RULE 68

The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner

was not precluded from recovering the loan from
Edna as he could file a personal action against her.
However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over the personal action which should
be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

FORECLOSURE OF
REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE
G.R. No. 183984

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its

Order7 dated 8 January 2004, the RTC, Branch 33
denied the motion for lack of merit.

April 13, 2011

ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C.
LINDO, Respondents.

On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint

for Sum of Money with Damages against
respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42 (RTC,
Branch 42) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-110858.

DECISION

Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative

Defenses and Counterclaims where they admitted
the loan but stated that it only amounted
to P340,000. Respondents further alleged that
Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was
contracted by Edna without Enricos signature.
Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case
on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata and
forum-shopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC,
Branch 33. On 7 March 2005, respondents also
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res
judicata and lack of cause of action.

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing
the 30 May 2008 Decision2 and the 4 August 2008
Resolution3of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94003.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals
Decision, are as follows:

The Decision of the Trial Court

On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an
Order8 denying the motion to dismiss. The RTC,
Branch 42 ruled that res judicata will not apply to
rights, claims or demands which, although growing
out of the same subject matter, constitute separate
or distinct causes of action and were not put in
issue in the former action. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8
February 2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied
respondents motion. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled
that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its
decision did not mean that petitioner could no
longer recover the loan petitioner extended to
Edna.

On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a

loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting
to P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3%
compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in
case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 (the
Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and
her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively,
respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory
Note5 and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his
attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for
the loan. All checks were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to file a
Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with
Damages against respondents. The case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
33 (RTC, Branch 33) and docketed as Civil Case No.
00-97942.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC,

Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC,
Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by
Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico.
The RTC, Branch 33 noted that the Deed was
executed on 31 October 1995 while the Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was
only dated 4 November 1995.

In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals

set aside the 22 July 2005 and 8 February 2006
Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general
rule is that a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and
not appealable, the rule admits of exceptions. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42

acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying

respondents motion to dismiss.

x x x in the absence of express statutory

provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute
against the mortgage debtor either a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of
the two remedies, but not both. By such election,
his cause of action can by no means be impaired,
for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.
Thus, an election to bring a personal action will
leave open to him all the properties of the debtor
for attachment and execution, even including the
mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against
the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for
deficiency judgment, in which case, all the
properties of the defendant, other than the
mortgaged property, are again open to him for the
satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his
remedy is complete, his cause of action
undiminished, and any advantages attendant to
the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely
accidental and are all under his right of election.
On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the
plaintiff to bring a personal action against the
debtor and simultaneously or successively another
action against the mortgaged property, would
result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to
justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and
obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v. San Agustin,
25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant
to the vexation of being sued in the place of his
residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and
then again in the place where the property lies.15

The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3,

Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available ground for the dismissal of the others.
The Court of Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment
of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a
single cause of action against the debtor, that is
recovery of the credit with execution of the suit.
Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative
remedies: either a personal action for the collection
of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage,
but not both. The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner had only one cause of action against
Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he
could not split the single cause of action by filing
separately a foreclosure proceeding and a
collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals
held that petitioner had already waived his
personal action to recover the amount covered by
the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4
August 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue

The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to

file his separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another
to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be
authorized plural redress for a single breach of
contract at so much costs to the court and with so
much vexation and oppressiveness to the debtor.16

The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of

Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing
the complaint for collection of sum of money on
the ground of multiplicity of suits.
The Ruling of this Court

In this case, however, there are circumstances that

the Court takes into consideration.

The petition has merit.

Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of

mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner
was not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed
without Enricos consent. The RTC, Branch 33
stated:

The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single

cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is,
to recover the debt.10 The mortgage-creditor has
the option of either filing a personal action for
collection of sum of money or instituting a real
action to foreclose on the mortgage security.11 An
election of the first bars recourse to the second,
otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in
which the debtor would be tossed from one venue
to another depending on the location of the
mortgaged properties and the residence of the
parties.12

All these circumstances certainly conspired against

the plaintiff who has the burden of proving his
cause of action. On the other hand, said
circumstances tend to support the claim of
defendant Edna Lindo that her husband did not
consent to the mortgage of their conjugal property
and that the loan application was her personal
decision.

The two remedies are alternative and each remedy

is complete by itself.13 If the mortgagee opts to
foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the
action for the collection of the debt, and vice
versa.14 The Court explained:

Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate

Mortgage was executed by defendant Edna Lindo
lacks the consent or authority of her husband

Enrico Lindo, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is

void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.

however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of

the real estate mortgage.19

This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff

cannot recover the P400,000 loan plus interest
which he extended to defendant Edna Lindo. He
can institute a personal action against the
defendant for the amount due which should be
filed in the place where the plaintiff resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides at the election of the plaintiff in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure. This Court has no
jurisdiction to try such personal action.17

The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Ednas liability

is not affected by the illegality of the real estate
mortgage.
Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93
misapplied the rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of contract implementing such
decision.

Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that

she obtained the loan. She claimed, however, that
her husband did not give his consent and that he
was not aware of the transaction.18 Hence, the RTC,
Branch 33 held that petitioner could still recover
the amount due from Edna through a personal
action over which it had no jurisdiction.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or

otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied)

Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief

before the RTC, Branch 93 of San Pedro Laguna
(RTC, Branch 93), which ruled:
At issue in this case is the validity of the
promissory note and the Real Estate Mortgage
executed by Edna Lindo without the consent of her
husband.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition
Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is
undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be
consented to by her husband to be effective. In the
instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the
authority or consent of the husband, is necessarily
void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this case
was executed on October 31, 1995 and the
subsequent special power of attorney dated
November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to
October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage
previously made by petitioner.

Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to

conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of
Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to
community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code
provide that the powers do not include disposition
or encumbrance without the written consent of the
other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void. However,
both provisions also state that "the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse x x x
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors."

The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract

of the loan however subsists notwithstanding the
illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a
mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation
which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null
and void. That obligation matures and becomes
demandable in accordance with the stipulation
pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances,
what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the
mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or
settling the indebtedness which is the principal
obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed
remains as evidence or proof of a personal
obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the
creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.

In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of

Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October
1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed
on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA
is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding
contract between the parties, making the

In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered declaring the deed of real estate
mortgage as void in the absence of the authority or
consent of petitioners spouse therein. The liability
of petitioner on the principal contract of loan

Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid

contract.

over any personal action that petitioner might have

against Edna.

However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner

allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and
the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executory
without asking the courts for an alternative relief.
The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely
relied on the declarations of these courts that he
could file a separate personal action and thus
failed to observe the rules and settled
jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing
petitioners avenue for recovery of the loan.

Considering the circumstances of this case, the

principle against unjust enrichment, being a
substantive law, should prevail over the procedural
rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals,
in the assailed decision, found that Edna admitted
the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted
to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to
unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous
decisions of the two trial courts when she
questioned the validity of the Deed. Moreover,
Edna still has an opportunity to submit her
defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as
to the amount of her indebtedness.

Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under

the law.

WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4

August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94003 are SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed
to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04110858.

In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a

mortgage-creditor may institute against the
mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt
or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The
Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and
not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery
of the mortgage-debt.21 In that case, however, this
Courtpro hac vice, ruled that respondents could
still be held liable for the balance of the loan,
applying the principle that no person may unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.22

G.R. No. 137566

February 28, 2001

ROBERTO G. ROSALES, as successor-ininterest of NAPOLEON S. ROSALES and LUIS

BUSTILLO,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL
DEVELOMENT CORPORATION, as substituted
plaintiff and the successor-in-interest of
CONTINENTAL BANK, respondents.

The principle of unjust enrichment is provided

under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 6, 1999, and
the resolution dated February 18, 1999, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 46391.

There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly

retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience."23The principle of
unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that
a person is benefited without a valid basis or
justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at
the expense of another.241avvphi1

On April 12, 1966, the Continental Bank instituted

Civil Case No. 612 with the then Court of First
Instance of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 7,
entitled, "Continental Bank, Plaintiff versus Atlas
Timber Company, Napoleon S. Rosales and Luis
Bustillo, Defendants." The complaint1 alleged that
Atlas Timber Company, through its Managing
Partner Napoleon Rosales, and Luis Bustillo in his
personal capacity, executed in favor of Continental
Bank a promissory note dated August 11, 1965, in
the amount of P1,000,000.00; that as security for
the payment of the note, Bustillo executed in favor
of the bank a real estate mortgage over forty-four
(44) parcels of land registered in his name under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11337, situated in
Nasugbu, Batangas; that likewise as security for
the payment of the note, Rosales executed a real
estate mortgage over forty-nine (49) parcels of
land registered in his name under TCT Nos. T11828 and T-11839, also in Nasugbu, Batangas;
that defendants failed and refused to pay the first
amortization on the loan of P90,000.00, thus
rendering the whole principal amount thereof due
and demandable. Plaintiff bank prayed that

The main objective of the principle against unjust

enrichment is to prevent one from enriching
himself at the expense of another without just
cause or consideration.25 The principle is applicable
in this case considering that Edna admitted
obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same
has not been fully paid without just cause. The
Deed was declared void erroneously at the
instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a
defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second,
when she filed an action for declaratory relief
before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be
expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an
alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals
ruled that he should have done, because the RTC,
Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction

defendants be ordered to pay the amount of One

Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) with interest thereon
at 8% per annum and attorney's fees equivalent to
10% thereof, and, in default thereof, that the real
estate mortgages executed by defendants Rosales
and Bustillo in favor of the bank be judicially
foreclosed.1wphi1.nt

issuance of writ of execution against

defendants Atlas Timber Company and
Napoleon S. Rosales in the event that the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale be
insufficient to satisfy the entire judgment.
SO ORDERED.4

In their Answer with Counterclaim,2 defendants

admitted the execution of the promissory note and
real estate mortgages. By way of affirmative
defenses, they averred that the loan was applied
for under the Industrial Guaranty Loan Fund (IGLF)
of the Central Bank, through Continental Bank, and
was intended for the completion of the veneer
plant of Atlas Timber Company, then being
constructed in Butuan City. Pursuant to the terms
of the Fund, the proceeds of the loan in the amount
of P1,000,000.00 were deposited by the Central
Bank with Continental Bank. Upon the assurance
by Continental Bank that the full amount of
P1,000,000.00 will be released to them, defendants
executed the promissory note and real estate
mortgages. However, instead of delivering to them
the entire amount of P1,000,000.00, Continental
Bank delivered only P424,000.00 and retained the
balance of P576,000.00, despite repeated demands
for the turn-over thereof. Consequently, defendants
were unable to complete the construction of the
plant and to manufacture veneer for exportation to
the United States. Defendants, therefore, set up a
counterclaim for pecuniary, moral and exemplary
damages and for attorney's fees.

Subsequently, the trial court issued an Order dated

April 22, 1975,5 amending the aforesaid decision as
follows:
Finding plaintiff's motion to amend the
decision dated December 16, 1974 to be
well-founded, same is hereby granted, and
the dispositive part of the decision
specifically paragraph 2 thereof, is hereby
amended in the sense that Original
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11337
should read as Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-11337 and that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-11839 registered in the name of
Napoleon S. Rosales given as security for
the obligation mentioned in the complaint
should be included in the public auction
sale to satisfy the judgment in case of
default in the payment of the obligation.
SO ORDERED.
On July 14, 1975, after ascertaining that
defendants have failed to pay the judgment debt
within ninety (90) days from January 25, 1975,
when service of the decision on them was deemed
completed, the court issued the Writ of
Execution,6 commanding the Branch Deputy Sheriff
to sell at public auction the lands covered by TCT
Nos. T-11337, T-11828, and T-11839.

Continental Bank filed its answer to the

counterclaim, alleging that out of the net proceeds
of the loan, in the amount of P999,730.00, the sum
of P575,535.82 was applied to previous loans
obtained by Atlas Timber for the initial construction
of the veneer plant.

At the foreclosure sale, Continental Bank was

awarded the lands as the highest bidder for the
price of P120,500.00. Accordingly, the Branch
Deputy Sheriff of the CFI, Branch VII, Balayan,
Batangas, executed the Officer's Deed of Sale7 on
September 25, 1975, conveying to Consolidated
Bank the mortgaged parcels of land.

On December 16, 1974, the trial court rendered its

decision,3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
(1) Ordering the defendants Atlas Timber
Company and Napoleon S. Rosales, jointly
and severally, to pay plaintiff bank the sum
of P1 million with interest at the rate of 8%
per annum from August 11, 1965 until fully
paid and the further sum equivalent to 10%
of the total amount due, as and for
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, and
which defendants shall pay within ninety
(90) days from date of receipt of this
decision;

On October 30, 1975, Continental Bank filed a

Motion for Confirmation of Officer's Deed of Sale
and To Order Issuance of Certificate of Final
Record.8 The hearing on the motion was set on
December 3, 1975, and later reset to February 20,
1976. In the meantime, Atty. Santiago F. Alidio,
collaborating counsel for defendants, filed a
Manifestation and Motion,9 alleging that he had
been designated as the City Legal Officer of the
City of Manila since December 20, 1974; and that
on February 20, 1976, he was directed by the
Mayor of Manila to attend a conference at
Malacaang Palace with Presidential Assistant Juan
C. Tuvera. Hence, he moved that his appearance at
the hearing on said date be dispensed with and
that defendants and their lead counsel, Atty.
Tagalo, be served notice of hearing.

(2) In default of such payment, the

mortgaged properties including the
improvements existing thereon covered by
OCT (sic) No. T-11337 and TCT No. 11282,
both of the Land Records of Batangas, shall
be sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment herein, without prejudice to the

The lower court issued an Order dated June 15,

1976,10 denying Atty. Alidio's prayer for deferment
of the hearing and granting the confirmation and
approval of sheriff's sale.

Petitioners argued, in fine, that the lower court

amended the decision in its Order dated April 22,
1975, by adding TCT No. T-11839 to the properties
to be sold at public auction, without prior notice to
petitioners (defendants therein). The amendment
was substantial because it included property which
was not stated in the original decision; hence, the
ninety-day period for petitioners to pay the
judgment debt should be reckoned not from the
date of service of the original decision but from the
date of service of the amendment thereto.
Consequently, plaintiff's motion for execution filed
on May 3, 1975, or barely eleven days after the
Order amending the decision, was premature
inasmuch as the thirty-day reglementary period to
appeal had not yet elapsed. More importantly, the
lower court's Order dated June 30, 1975 for the
issuance of a Writ of Execution was null and void,
since this was done before the expiration of the
ninety-day period for defendants to pay the
judgment debt. Therefore, petitioners contend that
they should be allowed another period of ninety
(90) days within which to pay the judgment debt.

On September 19, 1996, petitioners Roberto G.

Rosales, as successor-in-interest of Napoleon S.
Rosales, and Luis Bustillo, filed with the lower
court, then designated as the Regional Trial Court
of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9, a Motion to
Reopen the case, on the ground that defendants
and their lead counsel never received the decision
dated December 16, 1974; that they were never
notified of any hearing for the confirmation of the
Sheriff's Deed of Sale; and that the lower court did
not conduct a hearing prior to the issuance of its
Order dated June 15, 1976, confirming the Sheriff's
Deed of Sale. Petitioners prayed, among others,
that the sheriff's sale and order of confirmation be
set aside; and that another ninety-day period be
fixed within which they shall pay the judgment
debt.
In an Order dated March 17, 1997,11 the trial court
denied petitioners' motion to reopen the case.

Petitioners further argue that the sale to private

respondent of the lands, consisting of a total of
271.306 hectares, for the measly sum of
P120,500.00, must be stricken down as null and
void for being grossly inadequate and
unconscionable as to shock the moral sense.
Moreover, the inclusion at the auction sale of the
property of Luis Bustillo, covered by TCT No. T11337, was likewise null and void in view of the
lower court's finding in its decision that "Luis
Bustillo did not sign the promissory note and
therefore should not be held liable for the same."16

Meanwhile, on June 30, 1997, the lower court,

resolving an Ex-Parte Motion to Order the Issuance
of Final Deed of Sale filed by National Development
Corporation, the successor-in-interest of
Continental Bank, ruled as follows:
Perforce, the Sheriff does not have any
option but to execute the Final Deed of
Sale as mandated by Section 63 (a) of P.D.
1529 and there is no need for the Court's
intervention in order for the sheriff to
discharge his mandated function. For to do
so, it would leave into the hands of the
Sheriff the power to determine when to
transfer the property to the purchaser as
he wishes to.

Likewise, petitioners assail the validity of the order

of confirmation issued by the lower court for having
been issued without affording them notice and
hearing, as shown by the Certification of the Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, dated March 11, 1999,17 to the effect
that counsel for Napoleon S. Rosales was not
furnished a copy of the Order of the court dated
June 15, 1976. As mortgagors, they should have
been afforded a hearing and an opportunity to
show cause why the sale should not be confirmed,
as by proof of irregularities therein or gross
inadequacy of the price. The lack of such a notice
vitiates the confirmation sale, which may be set
aside anytime.

ACCORDINGLY, the ex-parte motion is

hereby DENIED.12
On that same date of June 30, 1997, the Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, executed the Final Deed of Sale in favor
of Continental Bank.13
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
denial of their motion to reopen the case, but the
same was denied on November 4, 1997.14 Thus, on
January 2, 1998, petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition forcertiorari, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 46391, entitled, "Roberto G. Rosales,
as successor-in-interest of Napoleon S. Rosales and
Luis F. Bustillo, Petitioners versus Hon. Elihu A.
Ybaez as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9; National
Development Corporation, as substituted plaintiff
and successors in interest of Continental Bank;
and, Arturo G. Matibag, as Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Balayan, Batangas, Respondents."15

Finally, petitioners accused Consolidated Bank of

laches and prescription for its failure to consolidate
its title for twenty (20) years.
On January 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition.18 Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied in its Resolution dated
February 18, 1999.19 Hence, this petition for review.
In its comment,20 private respondent National
Development Corporation, successor-in-interest of
Continental Bank, maintained that Napoleon
Rosales was duly notified of all Orders of the trial

court. In fact, petitioners wrote several letters to

private respondent wherein they requested that
they be allowed to repurchase the properties, and
that they failed to pay the real estate taxes on the
lands or perform any act consistent with ownership
thereof. Based on these, petitioners are estopped
from claiming ownership over the properties

control over said judgment. In the case

involved, there was an actual material
amendment of the dispositive portion of
the original decision before an appeal was
perfected by the defendant. It is likewise
settled that, in such a situation and for all
intents and purposes, a new judgment has
been promulgated and it is from receipt
thereof that the period to appeal must be
reckoned.25

On August 25, 1999, the petition was given due

course and the parties were required to submit
their respective memoranda.21

More importantly, the writ of execution issued by

the trial court on July 14, 1975, which states that
"defendants Atlas Timber Company, Napoleon S.
Rosales and Luis Bustillo failed to make any
payment even after the ninety (90) day period
from January 25, 1975, when service of the
Decision upon them is deemed completed,"26 and
commanding the Branch Deputy Sheriff to sell at
public auction all the foreclosed properties, was
null and void. The ninety-day period within which
petitioners could have paid the judgment debt and
thus avoided the sale of their properties at public
auction should have commenced a few days from
April 23, 1975. When the Writ of Execution was
issued on July 14, 1975, the said ninety-day period
had not yet expired.

There is merit in the petition.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari on the main ground that service on
petitioners of the decision dated December 16,
1974 as well as the orders of the lower court were
deemed completed; and that petitioners, by their
subsequent acts, should be deemed to have
constructive notice of the decision of the case a
quo. However, the Court of Appeals failed to
address petitioners' primary argument in their
petition for certiorari that the issuance of the writ
of execution was null and void for failure to afford
petitioners the full ninety-day period within which
to pay the judgment debt and avoid the sale of
their properties at public auction.

Since petitioners were deprived of the full use of

the ninety-day period within which to pay the
judgment debt, the writ of execution and the order
to sell the properties at public auction were null
and void. A judgment in an action for foreclosure of
mortgage could only be executed in a manner
prescribed in the Rules. Where the order of
execution was not in conformity with the Rules, the
same is null and void.27 The order for defendants to
pay the judgment debt within ninety days, prior to
the sale of the foreclosed properties at public
auction, is a substantive requirement which cannot
be omitted.28

We agree with petitioners that their period of

appeal and the ninety days grace period within
which they could have paid the judgment debt
should have been counted from service of the
Order dated April 22, 1975, which substantially
amended the decision. The amendatory Order
added TCT No. T-11839 to the properties that were
to be judicially foreclosed and sold at public
auction in the event that defendants therein fail to
pay the judgment debt within the ninety-day
period.
As such, the period to appeal should be reckoned
from service of the said amendatory Order. Where
a judgment is amended, the date of the
amendment should be considered the date of the
decision in the computation of the period for
perfecting the appeal.22 For all intents and
purposes, the lower court rendered a new
judgment from which the time to appeal must be
reckoned.23

This 90-day period given in the rule is not a

procedural requirement merely; it is a
substantive right granted to the mortgage
debtor as the last opportunity to pay the
debt and save his mortgaged property from
final disposition at the foreclosure sale. It is
one of the two steps necessary to destroy
what in law is known as the mortgagor's
"equity of redemption," the other being the
sale. It may not be omitted. As the writ of
execution or the order allowing the sale of
the mortgaged property was issued without
granting the mortgage debtor said 90-day
period, the order for the sale of the
property would be a denial of a substantial
right and void.29

In the case at bar, the records reflect that a copy of

the amendatory Order was sent to defense counsel
by registered mail on April 23, 1975. Assuming
there was constructive notice, service thereof must
have been deemed completed sometime
thereafter. Consequently, the motion for execution
filed by Continental Bank on May 3, 1975 was
premature, inasmuch as it was still within the
reglementary period for petitioners to appeal,
which under the Rules in force at that time was
fixed at thirty days.24

Consequently, the sale to Continental Bank of the

subject real properties is likewise null and void.
Necessarily, respondent's contention that
petitioners' right of action has prescribed must
perforce fail. The action or defense for the
declaration of inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.30 A contract which is null and void is

(T)he rule is that a judgment may be

modified prior to the perfection of the
appeal while the lower court still has

subject to attack at any time.31 Being null and void,

the sale of the properties to Continental Bank
produced no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum
est, nullum producit effectum.32

controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be

worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and
injustice.40 In Santiago v. Court of Appeals,41 we
held:

Apart from the foregoing, there exists in this case a

more compelling reason to nullify the auction sale,
which is the gross inadequacy of the price at which
respondent acquired the lands. If it is to be
presumed that private transactions were fair and
regular,33 and the ordinary course of business was
followed,34 then the properties had a market value
of, at the very least, One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), which was the amount of the loan
secured by the real estate mortgages executed on
the land. Moreover, it is also presumed that there
was sufficient consideration for a
contract.35 Parenthetically, it is worthy to note that
the totality of the mortgaged properties consisted
of ninety-three lots, with an aggregate area of
271.306 hectares. These vast tracts of land,
however, were sold to Continental Bank for only
P120,500.00, or roughly twelve percent (12%) of
the estimated market value of the property.

As for laches, its essence is the failure or

neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that
which, by the exercise of due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it
is the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it (Felix v. Buenaseda,
240 SCRA 139, 152 [1995], citing Cristobal
v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175, 182 [1977]). But
there is, to be sure, no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances.
The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and since
laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to
defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and
injustice (Jimenez v. Fernandez, 184 SCRA
190, 197 [1990]). In the case under
consideration, it would not only be
impractical but well-nigh unjust and
patently iniquitous to apply laches against
private respondent and vest ownership
over a valuable piece of real property in
favor of petitioners by virtue of an
absolutely simulated deed of sale never, in
the first place, meant to convey any right
over the subject property. It is the better
rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly
by the statute of limitations or the doctrine
of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or
injustice would result (Raeses v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 187 SCRA
397, 404 [1990], citing Cristobal v. Melchor,
supra).42

There is no dispute that mere inadequacy of the

price per se will not set aside a judicial sale of real
property. Nevertheless, where the inadequacy of
the price is purely shocking to the conscience, such
that the mind revolts at it and such that a
reasonable man would neither directly nor
indirectly be likely to consent to it,36 the sale shall
be declared null and void.37 In the early case
of Director of Lands v. Abarca,38 we ruled:
In dismissing the claim of Sarenas and
Braganza, the lower court held that the
sale by the sheriff of the property in
question in favor of said claimants was null
and void, because it was not made in
accordance with the requirements of the
law, and also because the amount of
P877.25 paid by Sarenas and Braganza was
absolutely inadequate. In deciding this
appeal we do not deem it necessary to
discuss all the questions raised by the
parties in their briefs. We believe that
the lower court was right in declaring
the sheriff's sale null and void on the
ground of the inadequacy of the price
paid. It appears that in 1927 the assessed
value of the contested property was more
than P60,000. A judicial sale of real
property will be set aside when the
price is so inadequate as to shock the
conscience of the court. (National
Bank vs. Gonzalez, 45 Phil., 693.)39

Respondent argues that petitioners should likewise

be declared estopped from seeking the declaration
of nullity of the auction sale because they offered
to repurchase the lands from the bank. It appears
that these proposals were made between the
periods September 2, 1993 and July 30,
1996,43 which was prior to the filing by petitioners
of their motion to reopen the case on September
16, 1996. Rather than construing this offer against
petitioners, this gesture must be taken as an
intention to avoid further litigation and, thus,
partook of the nature of an offer to compromise. As
such, the same cannot be taken as an admission
that petitioners were liable for the judgment
debt.44 Necessarily, and with more reason, the offer
should not be taken as a waiver of their right to
assail the validity of the sale. Verily, by offering to
redeem the properties, petitioners would attain
their ultimate objective, i.e., to pay off the
judgment debt and regain ownership of their lands.

Respondents allege that petitioners should be held

guilty of laches. We do not agree. There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court and since
laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is

When respondent refused this last-ditch proposal,

as it were, petitioners were constrained to resort to
legal means to achieve their goal, and thus filed
with the trial court their motion to reopen the
case.1wphi1.nt

incurred by Atlas Timber Company. However, the

findings of fact of the trial court on this matter
were not appealed by petitioners, albeit for reasons
not attributable to them.
Hence, the decision of December 16, 1974, as
amended by the Order dated April 22, 1975, should
not be disturbed, except only to delete TCT No.
11337 in the name of Luis Bustillo from the lands
to be judicially foreclosed, in view of our finding as
above-stated. Petitioners, therefore, remain liable
to pay respondent the amount of the loan of
P1,000,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of
8% per annum, and an amount equivalent to 10%
thereof as attorney's fees, as stipulated in the
promissory note. Petitioners are hereby granted a
new period of one hundred twenty (120) days
within which to pay the same, otherwise the lands
covered by TCT Nos. 11828 and 11839 shall be
sold at public auction to satisfy the debt. Under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the period
prescribed for that purpose in cases of judicial
foreclosure is not less than ninety (90) days nor
more than one hundred twenty (120) days,
counted from entry of judgment.46

Moreover, we find that, insofar as petitioner

Bustillo's land is concerned, the dispositive portion
of the decision was not in accord with the findings
as contained in the body thereof. While the
dispositive portion prevails over the body of the
decision in case of conflict, this rule does not apply
where it is clear from the body of the decision that
there was a glaring error made in the dispositive
portion, in which case the body of the decision will
control.
The general rule is, where there is a
conflict between the dispositive portion or
the fallo and the body of the decision,
the fallo controls. This rule rests on the
theory that the fallo is the final order while
the opinion in the body is merely a
statement ordering nothing.
However, where the inevitable conclusion
from the body of the decision is so clear as
to show that there was a mistake in the
dispositive portion, the body of the
decision will prevail.45

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 6,
1999, and the Resolution dated February 18, 1999,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 46391, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The sale of petitioners' lands covered by
TCT Nos. T-11337, T-11828 and T-11839 to
Continental Bank is declared NULL and VOID. Any
transfers made and any and all certificates of title
issued in lieu of TCT Nos. T-11337, T-11828 and T11839, are ORDERED CANCELLED.

In the case below, the trial court clearly found that

Bustillo did not make or sign the promissory note,
and thus declared that he should not be held liable
for the loan and his property should not be sold at
public auction, unless the properties included in
petitioner Rosales' mortgage was not sufficient to
satisfy the entire money judgment. In the
dispositive portion, however, the trial court ordered
that TCT No. T-11337, in the name of petitioner
Bustillo, was to be sold at public auction,
absolutely and without qualification. This part of
the judgment, which subjected Bustillo's property
primarily liable for the judgment debt
notwithstanding the finding that the same should
only be made to answer for the debt in a subsidiary
manner, violated Bustillo's right against the
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Hence, the body of the decision should have
prevailed over the dispositive portion, and
Bustillo's property should not have been sold at
public auction unless it was shown that the lands
belonging to Napoleon Rosales were insufficient to
satisfy the judgment debt.

Petitioners are ordered to pay to respondent

National Development Corporation, as successorin-interest of Continental Bank, the sum of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), with interest thereon
at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum
computed from August 11, 1965 until the date of
full payment, and an amount equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total amount due, as and for
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, within a period of
one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of
judgment. In default of such payment, the property
included in TCT Nos. T-11828 and T-11839 in the
name of Napoleon S. Rosales shall be sold at public
auction to satisfy the judgment.
G.R. No. L-45322 July 5, 1989

Therefore, the sheriff's sale of TCT Nos. T-11337, T11828 and T-11839 to Continental Bank is hereby
declared null and void. It should be stressed that
we are not here called upon to resolve the merits
of Civil Case No. 612, as contained in the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Balayan, Batangas
dated December 16, 1974. In their petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals as well as
in the petition for review before us, petitioners
question Continental Bank's act of debiting the
sum of P576,000.00 from the proceeds of their
loan, purportedly to satisfy previous obligations

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

(GSIS), petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO,
BRANCH III, ILOILO CITY and NELITA M. VDA.
DE BACALING & MARIA TERESA INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
J. T. Barrera and Associates for respondent MATIDO.
Ramon A. Gonzales for Nenita Bacaling.

court. Consequently, the mortgaged lots were sold

at public auction on February 28, 1961. The GSIS
was the highest bidder at the sale.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

On March 1, 1961, the GSIS filed a motion for

confirmation of the sale of the property to it (p. 25,
Record on Appeal). On October 10, 1961, it
reiterated said motion and further asked for a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, its bid
of P74,558.25 being inadequate to cover the
judgment debt which had swelled to P339,302.58
as of August 31, 1961 (p. 30, Record on Appeal).

