CASE DIGEST ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

BACKGROUND, BASIC CONCEPT AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Purita Salvatierra, et al., vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 107797, August 26, 1996 (261 SCRA 45)
Facts:
Enrique Salvatierra died without issues and survived by his brothers Tomas, Bartolome,
Venancio, Macario and sister Marcela. He left them parcel of land as heirs that was
extrajudicially partitioned among them. Anselmo, the son of Macario registered the
whole Lot no. 26 with 749 sq. m. land area in his name on May 20, 1980 with a showing
of bad faith knowingly that he only owns 405 sq. m. of land portion in Lot 26 as sold by
his father to him which the latter inherited from Enrique. Lito Longalong and Paciencia
Mariano who bought a portion of land in Lot 26 of 149 sq. m. land area brought an action
for reconveyance on the said lot on November 22, 1985. Anselmo contends that such
action already prescribed in 4 years as provided in article 1391 (action be brought for
annulment within 4 yrs upon discovery of fraud.) However, the CA ruled that the
prescription periods in the case at bar is 10 years according to Art. 1144.

Issue:
Whether or not the prescription period runs in 4 years (according to Art. 1391 of the Civil
Code) or 10 years (according to Art. 1144 of the Civil Code)?

Ruling:
With the evidence of fraud and the issue involving a real property, the court ruled
that Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that the prescriptive period for the
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title and should govern in the case at bar. The
action has not prescribed.

Sofia Gonzales vda. de Lima vs. Eleazar Tio

G.R. No. L-27181, April 30, 1970 (32 SCRA 516)

Facts:
It is an appeal filed by appellant Sofia Gonzales Vda De Delima, against appellee
defendant, Eleazar Tio from an order of dismissal of the Lower Court based on laches and
the prescription of the two causes of action for recovery of the disputed real property.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on May 8, 1964 for two causes of action. First, the
fact of ownership of property consisting of the coconut land in question, it was alleged
that on August 27, 1936 a contract or agreement was executed in writing whereby for the
sum of 600.00 the property of plaintiff was sold by her husband to Guillermo Tio
predecessor-in-interest of defendant with the right to repurchase for an unlimited time,
such property is a paraphernal in character owned jointly by plaintiff with her sister
Dionisia Gonzales Vda De Ibaez, who was neither a party to the contract. It was asserted
that their respective husbands enter into such contract without consent. The second cause
of action asserted that for reasons unknown to plaintiff the aforesaid Guillermo Tio
included in the transaction another parcel of adjoining coconut land which she would
likewise seek to recover by this complaint.
There was a motion to dismiss , filed on November 16, 1964, based on the
ground that such first and second causes of action allegedly existing in favor of plaintiff
were barred by the statute of limitations, defendant moreover having acquired the
property, subject matter of the complaint, by acquisitive prescription.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the action for recovery the property has already prescribed?
2. Whether or not the contract is voidable?

Held:
1. Plaintiffs inaction for 28 years from the time of the transaction before she filed
the action amounts to laches which cannot be excused by ignorance resulting from
inexcusable negligence.
It is now an established doctrine that inaction and neglect convert what otherwise could
be a valid claim into a state demand. They are factors that militate against any judicial
cognizance of a matter that could have given rise to an action in court is visited with the
loss of such a right. That in essence is what laches signifies. Nor does ignorance resulting
from inexcusable negligence suffice to explain such failure to file seasonably the
necessary suit. The lower court was thus on firm ground in relying on laches for its order
of dismissal.

Nor could it entertain any apprehension as to the correctness of its ruling when in
deference to what the then applicable Code of Civil Procedure provision prescribed, it
based its order f dismissal on plaintiffs right to file the action having prescribed as much
more than 10 years had elapsed. As provided therein, An action for recovery of title to,
or possession of, real property, or an interest therein can only be brought within ten years
after the cause of such action accrues.
For again, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 10 years actual adverse possession by any
person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land in whatever way his occupancy
might have commenced or continued and under a claim of title exclusive of any other
right and adverse to all other claimants, could result in the acquisition of title thereto by
prescription. For the complaint having been filed after 28 years, not only was the action
barred but the person in possession acquired the property by acquisitive prescription.
As in the contract, there was a stipulation with the right to repurchase the property for an
unlimited time. But, under Art 1503 right of redemption could not be for an unlimited
period even under a stipulation as that found in the contract here in question.
1. The allegation that no prescription could lie as the contracts was void and nonexistent from the beginning. This is on the assumption that the matter could be
governed by the New Civil Code. Even if it were so, plaintiff suffers from a
misapprehension the contract dealing as it did with paraphernal property cannot
be considered as void or non-existent but merely as unenforceable. So it was
entered into one of the allegation of here complaint to the effect that she did
demand of defendants predecessor-in-interest as well as from defendant himself
the return of said coconut land presumably upon the payment of the 600.00
which was at least implied ratification. Even if such were not the case, however,
as is clear from the above codal provision, an argument based on the allegation of
a void or non-existent contract obviously lacks persuasiveness.
It is thus evident that it is unwarranted to assert that errors could justifiably be imported
to the lower court in ordering the dismissal of the compliant.
It is not too much to say that defendants predecessor-in-interest in his dealings with
plaintiff failed to exhibit the utmost respect for the promptings of good faith that the
situation would seem to require. Nor did defendant make matters any easier for plaintiff.
Both of them, it would appear, were motivated solely by the promptings of inordinate
self-interest; they did yield unduly to the temptation to take advantage of the unfortunate
circumstances in which plaintiff found herself. Regrettably, however, she did allow this
state of things to continue until she lost the right to invoke the appropriate remedy the law
provides so that whatever grievance might have been alleged could be redressed. Nor is it
any reproach to the law if in the interest of public peace and stability in property
relationship, a continuing state of incertitude and doubt is put an end to.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of November 15, 1966 is affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Enriquito Serna vs. Court of Appeals, Santiago Fontanilla Rasing

G.R. No. 124605, June 18, 1999 (308 SCRA 527)
Facts:
The petitioner spouses and respondent spouses are first cousins in dispute of land
ownership. Apparently, their grandfather owns a 12,508 sq.m. land that was surveyed by
Turner Land Surveying Co. for him which he promised to pay for after the approval of
Bureau of Lands. He failed to pay for the costs and to elude foreclosure of the land he
sold said land to his daughter Rosa who assumed payment for the property tax. Rosa
subsequently sold the land to her nephew Santiago Fontanilla, herein respondent, under a
notarized deed of sale that was not registered to the Register of Deeds. Fontanilla
constructed a house and lived there. In 1978 they went to the US to visit their daughter.
While out of the country, petitioners Enriquito Serna applied a land registration of said lot
which was successfully registered in their name on Jan. 10, 1980. On May 27, 1981,
respondents filed an action for reconveyance and damages against petitioners. Petitioners
contend that when their grandfather failed to pay the surveying company they took the
property in question but it was redeemed later on and sold to their father but they could
not produce evidence. The court ruled in favor to the respondents as true owners of the
said lot hence this petition to the S.C.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in rendering its decision and appreciation of facts
and application of law?

Held:
The S.C. upholds the lower courts ruling declaring that the respondents are the rightful
owners of the said lot. Petitioners claim ownership based on a deed of sale executed
between their grandfather and father which they could not produce. This is a question of
facts that the SC cannot review on appeal. Respondents however have been paying taxes
and enjoying continuous possession of the land for over 60 years tacking the possession
of its predecessor grandfather and Aunt Rosa. These are circumstances and period
sufficient for prescription. They also filed the action for reconveyance within the
prescribed 10 years period from the issuance of Torrens title to the property for the
petitioners.

Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, Spouses Sabas Gepalago,
G.R. No. 123713, April 1, 1998
Fact:
Both petitioner and respondent claim ownership over a 3,625 sq.m land located at Bohol.
Petitioner claims ownership by virtue of inheritance from their father who, during his
lifetime took an uninterrupted possession over the land, declared the property for taxation
purpose and religiously paid the real estate tax. The respondent claims ownership as
registered owner of said lot as a portion of the lot owned by Pedro Luspo who mortgaged
his land to PNB and subsequently was foreclosed. The respondents won as the highest
bidder and they became the owner of that portion of land. The lower court ruled in favor
to the petitioners holding that they were in continuous possession and cultivating the land
for more than 30 years. Thus they acquired the land by prescription. Although a Torrens
Title is indefeasible and not subject for prescription it is not when the respondents
purchased the land from PNB with prior knowledge that the land was in possession of the
petitioners father. Upon appeal the CA reversed the court ruling and declared the
petitioners as the true owners of the property.

Issue: Whether or not a land registered under the Torrens system can prescribe in the
instance case.

Held:
The court ruled that the land in dispute has been covered by a Torrens Title more than 30
yrs before the petitioners instituted the present action. Sec. 47 of PD 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree states that no land under the Torrens System
be acquired through prescription. Such title is indefeasible. It is wrong to contend that the
prior knowledge of the respondents on the possession of the petitioners father defies the
Torrens titles inprescriptibility because there is no flaw on the title when they purchased
it from PNB that was the registered owner of the land. The vendee for value mainly relies
on what appears on the face of the title and is not compelled to go beyond that. Moreover,
the petitioner was unusually silent with the previous transactions involving the property
when Luspo mortgaged the land to PNB, when it was sold in public auction and the sale
of the land to the vendees. The court affirmed the decision of the CA declaring the
respondents as the true owners of the land in dispute.

Prescription

Imuan vs. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, Sept. 11, 2009

Facts:
Pablo contracted two marriages and all his children on both are already dead. The
petitioners in the case are his grandchildren while the respondent is the husband of his
daughter from his second marriage. Juana, Pablos second wife, together with her
children continued to be in possession of the parcel of land owned by Pablo after his
death. A joint affidavit was executed attesting that Pablo ceded the property in favor of
Juana in the occasion of their marriage but the document was lost. Juana sold said parcel
of land to the respondent which was registered in the register of deeds. The land area sold
to respondents was divided by a barangay road. They built a house on one side and
planted fruit-bearing trees on the other side. It is on the latters side where the petitioners
took possession and built a nipa hut thereon. An ejectment case was filed by the
respondents against petitioners but was later dismissed when the petitioners left the area.

Petitioners now brought an action for reconveyance, damages, and annulment of deed of
sale by Juana to the respondents. They contend that it was through their tolerance that
Juana and her children constructed their house on the lot in dispute, that Pablo have not
partitioned among his heirs his property and the sale made by Juana to respondents are
null and void. Respondents invoke the ground that when Pablo married Juana the
property was his exclusive property and donated such through propter nuptias when they
married. Thus Juana, being the owner of said lot, validly made the sale to respondents
who immediately took possession over the land and paid its realty tax. MTC ruled in
favor of the petitioners however upon appeal CA ruled in favor of the respondents as it
held that the respondents are in peaceful possession of said lot for 29 years which suffice
to meet the requirement of 10-year period of open, public, and adverse possession in the
concept of owner that the law on prescription requires. It ruled that petitioners are barred
by latches from claiming ownership of the disputed property.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are barred by latches and prescription in claiming their
share of the property?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondents have acquired the disputed property by
acquisitive prescription. Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other
real rights over immovable property and is concerned with a lapse of time laid down by
law where possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted, and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, and
notorious. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the
presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires
possession
in good
faith and
a just
title
in
10
years while extraordinary acquisitive prescription involves uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years without the need for good title and good faith.

