THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134981. June 18, 2003]

FREDELITO P. VITTO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolution

dated August 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20245, People
of the Philippines vs. Danilo Pajaron, et al., denying petitioner Fredelito P. Vittos
Motion For Leave Of Court To File Appellants Brief.
1[1]

The facts are as follows:

Fredelito Vitto, petitioner, together with Vic O. Pizarro and Danilo P. Pajaron,
were charged with homicide under an Information filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 117, Pasay City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5749.
After hearing, or on October 23, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting all the accused of homicide and sentencing them to six (6) years, four
(4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

2[2]

All the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as

CA-G.R. CR No. 20245. Since then, they have remained at large for failure to
post bail on appeal.
On November 13, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution requiring
them to explain why their appeal should not be deemed abandoned in view of
their failure to submit themselves to the proper authorities during the pendency
of their appeal.
3[3]

On December 1, 1997, petitioner, through counsel de parte, submitted his

explanation stating that he was not aware that he should surrender to the Court
of Appeals. His counsel then requested an additional period, or up to December
20, 1997, within which (a) to contact the accused who is in Mindoro and advise
him to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; and (b) to file the
appellants brief.
4[4]

However, petitioner did not present himself to the Appellate Court within the
period requested by his counsel. Neither did he file an appellants brief. Thus,
1[1]

Filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended.

2[2]

Penned by Judge Leonardo M. Rivera, Rollo at 14-28.

Penned by Justice Demetrio G. Demetria and concurred in by Justices Artemon D. Luna and Hector L.
Hofilea, Rollo at 31-32.
3[3]

4[4]

CA Resolution dated March 31, 1998, Rollo at 36.

on March 31, 1998, the court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal.
5[5]

On July 21, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion For Leave Of
Court To File Appellants Brief stating that his failure to surrender himself to the
authorities and to file the brief within the time requested was because he works
in a remote farm in Mindoro and has no sufficient funds to pay for his
transportation to Metro Manila.
In a Resolution dated August 6, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion, thus:
As the Resolution of March 31, 1998 dismissing the respective appeals of
the accused-appellants had already become final and executory on May 5,
1998 insofar as the accused-appellant Fredelito Vitto is concerned, the
Motion for Leave of Court to File Appellants Brief filed by his counsel
only on July 21, 1998 is DENIED outright.6[6]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying his Motion For Leave Of
Court To File Appellants Brief. He thus prays that the application of the Rules of
Court be suspended in his favor and that his brief be admitted considering his
predicament.
In his comment on the petition, the Solicitor General prayed that the petition
be denied for being unmeritorious.
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure of 2000
provides:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute.
The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and
with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (8a)

In People vs. Potajo, we held that an appeal by the accused is considered

abandoned where he fails to properly prosecute his appeal or does some act
inconsistent with its prosecution, such as when he refuses to submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the authorities.
7[7]

8[8]

In the present case, the record shows that petitioner, through counsel, asked
the Court of Appeals for an extension until December 20, 1997 within which to
submit himself before it and to file the appellants brief. However, petitioner
failed to comply with his commitment. Such omission is fatal to his appeal.
Thus, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of March 31, 1998, considered
petitioners appeal as having been abandoned and consequently dismissed the
same. The Resolution became final and executory on May 5, 1998. As such,
the Appellate Court, in its assailed Resolution dated August 6, 1998, correctly
9[9]

10[10]

11[11]

5[5]

Id. at 37.

6[6]

Id. at 13.

G.R. No. 57718, November 24, 1988, cited in People vs. Balanag, G.R. No. 103225, September 15,
1994, 236 SCRA 474.
7[7]

8[8]

People vs. Balanag, id.

9[9]

CA Resolution dated March 31, 1998, Rollo at 36.

10[10]

Torres vs. Orden, G.R. No. 4646, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 1.

denied petitioners subsequent Motion For Leave To File Appellants Brief

submitted on July 21, 1998, or more than two (2) months after the finality of the
Resolution dismissing the appeal.
While petitioner, who is being represented by a counsel de parte, wants to
avail himself of the opportunity to prove his innocence, yet he insolently refused
to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the very same Appellate Court from which
he is seeking relief. Such actuation cannot be countenanced.
Petitioners claim that he was not aware that he must surrender himself to
the court is a flimsy excuse. It bears stressing that he was represented by
counsel throughout the trial and while his case was on appeal. Considering that
he was facing a serious charge, it was incumbent upon him to inform his lawyer
of his whereabouts and to inquire about the status of his case from time to time.
In the same manner, his counsel should have exercised the required diligence
incumbent upon him to acquaint his client regarding the proceedings in the
appellate court.
Indeed, the law cannot protect a party who sleeps on his rights,
some acts inconsistent with its prosecution.

12[12]

or does

In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,

G.R. No. 169431

[Formerly G.R. Nos. 149891-92]
Present:

- versus -

JERRY RAPEZA y FRANCISCO,

Appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
April 3, 2007

11[11]

CA Resolution dated August 6, 1998, Rollo at 13.

12[12]

Sy Chin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136233, November 23, 2000, 345 SCRA 673.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In the complex but exquisite scheme laid down by the Constitution, the Bill of Rights
occupies a position of primacy, way above the articles on governmental power.
Once again, the Court extends fresh vitality to the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, which, beginning with the 1987 Constitution, has been accorded equal
but segregate weight as the traditional right against self-incrimination, to tip the
scales of justice in favor of the presumption of innocence and the lot of an unlettered
confessant.
13[1]

This treats of the appeal from the Decision14[2] dated 1 July 2005 of the
Court of Appeals affirming the Consolidated Judgment15[3] dated 24 July
2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City in
Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 where Jerry Rapeza (appellant) was
found guilty of two (2) counts of murder and sentenced to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count, plus a total of P100,000.00 as indemnity
for the heirs of the two (2) victims.
In two (2) separate Informations, appellant, together with Mike
Regino, was charged with the murder of the Spouses Cesar Ganzon and
Priscilla Libas,16[4] with the following accusatory allegations:
Criminal Case No. 13064
That on or about the 21st day of October, [sic] 1995, more or less
4:00 oclock in the afternoon at Cawa-Cawa District, Municipality of
Culion, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
13

People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 49 (2003).

[1]
14

Rollo, pp. 3-16; penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Danilo B. Pine.
[2]

15
[3]
CA rollo, pp. 17-40; penned by Judge Fernando R. Gomez, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Palawan,
Puerto Princesa, Branch 52.

The victims were reportedly husband and wife but the fact of their marriage was not established
during the trial. Furthermore, although it appeared they were both of advanced age, their respective ages
were not established.
16[4]

together and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation,

treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and while
armed with bladed weapons, did then and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with their bladed weapons, to wit:
knives, PRI[S]CILLA LIBAS, hitting her in the different vital parts of her
body and inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds which causes (sic)
hypovolemic shock which were (sic) the direct and immediate cause of her
instantaneous death.
17[5]

Criminal Case No. 13202

That on or about the 21st day of October, [sic] 1995, more or less
4:00 oclock in the afternoon at Cawa-Cawa District, Municipality of
Culion, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and while
armed with bladed weapons, did then and there wilfully, [sic] unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with their bladed weapons, to wit:
knives, CESAR GANZON, hitting him in the different vital parts of his
body and inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds which causes
hypovolemic shock which were the direct and immediate cause of his
instantaneous death.
18[6]

As Mike Regino was at large, only appellant was arraigned and he

pleaded not guilty.

Forthwith, joint trial ensued which resulted in the

judgment of guilt against appellant as co-principal for two (2) counts of

murder, with conspiracy and evident premeditation attending the
commission of the felonies. Both cases were thereafter elevated to this
Court on automatic review, but later referred to the Court of Appeals per
People v. Mateo.19[7] The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of guilt.20
[8]

The prosecution had sought to establish the facts and events recited
below.

17

Records, Vol. I, p. 1.

[5]

18[6]

Records, Vol. II, p. 1.

19[7]

G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

20

The appellate court modified the judgment with an additional award of P50,000.00 each in both
cases to the heirs of the victims by way of moral damages.
[8]

In the afternoon of 21 October 1995, an unidentified woman went to

the Culion Municipal Station and reported a killing that had taken place in
Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Barangay Osmea, Culion, Palawan. 21[9] The officer-incharge, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas, sent to the victims house which was the scene
of the crime an investigating team led by SPO2 Crisanto Cuizon, Jr. and
PO2 Isidro Macatangay. There they saw two bloodied bodies, that of a
woman lying on the floor of the sala and that of a man inside the bedroom.
The investigating team wrapped the bodies in blankets and loaded them in a
banca to be brought to the morgue. 22[10] The victims were later identified as
Priscilla Libas and Cesar Ganzon.
The Autopsy Reports23[11] show that the common cause of death of
both victims was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding
secondary to multiple stab wounds and that both bodies were in the early
stages of decomposition. The medico-legal officer testified that Ganzon
sustained six (6) wounds on different parts of his body while Libas bore
sixteen (16) wounds.24[12] All the wounds of the victims were fatal and
possibly caused by a sharp instrument.
Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant
had wanted to confess to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to look for
appellant.25[13] He found appellant fishing in Asinan Island and invited the
latter for questioning.

Appellant expressed his willingness to make a

confession in the presence of a lawyer.26[14] Appellant was then brought to

the police station after which SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad Arnel
Alcantara to provide appellant with a lawyer. The following day, appellant
21

TSN, 15 January 1997, p. 4.

[9]
22

Id. at 6-8.

[10]
23

Records, Vol. I, pp. 160-166.

[11]
24

TSN, 15 February 2000, pp. 3-12.

[12]
25

TSN, 6 October 1998, p. 15.

[13]
26

Id. at 23.

[14]

was brought to the house of Atty. Roberto Reyes, the only available lawyer
in the municipality.27[15] The typewriter at the police station was out of order
at that time and Atty. Reyes could not go to the police station as he was
suffering from rheumatism. 28[16] At the house of Atty. Reyes, in the presence
of Vice-Mayor Emiliano Marasigan of Culion, two (2) officials of the
Sangguniang Barangay, SPO2 Cuizon and an interpreter, SPO2 Gapas
proceeded with the custodial investigation of appellant who was assisted by
Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that he was being investigated
for the death of Libas and Ganzon.
Per the Sinumpaang Salaysay29[17] that appellant executed, he was
informed of his constitutional rights in the following manner:
xxxx
Tanong:

Bago kita kunan ng isang salaysay, ikaw ay mayroong

karapatan sa ating Saligang Batas na sumusunod:
a) Na, ikaw ay maaaring hindi sumagot sa tanong na sa
iyong akala ay makaka-apekto sa iyong pagkatao;

b) Na, ikaw ay may karapatang pumili ng isang

manananggol o abogado na iyong sariling pili;
c) Na, kung ikaw ay walang kakayahan kumuha ng isang
ab[u]gado ang Pulisya ang siyang magbibigay sa iyo.
d) Na, ang lahat na iyong sasabihin ay maaaring gawing
ebidensya pabor o laban sa iyo.
Sagot:

Opo, sir.

Tanong:

Nakahanda ka na bang ipag-patuloy ang pagsisiyasat na ito,

na ang ating gagamiting salita ay salitang Tagalog, na
siyang ginagamit nating [sic]?

27

Id. at 12.

[15]
28

Id. at 11.

[16]
29

Records, Vol. I, pp. 157-159, Exhibits A to A-2.

[17]

Sagot:

Opo, sir.

x x x30[18]

Thereupon, when asked about the subsequent events, appellant made

the following narration:
xxx
Tanong:

Maari mo bang isalaysay ang pang-yayari [sic]?

Sagot:

Opo, [n]oong Sabado ng umaga alas 8:00[,] petsa 21 ng

Oktobre, 1995, kami ni Mike ay nagkaroon ng pag-iinuman
sa kanilang bahay sa Cawa-Cawa at sinabi sa akin [sic]
puntahan naming iyong matanda, dahil may galit daw si
Mike sa dalawang matanda [Pris]cilla Libas at Cesar
Ganzon) na nakatira din sa Cawa-Cawa at ang layo ay
humigit-kumulang isang daang metro sa aming pinagiinuman at kami ay nakaubos ng labing dalawang bote ng
beer, mula umaga hanggang alas kuatro ng hapon at habang
kami ay nag-iinom aming pinag-uusapan [sic] ang pagpatay
sa dalawang matanda. Noong sinasabi sa akin ni Mike, ako
umayaw ngunit ako ay pinilit at sinabihan ko rin siya
(Mike) at pinag-tatapon [sic] pa niya ang bote ng beer at
may sinabi pa si Mike hindi ka pala marunong tumulong
sa akin, pamangkin mo pa naman ako. At ang sagot ko sa
kanya, ay maghintay ka, mamayang hapon natin[g]
puntahan. At noong humigit-kumulang [sa alas] [sic]
kuatro ng hapon, amin ng pinuntahan ang bahay ng magasawa, at pagdating namin sa bahay na dala naming [sic]
ang patalim, tuloy-tuloy na kaming umakyat, at hinawakan
ni Mike ang babae (Presing) at nilaslas na ang leeg at
sinaksak ng sinaksak niya sa ibat ibang parte ng katawan
at ako ay umakyat din sa bahay at nakita kong nakataob
ang lalaki (Cesar)[,] aking hinawakan [sic] ko sa kanyang
balikat, at siya ay nakaalam [sic] na mayroong tao sa
kanyang likuran, akin nang sinaksak sa kaliwang tagiliran
[sic] ng kanyang katawan, at hindi ko na alam ang
sumunod na pang-yayari [sic] dahil ako[]y tuliro. At kami
ay umalis at tumalon sa likod ng kusina, nang alam na
naming [sic] na patay [na] iyong dalawang matanda.
xxxx

31[19]

An interpreter was provided appellant as he was not well versed in

Tagalog being a native of Samar. As he is illiterate, appellant affixed only
30

Id. at 157.