The legal issue presented in this appeal

by certiorari is whether, after the judicial
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage and the
confirmation of the sale, the trial court may grant
or fix another period for the redemption of the
foreclosed property by the assignee of the
mortgagor's equity of redemption.
In 1957, a real estate loan of P600,000 payable in
monthly installments within a period of ten (10)
years with 7% interest per annum, was granted to
the spouses Ramon and Nelita Bacaling by the
petitioner, Government Service Insurance System
(hereafter GSIS) for the development of the
Bacaling-Moreno subdivision. To secure the
repayment of the loan, the Bacalings executed in
favor of the GSIS a real estate mortgage on four (4)
lots owned by them. Out of the approved loan of
P600,000, only P240,000 had been released to
them by the GSIS as of November 11, 1957.

On December 18, 1972, respondent Maria Teresa

Integrated Development Corporation (MTIDC), as
alleged assignee of the mortgagor's "right of
redemption," filed a "Motion to Exercise the Right
of Redemption" (p. 34, Record on Appeal). The
motion was granted by the trial court in an order
dated December 20, 1972. Check No. MK-45594 of
the China Banking Corporation in the amount of P
l,100,000 was delivered by MTIDC to the GSIS as
payment of the redemption price. However, the
check was dishonored by the drawee bank because
it was drawn against a closed account.

The Bacalings failed to finish the subdivision

project and pay the amortizations on the loan so
the GSIS, on May 22, 1959, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo a complaint for judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage (Civil Case No. 5233).
During the pendency of the case, Ramon Bacaling
passed away.

On motion of the GSIS the court issued on February

3, 1973 an order declaring null and void the
redemption of the property by respondent MTIDC.
Thereafter, written proposals were sent by said
respondent to the GSIS for the redemption of the
foreclosed property, but the GSIS required cash
payment of the redemption price.

In a decision dated October 5, 1960, the court

ordered the widow, for herself and as
administratrix of the estate of Ramon Bacaling, to
pay the GSIS:

On October 25, 1975, respondent Nelita Bacaling

filed a motion to re-open the case so she could
prove the inadequacy of the price of the sale of the
mortgaged property (p. 63, Record on Appeal). The
GSIS filed an opposition. In an order dated
December 8, 1975, respondent court denied
Nelita's motion, confirmed the sale of the
mortgaged property, and rendered a deficiency
judgment in favor of GSIS (p. 76, Record on
Appeal).

(1) P240,000 with interest at 7%

per annum from May 22, 1959 until
the amount was fully paid;
(2) to pay the sum of P21,879.56
as accumulated interests on the
debt up to February 11, 1959 plus
7% interest per annum, from
February 12,1959 until fully paid;

On December 19, 1975, fourteen (14) years after

the foreclosure sale on February 28, 1961 and
almost three (3) years after the court had annulled
on February 3, 1973 its redemption of the
foreclosed property, respondent MTIDC filed a
motion for reconsideration of the court's order and
sought the restoration of its right of redemption.
The court, over the strong opposition of the GSIS,
reconsidered on January 19, 1976 its order of
December 8, 1975 and granted MTIDC a period of
one year after the finality of its order of January 19,
1976 to redeem the Bacaling properties (p. 94,
Record on Appeal).

(3) to pay l0% of the judgment as

attorney's fees and costs; and
(4) should she fail to pay, or
deposit with the Clerk of Court, the
above amounts within a period of
ninety (90) days from receipt of a
copy of the decision, the four
mortgaged lots would be sold at
public auction to satisfy the
mortgage debt, and the surplus if
any should be delivered to the
defendant Nelita Vda. de Bacaling.
(pp. 12-13, Record on Appeal,)

The GSIS sought a reconsideration of that order on

the ground that the court may not extend the
period for the redemption of the property (p. 95,
Record on Appeal).

Mrs. Bacaling failed to pay the judgment debt

within 90 days after receipt of the decision of the

10

On February 12,1976, the court modified its order

of January 19, 1976 by giving MTIDC one (1) year
from January 19, 1976 within which to redeem the
Bacaling property, instead of one year from the
finality of the January 19, 1976 order (p. 101,
Record on Appeal). Petitioner received a copy of
this last order on February 12,1976.

period of not less than ninety (90)

days from the date of the service of
such order, and that in default of
such payment the property be sold
to realize the mortgage debt and
costs.
SEC. 3. Sale of mortgaged
property; effect. When the
defendant, after being directed to
do so as provided in the last
preceding section, fails to pay the
principal, interest, and costs at the
time directed in the order, the
court shall order the property to be
sold in the manner and under the
regulations that govern sales of
real estate under execution. Such
sale shall not affect the rights of
persons holding prior
encumbrances upon the property
or a part thereof, and when
confirmed by an order of the court,
it shall operate to divest the rights
of all the parties to the action and
to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of
redemption as may be allowed by
law. (Emphasis supplied.)

On March 1, 1976, the GSIS appealed by certiorari

to this Court raising purely legal questions (p. 102,
Record on Appeal).
In her Comment on the petition for review, Nelita
Vda. de Bacaling asked for the dismissal of GSIS
petition on the grounds that: (1) the appeal has
become moot and academic because the one-year
redemption period fixed by the trial court had
expired without the properties being redeemed;
and (2) the questioned order (dated February 12,
1976) is also pending appeal in the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 60842) hence, this case
should be remanded to that Court.
The respondent MTIDC, in its Comment, alleged the
same grounds for the dismissal of the appeal, and
further argued the legality of the lower court's
order because anyway the GSIS entertained and
encouraged its overtures for the redemption of the
foreclosed property.

There is no right of redemption from a judicial

foreclosure sale after the confirmation of the sale,
except those granted by banks or banking
institutions as provided by the General Banking Act
(Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
70987, Sept. 29,1988). This has been the
consistent interpretation of Rule 68 in a long line of
decisions of this Court.

On May 30,1977, this Court, through the First

Division, gave due course to the petition.
On October 21, 1977, We denied the motion to
remand this appeal to the Court of Appeals.
After the respondents had filed their Comments,
the case was declared submitted for decision on
January 27, 1978.

We may say, furthermore, that this

Court has already held that in
mortgage foreclosures the rights of
the mortgagee and persons
holding under him are cut off by
the sale when duly confirmed, and
with them the equity of
redemption. The reason for that
holding is that the right of
redemption being purely statutory,
and there being no statute
conferring that right, it does not
exist. (Benedicto vs. Yulo, 26 Phil.
166; Emphasis supplied.)

Considering the long lapse of the time that this

case has been awaiting adjudication, and
apprehensive that supervening events may have
rendered the issues moot and academic, this Court
on September 21, 1988 gave the parties ten (10)
days from notice to manifest whether they are still
interested in prosecuting the case. In a
Manifestation filed November 16, 1988, the GSIS
declared that it is still interested in prosecuting its
appeal.
We find merit in the appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule
68 of the Rules of Court provide:

... When the foreclosure sale is

validly confirmed by the court title
vests upon the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale, and the
confirmation retroacts to the date
of the sale (Binalbagan Estate, Inc.
vs. Gatuslao, et al., 74 Phil.
128). Only foreclosure of
mortgages to banking institutions
(including the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation) and those
made extrajudicially are subject to

SEC. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for

payment or sale. if upon the trial
in such action the court shall find
the facts set forth in the complaint
to be true, it shall ascertain the
amount due to the plaintiff upon
the mortgage debt or obligation,
including interest and costs, and
shall render judgment for the sum
so found due and order that the
same be paid into court within a

11

legal redemption, by express

provision of statute, and the
present case does not come under
exceptions. (Villar vs. Javier de
Paderanga, 97 Phil. 608609;Emphasis ours.)

confirmation. (Limpin vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 70987, September 29, 1988.)
Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking institution,
its mortgage is covered by the general rule that
there is no right of redemption after the judicial
foreclosure sale has been confirmed. Hence, Judge
Numeriano Estenzo exceeded his jurisdiction and
acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
the respondent, MTIDC, another one-year period to
redeem the Bacaling properties over the opposition
of petitioner GSIS as mortgagee- purchaser thereof
at the public sale. His orders dated January 19,
1976 and February 12, 1976 are null and void.

Where the foreclosure is judicially

effected, however, no equivalent
right of redemption exists. The law
(Sec. 3, Rule 68, Rules of Court)
declares that a judicial foreclosure
sale, 'when confirmed by an order
of the court, ... shall operate to
divest the rights of all the parties
to the action and to vest their
rights in the purchaser, subject to
such rights of redemption as may
be allowed by law.' Such rights
exceptionally 'allowed by law' (i.e.,
even after confirmation by an order
of the court) are those granted by
the charter of the Philippine
National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and
2938), and the General Banking Act
(R.A. 337) (See Moran, Comments
on the Rules, 1970 Ed., Vol. 3, p.
273, citing Gonzales vs. PNB, 48
Phil. 824,828; and Martin, Rules of
Court, etc., 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, p. 289,
citing Villar vs. Javier de
Paderanga, 97 Phil. 64; Piano vs.
Cayanong 7 SCRA 397). These laws
confer on the mortgagor, his
successors in interest or any
judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the
property sold on the foreclosureafter confirmation by the court of
the foreclosure sale which right
may be exercised within a period of
one (1) year, counted from the
date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the Registry of
Property.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted.

The appealed orders dated January 19, 1976 and
February 12, 1976 of Judge Numeriano Estenzo in
Civil Case No. 5233 are hereby annulled and set
aside.
Costs against the private respondents.

G.R. No. L-26752 March 19, 1971

PATERNO SANTOS, ET AL., petitioners,
LEONILA POLICARPIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA and PABLO
LUCAS, respondents-appellees.
Lumen Policarpio for petitioner-appellant.
Daniel M. Lucas, Jr. and Enrique M. Zafra for
respondents-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by Leonila Policarpio, from a
resolution of the Land Registration Commission.

But, to repeat, no such right of

redemption exists in case of judicial
foreclosure of a mortgage if the
mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank
or banking institution. In such a
case, the foreclosure sale when
confirmed by an order of the
court, ... shall operate to divest the
rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in
the purchaser.' There then exists
only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right
of the defendant mortgagor to
extinguish the mortgage and retain
ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the
90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with
Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its

The pertinent facts are not disputed. In the

language of the resolution appealed from:
The facts on record are as follows:
It appears that on March 7, 1959,
Natividad Sanchez and Pablo Lucas
bought from Imelda Reyes and
Maria Consuelo Mendoza a parcel
of land together with its
improvements, situated in the City
of Manila and covered by TCT No.
34200, with assumption of an
P8,000 real estate mortgage in
favor of the Monte de Piedad and
Savings Bank. By virtue of the said
sale TCT No. 57134 was issued in
the name of the above-mentioned
vendee. In view, however, of the

12

violation of some terms in the

mortgage contract by the
mortgagors, the mortgagee-bank
initiated foreclosure proceedings
and in the public auction sale
Leonila Policarpio was adjudged the
highest bidder. On September 2,
1963 Policarpio filed the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale for registration in
the office of the respondent
Register of Deeds and the same
was entered under Primary Entry
No. 3118/V-37. However, due to the
fact that there were some defects
in the document as pointed out by
the said Register of Deeds, the
registrant withdrew the same on
the following day, September 3,
1963, and they were not re-entered
for registration until almost a year
after August 26, 1964.

the deed of confirmation petition of assignment in

favor of Paterno Santos and the affidavit of
consolidation previously executed by him, the
Register of Deeds of Manila although "inclined to
believe" that the issue should be resolved in the
affirmative submitted the matter for consultation
to the Commissioner of Land Registration who,
after due hearing, issued a resolution, the
dispositive part of which reads:
All the foregoing considered, this
Commission believes and so orders
that the certificate of redemption
should be given preference in
registration to the affidavit of
consolidation; hence the
registration of the certificate of
redemption may be given due
course once the owner's duplicate
certificate of title is presented and
the corresponding fees are duly
paid. Let the Register of Deeds
therefore, be guided accordingly.

On July 7, 1965, Policarpio assigned

all her right and interests in the
certificate of sale in favor of Mr.
Paterno Santos who in turn had it
registered on July 19, 1965. On
August 17, 1965, one of the herein
mortgagors exercised his right to
redeem the property subject of the
auction sale by paying to the
Sheriff of Manila the amount of
P8,519.07 representing the
purchase price and interests due
thereon, and so was issued a
certificate of redemption, dated
August 21, 1965. The redemptioner
presented the said certificate of
redemption for registration in the
office of the Manila Registry but
was withheld pending submission
of the owner's duplicate certificate
of title. On the other hand, the
Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank,
as attorney-in-fact of the vendee in
the auction sale, probably not
knowing that the property was
already redeemed, executed on
September 6, 1965 a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Leonila
Policarpio, who, in turn, confirmed
her assignment of rights in favor of
Paterno Santos on September 8,
1965. The Deed of Confirmation of
Assignment as well as the affidavit
of consolidation previously
executed by Santos were
annotated on TCT No. 57134, on
September 10, 1965, but then, it
was discovered that the certificate
of redemption which was earlier
presented was still pending
registration. 1

A reconsideration of this resolution having been

denied, Leonila Policarpio interposed the present
appeal. The same hinges on the question whether
the redemption period of "one year from and after
the date of the sale," prescribed in section 6 of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, for the
redemption of property sold in extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, should be computed from
the date of the auction sale, in September 1963, as
contended by appellant, or from August 26, 1964,
when the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered
with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila,
as held by the Commissioner of Land Registration
in his appealed resolution.
This issue has long been settled in favor of the
ruling made in the contested resolution. As early as
June 30, 1959, We have held that the period of
redemption "begins to run not from the date of sale
but from the time of registration of the sale in the
Office of the Register of Deeds."This view,
expressed in Garcia v. Ocampo, et al., 2was
reiterated in Agbulos v. Alberto. 3 Although these
cases referred to execution sales, the rule therein
laid down was applied to foreclosure cases in
Salazar, et al. v. Meneses, et al., 4 Reyes v.
Noblejas, et al., 5 Rosario, et al. v. Tayug Rural
Bank, Inc., 6 Campillo v. Philippine National
Bank 7 and Reyes v. Manas, et al. 8 In Reyes v.
Noblejas, et al., 9 this Court even held:
But it is further argued by the
petitioner that the rule should not
be applied to this case where there
are no third parties involved. He
cites a number of authorities, to
the effect that as between the
parties, registration is not
necessary to bind the immediate
parties to a transaction involving
registered land. He would then
conclude that since the only

In view of the issue that had thus arisen, as to

whether the certificate of redemption executed in
favor of Pablo Lucas should have preference over

13

purpose of registration is to protect

the buyer from third party claims, it
stands to reason that when, as in
this case, there are no third party
claimants to the land, registration
is not necessary and the sale
between the parties should be
made to take effect from the date
of the auction sale. We are not
impressed by the argument.
Apparently, herein petitioner failed
to see the "other side of the coin"
and overlooked the doctrine, also
well settled, that the registration
required by Section 50 of the Land
Registration Law is intended
primarily for the protection of
innocent third persons, i.e.,
persons who, without knowledge of
the sale and in good faith, have
acquired rights to the
property.lwph1.t The same
protection to third parties is
obviously one of the objects of
Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court in requiring that the
certificate of sale issued by the
sheriff in an auction sale be
registered in the office of the
register of deeds, for the purpose
of the legislature in providing for
our present system of registration
is to afford some means of publicity
so that persons dealing with real
property may reach the records
and thereby acquire security
against instruments the execution
of which has not been revealed.
Redemption is not the concern
merely of the auction-vendee and
the mortgagor, but also of the
latter's successors in interest or
any judicial creditor or judgment
creditor of said mortgagor, or any
person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the
mortgage under which the property
has been sold. It is precisely for
this reason that the certificate of
sale should be registered, for only
upon such registration may it
legally be said that proper notice,
though constructive, has been
served unto possible
redemptioners contemplated in the
law. We have to conclude,
therefore, that the date of sale
mentioned in Section 6 of Act 3135,
as amended, should be construed
to mean the date of registration of
the certificate of sale in the office
of the register of deeds concerned.
Only after the lapse of the twelvemonth redemption period from the
date of registration of the
certificate of sale and in the
absence of any redemptioner

within the said period, may the

deed of final sale be executed in
favor of the purchaser who may
then consolidate the title of the
property in his favor. Consequently,
We have to declare that the Land
Registration Commissioner was
right in ordering the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to deny the
registration of the Deed of Sale and
the Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, the simultaneous
registration of which documents
was sought by herein petitioner
even before the certificate of sale
issued by the sheriff was
registered.
WHEREFORE, the resolution appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant
Leonila Policarpio. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 128567

September 1, 2000

HUERTA ALBA RESORT INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SYNDICATED
MANAGEMENT GROUP INC., respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
Litigation must at some time be terminated, even
at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy
dictates that once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable, the prevailing party
should not be denied the fruits of his victory by
some subterfuge devised by the losing party.
Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment
sets at naught the role of courts in disposing
justiciable controversies with finality.
The Case
At bar is a petition assailing the Decision, dated
November 14, 1996, and Resolution, dated March
11, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
38747, which set aside the Order, dated July 21,
1995 and Order, dated September 4, 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, in Civil Case No.
89-5424. The aforesaid orders of the trial court
held that petitioner had the right to redeem subject
pieces of property within the one-year period
prescribed by Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337
otherwise known as the General Banking Act.
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 provides that "in case of
a foreclosure of a mortgage in favor of a bank,
banking or credit institution, whether judicially or
extrajudicially, the mortgagor shall have the right,
within one year after the sale of the real estate as
a result of the foreclosure of the respective
mortgage, to redeem the property."
The Facts

14

The facts that matter are undisputed:

Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to

the Court of Appeals, the appeal docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 39243 before the Sixth Division of the
appellate court, which dismissed the case on June
29, 1993 on the ground of late payment of docket
fees.

In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage

with preliminary injunction filed on October 19,
1989, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5424 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the herein
private respondent sought the foreclosure of four
(4) parcels of land mortgaged by petitioner to
Intercon Fund Resource, Inc. ("Intercon").

Dissatisfied with the dismissal of CA-G.R. No.

39243, petitioner came to this Court via a petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112044, which
this court resolved to dismiss on December 13,
1993, on the finding that the Court of Appeals
erred not in dismissing the appeal of petitioner.

Private respondent instituted Civil Case No. 895424 as mortgagee-assignee of a loan amounting
to P8.5 million obtained by petitioner from
Intercon, in whose favor petitioner mortgaged the
aforesaid parcels of land as security for the said
loan.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the

dismissal of its petition in G.R. No. 112044 was
denied with finality in this Court's Resolution
promulgated on February 16, 1994. On March 10,
1994, leave to present a second motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 112044 or to submit the
case for hearing by the Court en banc was filed,
but to no avail. The Court resolved to deny the
same on May 11, 1994.

In its answer below, petitioner questioned the

assignment by Intercon of its mortgage right
thereover to the private respondent, on the ground
that the same was ultra vires. Petitioner also
questioned during the trial the correctness of the
charges and interest on the mortgage debt in
question.

On March 14, 1994, the Resolution dated

December 13, 1993, in G.R. No. 112044 became
final and executory and was entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgment.

On April 30, 1992, the trial court, through the then

Judge now Court of Appeals Justice Buenaventura J.
Guerrero, came out with its decision "granting
herein private respondent SMGI's complaint for
judicial foreclosure of mortgage", disposing as
follows:

On July 4, 1994, private respondent filed with the

trial court of origin a motion for execution of the
Decision promulgated on April 30, 1992 in Civil
Case No. 89-5424. The said motion was granted on
July 15, 1994.

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the following:

Accordingly, on July 15, 1994 a writ of execution

issued and, on July 20, 1994, a Notice of Levy and
Execution was issued by the Sheriff concerned,
who issued on August 1, 1994 a Notice of Sheriff's
Sale for the auction of subject properties on
September 6, 1994.

(1) P8,500,000.00 representing the

principal of the amount due;
(2) P850,000.00 as penalty charges
with interest at 6% per annum,
until fully paid;

On August 23, 1994, petitioner filed with the same

trial court an Urgent Motion to Quash and Set Aside
Writ of Execution ascribing to it grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned Writ of
Execution. To support its motion, petitioner invited
attention and argued that the records of the case
were still with the Court of Appeals and therefore,
issuance of the writ of execution was premature
since the 150-day period for petitioner to pay the
judgment obligation had not yet lapsed and
petitioner had not yet defaulted in the payment
thereof since no demand for its payment was made
by the private respondent. In petitioner's own
words, the dispute between the parties was
"principally on the issue as to when the 150-day
period within which Huerta Alba may exercise its
equity of redemption should be counted."

(3) 22% per annum interest on the

above principal from September 6,
1998, until fully paid;
(4) 5% of the sum total of the
above amounts, as reasonable
attorney's fees; and,
(5) Costs.
All the above must be paid within a period
of not less than 150 days from receipt
hereof by the defendant. In default of such
payment, the four parcels of land subject
matter of the suit including its
improvements shall be sold to realize the
mortgage debt and costs, in the manner
and under the regulations that govern
sales of real estate under execution."1

In its Order of September 2, 1994, the lower court

denied petitioner's urgent motion to quash the writ
of execution in Civil Case No. 89-5424, opining that
subject judgment had become final and executory
and consequently, execution thereof was a matter

15

of right and the issuance of the corresponding writ

of execution became its ministerial duty.

time, and therefore, this Court has no more

reason to pass upon the parties' opposing
contentions, the same having become
moot and academic."2 (Emphasis supplied).

Challenging the said order granting execution,

petitioner filed once more with the Court of
Appeals another petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed as
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, predicated on the same
grounds invoked for its Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the

Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
35086. In its Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 18, 1994, petitioner theorized that the
period of one hundred fifty (150) days should not
be reckoned with from Entry of Judgment but from
receipt on or before July 29, 1994 by the trial court
of the records of Civil Case No. 89-5424 from the
Court of Appeals. So also, petitioner maintained
that it may not be considered in default, even after
the expiration of 150 days from July 29, 1994,
because prior demand to pay was never made on it
by the private respondent. According to petitioner,
it was therefore, premature for the trial court to
issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment.

On September 6, 1994, the scheduled auction sale

of subject pieces of properties proceeded and the
private respondent was declared the highest
bidder. Thus, private respondent was awarded
subject bidded pieces of property. The covering
Certificate of Sale issued in its favor was registered
with the Registry of Deeds on October 21, 1994.
On September 7, 1994, petitioner presented an ExParte Motion for Clarification asking the trial court
to "clarify" whether or not the twelve (12) month
period of redemption for ordinary execution applied
in the case.

The trial court deferred action on the Motion for

Confirmation of the Certificate of Sale in view of
the pendency of petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086.

On September 26, 1994, the trial court ruled that

the period of redemption of subject property should
be governed by the rule on the sale of judicially
foreclosed property under Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court.

On December 23, 1994, the Court of Appeals

denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in
CA-G.R. SP No. 35086. Absent any further action
with respect to the denial of the subject motion for
reconsideration, private respondent presented a
Second Motion for Confirmation of Certificate of
Sale before the trial court.

Thereafter, petitioner then filed an Exception to the

Order dated September 26, 1994 and Motion to Set
Aside Said Order, contending that the said Order
materially altered the Decision dated April 30,
1992 "which declared that the satisfaction of the
judgment shall be in the manner and under the
regulation that govern sale of real estate under
execution."

As regards the Decision rendered on September

30, 1994 by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
35086 it became final and executory on January
25, 1995.
On February 10, 1995, the lower court confirmed
the sale of subject properties to the private
respondent. The pertinent Order declared that all
pending incidents relating to the Order dated
September 26, 1994 had become moot and
academic. Conformably, the Transfer Certificates of
Title to subject pieces of property were then issued
to the private respondent.

Meanwhile, in its Decision of September 30, 1994,

the Court of Appeals resolved the issues raised by
the petitioner in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, holding
that the one hundred-fifty day period within which
petitioner may redeem subject properties should
be computed from the date petitioner was notified
of the Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 112044; and
that the 150-day period within which petitioner
may exercise its equity of redemption expired on
September 11, 1994.

On February 27, 1995, petitioner filed with the

Court of Appeals a Motion for Clarification seeking
"clarification" of the date of commencement of the
one (1) year period for the redemption of the
properties in question.

Thus:
"Petitioner must have received the
resolution of the Supreme Court dated
February 16, 1994 denying with finality its
motion for reconsideration in G.R. No.
112044 before March 14, 1994, otherwise
the Supreme Court would not have made
an entry of judgment on March 14,
1994. While, computing the 150-day
period. Petitioner may have until
September 11, 1994. within which to pay
the amounts covered by the judgment,
such period has already expired by this

In its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the Court of

Appeals merely noted such Motion for Clarification
since its Decision promulgated on September 30,
1994 had already become final and executory;
ratiocinating thus:
"We view the motion for clarification filed
by petitioner, purportedly signed by its
proprietor, but which we believe was
prepared by a lawyer who wishes to hide
under the cloak of anonymity, as a veiled

16

attempt to buy time and to delay further

the disposition of this case.

On May 2, 1995, in opposition to private

respondent's Motion for Issuance of writ of
Possession, petitioner filed a "Motion to Compel
Private Respondent to Accept Redemption." It was
the first time petitioner ever asserted the right to
redeem subject properties under Section 78 of R.A.
No. 337, the General Banking Act; theorizing that
the original mortgagee, being a credit institution,
its assignment of the mortgage credit to petitioner
did not remove petitioner from the coverage of
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Therefore, it should
have the right to redeem subject properties within
one year from registration of the auction sale,
theorized the petitioner which concluded that in
view of its "right of redemption," the issuance of
the titles over subject parcels of land to the private
respondent was irregular and premature.

Our decision of September 30, 1994 never

dealt on the right and period of redemption
of petitioner, but was merely circumscribed
to the question of whether respondent
judge could issue a writ of execution in its
Civil Case No. 89-5424 . . .
We further ruled that the one-hundred fifty
day period within which petitioner may
exercise its equity of redemption should be
counted, not from the receipt of
respondent court of the records of Civil
Case No. 89-5424 but from the date
petitioner was notified of the entry of
judgment made by the appellate court.

In its Order of July 21, 1995, the trial court,

presided over by Judge Napoleon Inoturan, denied
private respondent's motion for a writ of
possession, opining that Section 78 of the General
Banking Act was applicable and therefore, the
petitioner had until October 21, 1995 to redeem
the said parcels of land, said Order ruled as follows:

But we never made any pronouncement on

the one-year right of redemption of
petitioner because, in the first place,
the foreclosure in this case is judicial. and
as such the mortgagor has only the equity
not the right of redemption . . . While it
may be true that under Section 78 of R.A.
337 as amended, otherwise known as the
General Banking Act, a mortgagor of a
bank, banking or credit institution, whether
the foreclosure was done judicially or
extrajudicially, has a period of one year
from the auction sale within which to
redeem the foreclosed property, the
question of whether the Syndicated
Management Group,. Inc., is a bank or
credit institution was never brought before
us squarely, and it is indeed odd and
strange that petitioner would now
sarcastically ask a rhetorical question in its
motion for clarification."3 (Emphasis
supplied).

"It is undisputed that Intercon is a credit

institution from which defendant obtained
a loan secured with a real estate mortgage
over four (4) parcels of land. Assuming that
the mortgage debt had not been assigned
to plaintiff, there is then no question that
defendant would have a right of
redemption in case of foreclosure, judicially
or extrajudicially, pursuant to the above
quoted Section 78 of RA 337, as amended.
However, the pivotal issue here is whether
or not the defendant lost its right of
redemption by virtue of the assignment of
its mortgage debt by Intercon to plaintiff,
which is not a bank or credit institution.
The issue is resolved in the negative. The
right of redemption in this case is vested
by law and is therefore an absolute
privilege which defendant may not lose
even though plaintiff-assignee is not a
bank or credit institution (Tolentino versus
Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 513). Indeed, a
contrary ruling will lead to a possible
circumvention of Section 78 because all
that may be needed to deprive a defaulting
mortgagor of his right of redemption is to
assign his mortgage debt from a bank or
credit institution to one which is not.
Protection of defaulting mortgagors, which
is the avowed policy behind the provision,
would not be achieved if the ruling were
otherwise. Consequently, defendant still
possesses its right of redemption which it
may exercise up to October 21, 1995 only,
which is one year from the date of
registration of the certificate of sale of
subject properties (GSIS versus Iloilo, 175
SCRA 19, citing Limpin versus IAC, 166
SCRA 87).

Indeed, if petitioner did really act in good faith, it

would have ventilated before the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its pretended right under
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 but it never did so.
At the earliest opportunity, when it filed its answer
to the complaint for judicial foreclosure, petitioner
should have averred in its pleading that it was
entitled to the beneficial provisions of Section 78 of
R.A. No. 337; but again, petitioner did not make
any such allegation in its answer.
From the said Resolution, petitioner took no further
step such that on March 31, 1995, the private
respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession with the trial court.
During the hearing called on April 21, 1995, the
counsel of record of petitioner entered appearance
and asked for time to interpose opposition to the
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.

17

Since the period to exercise defendant's

right of redemption has not yet expired,
the cancellation of defendant's transfer
certificates of title and the issuance of new
ones in lieu thereof in favor of plaintiff are
therefore illegal for being premature,
thereby necessitating reconveyance (see
Sec. 63 (a) PD 1529, as amended).

petition and set aside the trial court's Order dated

July 21, 1995 and Order dated September 4, 1995.
In its Resolution of March 11, 1997, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision promulgated on
November 14, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 38747.
Undaunted, petitioner has come to this Court via
the present petition, placing reliance on the
assignment of errors, that:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as

follows:
(1) The Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Possession is hereby denied;

I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE
COURT OF APPEALS (TWELFTH DIVISION) IN
CA G.R. SP NO. 35086 HAD RESOLVED
"WITH FINALITY" THAT PETITIONER HUERTA
ALBA HAD NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION BUT
ONLY THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.

(2) Plaintiff is directed to accept the

redemption on or before October
21, 1995 in an amount computed
according to the terms stated in
the Writ of Execution dated July 15,
1994 plus all other related costs
and expenses mentioned under
Section 78, RA 337, as amended;
and

II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED GRAVELY IN IGNORING THAT
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA POSSESSES THE
ONE-YEAR RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER
SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 337 (THE GENERAL
BANKING ACT).