Respondents immediately took possession of the property after buying it and diligently
paid its realty tax. Even if the petitioners saw respondents built a house thereon and
planted fruit-bearing trees, they did not raise objection on the respondents possession.
Their inaction further made them guilty of latches since they live merely 100 meters
away from the property to know of the respondents possession of said land. They only
filed an action for reconveyance 29 years after the respondents peaceful possession over
the property, the 10-year prescription period for ordinary acquisitive prescription has
already lapsed. The SC affirmed the CA decision declaring the respondents as the rightful
owner of the land in dispute.

Accretion
New Regent Sources, Inc. vs. Tanjuatco
G.R. No. 168800, April 16, 2009

Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint on rescission/declaration of nullity of contract,
reconveyance and damages against the respondent. Petitioner allegedly authorized
Vicente Cuevas being its Chairman and President to apply on its behalf to acquire two
parcels of land by right of accretion. Cuevas applied the lot in his name and while
pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands he assigned his rights to the

respondent. An order from the Director of Lands was issued transferring rights from
Cuevas to Tanjuatco. During the preliminary hearing, respondent filed a motion for
demurrer of evidence after the petitioner presented their evidence. The RTC dismissed the
case for insufficiencies of evidence and ruled that respondent is an innocent purchaser
hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the case upon demurrer of evidence?
Whether or not the respondent is an innocent purchaser of the property in dispute?

Ruling:
As to the first issue the court held that it is a question of fact which is improper for a
petition for review since the Supreme Court can only review a question of law. A
question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and
the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.

The court held that to warrant a reconveyance of land where the mode of acquiring a
property is by accretion, the following requisites should be met: (1) that the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers. It is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of
accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence
that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this
regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing
requisites. Respondent derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. A certification
was issued confirming that said lands were verified to be Alienable and Disposable
property of the State entitling it to transfer ownership to the respondent. Moreover,
petitioners failed to establish fraudulent registration of ownership of the title to
respondent since they did not provide evidence that Cuevas is empowered by the
petitioner to apply a registration of the property in their behalf. The respondent may
safely rely on what appears on the face of the registered title hence he is a buyer in good
faith. Petitioner was not able to substantiate its claim for ownership of the property
therefore their claim for reconveyance should be denied.

Emancipation Patent
Petronito Maylem vs. Ellano
G.R. No. 162721, July 13, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner files a motion for recovery of possession of a piece of agricultural land.
Bonifacio Abad was awarded a parcel of land that was under a leasehold agreement he
entered with the petitioners husband by virtue of PD No, 27 under Emancipation Patent.
The land transfer was covered by a transfer certificate of title registered with the Register
of Deeds. Petitioner persuaded Abad to allow her to a one year possession of the land
which he allowed. After the lapse of the agreed period petitioner refused to return the
land to Abad who subsequently filed complaint for recovery of possession of said
property before the provincial adjudicator of DAR after learning that it was mortgaged by
the petitioner to a third party. Meantime, the petitioner filed exclusion of her property
from the coverage of the Agrarian Reform Law. The Provincial adjudicator rendered
favor of Abad ruling that ownership of Abad of the property by virtue of emancipation
patent is absolute. Petitioner contends that pending the appeal for retention Abads
ownership of the land is not yet absolute and that the action brought by Abad already
prescribed. CA ruled in favor of Abad rendering him absolute owner of the property by
virtue of emancipation patent.

Issue:
Whether or not acquisition of property by emancipation patent is absolute and may
prescribe?

Ruling:
It was held that acquisition of property by emancipation patent vests absolute ownership
to the person whose name is registered in the title. Land transfer under P.D. No. 27 is
effected in two stages: (1) the issuance of a certificate of land transfer to a farmerbeneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to him in recognition of his
being deemed an owner; and (2) the issuance of an emancipation patent as proof of full
ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease

rentals by the farmer-beneficiary. The issuance of title gives the grantee absolute
ownership and he ceases to be a mere tenant or lessee.

As to the contention of the petitioner that Abad abandoned his right to the property by
allowing her to take possession of the land the court ruled that Abandonment or neglect,
as a ground for the cancellation of an emancipation patent or certificate of land award
requires a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or to abandon a
right or property coupled with an external act by which that intention is expressed or
carried into effect. It consists in any one of these conditions: (a) failure to cultivate the lot
due to reasons other than the non-suitability of the land to agricultural purposes, for at
least two (2) calendar years, and to pay the amortizations for the same period; (b)
permanent transfer of residence by the beneficiary and his family, which has rendered
him incapable of cultivating the lot; or (c) relinquishment of possession of the lot for at
least two (2) calendar years and failure to pay the amortization for the same period. None
of the instances cited above obtains in this case.

Furthermore, ownership by emancipation patent is non-transferrable except by hereditary

succession or in favor to the government. Even if Abad waived his right to the property it
is deemed void. Also prescriptive period under the Agrarian Reform Law do not apply to
emancipated patent. Petition is denied.

Jurisdiction

Aniceto Sumulong vs. Fortunato Sumulong

G.R. No. S.P. No. 68699 June 16, 2006
Facts:
Fortunato Sumulong applied for an application for a land registration for a parcel of land
before the RTC which was later assigned to the MTC pursuant to delegated jurisdiction.
He wants the land to be confirmed and registered in his name. In opposition, Aniceto
filed a motion to reopen the case, lift the order of general default and to admit opposition
contending he is a part owner and actual occupant of the land whose name was omitted
by Fortunato in his application for registration. This amounts to failure of Fortunato to
comply with the requirement set forth in Section 15 and 23 of PD 1529 which makes the
land registration proceeding null and void with the deliberate omission of his name as one

of the occupants and part owner of said land as constituting fraud. He further contends
that the application failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement because the
market value of the property is more than P100,000 and should be heard before the RTC.
The MTC ruled in favor of Fortunato holding that when the said land registration was
published it was a notice sent to the whole world and the MTC has acquired jurisdiction
over it and Anicetos claim of no knowledge about the registration cannot be given any
due course. Upon appeal, the CA denied Anicetos motion for reconsideration contending
that the assessed value of the property as provided in the tax declaration should be
followed which is valued at P50,860.00 and upheld the lower courts decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the MTC has the proper jurisdiction to hear the case.
Whether or not provisions from PD 1529 has been violated to render the land registration
null and void.

Held:
The court held that Section 34 of B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by R.A. 7691 provides that delegated jurisdiction over cadastral land
valued at less than 100,000 as ascertained from the affidavit of the claimant or tax
declaration of property shall be before the MTC. It is not the assessed market value that
should be followed. Hence the MTC has the proper jurisdiction over the land in dispute.

On one hand, failure of Fortunato to declare Aniceto as one of the part owners of the land
is in violation of the provisions of PD 1529. The court noted that both Fortunato and
Aniceto are neighbors as certified by their Brgy. Cpt., Aniceto holds a Declaration of Real
Property in the year 1977 with proof of receipt that he is paying real property tax. The
court has reason to believe that Fortunato deliberately omitted Aniceto as part owner
when he registered the land. Such constitutes fraud rendering the land registration in his
name as null and void.

TORRENS SYSTEM

Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, Patria Capay, et al

G.R. No. 118862, Sept. 24, 1999 (315 SCRA 190)

Facts:
A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and subsequently
extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in
public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the
mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis
pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in
the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole and
winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one was entered in TRBs
name without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of
the property and damages. Court rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for
want of consideration and thus cancelled TRBs title and issued a new cert. of title for the
Capays.

Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who subsequently
subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the
subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good faith since they
purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the court. Although
the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book
constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with adverse claim over the
property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is
pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute
while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.

Issue:
1. Who has the better right over the land in dispute?
2. Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling:
The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid
conflicts of title to real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property there
was no lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is

beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers
obtained the property from a clean title in good faith and for value. On one hand, the
Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not
annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status
of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the
declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure
proceeding has no legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real
owner of the property it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for
value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty
bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it to
Santiago.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108926, July 12, 1996 (328 Phil. 238)
right to register land

Facts:
The appellant Republic implores before the court to set aside the decision of the CA
declaring the ownership of a parcel of land in favor of Democrito Plazas. Plazas filed a
petition for registration and confirmation of his title over the land in dispute contending
that he is the owner thereof by virtue of an absolute deed of sale and that his predecessorin-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same. The Republic filed in opposition to said motion assailing on the
contrary while invoking that the land belongs to a public dominion and not subject for
private appropriation. The land is subject to a request by the DENR for a Presidential
Proclamation to reserve the land for Slum Improvement and Resettlement Site of the
NHA.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellee has the right to register the land title under his name.

Ruling:

The court ruled that there is clear and convincing evidence that the appellee has
established possession over the land for 30 years. His bona fide claim of ownership is
evidenced by the tax payment receipts, deed of sale, tax declaration, improvements made
on the land and developing it into a ricefield. The issuance of Proclamation No.
679 that the land is withdrawn from alienable portion of a public domain pursuant to the
slum improvement and resettlement project of the NHA does not prohibit the registration
of title by a person who claims and able to prove ownership thereof. Registration does not
vest title but only serve merely as evidence of such title. Paragraph 10 of LOI No. 555
provides that any privately owned land declared to be included in the NHA project may
be acquired by the State through expropriation. Proclamation No. 679 does not provide a
valid justification to deny an individual for a land title registration.

Crisanto Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, Regino Relova, Jr.

G.R. No. 130768, March 21, 2002 (379 SCRA 638)

Francisco Lu vs. Orlando Manipon

G.R. No. 147072, May 7, 2002 (381 SCRA 78)

(Midterm)

GENERAL PROCEDURE IN AN ORDINARY LAND REGISTRATION CASE

A. SURVEY OF THE LAND
Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97 SCRA 22)
Facts:
This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA
reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the
issuance of the Original Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona
Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the land in dispute
covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous,

adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial;
respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they
obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco,
the petitioners father occupied the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead
patent for it. He introduced some improvements on the land such as fencing the area with
barbwires, planting mango trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure
a title in favor of his children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates
and improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in
question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an
owner.
The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to find out that there is
already a survey plan of the said land in the name of the respondents and that a title was
already issued to them. Petitioner now contends that being an adjacent owner of the land
in question they were not notified of the survey. The Surveyors Certificate reveals that
notice was given to the following: Jose Cruz, Diego Francisco (petitioners father), and
Santol Creek. It is noted that both Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco were already dead from
the date of the notice and Santol Creek is not a person or entity. It was established that the
petitioner and her brother and sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent land of
the land in question were not notified of the survey. Petitioner did not read the publication
in the Official Gazette and the former mayor of Teresa who is the owner of the property
across the Santol Creek testified that Diego Francisco was in possession of the land
throughout his lifetime and after his death his heirs and not the respondents. By virtue of
this continuous, adverse, and open possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47)
years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner of this parcel of land.
Respondent contends that the petitioners claim for ownership of the land in question is
insufficient in form and substance failing to explain under what color of title she acquires
ownership of the land in question, citing that an essential requisite for a valid petition for
reopening and review of a decree should be made by a person who is deprived of the land
or interest. "In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 of Act 496 the applicant (1) must
have an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show fraud in the procurement of the
decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of
title obtained under the Land Registration Act. The mere claim of ownership of petitioner
lacks this requisite to merit in granting of their petition. They claim that Toribio Santos,
the respondents father owns the land and Alejandro Santos inherited it from him and
occupied the land in 1920 and has been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.
Issue:
1.

Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332

2.

Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.

Ruling:
It appears that Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco are both dead when the alleged notice was
served and that Santol Creek could not appear for the hearing because it is not a person.
The court finds it absurd that the respondent claims that they complied with the requisite
of serving notice to interested parties on the land in question. It is clear that the petitioner
and her brothers and sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent lots were not
notified of the registration proceeding applied for by the petitioner. It is clear that no
notice was sent to the actual owner and possessor of the land in question allowing the
respondents to successfully register the land in their name. It was also established that
respondents did not state the true adjoining owners of the North, East and West of the
land in question. On the North side it is no longer Diego Francisco who is the owner of
the lot but it is the petitioner by virtue of transfer of the homestead patent of their father
to them as his heirs. On the East, it is no longer Jose Cruz who owns the land but it was
already by a different person after his death. On the West, it is no longer Eugenio
Francisco who is the owner but it is Paula Francisco, petitioners sister who is in actual
possession of the land.
The court find that the respondents have the motive of concealing their application for
registration from the real owners of these said lands by not sending them the actual notice
of their application for registration to prevent them from filing their opposition. The court
cited the failure of the surveyors of the respondent to comply with the requirement of
finding out the actual occupants and boundary owners of the said land. The court held
that the registration of land cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad
faith. Thus it reverses the decision of the CA and affirmed the decision of the lower court
without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court complying with the additional
requirements for the issuance of the corresponding title in favor of petitioner.

Angel del Rosario vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 148338, June 6, 2002 (432 Phil. 824)
Facts:
The case is a petition for review on the reversal of the decision of the RTC by the CA
denying the application of the petitioner for the registration of a parcel of land (forest
land) located in Maragondon, Cavite. In October 13, 1997, petitioner filed an application
for registration of a parcel of land, stating therein that he is resident of Poblacion,
Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question, which was
alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since the 1920s or
even earlier; and that such land was being occupied and cultivated by him and his family.
He also indicated the owners/occupants of the adjoining properties and submitted the
following documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for with technical
descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-0011601, (b) Technical Description of Lot No. 1891;
(c) Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration
purposes, attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; (d) Certification, dated August
14, 1997, that the subject land is alienable and disposable;(e) Certification, dated October
7, 1997, that the property is not covered by any public land application or patent; (f) Tax
Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998, covering the parcel of land; and (g) Official
Receipt No. 1038951S, dated September 9, 1997, showing petitioner's payment of the
realty taxes on the said lot up to 1997.
Petitioner also submitted to the branch clerk of court the original copy of tracing cloth
plan of the land and the latter transmitted to the Land Registration Authority all the
documents supporting the petitioners application. No oppositor appeared during the
hearing except for the provincial prosecutor in behalf of the Bureau of Lands. All parties
except to the Bureau of Lands were declared in default by the court and the trial ensued.
Petitioner presented witnesses in the person of Raymuldo Telia who testified he knows
the petitioner to be the owner of the said land since he was young. Petitioner further
claims that he and his family planted mango and bamboo trees and raised animals on it
and they solely gather the fruits and forest products of said land. The lower court granted
the application of the petitioner thus the respondent appealed to the CA contending that
the petitioner failed to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the lot and to establish that
he and his predecessors-in-interest has been in open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted
possession of the land in dispute within the period required by law. The CA reversed the
lower court decision holding that the petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the
tracing cloth plan of the land applied for registration.
Issue:

Whether or not the failure to submit the original copy of the tracing cloth plan is required
in the land registration proceeding.
Ruling:
The court held that the submission of the original copy of the tracing cloth plan is a
mandatory requirement in the application of original registration of land. Failure to
submit the same is fatal. The purpose of which is to establish the true identity of the land
and ensure that it does not overlap adjoining lands that are already registered.
1.
The contention of the petitioner that he submitted it to the branch clerk of
court who transmitted the same to the Land Registration Authority has no merit
since the court held that he is duty bound to retrieve it and submit it before the
court. It is not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it had
no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original
tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the same
there from and submit the same in evidence.
2.
The court cannot admit his prayer to reopen the proceeding for him to
submit the original tracing cloth plan or sepia paper as newly discovered evidence
for it does not meet the following requisites for re-opening a case to present a new
evidence: 1) the evidence was discovered after the trial; 2) such evidence could
not have been discovered or produced on trial within a reasonable time; 3) it is
material and not merely corroborative in weight that when admitted will change
the judgment. The original tracing plan cannot be considered as newly discovered
evidence since it was already available at the time of application for registration.
3.
Petitioner failed to establish to have met the legal requirements on the
manner and length of possession as to vest him title of ownership of the land. He
claims to have planted bamboo trees and mango trees but such is held by the court
as mere casual cultivation of the land that does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership.
The court held that a possession of public land however long never confers title to a
person because the statute of limitation provided for public land does not operate against
the state unless occupant can prove under claim of ownership their possession and
occupation for the required number of years. (30 years)

Mariano Turquesa vs. Rosario Valera & Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 76371, January
20, 2000 (379 Phil. 618)
Facts:

Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2.
She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation purposes.
Notice for the application for registration was published in the Official Gazette.
Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and herein petitioners. The opposition
of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the land is part of
the public domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought
to be registered by the respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent
and denied petitioners motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositors
appealed to CA regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular
inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings
were opposed and a second ocular inspection was ordered. The trial court reiterated its
former judgment to register the whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent with its
encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no
longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their
properties were erroneously included in the respondents land registration. CA modified
the land registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.
Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan
and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court
decision and granted the motion for writ of possession on the landholdings of
Partolan, Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court while
excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved they have rightful
and registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors
filed a motion for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled for land registration of the entire area of Lot 1
including those owned by the oppositors?
Ruling:
The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon the
applicant who must show he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land
applied for. Because the land registration proceeding is an in rem proceeding, a default
order issued by the court binds the whole world except those appearing in court to file
their opposition or pleadings in the registration case. Thus, the oppositors are exempted
from the general default order by the court. On the respondents motion for writ of
possession on the lots occupied by Baltar and Partolan, the court finds no merit in
granting their motion. Respondent did not provide evidence on her rightful claim over
these land areas. Although Partolan was excluded in the general default issued by the
court while Baltar did not appeal on the trial courts decision, respondent is still required
to prove and establish her registrable rights over the land even in the absence of
opposition. The payment of tax by her predecessor-in-interest is not sufficient evidence to
prove ownership.

Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to identify the
land in dispute with the boundaries comprising it. What defines a piece of land is not
the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing
the land and indicating its limits. The writ of possesion sought by the private
respondent against persons who are in actual possession under claim of ownership and
their possession of the land raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Therefore, the
land areas to be registered to the respondent are limited only to certain areas in the sketch
that is annexed to the Commissioners report as the respondent failed to establish
proprietary right over the excluded areas.

Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC, G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991 (197 SCRA)
failure to prove bonafide claim to land through tacking possession from predecessorin interest to meet requirements provided by law
Facts:
Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was
opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest
acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been
in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the concept of an
owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a
public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in
favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that
she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of
her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of
Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title
from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time
of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for
13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor-ininterests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48
(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition of
ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the agricultural land in
public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is able to provide sufficient and substantial evidence as
complying with the requirement of law for confirmation of her ownership of the land in
dispute?

Ruling:
In is held that it is incumbent upon the respondent to prove that her predecessor-ininterest is the persons of Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan have been in adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful possession in the concept of an owner for 20 years
which she failed to provide a clear and convincing evidence to prove. Her bare
allegations do not constitute substantial proof. Respondent failed to comply with the
requirements of the law to confirm her title on the land applied for registration. Lower
court decision was set aside.
Underlying Principle: All lands not acquired from the government belong to the state as
part of public domain.

Director, Land Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February
7, 2000 (381 Phil. 761)
failure to prove possession according to the manner and no. of years required by law

Facts:

Respondent Aquilino Cario filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a sugar
land claimed to be owned by his mother of whom after she died he became the
administrator of the property in behalf of his brothers and sisters. By virtue of a deed of
extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner of the property. Report from the land
investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that the
improvements introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango
trees with the house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict and is not
covered by existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued to it;
that the respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as
inherited from his deceased mother. Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and
the only oppositor is the Bureau of Lands. The court granted the petition of the
respondent. The petitioner filed a review for certiorari contending that the respondent
failed to submit proof of his fee simple title and has not overthrown the presumption that
the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the state.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent established proof of his muniment of title to merit
registration of land in his favor?

Ruling:

The petition of the respondent is covered by the Land Registration Act providing that a
person alleging in his petition or application ownership in fee simple must present
muniments of title to substantiate his claim of ownership, presenting evidence of his
possession in the concept of an owner in a manner and number of years required by law.
The manner shall be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
property known as agricultural land of the public domain for 30 years preceding the filing
of application for confirmation (Commonwealth Act No. 141).

Possession of public land however long never confers title upon the possessor unless
occupant of the same is under claim of ownership for the required period. Even in the
absence of opposition the court can deny registration of land under the Torrens System on
ground that an applicant failed to establish his ownership by a fee simple on the property
sought to be registered.

The respondent only traced his own possession in the land in 1949 by virtue of
extrajudicial settlement and order and at the same time he filed his application for
registration in 1975 thus he was in possession of said land only for 26 years. His mere
allegation that his mother was in possession of the land since 1911 is self serving and
hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. The tax receipts and tax declaration he offered as
evidence do not substantiate clear proof of ownership. Thus, with his failure to prove that
his predecessor-in-interest occupied the land under the condition laid down by law, he
can only establish his possession of the land from 1949. Respondent failed to prove his
muniment of title for the registration of the land under the Registration Act with failure to
present convincing and positive proof of his continuous, open, uninterrupted and
notorious occupation of lot 6 in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years.