[18]
31

Id. at 157-158.

[19]

his thumbmark on the statement above his printed name. Bonifacio Abad,
the interpreter, and Atty. Reyes, as the assisting counsel, also signed the
statement. Atty. Reyes signed again as the notary public who notarized the
statement.
Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was filed against
appellant, and Regino was likewise arrested. Judge Jacinto Manalo of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Culion conducted a preliminary
investigation. Finding probable cause only as against appellant, Regino was
ordered released.32[20]

The Provincial Prosecutor, however, reversed the

finding of the MTC by including Regino in the Informations, but by then the
latter had already left Culion.33[21]
Testifying in his defense, appellant presented a different story during
the trial. The defense presented no other witness.
Appellant testified that he did not know the victims and that he had
nothing to do with their deaths. He was a native of Samar and he did not
know how to read or write as he never attended school.34[22] He arrived in
Culion as a fisherman for the Parabal Fishing Boat. 35[23] As his contract had
already expired, he stayed in Culion to look for work. He lived with Regino
as the latter was his only friend in Cawa-Cawa. 36[24] Reginos house was
about 40 meters away from the victims house.
Several days after appellants arrival, the killings took place.
Appellant, along with Regino and another man named Benny Macabili, was
asked by a police officer to help load the bodies of the victims in a banca.
32

Per Order dated 26 February 1996; id. at 7-9.

[20]
33

Per Resolution dated 10 June 1996; id. at 2-4.

[21]
34

TSN, 29 May 2001, p. 9.

[22]
35

Id. at 4.

[23]
36

Id. at 7.

[24]

Shortly thereafter, appellant was arrested and brought to the municipal hall
where he was mauled by PO2 Macatangay and placed in a small cell. 37[25]
Regino, too, was arrested with him. While under detention, appellant told
the police that it was Regino who was responsible for the killing of the
victims but the police did not believe appellant. But appellant later testified
that he implicated Regino only in retaliation upon learning that the latter
pointed to him as the perpetrator.38[26] Appellant was then asked by SPO2
Gapas to sign a document so that he will be released. When appellant
replied that he did not know how to sign his name, SPO2 Gapas took
appellants thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the document.

39[27]

Appellant claimed he did not resist because he was afraid of being mauled
again.
Appellant further denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting
Abad, the alleged interpreter. He never left the jail from the time he was
arrested except to attend the hearing before the MTC. 40[28] When appellant
was brought to the MTC, nobody talked to him during the hearing nor did
counsel assist him.41[29] He was thereafter brought by a police officer to a hut
in a mountain where he was told to go a little bit farther. He refused for fear
of being shot. The police officer then got angry and punched him in the
stomach.42[30]
On the basis of appellants extrajudicial confession, the RTC found
him guilty of both crimes. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.

37[25]

Id. at 13-16.

38

Id. at 40-41.

[26]
39

Id. at 22.

[27]
40

Id. at 18.

[28]
41

Id. at 23.

[29]
42

Id. at 37-38.

[30]

Appellant submits for our resolution two issues, namely: (1) whether
his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was likewise proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant mainly contends that the extrajudicial confession upon

which the trial court placed heavy emphasis to find him guilty suffers from
constitutional infirmity as it was extracted in violation of the due process
guidelines. Specifically, he claims that he affixed his thumbmark through
violence and intimidation. He stresses that he was not informed of his rights
during the time of his detention when he was already considered a suspect as
the police had already received information of his alleged involvement in the
crimes. Neither did a competent and independent counsel assist him from
the time he was detained until trial began. Assuming Atty. Reyes was indeed
designated as counsel to assist appellant for purposes of the custodial
investigation, said lawyer, however, was not appellants personal choice.
Appellant likewise maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay
states that his rights were read to him, there was no showing that his rights
were explained to him in a way that an uneducated person like him could
understand. On the assumption that the confession is admissible, appellant
asserts that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not
amply proven as the trial court merely relied on his alleged confession
without presenting any other proof that the determination to commit the
crime was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent
attempt.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the
constitutional guidelines on custodial investigation were observed. Hence,
appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay is admissible. Even if appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his alleged detention, that
would not be relevant, the government counsel argues, since custodial

investigation began only when the investigators started to elicit information

from him which took place at the time he was brought to the house of Atty.
Reyes. Moreover, appellant did not interpose any objection to having Atty.
Reyes as his counsel.

As to the qualifying circumstance of evident

premeditation, the Solicitor General submits that the same was sufficiently
proven when accused proceeded to the victims house together with Regino,
armed with bladed weapons, in order to consummate their criminal design.
He further argues that appellants defense of denial and his lame excuse of
being illiterate must be rejected in the face of a valid voluntary extrajudicial
confession.
The fundamental issue in this case is whether appellants extrajudicial
confession is admissible in evidence to warrant the verdict of guilt.
There is no direct evidence of appellants guilt except for the alleged confession and
the corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the
testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and
must perforce be discarded.
A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily shown to have been
obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 12, Art. III
thereof states in part, to wit:
43[31]

43

People v. Santos, 347 Phil. 723, 733 (1997).

[31]

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxxx

Republic Act No. 7438,44[32] approved on 15 May 1992, has reinforced

the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation. The pertinent provisions read:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial
Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his
order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to
and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who
shall at all times be allowed to confer private with the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be provided by with a competent and
independent counsel.
xxxx

f. As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the

practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law.

44
[32]
Otherwise known as An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof.

If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards,

it must further be tested for voluntariness, that is, if it was given freely by
the confessant without any form of coercion or inducement, 45[33] since, to
repeat, Sec. 12(2), Art. III of the Constitution explicitly provides:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be
admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be
voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of the confessants choice; 3) the confession must be
express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.
46[34]

45

See People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, 9 March 2004, 425 SCRA 11, 23; and People v. Santos,
supra note 31.
[33]

46[34]
People v. Porio, 427 Phil. 82, 93 (2002), citing People v. Gallardo, 323 SCRA 219 (2000) and
People v. Bacor, 306 SCRA 522 (1999); See People of the Philippines v. Oranza, 434 Phil. 417, 430
(2002); People v. Valdez, 395 Phil. 207, 224 (2000); People v. Base, 385 Phil. 803, 815 (2000); People v.
Lumandong, 384 Phil. 390, 403 (2000); People v. Calvo, Jr., 336 Phil. 655, 661 (1997).

If all the foregoing requisites are met, the confession constitutes evidence of a high
order because it is presumed that no person of normal mind will knowingly and
deliberately confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the
exclusionary rule.
The latter situation obtains in the instant case for several
reasons.
47[35]

48[36]

Appellant was not informed of

his constitutional rights in
custodial investigation.

A person under custodial investigation essentially has the right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and the
Constitution requires that he be informed of such rights. The raison d' etre for this
requirement was amply explained in People v. Ayson where this Court held, to wit:
49[37]

xxxx
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards
laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being
regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the
suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those
rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement.
But unless and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals
in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."

47[35]

U.S. v. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329 (1913).

48

People v. Santos, supra note 31.

[36]
49

G.R. No. 85215, 7 July 1989, 175 SCRA 216.

[37]

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial

interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as
this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." The situation contemplated has also been more precisely
described by this Court.
x x x After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation
begins[,] a confrontation arises which at best may be termed
unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not
only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to
break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and
unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he
considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained
and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study have taught them to extract
the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating
and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an
atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the
Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
xxxx

50[38]

We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but
was invited by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained
from 11 oclock in the morning of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23
October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this
juncture, appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as
he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court
that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the
investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995
in the house of Atty. Reyes. 51[39] In People v. Dueas, Jr.,52[40] we ruled, to
wit:
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. According to PO3
50

Id. at 229-231.

[38]
51

CA rollo, p. 85.

[39]
52

G.R. No. 151286, 31 March 2004, 426 SCRA 666.

[40]

Palmero, right after appellants arrest, the latter already insinuated to him
that he would confess his participation in the killing. As he testified on
cross-examination:
Q
A

A
Q
A

On December 18, 1996, when you arrested him what did he

actually told [sic] you?
Before we put him in jail at the Baler Police Station he told
us that he has [sic] to reveal something about the death of
Elvira Jacob.
So you already know [sic] that on December 18, 1996 that
whatever Catalino Duenas will reveal to you will give you
lead in solving the investigation in connection with the
death of Elvira Jacob, isnt it?
Yes, sir.
So, you still waited until December 23, 1996 for that
revelation, isnt it?
Yes, sir. Thats all, your honor.
53[41]

In the case at bar, SPO2 Gapas testified:

Q
A
Q
A

By the way, when you conducted the investigation in the house of

Atty. Reyes in Culion, why was Jerry Rapeza there?
I invited Jerry Rapeza and upon my invitation he voluntarily came
to me.
In the first place, why did you invite him?
To ask [a] question about the crime committed in the Island of
Cawa-Cawa.

xxx
Q
A

That was the only reason why you invited him, being a transient in
that place you made him a suspect?
In the first place[,] Your Honor, he was not a suspect but 2 days
after the commission of the crime a certain person came to me and
said that Jerry Rapeza requested that he will give his confession
but in front of a lawyer, so he said: Puntahan nating [sic] ang
isang taong nagngangalang Jerry Rapeza.

xxx
Q

And based on your experienced [sic], would it not be quite strange

that a person who committed a crime would voluntarily give
confession because ordinarily a criminals [sic] will find a way to
escape?
Yes, sir. [B]ut at that time the person who assisted me strongly
believed that Jerry Rapeza would confess so I did not make any
tanong-tanong in order to solve that crime so I proceeded to that
place and talked to the suspect.

53

Id. at 679-680.

[41]

Q
A

So you already considered Jerry Rapeza as a suspect?

When that person informed me that Jerry Rapeza would like
to confess.

x x x x [Emphasis ours.]

54[42]

Already being held as a suspect as early as 21 October 1995, accused

should have been informed of his constitutional rights.

SPO2 Gapas

admitted that appellant was not so informed, thus:

Q
A

What was he doing?

He was fishing, sir.

Q
A

And you told him that youre going to arrest him?

He did not refuse to go with me, sir.

xxxx
Q
A

From the Island you brought him to the station?

Yes, sir.

And there you arrived at the station at around 11:00 oclock in the
morning?
Yes, sir.

A
Q
A

And then you started to conduct the investigation as

Investigator of the Police Station?
Yes, sir.

xxxx
Q
A

And what was the[,] result of your investigation?

According to him he would confess and he would give his
confession in the presence of a lawyer so I talked to Kgd. Arnel
Alcantara.

xxxx

55[43]

Q
A

On October 22, 1995[,] when you brought him to the Police

Station, did you start the investigation at that time?
Not yet sir, I only talked to him.

When did you start the investigation?

54

TSN, 6 October 1998, pp. 14-16.

[42]
55

TSN, 6 October 1998, pp. 22-23.

[43]

I started the investigation when Jerry Rapeza was in front of his

lawyer.

Q
A

When was that?

October 23, 1995[,] noon time, sir.

Q
A

From the Island you just talked to him?

Yes, sir.

Q
A

You did not consider that as part of the investigation?

Yes sir, my purpose at that time was to certain (sic) the suspect of
the said crime.

xxxx
Q

Please answer my question[,] Mr. Witness, on October 22, 1995,

did you inform him of his constitutional rights?
No sir, I did not.

x x x x(Emphasis ours.)

56[44]

Even supposing that the custodial investigation started only on 23 October 1995, a
review of the records reveals that the taking of appellants confession was flawed
nonetheless.

It is stated in the alleged confession that prior to questioning SPO2 Gapas had
informed appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made
could be used in evidence for or against him, that he has a right to counsel of his own
choice, and that if he cannot afford the services of one, the police shall provide one for
him.

However, there is no showing that appellant had actually understood his rights.

57[45]

He was not even informed that he may waive such rights only in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be

meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as
opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof.

58[46]

Since

comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily

depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the
person undergoing investigation.

59[47]

In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was
illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog.

60[48]

This fact should engender a higher

56

Id. at 26-28.

[44]
57

Records, Vol. 1, p. 157; Exhibit A, supra note 17.

[45]
58

People v. Porio, supra note 34 at 98, citing People v. Espiritu, 302 SCRA 533 (1999), citing
People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 (1995).
[46]

59

People v. Canoy, 385 Phil. 73 (2000).

[47]

When appellant testified in court, he already understood and spoke Tagalog. He explained that
he learned it from his inmates in the provincial jail. He was transferred to the provincial jail in April 1996
and testified in court only five (5) years later or on 29 May 2001.
60[48]

degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly

communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession.

