THIRD DIVISION

to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the

requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the
issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig,
his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner,
and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that
the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such
he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted;
that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and
welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further
holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same

is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed
from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners
legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for
record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate
child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is
only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as
middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a
part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and;

(6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by
either the Catindig or Garcia families.

child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. [9]

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees
with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle
name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive
rules which regulate the use of surname [10] of an individual whatever may
be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an
adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a
widow, thus:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with

her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she
remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion
and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use

the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the

surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not
prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation
by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. [8] It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is
that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to

xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname,
or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent
spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she
may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though
he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.

obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including

the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person
shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion.

xxx

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants

and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons
and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the
use of a middle name. Even Article 176 [11] of the Family Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or
the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of
the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise
silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the

Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the
childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by
the wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers
surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which
reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the
child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname
of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of
the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is
up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the
child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of
the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the
present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited
the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce
since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile.
Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers
surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be
modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to

use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the
mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that
they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since
in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of
legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate
chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where
they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is
also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the
Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted
shall bear the surname of the adopters. [13] Again, it is silent whether he can
use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related
or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from

legitimate paternity and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider

adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.
[17]
This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when thePhilippines, as a State
Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the
United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19]secures these
rights and privileges for the adopted. [20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows
that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is
a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use
of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code
and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is
closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and
Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie
to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so
that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is
doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to
avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be
entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,
JJ., concur.

(Chairman),

Corona,

Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,

THIRD DIVISION

Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is

an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his
lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include
undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and
1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his
siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes
Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of
the decedent.

[G.R. No. 146737. December 10, 2001]

In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN "JHONNY"
LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late Maria
Locsin Araneta), the successors of the late LOURDES C.
LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and
the intestate estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN,
JR., petitioners, vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent.

On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly published,
[2]
thereby giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said
petition.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose
Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla,
claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondents petition for letters of administration. They averred that
respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan
C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name .

A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a

copy of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the
Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the
one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.

On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by

Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of
the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C.
Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by
prescription or the statute of limitations.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the
September 13, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
57708 which affirmed in toto the September 13, 1996 order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No. 4742. The
September 13 order of the trial court appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr.,
respondent, as the sole administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.

The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the
deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining
the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition
dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C.
Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein
respondent and the deceased.

Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.[1] died intestate on December 11, 1990,
respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed Administrator of the

To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the

deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the
intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit
"D")[3] of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of
birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit

DECISION

Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.

"D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr.
and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by
his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and
authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was
machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court the bound
volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")
showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims,
shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of
the deceased.
[4]

In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth

No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro
Manila, marked as Exhibit "8", [5] indicating that the birth of respondent was
reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not
contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as
anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956
and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of
Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958
revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956
form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario clearly
suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as witness,
Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of
Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City)
appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He
thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document
surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the Local
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
After hearing, th trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of
respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued on September
13, 1996 an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED and
the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the late Juan Johnny Locsin, Sr.

"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his filing of a

bond in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) to be approved
by this Court.
"SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision
affirming in toto the order of the trial court dated September 13,
1996. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a
motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were, however, denied
by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed
on appeal[7] does not apply when there appears in the record of the case
some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been
overlooked, or the significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if
considered, would affect the result of the case. [8] Here, the trial court failed
to appreciate facts and circumstances that would have altered its
conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons
preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of a person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec.2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor. [9] Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of
kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they
are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. [10] In Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals,[11] this Court held that in the appointment of the administrator of
the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with
is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not
survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of
administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural
son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the
estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established
that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this point, this
Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the

open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)

any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does
not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment."[12](Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased,
presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D")
and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the
trial court made the following findings, affirmed by the Appellate Court:
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 in
the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original having been testified to by
Rosita Vencer, exists in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo. Petitioner since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of an
acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his
mother was summoned to attend to the burial as evidenced by a picture of
relatives facing the coffin of the deceased with petitioner and his mother in
the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial that the standard
signatures presented by oppositors were not in public document and may
also be called questioned document whereas in the certificate of live birth
No. 477, the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or primary
evidence. The anomalous and suspicious characteristic of the bound
volume where the certificate of live birth as alleged by oppositors was
found was testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and requisitioned
forms. However, the forms sent to them was the 1958 revised form and
that she said their office usually paste the pages of the bound volume if
destroyed. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness of
the signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious
circumstances of the bound volume were erased due to the explanation of
Rosita Vencer."

This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.

Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil
Register), the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the
Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar
General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of
births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to
merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To
locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not
more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees
in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested
parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D,"
more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should
have been presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of
Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record
of respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38
years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G.
Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record
allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was
based merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that
Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil
Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil
Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be
clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find
Vencer's explanation not convincing.

already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new
form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."[13]
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not
satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1,
1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years
earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil
Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No. 102, revised in
July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that
the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But
for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The
back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is
torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the
other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D"
is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb
because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other
certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates,
Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged
father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The space which
calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page
of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the
blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate
were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume,
Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I
am not a bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into
the volume, she explained as follows:
"COURT:

Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was

recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958
form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer
answered that "xxx during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were

I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees would only paste a
document like this Certificate of Live Birth?
WITNESS:

Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to replace the
record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the record when the leaves
were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume to be taken
out?

form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter.In the instant
case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not
identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the
suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have
impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.

A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so we

have to paste them."[14] (Emphasis ours)

Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his
mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin
listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla
were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.

There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital

document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.

In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs.

Local Civil Registrar[16] that:

Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the

anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually highlighted
the suspicious circumstances surrounding its existence.

Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines x x x explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the
child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of
any information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make
or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when
signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
fathership of said child. (Emphasis ours)

The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that

Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have
been given more faith and credence by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to
send copies of registrable certificates and documents presented to them
for entry to the Civil Registrar General, thus:
Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars shall (a) file
registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry; (b)
compile the same monthly and prepare and send any information required
of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or copies of
any document registered upon payment of proper fees; (d) order the
binding, properly classified, of all certificates or documents registered
during the year; (e) send to the Civil Registrar-General, during the
first ten days of each month, a copy of the entries made during
the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate search
and identification in case any information is required; and (g) administer
oaths, free of charge, for civil register purposes"[15] (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the
Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in

The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated

in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals [17] where this Court said that "a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its
preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of
recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers onlyprima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. [18] Its
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil
Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of
nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed
and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.

10

At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring
discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and
"8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local
Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry
General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin
of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,
[19]
lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage
and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while
standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the
estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late
Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is
spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested personwithin the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of
administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989

NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual
capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors ANTONIO ALBERTO,
JR. and LOURDES ALBERTO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR.,
assisted by his mother as his natural guardian, ANDREA
JONGCO, respondents.
Taada, Carreon & Taada for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R'* entitled "Antonio J. Alberto,
Jr., thru his mother as his natural guardian, Andrea Jongco, plaintiffappellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her individual
capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and
Antonio Alberto, Jr., defendants-appellees", reversing the August 10, 1964.
Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila.
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition
filed on September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila
by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his
mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein
petitioners (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint, private
respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio
C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and
wife and as a result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942; that
during the time that his alleged father and mother lived together as
husband and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had
no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father
and mother continued living together as husband and wife, his father
supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that
even the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the
year 1944, his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father
married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the
marriage, two (2) children were born herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and

11

Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was separated from his
mother, he continued to support him and recognized him as his own child;
that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner
Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before
the then Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings for the
estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as Special Proceedings No.
9092; that in the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately
omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in
having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned
among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on
November 9, 1953; that his father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and
accordingly, as a natural child of his father, he is entitles to at least
P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the
intestate proceedings and came to know about it only recently and
thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to give him
his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to
acknowledge him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his onefourth share be turned over to him; and that petitioners be sentenced to
pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee and the cost of suit (Record
on Appeals, pp. 2-9).
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that (1) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and (2)
that the cause of action is also barred by the statute of limitation (Ibid, pp.
9-19). To this motion, private respondents filed an opposition on October
22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).
On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion
to Dismiss (Ibid, pp. 97-98).
On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint
(Ibid, pp. 98-102).
On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to Defendants'
counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102-104). On August 10, 1964, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104- 123). The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the
dismissal of the complaint without pronouncement as to
the costs. The counterclaim is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent
Court, and in a Decision promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75),
respondent Court reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision, reads:
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and set aside and another rendered declaring plaintiff
Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child of the
deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the
owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate
of Antonio C. Alberto; and ordering the defendants to
deliver to plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5)
share in said estate, subject to the usufructuary rights of
defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto pursuant
to Articles 834 of the Old Civil Code, and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p. 77).
Hence, the instant petition.
This Court, in a resolution dated November 27,1968, resolved to give due
course to the petition (Rollo, p. 91).
Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF

12

APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF

ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF
ACTION HAD NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN NOT
BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME,
WAS GUILTY OF LACHES.
V
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO AND OTHER
WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE SERIOUS
CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR
TESTIMONIES AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY
STATED IN ITS DECISION.
VI
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED
PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE.
VII

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO

TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN
DECLARING HIM OWNER PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE HEREDITARY
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED.
I.
It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was
filed on September 8, 1960, almost five (5) years after the enactment of
R.A. No. 1401 creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the
questions of paternity and acknowledgment fall beyond the jurisdictional
pale of the Court of First Instance of Manila and instead comes within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
While petitioners admitted that this objection to lack of jurisdiction by the
Court of First Instance of Manila over the subject matter of the present
action had not been raised either in the said court or in the Court of
Appeals and is brought to this Court for resolution for the first time on
appeal, they contend that a party may object to the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action at any stage of the proceedings,
even for the first time on appeal since lack of jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter cannot be waived. Such contention is untenable.
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in
the trial court cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog
City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had voluntarily
participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the
issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986]; Royales vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover, there are no more Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been
transferred to the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143
SCRA 356 [1986]).
II.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
estate of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092)
had already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order of

13

distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the

persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also
declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant case
which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order to establish his rights
to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment (Petitioners' Brief, p.
47) despite private respondent's insistence that he had no knowledge or
notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged natural father (Record on
Appeal, p. 21).
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.
This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement
of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding
against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter
involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine
Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires
jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the
notice prescribed ... and any order that may be entered therein is binding
against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re
Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled further that a final order of
distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
the estate in the distributees; and that the only instance where a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then,
the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper
motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action,
the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for
another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and
executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of
(Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva
Caceres 45 Phil. 895).
III.
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly
provides:
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion
shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition
was made.

Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on

November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period expired on
November 9,1957. Hence, the present action filed on September 8, 1960
and which has for one of its objects the rescission of the agreement of
partition among the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is
already barred by prescription.
That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged
preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of
the other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case
alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil Code as
follows:
Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the
compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be
proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the
other persons interested; ...
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in
Article 1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code)
should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition
by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the case at bar,
it is evident that the action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was
approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had already prescribed when
respondent filed the complaint in the case at bar on September 8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not
prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized
(Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent
as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the
rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in
common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case at bar.
Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects of
prescription on the plea of minority under the New Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive,
runs against: (1) Minors and other incapacitated persons
who have parents, guardians or other legal
representatives:

14

xxxxxxxxx
Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco,
who in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely
under the above-cited provision.
Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased
Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action for recognition of natural child may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the
presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child, the latter
may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment of majority
(Art. 285 [1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this case,
prescription runs against him even during minority (Wenzel etc., et al. vs.
Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]). In such case, the
action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the
death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
95 Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July
3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and partition was filed eleven
(11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for
recovery of property in order to avoid the consequences of prescription, for
as correctly stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery of the
property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and
distribution approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery
of any property from the petitioners is not possible. Be that as it may, such
partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not
apply and there is an injury to the rights of plaintiff, tills action would still
not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code which provide
that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively,
from the time the right of action accrues.
IV
Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its findings
clearly and unmistakably declared that respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of
laches as follows:

About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio

Alberto's marriage to Natividad del Rosario. Yet, she took
no steps to protect the interests of her child, Antonio,
although she was already confronted with the
incontrovertible proof of Antonio's infidelity and the
hallowness of his promises.
It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio
Alberto's not denying that Alberto, Jr. was his child, if such
was the case. If this was so, however, how can we explain
her inaction even after the death of Antonio Alberto in
1949, or until September 8, 1960, when she filed this
action, Andrea kept silent, took no action to have her child
recognized as the son of the alleged father. Her laches, as
well as the inherent improbabilities in her testimony
rendered it unworthy of belief.
... It is evident that the plaintiff's case is adversely affected
by his long delay in bringing this action. 'Undue delay in
the separate enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive
of lack of merit in this claim, since it is human nature for a
person to assert his rights most strongly when they are
threatened or invaded. (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil.
435-440). (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109).
This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it (Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]; Tendo vs.
Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984];
Medija vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120
SCRA 687 [1983]).
As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for the
surprising delay in the filing of the complaint in the case at bar except
perhaps, the fact that during the lifetime of the deceased Antonio Alberto,
private respondents were receiving support until the latter died in 1949;
but thereafter, they allowed more than ten years to elapse or until
September 8, 1960 before they filed the present action to assert their

15

rights despite Andrea Jongco's allegation that they stopped receiving

support after Alberto, Sr.'s death.

guilty of any of the aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yateo, August 28,1958;
104 PMI. 378).

On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that such delay
is prejudicial to them. Private respondents could have filed the action in
1944 when Andrea Jongco learned of the marriage of the deceased with
petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for 16 years when the
supposed father's lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses
like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s mother had become too old to give coherent
testimony.

V.

On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:

The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot
be favored by the courts. Time inevitably tends to
obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and
even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear,
the true clue to the solution of a case may be hopelessly
lost. These considerations constitute one of the pillars of
the doctrine long familiar in equity jurisprudence to the
effect that laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a
plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive
of a want of merit but may, according to the
circumstances, be destructive of the right itself.Vigilantibus
non dormientibus equites subvenit (Buenaventura vs.
David, 37 Phil. 435, reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA
227 [1961]).
The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr.
at the time of his supposed father's death. But such explanation as
discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of prescription under Article
1108 of the Civil Code where minority does not stop the running of the
prescriptive period for minors who have parents, guardians or legal
representatives.
Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are vigilant and
diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act (Cui
and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs.
Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154)." The law does not encourage laches,
indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to
deserve the considerations of the courts, he... must show that he is not

Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review
and reverse the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a general
rule, this is a function this Court does not undertake. The established
principle is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the
conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court in making its findings
went beyond the issues of the case, and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both the apellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings of
the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the
findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA
576 [1985]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593 [1986]).
It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized
exceptions to the rule, specifically that the findings of the Appellate Court
are contrary to those of the trial court.
At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the
complainants is of the view that the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is
sufficient to totally discredit not only her testimony but also her entire
case. Aside from being inherently improbable and the merit of her claim
being adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay in bringing
action, her testimony is contradicted by the testimonies of Jose, Zoilo and
Pilar who are brothers and sister of the deceased Antonio Alberto and who
have no pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome of the controversy.
They testified that during the period Andrea Jongco claimed that Antonio
Alberto, Sr. lived with her, the deceased in fact lived with his mother and
brothers at the family residence except for his brief stint with the army
(Decision, Civil Case No. 44164; Record on appeal, pp. 111-112).
More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has
had five children (aside from her son Antonio) with four different men. The
assumption, therefore, is that she lived with at least four different men
without being married to any of them. Thus, the trial court aptly ruled that

16

his propensity to promiscuous relationship with different men, render it

unjust to state with definiteness that any particular person is the father of
any one of her children." (Ibid, p. 121).
Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio, the
father, since the latter was a child and then of Antonio, the alleged son,
and Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged former lessor of Andrea Jongco and
Antonio Alberto. Their testimonies were, however, found by the trial court
to be inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience and
deliberately invented to conform with the testimony of Andrea Jongco (Ibid,
pp. 109-117).
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more credence
to the testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta and declared
that their testimonies have sufficiently established the fact that Antonio J.
Alberto, Jr. is the son of the late Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco
which finds further proof in the birth certificate and the baptismal
certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo, pp. 6-11).
In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985), this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs.
GSIS, 128 SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24
SCRA 434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano vs.
Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged
father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence
of paternity.
In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's testimony,
the Court of Appeals pointed out her serious inconsistency on material
points such as her claim that she was married to the deceased in 1941 and
her later admission in the answer that they were married in 1944.

marriage so that petitioners could have an apparent good reason for the
non-presentation of the marriage certificate.
As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural.
Besides petitioners' reasons for the choice of that place, the celebration of
the marriage was positively confirmed by Damaso Herrera, one of the
sponsors thereof.
In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact
by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be
disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in
a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs.
Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30 [19871; People vs. Grefiel, 125 SCRA 108
[1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985]; People vs.
Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 (1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I. of Misamis Oriental,
121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA 479 [1984]).
After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the
contending parties, no cogent reasons could be found to justify the
reversal of the findings of the trial court.
In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last
two assignments of errors.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first
marriage was a secret civil marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the
second was a religious ratification of the former. The lack of marriage
certificate as evidence was also considered by the Court of Appeals as an
impairment of credibility despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war
records in the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal were destroyed during the last
war. Said Appellate Court is of the view that if they did plan to marry
secretly at that time, they could have chosen a city or municipality near
Manila and that Pililla must have been chosen as the place of the supposed

17

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33659 June 14, 1990
VICTORIA U. BALUYUT, MA. THERESA U. BALUYUT and MA.
FLORDELIZA U. BALUYUT, all minors, represented by their mother
and guardian ad litem, NORMA URBANO, petitioners,
vs.
FELICEDAD S. BALUYUT and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Note: The family name Baluyut appears as Baluyot is some
pleadings.
Donald E. Asis for the Administratrix

MEDIALDEA, J.:

18

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria and Ma. Flordeliza,

all surnamed Baluyot, then minors, represented by their mother
and guardian ad litem, Norma Urbana which seeks the reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38069-R
entitled "Felicidad S. Baluyut, Administratrix-Appellant v. Victoria
U. Baluyut, et al., Intervenors-Appellees." The decision brought to
this court for review reversed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga (now Regional Trial Court) and dismissed
the petition for intervention filed by petitioners in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled "Intestate Estate of
Deceased Enrique Baluyut,' filed before the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, herein petitioners filed on April 29, 1965 a petition
for intervention. The petition alleged that petitioners have a legal
interest in the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut; that
petitioners-minors are the illegitimate children of the deceased,
begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and petitioners' mother
and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano; that petitioners were
conceived and born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited
with the deceased while the latter was already married to
Felicidad S. Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of children of the deceased during his
lifetime by direct overt acts of said deceased having supported
and maintained them. The petitioners also alleged that they were
deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp.
10-18, Record on Appeal).
Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed
administratrix of his estate, opposed the petition for intervention
(p. 20, Record on Appeal). On May 8, 1965 (pp. 18-19, Record on
Appeal), the trial court issued an order allowing the petitioners to
intervene.
After trial, a decision (pp. 24-31, Record on Appeal) was rendered
declaring the intervenors Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza
the forced heirs of deceased Enrique Baluyut and ordering
administratrix Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay P150.00 monthly
support to Norma Urbano, guardian ad litem for the three minor
children. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders:

1) FELICIDAD VDA. DE BALUYUT, the administratrix

to pay P150.00 as monthly support out of the Estate
of Enrique Baluyut to Norma Urbano guardian ad
litem for the three minor children, Victoria, Theresa
and Flordeliza Baluyut.
2) That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said
children are forced heirs of the late Enrique Baluyut.
3) That they are entitled to their hereditary rights in
said Estate of Enrique Baluyut under the provisions
of the New Civil Code (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal).
On February 15, 1966, the administratrix filed a Notice of Appeal
from the trial court's decision. On February 22, 1966, the
intervenors filed their Objection to Appeal and Motion for
Execution. The latter motion was based on the pronouncement in
Salazar v. Salazar, L-5823, April 29, 1953, that an order granting
supportpendente lite is final and executory.
On May 4,1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on
Appeal) declaring that it considers intervenors' motion for
execution as a motion for reconsideration and amended the
decision to the effect that it granted the minors Victoria, Theresa
and Flordeliza monthly support pendente lite in the amount of
P150.00 payable every first day of the month to their guardian ad
litem Norma Urbano.
On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp.
19-41, Rollo) reversing the decision of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
reversed and the intervenors' petition in
intervention is hereby declared dismissed, without
costs. The order granting alimony pendente lite to
the intervenors is hereby set aside. (p. 41, Rollo)
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of respondent Court of
Appeals' decision was denied on May 24, 1971 (p. 53, Rollo).

19

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed on June

19, 1971.
On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p.
57, Rollo). On July 1, 1971, We required the petitioners to file their
brief (p. 58, Rollo). Respondents, on the other hand, filed their
brief on October 28, 1971 (p. 85, Rollo). On December 17, 1971,
the petition was considered submitted for decision (p. 87, Rollo).
On June 3, 1975, petitioners filed a "Motion and Manifestation"
praying for the reinstatement of the order of the trial court to
grant the petitioners monthly support during the pendency of the
case. The said order for monthly support granted by the trial court
in its decision of May 4, 1966 was terminated in the early part of
1971 (p. 90, Rollo). When asked to comment on the manifestation
and motion of petitioners, respondents opposed said motion in
view of respondent Court of appeals' finding that petitioners were
not the recognized spurious children of deceased Baluyut (p.
113, Rollo).
On November 25, 1976, We granted petitioner's motion for
continuation of their monthly support pendente lite effective June
1975 until further orders (p. 141, Rollo). After an exchange of
pleadings by the parties regarding the order of this court on the
matter of the continuation of petitioners' support pendente lite,
and after a motion filed by petitioners to cite administratrix for
contempt, private respondents filed a manifestation on January
6,1978, informing this Court that: 1) the former administratrix
Felicidad S. Baluyut was substituted by one of her daughters,
Milagros B. Villar, as Special Administratrix; and that 2) they have
complied with the September 13, 1977 resolution of the court
requiring them to show cause why they should not be dealt with
as in contempt for failing to obey the order to pay petitioners a
monthly supportpendente lite. Private respondents also
manifested their compliance by depositing with the then Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 1, a Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank check in the amount of P4,350.00
representing the required support until October, 1977. Another
PCIB check in the amount of P300.00 representing
support pendente lite for November and December, 1977 was also
deposited with the trial court (p. 335, Rollo).