B. WHO MAY APPLY/REAL PARTY OF INTEREST

Peltan Development, Inc. v CA GR. No. 117029, March 19, 1997

Facts:

The respondents were applying for a free patent to a certain parcel of land which they
have been occupying, cultivating, planting, staying, and introducing improvements
thereon and neither one of petitioners was in possession thereof. They had the land
surveyed but the processing and approval of their application were held in abeyance
despite the absence of any opposition on grounds that there allegedly existing certificates
of title on said land in the name of Peltan Development. Peltan allegedly obtained their
title from spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Carlos, however the respondents assail that
the title was spurious and fictitious. Prior to their application for a free patent, the
improvements they introduced to the land were bulldozed by one of the petitioners. They
filed a complaint that by virtue of the spurious title produced by the petitioners and the
illegal destruction of the respondents plants and dwellings, their rights for a free patent
to the land were substantially prejudiced by petitioners and hold them liable to pay for
actual and compensatory damages. Peltan filed a motion for preliminary hearing on
affirmative defense on grounds that the respondents have no cause of action against them
and they are not the real party of interest in the action they sought to assert as they have
no subsisting title to present over the disputed property. Their contention was based on a
former jurisprudence that the government thru the Solicitor General should be the real
party of interest to file a motion for cancellation of the certificate of title. In answer, the
respondents re-asserted their cause of action to their complaint and showed their rights,
interest and claims to have been violated thereby placing them to a status of real party of
interest.

The lower court dismissed the complaint ruling that the respondents were not a real party
of interest. This decision was reversed by the court of appeals ruling that the lower court
should have treated the action as accion publiciana to determine which party has the right
to possession. The petitioners now file a petition for review and pray for the cancellation
of the notation of lis pendens on their certificate of title.

Issues:

Whether or not the respondents are the real party of interest in their action against the
petitioners?

Ruling:

The SC reversed the decision of the appellate court. It is a well-settled rule that the cause
of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint and to resolve the motion to
dismiss based on failure to state cause of action, only the facts in the complaint must be
considered. The court held that the CA failed to appreciate the fact that the title of the
petitioners were validly upheld by the court in a court proceeding (G.R. No. 109490 and
in G.R. No. 112038). Every court should take mandatory judicial notice to court decisions
when resolving motion to dismiss as required by Rule 129, section 1 of the Rules of
Court. The CA erred in recognizing the rights of the respondents as one based on their
actual possession of the land and their pending application for a free patent thereof. It
also committed a reversible error to treat the issue as one of accion publiciana since the
decision has already been rendered by the court before upholding the title of the
petitioners as valid and genuine. Therefore, it is no longer an option to treat the case as
one.

The respondents are held not as real party of interest since although they were not
praying for the reversion of the land to the government such complaint would still result
to the same under the Regalian doctrine. The respondents have no right over the land as
they admit that neither they nor their predecessors owned the land which is construed that
the land in dispute remains to be a property of public domain. If there is any person with
real interest to the land it should be the government. The SC reversed and set aside the
decision of the CA and cancelled the annotation of lis pendens to the petitioners title.

Spouses Francisco and Angela Tankiko v Justiano Cezar, et. al. GR No. 131277,
February 2, 1999

Facts:

Respondents are the actual occupants and residents of a parcel of land herein referred to
as Lot 3714 who introduced improvements thereon and are sales patent applicants of the
said lot. They were religiously paying taxes on the property. They filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against the petitioners. Apparently, an original certificate of
title (OCT) was issued to the petitioners after acquiring said lot from the heirs of the lots
alleged former owner Patricio Salcedo who acquires his title to the lot by virtue of a
decree of registration upon the decision of the cadastral court. Respondents assail the
validity of the title of Salcedo by citing the Consing decision of the court that involves
the neighboring lot 3715 with the following observation: (1) there is no showing that a
decision has been made on the Cadastral proceedings cited by the petitioners with no
records thereof in the Land Registration Commission and (2) they found a decision that
renders Lot 3715 and Lot 3714 public lands.

RTC decision: Dismissed the petition for lack of merit, recognizing the petitioners as the
owner of the property in litigation by virtue of their certificates of title while giving
respondents 90 days to vacate the property.

Court of Appeals decision: Set aside the RTC decision allowing respondents to stay
within the property pending the final termination of the administrative proceedings for
cancellation of petitioners title and final terminal of the action for reversion and
annulment of title. It also ordered the annotation of lis pendens on the OCT.

Petitioners now insist that the respondents have no capacity to file the complaint because
they are not owners of the land but merely an applicant for a patent thereof which makes
them not a real party of interest to the case. The CA contends that although the
respondents have no capacity to file an action for reconveyance and damages, for reason
of equity, it finds the necessity to resolve the issue of possession in the land on question.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents are the proper parties to initiate the present suit?

Ruling:

The court did not find justification on reason for equity to be appreciated in the case.
Equity is only invoked when the plaintiff has a clear right that it seeks to enforce and
would be violated if the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of standing. The
respondents do not have any enforceable right over their claim to the land for merely an
applicant and there is no guarantee that their application will be ruled in their favor.
Moreover, they are not the real part of interest by the fact that they admit that they are
only applicants and not owners of the land in dispute. Section 101 of the Public Land Act
provides that only the State has the right to institute an action for reconveyance of a
public land. A "real party in interest" is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit. To have a legal standing in a suit, the party should have substantial
interest in the case in that the party will sustain a direct injury as a result of an act. The
interest contemplated here is material interest in issue that will be affected by the decree.
The respondents only have an incidental interest not contemplated by law. The SC ruled
that the respondents have no legal standing to sue and not the real party of interest in the
case. The CA decision was reversed and set aside.

Republic v CA and Ceferino Paredes, Jr. GR No. 112115, March 9, 2001

Facts:

Respondent Paredes appeared to have purchased a certain parcel of land of which he

applied for a free patent. His application was approved and was issued with a Free Patent
and an OCT on May 1, 1976. On June 27, 1984 theSangguniang Bayan adopted a
resolution undertaking the assistance of the Municipality of San Francisco to recover
possession of the land as it was averred to have been designated by the Bureau of Lands
as a school site for the San Francisco Town Site Reservation, long before title to it was
issued in private respondent's name. They also questioned the claim of the respondent to
have posted his application for free patent on the door of their Municipal Hall because if
he did they would have filed an opposition thereto. The Bureau of Lands filed the
necessary action on their behalf for the recovery of the land, cancellation of the free
patent title under the respondents name and the reversion of the land to the public
domain. It also amended its complaint to include the Development Bank of the
Philippines as respondent where Paredes had mortgaged the property.

Trial court decision: Declared the title of Paredes null and void and ordered the
cancellation of his patent title and ordered both Paredes and DBP to surrender the OCT to
the Register of Deeds and the cancellation of the same. On DBPs cross-claim that it was a
purchaser for value in good faith, the court ordered Paredes to pay DBP the outstanding
balance of its loan.

CA decision: Reversed the trial court decision hence this petition with the following
issues raised by the petitioner:

Issue:

Whether or not the free patent title issued to respondent is contrary to the Free Patent
Law?

Whether or not Paredes caused misrepresentation and fraud on his application for the free
patent?

Ruling:

Proclamation No. 366 classified certain agricultural lands in Mindanao as alienable and
disposable which qualified individuals may only acquire by purchase or homestead.
Respondent acquired the land by a free patent and not according to the mode of
acquisition provided by the Proclamation. There are distinct differences between a
homestead patent and a free patent although both are patents granted by the Public Land
Act. Homestead patent requires that the applicant must have complied with the
residence and cultivation requirements of the law and residing continuously to the
property for at least 1 year in the municipality where the land is located. Free
patent requires that the applicant must have continuously occupied and cultivated either
by himself or his predecessors-in-interest an agricultural public land for at least 30 years
and the same has not been occupied by any person. On this ground alone, the SC finds
reason to nullify the title of the respondents.

Moreover, the SC also noted that it is beyond dispute that the land was reserved as a
school site before the issuance of the patent of the respondents. It also points out that the
respondent is aware that the occupation of his predecessor-in-interest, Almario Garay, on
said land was disturbed by the attempt of the government to construct a school building
thereon but this was prevented when he sought the help of an attorney to prevent the
encroachment made upon the property and such was reserved to be designated as a school
site. Respondent did not disclose this fact upon filing his application and stated therein
that the property is not claimed or occupied by any other person, it is unreserved and
unappropriated. This was construed by the SC to be a misrepresentation, fraud and deceit
on the part of the respondent. The petitioner also sufficiently established through their
resolution that the respondent did not post his application to the Municipal building as
attested by the acting mayor of their municipality. Otherwise the state would have filed
their opposition to assert that the property in dispute is designated as a school site.

The court also ruled that the respondent cannot invoke estoppel against the petitioner
because although the respondent acquired its title without any opposition from the
government, the latter is not estopped to question the validity of his certificate of title
because the principle of estoppel does not operate against the State.

SC set aside the CA decision and reinstated the trial courts decision.

Heirs of Pedro Lopez et. al. v Honesto C. de Castro, et. al. GR No. 112905, February
3, 2000

two applications of a parcel of land

Facts:

The petitioners filed an application for registration of parcel of land located in Tagaytay
City with the CFI in Cavite. The Municipality of Silang, Cavite files an opposition
alleging that the land is its patrimonial property. The petitioners claim that the land is a
part of the whole tract of land as their inheritance sought to be registered in Cavite but

was excluded from their application upon recommendation of the chief surveyor of the
Land Reg. Office because the land is located in the Province of Laguna. The motion to
dismiss by the Municipality of Silang was denied by the court due to lack of merit on
ground that the municipality has no personality to intervene because the lot was outside
its territorial limits. And even if it is a communal property of both municipalities, the
incorporation of Cavite to the city of Tagaytay makes it a property of the latter. Thus the
right to action accrues to the municipality of Tagaytay. Upon deliberation, the Clerk of
Court recommended to grant the application with its report disclosing that since time
immemorial, the De Los Reyes family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the
father of the applicant, Pedro Lopez who later took over the ownership and possession of
the land. Upon his death, his heirs succeeded over the property and subsequently
partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and ordered the registration of the
land in favor of the petitioner.

While examining the records in the course of granting the registration to the petitioners, it
was found out that the land was already registered in favor of the respondents Honesto de
Castro. Apparently, de Castro filed the registration of land in the CFI of Cavite in its
Branch IV in Tagaytay City and a decision was promulgated to issue the decree of
registration in his favor. The said land was allegedly owned by Hermogenes Orte who
sold it to the father of the respondent by virtue of a deed of sale that was destroyed during
Japanese occupation. His father continued possession and occupation of the land until his
death and his wife and children continued the possession thereof and finally registered it
in their name. 7 years later, the petitioner files a complaint for the execution of the
judgment rendered in their favor by the court and cancellation of title of the respondents
and order the respondents to vacate the property. In their counterclaim, the respondents
interpose the defense of latches, prescription and estoppel against the petitioners and
asserting the indefeasibility of their title under the Torrens System.

Lower court: held that it could not enforce the judgment against the respondents
considering they were not made parties to the case. Nor can it order the register of deeds
of Tagaytay City to cancel the title of respondents since it was not also made a party to
the case thus the court does not acquire jurisdiction over it. Further, the court held that the
action brought by the petitioners would be tantamount to the nature of collaterally
attacking the validity of the title of the respondents.