The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad

to buttress its claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him.
However, the presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently
established. Although the confession bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether
he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the alleged confession.

For one thing, SPO2 Cuizon did not mention Abad as one of the persons present
during the interrogation. He testified:

Who were present during that investigation?

Vice Mayor Marasigan and the two other SB members.

Can you identify who are these two SB members?

SB Mabiran and SB Alcantara.

Who else?

No more, sir.

So, there were two SB members, Vice Mayor Atty. Reyes, Gapas
and you?

Yes, sir.

xxxx

61[49]

For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have
been in the best position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to
Waray for appellant to understand what was going on. This significant circumstance
lends credence to appellants claim that he had never met Abad.

According to the appellate court, appellant admitted in his Brief that the
confession was made in the presence of an interpreter. The passage in appellants Brief
on which the admission imputed to him was based reads, thus:

The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when

accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if
the confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there is no
showing that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively
explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not
even presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a
language understood by accused-appellant.

61

TSN, 15 January 1997, p. 17.

[49]
62

CA rollo, p. 152.

[50]

62[50]

Clearly, the imputation is erroneous. Throughout his Brief, appellant disputes the
allegation that he ever met the interpreter much less made the confession with the latters
assistance. The evident import of the passage is that on the assumption that there was an
interpreter present still there was no indication that the rights of a person under
investigation were effectively imparted to appellant, as the interpreter could not translate
that which was not even said in the course of the proceeding.

Moreover, SPO2 Gapas testified on direct examination:

As a way of refreshing your mind[,] Mr. Witness, can you take a

look at this statement [referring to appellants Sinumpaang
Salaysay] those appearing on page 1 of the same up to the word
Opo sir, kindly take a look at this, do you remember that you
were the one who profounded (sic) this (sic) questions?

Yes, sir, I was the one who profounded [sic] that [sic] questions.

And you are very definite that the answer is in [the] affirmative, in
your question and answer?

I am not very sure, sir.

You are not very sure because he has a lawyer?

Yes, sir.

xxxx

63[51]

SPO2 Gapas could not say for certain if appellant had indeed understood his
rights precisely because he did not explain them to appellant. In any event, SPO2 Gapas
would be incompetent to testify thereon because appellants alleged confession was made
63

TSN, 6 October 1998, pp. 9-10.

[51]

through an interpreter as he did not understand Tagalog. SPO2 Gapas testimony as

regards the contents of appellants confession would in fact be hearsay. In U.S. v. Chu
Chio,

64[52]

this Court rendered inadmissible the extrajudicial confession of the accused

therein because it was not made immediately to the officer who testified, but through an
interpreter. Thus, the officer as witness on the stand did not swear of his own knowledge
as to what the accused had said. Similarly in this case, SPO2 Gapass testimony as to
what was translated to appellant and the latters responses thereto were not of his
personal knowledge. Therefore, without the testimony of Abad, it cannot be said with
certainty that appellant was informed of his rights and that he understood them.

Not having been properly informed of his rights prior to questioning and not
having waived them either, the alleged confession of appellant is inadmissible.

Confession was not made with

the assistance of competent and
independent counsel of appellants
choice.

Appellant denies that he was ever assisted by a lawyer from the moment he was
arrested until before he was arraigned. On the other hand, the prosecution admits that
appellant was provided with counsel only when he was questioned at the house of Atty.
Reyes to which appellant was allegedly taken from the police station.

SPO2 Gapas testified that he talked to appellant when they got to the police
station at 11 oclock in the morning of 22 October 1995 and the result of their talk was
that appellant would give his confession in the presence of a lawyer. Appellant was then
held in the police station overnight before he was allegedly taken to the house of Atty.
Reyes.

The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the
rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel,

64

8 Phil. 677 (1907).

[52]

unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel.

65[53]

Appellant did

not make any such waiver.

Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts
as to his competence and independence as appellants counsel for purposes of the
custodial investigation. The meaning of competent counsel and the standards therefor
were explained in People v. Deniega

66[54]

as follows:

The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should

be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accuseds behalf, it is
important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as
distinguished from one who would be merely be giving a routine,
peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals constitutional
rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accuseds right to be
informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing

custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be
engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latters relative or person
authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such
petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are
65

People v. Delmo, 439 Phil. 212 (2002), cited in People v. Dueas, Jr., supra note 40.

[53]
66

321 Phil. 1028, 1041-1042 (1995).

[54]

given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are

generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers
and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be

present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview,
counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to
give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to
remain silent or terminate the interview.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

67[55]

The standards of competent counsel were not met in this case given the
deficiencies of the evidence for the prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes signed the
confession as appellants counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no
evidence on how he assisted appellant. The confession itself and the testimonies of SPO2
Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon bear no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant
his constitutional rights. Atty. Reyes was not even presented in court to testify thereon
whether on direct examination or on rebuttal. It appears that his participation in the
proceeding was confined to the notarization of appellants confession. Such participation
is not the kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to appellant in legal
contemplation.

Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellants counsel of choice but was picked
out by the police officers allegedly through the barangay officials. Appellants failure to
interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as consent
under the prevailing circumstances. As discussed earlier, appellant was not properly
67

People v. Alberto, 436 Phil. 434, 444 (2002), citing People v. Deniega, supra note 46.

[55]

informed of his rights, including the right to a counsel preferably of his own choice.
SPO2 Gapas testified thus:

xxxx
Q
A

Now Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the accused[,] when
he allegedly gave his voluntary confession[,] he [sic] did not read
the document when he made his thumbmark?
He did not because according to him he is illiterate.

Q
A

Illiterate because he only placed his thumbmark and you have

all the freedom to manipulate him and in fact he doesnt know
that he is entitled to have a lawyer of his own choice?
He doesnt know.

xxxx

68[56]

Strikingly, while it was made to appear in the alleged confession that appellant
was informed of his right to a counsel of his own choice and that if he cannot afford the
services of one, the police shall provide him with one, it was overlooked that it was not
similarly made to appear in the same statement that appellant was advised that he had the
option to reject the counsel provided for him by the police authorities.

69[57]

Set against the clear provisions of the Constitution and the elucidations thereof in
jurisprudence, the foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities preclude the
admissibility of appellants alleged confession.

68

TSN, 6 October 1998, p. 28.

[56]
69

See People v. Canoy, supra note 47.

[57]

Confession is not voluntary.

It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and
the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.
The trial court found that
appellants bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several
factors constrain us to hold that the confession was not given under conditions that
conduce to its admissibility.
70[58]

First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been
supplied by the investigators themselves.

The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if,
upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt
upon its integrity, it being replete with detailswhich could only be supplied by the
accusedreflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary.

71[59]

The

trial court applied this rule but without basis. On closer examination of the evidence, the
key details in the alleged confession were provided not by appellant but by the police
officers themselves.

The prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the killings. This is disturbing,
to say the least.

The trial court found that the killings were reported to the police at four oclock in the
afternoon of 21 October 1995. That when the investigating team arrived at the scene
of the crime, the bodies of the victims were already rank and decomposing, and
that two days after the crimes were committed, SPO2 Gapas had set out to look for
appellant following information from a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant would
like to confess to the crimes.
72[60]

Indeed, SPO2 Gapas testified that he received a report of the killings on 21 October
1995 and sent a team to investigate the incident. On direct examination, he declared
that two days after the commission of the crime, he received information that
appellant would give his confession in front of a lawyer.
However, on crossexamination, he stated that it was on the following day or on 22 October 1995 when
73[61]

70[58]

People v. Porio, supra note 34 at 93-94.

71

People v. Satorre, 456 Phil. 98, 107 (2003); People v. Abayon, 199 Phil. 404 (1982).

[59]

72[60]

CA rollo, pp. 17-18.

73

TSN, 6 October 1998, p. 15.

[61]

he found appellant and invited him to the police station and that appellants custodial
investigation had taken place on 23 October 1995.
Likewise, SPO2 Cuizons testimony is far from enlightening. He testified, thus:
xxxx
Q

Now, on October 24, 1995, where were you?

I was in Culion Police Station.

While you were there in the Police Station, what happened?

A woman reported to us regarding this incident.

74[62]

xxxx
Q

When was the investigation conducted?

October 24, 1995.

On the same day that you discover [sic] the cadavers?

The investigation was conducted on October 25, 1995.

xxxx

75[63]

The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged
confession.
While the prosecution insists through the recitals of the Informations and the
testimony of its witnesses that the killings took place on 21 October 1995, the totality
of its evidence shows otherwise, i.e. the killings took place earlier. When the bodies
were discovered on 21 October 1995, they were already decomposing, a factor that
indicates that the victims had been dead long before then. How then could appellant
have killed the victims at 4 oclock in the afternoon of 21 October 1995 as expressly
stated in the confession, when that was the same date and time when the bodies were
discovered? Had appellant voluntarily confessed and had he really been the killer, he
would have given the correct date and time when he committed the horrid acts. The
only sensible way to sort out the puzzle is to conclude that the police officers
themselves supplied 21 October 1995 and four oclock in the afternoon as the date
and time of the killings in appellants statement, a barefaced lie on which the
prosecution based its allegations in the Informations and which SPO2 Gapas repeated
on the witness stand.

Moreover, the police officers went to the house of the victims on 21

October 1995 where they found the bodies. The autopsy on the victimss
bodies was done the following day or on 22 October 1995 while appellants
statement was allegedly taken on 23 October 1995.

By then, the

investigators knew how and where the victims were killed, circumstances
74

TSN, 15 January 1997, p. 4.

[62]
75

Id. at 15.

[63]

that could have enabled them to fill up the details of the crime in the
extrajudicial confession.76[64]
Curiously, the autopsy report on Ganzons body shows that he sustained six (6) stab
wounds, four (4) on the right side of his body and two (2) on the left side. Yet, it is
stated in appellants extrajudicial confession that he stabbed Ganzon on his left side.
Quite oddly, SPO2 Cuizon testified that Ganzon was wounded on the left arm only.
His full account on this aspect runs, thus:
Q
A

Where did you go?

I immediately proceeded to the house of the victim.

Q
A

What did you find out when you went to the house of the victim?
I have seen blood on the ground floor of the house.

76

See e.g. People v. Dueas, Jr., supra note 40 at 677-678, citing People v. Abayon, supra note 58.

[64]

xxxx
Q
A

When you opened the house[,] you are [sic] with Macatangay?
Yes, sir[.] I was with POII Macatangay but he was a little bit far
from the victim and I was the one who opened the door and went
upstairs.

Q
A

What did you find out inside the house?

I have seen a woman lying down with her hands nakadipa on the
ground and blooded (sic).

xxxx
Q
A

Where else did you go when you were already inside the house?
I went to the other bedroom.

Q
A

And what did you find out?

An old man with his face facing downward.

Q
A

The woman already dead was in the sala?

Yes, sir.

xxxx

77[65]

Q
A

Do you know in what bedroom (sic) of her body she was

wounded?
The neck was slashed and both arms and both foot (sic) were
wounded.

Q
A

How about the man?

Left arm, sir.

Q
A

Where else?
No more, sir.

xxxx

78[66]

(Emphasis ours.)

The prosecutions evidence likewise fails to establish when the custodial investigation
had taken place and for how long appellant had been in detention. Strangely, the
confession is undated and it cannot be ascertained from it when appellant made the
confession or affixed his thumbmark thereon. What emerges only is the bare fact that
it was notarized by Atty. Reyes on 23 October 1995. One can only speculate as to the
77

TSN, 15 January 1997, pp. 6-7.

[65]
78

Id. at 21-22.

[66]

reason behind what seems to be a lack of forthrightness on the part of the police
officers.
These unexplained inconsistencies cast doubt on the integrity and voluntariness of
appellants alleged confession.
Second, again appellant was not assisted by counsel.

To reiterate, the purpose of providing counsel to a person under

custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a
confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements. 79[67]
And in the event the accused desires to give a confession, it is the duty of his
counsel to ensure that the accused understands the legal import of his act and
that it is a product of his own free choice.
It bears repeating that appellant was held in the police station overnight before he was
allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes. He was not informed of his rights and
there is no evidence that he was assisted by counsel. Thus, the possibility of appellant
having been subjected to trickery and intimidation at the hands of the police
authorities, as he claims, cannot be entirely discounted.
Confession was not sufficiently
corroborated.

Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently
disputed unless they are corroborated.
There must be such corroboration so that
when considered in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused
beyond a reasonable doubt.
80[68]

81[69]

As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness

who testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was
made or by any other evidence.
82[70]

83[71]

79

See People v. Dueas, Jr., supra note 40.

[67]
80

U.S. v. De Leon, 27 Phil. 506, 511 (1914); U.S. v. Agatea, 40 Phil. 596, 601 (1919); People v.
Fontanosa, et al., 126 Phil. 583 (1967).
[68]

81

People v. Satorre, 456 Phil. 98 (2003).

[69]
82

[70]
U.S. v. Gregorio, 4 Phil. 433 (1905); See People v. Cunanan, 110 Phil. 313 (1960); People v.
Mojica, 119 Phil. 796 (1964); People v. Condemena, 132 Phil. 380 (1968).
83

5 MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, 271 (1980 ed.).

[71]

The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any

lingering doubt as to the credibility of appellants statement could have been laid to rest
by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the
custodial investigation. However, they were not presented in court.

