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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
THIRDDIVISION
G.R.No.169888November11,2008
RAMONY.TALAGA,JR.,CityMayor,LucenaCity,petitioner
vs.
HON.SANDIGANBAYAN,4thDivision,andPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:
HereinspecialcivilactionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourtseeksthenullificationof
theResolution1 dated October 3, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan issued in Criminal Case No. 27738
whereMayorRamonY.Talaga,Jr.(petitioner)andtheCityCouncilorsareprosecutedforviolationof
theAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct:RepublicAct(R.A.)No.3019,asamended.
The assailed Resolution ordered petitioner's preventive suspension for ninety (90) days in
accordancewithSection13ofR.A.No.3019.
Thefactsofthecase:
CriminalandadministrativecomplaintswerefiledbyElanRecreation,Inc.(ELAN)againstpetitioner
withtheOfficeoftheOmbudsman.Thecomplaintsallegedthatpetitioner,inhiscapacityasmayorof
theCityofLucena,hadunlawfullygrantedfavorstoathirdpartywithrespecttotheoperationofbingo
gamesinthecity,tothedamageandprejudiceofthecomplainants.2
On May 23, 2003, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon recommended the dismissal of
boththecriminalandadministrativecomplaints.3However,theOmbudsmanapprovedthedismissal
oftheadministrativecasebutdeniedthedismissalofthecriminalcase.
Asaresult,theOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutorrecommendedthefilingofthreecriminalchargesfor
violationofR.A.No.3019:
1. Criminal Case No. 27737. For causing undue injury to complainants when petitioner as
mayor of Lucena City vetoed an ordinance granting a local franchise to the complainants to
operatebingogamesinthecity
2. Criminal Case No. 27738. For giving unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by
approvinganordinancegrantingtoSyBangalocalfranchisetooperatebingogamesin
thecityand
3.CriminalCaseNo.27739.Forcausingundueinjurytocomplainantswhenpetitionerclosed
downtheirbingooperationstemporarily.(Emphasissupplied)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation4 questioning the finding of the Special
Prosecutor.TheMotionforReconsiderationwasdeniedbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsman.

OnMay17,2003,petitionerfiledamotiontoquashthethreeinformations.5OnFebruary9,2004,the
Sandinganbayan issued a Resolution6 quashing the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 27737 and
27739. However, it sustained the Information in Criminal Case No. 27738. In the said Resolution,
respondentreferredCriminalCaseNo.27738backtotheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandorderedthe
lattertoconductfurtherpreliminaryinvestigationtodeterminethepossibleliabilityofthemembersof
theCityCouncilwhichpassedOrdinanceNo.1963insaidcase.7
An Amended Information8 and Second Amended Information9 were filed by the prosecution in the
Sandiganbayan.ThefirstincludedthemembersoftheCityCouncilofLucenaCity(CityCouncilors),
as additional accused, while the Second Amended Information (Information) alleged conspiracy
between petitioner and the City Councilors. Over the opposition10 of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan
admittedbothamendedinformations.11
OnFebruary21,2005,petitionerandtheCityCouncilorsfiledaMotiontoQuash12theInformationon
thegroundthatthereisnovalidinformationonwhichtheSandiganbayanhasafindingofprobable
cause because the second amended information's allegations do not constitute an offense, there
beingnoviolationofPresidentialDecree(P.D.)No.771asithasnoapplicabilitytobingooperations
and P.D. No. 771 has been superceded by P.D. No. 1869 and R.A. No 7160. The Sandiganbayna
denied13thepetitionanditlikewisedeniedpetitioner'sMotionforReconsideration.14
OnJune29,2005,petitionerandtheCityCouncilorswerearraignedinCriminalCaseNo.27738and
allpleaded"notguilty".
OnJuly5,2005,theprosecutionfiledaMotiontoSuspendtheAccused
Pendente Lite.15 Petitioner and his coaccused filed an Opposition16 to the motion. Thereafter,
respondentorderedthesuspensionofthepetitionerandhiscoaccused,towit:
xxxx
WHEREFORE,theprosecution'smotionforsuspensionpendenteliteisherebyGRANTED,and
accused Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., Godofredo V. Faller, Danilo R. Zaballero, Salome S. Dato,
SimonN.Aldovino,WilfredoF.Asilo,andAuroraC.GarciaareherebydirectedtoCEASEand
DESIST from further performing and/or exercising the functions, duties, and privileges of their
positionsasCityMayor,andCityCouncilorsofLucenaCity,respectively,oranyotherpositions
theymaynoworhereafterbeholdingeffectiveimmediatelyuponreceipthereofandcontinuing
foratotalperiodofninety(90)days.17
Petitionerthenfiledthepresentpetitionforcertiorariwithanurgentapplicationfortheissuanceofa
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
CourtissuedaTemporaryRestrainingOrderonNovember9,2005enjoiningpublicrespondentsfrom
implementingthesuspensionofpetitioner.18
Assailinghissuspension,petitioneralleges:
I
THEPUBLICRESPONDENTCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONAMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IN ABDICATION OF ITS
CONSTITUTIONALDUTYTORESOLVEAJUDICIALCONTROVERSY,ITISMINISTERIAL
DUTYTOISSUEAPREVENTIVESUSPENSIONORDERAGAINSTTHEPETITIONERAND
THEREARENOIFSANDBUTSABOUTIT.
II
ASSUMINGTHATTHEISSUANCEOFTHEPREVENTIVESUSPENSIONISMANDATORY,
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE

SUSPENSIONOFTHEPETITIONERASSECTION13OFREPUBLICACTNO.3019,WHICH
FORMSTHEBASISOFTHEORDEROFSUSPENSION,ISUNCONSTITUTIONALONTHE
GROUND THAT IT IMPINGES UPON THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE
JUDICIARY.
III
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE
SUSPENSION OF HEREIN PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE EXISTS NO
VALIDINFORMATIONUNDERWHICHPETITIONERSTANDSCHARGED.19
Thepetitionisdevoidofmerit.
Petitionerarguesthatrespondentcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionwheninimposingthesanction
ofsuspension,itonlyreliedonthe"mandatory"provisionofSection13insensatetotheweightand
cogency of the peculiar circumstances of the case before it.20 Moreover, petitioner argues that the
bare reliance of respondent on Section 13 without calibrating the weight of diverse and dueling
evidencepertinenttotheissueofappropriatenessoforderinghissuspensionisaclearabdicationof
respondent'sconstitutionaldutytoexerciseitsjudicialfunction.21Inaddition,petitionercontendsthat
respondent should have looked into the "environmental circumstances" of the case and thus it was
unwarranted to apply the presumption in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan22 that unless the accused is
suspended,hemayfrustrateorcommitfurtheractsofmalfeasanceordoboth.
PetitionerasksthisCourttofirstlookintothecircumstancesofthecaseandthereafterdeterminethe
proprietyofissuingasuspensionorder.TheCourtcouldnotbemoreexplicitthanitsrulinginSegovia
v.Sandiganbayan,23thus:
Petitioners would now have this Court strike down these resolutions because supposedly
renderedinexcessofjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.TheCourtwillnotdoso.In
no sense may the challenged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical,
oppressive, egregiously erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for invalidation by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. On the contrary, in promulgating those resolutions, the
Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear command of the law and what it calls a "mass of
jurisprudence"emanatingfromthisCourt,sustainingitsauthoritytodecreesuspensionofpublic
officials and employees indicted before it. Indeed that the theory of "discretionary
suspension" should still be advocated at this late date, despite the "mass of
jurisprudence" relevant to the issue, is little short of amazing, bordering on
contumaciousdisregardofthesolemnmagisterialpronouncementsoftheHighestCourt
oftheland.24
xxxx
While petitioners concede that this Court has "almost consistently ruled that the
preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory in
character,"theynonethelessurgetheCourttoconsidertheircaseanexceptionbecause
ofthe"peculiarcircumstances"thereof.Theyassertthattheevilssoughttobeavoidedby
"separatingapublicofficialfromthesceneofhisallegedmisfeasancewhilethesameisbeing
investigated" e.g., "to preclude the abuse of the prerogative of (his) office, such as through
intimidation of witnesses,"or the tampering with documentary evidence will not occur in the
presentsituationwhere:
1.TheProjecthasbeencanceled.
2. (Their) ** official duties no longer pertain, in any manner, to the prequalification of
contractors dealing with NPC. Neither are they now involved in any bidding for or
awardingofcontracts,**it(being)emphasized(inthisconnection)thattheyweremerely