(3) The Register of Deeds of

Valenzuela, Bulacan is directed (a)
to reconvey to the defendant the
following titles of the four (4)
parcels of land, namely TCT Nos. V38878, V-38879, V-38880, and V38881, now in the name of plaintiff,
and (b) to register the certificate of
sale dated October 7, 1994 and the
Order confirming the sale dated
February 10, 1995 by a brief
memorandum thereof upon the
transfer certificates of title to be
issued in the name of defendant,
pursuant to Sec. 63 (a) PD 1529, as
amended.

III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT SYNDICATED MANAGEMENT
GROUP, INC. IS ENTITLED TO THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION
OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.5
In its comment on the petition, private respondent
countered that:

The Omnibus Motion dated June 5, 1995,

together with the Opposition thereto, is
now deemed resolved.

"A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

CORRECTLY HELD THAT IT RESOLVED WITH
FINALITY IN C.A.-G.R. SP NO. 35086 THAT
PETITIONER ONLY HAD THE RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION IN RESPECT OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES.

SO ORDERED."4
Private respondent interposed a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking the reversal of the Order
but to no avail. In its Order dated September 4,
1995, the trial court denied the same.

B. THE PETITION IS AN INSIDIOUS AND

UNDERHANDED ATTEMPT TO EVADE THE
FINALITY OF VARIOUS DECISIONS,
RESOLUTIONS AND ORDERS WHICH HELD
THAT, PETITIONER ONLY POSSESSES THE
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION IN RESPECT OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.

To attack and challenge the aforesaid order of July

21, 1995 and subsequent Order of September 4,
1995 of the trial court, the private respondent filed
with this court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 121893, but
absent any special and cogent reason shown for
entertaining the same, the Court referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals, for proper
determination.

C. PETITIONER IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL

FROM BELATEDLY RAISING THE ISSUE OF
ITS ALLEGED 'RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.
HDAECI

Docketed as G.R. No. 387457 on November 14,

1996, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the

18

D. IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER HAD

THE 'RIGHT OF REDEMPTION' OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES, THE TRIAL COURT
MADE A MOCKERY OF THE 'LAW OF THE
CASE."'6

resolve such issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086;

contending thus:
(1)
BY NO STRETCH OF LOGIC CAN THE 20
MARCH 1995 RESOLUTION IN CA G.R. SP
NO. 35086 BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THE
COURT OF APPEALS HAD RESOLVED 'WITH
FINALITY' THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA HAD THE RIGHT
OF REDEMPTION WHEN ALL THAT THE
RESOLUTION DID WAS TO MERELY NOTE
THE MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION.

And by way of Reply, petitioner argued, that:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA G.R. SP NO.
35086 COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLY
RESOLVED THEREIN WHETHER WITH
FINALITY OR OTHERWISE - THE ISSUE OF
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA'S RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
337.

(2)
THE 20 MARCH 1995 RESOLUTION IN CA
G.R. SP NO. 35086 IS NOT A FINAL
JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE. IT IS NOT
EVEN A JUDGMENT OR ORDER TO BEGIN
WITH. IT ORDERS NOTHING; IT
ADJUDICATES NOTHING.

II.
THERE IS NO ESTOPPEL HERE. PETITIONER
HUERTA ALBA INVOKED ITS RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
337 IN TIMELY FASHION, i.e., AFTER
CONFIRMATION BY THE COURT OF THE
FORECLOSURE SALE, AND WITHIN ONE (1)
YEAR FROM THE DATE OF REGISTRATION
OF THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE.

(3)
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA'S RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
37 WAS NOT AN ISSUE AND WAS NOT IN
ISSUE, AND COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLY
BEEN AN ISSUE NOR IN ISSUE, IN CA G.R.
SP NO. 35086.

III.
THE PRINCIPLE OF 'THE LAW OF THE CASE'
HAS ABSOLUTELY NO BEARING HERE:

(4)
(1)
THE 30 SEPTEMBER 1994 DECISION IN CA
G.R. SP NO. 35086 HAVING ALREADY
BECOME FINAL EVEN BEFORE THE FILING
OF THE MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, THE
COURT OF APPEALS NO LONGER HAD ANY
JURISDICTION TO ACT OF THE MOTION OR
ANY OTHER MATTER IN CA G.R. SP NO.
35086, EXCEPT TO MERELY NOTE THE
MOTION. EASIHa

THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER

SECTION 78, R.A. NO. 337 IS IN FACT
PREDICATED UPON THE FINALITY AND
CORRECTNESS OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 89-5424.
(2)
THUS, THE RTC'S ORDER RECOGNIZING
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA'S RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
37 DOES NOT IN ANY WAY HAVE THE
EFFECT OF AMENDING, MODIFYING, OR
SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 89-5424.

II.
IN STARK CONTRAST, THE ISSUE OF
PETITIONER HUERTA ALBA'S RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 78, R.A. NO.
337 WAS DIRECTLY RAISED AND JOINED BY
THE PARTIES, AND THE SAME DULY
RESOLVED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

The above arguments and counter-arguments

advanced relate to the pivotal issue of whether or
not the petitioner has the one-year right of
redemption of subject properties under Section 78
of Republic Act No. 337 otherwise known as the
General Banking Act.

III.
THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER
SECTION 78 OF R.A. NO. 337 IS
MANDATORY AND AUTOMATICALLY EXISTS
BY LAW. THE COURTS ARE DUTY-BOUND TO
RECOGNIZE SUCH RIGHT.

The petition is not visited by merit.

Petitioner's assertion of right of redemption under
Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337 is premised on
the submission that the Court of Appeals did not

IV.

19

EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH

HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER HUERTA
ALBA, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE
WELL-SETTLED POLICY OF THE LAW TO AID
RATHER THAN DEFEAT THE RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION.

exercised within a period of one (1) year,

counted from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the Registry of
Property.
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption
exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB
or a bank or banking institution. In such a
case, the foreclosure sale, 'when confirmed
by an order of the court. . . shall operate to
divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser.' There then exists only what is
known as the equity of redemption. This is
simply the right of the defendant
mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and
retain ownership of the property by paying
the secured debt within the 90-day period
after the judgment becomes final, in
accordance with Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its
confirmation.

V.
THEREFORE THE 21 JULY 1995 AND 04
SEPTEMBER 1995 ORDERS OF THE TRIAL
COURT ARE VALID AND PROPER IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF THE
LAW.
From the various decisions, resolutions and
orders a quo it can be gleaned that what petitioner
has been adjudged to have was only the equity of
redemption over subject properties. On the
distinction between the equityof redemption and
right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,7 comes to the
fore. Held the Court in the said case:

Section 2, Rule 68 provides that

"The equity of redemption is, to be sure,

different from and should not be confused
with the right of redemption.

'. . If upon the trial . . the court shall find

the facts set forth in the complaint to be
true, it shall ascertain the amount due to
the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or
obligation, including interest and costs, and
shall render judgment for the sum so found
due and order the same to be paid into
court within a period of not less
than ninety (90) days from the date of the
service of such order, and that in default of
such payment the property be sold to
realize the mortgage debt and costs.'

The right of redemption in relation to a

mortgage understood in the sense of a
prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged
property after registration of the
foreclosure sale exists only in the case
of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. No such right is recognized in a
judicial foreclosure except only where the
mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank
or a bank or banking institution.

This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of

redemption which, as above stated, may
be exercised by him even beyond the 90day period 'from the date of service of the
order,' and even after the foreclosure sale
itself, provided it be before the order of
confirmation of the sale. After such order of
confirmation, no redemption can be
effected any longer."8 (Emphasis supplied)

Where a mortgage is foreclosed

extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the
mortgagor the right of redemption within
one (1) year from the registration of the
sheriff's certificate of foreclosure sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected,
however, no equivalent right of redemption
exists. The law declares that a judicial
foreclosure sale 'when confirmed be an
order of the court. . . . shall operate to
divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of
redemption as may be allowed by law.'
Such rights exceptionally 'allowed by
law' (i.e., even after confirmation by an
order of the court) are those granted by the
charter of the Philippine National Bank
(Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General
Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer
on the mortgagor, his successors in
interest or any judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the
property sold on foreclosure after
confirmation by the court of the
foreclosure sale which right may be

Petitioner failed to seasonably invoke its purported

right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
Petitioner avers in its petition that the Intercom,
predecessor in interest of the private respondent,
is a credit institution, such that Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 337 should apply in this case.
Stated differently, it is the submission of petitioner
that it should be allowed to redeem subject
properties within one year from the date of sale as
a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage
constituted thereon.
The pivot of inquiry here therefore, is whether the
petitioner seasonably invoked its asserted right
under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 to redeem subject
properties.

20

Petitioner theorizes that it invoked its "right" in

"timely fashion", that is, after confirmation by the
court of the foreclosure sale, and within one (1)
year from the date of registration of the certificate
of sale. Indeed, the facts show that it was only on
May 2, 1995 when, in opposition to the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession, did petitioner file a
Motion to Compel Private Respondent to Accept
Redemption, invoking for the very first time its
alleged right to redeem subject properties under to
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.

may be true that under Section 78 of R.A.

337 as amended, otherwise known as the
General Banking Act, a mortgagor of a
bank, banking or credit institution, whether
the foreclosure was done judicially or
extrajudicially, has a period of one year
from the auction sale within which to
redeem the foreclosed property, the
question of whether the Syndicated
Management Group. Inc., is bank or credit
institution was never brought before us
squarely, and it is indeed odd and strange
that petitioner would now sarcastically ask
a rhetorical question in its motion for
clarification."9 (Emphasis supplied).

In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in

the day for petitioner to invoke a right to redeem
under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Petitioner failed
to assert a right to redeem in several crucial stages
of the proceedings.

If petitioner were really acting in good faith, it

would have ventilated before the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its alleged right under Section
78 of R.A. No. 337; but petitioner never did do so.

For instance, on September 7, 1994, when it filed

with the trial court an Ex-part Motion for
Clarification, petitioner failed to allege and prove
that private respondent's predecessor in interest
was a credit institution and therefore, Section 78 of
R.A. No. 337 was applicable. Petitioner merely
asked the trial court to clarify whether the sale of
subject properties was execution sale or judicial
foreclosure sale.

Indeed, at the earliest opportunity, when it

submitted its answer to the complaint for judicial
foreclosure, petitioner should have alleged that it
was entitled to the beneficial provisions of Section
78 of R.A. No. 337 but again, it did not make any
allegation in its answer regarding any right
thereunder. It bears stressing that the applicability
of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 hinges on the factual
question of whether or not private respondent's
predecessor in interest was a credit institution. As
was held in Limpin, a judicial foreclosure sale,
"when confirmed by an order of the court, . . shall
operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as
may be allowed by law',"10 which confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any
judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to
redeem the property sold on foreclosure after
confirmation by the court of the judicial foreclosure
sale. Thus, the claim that petitioner is entitled to
the beneficial provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No.
337 since private respondent's predecessor-ininterest is a credit institution is in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim which should have been
averred in petitioner's answer to the compliant for
judicial foreclosure.

So also, when it presented before the trial court an

Exception to the Order and Motion to Set Aside
Said Order dated October 13, 1994, petitioner
again was silent on its alleged right under Section
78 of R.A. No. 337, even as it failed to show that
private respondent's predecessor in interest is a
credit institution. Petitioner just argued that the
aforementioned Order materially altered the trial
court's Decision of April 30, 1992.
Then, too, nothing was heard from petitioner on its
alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 and
of the predecessor in interest of private respondent
as a credit institution, when the trial court came
out with an order on February 10, 1995, confirming
the sale of subject properties in favor of private
respondent and declaring that all pending incidents
with respect to the Order dated September 26,
1994 had become moot and academic.
Similarly, when petitioner filed on February 27,
1995 a Motion for Clarification with the Court of
Appeals, seeking "clarification" of the date of
commencement of the one (1) year redemption
period for the subject properties, petitioner never
intimated any alleged right under Section 78 of
R.A. No. 337 nor did it invite attention to its present
stance that private respondent's predecessor-ininterest was a credit institution. Consequently, in
its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the Court of
Appeals ruled on the said motion thus:

". . . A counterclaim is, most broadly, a

cause of action existing in favor of the
defendant against the plaintiff. More
narrowly, it is a claim which. if established,
will defeat or in some way qualify a
judgment or relief to which plaintiff is
otherwise entitled It is sometimes defined
as any cause of action arising in contract
available against any action also arising in
contract and existing at the time of the
commencement of such an action. It is
frequently defined by the codes as a cause
of action arising out of the contract or
transaction set forth in the complaint as
the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or
connected with the subject of the
action."11 (emphasis supplied)

"But we never made any pronouncement

on the one-year right of redemption of
petitioner because, in the first place,
the foreclosure in this case is judicial, and
as such. the mortgagor has only the equity.
not the right of redemption . . . While it

21

"The counterclaim is in itself a distinct and

independent cause of action, so that when
properly stated as such, the defendant
becomes, in respect to the matters stated
by him, an actor, and there are two
simultaneous actions pending between the
same parties, wherein each is at the same
time both a plaintiff and a defendant.
Counterclaim is an offensive as well as a
defensive plea and is not necessarily
confined to the justice of the plaintiff's
claim. It represents the right of the
defendant to have the claims of the parties
counterbalanced in whole or in part, and
judgment to be entered in excess, if any. A
counterclaim stands on the same footing,
and is to be tested be the same rules, as if
it were an independent
action."12 (emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 337 in all the stages of the proceedings

below.
Verily, the petitioner has only itself to blame for not
alleging at the outset that the predecessor-ininterest of the private respondent is a credit
institution. Thus, when the trial court, and the
Court of Appeals repeatedly passed upon the issue
of whether or not petitioner had the right of
redemption or equity of redemption over subject
properties in the decisions, resolutions and orders,
particularly in Civil Case no. 89-5424, CA-G.R. CV
No. 39243, CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, and CA-G.R. SP
No. 38747, it was unmistakable that the petitioner
was adjudged to just have the equity of redemption
without any qualification whatsoever, that is,
without any right of redemption allowed by law.
The "law of case" holds that petitioner has
the equity of redemption without any
qualification.

The very purpose of a counterclaim would have

been served had petitioner alleged in its answer its
purported right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337:

There is, therefore, merit in private respondent's

contention that to allow petitioner to belatedly
invoke its right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337
will disturb the "law of the case." However, private
respondent's statement of what constitutes the
"law of the case" is not entirely accurate. The "law
of the case" is not simply that the defendant
possesses an equity of redemption. As the Court
has stated, the "law of the case" holds that
petitioner has the equity of the redemption without
any qualification whatsoever, that is, without the
right of redemption afforded by Section 78 of R.A.
No. 337. Whether or not the "law of the case" is
erroneous is immaterial, it still remains the "law of
the case". A contrary rule will contradict both the
letter and spirit of the rulings of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, CA-G.R. CV No.
39243, and CA-G.R. 38747, which clearly saw
through the repeated attempts of petitioner to
forestall so simple a matter as making the security
given for a just debt to answer for its payment.

". . . The rules of counterclaim are designed

to enable the disposition of
a whole controversy of interested parties'
conflicting claims, at one time and in one
action, provided all parties' be brought
before the court and the matter decided
without prejudicing the rights of any
party."13
The failure of petitioner to seasonably assert its
alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337
precludes it from so doing at this late stage case.
Estoppel may be successfully invoked if the party
fails to raise the question in the early stages of the
proceedings.14 Thus, "a party to a case who failed
to invoked his claim in the main case, while having
the opportunity to do so, will be precluded,
subsequently, from invoking his claim, even if it
were true, after the decision has become final,
otherwise the judgment may be reduced to a
mockery and the administration of justice may be
placed in disrepute."15

Hence, in conformity with the ruling in Limpin, the

sale of the subject properties, as confirmed by the
Order dated February 10, 1995 of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 89-5424 operated to divest the
rights of all the parties to the action and to vest
their rights in private respondent. There then
existed only what is known as the equity of
redemption, which is simply the right of the
petitioner to extinguish the mortgage and retain
ownership of the property by paying the secured
debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
became final. There being an explicit finding on the
part of the Court of Appeals in its Decision of
September 30, 1994 in CA-G.R. No. 35086 that
the herein petitioner failed to exercise its equity of
redemption within the prescribed period,
redemption can no longer be effected. The
confirmation of the sale and the issuance of the
transfer certificates of title covering the subject
properties to private respondent was then, in order.
The trial court therefore, has the ministerial duty to

All things viewed in proper perspective, it is

decisively clear that the trial court erred in still
allowing petitioner to introduce evidence that
private respondent's predecessor-in-interest was a
credit institution, and to thereafter rule that the
petitioner was entitled to avail of the provisions of
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. In effect, the trial court
permitted the petitioner to accomplish what the
latter failed to do before the Court of Appeals, that
is, to invoke its alleged right under Section 78 of
R.A. No. 337 although the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. no. 35086 already found that 'the question of
whether the Syndicated Management Council
Group, Inc. is a bank or credit institution was never
brought before (the Court of Appeals) squarely."
The said pronouncement by the Court of Appeals
unerringly signified that petitioner did not make a
timely assertion of any right under Section 78 of

22

place private respondent in the possession of

subject properties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, declaring
null and void the Order dated 21 July 1995 and
Order dated 4 September 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 89-5424,
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

RULE 69 PARTITION
G.R. No. 192486

November 21, 2012

RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS

CARLO GERARD VIRAY, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA
USI, Respondents.
DECISION

23

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Mendoza

The Case
Petitioners have availed of Rule 45 to assail and
nullify the Decision1 dated July 24, 2009, as
effectively reiterated in a Resolution2 of June 2,
2010, both rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90344, setting aside the
Decision3 dated June 21, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 55 in Macabebe, Pampanga, in
Civil Case No. 01-1118(M), an accion
publiciana/reivindicatoria, which respondents
commenced with, but eventually dismissed by, that
court.
The Facts
At the core of the present controversy are several
parcels of land which form part of what was once
Lot No. 733, Cad-305-D, Masantol Cadastre (Lot
733 hereinafter), registered in the name of Ellen P.
Mendoza (Mendoza), married to Moses Mendoza,
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 141-RP
of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga. With an area
of 9,137 square meters, more or less, Lot 733 is
located in Brgy. Bebe Anac, Masantol, Pampanga.
On April 28, 1986, Geodetic Engineer Abdon G.
Fajardo prepared a subdivision plan4 (Fajardo Plan,
for short) for Lot 733, in which Lot 733 was divided
into six (6) smaller parcels of differing size
dimensions, designated as: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B,
Lot 733-C, Lot 733-D, Lot 733-E, and Lot 733-F
consisting of 336, 465, 3,445, 683, 677 and 3,501
square meters, respectively.

Lot 733-A

366 square meters

Sold to Sps. Avelino

and Margarita Viray

Lot 733-B

465 square meters

Unsold

Lot 733-C

3,445 square
meters

Unsold

Lot 733-D

683 square meters

Proposed Road

Lot 733-E

677 square meters

Unsold

Lot 733-F

3,501 square
meters

Sold to Jesus Viray

The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding,

Mendoza, Emerenciana M. Vda. de Mallari (Vda. de
Mallari) and respondent spouses Jose Usi and
Amelita T. Usi (Sps. Usi or the Usis), as purported
co-owners of Lot 733, executed on August 20, 1990
a Subdivision Agreement,7 or the

The following day, April 29, 1986, Mendoza

executed two separate deeds of absolute sale, the
first, transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus Carlo Gerard
Viray (Jesus Viray),5 and the second deed
conveying Lot 733-A to spouses Avelino Viray and
Margarita Masangcay (Sps. Viray).6 The names
McDwight Mendoza, Mendozas son, and one
Ernesto Bustos appear in both notarized deeds as
instrumental witnesses. As of that time, the Fajardo
Plan has not been officially approved by the Land
Management Bureau (LMB), formerly the Bureau of
Lands. And at no time in the course of the
controversy did the spouses Viray and Jesus Viray,
as purchasers of Lots 733-A and 733-F,
respectively, cause the annotations of the
conveying deeds of sale on TCT 141-RP.

1st subdivision agreement (1st SA). Pursuant to

this agreement which adopted, as base of
reference, the LMB-approved subdivision plan
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Alfeo S. Galang
(Galang Plan), Lot 733 was subdivided into three
lots, i.e., Lots A to C, with the following area
coverage: Lots 733-A, 465 square meters, 733-B,
494 square meters, and 733-C, 6,838 square
meters. In its pertinent parts, the 1st SA reads:
That the above-parties are the sole and exclusive
owners of a certain parcel of land situated in the
Bo. of Bebe Anac, Masantol, Pampanga, which is
known as Lot No. 733 under TCT No. 141 R.P. of the
Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, under Psd-No. 0310-025242;

Herein petitioner, Ruperta Cano Vda. de Viray (Vda.

de Viray), is the surviving spouse of Jesus Viray,
who died in April 1992.
As of April 29, 1986, the dispositions made on
and/or the ownership profile of the subdivided lots
appearing under the Fajardo Plan are as follows:

Lot No.

Area

That for the convenience of the parties hereto that

the existing community of the said Lot be
terminated and their respective share be
determined by proper adjudication;
That the parties hereto agreed to subdivided (sic)
the above-mentioned property by Geodetic
Engineer Alfeo S. Galang, as per tracing cloth and
blue print copy of plan Psd-03-025242 and

Conveyances by

24

t No.

technical description duly approved by the Bureau

of Lands, hereto Attached and made internal part
of this instrument in the following manner:
Lot 733-A - - - - - - - To Emerencia M. Vda. Mallari;
Lot 733-B - - - - - - - To Sps. Jose B. Usi and Amelita
Lot 733-C-1
B. Usi;
Lot 733-C - - - - - - - To Ellen P. Mendoza8 (Emphasis
added.)
Lot 733-C-2
TCT 141-RP would eventually be canceled and, in
lieu thereof, three derivative titles were issued to
the following, as indicated: TCT 1584-RP for Lot
733-C-3
733-A to Mallari; TCT 1585-RP9 for Lot 733-B Lot
to Sps.
Usi; and TCT 1586-RP for Lot 733-C to Mendoza.
On April 5, 1991, Mendoza, McDwight P. Mendoza,
Bismark P. Mendoza, Beverly P. Mendoza,
Lot 733-C-4
Georgenia P. Mendoza, Sps. Alejandro Lacap and
Juanita U. Lacap, Sps. Nestor Coronel and Herminia
Balingit, Sps. Bacani and Martha Balingit, Sps.
Ruperto and Josefina Jordan, and Sps.
Jose and Amelita Usi executed another Subdivision
Lot 733-C-5
Agreement10 (2nd SA) covering and under which
the 8,148-sq. m. Lot 733-C was further subdivided
into 13 smaller lots (Lot 733-C-1 to Lot 733-C-13
inclusive). The subdivision plan11 for Lot 733-C, as
likewise prepared by Engr. Galang on October
13,
Lot
733-C-6
1990, was officially approved by the LMB on March
1, 1991.

200 square meters

Sps. Jose and Amelita Usi

1,000 square meters

Sps. Alejandro & Juanita Lacap

300 square meters

Sps. Nestor & Herminia Coronel

500 square meters

Sps. Nestor & Herminia Coronel

and Sps. Bacani & Martha
Balingit

400 square meters

Sps. Ruperto & Josefina Jordan

500 square meters

Ellen, McDwight, Bismark,

Beverly and Georgenia Mendoza

220 square meters

Ellen, McDwight, Bismark,

Beverly and Georgenia Mendoza

1,000 square meters

Ellen, McDwight, Bismark,

Beverly and Georgenia Mendoza

500 square meters

Ellen, McDwight, Bismark,

Beverly and Georgenia Mendoza

The 2nd SA partly reads:

Lot 733-C-7
1. That we are the sole and exclusive undivided coowners of a parcel of land situated at Barrio Putat
and Arabia, Bebe Anac, Masantol, Pampanga,
identified as Lot No. 733-C of Psd-No. 03-041669,
containing an area of 8,148 sq. meters and covered
Lot 733-C-8
by T.C.T. No. 1586 R.P. of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga;
2. That it is for the benefit and best interest of the
Lot 733-C-9
parties herein that the [sic] their co-ownership
relation over the above-mentioned parcel of land
be terminated and their respective share over the
co-ownership be allotted [sic] to them;
Wherefore, by virtue of the foregoing premises,
Lot we
733-C-10
have agreed, as we hereby agree to subdivide our
said parcel of land x x x.12 (Emphasis added.)

1,000 square meters

Consequent to the subdivision of Lot 733-C in

line
Lot
733-C-11
with the Galang Plan and its subsequent partition
and distribution to the respective allotees pursuant
to the 2nd SA, the following individuals appeared
as owners of the subdivided units as indicated in
the table below:
Lot 733-C-12

668 square meters

Ellen, McDwight, Bismark,

Beverly and Georgenia Mendoza

550 square meters

Ellen, McDwight, Bismark,

Beverly and Georgenia Mendoza

Land Area

Partitioned
to:
Lot 733-C-13]

25

[1,310 square meters]

Sps. Jose and Amelita Usi

[Allotted for a proposed road]

August 1, 1989, rendered a Joint Decision17 finding

for the Sps. Viray and Jesus Viray, as defendants,
and accordingly dismissing the separate
complaints to annul the deeds of sale subject of
the joint cases.
In net effect, the two subdivision agreements
paved the way for the issuance, under the Sps.
Usis name, of TCT Nos. 1585-RP,13 2092-RP,14 and
2101-RP,15 covering Lots 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C10, respectively.

On appeal, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 24981-82,

and later this Court, in its Decision of December
11, 1995, in G.R. No. 122287 in effect affirmed in
toto the RTC dismissal decision.18 The Court, via its
Resolution of April 17, 1998, would eventually deny
with finality19 Mendoza and the Usis motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid December 11,
1995 Decision.

On the other hand, the subdivision of Lot 733, per

the Galang Plan, and the two subdivision
agreements concluded based on that plan, virtually
resulted in the loss of the identity of what under
the Fajardo Plan were Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F. The
Sps. Viray and the late Jesus Viray, to recall,
purchased Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F, respectively,
from Mendoza.

(c) A forcible entry case filed on November 19,

1991 by the late Jesus Viray against the Sps. Usi
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in
Macabebe, Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No.
91 (13), entitled Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray v.
Spouses Jose Usi and Emelita Tolentino, to eject the
Usis from Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan).

Then came the ocular inspection and

survey16 conducted on Lot 733, as an undivided
whole, by Geodetic Engr. Angelito Nicdao of the
LMB. Some highlights of his findings:

On July 29, 1998, the MCTC rendered a

Decision20 in favor of Jesus Viray, the dispositive
portion of which pertinently reads:

(a) Lot 733-A of the Fajardo Plan with an

area of 336 square meters that Sps. Viray
bought is within Lot 733-B (Galang Plan)
allotted under 1st SA to Sps. Jose and
Amelita Usi; and

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered for the plaintiff the late petitioner
Jesus Viray, and accordingly, the defendants Sps.
Usi and any other persons claiming under them are
hereby ordered to vacate the subject premises, Lot
733-F embraced in T.C.T. No. 141-R.P., Register of
Deeds Pampanga, and Lot 733-A, both situated at
Bebe Anac, Masantol, Pampanga and to remove at
their own expense, all structures or improvements
they built and introduced thereon.

(b) Lot 733-F of the Fajardo Plan with an

area of 3,501 square meters is almost
identical to the combined area of Lots 733C-8 to 733-C-12 awarded to Ellen Mendoza
and her childrenMcDwight, Bismark,
Beverly and Georgenia, and a portion
(1,000 square meters) of Lot 733-C-10 of
the Galang Plan awarded to Sps. Jose and
Amelita Usi.

Defendants are likewise sentenced to pay plaintiff

the amount of THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS
per month from November 19, 1991, until they
vacate the premises, as reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation thereof x x x.

As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping

transactions involving the same property or
portions thereof spawned several suits and
counter- suits featuring, in particular, herein
petitioners and respondents, viz:

xxxx
SO ORDERED.21

(a) A suit for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale

filed before the RTC, Branch 55 in Macabebe,
Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-0265-M,
in which the Usis and Mendoza, as plaintiffs,
assailed the validity and sought the annulment of
the deed of absolute sale executed by Mendoza on
April 29, 1986 conveying Lot 733-A (Fajardo Plan)
to defendants Sps. Viray.

The Decision eventually became final and

executory, the Usis having opted not to appeal it.
(d) A Petition for Annulment of the MCTCs July 29,
1998 Decision filed by the Sps. Usi before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0914M, entitled Sps.
Jose & Amelita Usi v. Hon. Pres. Judge MCTC,
Macabebe, Pampanga, the Court Sheriff, MCTC,
Macabebe, Pampanga and

(b) A similar suit for Annulment of Deed of Absolute

Sale commenced by Mendoza against Jesus Viray
before RTC-Br. 55 in Macabebe, Pampanga,
docketed as Civil Case No. 88-0283-M, entitled
Ellen P. Mendoza v. Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray, also
seeking to nullify the April 29, 1986 Deed of
Absolute Sale conveying Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) to
Jesus Viray and to declare the plaintiff as entitled to
its possession.

Ruperta Cano Vda. de Viray, which decision placed

Jesus Virays widow, Ruperta, in possession of Lot
733-F of the Fajardo Plan.
As may be noted, the spouses Usi, instead of
appealing from the July 29, 1998 MCTC Decision in
Civil Case No. 91 (13), sought, after its finality, its
annulment before the RTC. By Decision22 dated
June 29, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition to
annul. The Usis appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-

The adverted Civil Case Nos. 88-0265-M and 880283-M were jointly tried by RTC-Br. 55, which, on

26

G.R. CV No. 67945, merited the same dismissal

action.23 And finally, in G.R. No. 154538 (Spouses
Jose and Amelita Usi v. Ruperta Cano Vda. de
Viray), the Court denied, on February 12, 2003,
Sps. Usis petition for review of the CAs Decision.
The denial became final on April 8, 2003 and an
Entry of Judgment24 issued in due course.
(e) A Petition for Accion Publiciana/
Reivindicatoria 25 instituted on December 12, 2001
by Sps. Usi against the late Jesus Viray, as
substituted by Vda. de Viray, et al., before the RTC
in Macabebe, Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-1118(M), involving Lots 733-B, 733-C-1 and
733-C-10 (Galang Plan) covered by TCT Nos. 1585RP, 2092-RP and 2101-RP.