Abads testimony was likewise crucial in proving that appellant had understood
every part of his alleged confession. Confessions made in a language or dialect not
known to the confessant must also be corroborated by independent evidence.

84[72]

As

appellant is unschooled and was not familiar with the Tagalog dialect, his confession
which was in Tagalog necessarily had to be read and translated to Waray allegedly by
Abad. This Court has held that such a multiple process of reading and translating the
questions and translating and typing the answers and reading and translating again the
said answers is naturally pregnant with possibilities of human, if unintentional,
inadequacies and incompleteness which render the said confession unsafe as basis of
conviction for a capital offense, unless sufficiently corroborated.

85[73]

A confession may

be admissible if it is shown to have been read and translated to the accused by the person
taking down the statement and that the accused fully understood every part of it.

86[74]

To

repeat, we cannot accept SPO2 Gapas testimony as regards the contents of appellants
alleged confession for being hearsay evidence thereon. Since appellant allegedly made
the confession to SPO2 Gapas through Abad, Abads testimony is thus indispensable in
order to make the confession admissible.

84

5 MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, 272 (1980 ed.).

[72]
85

People v. Maisug, No. L-22187, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 742, 753.

[73]
86

Id.

[74]

Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt

which must be resolved in favor of appellant
as evidence.

88[76]

87[75]

and the confession should be disregarded

Verily, we are left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers

against whose abuse of authority the Constitution protects the appellant. As their
respective testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we find the
same insufficient bases to hold appellants extrajudicial confession admissible against
him.

The only other prosecution evidence under consideration are the

autopsy reports with which the alleged confession supposedly dovetails, as
the trial court concluded. However, a perusal of the alleged confession
would reveal that does not fit the details in the autopsy report. As discussed
earlier, Ganzon was found to have sustained six (6) stab wounds on different
parts of his body while appellant allegedly admitted stabbing him on his left
side only. The confession does not even state how many times appellant
stabbed the old man. SPO2 Cuizon testified that he saw only one stab
wound on Ganzons body and it was on the latters left arm. Thus, it is not
with the autopsy reports that the alleged confession dovetails but rather with
what the police authorities would like us to believe as the truth.

87

See People v. De la Cruz, 33 Phil. 653 (1997).

[75]
88

U.S. v. Marcial, et al., 7 Phil. 281 (1907).

[76]

Nevertheless, since the confession is inadmissible, it becomes

irrelevant whether it dovetails with the autopsy reports. The corroboration
that medico-legal findings lend to an extrajudicial confession becomes
relevant only when the latter is considered admissible. In People v. De la
Cruz,89[77] we held, to wit:
It is significant that, with the exception of appellants putative
extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of his alleged guilt has been
presented by the People. The proposition that the medical findings jibe
with the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly committed the
crimes falls into the fatal error of figuratively putting the horse before the
cart. Precisely, the validity and admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial
confession are in question and the contents thereof are denied and of
serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used as the basis for such a
finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which has still to be proved, a
situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando.

90[78]

No motive could be ascribed

to appellant.
For the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to
the identity of the perpetrator.91[79] In view of the inadmissibility of the
confession, there is no other evidence that directly points to appellant as the
culprit. However, the prosecution failed to show any motive on appellants
part to commit the felonies. Appellant consistently denied having known the
89

Supra note 75.

[77]
90

Id. at 666.

[78]
91

People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 504; See People v. Ballesteros, 349
Phil. 366 (1998).
[79]

victims.

Although the confession states that Regino allegedly sought

appellants help in killing the victims as Regino was his nephew, the fact of
their relationship was denied by appellant and was never established by the
prosecution. In People v. Aguilar,92[80] we held that the absence of apparent
motive to commit the offense charged would, upon principles of logic, create
a presumption of the innocence of the accused, since, in terms of logic, an
action without a motive would be an effect without a cause.93[81]
Furthermore, appellants conduct after the killings was not that of a
guilty person. He never attempted to flee even if he knew that the police
authorities were already investigating the incident as he was summoned to
help load the bodies in a banca. Being a transient in the place, he could
have easily disappeared and left the island but he remained there to continue
looking for work.
Taken together, these circumstances generate serious doubts that must
be resolved in appellants favor, congruently with the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
In view of the inadmissibility of appellants confession, which is the
sole evidence of the prosecution against him, the resolution of the issue of
whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation had attended
the commission of the crimes has become academic. Indeed, there exists no
other prosecution evidence on which appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt may be based.
In conclusion, the overriding consideration in criminal cases is not
whether appellant is completely innocent, but rather whether the quantum of
evidence necessary to prove his guilt was sufficiently met.

With the

exclusion of appellants alleged confession, we are left with no other

92

197 Phil. 210 (1982).

[80]
93

Id. at 219-220.

[81]

recourse but to acquit him of the offenses charged for the constitutional right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overcome only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, unless the prosecution discharges the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.94[82]

WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan,
Puerto Princesa City in Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 and the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jerry Rapeza
y Francisco is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence leading to reasonable
doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of
appellant from confinement, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to
report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

94

People v. Satorre, supra note 59 at 111.

[82]

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION
JAIME M. DE GUZMAN,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167492

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
March 22, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Resolution
as reiterated in its Resolution

96[2]

95[1]

dated 12 October 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA),

of 17 February 2005, dismissing the petitioners appeal in

CA-G.R. CR No. 28277 for failure to file his appellants brief in connection with his
appeal from an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 44, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Homicide against the person of one Antonio De Vera.

Briefly, the material facts may be stated as follows:

On 6 February 2001, in the RTC of Dagupan City, an Information for Frustrated

Homicide was filed against petitioner and three others identified only as John Doe, Peter
Doe and Paul Doe, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of June, 2000, in the City of

Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, JAIME
BINONG DE GUZMAN, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and
PAUL DOE, being then armed with a deadly weapon, with
intent to kill one ANTONIO DE VERA, confederating
together, acting jointly and helping each other, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the latter by stabbing and
hitting him on vital parts of his body, the said accused
having thus performed all the acts of execution which could
have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence but
which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is due
to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to him,
to the damage and prejudice of said ANTONIO DE VERA.

On arraignment, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of Not Guilty. Thereafter,

trial ensued.
95

96[2]

Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez,
Jr. (ret.) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; Rollo, p. 40.
Id. at 77.
[1]

In a decision

97[3]

dated 19 May 2003, the trial court found the petitioner guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and accordingly sentenced him, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Jaime Binong De

Guzman GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Homicide and pursuant to law, hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to Ten (10) Years of Prision Mayor in its medium period, as
maximum, and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay P46,000.00 representing actual
expenses incurred by the complainant.
SO ORDERED.

In time, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal whereupon the records of the case
were elevated to the CA.

In the CA, petitioner, as appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office (PAO),
filed a Motion for Extension of Time To File Appellants Brief,

98[4]

therein praying for an

extension of sixty (60) days or until 22 August 2004 within which to file his appellants
brief. The motion was granted by the appellate court in its Resolution of 2 July 2004.

Unfortunately, no appellants brief was filed by the petitioner within the extended
60-day period. Hence, in the herein assailed Resolution
dismissed the appeal, thus:

97[3]
98[4]
99[5]

Id. at 28-36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 40.

99[5]

of 12 October 2004, the CA

Despite extension granted which expired on August 22, 2004,

appellant failed to file brief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 8 Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.

Upon receipt of the aforequoted dismissal resolution, petitioner, again through the
PAO, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (With Motion to Admit Attached Brief for the
Accused-Appellant

100[6]

) therein alleging, through counsel, that it was only upon receipt of

the resolution dismissing his appeal that counsel became aware of her inadvertence in
failing to file the required brief within the extended period and that the delay in filing
the required appellants brief was without any malicious intent to delay the disposition of
the case, adding that the admission of the appellants brief attached to the motion will
not cause any prejudice to public interest, but would promote and enhance the
administration of justice.

In its next assailed Resolution

101[7]

of 17 February 2005, the CA denied the motion

for reconsideration:

The Court has studied the PAOs explanations for non-filing of

brief for the accused within the extended period prayed for by PAO and
We find no cogent reason to revise, amend, and much less, reverse Our
October 12, 2004 Resolution dismissing the appeal, for appellants failure
to file brief, pursuant to Sec. 8 Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appellants November 9,
2004 Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
100[6]

Id. at 41-43.

101[7]

Id. at 77.

Hence, petitioners present recourse, contending in the main that the CA should
have admitted his appellants brief since the failure to file the same within the extended
period was due to his counsels inadvertence. He adds that the admission of his brief will
not prejudice any party.

We GRANT the petition.

Undoubtedly, this Court has invariably ruled that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to
do so, the right to appeal is lost.

102[8]

Nonetheless, we find cogent reason to relax the rule in this case.

Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the CA may,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either
case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the period prescribed
by the rules, except where appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

Clearly, if the appellant is represented by a counsel de parte and he fails to file his brief
on time, the appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellee or by the CA with notice
to the appellant. However, the rule takes exception when the appellant is represented by a
counsel de oficio as in this case.

102

Prospero Balgami v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Aplomina, G.R. No. 131287,
December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 591.
[8]

For sure, in Foralan v. CA,

103[9]

which is akin to this case, the Court allowed the admission

of an appellants brief even if filed out of time because the appellant therein was
represented by a counsel de oficio, and ruled that it was error on the part of the appellate
court to dismiss the appeal motu proprio instead of first giving to appellant a notice to
show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed.

In several cases, the Court had set aside technicalities in the Rules in order to
give way to justice and equity. The Court can overlook the short delay in the filing of
pleading if strict compliance with the Rules would mean sacrificing justice to
technicality. The imminence of a person being deprived unjustly of his liberty due to a
procedural lapse of counsel is a strong and compelling reason to warrant suspension of
the Rules.

104[10]

A healthy respect for petitioners rights should caution courts against motu

proprio dismissals of appeals, especially in criminal cases where the liberty of the
accused is at stake. The rules allowing motu proprio dismissals of appeals merely confer
a power and do not impose a duty; and the same are not mandatory but merely
directory which thus require a great deal of circumspection, considering all the attendant
circumstances.

105[11]

Courts are not exactly impotent to enforce their orders, including

those requiring the filing of appellants brief. This is precisely the raison detre for the
courts inherent contempt power.

106[12]

Motu proprio dismissals of appeals are thus not

always called for. Although the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural, right, it is an
essential part of the judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of this prerogative, but instead, afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities.

107[13]

More so must this be in criminal cases where, as here, the appellant is

an indigent who could ill-afford the services of a counsel de parte.

103

[9]

104

[10]

105

[11]

106

[12]

G.R. No. 109832, February 7, 1995, 241 SCRA 176.

Alonzo v. Villamor, et al., 16 Phil. 315 (1910).
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41680, October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 144.
Paredes-Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120654, September 11, 1996, 261 SCRA

693.
107

[13]

Moslares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129744, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 440.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolutions

of the CA are SET ASIDE. The appellate court is ordered to REINSTATE petitioner's
appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 28277, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jaime Binong
M. De Guzman, and to accept his appellants brief thereon.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137672. May 31, 2000]

PAZ REYES AGUAM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

BONIFACIO RONSAYRO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the
Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's appeal because petitioner's motion for
extension to file appellant's brief was filed late by nine (9) days due to counsel's
mistake in counting the period for filing the same. The court also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
108[1]

109[2]

The facts are as follows:

On January 8, 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, in an action for sum of
money and damages arising from malicious mischief filed by petitioner Paz
Reyes Aguam against respondent Bonifacio Ronsayro, rendered decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
110[3]

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in

favor of the defendant dismissing the complaint and ordering the
plaintiff to pay the defendant the following:
a) P595,500.00 representing the share of the defendant from the lot
plaintiff sold, plus legal interest until the amount is paid from date of
demand;
b) The amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and,
In CA-G. R. CV No. 60077, promulgated on December 11, 1998, Cosico, J., ponente, Luna and
Magtolis, JJ., concurring, Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 33-34.
109[2]
Resolution, promulgated on February 23, 1999; Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, p. 26.
110[3]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 65605.
108[1]

d) Cost of suit."

111[4]

In due time, petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

112[5]

On September 25, 1998, the Court Appeals, through the Clerk of Court, issued a
notice addressed to Atty. Carlos G. Nery, Jr., petitioner's counsel, requiring her as
plaintiff-appellant to file within forty-five (45) days from receipt an appellant's
brief, furnishing a copy of the notice to Atty. Eladio P. Samson, respondent's
counsel.
113[6]

The notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner's counsel, Atty. Carlos G.
Nery at the latter's address of record, 26 Masbate St., West Ave., 1100 Quezon
City. The notice was received by an office clerk of a realty firm with which Atty.
Nery was sharing office. She was not an employee of petitioner's counsel and
she did not note down the date of receipt.
114[7]

115[8]

On November 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file appellant's brief, asking for ninety (90) days from the
expiry date within which to do so.
116[9]

On December 11, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for extension
and accordingly dismissed the appeal for failure of the appellant to file brief within
the reglementary period.
117[10]

On December 14, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals her appellant's
brief. On December 22, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the denial and to admit appellant's brief.
118[11]

119[12]

On January 21, 1999, respondent filed an opposition to the motion for

reconsideration.
120[13]

On February 23, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
121[14]

Hence, this appeal.