designated as ad hoc members of the Committee without additional compensation for

theiradditionalduties.
3.AlltherelevantdocumentaryevidencehadbeeneithersubmittedtotheOmbudsmanor
totheHonorableSandiganbayan.
Theyconcludethattheirpreventivesuspension"atthispointwouldactuallybepurposeless,as
there is no more need for precautionary measures against their abuse of the prerogatives of
theiroffice."
The arguments are not new. They have been advanced and rejected in earlier cases.
Theywillagainbesorejectedinthiscase.
TheCourt'spronouncementsinBolastigv.Sandiganbayan,aregermane:
x x x The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or
otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension.
The other one is, to prevent the accused from committing further acts of
malfeasancewhileinoffice.25(Emphasissupplied)
Ineluctably, the theory of petitioner that "environmental circumstances" of the case should first be
exploredhasnolegtostandon.
Section13,R.A.No.3019,otherwiseknownastheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct,provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convictedbyfinaljudgment,heshallloseallretirementorgratuitybenefitsunderanylaw,butif
heisacquitted,heshallbeentitledtoreinstatementandtosalariesandbenefitswhichhefailed
to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filedagainsthim.(Emphasissupplied)
InBeroav.Sandiganbayan,26theCourtexplicitlyruled:
Section 13 is so clear and explicit that there is hardly room for any extended court
rationalizationofthelaw.Section13unequivocallymandatesthesuspensionofapublicofficial
from office pending a criminal prosecution under R.A. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the Revised
PenalCodeorforanyoffenseinvolvingpublicfundsorpropertyorfraudongovernment.This
Courthasrepeatedlyheldthatsuchpreventivesuspensionismandatory,andthereareno"ifs"
and"buts"aboutit.
As early as Lucianov.Mariano,27the Court has set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower
courtsintheexerciseofthepowerofsuspension,towit:
xxxx
(c)Bywayofbroadguidelinesforthelowercourtsintheexerciseofthepowerofsuspension
fromofficeofpublicofficerschargedunderavalidinformationundertheprovisionsofRepublic
ActNo.3019orundertheprovisionsoftheRevisedPenalCodeonbribery,pursuanttosection
13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court
should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the
cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a
motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the
information or challenges the validity thereof, such showcause order of the trial court
wouldnolongerbenecessary.Whatisindispensableisthatthetrialcourtdulyhearthe
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter
hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold

thevalidityoftheinformationorwithholdsuchsuspensioninthecontrarycase.
(d)Nospecificrulesneedbelaiddownforsuchpresuspensionhearing.Sufficeittostatethat
the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminaryinvestigation,theactforwhichhestandschargeddonotconstituteaviolationofthe
provisionsofRepublicActNo.3019orofbriberyprovisionsoftheRevisedPenalCodewhich
would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he may
presentamotiontoquashtheinformationonanyofthegroundsprovidedintheRule117ofthe
Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the act upon determination of the
pendencyincourtorcriminalprosecutionforviolationoftheAntiGraftActorforbriberyundera
valid information requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly
protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial
court,say,findsthegroundallegedinthequashalmotionnottobeindubitable,thenitshallbe
calledupontoissuethesuspensionorderuponitsupholdingthevalidityoftheinformationand
settingthesamefortrialonthemerits.28(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)
Stated differently, the purpose of the law in requiring a presuspension hearing is to determine the
validity of the information so that the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceedwiththetrialonthemeritsofthecase,orwithholdthesuspensionanddismissthecase,or
correctanypartoftheproceedingsthatimpairsitsvalidity.Thathearingissimilartoachallengeto
thevalidityoftheinformationbywayofamotiontoquash.29Inthiscase,respondenthaddetermined
thevalidityoftheInformationwhenpetitionerfiledhisMotiontoQuash.Thehearingsorproceedings
heldthereon,ineffect,constitutedapresuspensionhearing.Respondenthasfollowedthedictatesof
thelaw.
ThisbringstheCourttopetitioner'sthirdassignederrorthatthereisnovalidInformationunderwhich
petitionerstandscharged.
In effect, petitioner is stating once again that the allegations in the Information do not constitute an
offense. Petitioner is holding on to a thin straw in claiming that the Information is fatally defective
since it failed to allege that petitioner by enacting and approving Ordinance No. 1963 had "caused
injury to any party, whether the government or private party", an essential element in the crime
charged.
TheInformationreads:
That on or about June 5, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Lucena City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
RAMON TALAGA , JR., being the City Mayor of Lucena, Quezon and GODOFREDO V.
FALLER, VICTOR U. PAULO, DANILO R. ZABALLERO, SALOME S. DATO, SIMON N.
ALDOVINO, WILFREDO F. ASILO, PHILIP M. CASTILLO, AURORA C. GARCIA, ROMANO
FRANCO C. TALAGA, being members of the City Council of Lucena City, while in the
performanceoftheirofficialand/oradministrativefunctions,committingtheoffenseinrelationto
theiroffice,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfully,andcriminally,withevidentbadfaithand/or
manifest partiality, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping such other, give
unwarranted benefit to Jose Sy Bang of Lucena City, by then and there, in conspiracy
with each other, by enacting and approving Ordinance No. 1963, series of 2000 dated
June 5, 2000 granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo
businessinLucenaCityinviolationofPresidentialdecreeNo.771.(Emphasissupplied)
Section3(e)ofR.A.No.3019,underwhichpetitionerischarged,provides:
Section3.Corruptpracticesofpublicofficers.Inadditiontoactsoromissionsofpublicofficers
alreadypenalizedbyexistinglaw,thefollowingshallconstitutecorruptpracticesofanypublic
officerandareherebydeclaredtobeunlawful:
xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
partyanyunwarrantedbenefits,advantageorpreferenceinthedischargeofhisofficial,
administrativeorjudicialfunctionsthroughmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithorgross
inexcusablenegligence.Thisprovisionshallapplytoofficersandemployeeschargedwiththe
grantoflicensesorpermitsorotherconcessions.(Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)
Contrarytotheargumentofpetitioner,thelawdoesnotrequirethattheinformationmustallegethat
the acts in question "caused injury to any party, whether the government or private party." The
presence of the word "or" clearly shows that there are two acts which can be prosecuted under
Section3:First,causinganyundueinjurytoanyparty,includingthegovernment,and,Second,giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantages or preference. Moreover, in Quibal v.
Sandiganbayan,30theCourtruledthatviolationofSection3(e)ofR.A.No.3019requiresproofofthe
followingfacts:
xxxx
1.HisactioncausedundueinjurytotheGovernmentoranyprivateparty,or gave any party
anyunwarrantedbenefit,advantageorpreferencetosuchparties.31
Section 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court provides the guideline for the determination of the validity or
sufficiencyofallegationsinaninformation,towit:
SECTION9.CauseoftheAccusation.Theactsoromissionscomplainedofasconstitutingthe
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
chargedaswellasitsqualifyingandaggravatingcircumstancesandforthecourttopronounce
judgment.(Emphasissupplied)
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise
the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to
enabletheaccusedtosuitablypreparehisdefense.32
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges against
him.TheInformationchargedthepetitionerofevidentbadfaithandmanifestpartialitywhenasMayor
ofLucenaCity,petitioner,inconspiracywiththeCityCouncil,gaveunwarrantedbenefitstoJoseSy
Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits,
namely,grantinguntothesaidJoseSyBangalocalfranchisetooperateabingobusinessinLucena
Cityinviolationofexistinglaws.Theseallegationsareclearenoughforalaymantounderstand.
Finally, petitioner's second assigned error deserves scant consideration. The validity of Section 13,
R.A. No. 3019 may no longer be put at issue, the same having been repeatedly upheld by this
Court.33 Basic is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justifyitsnullification,theremustbeaclearandunequivocalbreachoftheConstitution,andnotone
thatisdoubtful,speculativeorargumentative.34
The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive
suspensionliesinthecourtinwhichthecriminalchargeisfiledonceacaseisfiledincourt,allother
acts connected with the discharge of court functions including preventive suspension should be
acknowledgedaswithinthecompetenceofthecourtthathastakencognizancethereof,noviolation
of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgement.35 As earlier
mentioned, the court must first determine the validity of the information through a presuspension
hearing.Butonceaproperdeterminationofthevalidityoftheinformationhasbeenmade,itbecomes
theministerialdutyofthecourttoforthwithissuetheorderofpreventivesuspension.36
WHEREFORE,theinstant petitionisDISMISSED, there being no showing that the Sandiganbayan
gravelyabuseditsdiscretioninissuingitsResolutionofOctober3,2005,preventivelysuspendingthe
petitionerforninety(90)days.TheTemporaryRestrainingOrderdatedNovember9,2005islifted.