On February 19, 1980, petitioners, assisted by their guardian ad

litem and private respondent Administratrix Milagros B. Villar,
both parties assisted by their respective counsel, filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss the petition in view of petitioners 'filing of a
"Petition for Withdrawal of Intervention" with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga taking cognizance of the Intestate Estate of
Enrique Baluyut. The petition for withdrawal was based on a
waiver by petitioners of any right or interest they may have on the
estate of the deceased in consideration of the financial assistance
granted them by the administratrix of the estate (p. 371, Rollo).
The petition for withdrawal of intervention was approved by the
intestate court on February 14, 1980 (p. 369, Rollo), while the
Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition was noted by this
court on April 3, 1981 (p. 372, Rollo).
The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial
assistance extended to petitioners by the administratrix of the
estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo) is in the
nature of a compromise settlement of the instant petition (p.
371, Rollo). Considering, however, that the issue involved in this
case is whether or not petitioners, Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma.
Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyut are the acknowledged, spurious
children of the deceased, Enrique M. Baluyut, the Joint Motion to
Dismiss the instant petition cannot be granted, acknowledgment,
affecting as it does the civil status of persons and of future
support cannot be the subject of a compromise (pars. 1 and 4,
Article 2035 of the Civil Code). (See Advincula v. Advincula, L19065, January 31, 1964).
The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children
of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut. This finding was shared by
respondent Court of Appeals:
... the testimony of Norma Urbana supported by that
of Liberata Vasquez on the one hand as against that
of the administratrix who declared that she and her
late husband were always together and that of
Cecilia Waters who testified that Norma had a suitor
named Lieut. Alex on the other, leads us to give
credence to the proof of the intervenors specifically
the testimony of Norma that the intervenors are in

20

fact her illegitimate children with the late Enrique

M. Baluyut (p. 35, Rollo).
However, proof of filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M.
Baluyut is not sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary right
in the estate of the deceased. What is necessary to be established
by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be
entitled to successional rights under Article 887 of the New Civil
Code, is not the fact of his bare filiation but a
filiation acknowledged by the putative parent. This has been the
consistent pronouncement of this Court since the reversal of the
pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et al., 102 Phil. 346
by the pronouncement in the case of Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil.
697, 700, 701, 702. In the Paulino case, it was held:
An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to
support and successional rights from his putative or
presumed parents must prove his filiation to them.
Filiation may be established by the voluntary or
compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious)
child. Recognition is voluntary when "made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing." It is compulsory
when by court action the child brings about his
recognition. ...
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that by their motion to dismiss the
appellees are deemed to have admitted that the
appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural
child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an
admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit
from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to
allege that her putative father had acknowledged
and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment
is essential and is the basis other right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death
of the putative father.

This was reiterated in the case of Republic v. Workmen's

Compensation Commission, 121 Phil. 261, where this Court held
that:
... the illegitimate (spurious) child, to be entitled to
support and successional rights from his parents,
must prove his filiation and this may be done by
means of voluntary or compulsory recognition of the
relationship. For this purpose, the provisions
concerning natural children are held applicable. ...
There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil
Code; one, by the voluntary recognition by the putative parent
made in the record of birth, a statement before the court of
record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and
two, by compulsory recognition under Article 283 of the same law.
Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M.
Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious children?
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that
the petitioners were recognized by the deceased during his
lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth,
although in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the
latter. There was no authentic writing presented nor any
statement in a court of record which would prove that the
petitioners were recognized by the deceased.
With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates
the cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child as his,
namely: a) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the
conception; b) when the child is in continuous possession of the
status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the
latter or his family; c) when the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; d)
when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of
Baluyut to recognize them as the heirs of the deceased were the

21

alleged possession by the petitioners of the status of recognized

illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at the
time when their mother cohabited with the deceased. Since the
petitioners were still minors at the time of the death of Enrique M.
Baluyut, the action for compulsory recognition was correctly filed
by petitioners' guardian ad litem and mother, Norma Urbano.
However, as correctly pointed out by respondent appellate court,
since the recognition sought in the case is compulsory, strictness
in the application of the rules applies. We agree with respondent
appellate court that the evidence presented by petitioners failed
to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the success of
their action for compulsory recognition. Respondent court held:
The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her
witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as the issue of
recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma
was kept by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his
mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a
house supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this
Lacuna was not even presented to testify in support
of the claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut
rented his house for Norma. And, according to
Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some
twice a week in the house where she kept her as his
mistress; that Baluyut paid the hospital bills for the
delivery of the two younger children of Norma. But,
according to Liberata herself, it was not Baluyut who
personally paid the hospital bills but he gave the
money for the payment of the hospital bills to
Liberato and he requested her to pay the money to
the hospital. This only shows that Baluyut was
hiding his Identity as the father of the children of
Norma, an act which is inconsistent with recognizing
such children as his own.
If Enrique did not want to hide being the father of
the intervenors who were born at the Ortanez
hospital, there was no need for him to ask Liberata
to pay the hospital bill of Norma for the delivery of
her youngest child as Baluyut could have easily
done this himself. There is not even evidence
showing that he visited Norma at the hospital when

she delivered there. Coupled with the circumstance

that Enrique tried to hide his being the father of the
intervenors, there is absence of positive and
convincing proof that Enrique treated the
intervenors as his children in all relations in society
and in life. Far from treating them in society as his
children, he was hiding Norma and the intervenors
from society and visited them only once in a while
evidently only to satisfy his sexual urge with Norma
but with no genuine desire to have and treat the
intervenors so as to confer on them the continuous
possession of the status of recognized illegitimate
(not natural) children. There is not even any proof
that he had brought out these intervenors to show
them publicly as his children. With the single
exception of Liberata Vasquez, not a single neighbor
of Norma in the rather populous area of Project 4,
Quezon City, was produced to testify on any act of
Enrique to show his genuine desire to treat the
intervenors as his very own in his actual relations.
The foregoing deficiencies in the intervenors' proof
is fatal to their case.
In order to prove the continuous
possession of the status of a natural
child, the acts must be of such a
nature that they reveal, not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the
child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously' (Igar, et al. vs. Vda. de
Balingkit, CA, 60 O.G. 7792; Onos, et
al. vs. Vda. de Onos, CA-G.R. No.
24646-R, July 22, 1964).
The birth certificates Exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C' of the
intervenors do not help their case for these are not
evidence of recognized filiation by the deceased
Enrique Baluyut because, firstly, they were admitted
in evidence by the lower court merely as part of the
of the witnesses who referred to them in the course

22

of said witnesses' testimony and hence, they are not

evidence of the facts stated in them. Secondly, they
are merely evidence of the fact that gave rise to
their execution, that is, the fact of birth and nothing
else, much leas of recognition as they are not signed
by Enrique Baluyut.
In an action for compulsory
acknowledgment under paragraph 4,
Article 283 of the Civil Code, a birth
certificate which, on its face, was not
signed by the supposed natural father
is incompetent evidence on paternity,
being in violation of oration 5 of Act
3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code'
(Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 54
O.G. 4950; Crisolo va. Macadaong, No.
L-7017, April 19, 1964; Bernabe, etc.
vs. Lacodin, CA, 59 O.G. 3178).
If birth certificates, which are
unsigned by the presumed father as
required by section 5 of Act No. 3752
and Article 280 of the Civil Code, are
incompetent evidence even to prove
paternity alone, with more reason are
birth certificates incompetent
evidence to prove recognized filiation.
(pp. 36-39, Rollo)
Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the
application of law regarding compulsory recognition as first laid
down in the Javellana v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393. They opined that
the said case was in fact the forerunner of the liberal view that
has found its way into the present provisions of the New Civil Code
governing paternity and recognition.
Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court's ruling in
the Javellana case. That the case was the forerunner of the liberal
view that has found its way into our statute books, is true. But,
the rule of liberality enunciated therein applied only to case

involving voluntary recognition specifically in a public document

and not to cases of compulsory recognition. Thus,
Upon the second point, whether a voluntary
acknowledgment may be done incidentally in a
public document, a distinction must be made
between the two kinds of acknowledgment: (1)
voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former,
recognition may be incidental, but in the latter, it
must be direct and express.
In actions to compel the alleged father to
acknowledge his natural child, based upon
recognition in an indubitable writing, article 135,
par. 1, of the Civil Code, requires that the father
must expressly recognize his paternity. This
provision has been strictly construed by Spanish
and Philippine jurisprudence against the alleged
natural child. Thus, in the Sentence of July 5,1906,
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain held in an action to
compel acknowledgment under article 135, that a
mere allusion, more or leas clear, by the alleged
father to his supposed child, if there is no express
recognition of his paternity, is not sufficient. In the
Sentence of April 8,1915, that same Tribunal
declared that there should be an indubitable
documentary proof or uninterrupted on of the status
of a natural child, excluding deductions and
conjectures. As to Philippine cases, the same rule
has been adhered to in several decisions by this
court. Thus, in Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 4 Phil.,
746, an action was filed to compel recognition of a
natural child, based in part on a letter of defendant
telling the mother of his affection toward her and
asking her to take care of the child. This court held
that the letter did not expressly recognize the child,
under article 135. In Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5
Phil. 1, the alleged father wrote the child a letter
advising him how to conduct himself. This court held
that the letter did not contain an-express
recognition under article 135.

23

But while in actions to compel recognition the

foregoing principle is true with respect to
indubitable writings according to article 135, par. 1
of the Civil Code, however, in cases of voluntary
acknowledgment in a public document under article
131, the law is more liberal and permits an
incidental recognition. ... (Javellana, et al. v.
Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phils. 393)
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.

24

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA
PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2)

that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976;
6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over
the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero;

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the
Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of
First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying
among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be
issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of
the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and
B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and
Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her
"Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13,
1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti

Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only

25

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa
Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to
be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its
order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was
rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983
(reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which
reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not
consistent with the facts and law applicable, the same is
hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the
Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner
as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the
proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners
herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated
February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the
following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate
succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct
descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate
children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a
collateral relative (Art. 1003);

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation

of the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their
father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate
estate of their grandmotherSimona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
(Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of
the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the
estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her
son and father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitionerappellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore
acollateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who
are her direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988,
989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on
intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of
December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are provisional
and interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the
legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti
Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees
(petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit
from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their
father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de
Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in
their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on
the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies
the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of
representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate

26

and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right
to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by
Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the
right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of
their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers
solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the
legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of
Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the
other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of
said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by
the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in
turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the

Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are
reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of
representation was admitted only within the legitimate
family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed
that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father and
mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of
the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998)
our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate
child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate
issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the
intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of
an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide
either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the
right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and
modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be
more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis
illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of
Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1,
pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of
the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of
this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein
are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to

27

be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
erred in ruling that the Orders of the Courta quo dated December 1, 1976
and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without
merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held
that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and
hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of
the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976,
which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion
for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long
became final and executory are already removed from the power of
jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by
the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to
order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling
that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa
Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and
executory, hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision 1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio
(Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although

28

Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. 3Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and
Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children
in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned
sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May
2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental
Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein
respondent Antonio, ruling that [t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming
that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the
sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent
Antonio].6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants
[Antonios] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially
approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following
Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a.

Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of

Makati to cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the
father of the aforementioned minors in their respective
Certificate of Live Birth and causing the
correction/change and/or annotation of the
surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live
Birth from Grande to Antonio;

b.

Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental

Authority with [Grande] over the persons of their minor
children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;

c.

Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody

over the parties minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and
Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios]
residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday
evening and to [Grandes] custody from Saturday to
Sunday evening;

d.

Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons

and custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard

Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the

Order;
e.

Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the

aforenamed minors outside of the country, without the
written consent of the other and permission from the court.

f.

Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor

children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in
the amount of P30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her

motion was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22,
20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error
on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and
jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her
illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified
in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 114492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a.

The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the

City Civil Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to
enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective
certificates of live birth, and record the same in the
Register of Births;

b.

[Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard

Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother
herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is
hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor
children;

c.

[Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week,

and may only take the children out upon the written
consent of [Grande]; and

29

d.

The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of

the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the
amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the

fathers recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her
sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of
reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande
committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or
rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her
sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of
the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father
of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected
bestinterestofthechild clause, compels the use by the
children of the surname ANTONIO.11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order
considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give
support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the
minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive
respondent Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the
constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their children. 13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial
motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar
as it decreed the change of the minors surname to Antonio. When her
motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.
In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive languagemay
not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of
his surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code,
originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one
half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all

other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall

remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 14 which
now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove nonfiliation
during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
onehalf of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument
is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the
correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio
when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec.
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of
his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens
surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority
is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to
the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate
children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of
the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the
explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by RA 9255.

30

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use
the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent)
or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate
the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its
literal meaning free from any interpretation.16Respondents position that
the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal
basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there
is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word may in
the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is
under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.
The word may is permissive and operates to confer discretion 17 upon the
illegitimate children.

103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis
petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his
father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change
of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his
father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This
Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use
of the fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children,
citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255, 21 which
states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies

affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter
of childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea
that the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor
child. InAlfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even
a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather
than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is
no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court,
upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of
a surname different from the surnames of the childs father or mother.
Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is second only to
the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation
considering his circumstances.

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of
Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the
child shalluse the surname of the father, provided the registration is
supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the

choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it
would best serve his interest, thus:

7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the

child shall use the surname of the father upon the submission of the
accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a

persons name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his
successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these
matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any
way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against
such change.

7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the
child shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a public
document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the
documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule

7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if
he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a
separate instrument duly notarized.

31

xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition

the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere
administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot
amend an act of Congress.

8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the
child in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be
recorded in the Register of Births.

Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no

ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous. 23 What is
more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike
down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and
quasijudicial bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the
Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:

xxxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

xxxx

8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the

Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private
handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in
the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to

(new surname) pursuant to RA 9255.
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth
and Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration,
the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live
Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child
ishereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA
9255. (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. InMCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong
Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a
law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend
or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy
occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the abovequoted provisions of the

IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their fathers surname upon the latters recognition of his
paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word shall in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of may in Art.
176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname
discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the
choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
opposition to have their names changed to Antonio.26 However, since
these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they
do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or
against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence
of, the childrens choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.

32

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24,

2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 96406
is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 114492 isMODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as
follows:
a.

[Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard

Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother
herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is
hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor
children;

b.

[Antonio] shall have visitation rights at least twice a

week, and may only take the children out upon the written
consent of [Grande];

c.

The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of

the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the
amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and

d.

28

The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of
determining the surname to be chosen by the
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.

Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby
declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, LeonardoDe Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, PerlasBernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave. Mendoza, J., no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 85723 June 19, 1995

BIENVENIDO RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CLARITO AGBULOS, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 2, 1988 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 14276, which allowed, in an action for compulsory
recognition, the testimony of the mother of a natural child on the identity
of the putative father.
I
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support
was brought before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet, by
respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez,
petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas
Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination,
she was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but
the defendant's counsel raised a timely objection which the court
sustained.
The plaintiff filed before this Court a petition for review
on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516 entitled Clarito
Agbulos v. Hon. Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez." On March
18, 1988, this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
SP No. 14276), which promulgated the questioned Decision dated
November 2, 1988.
II
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner alleged that the
Court of Appeals erred: (1) in not dismissing the petition for certiorari on
the ground that the order of the trial court disallowing the testimony of

33

Felicitas Agbulos Haber was interlocutory and could not be reviewed

separately from the judgment; and (2) in reversing the said order and
allowing the admission of said testimony.

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the

period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the
conception;

As a rule, errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to the court's

jurisdiction nor involving grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable
by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court (Villalon v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 443 [1986]). However, there are
exceptions to said rule. For instance, certiorari is justified in order to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may
be danger of failure of justice. Certiorari may also be availed of where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient (Presco v. Court of
Appeals, 192 SCRA 232 [1990]; Saludes v. Pajarillo, 78 Phil. 754 [1947]).

(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of

a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter
or of his family;

We find that had the appellate court sanctioned the trial court's
disallowance of the testimony of plaintiff's mother, private respondent
would have been deprived of a speedy and adequate remedy considering
the importance of said testimony and the erroneous resolution of the trial
court.
On the merits of his petition, petitioner contended that Felicitas Agbulos
Haber should not be allowed to reveal the name of the father of private
respondent because such revelation was prohibited by Article 280 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided:
When the father or the mother makes the recognition
separately, he or she shall not reveal he name of the
person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he
or she state any circumstance whereby the other party
may be identified.
On the other hand, private respondent argued that his mother should be
allowed to testify on the identity of his father, pursuant to paragraph 4,
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provided:
In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child:

(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules.
Private respondent cannot invoke our decision in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15
SCRA 114 (1965). While we ruled inNavarro that the testimony of the
mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be used to establish his paternity,
such testimony was admitted during the trial without objection and the
defendant accepted the finding of the trial court that he was the father of
the plaintiff.
In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the calling of the mother
of private respondent to the witness stand to name petitioner as the father
of said respondent.
Likewise, in Navarro we clearly stated:
We are not ruling whether the mere testimony of the
mother, without more, is sufficient to prove the paternity of
the child. Neither are we ruling on the scope of Art. 280,
New Civil Code which enjoins the mother in making a
separate and voluntary recognition of a child from
revealing the name of the father, specifically, as to

34

whether the mother's testimony identifying the father is

admissible in an action to compel recognition if and when a
timely objection to such oral evidence is interposed (at p.
117).
Navarro, therefore, is not the end but only the beginning of our quest,
which felicitously was reached with our conclusion that the prohibition in
Article 280 against the identification of the father or mother of a child
applied only in voluntary and not in compulsory recognition. This
conclusion becomes abundantly clear if we consider the relative position of
the progenitor of Article 280, which was Article 132 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, with the other provisions on the acknowledgement of
natural children of the same Code.
Article 132 was found in Section I (Acknowledgment of Natural Children),
Chapter IV (Illegitimate Children), Title V (Paternity and Filiation), Book First
(Persons) of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889.
The first article in said Section provided:
Art. 129 A natural child may be acknowledged by the
father and mother jointly or by either of them alone.
The next article provided:
Art. 130 In case the acknowledgment is made by only
one of the parents, it shall be presumed that the child is a
natural one if the parent acknowledging it was, at the time
of the conception, legally competent to contract marriage.
The article immediately preceding Article 132 provided:
Art. 131 The acknowledgment of a natural child must be
made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other
public document.
Article 132 of the Spanish Civil Code provided:
When the acknowledgment is made separately by the
father or the mother, the name of the child's other parent
shall not be revealed by the parent acknowledging it, nor

shall any circumstance be mentioned by which such person

might be recognized.
No public officer shall authenticate any document drawn in
violation of this provision and should he do so
notwithstanding this prohibition shall be liable to a fine of
from 125 to 500 pesetas, and the words containing such
revelation shall be striken out.
Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was found in Section 1
(Recognition of Natural Children), Chapter 4 (Illegitimate Children), Title VIII
(Paternity and Filiation) of said Code. The whole section was repealed by
the Family Code.
The first article of this section was Article 276 which was a reproduction of
Article 129 of the Spanish Civil Code. The second article was Article 277
which was a reproduction of Article 130 of the Spanish Civil Code. The third
article was Article 278 which was a reproduction of Article 131 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
However, unlike in the Spanish Civil Code, wherein the progenitor of Article
280 followed immediately the progenitor of Article 278, a new provision
was inserted to separate Article 280 from Article 278. The new provision,
Article 279, provided:
A minor who may contract marriage without parental
consent cannot acknowledge a natural child, unless the
parent or guardian approves the acknowledgment, or
unless the recognition is made in the will.
If the sequencing of the provisions in the Spanish Civil Code were
maintained in the Civil Code of the Philippines, and Article 280 was
numbered Article 279, it becomes clear that the prohibition against the
identification by the parent acknowledging a child of the latter's other
parent refers to the voluntary recognition provided for in Article 278.
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is of the view that the prohibition in Article 280
does not apply in an action for compulsory recognition. According to him:
The prohibition to reveal the name or circumstance of the
parent who does not intervene in the separate recognition

35

is limited only to the very act of making such separate

recognition. It does not extend to any other act or to cases
allowed by law. Thus, when a recognition has been made
by one parent, the name of the other parent may be
revealed in an action by the child to compel such other
parent to recognize him also (I Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 590
[1985]).
Justice Eduardo Caguioa also opines that the said prohibition refers merely
to the act of recognition. "It does prevent inquiry into the identity of the
other party in case an action is brought in court to contest recognition on
the ground that the child is not really natural because the other parent had
no legal capacity to contract marriage" (I Comments and Cases on Civil
Law 380 [1967] citing In re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167 [1915]).
We have not lost sight of our decision in Infante v. Fiqueras, 4 Phil. 738
(1905), where we rejected the testimony of the mother of a child that the
defendant was the father of the plaintiff. The action for recognition in that
case was brought under Article 135 of the Spanish Civil Code, which limited
actions to compel recognition to cases when an indubitable writing existed
wherein the father expressly acknowledged his paternity and when the
child was in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of
the defendant father justified by the conduct of the father himself or that
of his family.
The action filed by private respondent herein was brought under Article
283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which added new grounds for filing
an action for recognition: namely,
xxx xxx xxx
3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father.
Likewise, the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff in Infante was not
admissible under the procedural law then in force, which was the Law of
Bases of May 11, 1888. Said law in pertinent part provided:

No se admitira la investigation de la paternidad si no en los

casos de delito o cuando existe escrito del padre en el que
conste su voluntad indubitada de reconnocer per suyo al
hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando
medie posesion de estado. Se permitira la investigacion de
la maternidad.
Traditionally, there was a free inquiry into the paternity of children allowed
by French royal decrees but the investigation of paternity was forbidden by
the French Revolutionary Government in order to repress scandal and
blackmail. This prohibition passed to the French Civil Code and from it to
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 (I Reyes and Puno, An Outline of Philippine
Civil Code 266 [4th ed.]).
Worth noting is the fact that no similar prohibition found in Article 280 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines has been replicated in the present Family
Code. This undoubtedly discloses the intention of the legislative authority
to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children.
Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
were repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children (Art. 175).
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by
any of the following:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:

36

(1) The open and continuous possession of

the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a,
267a)
Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article
283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that filiation may be proven by
"any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial
court is DIRECTED to PROCEED with dispatch in the disposition of the
action for compulsory recognition.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

37

The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September

8, 1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala
of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with
"gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a
judge."
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC,
Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found
to be patently wrong and indefensible. There ought to be no objection or
compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted
out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augean stable. 1
Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be manned by magistrates
chosen for their probity, integrity, impartiality, dedication and learning.
And so, any judge wanting in any of these qualities should be broomed off
and out of the bench in order to improve the judicial landscape. Screening
off the misfits, considering the great number of judges and justices in the
country at present, is the arduous and Herculean task of this Court. The
effort if dramatized with rectitude and sincerity should bring about the
strengthening of the people's abiding faith in democracy and the integrity
of our courts of justice.