122[15]

The issue raised is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal because of the late filing of
appellant's brief due to counsel's mistake in the counting of the reglementary
period from notice to file appellant's brief.
Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure to file
appellant's brief on time.
However, the dismissal is directory, not mandatory.
123[16]

124

Petition, pp. 2-3, Rollo, pp. 6-7.

Docketed as CA-G. R. CV No. 60077.
113[6]
Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, p. 16.
114[7]
Ibid.
115[8]
Petition, pp. 5-6, Rollo, pp. 9-10.
116[9]
Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, p. 16.
117[10]
Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 17-18.
118[11]
Petition, p. 4, Rollo, p. 8.
119[12]
Petition, Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 19-22.
120[13]
Petition, Annex "E", Rollo, pp. 23-24.
121[14]
Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, p. 26.
122[15]
Filed on April 12, 1999, Petition, Rollo, pp. 5-14. On September 06, 1999, we gave due course to the
petition, Rollo, pp. 42-43.
123[16]
Rule 50, Section 1 (e), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
124[17]
Catindig vs. Court of Appeals, 88 SCRA 675, 680 [1979]; Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 401,
406 [1977].
111[4]

112[5]

It is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the appeal. "The failure of an
appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of
dismissing the appeal automatically."
The court has discretion to dismiss or
not to dismiss an appellants appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a
duty.
The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with
the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in
each case."
Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors
technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to
render or dispense justice.
"A litigation is not a game of technicalities."
"Law
suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts."
Litigations must be
decided on their merits and not on technicality.
Every party litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.
Thus, dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice.
It is a
far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of
justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice
to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
[17]

125[18]

126[19]

127[20]

128[21]

129[22]

130[23]

131[24]

132[25]

133[26]

In the case before us, the notice to file appellant's brief was given to counsel of
petitioner. The rules require the notice to file brief to be given to the party
appellant.
The reason is that after taking an appeal, the party may change
attorney for purposes of the appeal. Hence, the notice must be given to the party
appellant. Thus, there was here a technical violation committed by the clerk of
the appellate court that ought not to prejudice the appellant.
134[27]

Moreover, the notice was sent by registered mail. This is, of course, permitted in
the rules.
However, the mail matter must be received by the addressee or his
duly authorized representative Service of papers which includes every written
notice on a person who was not a clerk, employee or one in charge of the
attorneys office, is invalid.
Here, the notice was received by an employee of a
135[28]

136[29]

Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534, 544 [1981], citing Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275
[1936].
126[19]
Catindig vs. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17; Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Milling Co.,
Inc., 26 SCRA 712, 715 [1969]; Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 368, 374 [1969].
127[20]
Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Milling Co., Inc., supra; Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, supra;
Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 543; Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120 [1990];
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 1999 ed., 570.
128[21]
Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 322 [1910]; Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 137, 141 [1970];
Canlas vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 160, 180 [1988].
129[22]
Alonso vs. Villamor, supra; Canlas vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 173.
130[23]
Alonso vs. Villamor, supra; American Express International, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167
SCRA 209, 221 [1988]; Canlas vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
131[24]
Tan Boon Bee & Co., Inc. vs. Judge Jarencio, 163 SCRA 205, 213 [1988] citing de las Alas vs. Court
of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200, 216 [1978]; Nerves vs. Civil Service Commission, 276 SCRA 610, 617 [1997].
132[25]
Tan Boon Bee & Co., Inc. vs. Judge Jarencio, supra, citing Heirs of Ceferino Morales vs. Court of
Appeals, 67 SCRA 304, 310 [1975]; A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590, 594 [1980].
133[26]
American Home Insurance Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 109 SCRA 180 [1981] concurring opinion, citing
Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 20; Catindig vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 681, Note 17;
Nerves vs. Civil Service Commission, supra, Note 24.
134[27]
See Rule 44, Sections 4, 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
135[28]
Rule 13, Sec. 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
136[29]
Rule 13, Sections 2, 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; Tuazon vs. Molina, 103 SCRA 365,
368 [1981].
125[18]

realty firm with which the counsel was sharing office. She was not an employee
of petitioner's counsel. He was a solo practitioner.
In the higher interest of justice, considering that the delay in filing a motion for
extension to file appellant's brief was only for nine (9) days, and normally, the
Court of Appeals would routinely grant such extension, and the appellant's brief
was actually filed within the period sought, the better course of action for the
Court of Appeals was to admit appellant's brief.
Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be overlooked when
they arose from an honest mistake, when they have not prejudiced the adverse
party.
The Court can overlook the late filing of the motion for extension, if strict
compliance with the rules would mean sacrificing justice to technicality.
137[30]

138[31]

Consequently, we find that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file appellants brief, and in
dismissing the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal. The Court remands the case to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, and disposition of the appeal on its
merits.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129090. April 30, 2003]

RICARDO B. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and THE HEIRS OF CONSOLACION C. DE GUZMAN,
respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari of the resolution

137[30]
138[31]

139[1]

139[1]

of the Court of Appeals

Case and Hantz vs. Jugo, 77 Phil. 517, 522 [1946]; Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 19.
Cf. Yong Chan Kim vs. People, 193 SCRA 344 [1991].
Penned by Associate Justice Jaime Lantin and concurred in by Associate Justices Corona Ibay-Somera

denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file appellants brief and,
ultimately, dismissing petitioners appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXIV, in Civil Case No. 91-57572. Petitioner s motion
for reconsideration of the assailed resolution was denied on March 31, 1997.
140[2]

141[3]

The undisputed facts follow.

Dr. Consolacion C. de Guzman, who died while this case was pending
appeal before this Court and is now substituted by respondent heirs,
filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner Dr. Ricardo B. Gonzales based on five
causes of action. The trial court enumerated the same as follows:
142[4]

The first cause consists in the act of the defendant in issuing and
implementing Hospital Order No. 4, Series of 1990, which allegedly removed
the defendant (sic) from a position as Head of the Department of Obstetrics &
Gynecology in the Fabella Hospital which was issued unwarrantedly,
maliciously and in wanton disregard of plaintiffs constitutional rights, and is a
forced demotion in rank, function and status, and subjected plaintiff to social
humiliation and embarrassment before all doctors, and members of all hospital
staff and employees of Fabella Hospital, and caused plaintiff mental anguish,
anxiety and sleepless nights. The second cause of action is the allegation in the
complaint that the filing by the defendant of the P6 Million libel case against the
plaintiff in the Quezon City Fiscals Office which likewise caused plaintiff to
suffer damages and incur attorneys fees. The third cause of action consists in
the filing by the defendant of the administrative case with the Department of
Health for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. And the fourth cause of action is the filing by the defendant of the
complaint with the Philippine Obstetrics & Gynocology Society for cancellation
of the plaintiffs membership as fellow. And the last cause of action is the filing
by the defendant of the administrative case with the Philippine Regulatory
Commission, to cancel plaintiffs license to practice her profession as a Doctor
of Medicine.143[5]

On April 7, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the deceased
plaintiff. The dispositive portion of the said decision read:
Accordingly, the Court awards to the plaintiff and against the defendant the
amount of P290,000.00 representing attorneys fees and costs of litigation, by
way of actual damages and to compensate plaintiff for the pain, suffering and
mental anguish she underwent by reason of the unwarranted filing of the
administrative cases against her by the defendant, the Court orders defendant
to pay plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000,000 (sic) as moral damages and
likewise orders the defendant to pay the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. All amounts awarded to the plaintiff to bear interest at the legal rate
from the date of this decision up to the time of actual payment.144[6]

Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals. On February

21, 1996, the appellate court sent by registered mail to Atty. Ruben Almadro,
petitioners counsel, a notice requiring him to file the appellants brief within 45
days from receipt thereof. According to the postmasters certification, the notice
was received on February 26, 1996 by a certain Vicente Mendoza at the
residence of Atty. Almadro. The petitioner therefore had 45 days from February
26, 1996 or up to April 11, 1996 to file the appellants brief.
and Salvador Valdez of the 8th Division; Rollo, pp. 57-58.
140[2]

Penned by Judge Sergio D. Mabunay, Rollo, pp. 61-75.

141[3]

Rollo, p. 60.

Respondents Adelaida de Guzman-Santos, Florentina de Guzman-Frogoso, Ricardo Cruz de Guzman,

and Zenaida de Guzman-Caluag; Rollo, pp. 250-251.
142[4]

143[5]

Rollo, pp. 123-124.

144[6]

Id., pp. 74-75.

Three months after the expiration of the 45-day period, on July 12, 1996,
Atty. Almadro filed a motion for extension of time to file the appellants brief. He
alleged that it was only on July 11, 1996, while in the process of transferring his
case records and files from his old office to a new one, that he found the
unopened letter-envelope sent by the appellate court requiring him to file the
appellants brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice. Atty. Almadro surmised
that the letter-envelope must have been received by a former househelp who
failed to bring it to his attention. He also alleged that there was no indication by
his househelp of the exact date of receipt of the said letter. He thus prayed that
he be given another period of 30 days from July 12, 1996 or until August 11,
1996 within which to file the appellants brief.
On July 23, 1996, Dr. de Guzman moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the petitioners motion for extension of time for filing the brief was
filed after the lapse of the original period.
On August 12, 1996, Atty. Almadro filed a manifestation stating that, since
August 11, 1996 was a Sunday, he filed thru registered mail two copies of the
appellants brief on August 10, 1996. He also manifested that he was filing seven
other copies of the appellants brief to complete a total of nine copies, together
with the affidavit of service to counsel for then respondent Dr. de Guzman.
On October 10, 1996, respondent Dr. de Guzman filed another motion
reiterating her previous motions to dismiss, to expunge the appeal from the
records and for the issuance of an entry of judgment.
On December 13, 1996, the appellate court issued a resolution, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, motion for time to file appellants brief is hereby DENIED,
for lack of merit, and the appeal is DISMISSED. The appellants brief filed out of
time is ordered expunged from the record of the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.145[7]

In dismissing the appeal, the appellate court held that:

Section 15, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court states that Extension of time for
the filing of briefs will not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause, and
only if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of time sought to be
extended. Defendant-appellant may secure several extensions to file brief
provided each extension is predicated on good and sufficient cause and
application for extension is filed before the time sought to be extended expires
(Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 120-121 cited in Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Volume 2, 1979 Edition, p. 489). When defendantappellant filed a motion for time to file appellants brief on July 12, 1996, 92
days had elapsed since the last day to file appellants brief. Hence, this motion
cannot be allowed.
Defendant-appellants reason for not filing his motion for extension of time
to file appellants brief seasonably is flimsy and puerile, to say the least. For
one, counsel for defendant-appellant alleged in his motion that he discovered
that unopened letter envelope containing the notice, only on July 11, 1996,
while he was in the process of transferring his various case records and files
from his present office/residence to a new office. Up to this very day, however,
this Court has not received any notice of change of address from counsel.
Counsel further contends that the letter envelope must have been received by
one of his previous househelps who must have inadvertently failed to bring said
mail matter to his attention. The court has no way of knowing whether this is
true as counsel himself was merely speculating. Even granting this to be true,
this negligence is simply inexcusable. It is the duty of counsel to adopt and
strictly maintain a system that efficiently takes into account all court notices sent
145[7]

Rollo, p. 58.

to him and not simply allow a househelp, without counsels diligent supervision,
to receive important court notices.146[8]

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court based
on the following assignments of error:
I
THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO FILE HIS APPELLANTS BRIEF WITHIN
THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND/OR TO SEEK
AN EXTENSION WITHIN SAID PERIOD WAS DUE TO EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT;
II
THE SETTLED RULE IS THAT LITIGATIONS SHOULD, AS MUCH AS
POSSIBLE, BE DECIDED ON THEIR MERITS AND NOT ON
TECHNICALITIES; and
III
RULES OF PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A VERY RIGID,
TECHNICAL SENSE ESPECIALLY WHERE, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR, THE
APPEAL IS VERY MERITORIOUS.147[9]

The petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction to the appellate court for denying his appeal purely on technical
grounds. He argues that the failure of his counsel to get hold of the letter-notice
of the appellate court for the filing of the brief was due to excusable neglect.
Petitioner likewise contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion
in not allowing the extension sought by the petitioner and in not admitting the
appellants brief inspite of the fact that the respondent heirs substantial rights will
not be violated by a contrary ruling. Litigations, according to the petitioner, should
as much as possible be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. Rules
of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical manner as they
are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice.
The crucial issue for consideration is whether the negligence of petitioner s
counsel was inexcusable, thus rendering his plea for equity unmeritorious.
Section 12, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Sec. 12. Extension of time for filing briefs. Extension of time for the filing of
briefs will not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause, and only if the
motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be
extended. (underscoring supplied)

Clearly, petitioners counsel was negligent in not filing the motion for
extension of time to file the appellants brief within the 45-day period from the
date of receipt of notice as required by Section 7, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Petitioners counsel, however, blames his househelp who
allegedly forgot to give him the said notice or to call his attention to it. Said
counsel allegedly discovered the same only when he was arranging his files after
transferring to his new office.
We hold that an attorney owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt an
efficient and orderly system of receiving and attending promptly to all judicial
notices. He and his client must suffer the consequences of his failure to do so
particularly where such negligence is not excusable as in the case at bar.
A
148[10]

146[8]

Ibid.