880283-M

Sps. Viray

Absolute
Sale

(Fajardo
Plan)

of Sps.
Viray.
Decision
is now
final.

Mendoza v.
Jesus Viray

Annulment
of Deed of
Absolute
Sale

733-F

Decision
in favor
of Sps.
Viray.

(Fajardo
Plan)

Subject
of CAG.R. CV
Nos.
2498182
denied.
Subject
of G.R.
No.
122287
petition
denied.

The execution of the July 29, 1998 MCTC Decision

in Civil Case No. 91 (13), as the Sps. Usi asserted in
their petition, would oust them from their own in
fee simple lots even though the dispositive portion
of said forcible entry Decision mentioned Lots 733A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan) and not Lots 733-B, 733C-1 and 733-C-10 (Galang Plan) which are
registered in their names per TCT Nos. 1585-RP,
2092-RP and 2101-RP.
In time, Vda. de Viray moved for the dismissal26 of
these publiciana/ reivindicatoria actions on
grounds, among others, of litis pendentia and res
judicata, on account of (1) the Sps. Usis appeal,
then pending before the CA, from the dismissal by
the RTC of Civil Case No. 99-0914M;27 and (2) the
August 1, 1989 RTC Decision in Civil Case Nos. 880265-M and 88-0283-M, as effectively affirmed by
the CA, and finally by the Court in G.R. No. 122287.
This motion to dismiss would, however, be denied
by the RTC through an Order28 of March 8, 2002,
compelling Vda. de Viray to file an answer,29 again
invoking in defense the doctrine of res judicata.
Sps. Usis Reply to Answer30 contained an averment
that their titles over the subject lots are the best
evidence of their ownership.

91 (13)

Jesus Viray
v. Sps. Usi

Forcible
Entry

733-F
(Fajardo
Plan)

900914M

Sps. Usi v.
Vda. de
Viray

(f) An action for Cancellation of Titles or Surrender

of Original Titles with Damages31 commenced by
Vda. de Viray, et al., against the Sps. Usi, Mendoza
and eight others before the RTC, Branch 54 in
Macabebe, Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No.
(02)-1164(M), seeking the cancellation of TCT Nos.
3614-R.P., 2099-R.P., 2101-R.P., 7502-R.P. and 2103R.P. covering Lots 733-C-8 to 733-C-12 as
subdivided under the 2nd SA of April 5, 1991 which
taken together is basically identical to Lot 733-F
(Fajardo Plan) sold to Jesus Viray.

Petition for
Annulment
of MCTC

733-F
(Fajardo
Plan)

Decision in
CC No. 91
(13)

Judgmen
t in favor
of Viray.
No
appeal.

RTC
dismisse
d
petition.
CA-G.R.
CV No.
67945
appeal
dismisse
d. G.R.
No.
154538
petition
denied.

To recap, the six (6) cases thus filed involving

portions of Lot 733 and their status are:

Civil
Case
No.

880265-M

The Parties

Sps. Usi v.

Action/Suit
for

Annulment
of Deed of

Subject
Lot(s)

733-A

(02)1164(M
)
Dispositi
on

Decision
in favor

27

Vda. de
Viray v.
Mendoza,
et al.

Cancellatio
n of Titles
before RTC,
Br. 55,
Pampanga

Lots 733C-8
To 733-C12
(Lot 733F (Fajardo
Plan)

Pending
before
the RTC.

011118(M
)

Sps. Usi v.
Vda. de
Viray

Petition for
Accion
Publiciana
and
Reivindicato
ria before
RTC, Br. 55,
Pampanga

733-B,
733-C1 and
733-C10
(Galang
Plan)

Petition
dismisse
d.
CA-G.R.
CV No.
90344
reversed
RTC
Decision.
Subject
of instant
case,
G.R. No.
192486

In sum, of the six (6) cases referred to above, the

first four (4) have been terminated and the main
issue/s therein peremptorily resolved. To a precise
point, the matter of the validity of the April 29,
1986 deeds of absolute sale conveying Lots 733-A
and 733-F under the Fajardo Plan to Sps. Viray and
Vda. de Viray (vice Jesus Viray), respectively, is no
longer a contentious issue by force of the Courts
Decision in G.R. No. 122287 effectively upholding
the dismissal of the twin complaints to nullify the
deeds aforementioned. Likewise, the issue of who
has the better possessory right independent of title
over the disputed lots has been resolved in favor of
Vda. de Viray and the Sps. Viray and against the
Usis and veritably put to rest by virtue of the
Courts final, affirmatory Decision in G.R. No.
154538.

25, 2007, the Sps. Usi interposed an appeal before

the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 90344.
The Ruling of the CA
On July 24, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed
decision, reversing and setting aside the appealed
June 21, 2007 RTC decision. The fallo of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED and
the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby
rendered declaring as legal and valid, the right of
ownership of petitioner-appellant respondents
herein spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi over Lot
Nos. 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10 covered by TCT
Nos. 1585-R.P., 2092-R.P, and 2101-R.P.,
respectively. Consequently, respondents-appellees
herein petitioners are hereby ordered to cease and
desist from further committing acts of
dispossession or from disturbing possession and
ownership of petitioners-appellants of the said
property as herein described and specified. Claims
for damages, however, are hereby denied x x x.
SO ORDERED.
The CA predicated its ruling on the interplay of the
following premises and findings: (a) the validity of
the two (2) duly notarized subdivision agreements,
or the 1st SA and 2nd SA, which the LMB later
approved; (b) the subdivisions of Lot 733 on the
basis of the Galang Plan actually partook the
nature of the partition of the shares of its coowners; (c) what Mendoza conveyed through the
April 29, 1986 deeds of absolute sale is only her
ideal, abstract or pro-indiviso share of Lot 733 of
which she had full ownership, the conveyance or
sale subject to the eventual delineation and
partition of her share; (d) Vda. de Viray has not
shown that fraud surrounded the execution of the
partition of Lot 733 through the subdivision
agreements of August 20, 1990 and April 5, 1991;
(e) the certificates of title of the Sps. Usi constitute
indefeasible proof of their ownership of Lots 733-B,
733-C-1 and 733-C-10; (f) said certificate entitled
the Sps. Usi to take possession thereof, the right to
possess being merely an attribute of ownership; (g)
Vda. de Viray can only go after the partitioned
shares of Mendoza in Lot 733; and (h) the issue of
possessory right has been mooted by the judgment
of ownership in favor of the Sps. Usi over Lots 733B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10.

Only two cases of the original six revolving around

Lot 733 remained unresolved. The first refers to the
petition for review of the decision of the CA in CAG.R. CV No. 90344 which, in turn, is an appeal from
the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 011118(M), a Petition for Accion Publiciana/
Reivindicatoria and Damages, and the second is
Civil Case No. (02)-1164(M) for Cancellation of
Titles or Surrender of Original Titles with Damages.
The first case is subject of the present recourse,
while the second is, per records, still pending
before the RTC, Branch 54 in Macabebe,
Pampanga, its resolution doubtless on hold in light
of the instant petition.
In the meantime, the Sps. Usi have remained in
possession of what in the Galang Plan are
designated as Lots 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10.

Vda. de Viray sought but was denied

reconsideration per the assailed June 2, 2010 CA
Resolution.

The Ruling of the RTC in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M)

As may be recalled, on June 21, 2007 in Civil Case
No. 01-1118(M), the Macabebe, Pampanga RTC
rendered judgment dismissing the petition of the
Sps. Usi32 for Accion Publiciana/Reivindicatoria. In
its dismissal action, the RTC held that the Sps. Usi
failed to establish by preponderance of evidence to
support their claim of title, possession and
ownership over the lots subject of their petition.

Hence, We have this petition.

The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE RTC
DISMISSING RESPONDENTS PETITION.34

Following the denial of their motion for

reconsideration per the RTCs Order33 of September

28

The Courts Ruling

Viray over Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) has been laid to

rest with finality in Civil Case No. 91 (13). Besides,
Sps. Usis action to assail the final and executory
July 29, 1998 MCTC Decision in Civil Case No. 91
(13) has been denied with finality in G.R. No.
154538.

In the main, the issue tendered in this proceeding

boils down to the question of whether the two (2)
subdivision agreements dated August 20, 1990 and
April 5, 1991, respectively, partake of a bona fide
and legally binding partition contracts or
arrangements among co-owners that validly
effectuated the transfer of the subject lots to
respondent spouses Usi. Intertwined with the main
issue is the correlative question bearing on the
validity of the deeds of absolute sale upon which
the petitioners hinged their claim of ownership and
right of possession over said lots.

The subdivision agreements not partition of coowners

Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and
assignment of a thing held in common by those to
whom it may belong.35
Contrary to the finding of the CA, the subdivision
agreements forged by Mendoza and her alleged coowners were not for the partition of pro-indiviso
shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were actually
conveyances, disguised as partitions, of portions of
Lot 733 specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and
portions of the subsequent subdivision of Lot 733C.

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

Petitioners contend first off that the CA erred in its
holding that the partitions of Lot 733 and later of
the divided unit Lot 733-C following the Galang
Plan were actually the partitions of the pro-indiviso
shares of its co-owners effectively conveying to
them their respective specific shares in the
property.

Notably, after a full-blown trial in Civil Case No. 011118 (M) wherein the spouses Usi merged an
accion publiciana with an accion reinvindicatoria in
one petition, the RTC held that Sps. Usi failed to
prove their case. However, in CA G.R. CV No.
90344, an appeal from said RTC decision, the CA,
while acknowledging the existence of the April 29,
1986 deeds of absolute sale, nonetheless accorded
validity to the August 20, 1990 and April 5, 1991
subdivision agreements. This is incorrect. The CA
held that the two (2) subdivision agreements, as
notarized, enjoy the presumption of regularity and
effectuated the property transfers covered thereby,
obviously glossing over the mala fides attendant
the execution of the two subdivision agreements. It
cannot be overemphasized enough that the two (2)
deeds of absolute sale over portions of
substantially the same parcel of land antedated the
subdivision agreements in question and their
execution acknowledged too before a notary
public.

We agree with petitioners.

First, the CAs holding aforestated is neither
supported by, nor deducible from, the evidentiary
facts on record. He who alleges must prove it.
Respondents have the burden to substantiate the
factum probandum of their complaint or the
ultimate fact which is their claimed ownership over
the lots in question. They were, however,
unsuccessful in adducing the factum probans or
the evidentiary facts by which the factum
probandum or ultimate fact can be established. As
shall be discussed shortly, facts and circumstances
obtain arguing against the claimed co-ownership
over Lot 733.
Second, the earlier sale of Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F
(Fajardo Plan) on April 29, 1986 was valid and
effective conveyances of said portions of Lot 733.
The subsequent transfers to the Sps. Usi of
substantially the same portions of Lot 733
accomplished through the subdivision agreements
constitute in effect double sales of those portions.
This aberration was brought to light by the results
of the adverted survey conducted sometime in
June 22, 1999 of Engr. Nicdao of the LMB.

The appellate court found and so declared the

subdivision agreements valid without so much as
explaining, let alone substantiating, its
determination. The CA never elucidated how the
Sps. Usi became, in the first place co-owners, with
Mendoza over Lot 733. On its face, TCT 141-RP
covering Lot 733 was in the name of spouses Ellen
and Moses Mendoza only. Then too, the CA did not
explain how under the 2nd SA the Sps. Usi, the
Sps. Lacap, the Sps. Balingit and the Sps. Jordan
became co-owners with Mendoza over Lot 733-C,
when Mendoza, under the 1st SA, virtually
represented herself as the sole owner of Lot 733-C.

Third, even granting arguendo that the subject

subdivision agreements were in fact but partitions
of the pro-indiviso shares of co-owners, said
agreements would still be infirm, for the Sps. Viray
and Vda. de Viray (vice Jesus Viray) were excluded
from the transaction. Like Vda. de Mallari, Sps.
Viray and Jesus Viray had validly acquired and,
hence, owned portions of Lot 733 and are
themselves co-owners of Lot 733.

A scrutiny of the records with a fine-tooth comb

likewise fails to substantially show a partition of Lot
733 by its co-owners. While the 1st and 2nd SAs
purport to be deeds of partition by and among coowners of the lot/s covered thereby, partition as a
fact is belied by the evidence extant on record.
Consider:

And last, over and above the foregoing

considerations, the instant petition must be
resolved in favor of petitioners, the underlying
reinvindicatory and possessory actions in Civil Case
No. 01-1118 (M) being barred by the application of
the res judicata principle. What is more, the issue
of superior possessory rights of petitioner Vda. de

It is undisputed that TCT 141 RP covering Lot 733

was originally in the name of Ellen P. Mendoza and

29

husband, Moses.36 The joint decision of the RTC in

Civil Case Nos. 88-0265 and 88-0283-M narrated
how the couple came to own Lot 733, thus: "Lot
733 was acquired by Spouses Moses Mendoza and
Ellen Mendoza and Spouses Pacifico Bustos and
Maria Roman from Donato Lacap for P5,000.00
(Exh. "1") in 1977. After two years, Spouses
Pacifico Bustos and Maria Roman sold one-half proindiviso portion of Lot 733 to spouses Moses
Mendoza and Ellen Mendoza for P6,000.00 (Exh.
"2") and the acquisition cost of the whole lot is only
P8,500.00 and x x x."37

participating co-owners, namely Sps. Usi, the Sps.

Lacap, the Sps. Balingit and the Sps. Jordan
became co-owners with Mendoza and her children,
i.e., McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and Georgenia.
The April 29, 1986 Deeds of Absolute Sale
of Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F are Valid
It must be noted that the RTC, in its decision in Civil
Case Nos. 88-0265-M and 88-0283-M, upheld the
validity of the separate April 29, 1986 deeds of
absolute sale of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo
Plan). The combined area of Lot 733-A (366 sq. m.)
and Lot 733-F (3,501) is less than one half of the
total area coverage of Lot 733 (9,137). The sale of
one-half portion of the conjugal property is valid as
a sale. It cannot be gainsaid then that the deeds,
executed as they were by the property owner, were
sufficient to transfer title and ownership over the
portions covered thereby. And the aforesaid RTC
decision had become final and executory as far
back as December 11, 1995 when the Court, in
G.R. No. 122287, in effect, affirmed the RTC
decision. Likewise, the MCTCs decision in Civil
Case No. 91 (13) for forcible entry, declaring Vda.
de Viray, as successor-in-interest of Jesus Viray, as
entitled to the physical possession, or possession
de facto, of Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan), and the RTCs
decision in Civil Case No. 99-0914M, disposing of
the belated appeal of the MCTC decision in the
forcible entry case, have become final and
executory on February 12, 2003 under G.R. No.
154538.

Mendoza and the Sps. Usi, in their separate

complaints for annulment of deeds of sale,
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 88-0265 and 88-0283M of the Macabebe, Pampanga RTC, alleged that
Moses Mendoza authorized Atty. Venancio Viray to
sell the subject lot for at least PhP 200 per square
meter, and that after his (Moses) death on April 5,
1986, Lot 733 was included in the proceedings for
the settlement of his estate docketed as Sp. Proc.
Case No. 86-0040-M of the RTC, Branch 55 in
Macabebe, Pampanga, The events thus alleged by
Mendoza and the Usis can be gleaned from the
final and executory joint decision in Civil Case Nos.
88-0265-M and 88-0283-M which petitioner Vda. de
Viray attached as Annex "5" in her Answer with
Counterclaim38 to the Usis petition for accion
publicana/reivindicatoria. Said Joint Decision amply
shows, in gist, the allegations 39 of both the Sps. Usi
and Mendoza in Civil Case Nos. 88-0265-M and 880283-M asserting said facts. And these assertions,
made in their complaints, are judicial admissions
under Sec. 4,40 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

In light of the convergence of the foregoing

disposed-of cases, there can be no question as to
the ownership of the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray
(vice Jesus Viray) over the specified and delineated
portions of Lot 733 which they purchased for value
from Mendoza. And Mendoza, as vendor, was
bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as
well as warrant, the thing which is the object of the
sale.42

Unlike Vda. de Mallari who, per Vda. de Virays own

admission, purchased the 416-square meter
portion of Lot 733 on February 14, 1984, thus
constituting her (Vda. de Mallari) as co-owner of
Mendoza to the extent of said area
purchased,41 the Sps. Usi have not been shown to
be co-owners with Mendoza. There is simply
nothing in the records to demonstrate how the Sps.
Usi became co-owners of Lot 733 before or after
the death of Moses Mendoza. Elsewise put, no
evidence had been adduced to show how the
alleged interest of the Sps. Usi, as co-owner, came
about, except for the bare assertions in the 1st and
2nd SAs that they co-owned Lot 733 and Lot 733-C
(Galang Plan).

In the instant case, the April 29, 1986 deeds of

absolute sale indeed included the technical
description of that part of Lot 733 subject of the
transactions, thus clearly identifying the portions
(Lots 733-A and 733-F under the Fajardo Plan) sold
by Mendoza to the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray
(vice Jesus Viray). Hence, there can be no
mistaking as to the identity of said lots.

It is fairly clear that Lot 733, even from the fact

alone of its being registered under the name of the
late Moses Mendoza and Ellen Mendoza, formed
part of the couples conjugal property at the time
Moses demise on April 5, 1986. Equally clear, too,
is that Vda. de Mallari became a co-owner of Lot
733 by virtue of the purchase of its 416-square
meter portion on February 14, 1984, during the
lifetime of Moses. Be that as it may and given that
the Sps. Usi have not been shown to be co-owners
of Mendoza and Vda. de Mallari prior to the sale by
Mendoza on April 29, 1986 of Lots 733-A and 733-F
(Fajardo Plan) to the Sps. Viray and Jesus Viray,
respectively, then the execution of the 1st SA on
August 20, 1990 could not have been a partition by
co-owners of Lot 733. The same could be said of
the 2nd SA of April 5, 1991 vis--vis Lot 733-C, for
the records are similarly completely bereft of any
evidence to show on how the purported

The deeds in question were, to reiterate, not only

valid but constitute prior conveyances of the
disputed portions of Lot 733. Accordingly, the
subsequent conveyances in 1990 and 1991 to the
Sps. Usi through transfer contracts, styled as
subdivision agreements, resulted, in effect, in a
double sale situation involving substantially the
same portions of Lot 733.
The survey report of LMB surveyor, Engr. Nicdao,
would support a finding of double sale. His report,
as earlier indicated, contained the following key
findings: (1) Lot 733-A (Fajardo Plan) with an area
of 336 square meters thus sold to the Sps. Viray is
within Lot 733-B (Galang Plan), the part assigned to

30

Sps. Usi under the division; and (2) Lot 733-F

(Fajardo Plan) with an area of 3,501 square meters
is almost identical to the combined area of Lots
733-C-8 to 733-C-12 awarded to Ellen Mendoza and
her children, McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and
Georgenia, and a portion (1,000 square meters) of
Lot 733-C-10 (Galang Plan) adjudicated to Sps. Usi.

Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after

peremptorily prevailing in their cases supportive of
their claim of ownership and possession of Lots
733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be
deprived of their rights by the expediency of the
Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an accion publiciana
and/or accion reivindicatoria, two of the three kinds
of actions to recover possession of real property.
The third, accion interdictal, comprises two distinct
causes of action, namely forcible entry and
unlawful detainer,44 the issue in both cases being
limited to the right to physical possession or
possession de facto, independently of any claim of
ownership that either party may set forth in his or
her pleadings,45 albeit the court has the
competence to delve into and resolve the issue of
ownership but only to address the issue of priority
of possession.46 Both actions must be brought
within one year from the date of actual entry on
the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the
date of last demand to vacate following the
expiration of the right to possess, in case of
unlawful detainer.47

A double sale situation, which would call, if

necessary, the application of Art. 1544 of the Civil
Code, arises when, as jurisprudence teaches, the
following requisites concur:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions
must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions
must pertain to exactly the same subject
matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over
the rightful ownership of the subject matter
must each represent conflicting interests;
and

When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation

has lasted more than one year, one may avail
himself of accion publiciana to determine the
better right of possession, or possession de jure, of
realty independently of title. On the other hand,
accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership which necessarily includes recovery of
possession.48

(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over

the rightful ownership of the subject matter
must each have bought from the very
same seller.43
From the facts, there is no valid sale from Mendoza
to respondents Usi. The parties did not execute a
valid deed of sale conveying and transferring the
lots in question to respondents. What they rely on
are two subdivision agreements which do not
explicitly chronicle the transfer of said lots to them.
Under the 1st SA, all that can be read is the
declaration that respondents, together with others,
are the "sole and exclusive owners" of the lots
subject of said agreement. Per the 2nd SA, it
simply replicates the statement in the 1st SA that
respondents are "sole and exclusive undivided coowners" with the other parties. While respondents
may claim that the SAs of 1990 and 1991 are
convenient conveying vehicles Mendoza resorted
to in disposing portions of Lot 733 under the
Galang Plan, the Court finds that said SAs are not
valid legal conveyances of the subject lots due to
non-existent prestations pursuant to Article 1305
which prescribes "a meeting of minds between two
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to
the other, to give something or to render some
service." The third element of cause of the
obligation which is established under Art. 1318 of
the Civil Code is likewise visibly absent from the
two SAs. The transfer of title to respondents based
on said SAs is flawed, irregular, null and void. Thus
the two SAs are not "sales transactions" nor "valid
sales" under Art. 1544 of the Civil Code and, hence,
the first essential element under said legal
provision was not satisfied.1wphi1

Now then, it is a hornbook rule that once a

judgment becomes final and executory, it may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land, as what remains to be done is the purely
ministerial enforcement or execution of the
judgment.49 Any attempt to reopen a close case
would offend the principle of res judicata.
Res judicata embraces two concepts or principles,
the first is designated as "bar by prior judgment"
and the other, "conclusiveness of judgment."
Tiongson v. Court of Appeals50 describes the effects
of res judicata, as a bar by prior judgment, in the
following manner:
There is no question that where as between the
first case where the judgment is rendered and the
second where such judgment is invoked, there is
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action, the judgment on the merits in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent
action not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim
or demand, but also as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and to all matters that could have been
adjudged in that case. x x x

Given the above perspective, the Sps. Viray and

Vda. de Viray (vice Jesus Viray) have, as against
the Sps. Usi, superior rights over Lot 733-A and Lot
733-F (Fajardo Plan) or portions thereof.

Res judicata operates as bar by prior judgment if

the following requisites concur: (1) the former
judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment
or order must be on the merits; (3) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having

Res Judicata Applies

31

jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

and (4) there must be, between the first and
second action, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of causes of action.51 All the requisites are
present in the instant case.

in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M) of the RTC, Branch 55

in Macabebe, Pampanga is accordingly
REINSTATED.

The better right to possess and the right of

ownership of Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) and the
Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of land cannot,
by force of the res judicata doctrine, be re-litigated
thru actions to recover possession and vindicate
ownership filed by the Sps. Usi. The Court, in G.R.
No. 122287 (Ellen P. Mendoza and Jose and Amelita
Usi v. Spouses Avelino Viray and Margarita
Masangcay and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray), has in
effect determined that the conveyances and
necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the
Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) on
April 29, 1986 were valid. This determination
operates as a bar to the Usis reivindicatory action
to assail the April 29, 1986 conveyances and
precludes the relitigation between the same parties
of the settled issue of ownership and possession
arising from ownership. It may be that the spouses
Usi did not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question in their
action for annulment of the deed sale of sale. But it
cannot be gainsaid that said action is closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership, and affects
the title, of the lot covered by the deed. The
prevalent doctrine, to borrow from Fortune Motors,
(Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,52 "is that an action
for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real
property does not operate to efface the
fundamental and prime objective and nature of the
case, which is to recover said real property."

G.R. No. 169985

Costs against respondents.

June 15, 2011

MODESTO LEOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
CASIMERO VALDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the March 31, 2005
decision2 and the October 6, 2005 resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68549. The
CA decision reversed the June 23, 2000 decision4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan, dismissing respondent Casimero
Valdezs complaint for annulment of title,
reconveyance and damages against petitioner
Modesto Leoveras.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the
registered owners - three-fourths () and onefourth () pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of
land located in Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan,
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
24695, with an area of 28,171 square meters.5

And lest it be overlooked, the Court, in G.R. No.

154538 (Spouses Jose and Amelita Usi v. Ruperta
Cano Vda. de Viray), again in effect ruled with
finality that petitioner Vda. de Viray has a better
possessory right over Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan).
Thus, the Courts decision in G.R. No. 122287
juxtaposed with that in G.R. No. 154538 would
suffice to bar the Sps. Usis accion publiciana, as
the spouses had invoked all along their ownership
over the disputed Lot 733-F as basis to defeat any
claim of the right of possessiOn. While an accion
reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an
ejectment case, such judgment constitutes a bar to
the institution of the accion publiciana, because
the matter of possessioq between the same parties
has become res judicata and cannot be delved into
in a new action.53

In September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her threefourths () share to Benigna Llamas.6 The sale was
duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695.
When Benigna died in 1944,7 she willed her threefourths () share equally to her sisters Alejandra
Llamas and Josefa Llamas.8 Thus, Alejandra and
Josefa each owned one-half () of Benignas threefourths () share.
On June 14, 1969, Alejandras heirs sold their
predecessors one-half () share (roughly
equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the
respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.9

The doctrine of res judicata is a basic postulate to

the end that controversies and issues once decided
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
shall remain in repose. It is simply unfortunate that
the RTC, in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M), did not apply
the doctrine of res judicata to the instant case,
despite petitioners, as respondents below, had
raised that ground both in their motion to dismiss
and answer to the underlying petition.

Also on June 14, 1969, Josefa sold her own one-half

() share (subject property) to the respondent and
the petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of
Absolute Sale.10 On even date, the respondent and
the petitioner executed an Agreement,11 allotting
their portions of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated July 24, 2009 and
Resolution dated June 2, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90344 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 21, 2007

That we [petitioner and respondent] are the

absolute owners of [the subject property] which is
particularly described as follows:

WITNESSETH

32

xxx

I, Benigna Llamas, Fernandez xxx do sell

xxx by way of ABSOLUTE SALE unto the
said Casimero Valdez, Modesto Leoveras
and Virgilia Meneses their heirs and
assigns, 7,544 sq.m.; 4,024 sq. m. and
8,689 sq. m. more or less respectively of a
parcel of land which is particularly
described as follows:

That our ownership over the said portion

mentioned above is evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale xxx
That in said deed of sale mentioned in the
immediate preceding paragraph, our respective
share consist of 5, 282.13 [one-half of 10,564
square meters] square meter each.

"A parcel of land xxx covered by [OCT No.]

24695." (Emphases added)

That we hereby agreed and covenanted that our

respective share shall be as follows:

3. Subdivision Plan of PSU 21864 of OCT

No. 2469520

Modesto Leoveras 3,020 square meters

residential portion on the northern part near the
Municipal road of Poblacion Pugaro, Manaoag,
Pangasinan;

4. Affidavit of Confirmation of
Subdivision21 dated May 3, 1994 (Affidavit),
which reads:

Casimero Valdez 7,544.2712 square meters of the

parcel of land described above.13

That we, Virgilia Li Meneses, xxx Dominga

Manangan; Modesto Leoveras; and Casimero
Valdez xxx

On June 8, 1977, the petitioner and the respondent

executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the
subject property.14 The parties took possession of
their respective portions of the subject property
and declared it in their name for taxation
purposes.15

xxx are co-owners of a certain parcel of land with

an area of 28, 171 sq. m. more or less in
subdivision plan Psu 21864 xxx covered by [OCT
No.] 24695 situated at Poblacion (now Pugaro),
Manaoag, Pangasinan;
xxx we agree xxx to subdivide and hereby
confirmed the subdivision in the following manner
xxx:

In 1996, the respondent asked the Register of

Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the
requirements for the transfer of title over the
portion allotted to him on the subject property. To
his surprise, the respondent learned that the
petitioner had already obtained in his name two
transfer certificates of title (TCTs): one, TCT No.
195812 - covering an area of 3,020 square meters;
and two, TCT No. 195813 - covering an area of
1,004 square meters (or a total of 4,024 square
meters).

Lot 2 with an area of 3, 020 sq. m. xxx to Modesto

Leoveras xxx;
Lot 3 with an area of 1,004 sq. m. xxx to Modesto
Leoveras xxx;
Lot 4 with an area of 7,544 sq. m. xxx to Casimero
Valdez xxx;

The Register of Deeds informed the respondent

that they could not find the record of OCT No.
24695; instead, the Register of Deeds furnished the
respondent with the following16 (collectively,
petitioners documents):

Lot 5 with an area of 8, 689 sq. m. xxx to Virgilia

Meneses;
Lot 6 with an area of 7,043 sq. m. xxx to Dominga
Manangan (Emphasis supplied.)

1. Two (2) deeds of absolute sale dated

June 14, 1969, both executed by Sta.
Maria, purportedly conveying an
unspecified portion of OCT No. 24695 as
follows:

On June 21, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint

for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages against the petitioner, seeking the
reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion
(disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on
the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the
3,020 square meters identified in the parties
Agreement.

a. 11, 568 square meters to the

respondent and petitioner17
b. 8, 689 square meters to one
Virgilia Li Meneses18

The respondent sought the nullification of the

petitioners titles by contesting the authenticity of
the petitioners documents. Particularly, the
respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by
presenting Benignas death certificate. The
respondent argued that Benigna could not have
executed a deed, which purports to convey 4,024

2. Deed of Absolute Sale (Benigna Deed)

also dated June 14, 1969 executed by
Benigna19 which reads:

33

square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because

Benigna already died in 1944. The respondent
added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to
the parties her three-fourths () share in 1969
because she had already sold her share to Benigna
in 1932.22 The respondent denied his purported
signature appearing in the Affidavit,23 and prayed
for:

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling

against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and
the Affidavit. The CA gave weight to Benignas
death certificate which shows the impossibility of
Benignas execution of the deed in 1969. The CA
also noted the discrepancy between the
respondents signatures as appearing in the
Affidavit, on one hand, and the documents on
record, on the other.27 The CA added that the
respondents failure to compare his genuine
signature from his purported signatures appearing
in the petitioners documents is not fatal, since
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court allows
the court to make its own comparison. In light of its
observations, the CA ruled:

a) xxx the cancellation of the [petitioners

documents];
b) the cancellation of TCT No. 195813 in
the name of Modesto Leoveras and that it
be reconveyed to the [respondent];

As the totality of the evidence presented

sufficiently sustains [the respondents] claim that
the titles issued to [the petitioner] were based on
forged and spurious documents, it behooves this
Court to annul these certificates of title.

c) the cancellation and nullification of [TCT

No. 195812] covering an area of 3,020
square meters xxx;
d) [the issuance of] title xxx in the name of
[respondent] over an area of 17, 104
square meters of OCT
24695; 24 (Underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 23,

2000 is SET ASIDE. Declaring TCT No. 195812 and
TCT No. 195813 as NULL and VOID, [the petitioner]
is hereby directed to reconvey the
subject parcels of land to [the
respondent].28 (Emphasis added.)