SOORDERED.
MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJustice
ActingChairperson
WECONCUR:

*ANTONIOT.CARPIO

AssociateJustice
**RENATOC.CORONA

***ADOLFOS.AZCUNA

AssociateJustice

AssociateJustice

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice
ATTESTATION
IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecase
wasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.
MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJustice
ActingChairperson,ThirdDivision

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certifythattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecase
wasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt'sDivision.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
*InlieuofJusticeConsueloYnaresSantiago,perRaffledatedOctober13,2008.
**InlieuofJusticeMinitaV.ChicoNazario,perRaffledatedOctober13,2008.
***InlieuofJusticeRubenT.Reyes,perSpecialOrderNo.521.
1PennedbyAssociateJusticeRodolfoA.PonferradawiththeconcurrenceofAssociateJustice

GregoryS.Ong(Chairman)andAssociateJusticeJose.R.Hernandezrollo,pp.4558
2Rollo,p.310.
3Id.at5969,7182.
4Id.at83108.

5Id.at311.
6Id.at137147.
7Rollo,p.383.
8Id.at166168.
9Id.at169171.
10Id.at172193.
11Id.at194195.
12Id.at196209.
13Id.at217225.
14Id.at226229.
15Rollo,pp.240244.
16Id.at245249.
17Id.at57.
18Id.at250.
19Rollo,pp.1415.
20Id.at17.
21Id.
22G.R.No.110503,August4,1994,235SCRA103.
23G.R.No.124067,March27,1998,288SCRA328.
24Segoviav.Sandiganbayan,supranote23,at336.
25Id.at340341.
26G.R.No.142456,July27,2004,435SCRA303.
27No.L32950,July30,1971,40SCRA187.
28Lucianov.Mariano,supranote27,at202203.
29Socratesv.Sandiganbayan,324Phil.151(1996).
30G.R.No.109991,May22,1995,244SCRA224.
31Quibalv.Sandiganbayan,supranote30,at231.
32Matilde,Jr.v.Jabson,No.L38392,December29,1975,68SCRA456.

33Segoviav.Sandiganbayan,supranote23,at336.
34LaBugalBalaanTribalAssociation,Inc.v.Ramos,G.R.No.127882,January27,2004,421

SCRA148,247.
35Segoviav.Sandiganbayan,supranote23,at337.
36LaBugalBalaanTribalAssociation,Inc.v.Ramos,supranote34,at177.

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