Court of appeals: Upon appeal to the CA, it re-affirms the lower courts decision with
emphasis on the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title while citing the Civil Code provisions
on Article 1544 on sale of property to different vendees where in case the land has been
registered in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date of registration shall
prevail.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can question the validity of the title of the respondents
over the property in dispute?

Ruling:

The court held that a land registration is an in rem proceeding which involves a
constructive notice against all persons including the state which is effective through the
publication of the application for land registration. The court held that when more than
one certificate of title is issued over the land, the person holding the prior certificate of
title is entitled to a better right against the person who relies on the subsequent certificate.
This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not on the date of filing the
application for registration of title. In land registration proceedings, all interested parties
are obliged to take care of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of
registration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall
prevail. The publication made with respect to the application of the respondents served as
a constructive notice against the whole world thus the court upheld the validity of their
title and its indefeasibility against collateral attack from the petitioners.

Granting that the petitioners did not have actual knowledge about the respondents
application to the land, they waited for 7 more years after knowing that the property was
already registered in the name of the respondents to demand for the execution of
judgment and cancellation of the respondents title. Therefore the SC finds them guilty of
latches. Petitioners petition was denied.

Note:

Jurisdiction issue:

The governing law when the respondent sought registration of their land was the
Judiciary Act of 1948 providing permanent station of 2 district judges in Cavite, thus the
application was filed before the court in Cavite. This was later amended providing for the
4 judges to preside in the Province of Cavite, the cities of Cavite and Tagaytay. Following
the rule on jurisdiction, the court of the place where the property is located should take
cognizance over the registration of property therefore upon the creation of Tagaytay City
branch of court, the application should have been transferred from Cavite to Tagaytay
branch. Retaining the venue of the application in Cavite however is in order since venue
is merely procedural not jurisdictional and may be waived in lieu of convenience to the
parties. The petitioners assailing the jurisdiction of the Cavite branch rendering decision
in favor of the respondents title over the property located in Tagaytay cannot be
sustained by the court.

C. PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT

Land Registration as a Proceeding In Rem

Teofilo Cacho v CA GR No. 123361, March 31, 1997

Facts:

Doa Cacho applied for a registration of two parcels of land in Lanao Province and is
situated within the limits of a military conservation. The two petitions were jointly tried
and the court promulgated a decision for the issuance of two decrees subject to certain
conditions of submitting the deed of sale for the first lot and the new plan for the second
lot. The sole heir of Doa Cacho, Teofilo Cacho files a motion for the reconstitution of
the two original certificates of title. His petition was opposed by the
respondents Republic of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City
of Iligan. The lower court dismissed the petition for the reason that the proper remedy
would be to file a motion for reconstitution of the decrees after appreciating that two
decrees were already issued which although subject to certain conditions are indisputably
final. The petitioners motion to amend their petition was denied by the court but upon
appeal, the SC remanded the case back to the lower court to hear their petition for the reissuance of the decrees. The lower court upheld the decrees previously issued to Doa
Cacho and order the Register of Deeds to re-issue said decrees. On appeal to the CA by
the respondents, they assail the decision on grounds that the petition suffers from

jurisdictional infirmities, with no compliance to the conditions over the decrees and there
is no real party of interest involved to prosecute the case. The CA sustained the validity of
the decrees while brushing aside the issue on jurisdictional infirmities but nevertheless
reversed the lower court decision on the re-issuance of the decrees on the grounds that the
final decision was reserved pending compliance to the conditions imposed by the court,
hence this petition before the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of registration may be validly upheld for re-issuance in favor
to the petitioner?
Ruling:
The SC held that a land registration proceeding is in rem thus the decree of registration
is binding and conclusive against all persons and government irrespective of whether they
were personally notified of the application for registration because the publication
requirement is construed to be a notice to the whole world. The final decree of
registration is deemed to be conclusive to all matters that can be litigated in a land
registration proceeding. Both the lower court and CA found no doubt as to the finality of
the decision for the decree after 1 year of its entry to the register of deeds according to the
Torrens System. To sustain the CA requirement for compliance of the conditions to the
decree would constitute derogation to the doctrine of res judicata and such would cause
assault on the integrity and indefeasible character of the Torrens System. The issuance of
the decree is merely the ministerial act on the Land Registration Commission upon the
final judicial judgment of the court. A land registration proceeding is an in rem
proceeding in that any final judgment promulgated upon by the court binds the whole
world. The SC sets aside the decision of the CA and reinstated the decision of the lower
court.

Notice to the Whole World

Egao v CA, 174 SCRA 484 G.R. No. 79787, 29 June 1989

Facts:

The respondents filed a motion for quieting the title and recovery of possession and
ownership against the petitioners. Apparently, they claim they are the owners of the
parcel of land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto Marfori to
whom the petitioners allegedly sold their land to. The Egaos acquired their land title by
virtue of a free patent and transferred their ownership in favor of Marfori by virtue of a
deed of sale. However, the Certificate of Title was not transferred in Marforis favor.
Upon purchase of the land from Marfori, the respondents introduced improvements

thereon and paid taxes for the property. However, the petitioners illegally occupied
portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner of the land by virtue
of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent.
The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the
lower court on grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao can validly sell the
land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. The CA
holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction
provided by Commonwealth 141 against encumbrance and alienation of public lands
acquired thru free patent or homestead patent. They cannot therefore obtain affirmative
relief. It also declares the respondents as innocent purchasers for value who the obtained
the duplicate of the OCT still in the name of the Egaos from Marfori and ownership was
transferred to them by physical possession of the property. It thus promulgated judgment
holding the respondents the absolute owners of the land in dispute, to cancel the OCT of
the petitioner and its transfer thereof to the respondents and to surrender peaceful
possession of the land to the respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to Marfori to resolve
the rights of the respondents over the land in dispute?

Ruling:

The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold the lot to Marfori
within the 5-year restriction period provided by law on Free Patent based on the Deed of
Sale entered into by the parties. Although the petitioners denied the validity of the Deed
of Sale the court held that it was notarized and a notarial document has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. When the land was sold to the respondents, they know that the
OCT is still registered under the name of the petitioners. Thus, they are not considered to
be innocent purchaser as contrary to the ruling of the CA. Where a purchaser neglects to
make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and
relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the
property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser
in good faith for value. A private individual cannot bring an action for reversion or any
action which would have an effect of canceling a free patent and the certificate of title
issued on the basis thereof since the land covered will form part again of the public
domain. Sec. 124 of the Public Land Act provides that deeds of sale of patented lands,

perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period are null and void thus the Egaos have
no title to pass to Marfori and nobody can dispose that which does not belong to him. The
respondents are not innocent purchasers for value with no standing to question the rights
of the petitioners over the land and to file an action to quiet the title. The petitioners
remained to be the registered owners and entitled to remain in physical possession of the
disputed property. Respondents are ordered to deliver the OCT to the petitioners without
prejudice to an action for reversion of the land to be instituted by the Solicitor General for
the State.

Purpose of Publication
Republic of the Philippines v CA 236 SCRA 442

Sending of Notice
Jose Stillanopulos v City of Legaspi, GR No. 113913, October 12, 1999

Facts:

The City of Legaspi filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of its titles to 20 parcels of
land which certificates of title allegedly been lost during the World War II. The OCT was
ordered by the court to be reconstituted in favor of the City of Legaspi. On 1970, the City
filed a complaint for quieting of title on Lot 1 against the petitioners father and other
parties. When the petitioners father died, his title was cancelled and transferred to the
petitioner. The court upheld the title of the petitioner was declared the lawful owner of
Lot 1. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision in favor of City of Legaspi. Its appeal
before the SC was denied on grounds that the issues raised were questions of facts that
the court could not entertain. Petitioner now filed an action for the cancellation of the
OCT of the City of Legaspi which was denied by the trial court on ground of res judicata
which the CA affirms. The petitioner now files an action for annulment of said OCT
based on 3 grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud in the procurement by the City of Legaspi of its
title; (2) its OCT that was judicially reconstituted does not exist; and (3) the court
reconstituting the title lacks jurisdiction. It also contends that his father who was the
registered and possessor of said lot was omitted by the City of Legaspi in its petition for
reconstitution of title. He also asserted that his predecessor-in-interest owned lots 1 and 2
and donated lot 2 to the City of Legaspi, the deed of donation of which shows that the
respondent acknowledge his predecessor-in-interest as the absolute owner of said donated
lot.

CA ruling: The CA ruled that the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud of 4 years
already lapsed and held that the petitioner is guilty of latches for filing the annulment
case. Petitioner is further barred by res judicata between the earlier case of quieting of
title and his petition for annulment there being identical parties, issues, and cause of
action. He is also guilty of latches for not bringing the issue on lack of jurisdiction of the
court.

Issues:
Whether or not the prescriptive period for external fraud already lapsed?
Whether or not res judicata bars the petitioner for his cause of action?
Whether or not he may assail the courts jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

On extrinsic fraud

The SC held that the respondents failed to state in its petition for reconstitution of title
that lot 1 was occupied by the petitioners predecessor-in-interest and failed to notify him
of the proceeding. Therefore, the deliberate failure to notify him constitutes fraud.
Unfortunately, the action already prescribed. Granting that the respondent failed to notify
the petitioner of their application for the reconstitution of their title, it filed an action for
quieting of title against the petitioners father in 1970 praying that it be declared as the
owner of the property. Thus, as early as 1970, they were already aware of the action of
the respondents. They failed to bring action within the 4-year prescription period. The
petitioner was wrong to contend that the prescription begins to run only after the
discovery of the fraud in 1988 when counsel of petitioner received the report from the
Land Registration Commission because

On jurisdiction issue

The petitioner was right to contend that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case due to lack of notice to the petitioners predecessor-in-interest because sending of
notice to the occupant of the property subject to a land proceeding is mandatory and
jurisdictional. Thus, with failure to send the notice to the other party renders the order of
reconstitution null and void. It was wrong for the court to entertain the application for
reconstitution for in such action, the title has been destroyed or lost and a new duplicate
of certificate of title will only be re-issued. The title of the property however was in the
possession of the petitioners predecessor-in-interest thus the reconstituted title was
deemed void. Unfortunately again, the action was brought to assail the courts jurisdiction
20 years after thereby giving rise to the respondents defense on latches against the
petitioners. The petitioners contention that the equitable doctrine of latches applied
against him renders fraud and injustice to him is untenable since the SC held he had a fair
chance to bring the action in the case of quieting of title to prove his ownership over the
disputed lot.

On res judicata

The SC held that the principle of Res Judicata sets in at the case at bar. Its elements
include the following: (1) a judgment has becomes final; (2) such judgment was rendered
on the merits; (3) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and (4) there was identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action
between the previous and the subsequent action. The action for annulment appears to be a
second cycle of reviewing a subject matter that has been finally decided by the court
previously.

