactor connected to transformer tertiary winding switching via circuit switcher or circuit
breaker on neutral side
Is
Ir
+
Vs
+
Y/2
Y/2
Vr
_
To derive Vs from the above circuit (Figure 23), we note that the current in the
capacitance at the receiving end is VrY/2 and the current in the series arm is Ir + VrY/2,
then
Vs (VrY / 2 Ir )Z Vr
eq. 30
eq. 31
Is would be the summation of the current in the shunt capacitance at the sending end
which is VsY/2, and the current in the series arm.
Is VsY / 2 VrY / 2 Ir
eq. 32
Is VrY (1 ZY / 4) (ZY / 2 1) Ir
eq. 33
The equations eq. 31 and eq. 33 can be expressed in the following form:
Vs AVr BIr
eq. 34
Is CVr DIr
eq. 35
Where
A D ZY / 2 1
eq. 36
BZ
C Y (1 ZY / 4)
eq. 37
eq. 38
A and D are dimensionless and B and C are in ohms and mhos, respectively.
Now let us look at an example of a line and using the above equations and compare the
no load receiving-end voltage before and after applying the shunt reactors.
Example: A single-circuit 215 kV, 230 mile transmission line has the following series
impedance and shunt admittance per mile:
z 0.843179.04 /mi
y 5.105 10 6 90 S/mi
Then
Z z l 193.9179.04
Y y l 1.174 10 3 90 S
We can also derive the no load receiving-end voltage (Vr,nl) by substituting
Ir =0 in Vs equation eq. 34.
Vs AVr , nl
Vr , nl Vs / A
Then
Vs 139.728.50 kV
and
Vr , nl Vs / A 157.0 kV
Now we calculate the no load receiving-end voltage for the same transmission line when
identical shunt reactors are connected at both ends of the line (see Figure 24),
compensating for 70% of the total shunt admittance of the line.
Is
Ir
+
Vs
_
+
Y/2
Y/2
Vr
_
Figure 24 Nominal- circuit with shunt reactors added to both end of the transmission line
Vs would be the same, but A would change since adding shunt reactors changes the value
of Y:
Z 193.9179.04
Y (1 0.7) 1.174 10 3 90 3.522 10 4 90 S
and
A ZY / 2 1 0.9670.38
Then
Vr , nl Vs / A 144.5 kV
This example shows that adding shunt reactors can limit the rise of the no load voltage at
the receiving end of the line from 157.0 kV to 144.5 kV.
The modes of failure differ from air-core to oil-immersed designs and this affects their
protection requirements and schemes.
Because of the proximity of the winding with the core and tank winding-to-ground
failures can occur. The magnitude of this fault decreases as the fault is located closer to
the neutral side of the reactor. Turn-to-turn faults start out as a small change in phase
currents but increase operating temperature internal pressure, and accumulation of gas. If
these are not quickly detected they will evolve into a major fault.
Turn-turn faults can also be caused by excessive water in insulation paper, which can
give raise to water vapor bubbles when temperature increases, thus creating a low
dielectric strength region leading to electric arc.
The main risk for short-time failures is the reduction in dielectric strength due to the
possible presence of gas bubbles in a region of high electrical stress, which are the
windings and leads. These bubbles are likely to occur when the hot-spot temperature
exceeds 140C for a reactor with winding insulation moisture content above 2%. This
critical temperature will decrease as the moisture concentration increases.
Figure 25 Equilibrium chart relating water vapor pressure over oil to water concentration in insulation
(kraft) paper vs. temperature.
The risk with excessive water in insulation paper can be mitigated by using an on-line
monitoring system with algorithms to determine water content in paper and bubbling
temperature, so as to issue warnings when the reactor is close to a dangerous condition,
before a turn-turn fault happens.
Bus connected
Shunt reactor
Transformer tertial
connected Shunt reactor
Line connected
Shunt reactors
52
52
52
52
52
52
Shunt Reactor
(single phase)
Iside 1
(-) ISIDE 2
Iside 2
(+) ISIDE 1
Iside 1
Restraint
Iside 1
Iside 2
Operating
Iside 1
Shunt Reactor
(single phase)
IDIFF =
Iside 1 +(-Iside 2) = 0
Iside 2
(+) ISIDE 2
Iside 2
Restraint
Iside 1 Iside 2
Operating
Iside 1
IDIFF =
Iside 1+Iside 2 = 2 x I
Iside 2
Idiff
Fault characteristic
(p.u.)
4
3
2
1
Irestraint
(p.u.)
The relay manufacturers are forming the restraint quantity in various ways. Some of the
variants are:
1. I Restraint I side1 I side2 see Figure 27 above.
2. I Restraint I side1 I side2
(+) ISIDE 1
Shunt Reactor
(single phase)
Iside 1
Iside 2
Iside 1
(-) ISIDE 2
(+) ISIDE 1
Shunt Reactor
(single phase)
Iside 1
(+) ISIDE 2
Iside 2
Iside 2
Iside 1
Iside 1
Iside 2
Iside 2
MOV
MOV
87
(I)
87
(I)
(+) ISIDE 1
Shunt Reactor
(single phase)
Iside 1
Iside 1
(-) ISIDE 2
Saturated CT
Iside 1
R
MOV
87
(I)
The proper operation of this scheme is to a large degree is dependent on using dedicated
CTs and choosing the correct combination of relay impedance and setting. The
CTs are required to have low secondary leakage impedance and the same ratio.
It is also obvious that if a CT is short circuited, this will not be detected by the relay and
lead to a permanent blocking of the function.
Figure 31 Differential currents of a 1% turn to ground fault in phase L1 at the neutral point of a 150 MVA,
220 kV, 50Hz shunt reactor
Generally the type of differential protections devices used for shunt reactors are the same
as for used for power transformers. Compared to power transformers the application on
shunt reactors are a lot easier.
No need for vector group correction
No need for zero sequence current elimination
The inrush currents are measured on both sides and should theoretically not be
seen by the protection as a differential current.
The magnitude of the through fault currents during external faults are relatively
small (i.e. during external ground fault approximately 1.0 p.u.).
There is however some possible challenges related to phase differential protections on
shunt reactors that must be addressed.
Switching in conditions
When energizing an iron core shunt reactor the actual peak value of the current might rise
to a value between 3 and 5.5 times rated current. The inrush currents in the three phases
will experience different degree of DC-offset. Due to the long DC-Time constant of the
shunt reactor the time to steady state condition may be fairly long and in the order of
seconds. Under such conditions the operating point of the magnetic flux in the CTs will
increase in the same direction as the DC-component. This situation persists as long as
there is a DC-component in the primary current. A result of this may be a time delayed
saturation of the CT.
Specifically for low impedance differential protection connected to closed-core CTs, this
time delayed saturation may cause undesirable protection operation. The fundamental
value of the primary currents may in this situation be close to rated current of the reactor.
The differential protection then operates in the sensitive part of the tripping characteristic.
Even a small differential current may in this situation lead to an incorrect trip by the
differential protection.
Some utilities always use CTs of the same make and with identical ratings on both sides
of the shunt reactors. The philosophy is to avoid uneven saturation and thus prevent
significant values of false differential currents. This is not a 100% fail safe practice, but
reports indicate that it has been quite successfully applied to shunt reactors. One
important reason for this is the fact that in shunt reactor applications the CTs on the
terminal- and neutral-side both suffer under the same conditions.
Other measures to avoid unwanted tripping of low impedance differential protection
under these conditions might be:
The 2nd harmonic restraint feature is often available in low impedance differential
protection applied to shunt reactors. This may offer additional protection improvements
in some cases.
For numerical low impedance differential protection a setting of the 2nd harmonic
blocking function as low as 10%, may prevent the restrained differential function from
undesired operation during reactor energizing.
Additional security against undesired operation may be achieved by activating the so
called cross blocking function. This function blocks the differential function in all
phases for a limited time as long as the 2nd harmonic threshold is exceeded in one of the
individual reactor phases.
As these settings increase the possibility for an unwanted blocking during real internal
fault conditions, it is advisable to use it in combination with the unrestrained differential
stage which is available in most numerical low impedance differential protections.
In modern protection applications, the introductions of adaptive DC-biasing offer a
desirable operational feature that enhance security buy stabilizing the differential
protection under such conditions. This new protection feature is described in chapter 7
New solutions offered by numerical relays.
CT ratio versus level of short circuit current
Generally for shunt reactor installations low CT ratios are often selected due to its low
operating current during normal operating conditions. The reactors are however often
connected to busbars or lines with very high fault levels. As a result the magnitude of the
currents during internal reactor faults may reach such high levels that the CT cores suffer
severe saturation. For low impedance differential protections the resulting distorted
differential currents may contain a large degree of 2nd harmonic current and thus cause a
blocking of the restrained differential function. Selecting a higher CT ratio may improve
the situation in some instances. For numerical differential protection the high level
unrestrained diff function, as described earlier, should also be used in order to secure a
fast fault clearance (pick up).
This high level stage works totally independent of the 2nd harmonic blocking or other
restraining quantities. Generally it also has quite low requirements to the CT
dimensioning. Dependable protection operation should in most cases be guaranteed as
long as the CTs steady state saturation current exceeds the protection setting level. The
actual protections CT requirements must nevertheless be checked against the relay
manufacturers recommendations.
Fault characteristic
Idiff
(p.u.)
4
3
High level
unrestr.
2
Differential
Low level
restrained
differential
Operate area
Restrained & Unrestrained
Operate area
Only restrained
Operate area
Only unrestrained
10
11
Irestraint
(p.u.)
Figure 32 Example - Tripping characteristic for a two stage numerical low impedance differential
protection applied to a shunt reactor.
For a shunt reactor application it should be possible to choose a setting of the high level
unrestrained diff function as low as 200% of rated reactor current [ref 7]. This relatively
sensitive setting is possible due to the fact that:
There will be no high level through fault currents for external faults.
The possible false differential currents caused by temporary CT saturation during
inrush conditions will be decisive for the setting. These inrush currents are of
relatively moderate level.
The numerical differential protection normally utilizes DFT filter technique of the
input current which effectively suppresses the dc component.
Figure 33 Shunt reactors inrush current in phase C with fully DC offset response of two different types of
digital filters.
Io (A)
Io (A)
I0 (a)
Io (B)
Io (B)
I0 (b)
Io (C)
Io (C)
I0 (c)
3I0
Phase relays
3I0'
3I0'
87N (I)
Figure 34 Low impedance restricted earth fault during external fault condition
I0 (A)
I0 (A)
I0 (a)
I0 (B)
I0 (b)
I0 (C)
3I0
I0 (B)
I0 (A+B) + ext.
Phase relays
3I0'
87N (I)
Figure 35 Low impedance restricted earth fault during internal fault condition
As described earlier there is a possibility for saturation of the phase current CTs during
reactor switch in conditions due to the long DC-time constant of the reactor. In this
situation the REF protection will see a residual current from the terminal side which is
not present on the neutral side. A REF scheme based on a simple zero sequence over
current protection as described in Figure 35 above may in this situation operate
unnecessarily.
A solution to this problem is to use dedicated restricted earth fault protection with
restraint feature. Various methods are used to form the restraint (biasing) quantity in
dedicated low impedance REF protection. Some of the common methods are:
Using the residual current
Using the maximum phase current.
Io (A)
Io (A)
I0 (a)
Io (B)
I0 (b)
Io (C)
3I0
3I0'
3I0'
Io (B)
Io (C)
I0 (c)
87N (I)
Figure 36 High impedance restricted earth fault during external fault condition
The high impedance REF protection detects the voltage that develops across the
differential junction points. During normal load conditions or external faults there will be
Saturated CT
IA
IB
IA
IB
Ib
IC
IC
Ic
Ib + Ic
87N (I)
Operate
Ib + Ic
Restr.