In his defense, the petitioner claimed that the

parties already had (i) delineated their respective
portions of the subject property even before they
acquired it in 1969 and (ii) agreed that upon
acquisition, each would own the portion as
delineated; that the area he actually possessed
and subsequently acquired has a total area of
4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two
portions and caused to be covered by the two TCTs
in question. The petitioner claimed that in signing
the Agreement, he was led to believe, based on the
parties rough estimation, that the area he actually
possessed is only 3,020 square meters contrary to
the parties real intention - i.e., the extent of their
ownership would be based on their actual
possession.25

Unwilling to accept the CAs reversal of the RTC

ruling, the petitioner filed the present appeal by
certiorari, claiming that the CA committed "gross
misappreciation of the facts"29 by going beyond
what the respondent sought in his complaint.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the CA should not have
ordered the reconveyance of both parcels of land
covered by the TCTs in question since the
respondent only seeks the reconveyance of the
disputed property i.e., the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 195813.

The petitioner further claimed that the respondent

voluntarily participated in executing the Affidavit,
which corrected the mistake in the previously
executed Agreement26 and confirmed the
petitioners ownership over the disputed property.
The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and for a declaration that he is the
lawful owner of the parcels of land covered by his
titles.

The petitioner asserts that after the subject sale,

the parties physically partitioned the subject
property and possessed their respective portions,
thereby setting the limits of their ownership.
The petitioner admits that the Benigna Deed is
"fabricated" but hastens to add that it was only
designed (i) to affirm the "true intent and
agreement" of the parties on the extent of their
ownership, as shown by their actual physical
possession, and (ii) as a "convenient tool" to
facilitate the transfer of title to his name.

RTC RULING
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The court ruled
that the respondent failed to preponderantly prove
that the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit are
fabricated and, consequently, no ground exists to
nullify the petitioners titles. The court observed
that the respondent did not even compare his
genuine signature with the signatures appearing in
these documents.

THE RESPONDENTS COMMENT

The respondent claims that since the petitioner
himself admitted using a spurious document in
obtaining his titles (as alleged in the complaint and
as found by the CA), then the CA correctly
cancelled the latters titles.30

CA RULING

34

The petitioner forged the respondents signature in

the Affidavit to make it appear that he agreed to
the division indicated in the document. The
respondent defended the CAs reconveyance of
both parcels of land, covered by the petitioners
titles, to the respondent by arguing that if the
distribution in the Affidavit is followed, the "original
intendment" of the parties on their shares of the
subject property would be "grievously impaired"31

written agreement to express the true intent and

agreement of the parties. The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intention of the
parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud,
inequitable conduct or accident, which
nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the
minds of the parties.38
At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by
parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the
parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly
corrected the mistake in the previously executed
Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the
parcels of land covered by his titles. It was the
petitioners staunch assertion that the respondent
co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the
parties true intention.

THE ISSUES
The two basic issues32 for our resolution are:
1. Whether the CA erred in nullifying the
petitioners titles.
2. Whether the CA erred in ordering the
reconveyance of the parcel of land covered
by the petitioners titles.

In the present petition, however, the petitioner

made a damaging admission that the Benigna
Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering
the respondents cause of action for reconveyance
of the disputed property on the ground of
fraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit
merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna
Deed, the petitioners admission, coupled with the
respondents denial of his purported signature in
the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability
of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the
petitioners defense.

THE RULING
We partially grant the petition.
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose
land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the name of another, to compel the registered
owner to transfer or reconvey the land to
him.33 The plaintiff in this action must allege and
prove his ownership of the land in dispute and the
defendants erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful
registration of the property.

Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in

the petitioners share the disputed property, the
petitioner obviously need not go at length of
fabricating a deed of sale to support his application
for the transfer of title of his rightful portion of the
subject property. Notably, there is nothing in the
Affidavit (that supposedly corrected the mistake in
the earlier Agreement) that supports the
petitioners claim that the partition of the subject
property is based on the parties actual possession.

We rule that the respondent adequately proved his

ownership of the disputed property by virtue of the
(i) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in
favor of the parties; (ii) the parties Affidavit of
Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties Agreement,
which cover the subject property.

Note that the RTC dismissed the complaint based

on the respondents alleged failure to prove the
spuriousness of the documents submitted by the
petitioner to the Register of Deeds. However, by
admitting the presentation of a false deed in
securing his title, the petitioner rendered moot the
issue of authenticity of the Benigna Deed and
relieved the respondent of the burden of proving its
falsity as a ground to nullify the petitioners titles.

The petitioner does not dispute the due execution

and the authenticity of these
documents,34 particularly the Agreement. However,
he claims that since the Agreement does not
reflect the true intention of the parties, the
Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to
reflect the parties true intention.1avvphi1
The petitioners argument calls to fore the
application of the parol evidence rule,35 i.e., when
the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing,
the written agreement is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms
can be admitted other than what is contained in
the written agreement.36 Whatever is not found in
the writing is understood to have been waived and
abandoned.37

By fraudulently causing the transfer of the

registration of title over the disputed property in
his name, the petitioner holds the title to this
disputed property in trust for the benefit of the
respondent as the true owner;39 registration does
not vest title but merely confirms or records title
already existing and vested. The Torrens system of
registration cannot be used to protect a usurper
from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to
enrich oneself at the expense of others.40 Hence,
the CA correctly ordered the reconveyance of the
disputed property, covered by TCT No. 195813, to
the respondent.

To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule,

the Rules of Court allows a party to present
evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the

35

The parties Agreement effectively partitioned the

subject property

in severalty,44 resulting in the partial or total

extinguishment of co-ownership.45

The petitioner also relies on his alleged actual

possession of the disputed property to support his
claim of ownership. Notably, both parties make
conflicting assertions of possession of the disputed
property.41 The petitioner testified on his
possession as follows:

In the present case, the parties agreed to divide

the subject property by giving the petitioner the
3,020 square meters "residential portion on the
northern part near the Municipal road."46 There is
no dispute that this 3,020- square meter portion is
the same parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2
(which is not the subject of the respondents action
for reconveyance) in the Affidavit and the
Subdivision Plan presented by the petitioner before
the Register of Deeds. The fact that the Agreement
lacks technical description of the parties
respective portions or that the subject property
was then still embraced by a single certificate of
title could not legally prevent a partition, where the
different portions allotted to each were determined
and became separately identifiable, as in this
case.47

Q: How many square meters did you get from the

land and how many square meters was the share
of [respondent]?
A: 4[0]20 square meters and my brother-in-law
6,000 plus square meters.
xxx
Q: Was there a boundary between the 4,020 square
meters and the rest of the property which (sic)
designated by your brother-in-law?

What is strikingly significant is that even the

petitioners own testimony merely attempted to
confirm his actual possession of the disputed
property, without, however, supporting his claim
contrary to the written Agreement that the
parties ownership of the subject property would be
co-extensive with their possession. This is the core
of the petitioners defense. At any rate, just as nonpossession does not negate ownership, neither
does possession automatically prove
ownership,48 especially in the face of an
unambiguous document executed by the parties
themselves.1avvphi1

A: There is sir, and the boundary is the fence.

Q: When did you put up that fence which is the
boundary?
A: After the deed of sale was made.
Q: And that boundary fence which you put
according to you since the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in 1969 up to the present does it still
exist?

Contrary to the petitioners claim that his actual

possession determines the extent of his ownership,
it is the parties Agreement that defines the extent
of their ownership in the subject property. One of
the legal effects of partition, whether by
agreement among the co-owners or by judicial
proceeding, is to terminate the co-ownership and,
consequently, to make the previous co-owners the
absolute and exclusive owner of the share allotted
to him.49

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Since the time you purchased the property
according to you you already divided the property,
is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that as of today who is in possession of that
4,020 square meters?

Parenthetically, the respondent declared for

taxation purposes the portion he claims in
December 1987.50 The total area (7,544 square
meters) of the properties declared is equivalent to
the area allotted to the respondent under the
Agreement. On the other hand, the petitioner
declared the 1,004-square meter portion only in
September 1994, under Tax Declaration No.
9393,51 despite his claim of exclusive and adverse
possession since 1969.

A: I, sir.42
The petitioner and the respondent were originally
co-owners of the subject property when they jointly
bought it from the same vendor in 1969. However,
the parties immediately terminated this state of
indivision by executing an Agreement, which is in
the nature of a partition agreement.

Nullification of the petitioners title over the 3,020

square meter portion

The Civil Code of the Philippines defines partition

as the separation, division and assignment of a
thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong.43 Partition is the division between two or
more persons of real or personal property, owned
in common, by setting apart their respective
interests so that they may enjoy and possess these

While the petitioner admitted using a spurious

document in securing his titles, nonetheless, he
questions the CAs nullification of TCT No. 195812
on the ground that, per the respondents own
admission and the parties Agreement, he is the
rightful owner of the land covered by this title.

36

We disagree.

Court cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT")

No. 2592 in the name of "Djayari or Jayyari Moro."
The Sharia District Court also ordered the partition
of the land in dispute, and the issuance of new
TCTs in the names of Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan,
Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan, Hadja Jehada Saupi
Garingan and Haymaton Garingan Jayyari.

The petitioners argument confuses registration of

title with ownership.52 While the petitioners
ownership over the land covered by TCT No.
195812 is undisputed, his ownership only gave him
the right to apply for the proper transfer of title to
the property in his name. Obviously, the petitioner,
even as a rightful owner, must comply with the
statutory provisions on the transfer of registered
title to lands.53 Section 53 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 provides that the subsequent registration
of title procured by the presentation of a forged
deed or other instrument is null and void. Thus, the
subsequent issuance of TCT No. 195812 gave the
petitioner no better right than the tainted
registration which was the basis for the issuance of
the same title. The Court simply cannot allow the
petitioners attempt to get around the proper
procedure for registering the transfer of title in his
name by using spurious documents.

The Antecedent Facts

On 23 February 1993, Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan,
Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan and Hadja Jehada Saupi
Garingan ("Hadji Munib, et al.") filed an action for
Partition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction against their sister Haymaton Saupi
Garingan4 ("Haymaton") and her husband Jayyari
Pawaki ("Pawaki"), also known as Djayari Moro.
Hadji Munib, et al. alleged that their grandfather
Saupi Moro owned an agricultural lot, fully planted
with coconut and other fruit bearing trees,
containing an area of 11.3365 hectares. The land is
situated in Sitio Tinebbasan, Barangay Semut,
Municipality of Lamitan, Basilan Province. Saupi
Moro acquired the land through purchase from Gani
Moro. Saupi Moro donated the land to his daughter
Insih Saupi ("Insih"), mother of Hadji Munib, et al.
and Haymaton. After the donation, Insih
predeceased her father and her interest over the
land passed to her children Hadji Munib Saupi
Garingan, Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan, Hadja Jehada
Saupi Garingan, and Haymaton Garingan.

Reconveyance is the remedy of the rightful owner

only
While the CA correctly nullified the petitioners
certificates of title, the CA erred in ordering the
reconveyance of the entire subject property in the
respondents favor. The respondent himself
admitted that the 3,020- square meter portion
covered by TCT No. 195812 is the petitioners just
share in the subject property.54 Thus, although the
petitioner obtained TCT No. 195812 using the same
spurious documents, the land covered by this title
should not be reconveyed in favor of the
respondent since he is not the rightful owner of the
property covered by this title.55

After the death of Saupi Moro in 1954,5 Haymaton

and Pawaki took over the administration of the
land. Later, Haymaton and Pawaki declared the
land, then still untitled, in their names for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 1675.
Haymaton and Pawaki refused to share with Hadji
Munib, et al. the income from the sale of fruits from
the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED.

The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are MODIFIED. Accordingly, the petitioner
is directed to RECONVEY to the respondent the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 195813. Costs
against petitioner.

Haymaton and Pawaki, on the other hand, claimed

that on 22 September 1969, Pawaki bought the
land from Jikirum M. Adjaluddin ("Jikirum"). TCT No.
T-2592 was issued in the name of Djayari Moro.
Pawaki took possession of the land in the concept
of an owner in the same year. He declared the land
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
1675.

G.R. No. 144095. April 12, 2005

SPOUSES HAYMATON S. GARINGAN AND
JAYYARI PAWAKI, Petitioners,
vs.
HADJI MUNIB SAUPI GARINGAN, HADJA TERO
SAUPI GARINGAN, and HADJA JEHADA SAUPI
GARINGAN,Respondents.

The Decision of the Sharia District Court

The Sharia District Court found that Saupi Moro
acquired the land in dispute from Gani Moro. Insih
Saupi, during her lifetime, accepted the land by
way of donation from her father. Upon the death of
Insih and her husband, their children succeeded to
the rights of their parents over the property. The
Sharia District Court ruled:

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

From the foregoing evidence of the plaintiffs it

appears that the property in question was given by
Saupi Moro during his lifetime to his daughter Insih
Saupi, who thereafter, stayed in the land and
introduced improvements consisting of coconut
trees with her husband Garingan until they died,

Before this Court is a petition for review 1 to reverse

the Decision2 dated 19 June 2000 and the
Order3 dated 19 July 2000 of the Sharia District
Court, Third Sharia Judicial District, Zamboanga
City in Civil Case No. 13-3. The Sharia District

37

predeceasing Saupi Moro, which shows that the

property given by Saupi Moro to his daughter Insih
Saupi Garingan during the formers lifetime, was
accepted by the latter during her lifetime.

they succeeded to whatever hereditary rights over

the estates of their deceased parents. The
evidence shows that plaintiffs mother Insih Saupi
Garingan predeceased her father Saupi Garingan. x
x x.

The herein plaintiffs in this case, including their

sister and defendant, Haymaton Garingan Jayyari,
being the children of Insih Saupi and Garingan,
steps (sic) into whatever rights or properties left by
their deceased parents.

In Civil Case No. 41 entitled Janjalawi Moro, et. al.,

plaintiffs vs. Andaang Moro, et. al., defendants that
was filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Basilan City is dated July 16, 1956 on paragraph 3
of the said Civil complaint states, "that Saupi Moro
died intestate in 1954" (sic); Thus, Insih Saupi and
Imam Garingan, the plaintiffs parents, who both
predeceased Saupi Moro, their death occurred
sometime before the death of Saupi Moro in 1954.
Such being the case, the law then governing the
successional rights of Filipino Muslims was still the
Civil Code of the Philippines, R.A. No. 386 which
became effective on August 30, 1950. (Ilejay vs.
Ilejay, et. al., (S.C.) 49 O.G. 4903). And, under
Article 90 of the present Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, P.D. 1083, "The rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent". This provision is an
adoption of Article 77 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which provides: "The rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent"; which has been interpreted
that the succession is opened by the death of the
person from whom the inheritance comes. (A.
Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 13, Vol. III, 1979 ed.; Cited
3 Navarro Amandi 82). Considering the applicable
laws on this regard, since Insih Saupi Garingan and
Imam Garingan who were plaintiffs parents,
predeceased Saupi Moro who died in 1954, the law
then applicable to successional rights of Filipino
Muslims was the prevailing law at that time which
was still the Civil Code of the Philippines. This rule
is recognized by the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines, P.D. 1083, under Article 186,
which provides:

On the basis of the evidence of the case, the herein

property in question was acquired by their
grandfather Saupi Moro from Gani Moro before
World War II or sometime during the Japanese
occupation. (See Exhibit "A-1", p. 297, Record).
During their grandfathers lifetime he donated it to
his daughter plaintiffs (sic) mother Insih Garingan
who together with her husband Garingan occupied
and planted said property; After plaintiffs mother
Insih Saupi Garingan died, the property was left to
plaintiffs sister now defendant Haymaton Garingan
Jayyari; And, after the latter also died, her husband
and co-defendant Jayyari Pawaki took over the
property. There is therefore, an implied trust
relation established between the heirs of Insih
Saupi Garingan plaintiffs herein and their sister
defendant Haymaton Garingan and the latter
husband Jayyari Pawaki over the said property. In a
case, it was held, "that the Torrens System was
never calculated to forment (sic) betrayal in the
performance of a trust." (Escobar v. Locsin, 74 Phil.
86). Thus, through the continuous possession of
the property beginning from the plaintiffs
grandparent Saupi Moro sometime in 1941, until
the latter died sometime in 1954 up to the time it
was held in trust by plaintiffs co-heir, defendant
Haymaton Garingan, and the latter husband and
co-defendant Jayyari Pawaki, who after Haymaton
Garingans death continued to hold the land
claiming to have acquired it by purchase from
Adjaluddin Moro, tacking the periods, more than
thirty years had elapsed which gives the herein
plaintiffs the right over the said property, though
the donation made in favor of their mother Insih
Garingan by their grandfather Saupi Moro was not
in a public instrument, but merely verbal. In a case
the Court held, "That while donation of immovable
property not made in a public instrument, such as
verbal one, is not effective as a transfer of title, yet
it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse
and exclusive character of the possession of the
intended donee, and such possession may ripen
into ownership by prescription." (Pensader vs.
Pensader, 47 Phil. 959; Apilado vs. Apilado (C.A.)
34 O.G. p. 144; Macabasco vs. Macabasco (C.A.) 45
O.G. 2532; Espique vs. Espique (S.C.) 53 O.G. 4079;
Cabacutan vs. Serrano (C.S.) 59 O.G. 292; Cited on
p. 523, A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. II, 1987 ed.).

"Art. 186. Effect of Code on Past Acts. (1) Acts

executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be governed by the laws in force at that time of
their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their
validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
right acquired or liability incurred thereby."
And, the applicable provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines on this regard are as follows, to
quote:
"Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different
marriages"; And,
Art. 980. The Children of the deceased shall always
inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares."

Plaintiffs herein, namely (1) Hadji Munib Saupi

Garingan, (2) Hadja Tero Saupi Garingan, (3) Hadja
Jehada Saupi Garingan, together with their sister,
and defendant (4) Haymaton Garingan-Jayyari are
the children of Insih Saupi and Garingan. Upon the
death of their parents Insih Saupi and Garingan,

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered as follows:

38

(1) That the following described real property, viz:

"A parcel of agricultural land located in Semut,
Lamitan, Basilan City, Philippines, identified as
Bureau of Lands Plan H-V-18368 bounded on N., by
seashore, 20 m. wide; on the SE., by property of
Turavin Moro; on the S., by property of Hatib Hiya;
and on the W., by property of Husin Moro,
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY FIVE
(113,365) SQUARE METERS more or less" is
ordered partitioned among the following in EQUAL
SHARES, to wit: Hadji Munib Saupi Garingan, Hadja
Tero Saupi Garingan, Hadja Jehada Saupi Garingan,
and Haymaton Garingan Jayyari, shall get entitled
to ONE FOURTH (1/4) SHARE EACH of the aforesaid
property;

against the petitioners in an action for partition as

they are not co-owners of the subject property,
petitioners being the sole owners of the property.7

(2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2592 covering

said property in the name of Djayari or Jayyari Moro
married to Haymaton Mora of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Basilan City is hereby ordered
annulled and cancelled, and, in lieu thereof the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Basilan City is
ordered to issue a New Certificate of Title in the
names of the owners mentioned in the preceding
paragraph 1, and in the proportion given therein;

The land in dispute was originally registered in the

name of Andaang Gani ("Andaang") under Original
Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-7939 issued on 6
December 1955. OCT No. P-793 was issued upon
the approval of Andaangs homestead application
and the issuance on 17 February 1955 of Letters of
Patent No. V-41831.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.
The settlement of the issue of ownership is the first
stage in an action for partition, and the action will
not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the
property in dispute.8 In this case, Hadji Munib, et al.
failed to prove their right to the land in dispute.
The Derivative Title of Jayyari Pawaki

Andaang died intestate on 29 August 1959. On 13

April 1960, Andaangs widow and sole heir, Cristeta
Santiago vda. de Gani ("Cristeta"), executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale10 adjudicating to
herself the land in dispute and at the same time
selling it to Jikirum. On 31 August 1967 or seven
years after the sale, Cristeta caused the
cancellation of OCT No. P-793 and the issuance in
her name of TCT No. T-1940.11 On the same date,
TCT No. T-1940 was cancelled and TCT No. T194112 was issued in the name of Jikirum.

(3) Ordering the defendant and anyone acting for

the defendants to peacefully, and voluntarily
surrender the afore-mentioned parcel of land
together with the improvements existing thereon
to the plaintiffs, their heirs or legal representatives,
and restore them in the occupation and enjoyment
thereof.
SO ORDERED.6

On 22 September 1969, Jikirum executed a Deed of

Absolute Sale13 in favor of Djayari Moro. On 10 June
1971, TCT No. T-1941 was cancelled and TCT No. T259214 was issued in the name of Djayari Moro also
known as Jayyari Pawaki.

In an Order dated 19 July 2000, the Sharia District

Court denied the motion for reconsideration of
Haymaton and Pawaki.
Hence, the present petition.

The Claim of Hadji Munib, et al.

The Issues

Hadji Munib, et al. claim that before or during the

Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Saupi Moro
acquired the land in dispute through sale from Gani
Moro. After Gani Moros death, his heirs, which
included Andaang, offered to repurchase the land
from Saupi Moro. Saupi Moro refused. The heirs of
Gani Moro15 instituted Civil Case No. 31 for Illegal
Detainer16 against Saupi Moro.17 Although the
Municipal Trial Court of Basilan City18 declared
Saupi Moro in default for non-appearance, it
dismissed the complaint in a Decision dated 24
September 1951, as follows:

In their memorandum, petitioners raise the

following issues:
Whether the Sharia District Court erred in ordering
the partition of the subject property and annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2592 on the
basis alone of respondents claim that Saupi Moro,
their predecessor-in-interest, was the one who
owned the said parcel of land during his lifetime,
thereby disregarding the protection accorded to
persons dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system.

Does an action lie against the defendant for Illegal

Detainer: Rule 72, pp. 247-248, Morans Rules of
Court, provides, that there are two (2) kinds of
Detainer: (1) that by a tenant, and (2) that by a
vendee or vendor, or other person unlawfully
withholding possession of any land of building (sic).
In the present case, the cause of action is based
only on a verbal contract that took place year ago,

Whether the Third Sharia District Court erred in

not ruling that respondents right to seek a
reconveyance of the subject property had already
prescribed or is barred by laches.
Whether the Third Sharia District Court erred in
not ruling that respondents have no cause of action

39

one of the principal parties is now dead. The court

believes that the right of the plaintiffs to recover
possession has not been clearly established. In
their complaint, they stated that the alleged
contract took place before World War II, while in
open court they stated that it took place during the
Japanese occupation. The plaintiffs likewise failed
to explain in Court, why Gani Moro during his
lifetime failed to redeem the property, although the
amount involved is a pittant (sic). Gani Moro has all
the time in the world and the means to repay said
amount of seventy (P70.00), before his death on
May, 1949, and if said contract really existed, he
would not have hesitated to redeem said property
knowing that his children stands (sic) to be
deprived of their inheritance of a substantial parcel
of land with improvements.

hectares of land since the occupation of the

Philippines by the United States, may enter a
homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares
of agricultural land of the public domain.
SEC. 13. Upon the filing of an application for a
homestead, the Director of Lands, if he finds that
the application should be approved, shall do so and
authorize the applicant to take possession of the
land upon the payment of five pesos, Philippine
currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and
after the date of the approval of the application,
the applicant shall begin to work the homestead,
otherwise he shall lose his prior right to the land.
SEC. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent
issued for the land applied for until at least onefifth of the land has been improved and cultivated.
The period within which the land shall be cultivated
shall not be less than one nor more than five years,
from and after the date of the approval of the
application. The applicant shall, within the said
period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as he is
ready to acquire the title. If at the date of such
notice, the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction
of the Director of Lands, that he has resided
continuously for at least one year in the
municipality in which the land is located, or in the
municipality adjacent to the same and has
cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously
since the approval of the application, and shall
make affidavit that no part of said land has been
alienated or encumbered, and that he has
complied with all the requirements of this Act,
then, upon the payment of five pesos, as final fee,
he shall be entitled to a patent.

Although, the allegations of the plaintiffs stands

unrefuted (defendant being in default) yet the
Court in the interest of justice, has to sift and
analyze the evidence of the plaintiffs in order that
justice could be meted to the parties.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Court is of the opinion and so hold, that the plaintiff
has failed to prove its case, and judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing the above complaint,
without costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.19
Despite the decision, Andaang applied for a
homestead patent over the disputed land.
Andaangs application was approved and on 17
February 1955, he was issued Letters of Patent No.
V-41831. On 6 December 1955, OCT No. P-793 was
issued in Andaangs name.

CA 141 requires the applicant to enter in

possession of, improve and cultivate the land.

In July 1956, the brothers and sisters of Saupi

Moro,20 claiming to be his heirs,21 filed Civil Case
No. 41 for Annulment of Certificate of Title to a
Parcel of Land and Damages against Andaang and
the Register of Deeds of Basilan before the then
Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Basilan
City.22 However, the case did not prosper. In a
certification dated 18 September 1994, Clerk of
Court Selso M. Manzanaris of the Regional Trial
Court of Isabela, Basilan declared that the building
housing the sala of the CFI of Basilan City was
burned in 1975. The records of Civil Case No. 41
were destroyed. The plaintiffs did not revive the
case which was "considered abandoned."23

Andaang was one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.

31 for illegal detainer against Saupi Moro.25 In that
case, the plaintiffs prayed that they be allowed to
redeem the land in dispute which Gani
Moro verbally mortgaged to Saupi Moro during
the Japanese occupation. The plaintiffs also prayed
that the trial court order Saupi Moro to vacate the
land and to restitute the premises to the
plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
There is no evidence on record that shows that the
heirs of Gani Moro subsequently reacquired the
land. Nothing shows that Andaang Gani was the
occupant of the land when he applied for
homestead patent, or that he occupied the land
and introduced improvements thereon in the
interim before the approval of his application.
Hence, Hadji Munib, et al. insist that Andaang did
not comply with the requirements of CA 141.

The Homestead Application of Andaang Gani

Under Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141"),24 as
amended, agricultural lands may be acquired by
homestead, as follows:

Review of Certificate of Title on Ground of Fraud

SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age

of eighteen years, or the head of a family, who
does not own more than twenty-four hectares of
land in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of
any gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-four

Section 122 of Act No. 496 ("Act 496"),26 provides:

40

SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine

Islands belonging to the Government of the (United
States or to the Government of the) Philippine
Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or to public or private corporations, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the
instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in
behalf of the Government to cause such instrument
before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with
the register of deeds for the province where the
land lies and to be there registered like other deeds
and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be
entered as in other cases of registered land, and an
owners duplicate certificate issued to the grantee.
The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from
the Government to the grantee shall not take effect
as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate
only as a contract between the Government and
the grantee and as evidence of authority to the
clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The
act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the land, and in all cases under
this Act registration shall be made in the office of
the register of deeds for the province where the
land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by
the grantee. After due registration and issue of the
certificate and owners duplicate, such land shall
be registered land for all purposes under this Act.

issued in accordance with this section shall

be incontrovertible. If there is any such
purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be
opened, but shall remain in full force and effect
forever, subject only to the right of appeal
hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no
decree or certificate of title issued to persons not
parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or
annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree
in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other person
for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the
phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee,
or other encumbrancer for value. (Emphasis
supplied)
The fraud contemplated in Section 38 of Act 496
refers to extrinsic or collateral fraud. In Libudan v.
Gil,28 the Court explained the scope of extrinsic or
collateral fraud as follows:
x x x (T)he action to annul a judgment, upon the
ground of fraud, would be unavailing unless the
fraud be extrinsicor collateral and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or
resolved in the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered. Extrinsic or collateral
fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a
prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys
or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side
of the case." But intrinsic fraud takes the form of
"acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such
as the use of forged instruments or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the presentation of
the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case."

Upon its registration, the land in dispute falls under

the operation of Act 496 and becomes registered
land. A homestead patent, once registered,
becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title.27
A person deprived of the land, estate, or interest
therein by virtue of a decree of registration may
avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of
Act 496. Thus:
Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the
applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in
his application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and
registration shall be entered. Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in
the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To
whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or
other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments or decrees: subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived
of the land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by
fraud to file in the competent Court of First
Instance a petition for review within one year
after entry of the decree provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Upon the expiration of said term of
one year, every decree or certificate of title

Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his

interest in land where the fraud consists in a
deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not
contested when in fact they are; or in applying for
and obtaining adjudication and registration in the
name of a co-owner of land which he knows had
not been allotted to him in the partition; or in
intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with
the land inspector to include in the survey plan the
bed of a navigable stream; or in willfully
misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or
in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to
notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an
application; or in misrepresenting about the
identity of the lot to the true owner by the
applicant causing the former to withdraw his
application. In all these examples the overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court or from presenting his case. The
fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into
the jurisdiction of the court.
xxx

41

We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground

of fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud
goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not
collateral, and has been controverted and decided.
Thus we have underscored the denial of relief
where it appears that the fraud consisted in the
presentation at the trial of a supposed forged
document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in
basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise
agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or
omissions of the counsel which prevented the
petitioner from properly presenting the case.