The petitioner was held by the court to have proven possession only over the lot during
the reconstitution proceeding. Even if the reconstitution proceeding was annulled, the
ownership of the property in favor of the respondent has already been settled in the
quieting of title proceeding. He is bound to abide to the decision of the previous case for
he allowed the trial court to proceed in determining ownership of the land and to nullify
his title.

Answer/Opposition
1. Flordeliza L. Valisno v Judge Andres B. Plan, GR No. L-55152 August 19, 1986

Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blancos and subsequently
declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by
assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba
claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and
Bienvenido Noriegas favor from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the
property and constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of
possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA
reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the
description of the property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan
provided by the respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be
completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law
that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under the Civil Code, Articles 433
and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and he
need not be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear that the
respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the apartment on
the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the
court choose the respondents evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that
shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and
landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as
mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the
property before the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the
dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court. The
CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC.
With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders both parties to submit their briefs.
Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC
considered the case submitted for decision with the brief of the respondent. The petitioner
filed a motion to amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant
to the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner?

Ruling:

The SC held that the Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to a
motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows its application in land registration
proceeding as only suppletory when it is practicable and convenient. Therefore, the court

may sustain a motion to dismiss in land registration proceeding as the case at bar. Noted
by the court in the ordinary civil case, the counterclaim can be taken as a complaint
where the defendant becomes the plaintiff. The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant
in the counterclaim and he may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in
default or file a motion to dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for the last
choice. The SC held that res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present
in the case: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment
on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of
parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent
Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not
result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to
defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. Although the first action was captioned
for the recovery of possession, possession is sought based on ownership, thus the action
was one in the nature of accion reinvidicatoria. The second action is for registration of
title where the registration is sought based on ones ownership over the property. The
difference between the two is that the plaintiff seeks to exclude other persons from
ownership over the property in the first action while it seeks to exclude the whole world
in the second action. The cause of action however remains the same. The employment of
two different actions does not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata
where one and the same cause of action cannot be litigated twice. Although the first
action was litigated before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a
registration court is of no significance since that both courts should be of equal
jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For convenience, the SC should
decide whether to dismiss the application for registration or the opposition thereto.
Because the conflicting claims of both parties have been settled and decided by the court
previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed the petition.

2. Republic of the Philippines v Alexander Lao, GR No. 150413, July 1, 2003

Facts:

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land.
She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and
Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn,
inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto
Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under
Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests
open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and
occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She

presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical
description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors names. The court
approved the application. The petitioner represented by the Solicitor General appealed the
decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for
review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to
warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required
periods and acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the
qualifications required by law on the manner of possession (continuous, adverse,
notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a bonafide claim of
ownership under C.A. 141?
Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was
disposable and alienable land of the public domain?
Ruling:
The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his title
over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years and the
land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by incontrovertible
evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time required by law. She did
not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest started occupying the
property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property from its previous owners was shown
and she did not show any relationship between the parties where she obtained her deed of
sale. She further did not present any certification from appropriate government agency to
show that the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of the public
domain. It is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these
incontrovertible evidences to support her claim for her application. In the absence of
these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her
application was denied.

D. Certificate of Title
1. A forge document may become the root of a valid title in the hands of innocent
purchaser for value.

Sps. Villamil vs Villarosa, GR No. 77167, April 17, 2009 (copied text only)
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon one who asserts that
status.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the
time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons claim.

The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies freedom from knowledge of circumstances
that ought to put aprudent person on inquiry. Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the
persons from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title. Good
faith, while always presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary requires this well-founded belief.

Indeed, we found that Villarosa had successfully discharged this burden. In the instant case, there were
no traces of bad faith on Villarosas part in acquiring the subject property
by purchase. Villarosa merely responded to a newspaper advertisement for the sale of a
parcel
of
land
with
an
unfinishedstructure located in Tierra Pura, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. He contacted the number
specified in the advertisement and was able to talk to a certain lady named
Annabelle who introduced him to the owner, Mateo Tolentino. When he visited the site, he
inquired from Mateo Tolentino about the unfinished structure and was informed that the
latter allegedly ran out of money and eventually lost interest in pursuing the construction
because of his old age. Villarosa was then given a copy of the title. He went to the Register of
Deeds and was able to verify the authenticity of the title. He also found out that the property
was mortgaged under the name of Mario Villamor, who turned out to be the employer of
Tolentino. Upon reaching an agreement on the price of P276,000.00, Villarosa redeemed the title from
Express FinancingCompany. Thereafter, the property was released from mortgage and a
deed of sale was executed. Villarosa then secured the transfer of title in his name.

Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way
oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Where there is
nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the
Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto.

This principle does not apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a
defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. One who falls within
the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good
faith.

A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if the property has already
been transferred from the name of the owner to that of the forger. This doctrine serves
to emphasize that a person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire
good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a Torrens title.

Having made the necessary inquiries and having found the title to be authentic Villarosa need not
go beyond the certificate of title. When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as
in this case, buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens
certificate of title indicates on its face. He examined the transferors title, which was then
under the name of Spouses Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize each and every title
and previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino. In sum, Villarosa was able to
establish good faith when he bought the subject property. Therefore, TCT No. 354675 issued in
his name is declared valid.
2. Buyer in Good Faith
Biblia Toledo-Banaga and Jovita Tan v CA, GR nO, 127941, January 28, 1989 (302
SCRA 331)

Facts:

Petitioner Banaga filed an action for redemption of her property which was earlier
foreclosed and later sold in a public auction to the respondent. The trial court declared
petitioner to have lost her right for redemption and ordered that certificate of title be
issued to the respondent which the petitioner caused an annotation of notice of lis
pendens to the title. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and allowed the petitioner to
redeem her property within a certain period. Banaga tried to redeem the property by
depositing to the trial court the amount of redemption that was financed by her copetitioner Tan. Respondent opposed in that she made the redemption beyond the period

ordered by the court. The lower court however upheld the redemption and ordered the
Register of Deeds to cancel the respondents title and issue a new title in favor of the
petitioner. In a petition for certiorari before the CA by the respondent, another notice of
lis pendens was annotated to the title. CA issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin
the execution of the court order. Meanwhile, Banaga sold the property to Tan in the
absolute deed of sale that mentions the title of the property still in the name of the
respondent which was not yet cancelled. Despite the lis pendens on the title, Tan
subdivided the lot into a subdivision plan which she made not in her own name but that
of the respondent. Tan then asked the Register of Deeds to issue a new title in her name.
New titles were issued in Tans name but carried the annotation of the two notices of lis
pendens. Upon learning the new title of Tan the respondent impleaded her in his petition.
The CA later sets aside the trial courts decision and declared the respondent as the
absolute owner of the property for failure of the petitioner to redeem the property within
the period ordered by the court. The decision was final and executory and ordered the
Register of Deeds to reinstate the title in the name of the respondent. The Register of
Deeds refused alleging that Tans certificate must be surrendered first. The respondent
cited the register of deeds in contempt but the court denied contending that the remedy
should be consultation with the Land Registration Commissioner and in its other order
denied the motion of respondent for writ of possession holding that the remedy would be
to a separate action to declare Tans title as void. In its motion for certiorari and
mandamus to the CA, the court set aside the two assailed orders of the trial court and
declared the title of Tan as null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate
the title in the name of the respondent. Petitioners now argued that Tan is a buyer in good
faith and raised the issue on ownership of the lot.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Tan is a buyer in good faith?

Ruling:

The court held that Tan is not a buyer in good faith because when the property was sold
to her she was aware of the interest of the respondent over the property. She even
furnished the amount used by Banaga to redeem the property. When she bought the
property from Banaga she knows that at that time the property was not registered to the
sellers name. The deed of sale mentioned the title which was named to the respondent.
Moreover the title still carries 2 notices of lis pendens. Tan therefore cannot feign
ignorance on the status of the property when she bought it. Because Tan was also

impleaded as a party to the litigation, she is bound by the decision promulgated to the
subject of such litigation. It is a settled rule that the party dealing with a registered land
need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to
guard or protect her interest. She has only to look and rely on the entries in the
Certificate of Title. By looking at the title Tan would know that the certificate is in the
name of respondent. Being a buyer in bad faith, Tan does not acquire any better right over
the property. The adjudication of the ownership in favor to the respondent includes the
delivery of the possession by the defeated party to the respondent.

3. Innocent Purchaser
Edilberto Cruz v Bancom Finance Corp. GR No. 147788, March 19, 2002

Facts:

The petitioners are the registered owners of an agricultural land. Candelaria Sanchez
introduced the petitioner to Norma Sulit who offered to buy the petitioners lot. The
asking price for the property is P7000,000 but Norma only has P25,000 which the
petitioner accepted as an earnest money with agreement that the title will be transferred in
the name of Norma after she pays the remaining balance. Norma failed to pay the balance
but negotiated to transfer the title in her name which the petitioner refused. However,
through Candelaria Sanchez the title was transferred to Norma upon the execution of a
deed of sale made by the petitioner in favor of Sanchez who obtained a bank loan using
the petitioners land as collateral. She then executed on the same day another deed of sale
in favor of Norma. Both deed of sales reflect the amount of only P150,000.00. Using the
deed of sale Norma was able to register the property in her name. Norma obtained a loan
from Bancom while mortgaging the land title. Meanwhile, a special agreement was
entered into by petitioner and Norma. When Norma failed to pay the remaining balance
stipulated in their special agreement, the petitioner filed a complaint for the reconveyance
of the land. Bancom claimed priority as mortgagee in good faith. Norma defaulted
payment with the bank and the property was foreclosed and auctioned with Bancom as
the highest bidder.

Trial Court decision: The trial court held that the contract of sale between petitioner and
Candelaria was absolutely simulated thereby producing no legal effect. Bancom was not a
mortgagee in good faith cannot claim priority rights over the property.

Court of Appeals: Reversed the RTC decision holding the deed of sale as valid and
binding and not simulated. The mortgage contract between Norma and Bancom is
likewise valid and Bancom has a priority rights over the property. It also ruled that the
petitioner intended to be bound by the sale and mortgage since they did not seek to annul
the same but instead executed a special agreement to enforce payment of the remaining
balance.

Issues:

Whether or not the sale and mortgage are valid?

Whether or not the respondent is an innocent mortgagee in good faith?

Ruling:

As a general rule, if the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous its stipulations
shall control but when its words contravene with the intention of the parties, the intention
shall prevail over the words of the contract. Simulation of contract takes place when the
parties do not want the express words of the contract to have its legal effect. It may be
absolute or relative. When parties do not intend to be bound at all it is absolute simulated
contract and considered void. When the parties conceal their true agreement, it is a
relative simulated contract and binds the parties when it does not prejudice third persons
and is not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order, and public policy. It was
shown that although a deed of absolute sale was executed in the amount of P150,000 no
consideration was involved as no exchange of money took place between them. Norma
and Candelaria also did not assert their right to ownership over the property. It was clear
that the deed of sale was simulated in order to facilitate the bank loan to be secured by
Candelaria using the property as collateral. The fact that Norma obtained registration of
the property in her name does not entitle her to ownership since the simulated deed of
sale produced no legal effect. A simulated contract is not a recognized mode of
transferring ownership.