Figure 37 Restrained low impedance restricted earth fault during energizing and one phase CT saturated
52
I >>
I >, t
50
51
Shunt
reactor
Overcurrent protections applied to shunt reactors are facing two different considerations:
The protection must allow a certain degree of current above rated current. An
overload of the shunt reactor can only be caused by increased system voltage. It is
exactly under these conditions the system needs to have the shunt reactors
energized.
The purpose is to protect as much of the winding without risk for unwanted trip.
The phase overcurrent scheme for the shunt reactor may consist of a 51 type (time
delayed) protection or a combination of 51 and 50 (instantaneous overcurrent).
The overcurrent threshold for the time delayed overcurrent function (51) should account
for normal system operation. In this regard, the current threshold must be set above the
maximum reactor current as a result of temporary system overvoltage or the voltage rise
in healthy phases during a single phase to earth fault in the connected grid. This voltage
will rarely exceed 1.3 per unit in systems with solidly earthed neutral. A setting of 1.5
times rated reactor current should normally be sufficient to override these temporary
overvoltages.
52
52
IE >, t
51N
Shunt
reactor
Shunt
reactor
IE >, t
51G
a)
b)
be set to detect 2nd harmonic energization current and block the 51N provided on the
terminal side of the reactor. These new applications however have to be validated through
proper relay simulation tests in the laboratory.
General notes
Because the time delayed earth fault protection can be initiated for external phase to earth
faults on the system, it is important to use sufficient time delays to override the external
faults.
52
VT
Z<
CT
21
Shunt
reactor
XR
U2
Q
eq. 39
Where U is the line-line voltage and Q is the 3phase VAR rating of the reactor.
An approach to determine the saturated reactor reactance will be to first select the
maximum expected short time overvoltage in the system which may be impacted by the
distance protection (time response of the distance protection). The actual reactor current
at this voltage level may then be determined from the reactor magnetizing characteristic.
The reactor reactance XMIN (Ohm/phase primary) under this condition is then
approximately given by eq. 40:
U
X MIN MAX
UR
XR
I MAX ( pu )
eq. 40
Where UMAX is maximum expected system overvoltage, UR is rated system voltage and
IMAX is the per unit reactor current at UMAX.
E.g. Introduction of an additional safety margin leaves a resulting setting of the reactive
zone reach to (0.85-0.9) * XMIN.
Distance protections for shunt reactors are specified with a maximum impedance
setting to cover at least 60% of rated reactor impedance.
Undesired operation during switching conditions has been observed but the
tendency seems to be reduced by numerical distance protection due to modern
filtering algorithms.
Figure 41 Current and apparent reactance in a turn-to-turn fault affected phase for a grounded 200MVAr,
420kV, 50Hz shunt reactor.
As the Figure 41 above shows, the distance protection scheme does not offer a very
sensitive detection of turn to turn faults. Its advantage compared to other current based
schemes is the ability to trip instantaneously for faults within zone 1. However, when set
to typically 60% of the rated shunt reactor impedance, more than 20% of the total turns
have to be shorted in order to achieve this fast tripping.
For comparison, also the amount of earth fault current 3I0 and zero sequence current
during turn to turn faults are shown in the Figure 42 below. The fact that the 3I0 current
increases rapidly when turns are shorted are utilized in some special turn to turn
protection schemes.
Figure 42 Negative sequence current and residual current 3I0 in a turn-to-turn fault affected 200MVAr,
420kV, 50Hz shunt reactor.
52
VT
Shunt
reactor
CT
50G
67N
Figure 43 Turn to turn fault protection based on zero sequence directional control
As the Figure 43 illustrates, both protections are connected to the CT in the neutral to
earth connection and not to a residual connection on the terminal side. This minimizes the
risk of undesirable operation of the earth fault protection or the directional relay due to
unequal saturation of phase CTs during inrush conditions.
Due to low zero sequence voltages resulting from turn-turn reactor faults, the 67N
function may have difficulty achieving adequate protection due to inadequate polarizing
voltage. This problem can be overcome by using a directional relay that has the
polarizing voltage reinforced by using the zero sequence current passing through an
impedance. The impedance value used should be less than the impedance of the shunt
reactor so as to prevent incorrect directional operation for unbalanced faults external to
the reactor. In addition, a small time delay in the 67N function (a few hundred
milliseconds), increases security of the scheme.
52
VT
67Q
Shunt
reactor
CT
50G
Figure 44 Turn to turn fault protection based on negative sequence directional control
During energization there is a possibility for apparent high levels of negative sequence
currents due to unequal saturation of the phase CTs. It is therefore necessary to block
this turn to turn protection until after the DC component of the phase currents have
completely decayed.
52
52
52
Shunt
reactor
I>, t
I>, t
I>, t
51
51
51
A precondition for correct operation is that all common earth paths from tank and
connected metallic parts (cable shields, oil conservator, pipes for fire protection etc.) are
insulated in such a way that the connection through the CT is the only path towards earth.
This measuring principle provides fast unit protection based on a simple arrangement.
Retrip timer
CB
Retrip
RTPU
Start BFP ph L1
0
BF timer
BFPU
L1 current
measured
BF Current
Threshold
&
Trip
BFP
Logic ph L2
Logic ph L3
Figure 47 Basic breaker failure protection scheme (logic phase L2 and logic phase L3 are similar to logic
phase L1 as detailed in the figure).
A
B
C
L+ (2)
L+ (1)
52-A
52-B
52-C
Shunt
reactor
L- (2)
L- (1)
3 phase trip
(coil 1)
3 phase trip
(coil 2)
5.1.10
For oil immersed shunt reactors with conservator tank the gas-operated Buchholz relay is
commonly applied. It is used to detect internal short circuits within the reactor tank
included turn to turn faults in the phase windings. The ability to detect turn to turn faults
is a benefit to minimize damage within the shunt reactor as it is difficult for the electrical
protection devices to detect small turn-turn faults.
Operating principle
A Buchholz relay is a standard protection fitted to oil-immersed shunt reactors which
detect all insulation breakdowns inside the shunt reactor tank, causing either the
formation of gas or surges of oil flow from the tank to the expansion vessel see Figure 49.
This applies to all phase and ground faults on the windings and to inter-turn faults. The
relay also detects losses of oil caused by leaks as well as defects such as broken
conductors and corroded or otherwise bad connections.
The operating principle of the Buchholz relay is based on the fact that firstly the pressure
of gas in the upper part of the shunt reactor tank increases due to the chemical
decomposition of the oil and/ or the combustion of solid insulating materials and
secondly that massive gas development gives to a surge of oil towards the expansion
vessel.
A Buchholz relay is installed in the pipe connecting the shunt reactor tank and the
expansion vessel. It generally comprises two floats one above the other. The upper one
signals the slow collection of gas and the lower float which in the event of a surge of oil
operates a mercury contact to trip the shunt reactor.
REACTOR TANK
5.1.11
The sudden pressure relay is commonly applied to oil immersed shunt reactors without
conservator tank, but can be used with any type of reactor, see Figure 50. As for the
Buchholz relay it responds to internal faults within the reactor tank and is used to detect
internal short circuits within the reactor tank including turn to turn faults.
Operating principle
The simplest form of pressure relief device is the widely used fragile disc that is normally
located at the end of an oil relief pipe protruding from the top of the shunt reactor tank.
The surge of oil caused by a serious fault bursts the disc, to allow the oil to discharge
rapidly. Relieving and limiting the pressure rise avoids explosive rupture of the tank and
consequent fire risk. Outdoor oil-immersed shunt reactors are usually mounted in a
catchments pit to collect and contain spilt oil thereby minimizing the possibility of
pollution.
A drawback of the fragile disc is that the oil remaining in the tank is left exposed to the
atmosphere after rupture. This is avoided in a more effective device, the sudden pressure
relief valve, which opens to allow discharge of oil if the pressure exceeds a set level, but
closes below this level. If the abnormal pressure is relatively high, the valve can operate a
few suitable contacts for tripping and to extinguish the fire.
PRESSURE-RELIEF DEVICE
5.1.11.1
Sudden pressure relays provide an excellent example of the classical protection dilemma
of dependability versus security. They are dependable for internal reactor faults but have
shown a tendency to operate undesired if exposed to vibrations. Design improvements
have reduced their tendency to misoperate but have not totally eliminated the security
problem. If there is repeatedly problems with misoperation of the sudden pressure relay,
installation of a newer style relay (immunity to vibrations) may be solution to the
problem.
The Buchholz relay has a significant higher security rating than the sudden pressure
relays and this type should be the preferred solution for conservator type shunt reactors.
5.1.12
52
Main 2 / Backup
IE>, t
BFP
I>, t
I>>
51N
51BF
51
50
Main 1
I>>
I>, t
BFP
IE>, t
50
51
51BF
51N
I> BUS
87BB
Shunt
reactor
Buchh./
Sudden
pressure
63
I>
87R
REF
87N
Table 1 Requirements met, on bus connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 1
Requirements
Protect for internal fault ph-ph
Protect for internal fault ph-earth
Protect for internal winding turn to turn fault
Provide for breaker failure
X = Full protection coverage
Main 1
X [87R], (X) [87G, 50, 51]
X [87R, 87N], (X) [51N]
X [63]
X [51BF]
Main 2 / Backup
(X) [50, 51]
(X) [51N]
X
[51BF]
52
Main 2 / Backup
Main 1
I> BUS
87BB
BFP
I>, t
I>>
51BF
51
50
HI IMP
REF
Shunt
reactor
Buchh./
Sudden
pressure
63
I>
87R
87N
IE>, t
51G
Table 2 Requirements met, on bus connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 2
Requirements
Protect for internal fault ph-ph
Protect for internal fault ph-earth
Protect for internal winding turn to turn fault
Provide for breaker failure
Main 1
X [87R]
X [87R]
X [63]
X [51BF]
Main 2 / Backup
(X) [87N, 50, 51]
X
[87N, 51G] (X) [50,51]
(X) [51G]
Main 2 / Backup
Main 1
52
BFP
51BF
I> BUS
87BB
Z<
21
IE>, t
51N
IE>>, t I>, t
I>>
50N
50
51
Shunt
reactor
Buchh./
Sudden
pressure
63
I>
87R
HI IMP
REF
87N
Table 3 Requirements met, on bus connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 3
Requirements
Protect for internal fault ph-ph
Protect for internal fault ph-earth
Protect for internal winding turn to turn fault
Provide for breaker failure
Main 1
X [87R], (X) [87N]
X [87N], (X) [87R]
X [63]
X [51BF]
Main 2 / Backup
(X) [21, 50, 51]
(X) [21, 50N, 51N]
(X) [21]
Line CB
Reactor
CB
52
52
52
Reactor
CB
Line CB
Line CB
Line CB
52
52
Reactor
circuit
switcher
Line CB
Reactor
circuit
switcher
52
52
52
Line CB
52
52
Line CB
52
52
Reactor
CB
Reactor
CB
Shunt
reactor
Bypass
device
Neutral
reactor
Line CB
Shunt
reactor
Bypass
device
Neutral
reactor
&
AND
AND
&
ON delay
&
240 cyc
Tripping
released
AND
Trip local line CB
&
Transfer trip
to remote end
Figure 57 Trip release logic for inrush suppression and blocking when deenergized (line
connected shunt reactors)
52
Circuit breaker or
circuit switcher on
reactor supply side
52
52
52
52
Circuit breaker or
circuit switcher on
reactor neutral side
52
Protection devices commonly applied to dry type air core shunt reactors
Typical protection devices applied to tertiary connected dry-type reactors are:
Instantaneous overcurrent protection (50 / I>>)
Time delayed overcurrent protection (51 / I>, t)
Negative sequence protection (46 / I2>)
Ground overvoltage protection (59N)
the entire phase winding a maximum of approximately 3 times rated current will occur
in the healthy phases.