147[9]

Rollo, p. 33.

Javier vs. Madamba, Jr., 174 SCRA 495, 499-500 [1989]; Enriquez vs. Bautista, 79 Phil, 220, 222
[1949].
148[10]

lawyer can adopt an efficient way of handling court mail matters even if his
residence also serves as his office. If petitioners counsel was not informed by his
house-help of the notice which eventually got misplaced in his office files, said
counsel has only himself to blame for entrusting the matter to an incompetent or
irresponsible person.
Aside from his failure to adopt an organized and efficient system of managing
his files and court notices, we also note that petitioners counsel, Atty. Almadro,
allowed one year to lapse before he again acted on the appeal of his client. The
trial court rendered the decision against the petitioner on April 7, 1995. Petitioner
must have appealed the same either in June or July of the same year.
Subsequently, the notice to file the appellants brief was received by the
househelp of Atty. Almadro, petitioners counsel, on February 21, 1996. It was
only on July 11, 1996 that Atty. Almadro claims to have discovered the notice.
From the time he must have filed his appeal sometime in June or July of 1995 up
to the time of the alleged discovery on July 11, 1996, Atty. Almadro apparently
never bothered to check why he had not received any notice for the filing of his
clients (appellants) brief.
The legal profession demands of a lawyer that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family and should adopt the norm of
practice expected of men of good intentions. In other words, a lawyer must
always be protective of the interests of his clients as a good father would be
protective of his own family.
Atty. Almadros actuation evidently shows his lack
of interest in protecting and fighting for his clients interests.
149[11]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari of the

resolutions of the Court of Appeals is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
KINGDOM OF BELGIUM,
represented by the Royal
Embassy of Belgium,
Petitioner,
- versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
UNIFIED
FIELD
CORPORATION, MARILYN G.

G.R. No. 164150

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

E. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 201 (Central Professional Books, Inc., 1995) citing PBC vs.
Aruego, CA-G.R. # 28274, June 18, 1965 and Blaza vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 461 (1988).
149[11]

ONG, VICTORIA O. ANG,

EDNA C. ALFUERTE, MARK
Promulgated:
DENNIS O. ANG and ALVIN O.
ANG,
Respondents.
April 14, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65150[1] of the Rules of
Court assailing the (1) Resolution151[2] dated 27 November 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77701 granting the Motion for
Reconsideration filed in said case by herein respondent Unified Field
Corporation (UFC), thus, allowing the latter to file its appellants brief; and
(2) Resolution152[3] dated 5 May 2004 of the appellate court in the same case
denying reconsideration of its 27 November 2003 Resolution sought by
herein petitioner Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, represented by
the Royal Embassy of Belgium.153[4]
The facts of the case are as follows:
A Complaint154[5] for specific performance of contract with damages
was filed by petitioner against respondents UFC, Marilyn G. Ong, Victoria
O. Ang, Edna C. Alfuerte, Mark Dennis O. Ang, and Alvin O. Ang, with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-976.
In its Complaint, petitioner avers that it entered into a Contract of
Lease dated 30 July 1997 with respondent UFC, represented by its President
150

151[2]
152[3]
153[4]
154[5]

Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices

Mario L. Guarina III and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-29.
Rollo, p. 25.
Id. at 27-29.
Through its Ambassador to the Philippines, His Excellency, R. Schellinck.
Rollo, p. 30.
[1]

and co-respondent, Marilyn G. Ong.

By virtue of the said contract,

petitioner leased from UFC Units B and D, with a gross area of 377
square meters, more or less, and six parking lots, at the Chatham House
Condominium, located at the corner of Valero and Herrera Streets, Salcedo
Village, Makati City (leased premises), for a maximum term of four (4)
years beginning 1 October 1997.

For the use of the leased premises,

petitioner agreed to pay the sum of P5,430,240.00, as rentals for the first two
years, from 1 October 1997 to 30 September 1999, payable in full upon the
official turn-over of the leased premises; and the sum of P678,780.00, as
security deposit, for a total amount of P6,109,020.00.155[6] The Contract
provided for the pre-termination option that may be exercised by the
lessee.156[7]
On or about 23 June 2000, three months prior to the expiration of the
third year of the lease, petitioner, through counsel, served by personal
service upon respondent UFC, through its President and co-respondent,
Marilyn G. Ong, a letter dated 23 June 2000157[8] informing the corporation
that petitioner was pre-terminating the Lease Contract effective 31 July
2000. Considering that under the Contract of Lease, it could pre-terminate
the lease after the expiry of the second-year term without having to pay pretermination penalties, petitioner also requested the return or delivery of the
total sum of P1,093,600.00, representing its unused two months advance
155[6]
156

157[8]

Id. at 31-32.
[7]
22. PRETERMINATION CLAUSE. Should the LESSEE, during the term of the lease
be disinterested to continue the lease for no reason whatsoever, the LESSEE shall pay the
LESSOR according to the schedule heretofore as enumerated, and the LESSOR shall thereafter
refund all unused advance rental payments to the LESSEE, if so required under this lease
agreement, within FORTY FIVE (45) days following receipt of full pre-termination payment.
Total sum due LESSOR in the event of pre-termination:

pre-termination before end of first year of lease, or prior to 01 October 1998: SIX
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS
(P678,780.00), Philippine Currency, including any and all unused advance rental
payments applicable for the first year of the lease. The unused advanced rental payments
applicable for the second year of the lease shall be refunded to the LESSEE within
FORTY FIVE (45) days following receipt of full pre-termination payment;

pre-termination after first year of lease and before end of second year of lease, or after 01
October 1998 and before 30 September 1999: SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS ONLY (P678,780.00) Philippine
currency;

pre-termination after second year of lease and before end of lease period, or after 30
September 1999 and before 30 September 2001: (Please refer to paragraph 1 of this
contract of lease). (Rollo, 43-43-A.)
Records, p. 66.

rentals for August and September 2000, in the sum of P414,820.00, and the
security deposit in the sum of P678,780.00, within forty-five days after the
pre-termination of the lease contract, or on 15 September 2000.
On 31 July 2000, petitioner vacated and surrendered the leased
premises to respondent UFC through the latters President and corespondent Marilyn G. Ong free of any outstanding bills for water,
electricity, telephone and other utility charges or damages to said leased
premises. However, respondents UFC and Marilyn G. Ong, in her capacity
as UFC President, totally ignored the demands made by petitioner in its
letter of 23 June 2000 and, consequently, failed to return or deliver the
P1,093,600.00 sought by petitioner.
Petitioner claims that respondent UFC plainly committed fraud in the
performance of its clear duty under paragraph 22 of the Contract of Lease by
not returning petitioners unused two months advance rentals and security
deposit despite repeated demands therefor.

Hence, the individual

respondents as directors of respondent UFC should be deemed to have

willfully and knowingly assented to a patently unlawful act or are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith, as the case may be, in directing the affairs of
respondent UFC. Under Section 31 of the Corporation Code 158[9] of the
Philippines, the respondent directors must be jointly and severally held
liable together with respondent UFC.
Petitioner thus prayed to the RTC:
x x x that, after due notice and trial, to render a judgment in favor
of [herein petitioner} and against [herein respondents] by ordering
[respondents] jointly and severally to pay [petitioner] the following sums
of money, to wit:
a)
158

the principal amount of P1,093,600.00, representing the

return or delivery of the unused two (2) months rentals and

Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers.- Directors or trustees who

willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any
personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as directors, or trustees shall be liable
jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons.
[9]

the security deposit, plus interest at the rate of twelve per

centum (12%) per annum from 15 September 2000 until the
principal amount due is fully paid, plus six per centum
(6%) per annum on the aforesaid interest due from the
filing of this complaint until the principal amount is fully
paid;
b)

the sum of P400,000.00, as and for actual damages by way

of attorneys fees and litigation expenses;

c)

the sum of P100,000.00, as and for moral damages;

d)

the sum of P100,000.00, as and for exemplary damages;

e)

the costs of suit.159[10]

Respondents filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim on 2

August 2001.160[11]

Thereafter, pre-trial was set.

However, respondents

failed to appear and, worse, failed to file their pre-trial brief, as required by
the Rules of Court. They were therefore declared to have waived their right
to adduce evidence on their behalf.

Respondents did not seek for a

reconsideration of the aforesaid Order; hence, petitioner was allowed to

present its evidence ex-parte on 19 June 2002 and 19 August 2002.
On 8 November 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the [herein
petitioner] has established its claim against the [herein respondents].
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[petitioner] and against the [respondents], ordering the latter, jointly and
severally, to pay [petitioner]:

159

[10]

160[11]

Id. at 38.

1.

the principal amount of Php1,093,600.00 representing two

(2) months rentals and security deposit, plus interest of
12% per annum from September 15, 2000, until the
principal amount due is fully paid, plus 6% per annum on
the interest due from the filing of this complaint until the
principal amount is fully paid;

2.

the sum of Php400,000.00, as and by way of attorneys fees

and litigation expenses;

3.

the sum of Php100,000.00, as moral damages;

Records, pp. 9-10.

4.

the sum of Php100,000.00, as exemplary damages; and

5.

costs of suit.161[12]

Respondents elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals.

They received a Notice to File Brief162[13] from the Court of Appeals.
Respondents were unable to comply with this directive. Petitioner thus filed
on 17 September 2003 with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal of the respondents on the ground that respondents counsel received
the Notice to File Brief on 16 July 2003 as shown by the Registry Return
Receipt and had forty-five (45) days or until 1 September 2003 to file their
appellants brief, but failed to do so. No opposition to the said Motion to
Dismiss Appeal was filed by respondents. Neither did they file a motion for
extension of time to file appellants brief.
On 30 September 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
which reads:
For failure of the [herein respondents] to file their brief within the
reglementary period, this appeal is hereby considered ABANDONED and
accordingly DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended.163[14]

On

27

October

2003,

respondents

filed

Motion

for

Reconsideration164[15] of the foregoing Resolution stating that their failure to

file their appellants brief was due to their counsels inadvertence, attaching
their brief thereto and praying for its admission. Respondents counsel had
used his residence as his mailing address and the domestic helper might have
misplaced the notice to file brief; hence, respondents counsel failed to
monitor the running of the reglementary period for the filing of the
appellants brief.

161[12]
162[13]
163[14]
164[15]

Rollo, p. 52.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 64.

On 27 November 2003, the Court of Appeals resolved respondents

Motion for Reconsideration as follows:
For consideration is [herein respondents] Motion for
Reconsideration of this Courts resolution dated September 30, 2003
dismissing their appeal for failure to file the [appellants] brief within the
reglementary period. [Respondents] contend that their failure to file the
same was due to inadvertence and not for the purpose of delay.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion to be meritorious and in the
interest of substantial justice, this Court resolves to GRANT the motion.
Accordingly, this Courts resolution dated September 30, 2003 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered allowing the
filing of the [appellants] brief. The appellants brief attached to the
motion for reconsideration is ADMITTED.
[Herein petitioner] may file its appellees brief within the period
prescribed by the rules upon receipt hereof.165[16]

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted

Resolution which the Court of Appeals denied in another Resolution dated 5
May 2004. According to the appellate court:
The failure of the [herein respondents] to file their brief within the
prescribed period does not have the effect of automatically dismissing the
appeal. The Court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the
appeal, fully aware of its primary duty to render or dispense justice, if
possible, with dispatch. However, every party must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the game of technicalities. If a stringent application of the rules
would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the
former must yield to the latter. Courts in real justice have always been
guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their
merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioners] motion
for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.166[17]

Hence, the present Petition raising the sole issue:

165[16]
166[17]

Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 28-29.

Whether or not Public Respondent acted with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the
resolutions of November 27, 2003 and May 5, 2004.167[18]

In brief, petitioner submits that the inadvertence of respondents

counsel to timely file their appellants brief is not a persuasive reason or a
compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure.168[19]
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the substantive merit of
their appeal to the Court of Appeals outweigh the procedural infirmity they
committed by their omission to file appellants brief within the prescribed
period, and that the decision of the RTC has no basis in fact and law.
The pertinent rules of procedure can be found in Section 7, Rule 44,
and Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which read:
Procedure in the Court of Appeals
Rule 44
Ordinary Appealed Cases
Section 7. Appellants brief.- It shall be the duty of the appellant to
file with the court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice
of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the
record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or
printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the
appellee.
RULE 50
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may
be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(e)
Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required
number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by
these Rules.

167[18]
168[19]

Id. at 180.
Id.

The issue in this case is not a novel one. It has already been the
subject of cases previously decided by this Court.
It is a good time to revisit the cases we have decided, delving on the
issue of non-filing of appellants brief to the Court of Appeals and its
consequence.
Early in Pongasi v. Court of Appeals,169[20] involving the failure to file
the appellants brief within the prescribed period, this Court ruled:
[P]etitioners counsel filed a timely motion for special extension of time
on February 19, 1975, two days before the expiration date on February 21,
1975, and that petitioners counsel filed defendants- appellants brief on
March 3, 1975, well within the 15 days special extension prayed for by
him in his motion.
xxxx
This litigation is one for partition and the conflicting assertions of
the parties herein over property rights deserve to be passed upon by the
appellate court if only to assure itself that the properties in question are
awarded to those who rightfully deserve them.