With the contention of Bancom that it is a mortgagee in good faith, the court ruled
otherwise pointing out that it is a mortgagee-bank thus is expected to exercise greater
care and prudence when dealing with registered lands. Failure to observe due diligence
was shown with judicial notice that the bank did not conduct an ocular inspection on the

property and did not send a representative to investigate the ownership of the land, these
being a standard procedure before approving loans. It is also aware of the adverse claim
because of the notice of lis pendens annotated to the title. Because it was established that
the two deeds of sale were simulated thus null and void, it does not convey any right that
may ripen into a valid title. The mortgage was also null and void because Norma was not
the owner of the property. The property cannot be validly foreclosed by the respondent.
The court declares the petitioner to remain as the valid owner of the property.

FINALS
4. Holder in Bad Faith
Domingo Lao v Estrella Villones- Lao et al. GR NO. 126777, April 29, 1999 (306
SCRA 387)
Facts:
Domingo Lao and Estrella Lao, during their marriage, acquired a real property worth
1.5M including improvements. The property was mortgaged with Metrobank at the time
they separated. After full payment of the mortgage, Estrella was able to obtain her own
copy of the property title. The property was leased by Domingo to Filmart and learned
that the title to the property was already cancelled and a new one was issued in the name
of Villena spouses when the Villena came to visit the property and informed the tenants
that they are the new property owners. Estrella was at that time in dire need of money and
the Malanas spouses approached her and introduced themselves as agents of Carlos
Villena who is willing to grant her a loan. Carlos Villenas required Estrella to obtain a
Special Power of Attorney from Domingo and his son Ernesto who are also named in the
title as owners of the property. Estrella admitted it would be difficult to obtain the SPA
because she and her husband are not on good and speaking terms. The Malana spouses
however assured her that they could help her obtain the SPA. 3 days after they returned to
Villena with the SPA and was able to secure the loan. Upon failure of Estrella to pay,
Carlos Villena effected an extrajudicial foreclosure of the property and a new certificate
of title was issued in favor of the Villena spouses. Domingo filed a complaint for the
annulment of the SPA, mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure, cancellation of the TCT
and reconveyance of title.
The lower court ruled in favor of Domingo and ordered spouses Villena and Malanas
together with Estrella to jointly and severally pay for damages and litigation costs to
Domingo while Villena can recover the indebtedness of Estrella through an ordinary suit.
In its modified judgment the court further ordered the Villenas to vacate the premises and
a new Cert. of title to be issued to Domingo and Estrella Lao with 20% share to Ernesto
Lao.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision declaring the mortgage and foreclosure sale
valid and ordered the transfer of the title to the Villena spouses. It held that the
respondents are mortgagees in good faith and not privy to the forgery of the SPA and the
petitioner was negligent to entrust the title to Estrella.
Issue: Whether or not the Villena spouses are mortgagees in good faith?
Ruling:
The court ruled that it was established that the Malana spouses are the agent brokers of
Villena and not of Estrella. The court believes that the Malanas and Villena are business
partners in credit financing. They were the ones who approached Estrella and offered the
loan to be financed by Villena. Estrella informed Carlos Villena about the difficulty of
securing the signature of Domingo yet they pursue the offer of loan with the Malanas
helping to secure the SPA. Estrella was just asked to sign a black SPA with her signature
affixed on the portion stating with my marital consent. She did not read and understand
the document. They took advantage of her dire need for money at that time. The
participation of the Malanas extends beyond as mere witness to the mortgage while
Villena was aware of the situation. Estrella as a co-owner is entitled to obtain her own
copy of the title of the property thus she cant be denied to secure her own title. The
court has reason to believe that Villena feign his innocence on the flawed character
of the SPA contending that as a legitimate businessman he should exercise due
diligence to consider the fact dealing with a conjugal property of an estranged wife.
The NBI also confirmed that the signatures of Domingo and Ernesto are forged.
Therefore the mortgage contract is deemed to be invalid and likewise the foreclosure is
also invalid. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the
protection of the law, for the law can not be used as a shield for fraud. The court
revived and affirmed the lower court decision.

5. Indefeasibility of Title
Pacifico Garing v Heirs of Marco Silva, et. al. GR No. 150173, September 5, 2007
(532 SCRA 294)
Facts:
Pacifico Garing and his wife filed before the RTC complaint for reconveyance of
property alleging that they are the lawful possessor of the Lot C of a subdivision plan
bounded southeast by the Mangop River. Over the years accretion caused by the Mangop
River led to the formation of land between the river and Lot C. He alleges that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of this land formation and cultivated the
same. Marcos Silva informed him that the two lots are within the boundaries of his
property and was later ordered to stop gathering coconuts from the said lots. They assail
the Original Cert. of Title issued to Marcos Silva to have unlawfully included in its Lot

No. 4891-B the two parcels of land they allegedly possess. The heirs of Silva answered
that they are the lawful owner of the said lots and that the petitioner forcibly with threat
took possession of the said lots. Pending the case for reconveyance of property, Jose
Acosta, another respondent filed a motion for intervention. He alleges to have purchased
the two lots from the heirs of Silva as shown by extrajudicial partition and simultaneous
sale and contends that the petitioners were present when they have the lot surveyed. They
did not raise any objection thereto. He further raise that the original registration for Lot
No. 4891-B was on Aug. 5, 1969 and the petitioner filed its complaint only on March 14,
1984 thus the action has already prescribed.
The lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit declaring the respondents as
the lawful owner of the lot in dispute. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court
decision holding that the petitioners claim that the formation of the lot was due to
accretion is without any supporting evidence. In the absence of concrete proof, it is
proper for the court to rule that the said lot is included in the title of respondent
covering Lot No. 4891-B. Jose Acosta has the right to rely solely on what appears on
the certificate of title of Silva as the vendor of the property except when he is
required to make the necessary inquiry in case of any cloud in the ownership of the
property. Under the Torrens Law, the Original Certificate of Title and that of the owners
duplicate certificate copy can be received as evidence in all Philippine courts and shall be
conclusive on all matters contained therein and principally with regards to the identity of
the property owner. And if there are pre-existing claims and liens which existed prior to
the issuance of the Certificate of Title, they are cut off if not noted thereon and the
certificate so issued binds the whole world.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are the lawful owner of the land in dispute.
Ruling:
It was held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and only questions of law may be
raised before it. It however held that the findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive.

E. ISSUANCE OF OWNERS DUPLICATE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Redon Realty Group, Inc. v CA

F. EFFECTS OF REGISTRATION
1. Ernesto David et al v Cristito Malay GR No. 132644, November 19, 1999 (318
SCRA 711)
Andres Adona (married to) Leoncia Abad
Carmen (daughter) married to Filomeno Malay
Cristito

Nora

Dionisio (children RESPONDENTS)

Andres Adona (co-habited with) Ma. Espiritu

Esperanza (daughter) - represented by her heirs surnamed David as PETITIONER
Fulgencio Lemque (son of Ma. Espiritu from first marriage) represented by his heirs as
PETITIONERS.
Facts:
Andres Adona, married to Leoncia Abad, applied for a homestead patent over a parcel of
agricultural land. When Leoncia died, he cohabited with Ma. Espiritu without the benefit
of marriage. When Andres died Ma. Espiritu succeeded in obtaining title over the land in
her name. After Maria Espiritu died, her children as well as descendants of Andres Adona
by his marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in peaceful and quiet possession of
the subject land. The petitioners executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement with sale over
the property to Mrs. Ungson. Respondents protested contending they are the true owners
of the land. The sale was however rescinded because Mrs. Ungson failed to pay in full the
amount agreed upon. Subsequently, the petitioners executed another deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale, dividing equally among themselves the land and sold their
respective shares to their co-petitioner Ubago et al. where an Original Cert. of Title was
issued in their favor on Nov. 27, 1992. Respondents filed a complaint for annulment of
sale with restraining order, injunction and damages against the petitioners contending that
the Original Cert. of Title was obtained by Ma. Espiritu by false representation as the
widow of Andres Adona.
Lower court ruling: dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and on ground
of prescription. The action, being an annulment of sale based on fraudulent titling of the
property constitutes a cause of action of a collateral attack on the Torrens Title. Even if
the action was treated as one of conveyance, the suit will still fail because the action for
reconveyance could be brought within 10 years from the date of issuance of certificate of
title and the action has already prescribed.

Court of Appeals ruling: set aside dismissal of lower court and ordered the cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the Ubagos and reconveyance of the
property of the estate of Andres Adona. There was evidence that Ma. Espiritu concealed
the existence of Adonas first marriage to Leoncia from her executed affidavit filed with
the Director of Lands. The attending fraud created an implied or constructive trust in
favor of the plaintiffs and notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens Title issued in
favor of Ma. Espiritu they can still be compelled to reconvey the title of the property to
the real owners. The Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not the certificate of title of the Ubagos may be collaterally attacked and the property
can be reconveyed to the respondents?
Ruling;
The issuance of a certificate of title of disposable public land and certificate of title issued under a
judicial registration proceeding is deemed indefeasible. Under the Land Registration Act, a
Torrens title becomes indefeasible after 1 year from the date of the decree of registration.
The decree becomes incontrovertible and binding on all persons whether notified or not
being an in rem proceeding. The OCT of Ma. Espiritu was issued in December 1933 and
becomes indefeasible a year after the decree. However, the attendance of fraud created an implied
trust in favor of the respondents that gave them the right of action to seek the remedy of
reconveyance of a property wrongfully obtained if the property has not yet been passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. If the property has been passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, the remedy would be an action for damages. The Court of Appeals did
not err to treat the action for annulment of sale with damages as one for reconveyance.
If the person who claims to be the owner of the property is in actual possession thereof, the right
to reconvey does not prescribe. An action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes
in 10 years. However, the person who is in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of
ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him continued right to seek the aid of court
to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim of a third party on his title. The prescription of 10
years on reconveyance based on implied trust is applied only to persons who are not in
actual possession of the property.
The Ubagos are not buyer in good faith. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys
property of another without knowledge that other persons may have right or interest to the
property and pays a full consideration of the same before he has notice of the claim or interest of
others to the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives
the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. It is true that a person dealing with
a registered land has the right to rely on the face of a Torrens title and may dispense with the need
to make further inquiry. An exception would be when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances attending to the title that would impel a reasonably prudent man to make an
inquiry or he has some knowledge as to the defect on the title or lack of right of the vendor. The
court finds out that in the Register of Deeds their Transfer of Certificate of Title has entry that
provides that their ownership over the land is subject to prospective claims by any possible heirs

and creditors who might have been deprived of their lawful participation in the estate. Rule 74,
section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for 2 years after the settlement and distribution of
an estate for any person or heirs who may have been unlawfully deprived of their
participation in the distribution of an estate to bring action to compel the settlement of the
estate in the courts in the manner provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful
participation. The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale was executed on December
15, 1990 while the plaintiffs complaint for Reconveyance was filed on December 7, 1992.
Hence, the two-year period has not yet elapsed.