I2>
CT
46
Shunt
reactor
Transformer tertiary
Tertiary Bus
L1
L2
L3
Grounding
transformer
52
Grounding
resistor
Shunt
reactor
3Uo>
59N
Ground overvoltage
protection
If more switched reactors are connected to the tertiary bus, the active fault current
contribution from the grounding transformer (Figure 60) can be utilized by directional
zero sequence protections to selectively trip the faulty shunt reactor.
5.3.4 Special schemes for turn to turn faults in air core shunt
reactors
A turn to turn fault (fault between turns within the phase winding) is a damaging
condition to shunt reactors. Once the arc between some turns has been initiated, the fault
may develop to flashover the entire winding. If not detected, this resulting phase to
neutral fault may then also result in thermal damage of the healthy phases (which in this
situation is connected to a voltage 3 * nominal voltage).
Even one shorted turn will cause a high magnitude circulating current in the fault
location. However, seen from the outside, the phase currents and the voltages can be of
the same order of magnitude as could be expected during normal service.
The ultimate aim of the turn to turn protection is to be able to detect a fault as a result of
one shorted turn in the winding.
This is a real challenge and calls for dedicated protection schemes for turn to turn faults.
Commonly applied schemes for turn to turn fault protection in dry type shunt reactors
are:
Split phase protection scheme (also described for oil immersed shunt reactors section 5.1.3.3) which should be used when the reactor are arranged using
multiple parallel circuits per coil.
Voltage unbalance scheme which is described below.
Tertiary Bus
L1
L2
L3
52
Circuit breaker or
circuit switcher
Shunt
reactor
I>, t
51
Figure 61 Simple split phase protection based on current balance measurement between
the two shunt reactor neutrals.
3Uo>
59N
Shunt
reactor
Ground
overvoltage
protection
Summation
Overvoltage
protection
59
Neutral
VT
Tertiary Bus
L1
L2
L3
1
52
Grounding
transformer
3Uo>
59N
Shunt
reactor
Ground
overvoltage
protection
Eventual
matching VT
Neutral
VT
Voltage differential
protection
59
1000 MVA
50 MVA
I>
87T
Tertiary Bus
Main 2 / Backup
52
CT
Main 1
I>>
I>, t
50
51
VT
59N 3Uo>
Shunt
reactor
Table 4 Requirements met, on tertiary connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 1
Requirements
Protect for internal fault ph-ph
Protect for internal fault ph-earth
Protect for internal winding turn to turn fault
Provide for breaker failure
X = Full protection coverage
(X) = Partial protection coverage
Main 1
X [50, 51]
X [59N]
(X) [51]
Main 2 / Backup
Tertiary Bus
Main 2 /
Backup
I>
87T
Main 1
52
CT
VT
I>>
I>, t
I2>
50
51
46
59N 3Uo>
Voltage unbalance
protection
Shunt
reactor
59
Neutral
VT
Table 5 Requirements met, on tertiary connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 2
Requirements
Protect for internal fault ph-ph
Protect for internal fault ph-earth
Protect for internal winding turn to turn fault
Provide for breaker failure
X = Full protection coverage
(X) = Partial protection coverage
Main 1
X [50, 51] , (X) [46]
X [59N], (X) [46]
X [59 unbalance], (X) [46]
Main 2 / Backup
(X) [87T]
Tertiary Bus
Main 2 /
Backup
Main 1
52
CT
VT
I>>
I>, t
I2>
50
51
51BF
59N 3Uo>
Shunt
reactor
Split phase
protection
51
Table 6 Requirements met, on tertiary connected shunt reactor protection scheme number 3
Requirements
Protect for internal fault ph-ph
Protect for internal fault ph-earth
Protect for internal winding turn to turn fault
Provide for breaker failure
X = Full protection coverage
(X) = Partial protection coverage
Main 1
X [50, 51]
X [59N]
X [51 split phase]
X [51 BF]
Main 2 / Backup
MONITORING
The following monitoring benefits are common for all types of shunt reactors:
To prevent damage that could end shunt reactor life.
Provide condition-based shunt reactor maintenance.
Increases reliability by detecting a problem before the shunt reactor fails.
Decreases repair costs.
mc
S
eq. 41
m c
Qc
eq. 42
When the amount of heat generated in the winding/core is equal to the heat carried
through the oil to the surface of the tank, the over-temperature is given by the following
exponential.
t in 1 e t /
eq. 43
The winding temperature protection is intended to keep the solid insulation, typically oilimpregnated paper, from reaching levels where there would be very fast deterioration of
its mechanical properties (commonly referred as insulation aging) or even a risk of turnturn fault due to the release of water vapor bubbles if bubbling temperature is reached.
To simulate the winding temperature, a resistor sized to approximate the heating in the
reactor winding at full load is supplied by a current transformer from one of the phase
currents. The resistor heating is added to the top oil temperature but circulating the top oil
into a well with the resistor. This combined heating temperature is used to simulate the
winding temperature. The winding temperature is usually limited to 140-180 degree C.
Modern winding temperature protection is usually integrated to the same electronic unit
for oil temperature protection. Since a regular temperature sensor cannot be installed at
the winding due to the insulation needed, winding temperature is commonly calculated
based on top oil temperature and load current, besides the reactor particular
characteristics programmed by user according to manufacturer data. For this purpose, a
CT secondary is connected to the winding temperature relay for reactors load
measurement.
Cooling fans or oil circulation pumps, if any, are normally controlled by the winding
temperature relay based on winding temperature and/or load current.
These winding temperature protection do not meet any of the other requirements but are
again the only protection which meets the temperature limit requirements.
For the system to initiate the nitrogen injection in extinction mode, two signals are
required: fire detection system signal and electrical protection signal, see Figure 70.
A block diagram and a description of the shunt reactor fire protection are shown in Figure
71 and Figure 72. The components of the protection system are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 Components used in a typical system for shunt reactor fire protection
Item
number
1
2
3
Description
Transformer (shunt reactor)
On load tap changer (OLTC)
Conservator
Item
number
15
16
17
Buchholz relay
18
Bushing
19
6
7
Isolation valve
Absorber
20
21
8
9
10
11
Rupture disk
Decompression chamber
Depressurization set support
Oil drain pipe
22
23
24
25
12
13
14
Description
Nitrogen Cylinder
Electrical actuator
Explosive gas elimination pipe to
transformer
Explosive gas elimination pipe to
OLTC
Explosive gas elimination pipe to
OGST
Cabinet
Explosive gas elimination valves
on transformer (shunt reactor)
Oil gas separation tank (OGST)
Air isolation shutter
Explosive gas evacuation pipe
Oil drain pipe from other
equipment
Conservator shutter
Explosive gases burn in safe area
6.6.1.1 Advantages
6.6.1.2 Disadvantages
6.6.2.1 Advantages
Simple to construct.
Requires little space.
Can be quickly easily installed, commissioned and utilized.
6.6.2.2 Disadvantages:
Introduction of nitrogen into the shunt reactor tank and evacuating oil are
necessary.
Risk of unwanted operation of the nitrogen system, if the fire detection system
operates unnecessarily.
Special oil draining system is required.
Does not cover fire in the bushings.
The behavior of a shunt reactor is satisfactory when the reactor has not deviated from its
previously established baseline, equilibrium point or fingerprint. A normal and constant
gas level for one shunt reactor may be very high for another. Each reactor has its own
unique normal dissolved gas pattern. It is the change in gas levels and, equally important,
the rate of change of the gas levels that cause a problem unit to stand out from the others.
Key Gas
Hydrogen (H2)
Acetylene (C2H2)
Methane (CH4)
Ethylene (C2H4)
Ethane (C2H6)
Carbone monoxide (CO)
Carbone dioxide (CO2)
The gasses listed above are typically grouped together, except for CO2, and are identified
as Total Dissolved Combustible Gas (TDCG). [ref 18] provides recommendations for
determining what course of action should be taken depending on the level of the key
gases and the TDCG. The courses of action are designated as conditions and are
divided into four categories with associated recommendations.
Condition 1: TDCG levels are normal and indicate the reactor is operating properly. Any
individual combustible gas exceeding specified levels should prompt additional
investigation.
Condition 2: TDCG levels within this range indicate greater than normal combustible
gas level. Exercise caution, analyze monthly.
Condition 3: TDCG levels within this range indicate a high level of decomposition.
Exercise caution, analyze weekly, consider planned outage, notify manufacturer.
Condition 4: TDCG levels within this range indicate excessive decomposition.
Continued operation could result in reactor failure. Analyze daily, consider removal from
service, notify manufacturer.
Another approach to determine the types of faults is to calculate the ratios of the key
gasses found dissolved in the reactor oil. Depending on the level of each key gas and the
ratio of specific combinations of gasses, the type of fault can be determined. The ratios
are designated as Doernenburg and Rogers ratios, [ref 18] for further information.
operative monitoring of the operational state of its insulating parts was made by the
analysis of oil dissolved gasses content as well as by PD measurement using acoustic
method. If the results of the two measurements show that there is a fault PD electric
measurements are performed to determine its nature and location.
Temperatures
Currents, system voltages
Tap-changer
Oil levels
Oil -DGA, moisture, breakdown
Bushing taps, Leakage current, RF, pressure
Radio Frequency Signals
Acoustic signals
Neutral current
Magnetic circuit
Cooler operation
A typical monitoring system for an oil immersed shunt reactor is capable of monitoring
the conditions of various shunt reactor components as shown in Table 9. By the use of
software to store and perform trend analysis of the measured data, the operator can be
presented with information on the state of health of the shunt reactor and alarms raised
when measured values exceed appropriate limits. This will normally provide the operator
with early warnings of degradation within one or more components of the shunt reactor,
enabling maintenance to be scheduled to correct the problem prior to failure occurring.
The maintenance can obviously be planned to suit system conditions, provided the rate of
degradation is not excessive.
Proposed list of main parameters for shunt reactors monitoring is presented in Table 9.
Table 9 List proposed of main parameters for shunt reactors monitoring
Nr Monitoring subject
1
Oil status
Insulation Status
Bushing status
Cooling system
Parameter for
monitoring
Temperature
Gas Monitoring
Hydrogen (H2)
Carbon monoxide
(CO)
Acetilene (C2H2)
Etylene (C2H4)
Ethane (C2H6)
Water in oil
Paper humidity
Hot-spot
temperature
Operating time
Lifetime
Acoustic signals:
-vibrations
-partial discharges
Environment
temperature
Insulation
Capacitance
Insulation Power
Factor (or Tangent
Delta)
Gas presence
detected by
Buchholz relay
Overpressure valve
Pump function
Cooler function
Status of cooler
switches
Cooling system
efficiency (normal /
Actions
Alarm/ trip
Alarm/ trip*
*see comments
below
Alarm
Alarm
Alarm/trip
Alarm
Alarm
Alarm
Alarm
Alarm
Alarm/ trip
Alarm
Alarm/ trip
Trip
Signal
Signal
Signal
Alarm
Oil in tank
Electrical
parameters
low efficiency)
Oil level
Status of rubber
bag/membrane in
conservator tank
(normal / leaking).