In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of

gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent
had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q.
Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent
allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla
Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous
union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much
married to Teresita Banzuela.
Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements of a
marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.
Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier,
respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran
vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged
therein for abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora
Pillarion with whom he had a son.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that
respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate
children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran born
on July 14, 1970
Venus B. Tabiliran born on
Sept. 7, 1971
Saturn B. Tabiliran born on
Sept. 20, 1975

38

by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed

registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or
oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these
children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.
The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption:
(1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice of
law by the preparation and notarization of documents, out of which he
charged fees beyond the authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary
Public. These acts which, according to the charge, amount to the private
practice of law, prejudice public interest.
Complainant submitted the following documents in support of these
allegations:
a) Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"), attesting to
the fact that respondent Judge Tabiliran prepared a
Simultaneous Deed of Sale, (Annex "C", Doc. No. 901, Page
No. 77, Book No. V, Series of 1991 of Ex-Officio Notary
Public Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr.) and collect P600.00 from the
vendees (par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9 records);
b) Receipt prepared under instruction of the respondent
showing that he received P250.00 thru MCTC Aide Ely O.
Inot for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit
declaring the correct ages of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila
Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai dated
November 12, 1991, when the legal fees therefor should
have been P10.00 only (Annex "D") (par. 10(a) a-2
Complaint, p. 9 records);
c) Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the direction
of the respondent dated November 12, 1991, showing that
said respondent received from Reynaldo Subebe the sum
of P150.00 for preparation and notarization by him of a
Joint Affidavit declaring the correct age of Agata Luna,
Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias (par. 10(a) a-c
Complaint, p. 9 records);

d) Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated November 12,

1991, signed by the respondent himself showing that he
received from Nelly Baradas the sum of P50.00 for
preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit attesting to
the correct age of one Luzviminda Jacoba (par. 10(a) a-d
Complaint, p. 9 records);
e) Another receipt (Annex "G") dated November 12, 1991,
issued by the respondent, showing that he received from
Torres P. Modai the sum of P50.00, thru the same Ely O.
Inot, MCTC Aide, for preparation of Joint Affidavit attesting
to the correct age of Flores Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e
Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records).
(2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by an
affidavit (Annex "M") executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide,
stating that he saw Edna Siton, complainant in a criminal case tried by
respondent, hand over to the latter a bag of fish and squid which
respondent Judge received.
(3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out of
which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio Oriola,
as supported by the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant
therein, and Benito Sagario, one of the persons present when the accused
perpetrated the acts aforesaid. (Submitted as Annexes "I" and "J",
respectively.)
Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the
foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a
dispenser of justice. By the example shown by the respondent, the public
had allegedly lost confidence in the administration of justice, perceiving as
is evident to see that the person occupying the position of a judge lacks
the morality and probity required of one occupying such a high office.
Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his
cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor
immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his
first wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and,
since then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and
respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25
years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when
he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.

39

Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of
the Civil Code in order to show the legality of his acts:
After the absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered
dead for all purposes except for those of succession. (Rule
131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.)
After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession. (Art. 390,
Civil Code.)

A Judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in

activities to improve . . . the administration of justice.
Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery claiming that it was
inconceivable for him to receive a bag full of fish and squid since his
residence was 42 kilometers from Jose Dalman where his courtroom or
office was located. It takes one an hour and a half by bus to reach
Katipunan and so, by the time he reaches his house, the fish and the squid
should have become rotten. In support of his denials, respondent
submitted as Annex "8", an affidavit of Ely D. Inot, their court Interpreter
who declared:
xxx xxx xxx

The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that
for the purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee is to respondent's mind, a
case in point.
He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then
"single", but he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false
misrepresentation, claiming that, since there were only three words to
choose from, namely: Single, Widow or Divorced, he preferred to choose
the word "single", it being the most appropriate. Besides, both he and
Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela
was honestly divulged.
On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications (Annexes
"4" & "5") from the Mayor of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to
the fact that there was no Notary Public in Manukan and, as such,
respondent may be allowed to notarize documents. He denied having
charged exorbitant fees. He claims that all the amounts received by him
were used to subsidize office expenses, since the funds he had been
receiving from the municipal government were not enough to cover
expenses in maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a certification
(Annex "6") from the Accounting Department of the Municipal Government
of Manukan to the effect that his yearly expenditures were more than the
yearly appropriations.
Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which states:

3. That last June 6, 1991, I was with the Municipal Judge,

Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., from the morning until we went home
in the afternoon and we in fact dined together in the local
Carenderia of Jose Dalman as it is the usual ways of the
Judge to eat lunch together with the court personnel;
4. That when we went home in the afternoon of that day
we were also together riding in a bus, the Lillian Express
and until I drop in Roxas and he proceeded to Katipunan
where his residence is;
5. That all the time during that day I did not noticed him
bringing anything except his "Hand Bag" which he used to
carry in going to the office; (Annex "8", Affidavit of Ely O.
Inot, December 17, 1992.)
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an
Affidavit of Desistance in a case pending in his sala and thereafter charged
the accused, Antonio Oriola, the sum of P500.00 for legal services. The
complainant, he said, was the one who induced Arcelita Salvador (the
complainant in the rape case) to execute an affidavit (Annex "I") in support
of the charge of corruption against respondent.
Complainant's filing of the present case was motivated by revenge and
resentment because, earlier, respondent filed an administrative case (A.M.

40

No. P-91-597) against her for "Insubordination and Serious Misconduct".

The Supreme Court decided to reprimand her with a warning that a
repetition of her acts will be severely dealt with. Respondent claims that
the complainant had nevertheless repeatedly continued to do acts of
insubordination in the following manner:
1) She continues to keep court records and has kept
refusing to hand them over to respondent inspite of verbal
and written orders;
2) She refused to receive a memorandum from the ViceMayor requiring the Clerk of Court to submit an Annual
report;
3) She refused to prepare the said annual report required
of her as Clerk of Court;
4) She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful orders of
the Court.
On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En Banc, the herein
administrative case was referred to Executive Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the
Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2)
counts of corruption: (1) for acting as notary public and collecting fees for
his services; and (2) for preparing an affidavit of desistance in a case
pending in his Court and receiving payment for it.
In his report and recommendation dated August 3, 1993, Executive Judge
Angeles found that:

4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to

Teresita T. Banzuela but who left and abandoned their
family home sometime in 1965 in Katipunan, Zamboanga
del Norte, and until now at present her whereabouts is not
known.
It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83 (2)
of the Civil Code which, although bigamous, remains valid
until automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42,
Family Code). Respondent's assertion that since 1965 to
the present, his first wife Teresita T. Banzuela had left their
conjugal dwelling and did not return, her whereabouts
being unknown, was not controverted. Living as husband
and wife pursuant to an authorized bigamous marriage,
respondent cannot be said to be acting in an immoral and
scandalous manner, and the immoral stigma of extramarital union since 1969 duly declared in their aforesaid
joint affidavit, may be considered cleansed by their
marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on
ratification on contracts in general is allowed to be applied,
it being ratification of marital cohabitation. Article 76 of
Civil Code, now Art. 34 of the Family Colde was intended to
facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have
been living in a state of concubinage for more than five
years (Tolentino, Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245, cited
in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code, 1992 Ed., p. 38).
Indicating his civil status in the marriage contract as
"single" is hardly considered a misrepresentation of fact,
specially to the solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto
C. Ruedas, Jr. to whom the aforesaid joint affidavit was
submitted.

ON GROSS IMMORALITY:
ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT:
In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May
23, 1986, (p. 13 of the records), respondent did not hide
the fact that he was married to Teresita T. Banzuela, having
disclosed it in his affidavit jointly executed with Priscilla Q.
Baybayan on May 23, 1986 (p. 115 of the records),
particularly paragraph 4 thereof which reads:

Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan,

namely: Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn
B. Tabiliran, all of whom were born before their marriage,
were disclosed and made known to the solemnizing officer
and the latter himself, in his affidavit dated May 23, 1986
(p. 116 of the records) which supports the marriage

41

contract of respondent with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, having

shown such fact.
Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia T.
Zanoria dated May 27, 1993, consisting of three pages,
was submitted by the complainant for the purpose of
proving her charge that the respondent falsely executed
his three separate affidavits, namely: Exhibit K dated May
24, 1983 regarding the late registration of birth of his
daughter Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M dated May 28,
1988 regarding the late registration of birth of his third
child Saturn B. Tabiliran; and his affidavit dated May 27,
1988, Exhibit O, in reference to the late registration of birth
of his second child Venus B. Tabiliran, stating inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight as the reasons for the
delayed registration of their births, without however
presenting said affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently denying
respondent the opportunity to cross examine her. Her
affidavit is not among those brought out in the pre-hearing
conference, and was not discussed during the hearing
itself, submitting it only after the investigation proper was
terminated. The supposed affiant claimed she was the
government midwife who attended to the births of
respondent's three children, denying, as the affidavit
shows, negligence, inadvertence or oversight on her part
to register their birth on time. Not having been presented
for respondent to confront her, or an opportunity to do so,
Exhibit P cannot be considered evidence of the charge. An
affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented (People
vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349), or admitted by the party
against whom it is presented.
ON CORRUPTION:
1. Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and
collecting fees:
Respondent has admitted having prepared the documents
and collected fees, in the instances specified in par. 10 of
the complaint, namely: (1) affidavit of Ponciana Geromo;
(2) Joint Affidavit of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi
Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of

Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias; (4) Joint
Affidavit on the correct age of Luzviminda Jacoba; and (5)
Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Flores Jalampangan, but
not necessarily on the accuracy of the amounts therein
stated as having been collected by him from them (please
see Pre-Hearing Order of May 20, 1993 of the Investigating
Judge). Seeking justification of his acts, respondent
submitted Annexes 4 & 5 of his comments (pp. 118 and
119, records) which are certifications of Manukan Mayor
Eugene U. Caballero attesting that in the absence of a
Notary Public in Manukan town, respondent who is a Judge
thereat was allowed "to prepare and ligalize (sic)
documents".
He declared "the fees derived from the preparation and
notarization of documents were mostly used by respondent
to buy supplies and materials of his Office", explaining that
his office needs cannot be sustained by the appropriations
of the local government which are inadequate. On page
120 of the records, his Annex 6 shows a shortage in his
appropriations for supplies. And supplies from the Supreme
Court can only be obtained if secured personally but has to
assume the expenses for transportation, freight and
handling.
Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of Judicial
conduct does not prohibit him from acting as Notary Public,
and the fees he has received were much lower than the
rates prescribed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, submitting Annex 3, p. 117
of the records, to prove it.
Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge may,
with due regard to official duties, engaged in activities to
improve the administration of justice, respondent claims
that due to his efforts, he was able to secure an extension
room of his office covering a floor area of 24 square
meters, from the Sangguniang Pampook of Region IX based
in Zamboanga City, costing P19,000.00 per certification
shown in his Annex 7 (page 121 of the records).