2. Bernardino Ramos and Rosalia Oli v CA GR No. 1110227, February 3, 1999 (302
SCRA 589)
Facts:
Pedro Tolentino who claims ownership over Lots 572 and 579 separately sold each lot to
the petitioners, Bernardino Ramos. The petitioners instituted an action for reconveyance
with damages against the respondents, Rodolfo Bautista and Felisa Lopez who allegedly
wrongfully registered the said lots in their name. The respondents acquired their title
from Lucia Bautista to whom a Certificate of title covering both lots is issued by the
Register of Deeds. As Lucias heir, Rodolfo is able to acquire title to the lots through a
Transfer of Certificate of Title. Petitioners contend that they are in open, public,
continuous, and adverse possession of said lots for not less than 50 years personally and
through their predecessors-in-interest and that Lucia neither claimed ownership thereto
nor took possession of the same. They assail the Certificate of Title in the name of the
respondents as null and void and that they have acquired the lots by acquisitive
prescription. Respondents claims absolute ownership over the said lots pointing out that
based from the cadastral survey, Pedro Tolentino was able to acquire only a different lot
that is adjacent to Lot 572 which is the portion occupied by the petitioners by tolerance of
the original registrant Lucia Bautista. In the affirmative defense respondents maintained
that the action for reconveyance brought by the petitioners is tantamount to a collateral
attack to the decrees of registration while asserting the indefeasible of the Torrens Title.
The lower court ruled to dismiss the petition citing the cadastral proceeding in 1940
where Bernardino Ramos did not answer to the proceeding despite his claim of
possession over the lots and only Lucia filed an answer and appeared to be the lawful
claimant in the proceedings thus was issued an Original Certificate of Title to the lots in
dispute. The trial court presumed that everyone is notified of the cadastral proceeding, it
being in rem in nature. The petitioner has 1 year from the issuance of the decree to file for
the reopening of the proceeding on ground of fraud but he did not do so. Latches against
him have set in for filing the action for reconveyance 36 years after. The court of appeals
upheld the decision of the lower court hence this petition before the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the registered title of the respondents can be attacked by the petitioners?
Ruling:

Petitioners anchor their claim for ownership over the parcels of land by virtue of the deed
of sale executed between them and Pedro Tolentino. However, they failed to present
evidence according to the forms required by law. The deed of sale was apparently lost by
a fire from their counsels office and in lieu thereof they presented a certification from a
notary public who was their other lawyer attesting to the authenticity of the certified true
copy of the deed of sale. The certification however does not meet the requirement of law
provided in section 20 of Rule 132 where before a private document be received as
authentic it must be proved by anyone who witness the execution of the document or
there is genuineness on the signature of the maker presented in evidence. They failed to
present any witness to the execution of said document and they could not demonstrate the
genuineness of the signature from the document as it does not bear any signature of the
maker. Furthermore, even if there is authenticity to the document, the basic civil law
principle of relativity of contract operates and it cannot bind third party like Lucia.
Failure to register the contract of sale to the said lot, the sale was merely binding between
the petitioner and the vendor. Petitioners presented evidence of mortgage of the property
but those did not conform to the form required by law. The instrument did not sufficiently
describe the property of the mortgage therefore it would be difficult for the court to
assume that the property mortgage was the same as the subject of dispute. Their claim of
possession of not less than 50 years on the property can be construed as a bare claim and
it is upon the petitioner to have the burden of proving their claim of possession to the lot
which they failed to prove in court. Their claim of fraud was not substantiated. Under
the law, an action for reconveyance on ground of fraud prescribed in 4 years which
is counted from the issuance of the registration of title to Lucia Bautista because the
registration served as a constructive notice to the whole world. On one hand, an
action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This
means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the
time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property. But
the petitioners failed to avail of any of the aforementioned remedies within the prescribed
periods. Private respondents have in their favor the law that protects holders of title under
the Torrens System of land registration. Petition was denied.

G. FREE PATENT
Francisco Baguio v RP, GR No. 119682, January 21, 1999 (301 SCRA 450)
Facts:
William Michael filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of a
public land. The application was recommended for approval by the land investigator who
also recommended that the applicant be granted a provisional permit to occupy the land
for one year. By virtue of the permit, Michael made reclamation of the land introducing
improvements therein. Upon the expiration of the permit the Highways District Engineer
recommended to the Director of Lands that the land be leased to Michael. On the other
hand, the land investigator recommended granting Michael the authority to survey the
foreshore land in view of the completion of the reclamation made by him on the

premises. On February 25, 1968, Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application covering
the reclaimed foreshore land. On the other hand, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau
of Lands for a free patent over the same land stating that the land was agricultural and he
has been in actual and continuous possession of the same. A free patent was issued in
Baguios favor by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The petitioner now demands rental
payment from Michael for using the land occupied by Michael Slipways, Inc. and filed an
opposition to Michaels miscellaneous sales application on the said land. In turn, Michael
filed a protest on the issuance of the free patent to Baguio by the Bureau of Lands since
he is the actual possessor of the land since 1963 and introduced substantial improvement
thereon.
Upon recommendation of the Land Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the government filed a petition for the cancellation
of the patent and reversion of land to the public domain. Ricardo Michael was allowed to
intervene as heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael. The trial court cancelled
the free patent of Baguio and ordered the reversion of the land to public domain. It ruled
that the false statement that Baguio made in his application for free patent had the effects
of ipso facto canceling the free patent granted to him. On appeal, petitioner assails the
court decision of cancelling his patent since the action has already prescribed and that it
erred in ruling that he acted in bad faith and procured the registration of his free patent
through fraud and misrepresentation.
Issue:
Whether or not the free patent of the petitioner may be cancelled?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court that while a Torrens Title becomes indefeasible within 1 year
after its registration the State may still bring action for reversion of a parcel of land
to the public domain covered by a Torrens title obtained through fraud because such
action is not barred by prescription as provided by Commonwealth 141. Public
policy demands that one who obtains title from a public land through fraud should not be
allowed to benefit from it. The declaration of the petitioner in his application for patent
under oath that the land is an agricultural land not claimed or occupied by another person,
that he is in actual and continuous possession of the land constitute fraud and
misrepresentation. Records show 13 years before the alleged occupation of the petitioner
to the land, Michael already filed a foreshore lease application over the same and since
then it was Michael who was in actual possession of said land by operating a dry docking
service and made some improvements thereon. It was also established that the land in
dispute is a foreshore land and not agricultural. The false statement made by petitioner in
his application justifies the immediate cancellation of his title. The indefeasibility
principle of Torrens System does not apply on titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. The registration of a patent under the Torrens System merely
confirms the registrants title. It does not vest title where there is none because
registration under this system is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Michael has been in possession of the land by virtue of provisional permit granted to him
to occupy the same 13 years before the petitioner filed his application for a free patent

and Michael filed a sales application over the land 8 years prior to the petitioners
application. Thus, it was correct for the court to rule that William Michael and his
successor-in-interest Ricardo Michael as the true and rightful possessor of the land. Sec.
105 of the Public Land Act provides that in case of death of the original applicant he can
be succeeded in his rights and obligations by his legal heirs with respect to the land
applied for or leased therefore Ricardo Michael is entitled to the possession of the land as
contrary to what the petitioner asserts.

H. Double Sale of Immovable Property

Pagaduan v Sps Ocumo, GR No. 176308, May 8, 2009

Romeo Co. v CA GR No. 93687, May 6, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner Marcelita Co brought two parcels of land. She sold one of the lots and the other
lot was titled in the name of her brother Ruperto Padonan as a trustee of the property and
a house was constructed thereon. In furtherance of their trust agreement, Ruperto
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Marcelita who took possession of the house
and lot. The deed of sale however was not registered. More than a year later, Ruperto
executed another deed of sale of the house and lot registered in his name in favor of the
respondent Eduardo Memije who was unable to take possession of the properties because
the petitioners are occupying the same. Respondent now sued for recovery of possession
and quieting of title but it was dismissed. Thereafter they filed petition for writ of
possession in the original land registration proceeding, which the lower court issued but
was set aside by the appellate court. Petitioner now filed an action to annul the deed of
sale and title against the respondents before the RTC of Caloocan City. This was
dismissed on ground of improper venue. Respondents filed for the recovery of possession
of the property and the petitioner raised the affirmative defense of fraud on their
ownership of the property and interposed the same as compulsory counterclaim instead of
re-filing a separate action for annulment of the deed of sale executed in favor of the
respondents.
Lower court: ruled against petitioner
CA: affirmed lower court decision with modification citing that an action to recover
possession of realty attacking the transfer certificate of title by way of affirmative defense
on ground of fraud committed by Ruperto when he sold the property to respondent is an
improper procedure as this constitutes an attack to the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title.
Petitioner should have pursued their original complaint for the annulment of deed of sale

which was dismissed without prejudice of re-filing it again before the proper court at
Malabon. Moreover, the respondents have the right to possession being the registered
owners of the property.
Issue:
Who has the better right of possession over the property between the petitioner and
respondent?
Ruling:
The petitioner filed an affirmative defense on attacking the validity of the deed of
absolute sale executed by Ruperto to the respondents and at the same time attacking the
Transfer of Certificate of Title of the respondents over the property issued by the Register
of Deeds of Rizal by virtue of the same deed. Attacking the TCT of the respondents by
way of affirmative defense is an improper procedure. The petitioner should have pursued
its case filed at the RTC of Caloocan annulling the deed of sale and title with damages
before the RTC of Malabon as the proper venue for the action.
The affirmative defense by the petitioner alleging fraudulent connivance between
Ruperto and respondents cannot overcome the evidence of the respondents ownership
over the title covered by the Torrens Title. It was held that the respondents were in good
faith with no attendance of fraud when they acquired title over the property because they
already paid and registered the property before they know of the adverse claim of the
petitioner. Respondent paid for the mortgage over the property and thereafter Ruperto
executed the deed of sale. By virtue of such deed, the Register of Deeds released the
mortgage over said property and issued a Transfer of Certificate of Title in the name of
the respondents. The keys of the house were given to them by Ruperto however they
were not able to possess the property because petitioners prevented them from doing so.
Although having reported the matter to Ruperto, no further action was taken thus the
respondents sought to take judicial recourse.
Petitioner asserts that no double sale took place because the sale made by Ruperto to
them is by virtue of their trust agreement. However the court held that the respondents are
not privy of such agreement, the conflict of which is only between the petitioner and
Ruperto. Respondents mainly relied on the clean transfer of certificate of title in the name
of Ruperto, the title of which does not contain annotation of such trust agreement. The
Civil Code provides that on the question of double sale of immovable property, the
ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it
to the Registry of Property. Therefore the respondents were held as the rightful owner
of the property in dispute.