Primary currents
Phase voltages
Active power
Reactive power
Copper losses
Iron losses
Connected/
disconnected
Alarm
Alarm
Displayed
Displayed
Displayed
Displayed
Displayed
Signal
1. Oil status:
Oil temperature: knowledge of the top oil temperature allows the following
statements to be made: thermal monitoring (e.g. triggering of the alarm in the
event of excessive temperatures), hot-spot temperature calculation and overload
capacity.
Gas dissolved: Trip by monitored Gas level is not a common practice, since this a
slow changing variable (hydrogen takes time to dissolve in oil), so that it is up to
the operation and/or maintenance people to decide for an immediate or scheduled
trip of the reactor after receiving an alarm.
2. Insulation status:
Partial discharges and thermal overload lead to gaseous decomposition products
of the oil. The quantity of the harmful gases in the oil is therefore a sign for
oncoming problems within the shunt reactor insulation. The hydrogen in the oil
can be detected with a special sensor. The sensors measures dissolved hydrogen
continuously and accurately. The quantity of hydrogen is a reliable indicator of a
recent or existing fault, as it is produced by all fault types. Small concentrations of
Hydrogen are thus providing an early warning for the presence of a fault. The
sensor measures the cumulative gas quantity on the basis of a fuel cell in relation
to a proportional distribution formula. The increase of the quantity of gas can be
used as an initiative for a conventional gas analysis in order to draw conclusions
about the type of the fault.
Moisture of oil: The knowledge of the water content in the oil allows conclusions
to be made on the absorption of humidity caused by the breathing of the shunt
reactor and development of humidity caused by disintegration of the paper
insulation. The humidity content is a measure for the electrical strength of the
insulating oil.
3. Bushing status:
The external insulations consist of the bushing and an oil-filling for insulation. A
failure of the bushing can happen due to leakages. If the bushings have separate
oil volume it is possible to install a pressure sensor. The pressure of the bushings
is acquired and compared with the other phases.
The shunt reactors are generally designed for natural cooling with the radiators
mounted directly on the tank. However sometimes it is required to have some
action in the cooling circuit, such as operating pumps and fans, depending on the
status of the shunt reactor circuit breaker. The control action can be initiated by
the circuit breaker auxiliary contact or by operation of an overcurrent relay. By
using the overcurrent relay a secure control action is obtained when the reactor is
energized independent of the circuit breaker auxiliary contact status.
The operating condition of pumps and fans: by recording the status of the pumps
and fans it is possible to establish the operating time of the individual elements,
also the operating states are necessary for determining the thermal time constants
of the shunt reactor.
6. Oil in tank:
To detect oil leakage, the oil levels in the conservator tank or main tank are
measured.
7. Electrical parameters:
Load current: the knowledge of the load current allows the calculation of the
following values: power, hot spot temperature, ageing rate, thermal modeling and
actual possible overload capacity. E.g. the hot spot temperature can be
determinate by load current and top oil temperature. This enables the calculation
of the ageing rate and the actual overload capacity, see IEC 60354.
IED Sensors
Monitoring
Computer
Temperature Monitoring
Intranet /
Internet
LTC Monitoring
Other parameters
Maintenance
Warning
Remote
Operation
Center
60
40
20
Fault occurs
0
DC offset of
the instantaneous
differential current
-20
CT saturated
-40
50
100
150
200
250
Time in milliseconds
As long as the current transformers on both sides of a reactor transform the primary
currents in exactly the same way (whether saturated or not) there will be no differential
currents, see for example Figure 77, where the instantaneous differential currents IDL1
and IDL2 under the first 200 ms are practically zero. On the other hand, if current
transformers on one side saturate (first), false differential currents will appear (see IDL3)
that might cause the shunt reactor to be switched off the power system. This can take
place after such a long time as one second or more. To counteract these unpleasant
phenomena, which may result in an unwanted trip command, the sensitivity of the
differential protection is temporarily decreased, based on the DC offset in the
instantaneous differential currents as described above. This DC desensitization is not
active, if a disturbance has been detected and characterized as internal fault by the
internal/external fault discriminator described in section 7.2.
Currents in kA
1
CB
closes
0.5
-0.5
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Currents in kA
iL3
iL3
CB
closes
0.5
-0.5
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Currents in kA
0.4
0.2
CB
closes
IDL1
IDL2
IDL3
IDL3
0
IDL2
-0.2
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Time in milliseconds
10-Jan-2007 14:16:28
Figure 77 A shunt reactor suddenly connected to the power system (inrush), with some eventual
differences in the CTs on both sides, or different loads on them, the differential protection sees these
currents as shown in the figure. As a result, the differential protection calculates (false!) instantaneous
differential currents as shown in the figure. These false differential currents might cause an unwanted trip
of the reactor.
For internal faults, the operate currents (differential) are always safely, i.e.
with a good margin, above the operaterestrain characteristic, see Figure 78.
For external faults, the false (spurious) operate currents are safely, i.e. with a
good margin, below the operaterestrain characteristic, see Figure 78.
Differential currents versus bias currents for heavy internal and external faults
2
1.8
"steady-state"
for internal fault
1.6
Differential current in kA
1.4
SlopeSection3 = 80%
1.2
OPERATE
REGION
1
0.8
SlopeSection2 = 40 %
0.6
0.4
RESTRAIN
REGION
IdMin
0.2
0
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
Bias current in kA
Figure 78 An example of a good operate restrain characteristic. Under heavy external fault condition
with current transformer saturation, the spurious false differential current does not enter the operate region.
The internal-external fault discriminator feature can enhance the stability of the
differential protection by making this protection to operate faster for internal faults and
blocking this protection for external faults, see Figure 79 and Figure 80.
The internal-external fault discriminator responds to the relative phase angles of the
negative-sequence fault currents at both ends of the shunt reactor winding:
If the two negative sequence currents flow in the same direction, the fault is
internal.
If the two negative sequence currents flow in opposite directions, the fault is
external.
If a fault is classified as internal, then any eventual block signals by the harmonic
criterion are overridden, and the differential protection can operate very quickly without
any further delay.
If a fault (disturbance) is classified as external, then generally, but not unconditionally, a
trip command is prevented.
One of the advantages of using the negative-sequence currents compared to the zerosequence currents is that they provide coverage to phase-to-phase faults as well, not only
faults involving earth.
The negative sequence internal-external fault discriminator works satisfactorily even in
case of three-phase faults. Because of the decaying DC offset of the fault currents, the
system is not quite symmetrical immediately after the fault. Thanks to the transient
existence of the negative sequence system, faults can be distinguished as internal or
external, even for symmetrical three-phase faults.
90 deg
120 deg
The directional
characteristic
is defined by
the settings:
******************
1. Minimum negative
sequence current
Internal
fault
region
0 deg
180 deg
Minimum negative
sequence current
External
fault
region
Internal / external
fault boundary.
Default 60 deg
270 deg
Figure 79 Internal/external fault discriminator.
120
60
150
Internal / external
fault boundary
with the angle
Negative Sequence
Relay Operate Angle
(ROA)
30
External
fault
region
Internal
fault
region
180
5 kA
210
330
Internal
fault declared
here 8 ms
after fault
10 kA
240
300
270
Negative sequence differential current phasor (in kA)
Directional limit (within NegSeq ROA degrees is internal fault)
The Figure 80 shows a case where the trajectory of the negative-sequence phasor remains
within the internal fault region all the time in spite of current transformer saturation. The
fault must definitely be internal. In the beginning, when one or the other of the two
negative sequence phasors (i.e. two contributions to the total negative sequence
differential current) is too small for a directional measurement, the magnitude of the total
differential current phasor is mapped on the 120-degrees axis. A long as this condition
persists neither external-, nor internal fault (disturbance) is declared. The figure
corresponds to an internal L1 L2 short circuit on terminals of a generator.
The Open CT detection algorithm must quickly detect an open CT condition and
prevent the protection from tripping (in case it has been set to block the differential
protection).
Further, the Open CT Feature must be very secure. It must not interfere with the normal
duties and responsibilities of the Reactor Differential Protection. That is, the Open CT
sub-function must only operate in case of an open CT, and not, for example, internal
faults, external faults, in case of heavy current transformer saturation, etc.
ZS
ZS
CT
AC
VT
ZR
Shunt Reactor
ZR
Shunt Reactor
External
fault
ZS
CT
ZS
VT
I0
ZR
E0
+
Shunt Reactor
ZR
Shunt Reactor
As this is external grounding fault, at the point where reactor protection is installed, zero
sequence current flows from grounding point into the terminal side of the reactor, and
then into the ground. Therefore, at the point where the protection is installed, U0 and I0
satisfy the following relation, see eq. 44:
U0 I0 Zr
eq. 44
I0
ZS
ZS
CT
Internal
fault
VT
I0
ZR
ZR
+E
Shunt Reactor
Shunt Reactor
Internal turn-to-turn fault or turn-to-ground fault is the fault source of zero sequence
network. At the point where the reactor protection is installed, zero sequence current
flows from inside of the reactor, and into the ground via equivalent system impedance. In
this way, at the point where the protection is installed, U0 and I0 satisfy the following
relation, see eq. 45:
U 0 I 0 Z S _ tot
eq. 45
U0
Figure 85 Zero sequence voltage and current for internal turn-turn fault
Example:
From above vector analysis, it can be seen that the vector relation between U0 and I0
during internal faults is totally opposite to that during external faults. At the same time,
because the reactor impedance is far greater than the system impedance, the U0 amplitude
is very small which can be seen in the following figure showing two vector relations (it is
supposed that I0 values during the two conditions are equal).
Ext fault U0
I0
Int fault U0
If U0 is changed, the U0 magnitude during internal faults can be raised to improve the
protection sensitivity.
U 0 (calc ) U 0 U
eq. 46
After the transformation, the vector relation is changed to, see Figure 87:
External fault U0
External fault U 0 +
I0
Internal fault U 0
Internal fault U 0 +
Voltage waveforms are shown below, which are recorded during of a simulation test of
2% turn-to-turn fault of reactor in the dynamic simulation lab, see Figure 88.
0 0 3 > 3 5 _ A -U A (V )
0 0 3 > 3 5 _ A -U A ( V )
M a g n it u d e ( M a g )
100
0 0 3 > 3 6 _ B -U B ( V )
0 0 3 > 3 7 _ C -U C ( V )
0 0 3 > 3 8 _ N -3 U 0 ( V )
50
-5 0
-1 0 0
0
50
100
E le c tr o te k C o n ce p ts ?
150
T im e ( m s)
200
250
300
T O P , T h e O u tp u t P r o ce sso r ?
This chapter is based on the settings recommendations and concepts for further
consideration borne out of Sections 5, 6, & 7. Reactor protection depends on the type of
reactor and its connection to the power system as discussed in depth in Section 5.
Looking at the example Figure 51, Figure 52 and Figure 53 for bus-connected oilimmersed reactors, it is obvious there are multiple protection configurations possible.
Some protections are not possible such as sudden pressure or Buchholz relaying on an
air-core reactor. Whether or not to use redundant or backup protection is a matter of user
choice and depends upon factors such as
1.
2.
3.
4.
The importance of the particular reactor installation to the electric grid system.
The cost of the reactor equipment.
Any special design likely to be more susceptible to certain faults.
The need to disable the Main 1 (Primary) protection system and maintain full
protection on a second protection system while the reactor remains in service.
Most oil-immersed reactors are probably worthy of redundant (Main 1 and Main 2) or at
least limited backup protection in addition to a complement of full protection. Most
utilities reported in the survey that when two redundant systems are used, there are
separate DC supplies, CT windings, and trip coils. Lower-cost, lower-voltage air-core
reactors may not warrant more than one set of full protection.
8.1
PROTECTION SCHEMES
The main types of reactor protection schemes are listed below.