42

In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis-a-vis the

power of Municipal Trial Court Judges and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judges to act in the capacity of Notary Public ExOfficio, the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M. No. 89-111303, MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has ruled:
MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits
with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as
notary public ex-officio perform any act within the
competency of a regular Notary Public, provided that: (1)
all notarial fees charged be for the account of the
Government and turned-over to the municipal treasurer
(Lapea, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29,
1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2) certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or
notary public in such municipality or circuit.
Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and
residing in Manukan town, even in Jose Dalman which is
within his circuit is confirmed, respondent Judge while he
may be justified in so acting as notary public, did not,
however, comply with requirement No. 1 which obliged him
to charge for the account of the Government and turn-over
to the municipal treasurer all notarial fees. And there is no
way of determining the truth of his assertion that the
notarial fees he collected were "mostly used" to buy
supplies and materials for his office, absent any
accounting.
2. Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:
Admitting the existence of Annex H found on page 21 in
the records, respondent, however, denied the imputation
therein contained by affiant Calixto Calunod that he
received a sando bag full of fish and squid from a certain
Edna Siton who had a case with respondent's court as
complainant in a certain criminal case. Instead of calling
the affiant himself, complainant presented the Court
Interpreter Ely O. Inot, who "confirmed that there was squid
and fish contained in a plastic bag which was left in
Aseniero Carenderia by a person unknown to her and some
members of the Court staff. When informed by the

carenderia owner that the stuff was intended for Judge

Tabiliran, the latter told them to cook it, and they
afterwards partook of it without the Judge who already
boarded the passenger bus". (Record of Proceedings, p. 1,
par. No. 1, dated June 11, 1993). Being her witness,
complainant is bound by her testimony. This particular
charge is, therefore, not proved.
3. Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting Fee for
his Services:
Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before 2nd
Asst. Provincial Fiscal Valeriano B. Lagula were submitted:
one by Arcelita Salvador, complainant in an attempted
rape case who was categorical in her declaration that
respondent Judge asked and received from Pitoy Oriola,
brother of accused Antonio Oriola the amount of P500.00
after the Judge prepared the affidavit of desistance and
motion to dismiss which he made her sign (Annex I, p. 40
records). Benito Sagario who was present executed another
separate affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the records,
confirming it. In admitting the affidavit, respondent,
however, denied the imputation, asserting that it is false,
but without confronting them or presenting witnesses to
dispute their accusation. He could have demanded that the
affiants, including the persons they mentioned were
present in the transaction, namely: accused Antonio Oriola,
his brother Pitoy Oriola, Ignacio Salvador, and INC Minister
Antonio Calua be required to appear for his confrontation,
but respondent chose not, contented himself only with the
explanation that it was just the handiwork of complainant
Abadilla and her husband, a major in the military who is an
active member of the Iglesia Ni Cristo of which affiant
Arcelita Salvador also belonged, which is bare and
unsubstantiated. No other conclusion can be drawn other
than holding, as the Investigating Judge does, that this
particular charge is true. Evidently, Judge Tabiliran wants to
avoid meeting them by way of confrontation. If he is
innocent, and is certain the charge is fabricated, he will
surely raise hell to insist that he confronts them face to
face. Clearly, his deportment betrays his insistence of
innocence.

43

On Respondent's Counterclaim:
It was not proven. On the contrary, the controverting
evidence shows that the records of Criminal Case No. 2279
referred to in his Annex 9, p. 123 of the records, were not
in the possession of complainant. Quite obviously, Ely O.
Inot, respondent's Court Interpreter tried to cover up the
fact that the same were already being kept by Judge
Tabiliran before he issued the memorandum, Annex 9.
Complainant, who is respondent's Clerk of Court was not,
therefore, in a position to comply with his Order.
Also, Mrs. Abadilla's failure to prepare the annual report of
the Court in 1992 as called for in Annexes 10 and 10-A
was, contrary to respondent's claim, not by reason of her
obstinate refusal to obey her superior but, by sheer
impossibility to comply, considering that monthly reports
upon which the annual report shall be based, were not
prepared by her, not because of her refusal to do so which
is among those included in her job description, but because
the Judge himself took the work from her for no other
reason than to establish the false impression that the
complainant is disobedient to the Judge, and does not
attend to her duties.
By and large, there is no harmony in their office.
Complainant and respondent are not in talking terms. They
are hostile to each other. Respondent's complaint that Mrs.
Abadilla spat saliva in front of him whenever they meet
each other; destroying the Court dry seal by throwing it at
him one time she was mad; showing face; and sticking out
her tongue to him, are all puerile acts which the
undersigned cannot conclude as sufficiently established
even with the testimony of Mrs. Ely O. Inot which is far
from being definite and categorical, whose actuation is
understandable because Judge Tabiliran, being her
superior, has moral ascendancy over her (Record of
Proceedings, June 11, 1993).
The undersigned believes that the problem is on Judge
Tabiliran, and not on Mrs. Abadilla, who has been in the
service as Clerk of Court under a previous Judge of the

same Court for quite long without any complaint having

been filed. The evidence disputing his counterclaim tends
to show that respondent tried to build up a situation of
undesirability against his Clerk of Court whom he wanted
pulled out from her position in his Court.
Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And
Comments:
The authority to investigate being confined only to matters
alleged in the complaint on the basis of which respondent
filed his comments, other matters not therein covered
which complainant brought out by way of presenting
documentary exhibits, (from Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not
subject of this report and recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION:
The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and DECEITFUL
CONDUCT have not been proven, but the undersigned
believes evidence is sufficient to sustain pronouncement of
guilt on two counts of CORRUPTION, namely: acting as
notary public and collecting fees for his services in
preparing affidavit of desistance of a case in his Court.
Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and false imputation
against his Clerk of Court are found duly established.
WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge from the
service for a period of three months is recommended.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross
immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said
Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B.
Tabiliran.
Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla
Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned
him and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had
been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early
as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely
Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on

44

July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was
born on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla
Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to
his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of
the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after
an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By
respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in
1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit
with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent
had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already
dead for all purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with
Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was
still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social
institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil
contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122,
Ramon C. Aquino).
By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust
reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals
and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v.
Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).

in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite

his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be
legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they
were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and
his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case
at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as
amended) which provides:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children
born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of
adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code:
(Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated
the above-mentioned provision thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986,

We are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the
facts for a proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the
finding of the Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized
under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code.

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of

successional rights;

With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge
has likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates
(Exhs. "J", "L", & "M") of respondent's three illegitimate children with
Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate
issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to
note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all
surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975,
respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was

4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to

adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of
marriage;

3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social

mores change;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry

many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code,
p. 252, Alicia v. Sempio Diy).

45

It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new,

can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent.
It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita
disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears
that on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent
entitled,Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (G.R. No. 1155451) which was decided by
this Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment
of his family home and for living with another woman with whom he
allegedly begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of
the failure of his wife to substantiate the charges. However, respondent
was reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To
Live Separately from Bed", with a stipulation that they allow each of the
other spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be,
without the objection and intervention of the other. It was also in the same
case where respondent declared that he has only two children, namely,
Reynald Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his
legitimate issues. Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs.
"M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn and Venus are his third and second children
respectively, are erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his
legitimate children.

public ex-officio shall charge for their services the fees

prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government
funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the
Philippines, p. 202.)
Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees
collected by him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government
as required by law raises the presumption that he had put such
fund to his personal use.
With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of
Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the
amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely
denied the said imputation but failed to offer any evidence to support such
denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA
166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this
remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Canon 2

With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the
Investigating Judge that respondent should be found culpable for two
counts of corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal
fees in preparing an Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.
Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the
documents (Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G") wherein he charged
notarial fees. Though he was legally allowed to notarize documents and
charge fees therefor due to the fact that there has been no Notary Public in
the town of Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise
corrupt and illegal acts.
Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus:
Sec. 252. Compensation of Notaries Public No fee,
compensation, or reward of any sort, except such as is
expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be collected
or received for any service rendered by a notary public.
Such money collected by notaries public proper shall
belong to them personally. Officers acting as notaries

A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all activities.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently,
orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all
without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Panganiban, J., took no part.

46

desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by

petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon
petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may
pertain to respondent in the future.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 143989

July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete
without children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr.
Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's
nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender
age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple
who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom
fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided
to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the
petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling
of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the
Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose
Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of
1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her
petition, she averred
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom,
to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the
latter died, and even before his death he had made known his

xxx

xxx

xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the

utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records
with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as
Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present,
and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice
of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this
city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for
the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the
care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more
remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is
not expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of
petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to
visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by
their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and
petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy
of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her
late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No.
99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her
love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of

47

adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for

all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no
more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation," 1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into
effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of

the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs.
Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the
right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the
Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there
is lack of cause of action.

"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of

the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if
over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.

"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired

under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected.
Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said
right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the
legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to
petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the
instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had
already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)

"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be

subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)
may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of
the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is

ordered dismissed."4

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally
(a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the
petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of
R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the
proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases
where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of
then Article 3482 of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court,
having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights
on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure
male heirs in the family.5 The continuity of the adopter's family was the
primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused
on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights
of the adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an
effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor

48

recognized adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption was given an
impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a
paramount concern.8Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption
ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption
which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans
came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most
countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding
consideration.9 In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of
children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of
the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,10followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the
Child,11 were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the
rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines 12 of 1950 on
adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code 13 and then by
the Family Code of the Philippines,14 gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations
initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State
Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying
intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these
rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the
legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in
the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to
rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to
sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely
affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of
its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and
the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process15 that expresses apresent fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action;16 it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right
has become vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or
fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was
filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth

Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be

sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered
its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family
Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint
adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued
that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles
alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason,
having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in
effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by
her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,21spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt
Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize
Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the
time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt.
After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988
disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then
prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the
argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the
time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then,
the new law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold
that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated
by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside
the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 23 of the
Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right
within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be
acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental

49

but rather a right merely created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is

governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the
best interest and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to regulation by the State.27 Concomitantly, a right of
action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been
exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless,
the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be
the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is
still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the
legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance,
upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him
from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
[G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CONCEPCION
S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 62,
Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and
ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due
Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City [1] to
adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old,

50

respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of

the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark
Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a
naturalized American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due,
as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10,
1990 granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the
children of the spouses Dye by adoption. [2]Respondent Regional Trial Court
disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses
being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine
months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation
of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes,
namely, to promote the welfare of a child. [3] The court also found that the
petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good
moral character, sufficient financial capability and love and affection for
the intended adoptees.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law,
contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt
Maricel and Alvin Due.
The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children
in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided
by law."
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is
disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he
does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by
the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child.
Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he
is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized
American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the
coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who
is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that
aliens may not adopt.
On her own. Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the
law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions.
Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code)
retained the Civil Code provision [4] that husband and wife may jointly
adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional
character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Article 185 of the
Family Code provides:

As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is

proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which states:

"Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases:

"Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;

xxx xxx xxx

(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they
did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a similarly
situated alien husband with a former Filipino wife seeking to adopt the
latter's nephews and niece in the case ofRepublic v. Court of Appeals.
[5]
Although the wife in said case was qualified to adopt under Article 184,
paragraph 3 (a), she being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity, she could not jointly adopt with her husband under

51

Article 185 because he was an alien ineligible to adopt here in the

Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which
is the promotion of the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose.[6] The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding
and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes,
love, care and education for less fortunate children. [7] Regrettably, the
Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring
adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such
time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain
the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City in Special Proceeding No. 4203
(In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Maricel R. Due and
Alvin R. Due), dated September 10, 1990 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, and Torres, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.