The Proper Party to Bring the Action

In any event, Hadji Munib, et al. are not the proper
parties to file an action for reconveyance of the
land in dispute.
Even in Civil Case No. 41, the plaintiffs there did
not claim that the land was privately owned and
thus not proper subject for homestead application.
They only alleged continuous possession of the
land. Even in their Memorandum filed before this
Court, Hadji Munib, et al. only alleged that
Andaang Gani violated the provisions of CA 141
and that he was never in actual possession and
occupation of the land in dispute. Hadji Munib, et
al. also acknowledged that Civil Case No. 31 only
confirmed Saupi Moros physical possession of
the land. Indeed, Civil Case No. 31, being a case for
illegal detainer, did not settle the issue of
ownership of the land. The trial court dismissed the
complaint in that case only because the plaintiffs
failed to establish their right to recover possession
of the land. Any determination of ownership made
in the illegal detainer case is not conclusive.

The fraud being attributed to Andaang is not

extrinsic and collateral. In Libudan, the Court
ruled that the allegation that neither the applicant
nor his alleged successor-in-interest has ever been
in actual possession of the property in question
since time immemorial does not constitute
extrinsic fraud.
Granting that Andaang committed extrinsic and
collateral fraud, Hadji Munib, et al. failed to avail of
the remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496
within the prescribed period.

Evidently, the land was not privately owned by

Gani Moro from whom Saupi Moro "acquired" it.
The land in dispute was part of the public domain
before the issuance of OCT No. P-793. If it were
otherwise, there would be no need for Gani Moros
son, Andaang, to file a homestead application.

In Nelayan, et al. v. Nelayan, et al.,29 this Court

ruled that in the case of public land grants
(patents), the one-year period under Section 38 is
counted from the issuance of the patent by the
government.
The Letters of Patent was issued on 17 February
1955. The brothers and sisters of Saupi Moro filed
Civil Case No. 41 for annulment of title only in July
1956, more than a year after the issuance of the
Letters of Patent. There is no evidence that Saupi
Moros children, who are his compulsory heirs,
intervened in the case. Insihs children who claim
to have succeeded to the rights of their mother
also failed to intervene in the case. Hadji Munib, et
al. did not do anything to protect their interest, not
even after the records of Civil Case No. 41 were
burned. Instead of availing of the remedy under
Section 38 of Act 496, Hadji Munib, et al. filed an
action for partition on 23 February 1993, which
must fail because a Torrens title is not susceptible
to collateral attack. Thus:

The rule on this matter is clear:

All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.31
Hadji Munib, et al.s action for partition effectively
seeks to cancel the homestead patent and the
corresponding certificate of title. However, even if
the homestead patent and the certificate of title
are cancelled, Hadji Munib, et al. will not acquire
the land in the concept of an owner. The land will
revert to the government and will again form part
of the public domain.

"It is a rule in this jurisdiction that once a public

land has been brought under the Land Registration
Act, the Torrens title issued thereto is indefeasible.
It is entitled to the same regard as one issued in a
judicial proceeding. The Torrens title is not
susceptible to collateral attack. The decree (or
order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of
the patent in the case of a homestead) may be
reviewed under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration
Act by filing the appropriate petition within one
year from the issuance of the said decree or from
the issuance of the order for the issuance of the
patent. Or an appeal may be taken to the appellate
court within the reglementary period from the
decision of the Court; and in the case of the
homestead, the administrative remedies may be
pursued. These are the methods of direct attack."30

Section 101 of CA 141 provides that actions for

reversion of public lands fraudulently awarded
must be instituted by the Solicitor General and in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines.32 Thus:
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a
certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, as long
as the land disposed of is really a part of the
disposable land of the public domain and becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible after one year

42

from issuance. x x x. The only instance when a

certificate of title covering a tract of land, formerly
a part of the patrimonial property of the State,
could be cancelled, is for failure on the part of the
grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by
law, and in such case the proper party to bring the
action would be the Government to which the
property would revert.33

Complex Realty and Trading Corporation (UCRTC)

which subdivided the property into fourteen (14)
lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N. The subdivided lots were
then offered for sale with first priority to each of
the tenants, including the private respondents and
petitioner. 2 Lot 666-H has an area of 248 square
meters, consisting of two (2) parts. One part is the
residential portion with an area of 112 square
meters purchased by private respondents-spouses
Benolirao 3 while the second part is the right of way
for Lot 666-I and the aforesaid residential
portion. 4 Private respondent Carisima purchased
Lot 666-I. Petitioner, who was occupying the
western end and front portions of the aforesaid lots
declined the offer to purchase any of the lots
offered for sale by UCRTC. 7

Considering the foregoing, Hadji Munib, et al. have

no personality to file an action to recover
possession of the land in dispute. Further, they
failed to timely avail of whatever remedy available
to them to protect whatever interest they had over
the land.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sharia District
Court, Third Sharia Judicial District, Zamboanga
City in Civil Case No. 13-3, is SET ASIDE, and
another one is entered DISMISSING the complaint
in Civil Case No. 13-3.

Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V.

Ongsiako's wife, Mrs. Rosario de Jesus. Thereafter,
the collection of rentals was stopped prompting
petitioner to file on June 30, 1987, Civil Case No.
5456 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
City for consignation of rentals against UCRTC,
Rosario de Jesus and the spouses Carisima. The
consignation was granted by the trial court and
was eventually affirmed on appeal by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 on October
25, 1989. 6

RULE 70

On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of

absolute sale in favor of private respondentsspouses Benolirao for Lot 666-H. 7 This sale was
annotated at the back of UCRTC's title on Lot 666H. 8

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND

UNLAWFUL DETAINER
G.R. No. 118328 October 8, 1998

On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and

written demands were made upon petitioner,
UCRTC instituted an action against her for recovery
of possession of the subject premises before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114
docketed as Civil Case No 6652. 9 On July 15, 1990,
the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint of UCRTC, stating in part, to wit:

MARCIANA SERDONCILLO, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FIDEL and EVELYN BENOLIRAO,
MELITON CARISIMA, and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff,

not having been authorized in
writing for the purpose, may not
validly bring an action to enforce a
perceived easement of right of way
pertaining to the owners of Lots
666-H and 666-I or the Benolirao
and Carisima families, while
Benjamin Ongsiako possessed the
authority to institute the case
(Exhibit "G"), plaintiff is not the real
party in interest. Furthermore, the
situation obtaining does not call for
the enforcement of an easement of
right of way. Defendant Seldoncillo
is not the owner of and has never
claimed ownership over the portion
of Lot 666-H on which her house is
erected. A servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a

MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review assails the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 14, 1994 in CA G.R. CV
No. 39251 1which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, (Branch 108) in
Civil Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992 directing
herein petitioner to demolish and remove all illegal
structures which she constructed in front of the
subject lot, to vacate the said property and right of
way, and return possession thereof to the
respondents.
The antecedent facts:
The subject premises was formerly part of the
estate of H. V. Ongsiako, comprising of 1,806
square meters, more or less, located at the corner
of Pilapil and N. Domingo Streets, Pasay City. The
legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United

43

different owner (Article 613, New

Civil Code). In the present case the
ejectment of defendant Serdoncillo
from the portion of Lot 666-H
occupied by the house at the
instance of the proper party
(Renato Bolinarao's family ) would
remove the obstruction.

the front portions of the latter's

properties leaving them virtually
obstructed with no ingress or
egress from the main road;
7. That verbal and written demands
made upon the defendant by the
plaintiffs to remove and demolish
her structures had been ignored,
the last of which was on November
20, 1990, xerox copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "C" and
taken as an integral part hereof,
but despite such demands, the
defendant failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to remove and
vacate her illegal structures on the
portion of the properties as well as
on the right of way of plaintiffs.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing consideration, the
complaint against the defendant
Marciana Serdonillo, as well as
defendant's counterclaim, is
dismissed for lack of merit. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 10

8. That plaintiffs in compliance with

the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
lodged a complaint before the
Barangay Captain, Barangay 84,
Zone 10 of Pasay City, which
certified filing of the same in court,
xerox copy of said certification is
hereto attached as Annex "D" and
taken as integral part hereof;

UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the

Regional Trial Court, hence, the same became final.
On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil
Case No. 7749 for the Exercise of Preferential
Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private
respondents-spouses a Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao
praying for the annulment of sale of a portion of lot
666-H sold to the Benolirao spouses on the ground
that said transfer or conveyance is illegal. She
claimed that she has the preferred right to buy the
said property and that the same was not offered to
her under the same terms and conditions, hence, it
is null and void. UCRTC and private respondents
prevailed and this case was dismissed. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the same was dismissed
on July 9, 1992. 11

9. That due to the unjustified

refusal of the defendant, the
plaintiffs are suffering the
unnecessary inconvinience of the
absence of decent and sufficient
ingress and egress on their
properties, and will continue to
suffer the same unless the illegal
structures are finally demolished
and/or removed by the
defendants; 13

On November 20, 1990, private respondents made

their final demand on petitioner reiterating their
previous demands to vacate the property. 12 On
December 13, 1990, private respdndents filed their
complaint for recovery of possession of the subject
premises against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, docketed as
Civil Case No. 7735, which compiaint alleges these
material facts:

Petitioner, in her Answer, put up the defense that

she is the legitimate tenant of said lots in question
since 1956, pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder, thus:
13. That Lot 666-H and Lot 666-I
mentioned in the complaint are
formerly portions of a big track(sic)
of land consisting of 1,806 square
meters then owned by H.V.
Ongsiako;

5. That plaintiffs, being then

registered owners of the properties
designated as lot 666-H and 666-I,
are likewise the owners/grantees of
the right of way granted by United
Complex Realty and Trading
Corporation which was
correspondingly annotated in its
title (Annex "B-3" ) under Entry No.
205154/T-172291 of the Register of
Deeds of Pasay City;

14. That since 1956 and before the

1,806 square meters of lot owned
by H.V. Ongsiako was subdivided
into fourteen (14) lots in 1982,
defendant is (sic) already a
legitimate tenant and occupant
family of around 400 square meters
of the 1,806 square meters of the
said land then owned by H.V.
Ongsiako by erecting her
residential house thereon at the

6. That since 1982 the defendant

has built and constructed a
residence and pig pen on the
plaintiffs' right of way as well as on

44

agreed monthly rental of P15.00

and increased to P 100.00;

As to the attorney's fees, each

party should shoulder his/her
expenses.

15. That upon the death of H.V.

Ongsiako his heirs continued
collecting the monthly rental of the
premises from the defendants;

SO ORDERED. 15
Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that: 1)
the lower court should have dismissed the
complaint of private respondents considering that
based on the letter of demand dated November 20,
1990, the action filed should have been unlawful
detainer and not an action for recovery of
possession; 2) the action filed by private
respondents is barred by res judicata considering
that the present action is identical with that of Civil
Case No. 6652; 3) the lower court erred in not
dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action
with respect to enforcement of right of way vis a
vis defendant; and 4) the lower court erred in
ordering that defendants vacate the properties in
question since the lease of defendants thereon was
still in existence and had not yet been
terminated. 16

16. That the heirs of H.V. Ongsiako

formed a corporation known as
UNITED COMPLEX REALTY AND
TRADING CORPORATION and the
big parcel of land consisting of
1,806 square meters was
transferred to the said corporation
and subdivided in 1982 into
fourteen (14) lots, two (2) of which
lots are the very same lots leased
by the defendant from H.V.
Ongsiako and later from his heirs
and then from United Complex
Realty and Trading Corporation as
alleged in the preceding pars. l3,
14, and 15;14
The issues having been joined, trial on the merits
ensued. On June 30, 1992, the trial court rendered
its decision in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals

rendered its decision sustaining the findings of the
trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner,
stating in part as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of the

foregoing, and finding
preponderance of evidence in
plaintiffs' favor, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:

The issue as to the proper action

has been resolved by the
respondent court, to wit:
The defense that
what should have
been filed is an
ejectment case and
not recovery of
possession, is not
also correct. The
filing of this case
for recovery of
possession, instead
of an ejectment
case, is not
altogether
unjustified. The
Benoliraos and
Carisima became
the owners as early
as May, 1989.
Verbal and written
demands had been
ignored. There is an
immediate need for
plaintiffs to use the
right of way, which
up to the present
time is obstructed.
At most, what
surfaced is a
technicality which
should be
abandoned.

1) Ordering the defendant to

demolish and remove all illegal
structures she constructed on the
front portions of the subject lots
and on the right of way of the
plaintiff;
2.) Ordering the defendant to
vacate the property and right of
way and return possession thereof
to the plaintiffs,
3) Ordering the defendant to pay
the cost of suit.
As to the damages (actual and
moral) no award is given. In the
absence of proof of fraud and bad
faith by the defendants, the latter
are (sic) not liable for damages
(Escritor Jr. vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 577).
Actual and compensatory damages
require substantial proof. In the
absence of malice and bad faith,
moral damages cannot be awarded
(Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA
SCRA 561).

45

A plain reading of the complaint

shows that plaintiff-appellees cause
of action is for recovery of
possession of their property which
was encroached upon by
defendant-appellant. 17

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that

jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the
motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. 22 What determines the jurisdiction of
the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. 23 Accordingly, the issues in the instant
case can only be properly resolved by an
examination and evaluation of the allegations in
the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785. 24

A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid

decision filed by petitioner on August 8,
1994 18 was denied by the respondent on
September 23, 1994. 19
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner ascribes one single error committed by
the respondent court, to wit:
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Sp. Fifteenth Division)
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION IN
DECIDING AS AN ACCION PUBLICIANA AN
EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE (THE
JURISDICTION OF WHICH CLEARLY PERTAINS TO
THE INFERIOR COURT), A CASE BASICALLY
INVOLVING AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY.

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect

the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the
land, it is necessary that the complaint must
sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to
bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. 25 In short, the jurisdictional
facts must appear on the face of the complaint.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it
does not state how entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria. 26

Petitioner asserts that the respondent court erred

in sustaining the trial court's finding that the
complaint filed by private respondents for recovery
of possession of the subject premises is an accion
publiciana notwithstanding the fact that the action
was filed within one (1) year from demand.
Petitioner contends that private respondents
should have filed an action for unlawful detainer
and not an action for recovery of possession
against petitioner. Consequently, the trial court is
without jurisdiction to hear and determine Civil
Case No. 7785. In support of her contention,
petitioner cited the cases of Bernabe vs.
Luna 20 and Medina vs. Court of Appeals, 21 which
she states is strikingly similar to the facts of this
case. Consequently, the rulings of this Court in
these two cases are squarely applicable and
controlling in the case at bar.

In the case of Javier vs. Veridiano II 27 this Court

held that the doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, 28 decided
more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law. It
preserved the age-old remedies available under
existing laws and jurisprudence to recover
possession of real property, namely: (1) accion
interdictal, which is the summary action for either
forcible entry ordetentacion, where the defendant's
possession of the property is illegal ab initio; or for
unlawful detainer or desahucio, where the
defendant's possession was originally lawful but
ceased to be must be so by the expiration of his
right to possess, both of which must be brought
within one year from the date of actual entry on
the land, in case of forcible entry; and from the
date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer,
in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan
court; (2) accion publiciana which is a plenary
action for recovery of the right to possess and
which should be brought in the proper regional trial
court when the dispossession has lasted for more
than one year; and, (3) accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which
seeks the recovery of ownership and includes
the jus possidendi brought in the proper regional
trial court.

Private respondents, however, aver that they were

merely successors-in-interest of UCRTC and
therefore step into the shoes of the latter. They
claim that the demand to vacate required by law
should at the very least be reckoned from June 2,
1989, the date of the filing of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 6652 considering that their demands are
simply a reiteration of UCRTC's demands against
petitioner. Private respondents further contend that
the allegations in the complaint determine the
jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the complaint in Civil
Case No. 7785 specifically alleged that private
respondents are the owners of lots 666-I and 666-H
as evidenced by transfer certificates of title and
prayed for recovery of possession of a portion
thereof including its right of way illegally and
unlawfully possessed by petitioner.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is

thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership
over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. It is different from accion

Petitioner's position is without merit.

46

interdictal or accion publicianawhere plaintiff

merely alleges proof of a better right to possess
without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty,
Inc., 29 this Court held that:

to an accion publiciana, which is

the recovery of the right to possess
and is a plenary action in an
ordinary proceeding in the Court of
First Instance.

We have consistently held that a

complaint for forcible entry, as
distinguished from that of unlawful
detainer, in order to vest
jurisdiction upon the inferior court,
must allege plaintiff's prior physical
possession of the property, as well
as the fact that he was deprived of
such possession by any of the
means provided in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, namely:
force, intimidation, threats,
strategy and stealth, "for if the
dispossession did not take place by
any of these means, the courts of
first instance, not the municipal
courts, have jurisdiction.

A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil

Case No. 7785 undisputably show that plaintiffs
(private respondents herein) clearly set up title to
themselves as being the absolute owner of the
disputed premises by virtue of their transfer
certificates of title and pray that petitioner
Serdoncillo be ejected therefrom. There is nothing
in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any
of the means of dispossession that would
constitute forcible entry under Section (1) Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, nor is there any assertion of
defendant's possession which was originally lawful
but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right
to possess. It does not characterize petitioner's
alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the
same was legal or illegal nor the manner in which
petitioner was able to construct the house and the
pig pens thereon. The complaint merely avers that
a portion of the lot owned by private respondents
and its right of way have been occupied by
petitioner and that she should vacate. The action
therefore is neither one of forcible nor of unlawful
detainer but essentially involves a dispute relative
to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of land
allegedly encroached upon by petitioner and its
adjoining right of way. Indeed, the Ocular
Inspection Report of the Branch Clerk of Court,
states that:

xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid Rule 70 does not,
however, cover all of the cases of
dispossession of lands. Thus,
"whenever the owner is
dispossessed by any other means
than those mentioned he may
maintain his action in the Court of
First Instance, and it is not
necessary for him to wait until the
expiration of twelve months before
commencing an action to be
repossessed or declared to be
owner of the land." Courts of First
Instance have jurisdiction over
actions to recover possession of
real property illegally detained,
together with rents due and
damages, even though one (1)
year has not expired from the
beginning of such illegal detention,
provided the question of ownership
of such property is also involved. In
other words, if the party illegally
dispossessed desires to raise the
question of illegal dispossession as
well as that of the ownership over
the property he may commence
such action in the Court of First
Instance immediately or at any
time after such illegal
dispossession. If he decides to raise
the question of illegal
dispossession only, and the action
is filed more than one (1) year after
such deprivation or withholding of
possession, then the Court of First
Instance will have original
jurisdiction over the case. The
former is an accion de
reivindicacion which seeks the
recovery of ownership as well as
possession, while the latter refers

. . . (T)he right of way hit directly

the defendant Serdoncillo's
property consisting of a two-storey
residential house made of wood
and GI sheets and occupying the
entire width of the rear portion of
the right of way. A coconut tree
stands on the middle of the road,
at the back of which is a shanty
made of rotten G.I. sheets around it
which is used as pigpens and place
of washing clothes extended from
defendant's house. To gain access
to plaintiff's property, the group
turned right and passed between
an "aratiris" tree and cemented
firewall owned by Mr. Belarmino
making only one person at a time
to pass. This passageway has only
a width of 0.5 meter which is being
used by the defendant and her
members of the family aside from
the plaintiffs.
. . . Two (2) monuments of the lot
boundary of the plaintiff's property
are existing, but the rest are
nowhere to be found. According to
Mrs. Benolirao, they are located
within the premises of the
defendant's house. At the back of

47

Benolirao is a private property

gutted by fire.

xxx xxx xxx

We have noted that while
petitioners allege in their complaint
that they are the owners of the lot
on which the house of the private
respondent is constructed, their
attached TCT shows that the lot is
still in the name of Fejosera
Investment Incorporated, Private
respondent and said company
entered into a contract of lease in
1950 for the use and occupation of
said lot. Petitioners allegedly
bought the lot in question in 1973,
and they must have been fully
aware of the occupancy of the
private respondent of the premises
in question. Yet, they did not take
any action to remove the house of
the private respondent or to inform
the respondent that they had
become the new owners of the lot
in question. It is clear therefore
that the lease was allowed to
continue.

. . . Upon request, the group wass

granted permission by the relatives
of the defendant to inspect the
place. The group further noticed
that defendant's improvements
were even encroaching on the
plaintiff's lot by approximately 4.1
meters, more or less. The house of
the defendant is facing the
plaintiff's property; there is a small
chicken house and there is also a
dog house standing near it. 30
It is noted that at the time of the filing of said
complaint, Civil Case No. 7749, an action for
annulment of the sale between UCRTC and private
respondents Benolirao of Lot 666-H initiated by
petitioner was likewise pending in another court.
This case puts in issue the validity of private
respondents' acquisition of the subject lots and
ultimately their ownership of Lot 666-H.
Thus, what is noticeable in the complaint is that
private respondents definitely gave petitioner
notice of their claim of exclusive and absolute
ownership, including their right to possess which is
an elemental attribute of ownership.31 It is
immaterial whether or not private respondents
instituted their complaint one month from date of
last demand or a year thereafter. What is of
paramount importance is that the allegations in
complaint are of the nature of either an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the possession of
private respondent over the lot in
question became illegal only on
November 14, 1980, when the
formal demand to pay and vacate
the premises was sent to him. 32
The allegations in the complaint clearly show that
plaintiffs were already the owners of the property
when defendant constructed a house on the
disputed lot without their permission. That despite
formal demand defendant failed to vacate and
surrender possession of the property to them.
Indeed, the averments in plaintiffs' complaint
present jurisdictional facts which do not illustrate
plaintiffs' action as either an action
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria but that of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Thus, the trial
court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint,
pertinent portion of which is quoted hereunder:

Petitioner's reliance on the Bernabe and Medina

cases, which she claims to be squarely applicable
under the circumstances herein, is entirely
misplaced. While it is true that in these two cases
the complaints were filed before the one-year
period had expired from date of last demand, the
allegations in the complaint failed to state material
facts which are indicative of a case of either
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Thus, the Court in Bernabe stated that:
In their complaint, plaintiffs
(petitioners herein) allege that they
are the owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 199.4 square
meters more or less, located in
Tondo, Manila, that defendant
(private respondent herein)
constructed a house on said lot
without plaintiff's permission; that
on November 14, 1980, plaintiffs
thru counsel made a written
demand for the removal of said
house as well as for the recovery of
damages for the reasonable use
and occupation thereof; and that
defendant refused and failed to
comply despite repeated demands.

It is clear on the face of the

complaint that at the time of the
filing of this case on February 19,
1981, the defendant was in
possession, as a tenant, of the
premises. When plaintiff's counsel,
therefore sent a written notice on
November 4, 1980 requiring
defendant to vacate the premises
when this action was brought, the
one (1) year period after the
unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession has not yet set in. It
is clear that this is an ejectment
case within the exclusive

48

jurisdiction of the City Court of

Manila.

(b) In other cases the judgment or

order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the
same capacity;

SO ORDERED. 33
We likewise find the Medina case, relied upon by
petitioner, to be inappropriate. The facts distinctly
show that the complaint filed by the owners of the
property before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 47, was for unlawful detainer. It was
the action resorted to by the plaintiffs after
advising the defendant (the lessee of the premises
in question) that a member of the family, Dr.
Igama, urgently needed the house and after
repeated demands to vacate made on the lessee
proved to be unsuccessful. All these incidents, from
notification to the filing of the complaint dated May
16, 1985, transpired within a period of six (6)
months. Indeed, the factual background of this
case is a classic illustration of an action for
unlawful detainer. Verily, the facts are therefore
diametrically opposite to the facts or case at bar.

The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine

of res judicata rests is that parties ought not be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once, that when the right or fact has been judicially
determined, the judgment of the court, so long as
it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate. 35
Thus, for res judicata to bar the institution of a
subsequent action the following requisites must
concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2)
it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and, (4)
there must be between the first and second
actions; (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
subject matter; and (c) identity of cause of
action. 36

Petitioner has therefore no legal basis to insist that

the present case is similar to the Bernabe and
Medina cases and from which this Court should
base its findings and conclusions. The doctrine laid
down in Tenorio vs. Gombais still controlling. In that
case the Court ruled that courts of first instance
have jurisdiction over all actions involving
possession of land except forcible entry and illegal
datainer, and therefore the lower court has
jurisdiction over the action alleged in the
appellant's complaint because it is neither of illegal
detainer nor of forcible entry. 34

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first

three (3) requirements and the identity of the
subject matter. The only issues remaining are
whether as between Civil Case No. 5456 and Civil
Case No. 7785, there is identity of parties and of
causes of action in Civil Case No. 5456 to bar the
institution of Civil Case No. 7785.

Petitioner maintains that her leasehold right as a

tenant of the subject premises had been settled in
Civil Case No. 5456, an action for consignation,
which she won before the Metropolitan Trial Court
and affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 109. Said court ruled that the
latter is a tenant of the site or premises in question
and that she cannot be ejected therefrom, even on
the assumption that her house and pig pen are
allegedly standing on a right of way. She claims
that pursuant to Section 49 (b) (now Section 47)
Rule 39, Rules of Court, the issue of tenancy in said
case is now conclusive between her and private
respondent with respect to the subject premises in
question.

There is identity of parties. The record shows that

the parties in Civil Case No. 5456 are petitioner as
plaintiff while the defendants were UCRTC, the
spouses Meliton and Efremia Carisima and Rosario
de Jesus. Private respondents-spouses Fidel and
Evelyn Benolirao acquired lot 666-H from UCRTC
and are therefore the successors-in-interest of
UCRTC by title subsequent to the commencement
and termination of the first action. As such, private
respondents merely stepped into the shoes of
UCRTC and acquired whatever capacity and title
the former had over the same property or subject
matter of the action. Indeed, there is actual, if not
substantial, identity of parties between the two
actions. 37

Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit.

Sec. 49 (now Section 47), provides that:
Sec. 49. Effects of Judgments.
the effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court or judge
of the Philippines having
jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or order, may be as
follows:

There is however, no identity of causes of action in

both cases. In the case of Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals, 38 this Court held that the test of identity
of causes of action lies not in the form of an action
but on whether the same evidence would support
and establish the former and the present causes of
action. Petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 5456
is an action for consignation of rentals while Civil

(a) xxx xxx xxx

49

Case No. 7785 is an action for recovery of

possession.

DANAO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and EMETERIA
M. GURIEZA, Respondents.

In other words, the issue in Civil Case No. 5456 is

whether or not consignation of rentals is proper
under the circumstances obtaining in that case.
Private respondents action for recovery of
possession requires them to present evidence of
their claim or title to the subject premises and their
right to possess the same from petitioner. Stated
conversely, the evidence in Civil Case No. 5456 is
entirely different to that in Civil Case No. 7785.
Thus, the decision in Civil Case No. 5456 does not
in any way affect nor bar Civil Case No. 7785.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are
the Decision2 dated February 18, 2013 and the
Resolution3dated June 5, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117686 which
reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated October
27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
6974 and dismissed petitioner Bonifacio Piedad's
(Bonifacio) Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages against respondents-spouses Victorio
Gurieza and Etneteria M. Gurieza (Sps. Gurieza).

Indeed, the Court noted that the parties had been

at odds since 1987 when petitioner initiated Civil
Case No. 5456, and then Civil Case No. 7749.
Private respondents' predecessor UCRTC likewise
initiated Civil Case No. 6652 and the present case
under appeal, Civil Case No. 7785, all because of
the use of a right of way and an encroachment of
only 4.1 meters of the subject premises. At some
point in time, all these squabbles must end. Thus,
the respondent court stated that:

The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer and Damages5 filed by Bonifacio
against Sps.Gurieza before the Municipal Trial Court
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (MTC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 3877. In his complaint, Bonifacio
alleged that heis the absolute owner of the 1/3
middle portion of a parcel of residential land
designated as Lot 1227, located at La Torre,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, withan area of
4,640.98 square meters (subject lot) which he
acquired through intestate succession from his late
father who inherited the same from the latters
parents, Alejandro Piedad (Alejandro)and Tomasa
Villaray (Tomasa). He also claimed that his
ownership of the subject lot took place even before
his fathers death and was validated through a
Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and
Partition (Deed of Confirmation) executed by
Alejandro and Tomasas legal heirs. Further,
Bonifacio alleged that before migrating to Hawaii,
he built a bungalow on the subject lot and assigned
numerous caretakers to look after it, the last of
which were Sps. Gurieza. Sometime in 2005,
however, Sps. Gurieza allegedly took interest of the
bungalow and the subject lot after learning from an
employee of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) that Lot 1227 is public
land. Using such information, Sps. Gurieza had the
subject lot declared under their name for tax
purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227,
and filed an application for survey authority and
titling with the Bureau of Land Management,
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the DENR, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
(CENRO DENR Nueva Vizcaya).6

It is true that it is the purpose and

intention of the law that courts
should decide all questions
submitted to them "as truth and
justice require", and that it is
greatly to be desired that all
judgments should be so decided;
but controlling and irresistible
reasons of public policy and of
sound practice in the courts
demand that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgment of the
courts determining controversies
submitted to them should become
final at some definite time fixed by
law. 39
In passing, We reiterate the time-honored doctrine
that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court,
and the Court, will not normally disturb such
factual findings unless the findings of the court are
palpably unsupported by the evidence or unless
the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of
facts. 40 In this case, We find the said decision to be
totally supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the foregoing premises, it is unnecessary
to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 39251 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncements as to costs.
G.R. No. 207525

When Bonifacio learned of Sps. Guriezas acts, he

authorized Ofelia Bay-ag to file a protest before the
DENR which deferred further action on their (Sps.
Guriezas) application before it. Thereafter,
Bonifacio sent his daughter, Maria Inspiracion
Piedad-Danao (Danao), to the country to personally
demand that Sps. Gurieza vacate the subject lot

June 18, 2014

BONIFACIO PIEDAD, MARIA PIEDAD

represented by INSPIRACION

50

unconditionally; and for this purpose, Danao

initiated a complaint before the barangay court.
However, during the mediation proceedings, Sps.
Gurieza refused to heed Danaos demand and even
challenged her to go to higher courts. Thus,
Bonifacio was constrained to file the instant case
as his last resort.7

consequently, ordered the dismissal of Bonifacios

Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages. The
CA found, upon further scrutiny of the Deed of
Confirmation, that Emeteria M. Gurieza, whom
Bonifacio recognized as one of the heirs of the
subject lot, among others, as well as the other
heirs of Alejandro and Tomasa, did not sign the
Deed of Confirmation. As such, the CA did not give
credence to the said document and ratiocinated
that "[a]bsent credible proof that the subject [lot]
was ever partitioned by the heirs of [Alejandro and
Tomasa], x x x Emeteria continues to be a coowner thereof," and, hence, cannot be ejected from
the same.15

In their defense, Sps. Gurieza denied Bonifacios

claim and maintained that in 1974, the subject lot
was a vacant and virginal public land and that the
DENR allowed them to possess and occupy the
same in the concept of an owner. As such, they
acquired the same through acquisitive prescription.
They likewise assailed the authenticity and validity
of the Deed of Confirmation, contending that it was
only signed by a few heirs of Alejandro and
Tomasa.8

Bonifacio moved for reconsideration but was,

however, denied in a Resolution16 dated June 5,
2013, hence, this petition.