8.1.1
Differential protection is the most commonly applied protection for bus-connected oilimmersed shunt reactors. Generally, the differential relays provide quick clearance of
phase-to-phase and ground faults. When using low-impedance differential protection
(section 5.1.1.1), recommendations include:
It is imperative to verify that the CTs and wiring fulfill the requirements
necessary for proper functioning of the protective relay scheme.
Use a relay with biasing or restraint of the fundamental frequency to guard against
false operation due to unequal CT response to large external fault currents.
Use a relay with 2nd harmonic restraint or blocking to guard against false
operation due to unequal CT response to DC offset with long time-constant.
Utilizing such a device that also cross-blocks all of the phases during this
condition will provide even more security against false trips. Another method is
adaptive DC biasing which desensitizes the differential relay if DC offset is
detected.
Use a relay that includes an unrestrained differential element with a setting chosen
below the steady-state saturation current of the connected CTs (a typical setting is
200% of the rated reactor current).
A differential relay that provides open CT detection can prevent the differential
element from falsely operating for this condition.
It is imperative to verify that the CTs and wiring fulfill the requirements
necessary for proper functioning of the protective relay scheme.
A typical setting for the time-overcurrent pickup is 1.5 times the rated reactor
current with intent to minimize false operation during temporary overvoltages.
Negative sequence overcurrent (usually used for air-core reactor designs) should
be set above the maximum level of natural system unbalance and manufacturing
tolerances.
The time delay should be set to coordinate with other protections that operate for
unbalanced faults external to the reactor.
8.1.5.1
Zero-sequence differential relays (Restricted earth fault relay) are one way of providing
protection against phase-to-ground faults in shunt reactors supplied from solidly
grounded systems. Generally, this protection is also provided for EHV shunt reactors
with a Neutral Grounding reactor connected between the star point of the shunt reactor
and ground.
Implementation recommendations include (see Section 5.1.2):
For low-impedance REF, use a relay with biasing or restraint of the fundamental
frequency to guard against false operation due to false residual current caused by
unequal CT response.
Confirm that the relay used is immune to off-nominal frequency currents. 3rd
harmonic and its multiples must be filtered out by the relay.
The sensitivity to the harmonic and inrush currents is one of the main problems
with back-up ground over current relays. Settings must be able to allow inrush,
which usually means desensitizing the back-up relay. Numerical relays are
recommended as they offer the best characteristic since the digital filters remove
harmonics and DC offset currents from the inrush.
This protection may need to be coordinated with protections for external ground
faults.
Further considerations:
Using a 51N function from the residual CT connection on the terminal end, plus a
51G function measured from a single CT in the reactor neutral will provide
improved ground fault coverage and provide better fault location.
Modern numerical relays detect 2nd harmonic currents and offer the possibility to
program logical equations to block and unblock various protection devices
according to a specific philosophy. For example, the 51G on the neutral side
winding of the reactor may be set to detect 2nd harmonic energization current and
block the 51N provided on the terminal side of the reactor.
This protection cannot determine the location of the ground fault. The fault can
be anywhere on the delta tertiary system.
To provide adequate operating quantities the directional relay used has voltage
polarization reinforced by passing appropriate sequence fault current through a
replica impedance. This impedance represents the reactor impedance but must
actually be a value less than the impedance of the reactor. Otherwise the scheme
may misoperate for earth faults external to the reactor.
If a source of zero-sequence voltage is not present to be reinforced or zerosequence directional control is inadequate, negative sequence directional relaying
may be used. However, a negative sequence current relay is susceptible to
unbalances such as may occur during unequal CT response during energization or
denergization.
For line connected shunt reactors, blocking these schemes with an undervoltage
relay and time delay may be appropriate to prevent false operation during
temporary unbalances from other causes including line switching.
Specify split-winding reactors in the future to get good coverage for turn-turn
faults.
to-turn faults as it is difficult for the electrical protection devices to detect this type of
fault.
Considerations for these devices:
The Buchholz relay is significantly more secure in operation than the sudden
pressure relay. The Buchholz is the preferred device for conservator-type shunt
reactors.
To increase reliability and to allow optional gas collection from different places in
the tank, one of the surveyed utilities provides two Buchholz relays in each tank,
located in separate pipes from different areas of the tank to the conservator.
Further there are two pressure relief devices on each tank. This is because they
feel that using only one of these protection functions for sensitive internal fault
detection does not adequately cover the entire tank area.
Compare the sensitivity of the electrical to the mechanical gas pressure protection
to determine which should be the main protection. Consider the following:
1. To alarm for small turn-turn faults, before gas appears
2. To coordinate time delayed tripping of shunt reactors with the sudden pressure
(63) function
3. To provide instantaneous tripping
For higher reliability, duplicating of the initiating contacts is sometimes done and
may be considered on case-by-case basis depending upon then location and size
of shunt reactors and voltage class.
Develop adequate shunt reactor overload protection taking into account the
surrounding external ambient temperatures and time constants of the reactor. The
protection scheme should measure the true RMS (RMS up to the 50th harmonic,
Nyquist frequency of 2.5 kHz and sampling frequency of 5 kHz), determine the
overcurrent in the reactor winding, and start the reactor cooling.
Some relay manufacturers combine breaker failure and pole discrepancy in the
breaker failure scheme, the scheme of Figure 47 is very desirable if you use two
trip coils and list the functions associated with the pole discrepancy.
section 5.2. The trip release logic scheme shown in Figure 57, provides blocking for
inrush and deenergization.
Buchholz gas-accumulator relay or sudden pressure relay for low current turnto-turn faults.
Additionally for air core reactors, phase differential and breaker failure protection may be
considered. The phase differential used can be the transformer differential if it is
acceptable to clear the entire transformer for loss of a reactor.
Overcurrent or impedance relays for internal three phase-to-ground, phase-tophase and phase-to-ground faults.
Instantaneous and time-delayed overcurrent relays for phase and ground fault.
Typically not provided due to lower cost and less significance of air-core
reactors.
Most utilities reported in the B5-37 survey that when two redundant systems are used,
there are separate DC supplies, CT windings, and trip coils.
CONTROL
To control the power system voltage, shunt reactors are switched on/off either manually
or automatically. Standard [ref 20] provides guidelines for switching requirements of
shunt reactors. For example, one of the most important aspects of switching reactors is
current chopping by forcing reactor current to zero. This will result in high voltage across
breaker poles. Solution to this problem may include surge arrestors applied to the reactor
and transformer tertiary terminals to avoid excess voltage during switching. This section
discusses switching actions.
Typically more than one over/ under voltage level with independently settable
time delays is required within the relay.
Over/ under voltage relay shall be capable to operate only when all three voltages
are above/ below set operate level or relay must be capable to measure and
operate on the value of the positive sequence voltage.
The automatic closing and opening commands are issued on over voltage and under
voltage detection respectively after a certain time delay.
The commands will be a pulse with adjustable duration.
The automatic closing operation will be blocked:
against successive commands
by operation of shunt reactor protection
by operation of busbar protection
by operation of transformer protection (when the shunt reactor is connected at the
tertiary of the transformer).
Unblocking will be made only by the operating personnel. The automatic opening
operation will be blocked in case of VT open circuit.
U>
t1
tC
T ON
AND
T ON
CLOSE
CMD
taux2
AUTOMATIC ON
OR
T ON
AND
AUTOMATIC OFF
AND
taux3
T ON
taux1
T ON
t2
tO
T ON
OR
PROT Block
AND
T ON
OPEN
CMD
U<
Figure 89 Example of logical diagram for shunt reactor automation
Where:
U> - overvoltage function
U< - undervoltage function
tO open pulse duration
tC close pulse duration
taux1 time after the scheme is ready to block actions
taux2 blocking time with automatic recovery after command (close/ open)
taux3 monitoring and blocking time for repeated commands
t1 time required to measure overvoltage level
t2 time required to measure undervoltage level.
Even though a modern breaker will have very low re-strike probability at switching of
reactive loads, for statistical reasons a few occasional re-strikes may occur during the
course of a large number of switching operations. This risk of occasional re-strikes may
be eliminated by means of controlled opening operations.
Conventional countermeasures such as pre-insertion resistors, damping reactors or
resistors, or arresters are used to limit the magnitude and effect of the switching
transients, after they have occurred. In addition, system and equipment insulation may be
upgraded to withstand the stresses. These methods, however, may be inefficient,
unreliable or expensive, and do not treat the root of the problem.
Principle of controlled switching
Controlled switching is a method for eliminating harmful transients via time controlled
switching operations. Closing or opening commands to the circuit breaker are delayed in
such a way that making or contact separation will occur at the optimum time instant
related to the phase angle. See Figure 90.
BB
VT
Output
Command
CB
SR
Reference
Voltage
POW
Input
Command
If controller is used for controlled opening, it is important that all protection trip
commands are by-passing the controller. When the shunt reactor is to be energized, an
input command is given to the point-on-wave controller. Following the command the
controller will determinate a reference time instant, related to the phase angle of the
busbar voltage. When this has been done, and after an internally created waiting time, the
controller will then give an output closing command to the circuit breaker. The time
instant for the output closing command is determined by the make time of the circuit
breaker and the target point for making. Both the predictable make time and target point
has been pre-programmed into the controller. The circuit breaker will then close at the
correct time instant and minimize the switching transients.
Due to the oscillating reactor voltage, there will be a high voltage stress across the circuit
breaker. If the contact gap is short, the circuit breaker probably will reignite, see Figure
93. A re-ignition will generate high-frequency transients (typically hundreds of kHz) in
both reactor voltage and current. Following a re-ignition, the reactor current will be
interrupted again either at high-frequency zero crossing of the current, or most probably,
at the subsequent power frequency zero crossing. The very steep voltage transients
caused by re-ignitions will be unevenly distributed across the reactor winding, with the
highest stress on the initial turns. There is a risk that the voltage stress will lead to
puncture of the winding insulation in the reactor, which in the long run may lead to
complete breakdown. Insulation of nearby equipment may also be damaged. Surge
arresters will only protect to a limited extent, since the severity of the voltage stress is
related both to the rate-of-change and to the amplitude.
Different substation arrangements may call for special solutions for overall total
functionality. Double circuit breaker schemes and one and a half circuit breaker
schemes may require special arrangements to attaining proper function of adaptive
control.
In Figure 99 it shows a CB and a half scheme with controlled reactor circuit breakers. All
CTs are installed outside the reactor bays.
Figure 99 Circuit breaker and half scheme with CT outside reactor bays.
Generally every circuit breaker will be controlled with its own POW controller. However,
in some substation configurations one circuit breaker may switch two different loads,
which may call for more than one controller per circuit breaker. In most cases a specific
load is switched by its own circuit breaker. In some substation configurations, one load
may be alternatively be switched by different circuit breakers.
The following two conditions require special care:
One load switched by two circuit breakers.
Two different loads alternatively switched by the same circuit breaker.
Special care should be taken when applying the adaptation control features based on reignition detection. This is the case if the shunt reactor can be energized from two sides
and where the CTs are common. An example of such an installation is shown in Figure
100.
In this case current will always be measured by the CT as long as any of the two breakers
CB1 or CB2 is conducting. The only way to use the re-ignition detection function here is
to arrange a fixed switching order and to set the function disabled for controller of the
first shunt reactor breaker to open.
Hydro Quebec
Brazil (BR)
Copel
ESKOM
France (FR)
RTE
Spain (ES)
RED Electrica
Romania (RO)
Sweden (SE)
Norway (NO)
Statnett
Finland (FI)
Fingrid
China (CN)
India (IN)
Power Grid
National Grid
Australia (AU)
Power link
Transpower
The objective of the survey was to get some details of the practices followed in various
countries regarding control, monitoring and protection of shunt reactors that are directly
connected to EHV system and those that are connected to the EHV system through
tertiary of transformer. The areas on which information was sought are listed below.