52

There is no controversy as to the facts.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to
adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the
petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of
Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a
natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a
Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn
became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam.
They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.

G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69,
Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
CLOUSE,respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
R.M. Blanco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No.
RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named
Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.
The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents
spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt
under Philippine Law.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present,

Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His
mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home
and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for
adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the
best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered a
decision on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption
filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse and
decrees that the said minor be considered as their child by
adoption. To this effect, the Court gives the minor the
rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners.
Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA
CLOUSE.

53

The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his

natural parents and vests parental authority to the herein
petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to
Article 36 of P.D. 603 as amended, the decree of adoption
shall be effective as of the date when the petition was
filed. In accordance with Article 53 of the same decree, let
this decree of adoption be recorded in the corresponding
government agency, particularly the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte where the minor was born.
The said office of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby
directed to issue an amended certificate of live birth to the
minor adopted by the petitioners.
Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the petitioners,
DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of the Solicitor General
and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for
relief, contending:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY
ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
We rule for petitioner.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate

child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing
exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional
cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In
the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor
alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in
the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other.

54

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition
that must be read along together with Article 184. 3
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603
(The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and wife "may"
jointly adopt. 4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986
amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and
wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. 5 It was so crafted to
protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code
reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt,
except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. 6 This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal
situation. 7 As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 8

parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in

accordance with this Code. 9
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its
interpretation. There is only room for application. 10
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that
objective. 11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare
of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life. 12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child
that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases. 13 Executive Order
209 likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would
justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by
private respondents who are aliens.

In a distinctly similar case, we held:

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree
No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses
to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law
was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty.
Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity for a joint
adoption by the spouses except in only two instances

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

(1) When one spouse seeks

to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks
to adopt the legitimate
child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on
the parental authority, can aptly find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one
spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, jointly

55

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON,
BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L.
VELOSO, respondents.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose W. Diokno Law Office private respondents the Leons.
Arturo E. Balbastro for privates respondent Veloso.

TEEHANKEE, J.:1wph1.t
The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent
judge's orders declaring that petitioner has failed to establish by
competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased
Lazatin spouses and prays for judgment of this Court "declaring as
established the fact of (his) adoption as a son of the deceased spouses
entitling him to succeed in their estates as such." Respondent judge
correctly ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to
intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de
Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted son, after
having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
her pre-deceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son),
over the opposition of private respondents, to introduce evidence that he
had "enjoyed ... the status of an adopted child of the without his first

56

producing competent and documentary that there had been judicial

proceedings for his by the said spouses which resulted in the final
judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption.
On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay
City, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin
daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de
Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.
One month after Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de Asis,
commenced an intestate proceeding before the Court of First Instance of
Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and
Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr.
Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin
also intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural)
child.
Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also
died, leaving a & holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing,
among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent
Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo,
a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son
of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the
People's Bank and Trust Company, Roxas Boulevard branch, which either
she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's
death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband,
respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed
its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her
sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to
her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the safety
deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her
deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock
certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to
close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an
authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death and so, she
removed everything from the box.
On June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of
the late Margarita de Asis, before docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P of
respondent Court, Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. de

Leon had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta.
Clara, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had
executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding
its production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit
box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but
there was no will or any document resembling a will therein.
Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B.
Alcantara, the safety deposit box was opened on November 6, 1974, at
which time it was found to be empty, because prior thereto respondent
Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents.
On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de
Asis, petitioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the
estate of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326- P), as an
admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed
a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private
respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box, Whereupon, on
January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to
deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of
Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P,
Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the
sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for
respondents Nora L. de Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those
papers and items removed from the safety deposit box and to deliver the
same to the custody of the court within one week. Within the period
ordered, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court, not
the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box which
could only be opened upon order of the court.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara
filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No.
2341-P, as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by
Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the
petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by
him. This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that
petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita
de Asis.

57

On September 29, 1975, Judge Campos found respondent' Nora L. de Leon

guilty of contempt of court for not complying with the orders of January 31,
1975 and May 29, 1975, requiring her to produce and deliver to the court
an the papers and items removed from the safety deposit box. Her former
counsel was also found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay a fine of
P00.00 and suspended from appearing in the two cases (Sp. Proc. No.
2326-P, Mariano M. Lazatin, and Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, Margarita de Asis),
on her testimony that she, Nora L. de Leon, acted upon his advice.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son
in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, at which hearings
petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner
attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had
recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported
by them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but
was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased
spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at
first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of
Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at
Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they
continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to
be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she
addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita
de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that
petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin." 1
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents'
objections to the admission of petitioner's evidence, but on November 14,
1975, when petitioner could not present evidence on the issue of his
alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing and
gave the parties time to file memoranda on the question of the
admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner.
On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's
evidence because: t.hqw
All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta.
Clara through their counsel do not prove or have no
tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding
where the adoption of the parties above named were taken
up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish
the presence of any record of a proceeding in court where

the adoption of the above named persons was held. The

evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a recognized
natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for
which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this
proceedings. In view thereof, and taking into consideration
the evidence heretofore presented by the petitioners, any
further introduction of similar evidence, documentary or
oral, would not prove or tend to prove the fact of their
adoption but rather of a recognized natural child.
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare
as established the fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's
refusal to comply with the orders of respondent court to deposit the items
she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. As
authority therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court, since according to him, the order of the court for the
production of the items in the safety deposit box can be considered as an
order for production and inspection of documents under Rule 27.
Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976,
respondent court denied petitioner's motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent
Nora L. de Leon deposited with respondent court the items she had
removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by
respondent court, with notice to the parties, and the items surrendered
consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock certificates.
On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite
resolution on his previous n declare as established the fact of adoption,
issued the f order: t.hqw
As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to
establish his status as an adopted child, The Court has
ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The any
motion for reconsideration unless based on some
documentary proof.
Hence, the petition at bar.
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and
jurisprudence.

58

1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between

two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. 3 Only an adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court is valid in this jurisdiction. 4 It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly
and entirely artificial. 5 To establish the relation, the statutory requirements
must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute
nullity. 6 The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively
proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a
public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if
existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the
destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On
the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence.7 Where, under the provisions of the
statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. 8
2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any
proof of judicial adoption. We can not pluck from his chain of evidence any
link to the real existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor.
Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or another
a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption
proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as
a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof
are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds
from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the
years 1928 and 1932. By what particular court was the adoption decreed
or by whom was the petition heard, petitioner does not even manifest,
much less show. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding
or to the adoption decree. Apparently on the assumption that the adoption
was commenced in Manila, petitioner's counsel secured a certification from
the Court of first Instance of Manila which, however, negatively reported
"(T)hat among the salvaged records now available in this Office, there has
not been found, after a diligent search, any record regarding the adoption
of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in
the years 1928 to 1931 by the spouses Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin and
Margarita de Asis Lazatin." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila "(T)hat our pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court of First
Instance were either destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City
of Manila," does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption
in favor of petitioner. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was
really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the Court

of first Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a

judgment of approval was rendered by said court. Moreover, if there was
really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of
the newpaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule
99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of
the publishing house to that effect. Petitioner's failure on this point is
anotherer strong indication of the non-existence of the one who gave the
written consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also
observed to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99, Rules of Court), whether the
parents or orphanage, does not appear on this point is not so difficult and
such proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence of the
adoption. And of course, if the war, the clear right and duty of petitioner
was to duly reconstitute the records as provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided
by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has
lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to
establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased,
made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that
he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the
deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his
majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. 10 Nor does the
fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and
referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, recognized and referred
to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of
the child. 11 Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts
and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's
evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child,
not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child was
the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of
the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated. (Supra, at page 3 hereof)
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree,
although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural
expressions of persons who must know the truth. 12 Pedigree testimony is
admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and
because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from
its admission. 13 But, in proving an adoption, there is a better proof
available and it should be produced. The whereabouts of the child's family
and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in
those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely produce an

59

adoption order, if indeed there was an order. 14 Besides, since the point in
favor of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or
pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition upon which
such evidence is received that it emanate from a source within the family.
Pursuant to this view, before a declaration of a deceased person can be
admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant,
by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof,
must ordinarily be established by competent evidence. 15Section 33 of Rule
130 states: "The act or declaration of a person deceased, or outside of the
Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such actor declaration ..."
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of
adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court. 16 The sufficiency of the proof
offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within
the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the
particular case. 17 As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the
former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first beer.
established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is
indispensable. 18 Petitioner's supposed adoption was only testified to by
him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the deceased Mariano M.
Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceased spouses treated
petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made, the records thereof
should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent
thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be
the case, adduced. 19
Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as
their child does not justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact
judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it constitute admissible proof of
adoption.
We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29
should be applied to consider as established the fact of his adoption due to
the refusal of respondent Nora L. de Leon to produce the document of

adoption, because first, the fact or real existence of petitioner's adoption

had not been established; second, there is no proof that such document of
adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. de
Leon; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora de Leon to
produce the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated
as a mode of discovery of production and inspection of documents under
Rule 27; and fourth, the items deposited in the safety deposit box have
already been surrendered by respondent Nora L. de Leon on April 26; 1976
and no document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as found in
the safety deposit box.
5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.
Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita
de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P as an adopted child because of lack of proof
thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that
he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as
an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. 20 A child
by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. by adoption unless the
act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is
done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed
adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. 21 The burden of
proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to
adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori if no
hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to
submit proof thereof, whether the will is probated or not, intervention
should be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary
complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be ligitimate, legitimated,
adopted, acknowledged illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal
fiction or recognized spurious child. 24
In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial
admissions) which show that petitioner sought to intervene on November
22, 1974 in the estate proceedings of his alleged adoptive father Dr.
Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child, 25 while his intervention on August 20, 1975 in the estate of
Margarita de Asis, widow of the deceased Dr. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P)
was as her adopted child on the basis of the affidavit of a brother of the
deceased Dr. Lazatin, Benjamin Lazatin, executed August 19, 1975 (which
affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on May 31, 1975, which failed to
estate by "oversight" petitioner, but stated that affiant knew petitioner to
be "an illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin who later "legally adopted (him) as a