Gregorio v. Court of Appeals170[21] followed suit as this Court again

gave due course to the appeal despite the filing of the appellants brief
beyond the reglementary period, considering the subject matter of the
appeal:
What is before the court is a question of forgery in the supposed
conveyance of a 57,491-square meter land located in the residential area of
a 57,491-square meter land located in the residential area of Las Pias,
Rizal. Petitioner claims that the sale of the land to the Spouses Corpuz
Parami and Luciana Parami is an absolute falsity. He stubbornly asserts
that he never sold the land to them. Such charges are doubtless not devoid
of significance. Respondent Appellate Court, therefore, grievously erred
in dismissing the appeal.

This Court expounded on its decision thus:

169[20]
170[21]

163 Phil. 638, 643-644 (1976).

164 Phil. 129, 136 (1976).

The expiration of the time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the
notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not a jurisdictional
matter and may be waived by the parties. It is sufficient ground for
extending the time where the delay in filing the brief was caused in part by
a misunderstanding of counsel, and in part by appellants inability,
because of his poverty, to obtain the money necessary to pay the expenses
of the appeal. Similarly, where the question raised is of sufficient
importance to require an examination of the record, the late filing of the
brief may be forgone. This is especially true, like in the case before Us,
where there is no showing or assertion whatsoever of any intent to delay
on the part of the appellant. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure
are used only to help secure not override substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.

Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 171[22] took its

bearings from the above case, thus:
[t]he need x x x to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of
petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and
sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and
fourth motions for extension x x x and constituted an exceptional
circumstance which impressed petitioners appeal with public interest.
Thus, petitioners appeal was given due course despite the late filing of its
appellants brief.
Similarly, the case at bar is impressed with public interest. If
petitioners appeal is denied due course, a government institution could
lose a great deal of money over a mere technicality.

Though not deviating from the basic principle set in the above cases
earlier mentioned, Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals172[23] became more succinct and this Court emphasized that sufficient
cause must exist for the relaxation of procedural rules:
As consistently reiterated, the power conferred upon the Court of
Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and not merely ministerial.
With that affirmation comes the caution that such discretion must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
In the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb the conclusions of
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof that any
inadvertence was caused by the Post Office. Moreover, no conclusive
proof could be shown that a motion for extension was indeed filed at any

171
172[23]

411 Phil. 121, 135-136 (2001).

432 Phil. 733, 741-742 (2002).
[22]

time. All these create a doubt that petitioners counsel has been candid in
his dealings with the courts. Needless to stress, a lawyer is bound by
ethical principles in the conduct of cases before the courts at all times.
As a last recourse, petitioner contends that the interest of
substantial justice would be served by giving due course to the appeal.
However, we must state that the liberality with which we exercise our
equity jurisdiction is always anchored on the basic consideration that the
same must be warranted by the circumstances obtaining in each case.
Having found petitioners explanation less than worthy of credence, and
without evidentiary support, we are constrained to adhere strictly to the
procedural rules on the timeliness of submission before the court.

Bago v. People173[24] followed the lead of Philippine Merchant, and

ruled as follows:
On March 9, 1998, petitioners counsel filed a manifestation
stating the Appellants Brief was filed seasonably by his secretary with the
Court of Appeals. However, the original of the same was inadvertently
filed with the copies intended for the Brief Section because there were
Christmas parties going on. Petitioners counsel likewise admitted that the
Office of the Solicitor General had just been furnished with a copy of the
Appellants Brief due to the failure of her secretary to send it on
December 22, 1997.
xxxx
[I]t is axiomatic that Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law,
have the force and effect of law. More importantly, rules prescribing the
time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken,
are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with
such rules is mandatory and imperative. Only strong considerations of
equity, which are wanting in this case, will lead us to allow an exception to
the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice.
Consequently, the instant petition must perforce be denied.
Petitioner has failed to show compelling reasons to relax the rules in his
favor. His failure to comply strictly with the procedural requirements of
the Rules of Court and observe the reglementary periods prescribed
therein will not warrant the application of equity and the liberal
construction of the Rules.

Of the same tenor is De la Cruz v. Ramiscal,174[25] where we again

explained at length that:
Petitioners justification that their former counsel belatedly
transmitted said order to them only on 20 March 1998 is not a good reason
173[24]
174[25]

443 Phil. 503, 505-506 (2003).

G.R. No. 137882, 4 February 2005, 450 SCRA 456-457.

for departing from the established rule. It was the responsibility of

petitioners and their counsel to devise a system for the receipt of mail
intended for them. Rules on procedure cannot be made to depend on the
singular convenience of a party.

Asian Spirit Airlines (Airline Employees Cooperative) v. Bautista 175[26]

stayed on course with the more recent jurisprudence by refusing to allow the
late filing of the appellants brief on the ground of the mistake or
inadvertence of the counsels secretary:
Blaming its counsels unidentified secretary for its abject failure to file its
brief is a common practice for negligent lawyers to cover up for their own
negligence, incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude. Such excuse is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to
observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. It
bears stressing that it is the duty of counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a
system that insures that all pleadings should be filed and duly served
within the period therefor and, if he fails to do so, the negligence of his
secretary or clerk to file such pleading is imputable to the said counsel.

In Uy v. Baloja, 176[27] counsel of therein petitioner attributed his failure

to file the appellants brief on time to his inability to locate the transcript of
stenographic notes in the case. Unmoved, this Court dismissed the appeal
and pronounced:
Truly, petitioners conduct in the premises can never be a case of
excusable neglect. Quite the contrary, it smacks of a lack of honest
concern on his part and a blatant disregard of the lawful directive of the
appellate court. Giving in to petitioners maneuverings is tantamount to
putting premium on a litigants naked indolence and imparting imprimatur
to a scheme of prolonging litigation.

This Court reiterated its stance on the strict adherence to the rules of
procedure when in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Goimco, Sr., 177[28] it
rejected therein petitioners excuse for the late filing of his appellants brief:
We note that petitioners previous counsel is a large law firm with several
lawyers in its roster. Yet it took said counsel four (4) months, from the
expiration of the reglementary period, within which to file the appellants
brief. It is settled that failure to file brief for a client constitutes
175
176[27]
177

G.R. No. 164668, 14 February 2005, 451 SCRA 294, 300.

G.R. No. 134155, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 55, 60-61.
[28]
G.R. No. 135507, 29 November 2005, 476 SCRA 361, 367.
[26]

inexcusable negligence. Petitioners flimsy excuse that its counsels logbook containing the schedules for the filing of pleadings and hearings was
lost is, to say the least, most unpersuasive. Said counsel should have
examined consistently the records of its cases to find out what appropriate
actions have to be taken thereon. The notice to file the appellants brief
was in the records of the instant cases all along. Had counsel been
efficient in the handling of its cases, the required appellants brief could
have been filed on time. Its failure to do so is an inexcusable negligence.

In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,178[29] the Court likewise refused to relax its

procedural rules:
Petitioner does not deny the procedural infraction on his part, but
he asks for the relaxation of the rules. Granting his plea, however, would
be to fault the appellate court for acting in faithful compliance with the
rules of procedure which the court has been mandated to observe.
The Rules of Court are designed for the proper and prompt
disposition of cases before the appellate court. We cannot just turn a blind
eye and tolerate its contravention. Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court provides that it shall be the duty of the appellant to file his brief
within 45 days from receipt of notice. His failure to comply with this
mandate is a ground for the dismissal of his appeal as provided under
Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner actually had 135
days to prepare his brief which is a considerable period of time.
In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules
of procedure, so that the ends of justice may be better served. However,
such liberality may not be invoked if it would result in the wanton
disregard of the rules, and cause needless delay. Save for the most
persuasive of reason, strict compliance with the rules is enjoined to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Negligence of petitioners
counsel and his own failure to enter the appearance of his collaborating
counsel are, to our mind, unacceptable reasons for relaxing the observance
of the period set for filing briefs.

The same principle was highlighted in Moneytrend Lending v. Court

of Appeals,179[30] where we again repeated that the general rule is that failure
to file the appellants brief within the prescribed period would result in the
dismissal of the appeal, and any exemption from the rule must be for the
most compelling reasons and the delay must be for a reasonable period:
It may be that mere lapse of the period to file an appellants brief
does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal and loss of

178[29]
179[30]

G.R. No. 156894, 2 December 2005, 476 SCRA 581, 585-586.

G.R. No. 165580, 20 February 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 713-714.

jurisdiction by the appellate court. It ought to be stressed, however, the

relaxation of the rules on pleadings and practice to relieve a party-litigant
of an injustice must be for most persuasive reasons. And in case of delay,
the lapse must be for a reasonable period.

In Delos Santos v. Elizalde,180[31] this Court reminded litigants of their

responsibility to monitor the status of their case and the inexcusability of the
inability to file appellants brief on account of non-monitoring:
Petitioners failure to apprise themselves of the status of their case
during its pendency before the CA is inexcusable. Moreover, their former
counsels failure or neglect to file the required appellants brief shall bind
them.

Then in Redena v. Court of Appeals,181[32] we repeated that negligence

of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellants brief within
the reglementary period, and explained at length that:
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he
will suffer deprivation of property without due process of law on account
of the gross negligence of his previous counsel. To him, the negligence of
his former counsel was so gross that it practically resulted to fraud because
he was allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had
prepared and filed his appellants brief. He thus prays the Court reverse
the CA and remand the main case to the court of origin for new trial.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of
counsels negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to present his
case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in
outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the
interests of justice so require. None of these exceptions obtains here.
For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short
of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown. Here,
petitioners counsel failed to file the appellants brief. While this omission
can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross
negligence to justify the annulment of the proceeding below.

In Natonton v. Magaway,182[33] this Court deemed it proper to

underscore once more that the dismissal of an appeal for the late filing of the
appellants brief is discretionary upon the court, depending on the
circumstances surrounding the same:
180[31]
181[32]
182[33]

G.R. No. 141810 & 141812, 2 February 2007, 514 SCRA 14, 34.
G.R. No. 146611, 6 February 2007. 514 SCRA 389, 402.
G.R. No. 147011, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 199, 203-204.

In Carco Motor Sales v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-44609,

August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 526), this Court held:
As held by the Court in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), (T)he expiration of the
time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of
appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not a
jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties.
Even after the expiration of the time fixed for the filing
of the brief, the reviewing court may grant an extension
of time, at least where no motion to dismiss has been
made. Late filing or service of briefs may be excused
where no material injury has been suffered by the
appellee be reason of the delay or where there is no
contention that the appellees cause was prejudiced.
Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for
failure to file appellants brief on time. However, the dismissal is
directory, not mandatory. It is not the ministerial duty of the court to
dismiss the appeal. The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the
time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal
automatically. The court has discretion to dismiss an appellants appeal.
It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The discretion must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case. (Emphases
supplied.)

It is thus daylight clear from all these cases that:

(1)

The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an

appeal when no appellants brief is filed within the reglementary period

prescribed by the rules;
(2)

The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an

appeal is discretionary and directory and not ministerial or mandatory;

(3)

The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the

reglementary period does not have the effect of causing the automatic
dismissal of the appeal;
(4)

In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still

allow the appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the courts leniency it
is imperative that:

(a)
liberality;

the circumstances obtaining warrant the courts

(b) that strong considerations of equity justify an

exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial
justice;
(c) no material injury has been suffered by the
appellee by the delay;
(d) there is no contention that the appellees cause was
prejudiced;
(e)

at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.

(5)

In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and

(6)

Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate

excuse as to call for the appellate courts indulgence except:

(a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law;
(b) when application of the rule will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or
(c)

where the interests of justice so require.

In this case, the Court cannot say that the issues being raised by
respondents are of such importance that would justify the appellate court to
exempt them from the general rule and give due course to their appeal
despite the late filing of their appellants brief.

It is starkly clear that

respondents do not deny that they owe petitioner the amount it is

demanding, as borne out in the Answer they filed before the RTC, save to
say that petitioner refused and failed to accept the payment thereof.
Respondents Answer before the RTC confirms this observation.
Answer reads:

Their

5. [Herein petitioner] has no valid cause of action as against the

[herein respondents] considering that [respondent UFC] has already
prepared the check as early as October 3, 2000 as its payment in the
amount of P1,025,590.00 but the [petitioner] refused and failed to accept
such payment. For reference, we attached herewith copy of the check
voucher and check as Annexes A and B respectively.183[34]

Even the claim of refusal by petitioner to accept the check payment is

contrary to ordinary human character and cannot be given even half a life.
For, why would the petitioner go to this length in collecting the amount due
him after allegedly refusing and failing to accept the respondents payment?
Our attention is riveted to respondents repeated laxity and indolence
as regards this case even when it was still pending before the RTC. As
shown by the records and contained in the RTC Order dated 22 April 2002:
When called for pre-trial, there was no appearance on the part of
the [herein respondents]. Records show that this is the 4 th time this case is
set for pre-trial. In fact, up to the present time despite the requirements of
the Rules of Court the [respondents] have failed to file their Pre-trial Brief.
When called for the third time at 10:00 a.m., there was still no appearance
on the part of the [respondents], prompting the [herein petitioner] thru
counsel to pray for an Order of default.
Premises considered, and as prayed for, the [respondents] are now
declared to have waived their right to adduce evidence on Pre-trial, and
the [petitioner] may present evidence ex-parte on May 24, 2002, at 2:00
p.m.184[35]

Respondents did not file any motion to set aside the above order.
Respondents evidently continued with their lack of care even when
they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals as shown by their not having
filed an appellants brief under the reglementary period. The purported
inadvertence of their counsel cannot justify a relaxation of the rules. It is the
counsels responsibility to see to it that he has established an efficient system
to monitor the receipt of important notices and orders from the courts.
While the omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not

183[34]
184[35]

Id. at 46.
Rollo, p. 49.

amount to gross negligence to call for the exception to the oft-repeated rule
that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Respondents are, thus, bound
by their counsels negligence.
Finally, it appears that respondents finally attached their Brief only
in their Motion for Reconsideration filed on 27 October 2003 in the Court of
Appeals seeking a reconsideration of the appellate courts Resolution of 30
September 2003, dismissing their appeal. The delay in the filing thereof, 57
days after the expiration of the period to file the same on 1 September
2003,185[36] was, indeed, unreasonably long.
ALL TOLD, the Court finds no sufficient and compelling reasons to
justify the exercise of the Courts leniency and sound discretion. Under the
facts of the case, the Court is constrained to adhere strictly to the procedural
rules.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated 27 November 2003
and 5 May 2004 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the Resolution
dated 30 September 2003 dismissing the appeal of respondents Unified Field
Corporation, Marilyn G. Ong, Victoria O. Ang, Edna C. Alfuerte, Mark
Dennis O. Ang and Alvin Ang, is REINSTATED.