Application and Design of Shunt Reactors
Information on the voltage levels used
Types of connections to the power system
Grounding methods
Reactor design
Protection and Redundancy
Several countries use Shunt Reactors and these are at voltage levels ranging from 10kV
to 1000kV. Table 11 below gives voltage levels furnished by responding utilities having
shunt reactors installed in their systems.
Table 11 Voltage levels
10-66
kV
CA
BR
ZA
13.8
11/15/22
100-160
kV
220-330
kV
161
315
132
220/275
380-500
kV
735-765
kV
735
400
765
1000-1200
kV
10-66
kV
FR
ES
RO
SE
NO
FI
GS
CN
IN
UK
SCT
AU
NZ
100-160
kV
20
30
35
22/ 66
10/20
13.8/ 33
10/35/66
33
13
33
132
220-330
kV
380-500
kV
225
220
400
400
400
400
420
220
300
132
220/330
275
18
380
500
400
400
735-765
kV
1000-1200
kV
750
765
1000
275,330
11
10.2.2
Shunt Reactors installed at voltage level 10-66kV are mainly connected to transformer
tertiary. Shunt Reactors installed at voltage level 100-160 kV and 220-330 kV are mostly
bus connected. Shunt Reactors installed at voltage level 380-500kV and 735-765 kV and
1000-1200 kV are either bus or line connected.
Table 12 below gives details furnished by responding utilities having shunt reactors
connected to bus, line and/or to tertiary winding of transformer.
Table 12 Shunt reactor connection to the power system
CA
BR
ZA
FR
ES
RO
Line Connected
(kV)
Bus Connected
(kV)
735
161/315/735
400/765
220/400/765
225/400
220/400
400
Tertiary Connected
(kV)
13.8
66
20
30
35
Line Connected
(kV)
Bus Connected
(kV)
Tertiary Connected
(kV)
420
220/400
300/420
?
22
10/20
13.8/33
10/35/66
33
13
33
18
11
SE
NO
FI
GS
CN
IN
UK
SCT
AU
NZ
380
500/750/1000
400/765
275/400
275/330
10.2.3
132/380
400/765
275/400
Shunt Reactors installed at voltage level 380-500kV and 735-765 kV and 1000-1200 kV
are either bus or line connected. Bus connected reactors are always directly grounded.
Line connected reactors are grounded either directly or through a neutral reactor. ZA,
CN , IN and AU ground some of the line connected reactors through a neutral
reactor.AU are considering removal of neutral reactors as they are facing some problems
with 330kV circuit breakers.
All countries that have tertiary connected reactors are normally ungrounded. CN have
some tertiary connected reactors that are grounded.
10.2.4
Directly connected reactors up to 500 kV are normally of 3Ph, 3 limb or 3 ph, 5 limb
construction. In 735/765 kV and 1000kV level they are of single phase construction. All
these reactors are oil filled.
Shunt reactors designed with split winding or auxiliary winding per phase do not seem to
be common. None of the responding utilities report having these types of reactors. FR,
NO, GS and UK have specifically answered that they do not use any auxiliary winding.
NO has specifically confirmed that they do not use split winding.
Table 13 below gives different types of shunt reactor designs among the responding
utilities.
ZA
FR
ES
RO
SE
NO
GS
X
X
CN
X (765kV)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
IN
UK
SCT
AU
X (220/330/750/1000 kV)
X (765kV)
X
X
10.3.1
Following electrical protections are generally used for directly connected shunt reactors.
Differential for ph-ph, restricted earth fault for ph-g, impedance /Buchholz for inter turn
faults, ph over current (instantaneous and time delayed, ground overcurrent
(instantaneous and time delayed) as back up.
Following electrical protections are generally used for tertiary connected shunt reactors:
Ph over current (instantaneous and time delayed) for ph-ph faults, ground overvoltage for
ph-g and inter turn faults.
Table 14 and Table 15 give some details furnished by responding utilities about the
electrical protections used for directly connected and tertiary connected reactors.
CA
ZA
X
See
note1
Ground
overcurrent
:instantaneous
Others
time delayed
Phase
overcurrent
:instantaneous
Ground
delayed)
me
overcurrent
Phase
overcurrent
: time delayed
Impedance
Restricted E/F
Differential
FR
ES
RO
SE
NO
GS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CN
IN
UK
AU
X
X
X
X
X
X
See
note2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Adaptive directional power
X
FI
Others
Ground
Overvolt
age
Phase
overcurr
ent
instantan
eous
BR
Phase
overcurr
ent
time
delayed
Sensitive compensated
unbalance relay and
backup non
compensated
unbalance relay
Others
Phase
overcurr
ent
instantan
eous
X
Ground
Overvolt
age
Phase
overcurr
ent
time
delayed
X
SCT
Differential and
directional earth fault,
overcurrent and earth
fault.
NZ
10.3.2
For directly connected reactors following nonelectrical protections are generally used: Oil
temperature, Oil Pressure, Winding Temperature, Oil level, Buchholz, Fire protection.
For Oil filled tertiary connected reactors following are used: Oil temperature, Oil level,
Buchholz.
Table 16 and Table 17 give some details furnished by responding utilities about nonelectrical protection functions used for shunt reactors.
X
X
SE
NO
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Others
X
X
X
Fire
protection
Winding
temperature
X
X
X
Buch holz
Oil pressure
CA
ZA
FR
ES
RO
Oil level
Oil
temperature
X
X
Extreme voltage
automatic relay and
cooling equipment
Winding
temperature
Oil level
Buch holz
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Others
Oil pressure
X
X
X
Fire
protection
Oil
temperature
GS
CN
IN
UK
AU
Cooling intervention
X
10.3.3
Buchholz
X
X
Oil level
BR
FI
SCT
NZ
Winding
temperat
ure
Oil
temperat
ure
X
X
X
X
X
X
Most of the responding utilities use two groups of protections for directly connected
reactors but they are not fully duplicated. One utility provides full duplication for
electrical protections but use only one set of mechanical protections. There is another
utility that use only one group of protections.
For tertiary connected reactors use of single group of protections is common. One utility
uses two groups of protections for tertiary connected reactors too.
Table 18 and Table 19 gives details of manner in which redundancy is provided in the
protection system by the responding utilities in case of directly connected and in tertiary
connected reactors.
Table 18 Redundancy for directly connected reactors
Group A protections
CA
Group A
ZA
Differential
Restricted earth fault
Overcurrent (inst+time delayed)
Earth fault (time delayed)
FR
ES
Differential
Restricted earth fault
Overcurrent (inst+time delayed)
Earth fault (time delayed)
Differential
WTI
Oil temperature
Oil pressure
SE
Differential
NO
Differential
GS
Group A
Differential
Restricted earth fault
Adaptive zero sequence power
protection
Adaptive zero sequence
distance protection
Overcurrent (inst+time delayed)
Earthfault (inst+timedelayed)
Neutral point overcurrent
Differential
RO
CN
IN
Group B protections
-
Group B
Differential
Restricted earth fault
Overcurrent (inst+time
delayed)
Earth fault (time delayed)
Differential
Restricted earth fault
Overcurrent (inst+time
delayed)
Earth fault (time delayed)
Restricted earth fault
Overcurrent (inst+time
delayed)
Earthfault (inst+timedelayed)
Buchholz
Overcurrent (inst+time
delayed)
Earthfault (inst+timedelayed)
Neutral point overcurrent relay
Buchholz
WTI
Oil temperature
Overcurrent (inst+time
delayed)
Earthfault (inst+timedelayed)
Mechanical protections
Group B
Differential
Restricted earth fault
Adaptive zero sequence power
protection
Adaptive zero sequence
distance protection
Overcurrent (inst+time
delayed)
Earthfault (inst+timedelayed)
Neutral point overcurrent
Mechanical protections
Restricted earth fault
UK
AU
Group A protections
Backup impedance
Oil temperature
Oil pressure
Differential
NZ
Differential
Mechanical protections
Group B protections
Buchholz 1)
WTI
Oil level
Fire protection
Restricted earth fault
Overcurrent (inst+time
delayed)
Earthfault (inst+timedelayed)
Differential
Mechanical protections
Group A protections
Group B protections
BR
FI
Overcurrent (inst+timedelayed)
Compensated unbalance relay
SCT
One group
NZ
One group
10.3.4
protections are provided uses two DC supplies, different trip coils and two secondary
windings of CTs.
10.4.1
Types of faults reported in case of directly connected reactors are winding faults (Ph-g,
Ph-Ph, turn to turn), faults in bushings and auxiliary equipment, overload, oil
temperature/winding temperature high, mechanical defects and problems in CB. The
reasons for faults are moisture ingress in auxiliaries and bushings, over voltage, oil level
falling, dielectric failures, thermal, mechanical failures. The faults range frequency, from
0.5 per year to 5.6 per year.
In case of tertiary connected reactors one utility has reported inter turn faults, faults
related to auxiliary apparatus and erroneous trips.
Fault types, reasons and failure rates reported by responding utilities are given in Table
20 and Table 21 below.
Table 20 Types of faults on directly connected shunt reactors
ZA
ES
RO
FR
SE
NO
GS
CN
IN
UK
AU
BR
Type of fault, Reasons for fault and how often they occur
Not available
-
FI
SCT
NZ
10.4.2
In case of directly connected reactors mal operations due to mismatch in CT cores used
for REF and malfunctioning of back up impedance relays during switching and
unsuccessful auto reclosing due to improper tuning of neutral ground reactors are some of
the problems reported by some utilities. Some utilities have said there have been no
maloperations.
In case of tertiary connected reactors one country has reported some instances of
erroneous trip.
Table 22 and Table 23 below give summary of the responses received from different
responding utilities.
Table 22 Protection performance- directly connected shunt reactors
ZA
FR
ES
RO
SE
NO
GS
CN
?
?
-
IN
UK
AU
FI
SCT
NZ
?
?
10.4.3
ZA
FR
ES
RO
SE
NO
GS
Specifications for CTs are being carefully issued for new installations
to meet a requirement such as a class X or similar
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Numerical relays for their added benefits.
IN
UK
AU
CN
No
After introduction of numerical relays with in-built disturbance
recorders analysis is simpler
No limitations, second Buchholz relay is being considered.
The comments from responding utilities on the philosophy used for automatic switching
are given in Table 25 below. In case of directly connected reactors both manual and
automatic switching is practiced in various countries. Some explanation of the philosophy
used when automatic switching is used is also given. Automatic control in this context
means that the switching decisions are made for instance by voltage regulators.
Manual
CA
ZA
FR
Automatic
?
Automatic switching is only allowed where the device
being switched can be completely compensated, for e.g. if
a 100MVA reactor is being switched out, the SVC must
have 100MVAR capacitance availability.
?
X (SVCs
only)
ES
RO
Manual
Automatic
NO
GS
CN
IN
UK
AU
In case of tertiary connected shunt reactors in BR, SCT, NZ the switching is done
manually as per the advice from the control room. In FN manual local, manual remote,
automatic local (voltage regulator) and, in two special cases, automatic remote (regional
regulation) is used.
10.5.2
The frequency with which shunt reactors are switched in and out depends on loading
conditions. Seasons also have an effect on this. In most cases switching in and out of
reactors is done daily and in some cases once in a while. Table 26 and Table 27 gives
summary of the responses received for this question for directly connected and tertiary
connected shunt reactors.