60

son before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime between the
years 1928 and 1921") and prescinding from the question of whether a
natural or spurious child may be legally adopted by the putative father, we
hold that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed by
respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of March 4, 1976, March
26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as
established in this proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any
motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof." The
Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding
by petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as established the fact
of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling
him to succeed in their estates as such in accordance with the applicable
law on succession as to his inheritance."
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 16, 1976 a
temporary restraining order; which as amended on July 21, 1976,
restrained respondent judge "from proceeding with the hearing scheduled
on June 17, 1976 at 8:30 a.m., requiring the submission of evidence to
establish heirship in Special Proceedings No. 2326-P entitled 'Intestate
Estate of the Late Mariano M. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings No. 2341-P,
entitled 'Testate Estate of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin,' and
from proceeding with the probate of the alleged holographic will of the
deceased Do;a Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29,
1976, August 10 and 12, 1976 and on any other dates." With the Court's
determination of the issues as herein set forth, there is no longer any need
for restraining the proceedings below and the said restraining order shall
be immediately lifted.
On January 24, 1977, the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to
conditionally allow respondent judge "to take the deposition of petitioner's
witnesses to perpetuate their testimonies pursuant to Rule 134, Section 7
of the Rules of Court, subject to the Court's ruling in due course on the
admissibility of such testimonies." The Court thereby permitted in effect
the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, principally among them
Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L. Lazatin, both brothers of the deceased Dr.
Mariano L. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner's motion of January 11,
1977: t.hqw
Substantially, the testimony of the above-named witnesses
will be on the fact that they had been informed by the
deceased spouses, Mariano and Margarita Lazatin that
your petitioner was their [Mariano's and Margarita's]

judicially adopted son and to elicit further from them the

fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being
their judicially adopted son in the Lazatin family.
The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's
witnesses was but in application of the Court's long standing admonition to
trial courts is reaffirmed in Lamagan vs. De la Cruz, 26, "to be liberal in
accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to accept
the evidence, the affected party will nevertheless be allowed to spread the
excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal." The Court therein
once again stressed the established rule that "it is beyond question that
rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of
evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may
not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari, but are to be
assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the
decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case," 27 and that a
party's recourse when proferred evidence is rejected by the trial court is to
make a offer stating on the record what a party or witness would have
testified to were his testimony not excluded, as well as to attach to the
record any rejected exhibits.
At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and
for probate of the alleged holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda.
de Lazatin, pet who has failed to establish his status as an alleged ;m child
of Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved to him by the court below, he can
show some documentary proof),and whose intervention in the estate of the
deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate child, win have
to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the of such
admitted illegitimate child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory and
his course of action and whether or not he may be duly snowed to
intervene in the proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate
child, his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling against him is to make
a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral and documentary,
and seek a reversal on an appeal in due course.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying
petitioner's petition below "to declare as established in this proceeding the
fact of [his] adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order
issued on June 16, 1976 and amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted,
effective immediately. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

61

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,

concur.1wph1.t
De Castro, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES
and ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.
Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.
Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.

62

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the
person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution, dated 5
October 1987, the Court resolved to issue the writ returnable to the
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig at the hearing of 12 October
1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his
report and recommendation to the Court.
On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig
submitted to the Court his report and recommendation, also dated 3
December 1987.
It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents
Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and
wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister
and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and
Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when
she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption
of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina
Carreon on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by
herein petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Fourth Judicial District, Branch 67 which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a
decision 2granting the petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne
Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority
of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to
them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes,
known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable
of inheriting their estate ." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners
Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would
get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.

As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the

respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners'
residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so
by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house in
Paraaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but
Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for
adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had
executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners
that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid
the amount of P150,000.00.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on
the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal in the adoption case, testified on 27 October 1987 before the
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig in connection with the
present petition. She declared that she had interviewed respondent Gina
Carreon on 24 June 1987 in connection with the contemplated adoption of
the child. During the interview, said respondent manifested to the social
worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. 4
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children,
the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be
separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the
Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 5 In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral,
physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the
latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open
cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright
and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had
previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom
she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and
vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a
sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral
outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are
legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially
capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what

63

the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only
jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most
likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents
over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of
the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over
the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting
parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 9
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is GRANTED. The custody
and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to
petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if
they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately
upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.

64

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
on February 20, 1990 1 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City 2 granting the petition of herein
private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the
reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt
Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her
family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3

The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on
March 28, 1988. 4 The order was duly published, with copies thereof
seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social
worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the
bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that
purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. 5
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the
hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of
her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted
in the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor
child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural
parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of
the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the
surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the
surname of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Regional
Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar
of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision. 6
Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated,
affirmed the aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present
petition with the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition
for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt

65

Jason Condat in favor of spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and

Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C.
Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a
petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of
them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the
case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No.
209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new
law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for
adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the
Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat
by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the noninclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect,
hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be
taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be
aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a
special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been
raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we
shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated
assignment of errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate
relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses
the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights
include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand,

but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has
vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right
to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband
therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit
and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to
file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication,
in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and
cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the
governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 12 We do
not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an
exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local
and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that
Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes
are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they
may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future
actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps
completed before their enactment. 13
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and
procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending
proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment
although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only
procedural steps taken after their enactment. 14
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending
actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them
from its operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or
invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure
must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises. 15

66

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a

case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A
petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law
which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law
in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. 16 To repeat, the jurisdiction of
the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 17

4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father,

am giving my lawful consent to this adoption of said minor
child, JASON CONDAT;

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family
Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have
modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of
private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a
petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly,
reject the same.

7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF

CONSENT for whatever it is worth in the premises as to the
matter of adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT, by
my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me,
DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis
supplied.) 18

Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the
petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to
the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof,
shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The
pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I
mutually desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON
CONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years old, likewise
residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also
in the Philippines;
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption
of said minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in
Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;

5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES,

and I have continuously reared and cared for this minor
child, JASON CONDAT since birth;
6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a
kind of maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very
own, exercising therein the care, concern and diligence of a
good father toward him;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in
open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he
must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his
part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the
text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal
requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations
of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules
on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not
apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule
therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up
to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the
rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. 19 The modern
tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a
substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity

67

of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and

technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and
beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material
requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring
the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight
defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for
declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach
the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there
was a substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules of
pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it
is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating to
the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested,
than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is
generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially
complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the
court jurisdiction. 21

The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition
for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly
stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case
and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, 28 We are of the
opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a
quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and
the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life." 29
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in
the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons
to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 30
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the

interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in
proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by
another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is
charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring
those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish
that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance
with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the
parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not
be disturbed. 24
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of
adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the
consent of his natural parents. 25 The representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval
of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial
custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had
been living with the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said
petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164948

June 27, 2006

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

68

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826
which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the
petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United
States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam,
USA, filed a petition3 for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who
was born on August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5,
1989.6 The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners
brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on
May 19, 1990,7 the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria
Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married
there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws
from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are
being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to
adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent8 to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own
home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the
minors; her children gave their written consent 9 to the adoption of the
minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in
petitioners custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her
favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that

after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption
of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene
Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor childrens
name follow the family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the
premises.10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34
of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report
thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of
the petition.11 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its
behalf.13 Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the
eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her
and her siblings.15 The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of
Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in
Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD,
Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following
recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene
all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented
to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in
view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and
support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the
mother which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their
willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in
the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The

69

minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they

regarded her as second parent.

petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove

that Amelia assents to the adoption.

3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian

who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they really
need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their
protection and well being.

On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for
adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive
portion reads:

In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors

Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by
their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further
recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close
relatives and that close attachments was already developed between the
petitioner and the 3 minors.17

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon

Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal
obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that
they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata
Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parentchildren relationship has long been established between the children and
the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from
"Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."

Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this
May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the
personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac,
Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth
certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata
Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and
guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the
wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of
the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a
cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary
guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and
support which she could not provide as she already has a second family &
residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been
supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she
believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a
better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children. 18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption;

The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2,

2002. In its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following
arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES
BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS
CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III

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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION

DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION
TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the ruling of the
RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the
affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted
in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not
authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and
although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the
children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November
25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc.
No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

23

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21, 2004, which the
CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004. 25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari 26 on
September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND
MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF
WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD
HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO
SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a)
whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the
affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters
children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not
petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as
stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood
and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the
liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as
it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and
privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the
paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The
Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend
to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus,
the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely
on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural
rights of the parents over the child.31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly
counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval
of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is
hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has
legal custody of the child;

71

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of

age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over,
of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latters souse, if
any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. 32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for
the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to
his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with
the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof
provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child
without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform the
filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds
presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects
to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the
child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of
others is not such an abandonment.35 To dispense with the requirement of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.36

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to
interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John
Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and
Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not
require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her
minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos
as witness in support of the petition.

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine
Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children.
Petitioners testimony on that matter follows:

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological

mother is no longer necessary because when Amelias husband died in
1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to
the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial
needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned
the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that
after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC
that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the
Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and
during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she
conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance
where she communicated with the family?

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.

A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.

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Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second
marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.

Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and
custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001
and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their guardian.
The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have
been supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that
they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends
financial support but very minimal.39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:

37

xxxx

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother
communicate with you?
A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated
the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx

As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings.
She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also
encourages openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty
counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia
recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her
husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing
support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the
support of her husbands relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her
parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she
used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to
the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good,
however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They
became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now
2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia
claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and
his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular
support.

73

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month

through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month
to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are
continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of
minors up to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her
children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was
merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for,
as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious
personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to
the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent
in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein
will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother,
Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the
adopter.42 It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether
to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof
has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children,
and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given
to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and
its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.
Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of
paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the
markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on
documents unless formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity
of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of
petitioners children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for

it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document

notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No.
2103,46 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in
a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, charg d affaires, consul, viceconsul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting
within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a
notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to
him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to
keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer
mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the
certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, charg de affaires, consul, viceconsul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting
within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer
making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that
the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising
the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act,
and that as such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where
the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if
any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not
comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the
Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by

74

anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the

genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers. 47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to
authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is
inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not
stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial
backing, support and commitment of her children and her
siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially
capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house,
and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a
month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to
provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its
comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that
"petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on
the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the
minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should
be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.

children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to
support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a
legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do
not prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her
children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors
herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this
issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions
for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from
filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child,
it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in
a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping
with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by the
Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam
to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as
the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time
of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a
part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around
$1,000 a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to
bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in
Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows
that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be
able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children
in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her

75

petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the

exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died
on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA
SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by
her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their
capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with
Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who
alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful
descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint,
this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch
12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No.
1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and
Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the
basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March
9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth
certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children
were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.

76

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed
Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs
of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence,
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent
court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541),
the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No.
1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is
MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari.
Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it
disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent
law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the
exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not
legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27,
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth
of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is
Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1)
Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita
Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she
was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners
seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that
Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the

same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was
born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to
challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and
executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were
proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the
decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro
and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they
should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued.
They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of
such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN
(10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the
petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of
birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the
revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth
of a child is not one of those provided by law for the
revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the
considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to
the present, the same not having been revoked or
rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson,
the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on
the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge
to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their
action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the
issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not,cannot
be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption
arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is

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thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were

proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the burden of proof is
on the party attacking it; it cannot be
considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial determination of
some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the
adoption, may be essential to the exercise
of jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption, this does not make it essential to
the jurisdictional validity of the decree that
the fact be determined upon proper
evidence, or necessarily in accordance with
the truth; a mere error cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the determination must
stand until reversed on appeal, and
hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If
this were not the rule, the status of
adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be
the same at all investigations, and might
be regarded with different effect by
different tribunals, and the adoption might
be held by one court to have been valid,
while another court would hold it to have
been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the
trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained.
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the
prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the

birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be
refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the
case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita
Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party.
The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was
never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the
birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety
of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does
not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo,
as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of
the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
from different marriages.

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An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting

parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first
to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that
one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to
his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their
continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place
and the degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if
he could have inherited.

that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have
the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only
the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the
adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson
and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to
share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the
other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased
Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by

the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one who the person represented would have
succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants
of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus
the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent
her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share
her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be
equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and
Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true

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