The MTC Ruling

The Issue Before the Court

In a Decision9 dated May 8, 2009, the MTC ruled in

Bonifacios favor, and, accordingly, ordered Sps.
Gurieza to vacate the subject lot, and pay Bonifacio
the amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and
costs of suit. It found that Bonifacio had a better
right of possession over the subject lot as
evidenced by the house he built thereon as early
as the 1950s when he took possession of the said
lot, as well as the affidavits of witnesses who are
pioneer residents of the area, attesting that Sps.
Guriezas claim over such lot is
preposterous.10 Further, the MTC also found that
Sps. Guriezas continuous stay on the subject lot
was by Bonifacios mere tolerance and such stay
became illegal when they refused to vacate the
said lot despite the latters demand. Consequently,
Bonifacio "may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of [his] property and [the] filing of this
case is the remedy granted [to him] by law."11

The primordial issue for the Courts resolution is

whether or not the CA correctly reversed the RTC
ruling and, consequently, dismissed Bonifacios
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages
against Sps. Gurieza.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied.
The possession of the defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due
to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The only issue to be resolved in an
unlawful detainer case is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent
of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.17

Dissatisfied, Sps. Gurieza appealedto the RTC,

which was docketed

An ejectment case, based on the allegation of

possession by tolerance, falls under the category of
unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the
defendant to use his/her property by tolerance
without any contract, the defendant is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he/she will
vacate on demand, failing which, an action for
unlawful detainer will lie.18

as Civil Case No. 6974.

The RTC Ruling
In a Decision12 dated October 27, 2010, the RTC
affirmed the MTC ruling in toto. Similarly, the RTC
found that the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by both parties clearly showed
that Bonifacio indeed had better possessory rights
over the subject lot and the bungalow type house
built thereon than Sps. Gurieza.

Thus, under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of

Court, the complaint must be filed "within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession" and must allege that: (a) the
defendant originally had lawful possession of the
property, either by virtue of a contract or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) eventually, the
defendants possession of the property became
illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to
defendant of the expiration or the termination of
the defendants right of possession; (c) thereafter,
the defendant remained in possession of the

Aggrieved, Sps. Gurieza elevated the case to the

CA by way of petition for review.13
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated February 18, 2013, the CA
reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and

51

property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment

thereof; and (d) within one (1) year from the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.19

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus holds that

the CA erred in dismissing Bonifacio' s Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against Sps.
Gurieza. Perforce, a reversal of its ruling is proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 18, 2013 and the
Resolution dated June 5, 2013 of the Court of A
peals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117686 are hereby
REVERSED and SET A IDE. Accordingly, the
Decision dated October 27, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
28 in Civil Case No. 6974 is REINSTATED.

In this light, the Court shall solely resolve the issue

as to who between the parties has the better right
of possession de facto over the subject lot.
Corollary thereto, issues pertaining to ownership
are better threshed out in another action instituted
for such purpose.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court
holds that Bonifacio had clearly established his
cause of action for unlawful detainer. The following
established facts impel this conclusion:

G.R. No.177484

July 18, 2014

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA AND

REMEDIOS VELASCO, Petitioners,
vs.
WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
represented by its President, ALIZA
MA, Respondent.

First, the evidence shows that as early as the

1950s, Bonifacio already had possession of the
subject lot and even built a bungalow-type house
thereon. Moreover, when he migrated to Hawaii,
Bonifacio appointed numerous caretakers to the
said house and lot, the last being Sps. Gurieza.
Thus, despite his migration to Hawaii, Bonifacio
never relinquished said possession over the house
and lot. Consistent with Article 52420 of the Civil
Code, it is well-settled that "[i]t is not necessary
that the owner of a parcel of land should himself
occupy the property as someone in his name may
perform the act. In other words, the owner of real
estate has possession, either when he himself is
physically in occupation of the property, or when
another person who recognizes his rights as owner
is in such occupancy."21 Thus, the Sps. Guriezas
stay on the subject lot was only made possible
through the mere tolerance of Bonifacio.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is
the September 15, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60010. Said
Decision granted respondent Waterfields Industries
Corporation's (Waterfields) Petition for Review of
the July 14, 2000 Decision2 of the Regional TriaJ
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No.
00-96228, which in tum affirmed the May 7, 1999
Decision3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Manila, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 160443-CV
granting petitioners spouses Alejandro Manzanilla
and Remedios Velasco's (spouses Manzanilla)
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
Waterfields. Likewise questioned is the CA April 12,
2007 Resolution4 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.

Second, when Bonifacio learned that Sps. Gurieza

declared the subject lot under their name for tax
purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227,
and filed an application for survey authority and
titling with the CENRODENR Nueva Vizcaya, he
immediately took steps to terminate their tolerated
stay on the subject lot and house and demanded
that they leave immediately, rendering the
Sps.Guriezas stay on the subject lot illegal.

Factual Antecedents
The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a
25,000-square meter parcel of land in BarangaySan
Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, covered by Transfer
of Certificate of Title No. T-35205. On May 24,
1994, they leased a 6,000-square meter portion of
the above-mentioned property to Waterfields, as
represented by its President Aliza R. Ma (Ma).
Pertinent portions of their Contract of
Lease5 provide, viz:

Third, instead of vacating the subject lot, Sps.

Gurieza defied Bonifacios demand and asserted
their ownership over the same.1wphi1 Moreover,
they even challenged Danao to go to the courts to
have them removed from such lot. In effect, Sps.
Gurieza was able to unlawfully withhold possession
of the subject lot from Bonifacio.

Section 2. TERM OF LEASE. The Lease shall be for a

period of TWENTY FIVE (25) YEARS from May 16,
1994 to May 15, 2019, renewable upon the option
of the LESSEE;

Lastly, Bonifacio, through Danao, made his final

demand to Sps. Gurieza on January 14, 2008, as
evidenced by a Certificate to File Action issued by
the Barangay Captain of the area where the
subject lot was located, stating that the
Sangguniang Barangay had tried to settle the
dispute between the parties but failed to do
so,22 and filed his complaint on June 24, 2008, or
within the one (1) year period from his last
demand.23

Section 3. MONTHLY RENTALAND ESCALATION. In

consideration of the lease herein constituted,
LESSEE shall pay unto the LESSORS a monthly
rental in the gross amountof EIGHTEEN THOUSAND
(P18,000.00) payable within the first TEN (10) days
of each month x x x.

52

Section 4. DEPOSIT. LESSORS hereby acknowledge

receipt from LESSEE a rental deposit in the amount
ofTWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND
(P216,000.00) PESOS, Philippine currency, to
answer for any unpaid rentals, damages, penalties
and unpaid utility charges.Such deposit or any
balance thereof shall be refunded to the LESSEE
immediately upon the termination or expiration of
this contract.6

On July 30, 1998, the spouses Manzanilla filed

before the MTC a Complaint10 for Ejectment against
Waterfields. They alleged in paragraph 4 thereof
that they entered into a Contract of Lease with
Waterfields on May 24, 1994, and in paragraph 5,
that the same was amended on June 6, 1994 and
July 9, 1997.11 However, Waterfields had
committedviolations of the lease agreement by not
paying the rentals on time. And in yet another
violation, it failed to pay the P18,000.00 monthly
rental for the past six months prior to the filing of
the Complaint, that is, from December 1997 to May
1998 or in the total amount of P108,000.00.
Demands upon Waterfields to pay the accrued
rentals and vacate the property were unheededso
the spouses Manzanillaconsidered the contract
terminated and/or rescinded.12 And since
Waterfields still failed to comply with their final
demand to pay and vacate,13 the spouses filed the
Complaint and prayed therein that the former be
ordered to (1) vacate the subject property and, (2)
pay the accrued rentals of P108,000.00 as of May
1998, the succeeding rentals of P18,000.00 a
month until the property is vacated, the interest
due thereon, attorneys fees, and cost of suit.

The parties executed on June 6, 1994 an

Amendment to the Contract of Lease.7 Save for the
commencement of the lease which they reckoned
on the date of the execution of the amendment
and the undertaking of the spouses Manzanilla to
register the agreements, the parties agreed therein
that all other terms and conditions in the original
Contract of Lease shall remainin full force and
effect.
Beginning April 1997, however, Waterfields failed
to pay the monthly rental. Hence, Ma sent the
spouses Manzanilla a letter8 dated July 7, 1997
which reads as follows:
Spouses Mr. & Mrs. Alejandro Manzanilla
Sto. Tomas, Batangas
I promise to pay the following rentals in arrears:
10 April 97

8,000.00

10 May 97

18,000.00

10 June 97

18,000.00

10 July 97

18,000.00

check replacement

8,000.00
P70,000.00

by way of check payment dated July 15, 1997.

In addition to the aforementioned, I will give a
check for the amount of P18,000, representing
advance rental for the month ofAugust 1997.
From hereon, notwithstanding the terms of the
lease contract, I shall pay rentals (eve) on or before
the 10th day of each month, (30-day) representing
advance rental.
The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall
be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid
utilities,if any, and other incidental expenses only
and applied at the termination of the lease.

In its Answer,14 Waterfields admitted paragraphs 4

and 5 of the Complaint and alleged that: (1) when
the lease agreement was executed, the property
subject thereof was just bare land; (2) it spent
substantial amounts of money in developing the
land, i.e., building of water dikes, putting up of a
drainage system, land filling and levelling; (3) it
built thereon a processing plant for fruit juices,
preserved vegetables and other frozen goods for
which it spent around P7,000,000.00; and (4) it
caused the installation in the said premises of an
electrical system for P80,000.00 and water system
for P150,000.00. Waterfields further alleged that
although the first two years of its operation were
fruitful, it later suffered from business reverses due
to the economic crisis that hit Asia. Be that as it
may, Waterfields claimed that it did not fail or
refuse to pay the monthly rentals but was just
utilizing the rental deposit in the amount
of P216,000.00 (equivalent to one year rentals) as
rental payment in accordance with Section 4 of the
original Contract of Lease. Hence,it argued that the
spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action against
it. Waterfields also asserted that the precipitate
filing of the Complaint against it is tainted with bad
faith and intended to cause it grave injustice
considering that it already spent an enormous
amount of almostP10,000,000.00 in developing the
property. By way of compulsory counterclaims,
Waterfields sought that the spouses Manzanilla be
ordered to pay it moral damages and attorneys
fees.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

The lease contract dated 5/24/94 shall be amended

according to the above provision.

In its Decision15 of May 7, 1999, the MTC found

Mas letter of July 9, 1997 to have amended the
Contract of Lease. In particular, Section 4 of the
Contract of Lease which provides that the rental
deposit shall answer for any unpaid rentals,
damages, penalties and unpaid utility charges was
superseded by the portion in Mas July 9, 1997
letter which states that "the deposit stipulated in
our lease contract shall be used exclusively for the
payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other

(Signed)
ALIZA MA
President
Waterfields Industries Corporation
7/9/97
Quezon City9

53

incidental expenses only and applied at the

termination of the lease".Hence, the MTC found no
merit in Waterfields claim that it did not fail or
refuse to pay the monthly rentals as it was
applying the rental deposit to its payment of the
same. Consequently, the MTC declared that
Waterfields violated the lease agreement due to
non-payment of rentals and disposed of the case
as follows:

they terminated the Contract of Lease. Upon such

termination, it held that the rental deposit should
have been applied as payment for unpaid utilities
and other incidental expenses, if any, in view of the
following portion of the July 9, 1997 letter:
The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall
be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid
utilities, if any, and other incidental expenses only
and applied at the termination of the lease.20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered in favor of [the spouses
Manzanilla] and against [Waterfields], ordering the
latter to

And since the spouses Manzanilla did not allege

that there were unpaid utilities or incidental
expenses for the account of Waterfields as of the
termination of the contract, the whole amount
of P216,000.00 should have been returned by the
former to the latter when the contract was
terminated. Not having done so, the spouses
Manzanilla therefore,became debtors of Waterfields
insofar as the said amount is concerned. And since
Waterfields is also a debtor of the spouses
Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid rentals,
compensation should take place. It ratiocinated:

1. vacate subject premises and surrender

same peacefully to [the spouses
Manzanilla;
2. to pay [the spouses Manzanilla] the sum
of P108,000.00 representing rental arrears
from December, 1997 to May, 1998, and
the sum of P18,000.00 a month thereafter,
until it has actually vacated and
surrendered subject premises;

Compensation shall take place when two persons,

in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each
other (Art. 1278, Civil Code). Asof the filing of the
action, [Waterfields] was indebted to [the spouses
Manzanilla] in the amount of P144,000.00 as
unpaid rentals covering the period December 1997
to July 1998, while [the SpousesManzanilla] owed
[Waterfields] the sum of P216,000.00 representing
its rental deposit. Offsetting theP144,000.00
unpaid rentals against the P216,000.00 rental
deposit, [Waterfields] emerges as the creditor to
the tune of P72,000.00. In other words, as of the
filing of the action, respondents were even
overpaid in the sum ofP72,000.00.21

Toward this end, whatever rentaldeposit

[Waterfields] may have, shall be taken into
account to answer for the latters
arrearages.
3. to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."16
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Before the RTC, Waterfields questioned the MTCs
ruling that Mas letter of July 9, 1997 effectively
amended the Contract of Lease. It argued that the
said letter is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds since the same was merely in the
handwriting of Ma, unsubscribed by both parties,
and unacknowledged before a notary public.
Hence, the rental deposit should havebeen applied
as payment for monthly rentals pursuant to the
original Contract of Lease.

The CA thereafter concluded that the spouses

Manzanilla haveno cause of action against
Waterfields, viz:
Consequently, [the spouses Manzanilla] had no
cause of action against [Waterfields] for alleged
violation of the Contract, particularly non-payment
of rentals.22
Hence, the falloof the CAs September 15, 2006
Decision:

The RTC, however, was unimpressed. It noted in its

Decision17 dated July 14, 2000 that in its Answer,
Waterfields admitted paragraph 5 of the Complaint
which states that the Contract of Lease was
amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997. Further,
the very existence of Mas July 9, 1997 letter
negated the applicability of the Statute of Frauds.
The RTC thus disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

decision dated May 7, 1999 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 4), as affirmed by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 42), is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is
rendered DISMISSING [the spouses Manzanillas]
action for unlawful detainer against [Waterfields].
Costs against [the spouses Manzanilla].

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.23
SO ORDERED.

18

The spouses Manzanilla filed a Motion for

Reconsideration,24 which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution25 dated April 12, 2007.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, however, had a different take. In its
Decision19 dated September 15, 2006, it gave
weight tothe spouses Manzanillasallegation that

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

54

Issues

It is quite unfortunate that the CAhas apparently

confused itself in resolving the basic issue involved
in this case.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A

QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD
WITHLAWS AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1278 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE WAS [SIC] APPLICABLE AND THAT
COMPENSATION HAD TAKEN PLACE.

As may be recalled, the spouses Manzanilla, on

account of Waterfields alleged violation of the
contract of lease by non-payment of rentals,
considered the contract terminated and demanded
for the latter to pay its obligation and vacate the
property. As demand proved futile, the said
spouses filed the Complaint for ejectment [unlawful
detainer].

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A

QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD
WITHLAWS AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT DISMISSED
HEREIN PETITIONER[S] ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER.26 The Parties Arguments

In Fideldia v. Sps. Mulato,27 the Court held that:

For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer
suit, two requisites must concur: (1) there must be
failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of
the lease, and (2) there must be demand both to
pay or to comply and vacate. The first requisite
refers tothe existence of the cause of action for
unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the
jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that
said cause of action may be pursued. Implied in the
first requisite, which is needed to establish the
cause ofaction of the plaintiff in an unlawful
detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract of
lease entered into by the plaintiff and the
defendant, the same being needed to establish the
lease conditions alleged to have been violated.
Thus, in Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
the Court held that the evidence needed to
establish the cause of action in an unlawful
detainer case is (1) a lease contract and(2) the
violation of that lease by the defendant.28

The spouses Manzanilla contend that there can be

no issue as to the due execution, effectivity and
enforceability of Mas July 9, 1997 letter since aside
from the fact that Waterfieldsitself admitted in its
Answer that the Contract of Lease was amended on
July9, 1997, the MTC and the RTC had uniformly
ruled that the said letter operates as an
amendment to the original contract. And as the
rental deposit cannot be applied as payment for
the monthly rentals pursuant to the amendment,
Waterfields is considered in default in its payment
thereof. Conversely, Waterfields has committed a
violation of the Contract of Lease which gave rise
to a cause of action for ejectment against it.
The spouses Manzanilla likewise question the
CAsapplication of the principle of compensation. To
them, compensation cannot take place in this case
because (1) the parties are not principal creditors
of each other; (2) the P216,000.00 rental deposit
cannot be considered as debt; and (3) the said
amount has not yet been liquidated.

Here, there is no issue with respect to demand.

What is in question is the presence of a cause of
action. As mentioned above, courts, in order to
ascertain whether there is cause of action for
unlawful detainer, must inquire into (a) the
existence of the lease contract and, (b) the
violation of that lease by the lessee. Since in this
case the existence of a lease contract between the
parties is undisputed, the focus is on the supposed
violation of the lease, that is, Waterfields alleged
non-payment of rent. The basic question that thus
presents itself for determination is: Did Waterfields
fail to pay rent?The answer to this is crucial as from
the same will depend the existence ofthe cause of
action.However, since Waterfields denies that it
failed to pay rent and puts up the claim that it was
utilizing the rental deposit as rental payment, a
preliminary question emerges, viz: May the rental
deposit be utilized as rental payment?

Waterfields, for its part, continues to stress that

Mas letter of July 9, 1997 was merely in the latters
handwriting,unsigned by both parties, and
unsubscribed before a notary public. Being so, it
could not have the effect of amending Section 4 of
the original contract. This therefore negates the
spouses Manzanillas claim that Waterfields was in
default in its payment of the monthly rentals since
the rental deposit could very well be utilizedfor the
same per the said Section 4. Besides, sustaining
the rulings of the MTC and RTC will result in unjust
enrichment considering that Waterfields will be
constrained to hand over to the spouses Manzanilla
the subject property for which it had spent
almost P10,000,000.00 in improvements.
Waterfields surmises that the CA must have seen
this inequitable situation such that itreversed the
rulings of the trial courts. Further, it concurs with
the CA when itapplied the principle of
compensation.

Accordingly, the MTC in resolving the case first

determined if the July 9, 1997 letter operates as an
amendment to the original contract. Finding in the
affirmative, it declared that the rental deposit
cannot be utilized as payment for the rentals in
view of the saidamendment. As things thusstood,
the rental for the months of December 1997 to May
1998, as statedin the Complaint, remained unpaid.
Clearly, there was failure on the part of Waterfields
to pay rent and, consequently, it committed a
violation of the lease. It is this violation which gave
rise to a cause of action for unlawful detainer
against Waterfields as well as to the right of the
spouses Manzanilla to consider the contract

Our Ruling
There is merit in the Petition.
The CA has confused itself in resolving the basic
issue involved in this case.

55

terminated. And as the two requisites of an

unlawful detainer suit are obtaining in this case,
i.e.,cause of action and demand, the MTC
ultimatelysustained the spouses Manzanillas
Complaint. Finding this in order, the RTC affirmed in
totothe MTCs Decision.

Upon coming up with ananswer to this, the CA

should have stopped there since at that point, it
can already conclude whether there exists a cause
of action for unlawful detainer, which as mentioned
is the only contentious issue involved in this case.
The problem, however, is that the CA acted on its
mistaken notion as to when a cause of action
arises. It did not base its determination of the
existence of the cause of action from the fact
thatWaterfields failedto pay rents from December
1997 to May 1998. Toit, the cause of action in this
case only arose after the contract was terminated
and the rental deposit was found sufficient to cover
the unpaid rentals. This is erroneous since as
already discussed, it is the failure to pay rent which
gives rise to the cause of action. Prescinding from
this, the CAs acknowledgement that
Waterfieldsfailed to pay rent, as shown by its
declaration that the latter is the debtor of the
spouses Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid
rentals, is clearly inconsistent with the conclusion
that no cause of action for ejectment existsagainst
Waterfields.

Surprisingly, the CA in resolving the Petition for

Review before it, veered from the incisive approach
by which the trial courts determinedif there exists a
cause of action. Itgave credit to the spouses
Manzanillas allegation in the Complaint that they
terminated the contract of lease, viz: Prior to the
institution of the action, [the spouses Manzanilla]
terminated the Contract. Thus, par. 8 ofthe
complaint states that (i)n view of [Waterfields]
aforesaid violations, the lease contract of the
parties was terminated and/or rescinded per [the
spouses Manzanillas] final letter terminating (the)
subject lease contract.29
Without first finding for itself whether there is a
violation of the contract through non-payment of
rent as to justify the alleged termination, the CA
impliedly considered the contract validly
terminated and based on this premise applied the
following portion of Mas July 9, 1997 letter:

Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of

the contract due to nonpayment of rent.1wphi1 It
therefore follows thatthe cause of action for
unlawful detainer in this case must necessarily
arise beforethe termination of the contract and not
the other way around as what the CA supposed.
Indeed, in going beyond the termination of the
contract, the CA went a bit too far in its resolution
of this case.

The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall

be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid
utilities, if any, and other incidental expenses only
and applied at the terminationof the lease.
Accordingly, the CA ruled that the spouses
Manzanilla should have returned the whole amount
of the rental deposit to Waterfields upon the
termination of the contract there being no
allegation of unpaid utilities and expenses in the
Complaint. Not having done so, it considered the
spouses Manzanilla as debtors of Waterfields with
respect to the rental deposit, and Waterfields, in
turn, as debtor of the spouses Manzanilla anent the
unpaid rentals for the months of December 1997 to
July 1998.30 Applying the principle of compensation,
it then declared that the spouses Manzanilla
haveno cause of action against Waterfields since
the rental deposit was sufficient to cover the
unpaid rentals for the said months.

In view of the foregoing, the Court need not

belabor the parties arguments respecting the
principle of compensation, the same having been
anchored by the CA on its mistaken premise as
discussed above.
Be that as it may, this Court, in line with its
bounden-duty, shall in the following discussion put
things in their proper light.
Waterfields cannot now contradict its judicial
admission that the Contract of Lease was amended
on July 9, 1997; the doctrine of estoppel likewise
bars it from falsifying Mas July 9,1997 letter in this
litigation.

The Court, however, finds the CA disquisition

flawed.
First, the CA should not have immediately assumed
as true the spouses Manzanillas allegation that the
contract was already terminated. Aside from the
fact that this termination was specifically denied by
Waterfields in its Answer,31 it is settled that a
mereassumption cannot be made the basis of a
decision in a case or in granting relief. A judgment
must always be based on the courts factual
findings.32

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal
or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no suchadmission was made. "A
party may make judicial admissions in (a) the
pleadings, (b) during trial, either by verbal or
written manifestations orstipulations, or (c) in other
stages of the judicial proceeding."34

Second, it must be stressed that in this case, the

violation of the lease through non-payment of rent
is whatconstitutes the cause of action.33 Hence,
once the failure to pay rent is established, a cause
of action for unlawful detainer arises. The CA
should have therefore limited itself to the
determination of whether Waterfields failed to pay
rents for the months of December 1997 to May
1998 as complained of by the spouses Manzanilla.

Here, paragraph 5 of the Complaint alleges:

5. That, subsequently, the said Contract of Lease
was amended on 06 June 1994 and on 09 July
1997x x x.35

56

Whereas, paragraph 2 of Waterfields Answer

reads:

Manzanilla, by so doing, agreed to the amendment

as contained in the July 9, 1997 letter and was
supposed to enjoy the advantage of receiving
advanced rental payment and of applying the
rental deposit only against the unpaid utilities and
incidental expenses. Plainly, both parties expected
to benefit from the July 9, 1997 letter such that
their intention to give effect to the same, including
the part that amends the original contract which is
the one in issue in this case, is evident.

2. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Complaint are

admitted.36
Clearly, Waterfields admitted in its Answer the
truth of the material allegation that the Contract of
Lease was amended on July 9, 1997. "It is
wellsettled that judicialadmissions cannot be
contradicted by the admitter who is the party
[itself] and binds the person who makes the same,
and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake (as in this case), no amount of
rationalization can offset it."37

Waterfields claim of unjust enrichment is unworthy

of credence.
Waterfields avers that sustaining the trial courts
ruling would amount to unjust enrichment since it
would be constrained to hand over to the spouses
Manzanilla, even before the expiration of the lease,
the subject premises for which it had already spent
substantial amounts in terms of improvements.

Moreover, "[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel, an

admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannotbe denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. A
party may not go back on his own acts and
representationsto the prejudice of the other party
who relied upon them. In the law of evidence,
whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act,
or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing [to be] true,
and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or
omission,be permitted to falsify it."38

"The principle of unjust enrichment requires two

conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a
valid basis or justification,and (2) that such benefit
is derived at the expense of another."40 It does not,
however, apply in this case since any benefit that
the spouses Manzanilla may obtain from the
subject premises cannot be said to be without any
valid basis or justification. It is well to remind
Waterfields that they violated the contract of lease
and that they failed to vacate the premises upon
demand. Hence, the spouses Manzanilla are
justified in recovering the physical possession
thereof and consequently, in making use of the
property. Besides, in violating the lease by failing to
pay the rent, Waterfields took the risk of losing the
improvements it introduced thereon in favor of the
spouses Manzanilla. This is because despite the
fact that the lease contract provides that in case of
termination of the lease agreement all permanent
improvements and structures found in the subject
premises shall belong to the lessors,41 it still
violated the lease.

In view of these, any effort on the part of

Waterfields to impugn the July 9, 1997 letter is
futile.
Even without the above-mentioned admission of
Waterfields, the contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of the parties reveal their intention to amend
the original Contract of Lease.
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "to
judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequentacts shall be
principally considered." "[I]n doing so, the courts
may consider the relations existing between the
parties and the purpose of the contract."39

All told, the Court sustains the RTC in affirming the

MTC's grant of the spouses Manzanilla's Complaint
for ejectment against Waterfields.

As aptly opined by the MTC, the intention of

Waterfields in coming up with the July 9, 1997
letter isto repress its violation of the contract since
at that time it was already in default in the
payment of rent since April 1997. Hence, aside
from promising to pay its rental arrears from April
1997to July 1997, Waterfields, in order to assuage
the spouses Manzanilla, likewise pledged to pay
rent in advance starting August 1997. More
significantly, it undertook to amend the original
contract by stating that the rental deposit shall be
used exclusively for payment of unpaid utilities and
incidental expenses. Clearly, Waterfields intended
to give the spouses Manzanilla extra advantage by
virtue of the said letteramendment. This is
considering that during those times, the said
spouses may at any time opt to enforce their right
to eject Waterfields from the premises since
Waterfields was then admittedly in default.
Obviously, Waterfields got what it wanted as it was
not ejected from the premises and instead, its
payment in arrears was accepted by the spouses
Manzanilla. On the other hand, the spouses

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated September 15, 2006 and Resolution
dated April 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 60010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated July 14, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No.
00-96228, which affinned the Decision dated May
7, 1999 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 160443-CV granting the
Complaint, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 202354

September 24, 2014

AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY,
CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY,
JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all
other persons claiming authority under
them, Respondents.

57

DECISION

year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled

that it has no jurisdiction over the case.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that
unlawful detainer was the proper remedy
considering that she merely tolerated respondents
stay in the premises after demand to vacate was
made upon them, and they had in fact entered into
an agreement and she was only forced to take
legal action when respondents reneged on their
promise to vacate the property after the lapse of
the period agreed upon.

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is

the Decision1 dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which
reversed the Decision2 dated August 22, 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City and affirmed the Decision3 dated
October 8, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang, Cavite, Branch 17 in
Civil Case No. 862.

In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in

her complaint, petitioner did not state that
respondents entered her property through stealth
and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful
possession and acceded to the request of
respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008
but respondents reneged on their promise to
vacate the property by that time. It held that the
suit is one for unlawful detainer because the
respondents unlawfully withheld the property from
petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for
one year.

The present controversy stemmed from a

complaint4 for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful
Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner
Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact,
Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named
respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her
household. Said respondents are the occupants of
a parcel of land with an area of seven hundred
sixty-nine (769) square meters, situated at
Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of
petitioner and issuedby Municipal Assessor
Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.

With the subsequent oral agreement between the

parties, the RTC ruled that respondents occupation
ofthe property without petitioners consent can be
converted to a contract, such agreement not being
prohibited by law nor contrary to morals or good
customs. Having satisfied the requisites for an
unlawful detainer action, the RTC found that
petitioners complaint was filed within the
prescribed one-year period counted from the time
the final demand to vacate was received by the
respondents on July 24, 2008.