Frequency of switching
CA
ZA
FR
ES
RO
SE
NO
GS
CN
IN
UK
AU
?
Most reactors are not switched regularly (< once a week). A few reactors
are switched to increase power transfer capability of the network and are
typically switched twice a day. At the stations where automatic switching
takes place, reactors are switched 10 15 times a day (assuming normal
operating conditions)
?
Reactors are switched in and out daily.
130 switching per year.
Once or twice every day
Daily
In general during winter this is more frequent for bus reactors.
Shunt reactors are directly connected to transmission line without any circuit
breaker.
Almost daily according to system voltage condition as advised by regional
load dispatch center. Usually bus reactors are switched two or three times
each day. These switchings are also seasonal.
On an average each reactor is switched once per day.
Typically, daily.
Frequency of switching
BR
FI
SCT
NZ
Daily
Depends on voltage stability, many of the reactors are switched in / out daily
Once a day, tend to be in the night.
Rarely; only when there is light loading.
10.5.3
In case of directly connected reactors many utilities use synchronized switching mostly
for opening of the CB. In some cases they are also used for closing of the CB. Some
utilities who do not use them at present are considering there usage due to increased
failure rates observed in the breakers. Table 28 below gives summary of the responses
received from responding utilities for directly connected shunt reactors.
10.5.4
ZA
FR
ES
RO
GS
I, Q
Oil temperature and winding temperature
Monitoring the dissolved gas and water (H2 , H2 O)-alarm
CN
IN
UK
AU
DGA of oil from reactor and bushings is being done. Based on the
results trend in DGA, a national & regional transformer committee
comprising of expert engineers recommend the test plan, test frequency
etc. On-line dry-out systems are used. DOMINO test is conducted on
reactors every year. SFRA tests are conducted upon requirement to
compare traces with base signatures.
I, U, Q, oil level, WTI, all the alarms and indications generated by
protection functions.
WTI switches cooling system on/off, and trip reactors if winding
temperature is detected to be higher than a set value.
U & I, with manual investigation of any abnormalities.
SCT
NZ
APPENDIX
A. EXAMPLE OF CONTROLLED SWITCHING OF A 500KV
SHUNT REACTOR IN JAPAN
A.1
Introduction
It is known that when the switchgear interrupts a shunt reactor current, it generates reignition, causing high overvoltages [ref 25] ~[ref 30]. Tokyo Electric Power Company
has constructed a 500kV underground substation in an urban area. Having long-distance
cables connected, the substation is equipped with 500kV shunt reactors. 550kV one-break
circuit breaker is used to switch the shunt reactor current. The controlled switching is
employed for this 500kV shunt reactor switching. Full-scale shunt reactor current
interruption tests of the 550kV gas circuit breaker were carried out for this study at a
high-power laboratory.
A.2
Figure 101 shows a test circuit of a single phase 500kV reactor current interruption.
2.65H was interrupted by a 550kV one-break gas circuit breaker (CB). By taking account
of the actual Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS), with a small load side capacitance C L, tests
were carried out at 1.8 kHz and 2.5 kHz. The capacitance CS at the power supply side
was determined to be about 10 times CL, so that high overvoltages would be generated at
the reactor terminal in the event of re-ignition [ref 31].
The test conditions are summarized in Table 31.
Figure 101 Single phase test circuit for interrupting 500kV reactor current.
Table 31 Test conditions for single phase circuit for interrupting 500kV reactor current.
No. CB conditions
Operating hydraulic
pressure
(MPa)
1
31.5 (rated)
2
3
4
A.3
SF6 gas
pressure
(MPa)
0.6 (rated)
0.6 (rated)
0.6 (rated)
0.55 (alarm)
Circuit conditions
Applied
Interrupting
voltage
current
(kV)
(A)
318 (500/3) 381
318 (500/3) 381
289 (500/3) 347
318 (500/3) 381
Load side
frequency
(kHz)
1.80
2.50
1.80
1.80
Thus, with the test circuit in Figure 101, a series of interruption tests were carried out
with different values of T0. The results are shown in Figure 103.
Now, the longer T0 is, the longer the distance is between the circuit breaker contacts at
the first reactor current zero crossing. At the longer distance between the contacts, the reignition takes place under a higher voltage between contacts;
Thus, re-ignition overvoltage is higher. Tests were carried out to obtain the relation
between time T0 and the voltage between the contacts upon re-ignition. The results are
shown in Figure 104.
A.4
Figure 105 illustrates how the controlled switching in the 550kV breaker acts to suppress
re-ignition overvoltages. Figure 105(a) shows the scheme of the controlled switching.
Figure 105(b) shows the time chart of the controlled switching. The control unit outputs
the contact separation command to the circuit breaker at an appropriate point of time.
(3) Even if the opening time variations with hydraulic pressure variations taken into
account, the contact separation points are in a certain range of dispersion.
This dispersion of the contact separation points on the 550kV one-break circuit
breaker was limited within 1.5ms.
Using the test results in Chapter 15.3 and the results of the investigation on the
dispersion of contact separation points described above, a controlled switching
was achieved for the 550kV one-break gas circuit breaker.
It is shown in Figure 106, which contains the test results for the relation between
the contact separation point and the voltage between the contacts at re-ignition
shown in Figure 104.
Figure 106 shows followings:
a) The target arcing time, which is between contact separation target point C
and the interruption point E is 11ms;
b) The latest point D in the contact separation point dispersion range Ts is
not in the contact separation range =9.0ms, in which re-ignition takes
place. So that the interruption is completed without re-ignition at the point E.
c) At the earliest point B in the contact separation point range Ts, the voltage
between the contacts at the re-ignition is 0.2 p.u.
The overvoltage at this re-ignition is estimated to be approximately below
1.2p.u (overvoltage = terminal voltage + voltage between contacts = 1.0 +
0.2 = 1.2pu). This is a sufficiently safe value in terms of equipment
insulation.
d) In the contact separation point dispersion range Ts of B to D, overvoltages
are suppressed to approximately below 1.2p.u. Therefore, the controlled
switching is quite effective.
Figure 106 Opening phase control achieved on 550kV one-break circuit breaker.
A.5
Conclusion
1. The relation was obtained between the contact separation point and the probability of
re-ignition as well as the voltages between the CB contacts which produce re-ignition.
2. Even with the dispersion of circuit breaker operations taken into account, there was a
contact separation point that did not cause high re-ignition overvoltages. Thus, by setting
a contact separation at this point, high re-ignition overvoltages could be suppressed.
3. It was proven that even with re-ignition; there was no high-frequency arc extinction,
that is, no voltage escalation due to multi-re-ignition. Overvoltages due to current
chopping where at a safe level in terms of equipment insulation.
The investigation shows that the reactor current could be interrupted safely by
suppressing re-ignition surges by employing controlled switching.
Figure 109 shows the three line diagram of two banks of 765 kV line reactors three 80
MVar reactors connected with a 765kV auxiliary bus to which the spare single phase
reactor is also connected.
The protection of the EHV shunt reactor in this case is achieved by using CT switching
arrangement for all the single phase reactors including the spare reactor. Since the relays
have limited analogue inputs for current and voltage the switching for the analogue inputs
is done externally when spare shunt reactor is placed into service.
62
94
CB-LV
50N
51N
63
51
50
94
CB-HV
CB-LV
52
50/51
50N
51N
DEVICE DESIGNATIONS
87 DIFFERENTIAL RELAY
49 THERMAL RELAY
63 SUDDEN PRESSURE RELAY
50 INST. OVERCURRENT RELAY
51 TIME OVERCURRENT RELAY
62 TIME DELAY RELAY
94 AUX. TRIPPING RELAY
52
52
52
52
TO DISTRIBUTION
and 51N at CB-LV are also coordinated with downstream protection but act as a backup
by tripping CB-HV and removing the entire shunt reactor from service.
87
CB-HV
52
59N
ALARM
51
CB-LV
52
52
52
52
52
TO DISTRIBUTION
Figure 111 Ungrounded Auxiliary Power Winding for Low-voltage Distribution
Introduction
It is known that the charging current is proportional with the degree of the voltage and the
length of the transmission line. For this reason, overvoltage always emerges at the end of
the long unloaded line, mainly due to the large amount of capacity accumulated along the
line. Therefore, in order to limit the overvoltage within a certain range, it is necessary to
build adequate numbers of switching stations equipped with reactors along the
transmission lines. But if the switching station is located at such a remote area without
reliable power supply, and also it is far from the load centre, then a reliable source of
service power need to be supplied.
An example hydropower station possesses an installed capacity of 3300 MW. The
electrical power is delivered to area A through three 500 kV transmission lines with
length of 470 km each, and then the power is forwarded through two 500 kV transmission
lines to other places.
To regulate the voltage level, a switching station has been established between generation
and area A, 470 km away from the generation.
There is no other reliable power supply in this region.
D.2
Introduce one 35 kV line from the regional power grid, as the main backup power
supply of the switching station, and the capacity of station transformer is 630
kVA.
Install a set of diesel generators which is started manually, as the assisted backup
power supply, and its capacity is 40 kVA.
Extract electrical power energy through the auxiliary winding system of the two
groups of 500 kV high voltage shunt reactors, as the primary power supply for the
switching station, and the capacity of each shunt reactor is 60 MVAr.
D.3
The main structure and technical parameters of the
shunt reactor
There are two groups of ordinary high voltage shunt reactors, and two groups with
auxiliary winding system through which the power energy is extracted to feed the
switching station.
Reactor structure
The structure of the reactor is the 3-pole form, consisting of a main pole core with air gap
and two secondary pole cores. The 550 kV winding is wrapped around the main pole
core, composed of two winding modules with series connection, and at the axial
intermediate point of the two modules there is a third terminal. The energy extraction
winding consists of the two windings wrapped around the two secondary pole cores with
parallel connection, whose voltage depends on not only the turns ratio of the main
winding and secondary winding but also the magnetic flux through the two secondary
windings. The three-phase terminals of the energy extraction windings connect to three
independent power cables, with a load break switch.
The installation
Breakers, grounding switches, fuses, a 6.5-kV intermediate (distribution) transformer,
load switches, lightning arresters and all the other necessary protection, control and
metering devices are installed in a sealed concrete component box. To avoid phase to
phase fault, three independent cables are used to interconnect the energy extraction
windings of the three shunt reactors with the high-voltage buses of the service power
distribution box. After entering the distribution box, the power energy extracted goes
forward through lightning arrester, grounding switch, SF6 circuit breaker, fuses and then
reaches the intermediate transformer, in which the voltage is stepped down to 400/231V
from 6.5 kV. Passing the intermediate transformer and then a main load switch, the
power energy flows into the low-voltage buses of the service power distribution box.
Through three separated power cables, the power energy is forwarded to the electricity
distribution room of the control building. To ensure quality of secondary voltage, a
transformer with on-load tap changer is selected as the intermediate transformer, and the
range of regulatory voltage is 2 2.5%.
Main equipment parameters
Shunt Reactors
Rated capacity: 60 MVAr
Rated power of the auxiliary winding: 167 kVA
Rated voltage of the main winding: 550 kV
Rated voltage of auxiliary winding: 6.5 kV
Rated current of the main winding: 189 A
Rated current of auxiliary winding: 44.5 A
Weight: 78000kg
Intermediate Transformer
Rated capacity: 500 kVA
Rated voltage of the primary winding: 6.5 kV
Reactance: 1681
D.4
As the high-voltage shunt reactors are attached to the 500kV line directly, this leads to a
disadvantage that the shunt reactors can only be isolated by tripping the circuit breakers
at the two ends of the line, which may disturb the operation of power grids. Therefore it
is extremely important to ensure reliable operation of the reactor.