Costs against

respondents.

SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

185[36]

Rollo, p. 60.

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

NACHURA
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137771. June 6, 2002]

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC., petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO OPPEN, INC.,
respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

In this petition for review, petitioner assails the two resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated July 23, 1998i[1] and February 26, 1999,ii[2] in CAG.R. CV No. 56325, dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground that the
Appellants Brief was (a) filed out of time and (b) without a motion for leave
for its admission.

The following are the factual antecedents.

On May 22, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61,
rendered a decisioniii[3] adverse to petitioner in Civil Cases Nos. 90-3490 and
91-685, upholding the validity of an auction sale over a piece of land and
ordering the issuance of a new Certificate of Title in favor of herein
respondent Oppen.iv[4]
On August 15, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the adverse
decision of the RTC.
On March 26, 1998, petitioner received a Noticev[5] to File Appellants
Brief from the Court of Appeals. Petitioner had 45 days vi[6] or until May 10,
1998 to file its brief. Since May 10 was a Sunday and May 11 was a holiday,
petitioner had until May 12, 1998 to file it.
On May 7, 1998, or five days before its deadline, petitioner allegedly
filed by mail an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellants Brief, praying for an additional period of 60 days or from May
13, 1998 to July 13, 1998 within which to file the brief.
On July 13, 1998, the last day of the extension prayed for, petitioner
filed its appellants brief.
On July 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division)
dismissed the appeal in a resolution,vii[7] for failure to file the appellants
brief within the required period of 45 days from receipt of notice to file the
same. It was further noted by the CA that the appellants brief, received only
on July 13, 1998, was without any accompanying motion for leave to admit
the same.
The CA found that:
Record shows that a notice to file brief dated March 17, 1998
was received by appellant on March 26, 1998. Consequently, the 45day period within which to file appellants brief expired on May 10,
1998.
On July 2, 1998, the Judicial Records Division (Civil Cases
Section) submitted a report stating that no appellants brief has been
filed in this case.
However, the appellants brief was received by this court on July
13, 1998, without any accompanying motion for leave to admit the
same.
The pertinent provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding the filing of appellants brief read as follows:
RULE 44
SECTION 7. Appellants Brief. --- It shall be the duty of the
appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days
from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all evidence, oral
and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies
of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief,

with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the

appellee.
RULE 50
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. --- An appeal
may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required
number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the
time prescribed by these Rules;
For failure of appellant to file its brief within the required period
of forty five (45) days from receipt of the notice to file brief, the
appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.viii[8]
On August 4, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration ix[9] of
the said Resolution. It was alleged therein that a prior Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Extension of Time had been filed. A copy of the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellants Brief was appendedx[10] to
the Motion for Reconsideration. Also attached therein was Registry Receipt
No. 13864xi[11] while Registry Receipt No. 13867xii[12] was noted on the
Motion for Extension. Both registry receipts appeared to be dated May 7,
1998.
Petitioner explained that the reason the brief was not accompanied by a
Motion for Leave to Admit, was because its counsel had assumed that the
CA granted the Motion for Extension and thought that he had until July 13,
1998 to file the brief. It was only on the same day the Motion for
Reconsideration was filed that petitioner found out that the CA did not
receive a copy of the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellants Brief.
Thus, on August 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement, xiii[13] attaching
thereto the following documents:
1. An Affidavitxiv[14] of Hernando B. Dellomas, the person who
mailed the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellants Brief; and
2. A Certificationxv[15] issued by Ms. Matabai Garcia, the receiving
clerk of the Ayala Post Office
On October 14, 1998, the CA issued a Resolution xvi[16] directing the
postmaster of the Manila Central Post Office to inform it within 10 days
whether Registry Receipts Nos. 13864 and 13867 mailed at the Ayala Post
Office on May 7, 1998, addressed to the CA and opposing counsel, were
delivered to and received by the addressees and the dates thereof.
On February 26, 1999xvii[17] the CA issued a Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. It found that, per certification of the postmaster

and contrary to what petitioner insists on, no motion for extension was sent
to the CA and opposing counsel on May 7, 1998. Hence, the CA reiterated
that appellants brief was filed out of time and affirmed its denial of the
appeal. It stated thus:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated July
23, 1998 dismissing the appeal for failure of appellant to file its brief
within the period of forty five (45) days from receipt of the notice to
file brief.
Appellant claims that it filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
extension of time to file appellants brief, which it sent by registered
mail to this Court and to appellees counsel, and that it filed its brief
within the period requested.
Upon learning that its motion for extension of time to file brief
has not been received by this Court, appellant submitted an Affidavit
of Hernando B. Dellomas, Para-Legal of Batocabe and Associates,
alleging that he was the one who deposited a copy of said motion
addressed to the Court of Appeals at the Ayala Post Office in Makati
City on May 7, 1998 and that he was issued Registry Receipt No.
13864, as well as the Certification of Matabai Garcia, receiving clerk
at the Ayala Post Office, stating that Registered Letter No. 13864
posted at Ayala Post Office on May 7, 1998 addressed to the Court of
Appeals, Manila was dispatched on May 7, 1998 under
APO/DSMDC, Bill No. 117, Page No. 1, Line No. 60, Column 2.
An Opposition to the motion for reconsideration was filed by
appellee Ernesto Oppen, Inc. alleging that it has not likewise
received a copy of appellants motion for extension of time to file
appellants brief, so that no such motion was probably filed by
appellant.
In a Resolution dated October 14, 1998, We requested the
Postmaster, Manila Central Post Office, to inform this Court, within
ten (10) days from notice, whether Registered Letter Nos. 13864 and
13867, both mailed at the Ayala Post Office, Makati City on May 7,
1998, addressed to the Court of Appeals, Manila and to Atty. Jaime
V. Padilla, Suite 10, Padilla-Delos Reyes Bldg., 232 Juan Luna St.,
Binondo, Manila, respectively, were delivered and received by the
addressees and the date thereof.
In a letter dated November 5, 1998, Postmaster Renato N.
Endaya, Central Post Office, Manila, informed this Court that per
record of said Office and based on the letter-reply of Mr. Felizardo S.
Leoncio, Acting Postmaster, Ayala Post Office, Makati City dated
November 5, 1998, Registered Letter Nos. 13864 and 13867 were
addressed to Prosecutor Dina P. Teves, City Prosecutors Office, City
Hall-Manila and to Atty. Aristotle Reyes of Public Attorneys Office,
City-Hall, Manila, respectively and not to the Court of Appeals,
Manila and to Atty. Jaime V. Padilla. Attached to said letter is the
letter-reply of Felizardo S. Leoncio, Acting Postmaster, Ayala Post

Office, Makati City, who further stated that registered letter nos.
13864 and 13867 addressed to prosecutor Dina P. Teves and Atty.
Aristotle Reyes were dispatched on May 12, 1998 at DSMDC
enclosed on Registry Bill No. 97, Page 1, Column 1, Lines 23 and
25.
Thus, on the basis of the official records of the Central Post
Office, Manila and Ayala Post office, Makati City, no such motion
for extension of time to file brief was sent by registered mail to this
Court and to appellees counsel.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack
of merit.
xxx
SO ORDERED.xviii[18]
Petitioner now comes to this Court via this petition for review,xix[19]
alleging the following grounds:
(A) DISMISSAL OF APPEAL ON PURELY TECHNICAL
GROUNDS IS USUALLY FROWNED UPON; THE COURT OF
APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED UTMOST LIBERALITY
IN ADMITTING A BRIEF ALREADY FILED; and
(B) APPELLANT ACTUALLY FILED BY REGISTERED MAIL
ON MAY 7, 1998 ITS URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANTS BRIEF; THE
ATTENDANT FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CLEARLY SHOW
THAT SUCH MOTION HAD BEEN DULY FILED.xx[20]
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the CAs dismissal of the
appeal due to the late filing of the appellants brief is proper, in view of the
attendant factual circumstances and in the interest of substantial justice.
Petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure, xxi
[21]
considering that the appellants brief has in fact been received by the
appellate court, and that, according to petitioner, the appeal is meritorious.
Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy
of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination of their
cases on the meritsxxii[22] and of dispensing with technicalities whenever
compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.xxiii
[23]

In the present case, we are faced with the fact that per official records of
the Manila Central Post Office,xxiv[24] no timely motion for extension of time
to file the appellants brief was mailed on the date in question and addressed
to the CA and opposing counsel. A careful trace made of the registry receipts
presented by petitioner as the ones issued to it reveals that these receipts
correspond to documents sent on a different date and addressed to different
people. This is consistent with the fact that per official records of the Court
of Appeals, and the manifestation of opposing counsel, no copy of such
motion was received by them. Thus, the CA found the appellants brief to

have been filed out of time. It now devolves upon petitioner to refute the
presumption of regularity and convince this Court that a reversal is
warranted.
We agree with the CA that the evidence presented by the petitioner is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in the preparation of the
records of the Post Office and that of the CA. First, as aforementioned, the
registry receipts correspond to documents mailed on a different date and
addressed to different people. Second, the certification made by one Matabai
Garcia was rendered without probative value in view of the official response
made by the Postmaster General, per records of the Ayala Post Office, that
the same receipts were not for documents mailed on May 7, 1998, nor were
the documents addressed to the CA and opposing counsel.
As consistently reiterated, the power conferred upon the Court of
Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary xxv[25] and not merely
ministerial. With that affirmation comes the caution that such discretion
must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.xxvi[26]
In the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof that any
inadvertence was caused by the Post Office. Moreover, no conclusive proof
could be shown that a motion for extension was indeed filed at any time. All
these create a doubt that petitioners counsel has been candid in his dealings
with the courts. Needless to stress, a lawyer is bound by ethical principles
in the conduct of cases before the courts at all times.
As a last recourse, petitioner contends that the interest of substantial
justice would be served by giving due course to the appeal. However, we
must state that the liberality with which we exercise our equity jurisdiction is
always anchored on the basic consideration that the same must be warranted
by the circumstances obtaining in each case. Having found petitioners
explanation less than worthy of credence, and without evidentiary support,
we are constrained to adhere strictly to the procedural rules on the timeliness
of submission before the court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Resolutions dated July 23, 1998 and February 26, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. The denial of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 56325 due to the late filing of the Appellants Brief pursuant to Rule 50
(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is hereby declared FINAL.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.

i[1]

Rollo, pp.77-78.

ii[2]

Id. at 95-97.

iii [3]

CA Rollo, pp. 57-61.

iv[4]

Id. at 61.

v[5]

Dated March 17, 1998. See CA Rollo, p. 25.

vi[6]

Revised Rules of Court, Rule 44, Section 7.

vii[7]

Rollo, pp. 77-78.

viii [8]

Ibid.

ix[9]

Rollo, pp. 79-84.

x[10]

Id. at 85-88.

xi[11]

Id. at 85; A copy of Registry Receipt No. 13864, marked as Annex A-1 appeared
on the face of the same Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellants Brief.
xii[12]

Id. at 87.

xiii [13]

Id. at 89-91.

xiv[14]

CA Rollo, p. 82.

xv[15]

Id. at 83.

xvi[16]

Rollo, pp. 93-94.

xvii[17]

Id. at 95-97.

xviii [18]

Id. at 95-96.

xix[19]

Id. at 11-34.

xx[20]

Id. at 18.

xxi[21]

Id. at 154.

xxii[22]

Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137672, 332 SCRA 784, 790 (2000).

xxiii [23]

Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., G.R. No. 130906, 303 SCRA 127, 138 (1999), citing
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31303-04, 83 SCRA 453, 483 (1978).
xxiv[24]

CA Rollo, pp. 96-98.

xxv[25]

Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137672, 332 SCRA 784, 789 (2000); citing
Catindig vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 33063, 88 SCRA 675, 680 (1979).
xxvi[26]

Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-27005, 26
SCRA 712, 715 (1969).