Besides the ordinary structure, the shunt reactor has an additional auxiliary winding
system, which increases exposure to reactor faults. To maintain the operation of this
special reactor, the manufacturer should be requested to take effective measures to avoid
the internal faults of the reactor, especially when a fault occurs on the auxiliary winding
system, it should not spread to the main winding system.
The faults on the external devices attached to the auxiliary winding system should be
avoided outside the reactor. Three independent cables are used to join the auxiliary
winding systems of each reactor with the external devices. And these cables are separated
with a distance aimed at eliminating the short-circuit fault between these cables ahead of
the SF6 breaker.
To eliminate the impact on the reactor in case a fault happened on the downstream device
of the load switch, overcurrent and grounding protective devices have been installed, and
a high-voltage fuse is also attached to the load switch as another overcurrent device;
Thermal and overcurrent protection have been installed on the main breaker of the
secondary circuit of this intermediate transformer. Moreover, fuses have been set to
isolate the faults on the 400V feeder circuit. For protection of the high-voltage reactor,
preventing the overvoltage of the main winding from entering energy extraction and
power distribution system, a lightning arrester is installed in the cable of auxiliary
winding system.
D.5
Operating history
During the elapsed operating time only the breaker of feeder circuit connecting to the
secondary winding of the intermediate transformer has been tripped once because of the
failure in electrical motor of the station water pump. The power energy extracted from
500 kV power grid system by two groups of auxiliary winding systems guarantee the
reliability of service power of the switching station.
D.6
Conclusions
Due to the low reliability of regional power grid, through the 35 kV cables, the power
flowing into the power service transformer is often interrupted, so the reliability of the
power service of the switching station cannot be maintained only by depending on the
regional power grid. Locating in remote areas, without reliable power supply sources,
these switching stations should make use of shunt reactor with auxiliary winding system
to obtain reliable power supply.
With enhanced energy extraction capacity, the additional power energy can be distributed
to the adjacent areas.
During the system design it is necessary to ensure the reliable operation of the highvoltage side of the power grid system even when a fault occurs on either the energy
extraction winding system or the downstream distribution system. Therefore, on one
hand, the manufactory should ensure the reliability of internal elements of the reactor in
the design and manufacturing procedure, that is, the high-voltage part of the reactor
should not be damaged by the fault either on energy extraction winding system or on
downstream distribution system. On the other hand, separated (segregated) power cable
needs to be adopted to avoid faults happening on cables of the energy extraction.
Interrupting and the protection devices should be appropriately equipped to restrict the
fault on distribution system within the downstream area of the circuit breaker.
the control points. This ramping function is to avoid the fast reactive switching due to the
voltage target change.
For Coarse Voltage Control (disturbed operation), ARS provides fast switching of HV
and LV reactive plant to correct large HV and LV voltage variations.
For Fine Voltage Control (normal operation), ARS provides slow switching of LV
reactive plant to maintain the voltage within set limits of user selected target voltage.
The power system voltage inputs to the ARS system shall be supplied conventional
voltage transformers with an output of 63.5 V rated secondary. Only single-phase voltage
measurement shall be used for the ARS system. A balanced load and voltage shall be
assumed at all times.
All voltage measuring transducers (if applicable) shall be full range 4 - 20 mA true rms
The average of all the HV group voltages shall be displayed as HV voltage on the local
control panel with an accuracy of at least 0.5 kV and a resolution of 0.1 kV.
Fine Voltage Control mode shall monitor the HV voltage and carry out slow switching of
LV reactive plant to keep the HV voltage within a narrow dead-band around a selected
voltage target.
The thresholds and dead-bands associated with this control mode are detailed as follows:
Figure 112 Automatic Reactive Switching (ARS), relationship of thresholds and dead-bands for Coarse
and Fine Voltage Control Modes of the combined HV/LVARS
MHVVS :
HVSM :
HHVM :
LHVM:
VLHVM:
FC:
CC:
Fine Control
Coarse Control
Note that VHHV and EHHV are fixed value, not linked to the Target Voltage
F. ABBREVIATIONS
ANSI Numbers and abbreviations in Table 32 and Table 33, see [ref 12] and [ref 13].
Table 32 Function descriptions with ANSI, IEC61850-5, IEC61850-7-4 and IEC Symbols
ANSI Code
IEEEC37.2
21P
IEC 61850-5
Code
PDIS
IEC 61850-7-4
Code
PDIS/PSCH
IEC Symbols
Function description
21G
PDIS
PDIS/PSCH
Ground distance
25
27P
RSYN
PTUV
RSYN
PTUV
Synchrocheck
Phase Undervoltage
27X
PTUV
PTUV
Auxiliary Undervoltage
32
PDPR
PDOP/PDUP
37
40
PUCP
PUEX
PTUC/PDUP
PDUP/PDIS
Directional power
protection
Undercurrent protection
Field loss protection
46
PPBR
PTOC
47
PPBV
PTOV
49
PROL/PSOL
PTTR
50P
PIOC
PIOC
50G
PIOC
PIOC
50hr
PIOC
PIOC
50Q
PIOC
PIOC
50N
PIOC
PIOC
50P BF
RBRF
RBRF
50N BF
RBRF
RBRF
Phase distance
50EZ
PIOC
PIOC
End Zone
50HS
PIOC
PIOC
Switch On To Fault
50NU/51NU
PIOC
PIOC
50STUB
PIOC
PIOC
50T
PIOC
PIOC
51
PTOC
PTOC
51N
PTOC
PTOC
59P
PDOV
PTOV
Neutral Time
Overcurrent
Phase Overvoltage
59G
PDOV
PTOV
Ground Overvoltage
59Q
PDOV
PTOV
59X
PDOV
PTOV
Negative Sequence
Overvoltage
Auxiliary Overvoltage
66
PSMU
PMRI
67P
PDOC
PTOC
67N
PDEF
PTOC
Neutral Directional
Overcurrent
67G
PDOC
PTOC
68
78
RPSB
PPAM
RPSB
PPAM
Ground Directional
Overcurrent
Power Swing Blocking
Out-of-Step Tripping
79
81M
81m
81df/dt
85
RREC
PFRQ
PFRQ
PFRQ
RCPW
RREC
PTOF
PTUF
PFRC
PSCH
87L
PLDF
PDIF
87N
PNDF
PDIF
Autorecloser
Overfrequency
Underfrequency
Frequency rate of change
Teleprotection / Direct
intertrip
Restrained Line
Differential
Restricted earth fault
87P
PPDF
PDIF
Phase comparison
87R
PTDF
PDIF/PHAR
87T
PTDF
PDIF/PHAR
87BB
PBDF
PDIF/PDIR
Restrained Reactor
Differential
Restrained Transformer
Differential
Restrained Bus
Transformer tank
protection
Phase Time Overcurrent
Excessive number of
start-ups protection
Phase Directional
Overcurrent
50/87B
PBDF
PDIF/PDIR
OSC
ER
FL
46
46BC
50TCL
64
52 a,b
50DD
RDRE
RDRS
RFLO
PPBR
PTOC
YLTC
PHIZ
XCBR
PIOC
RDRE
RDRS
RFLO
PTOC
PTOC
YLTC
PHIZ
XCBR
PIOC
50/74
PIOC
CILO
CSWI
MMXU
PIOC
CILO
CSWI
MMXU
MMTR
CPOW
MMTR
CPOW
MET
MET
Differential
Unrestrained Bus
Differential
Disturbance recording
Events recording
Fault locator
Current Unbalance
Broken conductor detection
Tap changer lock
Zero sequence overvoltage
Circuit breaker (CB) control
Current Disturbance
Detector
CT Trouble
Interlocking
Control function
Measuring functions (I,
U, f, P,Q)
Metering function
Point-on-wave breaker
controller
Abreviations
Description
AC
Alternating Current
ARS
BBP
Busbar Protection
BCU
BFP
Current
CB
Circuit Breaker
CT
Current Transformer
DC
Direct current
EHV
Ground
GIS
GOOSE
GPS
GUI
H
HV
HW
HMI
I
High Voltage
Hardware
Human Machine Interface
Current
IDL
IDMT
IED
Low
MV
Medium voltage
MSC
MTBF
MTTR
Neutral
OC
Over current
OGST
OLTC
PD
Partial Discharge
PC
Personal Computer
PLC
POW
Point On Wave
REF
TCS
TRV
RTU
SCADA
SW
Software
Voltage
Voltage
VSR
VT
Voltage transformer
SO
System Operators
G. REFERENCES
G.1
Books
[ref 3] Numeriska metoder, Lrobok 1, Peter Pohl, Gerd Eriksson, Germund Dahlquist William D.
Stevenson, Jr., Elements of power system analysis, Fourth Edition
[ref 5] Elkraftsystem, Systemet och dess Analys, Gassam Batal, Institutionen fr elektronik,
Mlardalen University 2003
[ref 6] Gerhard Ziegler, Numerical Differential Protection, Principles and Applications, March 2005,
ISBN 3 89578-234-3
G.2
Technical Papers
[ref 8] IEEE Std C37.109-2006, IEEE Guide for the Protection of Shunt Reactors
[ref 9] CIGRE WG report 34.01 Reliable fault clearance and back-up protectionIEEE Std
C37.109-2006, IEEE Guide for the Protection of Shunt Reactors
[ref 10] International IEC, Standard 60270, High-voltage test techniques Partial discharge
measurements
[ref 11] IEEE Guide for the Detection and Location of Acoustic Emissions from Partial Discharges
in Oil-Immersed Power Transformers and Reactors, C57.127-2007
[ref 12] IEC 61850-5, First edition 2003-07
G.3
Other Documents
[ref 23] CIGRE WG B5.37 Questionnaire on Existing Practices of Shunt Reactors Protection,
Monitoring and Control 2007/2008
[ref 24] Carlson, ., Shunt Reactor Manual, ABB Power Technology Products/Transformers,
Ludvika-Sweden, 2002-08-20
[ref 25] CIGRE Working Group 13.02, Interruption of Small Inductive Current 1 & 2, ELECTRA,
No.72, p.73 1980
GIS
[ref 33] T.Kobayashi, S.Tsukao, I.Ohno, T.Koshizuka, S.Nishiwaki, N.Miyake, K.Matsushita, T.Saida,
"Application of Controlled Switching to 500kV Shunt Reactor Current Interruption" IEEE Trans.
on Power Delivery, Vol. 18, 2003, pp480-486
[ref 34] LAI, Loi Lei, et al, Application of 500 kV Shunt Reactor with Auxiliary Winding System in
Switching Station in China, January 19, 2009
[ref 35] ELECTRA. An International Survey on Failures in Large Power Transformers in Service. Paris:
CIGRE, Ref. no. 88, 1983.
[ref 36] APPLICATION OF NUMERICAL RELAYS FOR HV SHUNT REACTOR PROTECTION (Z.
Gaji, B. Hillstrm, M. Kockott) ABB Automation Technologies AB Vasteras, Sweden
[ref 37] Transformer PD Diagnosis using Acoustic Emission Technique, Tord Bengtsson, Hkan Kols
ABB Corporate Research, Bengt Jnsson ABB Transformers AB, ISH 97
August 25-29, 1997, Montral, Canada
[ref 38] Ray Zhang, Automatic Reactive Switching for HV and LV Shunt Reactive Plant, National Grid
Report, UK, 2001
[ref 39] Adaptive Differential Protection for Generators and Shunt Reactors, Relay Protection and
Substation Automation of Modern EHV Power Systems, Moscow Cheboksary, September 1012, 2007, I. Brncic, Z. Gajic and S. Roxenborg.