The parties were ordered to proceed to the

Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to Section
2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus
the case was returned to the court.5
After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a
Decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

The falloof the Decision of the RTC states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is,

hereby, rendered in favor of defendants Victoria
Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond
and Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay and Myrlinda
Yalo, and all persons acting under them, and
against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias, represented by
her attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant
Complaint for ejectment with damages, Unlawful
Detainer is, hereby, DISMISSED.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of

the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo
dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the
defendants and all claiming under their rights to:
(1) vacate the subject property and surrender
possession and control over the same to the
plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos each as rentals or compensation for the use
thereof starting from July 2008 until the same is
paid in full, with interests thereon at twelve (12%)
percent per annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages;
(3) pay the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos, as exemplary damages; and (4) pay the sum
of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, as
attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.6
The MCTC held that the allegations of the
complaint failed to state the essential elements of
an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that
petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents
occupation of the subject property was
unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the
demand letter sent by petitioners counsel that
respondents entered the property through stealth
and strategy, and in petitioners own "Sinumpaang
Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for
forcible entry which should have been filed within
one year from the discovery of the alleged entry.
Since petitioner was deprived of the physical
possession of her property through illegal means
and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one

SO ORDERED.7
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of
appeal within the reglementary period, the above
decision became final and executory.8

58

On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion

for issuance of a writ of execution. At the hearing
heldon January 4, 2012,respondents were given a
period of ten days within which to file their
comment. At the next scheduled hearing on
February 6, 2012,respondents counsel appeared
and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearancewith
Manifestation informing the court that on the same
day they had filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for injunction before the CA, copies ofwhich
were served to petitioner thru her counsel and to
the RTC. Nonetheless, in its Order dated February
6, 2012, the RTC stated that said manifestation was
"tantamount to [a] comment to the pending
motion" and thus gave petitioners counsel a
period of ten (10) days within which to fileher Reply
and thereafter the incident will be submitted for
resolution.9

the only property possessed by respondents who

are indigent, respondents lack of awareness of
unfavorable judgment rendered on appeal by the
RTC, substantive merits of the case insofar as the
jurisdictional requirements in a suit for unlawful
detainer, lack of showing that resortto certiorari
petition was frivolous and dilatory, and there being
no prejudice caused to the other party.
After a thorough review of the records and the
parties submissions, we find neither reversible
error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by
the CA.
The invariable rule is that what determines the
nature of the action, as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the
complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which
Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy,
and must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. 13 Such
remedy is either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical
possession of his land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In
illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his
right thereto under any contract, express or
implied.14

On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the assailed Order dated August 22, 2011 rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial
Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 8, 2010
rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Branch 17 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10

The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in

petitioners complaint make out a case for forcible
entry but not for unlawful detainer.

The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no

jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive
period for filing an action for forcible entry has
lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into
one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year
period to file her action from the time of her
demand for respondents to vacate the property.

In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a

complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by toleranceof
the plaintiff;

Further, the CA said that while petitioner has

shown that she is the lawful possessor of the
subject property,she availed of the wrong remedy
to recover possession but nevertheless may still
file an accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria
with the proper regional trial court.

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal

upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination ofthe latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

Petitioner contends that the CA erred and

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the
judgment of the RTC which has long become final
and executory. She argues that the suspension of
the strictadherence to procedural rules cannot be
justified by unsupported allegationsof the
respondents as to supposed non-receipt of
documents concerning this case.

(4) within one year from the last demand on

defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.16
In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:
3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land
situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with
an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769)
SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor
of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is
hereto attached as Annex "B";

On their part, respondents maintain that they were

not aware of the proceedings before the RTC and
were not furnished a copy of the said courts
adverse decision. They also stress that resort to
certiorari was proper and the suspension of
procedural rules was justified by compelling
circumstances such as the imminentdestruction of

59

4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control

over the subject property. She had it planted to
Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However,
sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have entered the subject property and
occupied the same;

But even where possession preceding the suit is by

tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be
made.
If right at the incipiencydefendants possession was
with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt that the
latter may require him to vacate the premises and
sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of
Rule 70, within one year from the date of the
demand to vacate.

5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they

leave the premises. The defendants requested for
time toleave and she acceded to said request. The
defendants committed to vacate the subject
property by the end of May, 2008;

xxxx

6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants

unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject premises
prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a
lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL
DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay
reasonable compensation for their illegal use and
occupancy of the subject property. A copy of the
DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as Annex "C";

A close assessment of the law and the concept of

the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present
right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons:First. Forcible entry
into the land is an open challenge tothe right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the
speedy redress in the inferior court - provided for
in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to bespeedy; and the possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in
the inferior court. Second,if a forcible entry action
in the inferior courtis allowed after the lapse of a
number of years, then the result may well be that
no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No
matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of
tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and
summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in
mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but
in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
(Italics and underscoring supplied)

7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon

Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st for possible
conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still
refused to vacate the subject property. Thus, the
said Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE
ACTION, as evidenced by a copy thereto attached
as Annex "D";
x x x x17
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of
action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe
possession by the respondents being initially legal
or tolerated by the petitioner and which became
illegal upon termination by the petitioner of
suchlawful possession. Petitioners insistence that
she actually tolerated respondents continued
occupation after her discovery of their entry into
the subject premises is incorrect. As she had
averred, she discovered respondentsoccupation in
May 2007. Such possession could not have been
legal from the start as it was without her
knowledge or consent, much less was it based on
any contract, express or implied. We stress that the
possession ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.18

It is the nature of defendants entry into the land

which determines the cause of action, whether it is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against
the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry
is legal but the possession thereafter becomes
illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that

where the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case. Thus:

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the

ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of
facts as brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as
these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is

essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the
start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy. As
explained in Sarona v. Villegas:

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of

the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
affected or how and when dispossession started,

60

the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor

an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against
respondent alleging that they were the owners of
the parcel of land through intestate succession
which was occupied by respondent by mere
tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased
mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not
petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper,
the court ruled:

allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of

unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this
light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had
no jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as
it failed to allege how and when entry was
effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that
"sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have enterep the subject property and
occupied the same", as correctly found by the
MCTC and CA, would show that respondents
entered the land and built their houses thereon
clandestinely and without petitioner's consent,
which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred
in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they

inherited the property registered under TCT No. C32110 from their parents; that possession thereof
by private respondent was by tolerance of their
mother, and after her death, by their own
tolerance; and that they had served written
demand on December, 1994, but that private
respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated
becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land
the moment he is required to leave. It is essential
in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that
plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. This is where
petitioners cause of action fails. The appellate
court, in full agreement with the MTC made the
conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their
mother and after her death, by them, was
unsubstantiated. x x x

Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely

erred in nullifying a final and executory judgment
of the RTC deserves scant consideration.
It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred
by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of
the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action.20 Indeed, a void judgment
for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect. Hence, it can never become final and any
writ of execution based on it is void.21

The evidence revealed that the possession of

defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint,
considering that defendant started to occupy the
subject lot and then built a house thereon without
the permission and consent of petitioners and
before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants
entry into the land was effected clandestinely,
without the knowledge of the owners,
consequently, it is categorized as possession by
stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in
Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court of
Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to
be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as
one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The Decision dated June 20, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 201286

July 18, 2014

INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA
L. BUAGAS, RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO,
SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA C. ARANAS, and
RUFINA C. RAMIREZ, Respondents.

xxxx
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint
do not contain any averment of fact that would
substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted
or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that "respondents without any color of
title whatsoever occupies the land in question by
building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof."
Nothing has been said on how respondents entry
was effected or how and when dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties. This failure of petitioners to

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the Resolutions dated 12 May

61

20112 and 9 March 20123 of the Court of Appeals

(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02784.

never been terminated by the parties. She added

that she had not abandoned her possession over
the land and has continuously paid the rent on a
month to month basis. Tagalog denied having been
notified of the respondents intention to use and
subdivide the land and further alleged that she
sought and was granted permission to repair her
dwelling structure and undertook the repair without
enlarging the area of her occupation. Tagalog
admitted being summoned by the Office of the
Municipal Engineer and Barangay Captain and she
alleged that both offices found that she had long
ceased the repair work. As a defense, Tagalog
prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that the action was for ejectment and unlawful
detainer which was beyond the jurisdiction of the
RTC.

The Facts
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 1595-A containing an area of
27,551 square meters situated in Buanoy,
Balamban, Cebu and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-57604.
On 5 February 2003, respondents Maria Lim Vda.
de Gonzalez, Gaudencia L. Buagas, Ranulfo Y. Lim,
Don L. Calvo, Susan C. Santiago, Dina C. Aranas,
and Rufina C. Ramirezfiled with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 29, a
Complaint4 for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order with Damages and Attorneys
Fees against petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog).
At the time of the complaint, the land was declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 0108-05410 with an assessed value of P57,960 and a
market value of P264,930.5

In a Decision6 dated 5 May 2008, the RTC decided

the case in favor of respondents. The RTC ruled
that, in the complaint, respondents prayed for the
recovery of possession of the leased property as
owners. Thus, the issue of ownership, which was
within the original jurisdiction of the court was
primordial and the prayer for eviction was merely
incidental there being no written contract of lease
between the parties. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states: WHEREFORE, finding the evidence
for the plaintiffs to have preponderantly and
greatly leaned in their favor, judgment is hereby
rendered against the defendant, Inocencia Tagalog
as follows:

In the Complaint, respondents stated that they

were the co-owners of the land. They alleged that
Tagalog occupied a portion of the land as lessee
and paid rent on a month to month basis by virtue
of a verbal contract. Tagalog built a house with
light materials on the land and when a strong
typhoon hit Cebu, Tagalogs house was damaged.
Thereafter, respondents alleged that Tagalog
discontinued payingthe rent and stopped
inhabiting the house.

(1) Ordering her to vacate the premises in

question, deliver the peaceful possession
thereof to plaintiffs who are its rightful
owners but wrongfully deprived of it, and
remove whatever structures are built
thereon at her own expense;

Sometime before December 2002, respondents

demanded that Tagalog remove the scattered
debris on the land, notified her of their intention to
use the land, and subdivide and develop it for their
personal use. Respondents informed Tagalog to
vacate the premises asserting that the verbal
contract of lease was deemed terminated upon the
expiration of the monthly contract. However,
Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she was
still a lessee.

(2) Directing her (defendant) to pay

plaintiffs the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages and
the further sum of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, as reasonable
attorneys fees; plus
(3) Costs of suit.

Sometime in January 2003, respondents alleged

that Tagalog constructed a two-storey residential
house made of cement, large steel bars, hollow
blocks, sand and gravel on the land. Respondents
informed the Office of the Municipal Engineer
ofBalamban, Cebu of Tagalogs act of constructing
a house on the land without their consent and
without the required building permit. Respondents
alleged that despite the warning given by the
Office of the Municipal Engineer to stop the
construction, Tagalog still continued withthe
construction. Respondents then referred the matter
to the Barangay Captain of Buanoy, Balamban,
Cebu but again, as respondents alleged, Tagalog
only ignored the advice given by the Barangay
Captain.

SO ORDERED.7
Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 30 May
2008. Tagalog then filed an appeal8 with the Court
of Appeals. In a Resolution9 dated 12 May 2011, the
CA dismissed the case for failure of Tagalog to
filethe required brief within the extended period
requested. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of appellants failure to file
the required brief within the extended period
requested, and pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the aboveentitled case is hereby DISMISSED.

In her Answer, Tagalog alleged thatthe lease

contract was still valid and subsisting and had

62

SO ORDERED.10

house was previously standing, and that

the verbal contract of lease was deemed
terminated upon the expiration of the
verbal monthly contract.

Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which

was denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution11 dated 9 March 2012.

9. Due to the termination of the verbal

monthly contract, plaintiffs demanded that
defendant remove the scattered debris and
notified defendant that they are already
intending to use the property and
subdivide and develop it for their personal
use.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue
The main issue for our resolution iswhether the
Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action.

10. However, defendant refused to vacate

the property and continued to possess the
same, and refused to remove the debris
scattered thereon despite demands for her
to do so. Instead, defendant wrongfully
claimed that she is still a lessee of the
portion previously occupied by her and that
she still intends to continue her possession.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner contends that the subject of the action is
for unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a first
level court or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Since
the case was filed with the RTC, a second level
court, the RTCs decision should be rendered void
for lack of jurisdiction over the case.

11. Instead, sometime in the first week of

January 2003, defendant brought cement,
large steel bars, hollow blocks, sand and
gravel and other construction materials
into the premises in question and started
the construction of a two (2) storey
residential house thereon.

The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined

by the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. In order to
determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction,
it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of the
complaint filed before it.

xxxx
14. Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief being
demanded which is for the defendant to
vacate the premisesin question and to
desist from constructing a residential house
thereon because plaintiffs have a right to
possess the property being the owners
thereof and that defendants possession of
the same is now unlawful and illegal due to
the termination of the verbal contract of
lease on a month to month basis.12

In the present case, the complaint was for recovery

of possession, preliminary mandatory injunction
with a prayer for temporary restraining order with
damages and attorneys fees. Respondents
complaint contained the following allegations:
xxxx
3. Plaintiffs (respondents) are amongthe
registered owners and are coowners of a
parcel of land, x x x.

Based on the allegations in respondents

complaint, it is clear that the case involves only the
issue of physical possession or unlawful detainer as
defined in Section 1,13 Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. In De Leon v. CA,14 we held that unlawful
detainer is the withholding by a person from
another of the possession of a land or building to
which the latter is entitled after the expiration or
termination of the formers right to hold possession
by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An
ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to recover
not possession de jure but physical possession only
or possession de facto, where dispossession has
lasted for not more than one year.

xxxx
6. For quite sometime, defendant
(petitioner) has been occupying a portion
of the above-described parcel of land, as
lessee thereof, where her house was being
built withlight materials and was paying
rentals over the same by virtue of a verbal
contractof lease on a month to month
basis.
7. The said house of the defendant was
damaged by a strong typhoon which hit
Cebu and was no longer inhabited by her
and her family for quite sometime.

The right to recover possession of the land based

on the expiration of the verbal monthly contract of
lease is governed by Article 168715 of the Civil
Code. Since the lease is paid monthly under a
verbal contract of lease without a fixed period, the
lease period is from month to month. Respondents
demanded that Tagalog vacate the land sometime
before December 2002, after the termination ofthe

8. Since the destruction of the defendants

house, the latter was no longer paying
rentals as a consequen[ce] ofher
possession of the property where her

63

monthly verbal lease contract. They filed the

complaint with the RTC in February 2003. Since the
complaint was filed within one year from the
expiration of the right to hold possession, this case
is clearly an unlawful detainer suit within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. The conclusion would be
different ifthe action is for the recovery of the right
to possess and dispossession lasted for more than
one year which would justify resort to the remedy
of accion publiciana. Accion publiciana is the
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of the land
independently of the title and is filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the land. In such case, the RTC has
jurisdiction.16

vs.
MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(MAHA), Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify
the Decision1 dated October 19, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050. The CA had
affirmed the Decision3 dated January 10, 20064 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City,
Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 05-485 which reversed
the Decision5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Antipolo City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
104-00.

However, in this case, the unlawfulwithholding of

possession of the land before the filing of the
complaint with the RTC lasted only for more or less
three months.1wphi1 Also, neither of the parties
brought forth the issue of ownership which was the
reason given by the RTC for taking cognizance of
the action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and any
judgment, order or resolution issued without it is
void and cannot be given any effect.17 This rule
applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised
for the first time on appeal or even after final
judgment.18 In this case, Tagalog raised the issue of
jurisdiction in her Answer.

The case stemmed from a complaint6 for "Forcible

Entry/Unlawful Detainer" filed by respondent
Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA)
against AMARA W CIGELSALO Association (AMARA)
and its members. The complaint was raffled to the
MTCC of Antipolo City, Branch 1 and docketed as
Civil Case No. 104-00.
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a
certain parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2226037 with an area
of 9,936 square meters situated in Sitio Manalite,
Phase I, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City.8 Through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth,
petitioners entered the premises and constructed
their temporary houses and an office
building.9 Petitioners likewise even filed a civil case
to annul MAHAs title on September 2, 1992, but
said case was dismissed by the trial court. After
said dismissal, MAHA demanded that petitioners
vacate the land. Petitioners pleaded that they be
given one year within which to look for a place to
transfer, to which request MAHA acceded. The said
one-year period, however, was repeatedly
extended due to the benevolence of MAHAs
members. Later on, petitioners came up with a
proposal that they become members of MAHA so
they can be qualified to acquire portions of the
property by sale pursuant to the Community
Mortgage Program (CMP).10 MAHA again agreed
and tolerated petitioners possession, giving them
until December 1999 to comply with the
requirements to avail of the CMP benefits.
Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply with said
requirements. Thus, on August 9, 2000, MAHA sent
formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the
property. Upon the latters refusal to heed the
demand, MAHA filed the complaint for "Forcible
Entry/Unlawful Detainer."

Clearly, the RTC erred in not dismissing the case

before it.1wphi1 Under the Rules of Court, it is the
duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.19
In sum, since respondents' complaint should have
been filed with the MTC, the RTC seriously erred in
proceeding with the case. The proceedings before
a court without jurisdiction, including its decision,
are null and void. It then follows that the appeal
brought before the appellate court, as well as the
decisions or resolutions promulgated in accordance
with said appeal, is without force and effect.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Resolutions dated 12 May 2011 and 9
March 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 02784. We DISMISS Civil Case No. T-1059
without prejudice to the parties seeking relief in the
proper forum.
G.R. No. 182953

October 11, 2010

CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, JOSE DERAMA,

CATES RAMA, JOSIE MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO,
JESUS OLIQUINO, NORBERTO LOPEZ, RUBEN
ESPOSO, BERNARDO FLORESCA, MARINA
DIMATALO, ROBLE DIMANDAKO, RICARDO
PEA, EDUARDO ESPINO, ANTONIO
GALLEGOS, VICTOR SANDOVAL, FELICITAS
ABRANTES, MERCY CRUZ, ROSENDO ORGANO,
RICKY BARENO, ANITA TAKSAGON, JOSIE
RAMA and PABLO DIMANDAKO, Petitioners,

In their Answer with Counterclaims,11 petitioners

denied the said allegations and averred that they
are the owners of the subject lot, having been in
actual physical possession thereof for more than
thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into the
land. They claimed that as the years went by, they
established the AMARA and bought the subject

64

property from Julian Tallano. The property later

became known as the Tallano Estate and registered
under TCT No. 498. They likewise argued that the
allegations in the complaint do not confer
jurisdiction upon the court acting as an ejectment
court, and that the complaint was irregular and
defective because its caption states that it was for
"Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer." MAHA,
additionally, had no legal capacity to sue and was
guilty of forum shopping. Its officers were likewise
fictitious.

from June 1992 until the premises are

actually vacated.
SO ORDERED.16
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review
with the CA assailing the decision of the RTC. In a
Decision dated October 19, 2007, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. The CA held that while the
complaint in the beginning alleged facts which
make out a case for forcible entry, the rest of the
averments therein show that the cause of action
was actually for unlawful detainer. The CA noted
that the complaint alleged supervening events that
would show that what was initially forcible entry
was later tolerated by MAHA thereby converting its
cause of action into one for unlawful detainer.
Accordingly, the complaint was filed within the
required one-year period counted from the date of
last demand. The CA further held that the fact that
the complaint was captioned as both for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer does not render it
defective as the nature of the complaint is
determined by the allegations of the complaint.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,

On May 19, 2005, the MTCC of Antipolo City

rendered a decision dismissing the case for lack of
cause of action. The MTCC held that the complaint
filed was one of forcible entry, but MAHA failed to
establish the jurisdictional requirement of prior
physical possession in its complaint.12 Also, the trial
court held that MAHAs failure to initiate immediate
legal action after petitioners unlawfully entered its
property and its subsequent declaration of
benevolence upon the petitioners cannot be
construed as tolerance in accordance with law as
to justify the treatment of the case as one for
unlawful detainer.13
MAHA appealed the decision to the RTC. The RTC
rendered a Decision dated January 10, 2006,
reversing the decision of the MTCC. The RTC held
that the lower court erred in dismissing the case by
considering the complaint as one of forcible entry
which required prior physical possession. The RTC
found that MAHA was able to allege and prove by
preponderance of evidence that petitioners
occupation of the property was by mere
"tolerance." MAHA tolerated the occupation until all
those who wanted to acquire MAHAs rights of
ownership could comply with membership
obligations and dues.14 Petitioners, however, failed
to comply with said obligations within the given
period; thus, their occupation became illegal after
MAHA demanded that they vacate the
property.15 The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74
dated January 10, [2006] is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioners motion for reconsideration from the
said decision was denied in a Resolution dated May
21, 2008. Hence, petitioners are now before this
Court raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 74 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 05-485
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT [IN CITIES],
BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY THAT
DISMISS[ED] THE FORCIBLE
ENTRY/UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR
LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment

appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new judgment is rendered ordering the
defendants; their representatives and all persons
acting for and in their behalf; members of their
families; their lessees and sub-lessees; or other
people whose occupation of the premises are from
the authority of defendants, their representatives
or members of the defendants families; and other
transferees pendente lite:

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT RULED THAT THE COURT [A QUO]
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.

1) to vacate the subject premises;

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT RULED THAT THE COMPLAINT BOTH
CAPTIONED AS FORCIBLE ENTRY AND
UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS NOT DEFECTIVE.

2) to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff

the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P35,000.00) as for attorneys fee[s] and
the cost of suit; and,

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS

[HAVE] A SUPERIOR RIGHT OF POSSESSION
OVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.

3) to pay the plaintiff severally the sum of

ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per month

65

V. WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1,
ANTIPOLO CITY HAS JURISDICTION.

the beginning as he acquired possession by force,

intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a
case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for
recovery of possession from the defendant whose
possession of the property was inceptively lawful
by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right
thereunder.

VI. WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1,
ANTIPOLO CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER AN
EJECTMENT CASE BASED ON FORCIBLE
ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER.18

In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the

complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical
possession of the property in dispute until he was
deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the
means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth.20 In unlawful detainer, there
must be an allegation in the complaint of how the
possession of defendant started or continued, that
is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that
defendant holds possession of the land or building
"after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express
or implied."

Essentially, there are two principal issues for our

resolution: (1) whether or not the allegations in the
complaint are sufficient to make up a case of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer; and (2) whether
or not the CA was correct in affirming the RTCs
decision finding a case of unlawful detainer.
Petitioners assert that the jurisdictional
requirement of prior physical possession in actions
for forcible entry was not alleged with particularity
in the complaint, as it merely alleged that
respondent had been deprived of its possession
over the property. They also maintained that they
were not withholding possession of the property
upon the expiration or termination of their right to
possess because they never executed any
contract, express or implied, in favor of the
respondent. Hence, there was also no unlawful
detainer.

In the present case, a thorough perusal of the

complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly
constitute a case of unlawful detainer:
xxxx

We deny the petition.

3. Plaintiff is the registered owner of that
certain parcel of land involved in the
instant case covered by TCT No. 222603
containing an area of 9,936 sq.m. situated
in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Baranggay Sta.
Cruz, Antipolo City, which property was
place under community mortgage program
(CMP);

Well settled is the rule that what determines the

nature of the action as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the
complaint.19 In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases under
Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:

4. Other defendants in the instant case are

all member and officers of defendant
AMARA who, through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy and stealth entered into
the premises herein and constructed their
temporary houses and office building
respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from
using the premises thus, depriving the
same of its prior possession thereof;

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and

when.-- Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.

5. On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of

the cheapest sort defendants, in
conspiracy and collusion with each other,
defendants as representative of Heirs of
Antonio and Hermogenes Rodriquez, the
alleged owner of the property at bar, filed
civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff,
lodge before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, seeking to annul
plaintiff title;

There are two entirely distinct and different causes

of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a
case for forcible entry, which is an action to
recover possession of a property from the
defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from

6. Immediately upon final dismissal of such

groundless, baseless and malicious suit,
plaintiff demanded defendants to vacate
the premises, but the latter pleaded with
the former to be given a one (1) year

66

period within which to look for a place to

transfer, which period, upon pleas of
defendants, coupled with plaintiffs
benevolence was repeatedly extended by
said plaintiffs tolerance of occupancy
thereof, but under such terms and
conditions. Due to failure to comply with
their undertaking despite repeated
demands therefor plaintiffs sent a formal
demand letter upon defendants;

amount of P35,000.00 plus P3,500.00 per

court appearance;
x x x x21
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1)
initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became
illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latters right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession
of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from
the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.22

7. Upon receipt of the above-stated

demand, defendants propose to become
members of plaintiff, as qualification to
acquire portions of the property by sale
pursuant to the CMP, to which plaintiff
agreed and tolerated defendants
possession by giving the same a period
until the month of December 1999, to
comply with all the requirements prerequisite to the availing of the CMP benefits
but failed and despite repeated demands
therefor, thus, the filing of a complaint with
the Baranggay and the issuance of the
certificate to file action dated February 8,
2000;

Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA

acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners
stay and gave them the option to acquire portions
of the property by becoming members of MAHA.
Petitioners continued stay on the premises was
subject to the condition that they shall comply with
the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they
failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right
to demand for them to vacate the property as their
right of possession had already expired or had
been terminated. The moment MAHA required
petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants
illegally occupying the land.23 Well settled is the
rule that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against
him.24 Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in
favor of MAHA.

8. As time is of the essence, and the fact

that the defendants are mere intruders or
usurpers who have no possessory right
whatsoever over the land illegally occupied
by them, trifling technicalities that would
tend to defeat the speedy administration of
justice formal demand is not necessary
thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A. G.R. No.
24910 R Feb. 7, 1964) however, to afford a
sufficient period of time within which to
vacate the premises peacefully another
oral and formal demands were made upon
the same to that effect, and demolish the
temporary office and houses they
constructed on plaintiffs property and
instead defendants again, as
representative to alleged "Estate of Julian
Tallano" filed a complaint for ejectment
against plaintiffs former President, Hon.
Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as
civil case no. 4119, lodged, before branch
11 of this Honorable court, defendants
obstinately refused to peacefully turn over
the property they intruded upon in fact
they even dared plaintiff to file a case
against them boasting that nobody can
order them to vacate the premises;

As to petitioners argument that MAHAs title is

void for having been secured fraudulently, we find
that such issue was improperly raised. In an
unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution
is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the parties.25 Since the only issue involved is
the physical or material possession of the
premises, that is possession de facto and not
possession de jure, the question of ownership must
be threshed out in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution
dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 93050 are hereby AFFIRMED.

9. Defendants letter dated August 9, 2000,

acknowledged actual receipt of plaintiffs
two (2) formal demands letters. Thus, "the
issuance of Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman" dated September 25, 2000;

With costs against petitioners.

10. As a result thereof, plaintiff was

compelled to engage the services of the
undersigned counsel in order to
immediately institute the instant suit for
which services plaintiff agreed to pay the

G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011]

SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS.
OSCAR C. FARRALES AND DAISY C. FARRALESVILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS.

67

decided to lease portions of the property to help

pay the loan. Daisy managed the operation of the
boarding house.[12] To bolster their claim, Oscar and
Daisy presented copies of rental receipts [13] going
back from 2001 to 2003. They would not have been
able to lease the rooms unless they were in
possession.[14]

DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when establishing
the jurisdiction of the court over an action for
forcible entry, for plaintiff to allege in his complaint
prior physical possession of the property and b) the
need for plaintiff to prove as well the fact of such
prior physical possession.

Further, Oscar and Daisy asked the MeTC to

dismiss the action on the ground of failure of Abad
to show that he and his wife enjoyed prior physical
possession of the property, an essential requisite in
forcible entry cases. Abad's allegation that he and
his wife immediately leased the property after they
bought it was proof that they were never in
possession of it for any length of time.[15]

The Facts and the Case

Petitioner Servillano Abad claims that on August 6,
2002 he and his wife, Dr. Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad,
bought a 428-square meter registered property on
7 Administration St., GSIS Village, Project 8,
Quezon City,[1] from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis
Farrales. The latter were the wife and sons,
respectively, of the late brother of respondents
Oscar Farrales (Oscar) and Daisy FarralesVillamayor (Daisy).[2] Teresita operated a boarding
house on the property.[3]

On March 30, 2005 the MeTC rendered a

decision[16] in favor of Abad, stating that Oscar and
Daisy could not acquire ownership of the property
since it was registered. And, as owner, Abad was
entitled to possession.
Disagreeing with the MeTC, Oscar and Daisy went
up to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
In a decision17 dated October 26, 2005, the RTC
affirmed the decision of the MeTC in its totality. It
held that Oscar and Daisy could no longer impugn
the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the action since
they raised the ground of Abad's failure to allege
prior physical possession in his complaint for the
first time on appeal. Besides, said the RTC, since
the complaint alleged that Servillano owned the
property, it may be presumed that he also had
prior possession of it. No evidence to the contrary
having been presented, the presumption stood.

Because the Abads did not consider running the

boarding house themselves, they agreed to lease
the property back to Teresita for P30,000.00 a
month so she could continue with her business.
[4]
But, although the lease had a good start, Teresita
suddenly abandoned the boarding house,[5] forcing
the Abads to take over by engaging the services of
Bencio Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the
boarding house business.[6]
On December 7, 2002, Dr. Abad went to the
boarding house to have certain damage to some
toilets repaired. While she was attending to the
matter, she also hired house painters to give the
boarding house fresh coat of paint.[7] On December
8, 2002 Oscar and Daisy came, accompanied by
two men, and forcibly took possession of the
boarding house. Frightened, the painters called the
Abads who immediately sought police help. The
Abads were later appeased, however, when they
learned that the intruders left the place.

Abad moved for immediate execution[18] and partial

reconsideration[19] of the decision with respect to
his claim for attorney's fees, exemplary damages,
and reasonable rents. For their part, Oscar and
Daisy sought reconsideration[20] of the RTC decision
and moved to strike out Abad's motions.[21] On
December 1, 2005 the RTC issued an Order,
[22]
granting Abad's motion for immediate execution
that would place him in possession and ordering
the immediate release to him of the P390,000.00
supersedeas bond that Oscar and Daisy posted in
the case. Further, the RTC partially reconsidered
its decision by awarding attorney's fees of
P20,000.00 to Abad. Oscar and Daisy moved for
the reconsideration of this order. [23] In an Order
dated December 9, 2005, the RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Oscar and Daisy
of its October 26, 2005 Decision on the ground of
non-compliance with Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.

Two days later or on December 10, 2002, the day

the Abads left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy forcibly
entered and took possession of the property once
again. Because of this, on March 10, 2003
petitioner Servillano Abad (Abad) filed a
complaint[8] for forcible entry against the two
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City.[9]
Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they
forcibly seized the place. They claimed ownership
of it by inheritance. They also claimed that they
had been in possession of the same from the time
of their birth.[10] That Oscar had been residing on
the property since 1967 as attested to by a March
31, 2003 certification issued by Barangay Bahay
Toro.[11]

Undaunted, Oscar and Daisy filed a petition for

review[24] with the Court of Appeals (CA). On March
8, 2007 the CA rendered a decision,[25] annulling
the decisions and orders of both the MeTC and the
RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA
pointed out that Abad merely alleged in his
complaint that he leased the property to Teresita
after he and his wife bought the same and that,
thereafter, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the
same. Since Abad did not make the jurisdictional
averment of prior physical possession, the MeTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over his action. Further,
Oscar and Daisy ably proved actual possession
from 1967 through the barangay certification.

While the defendants admitted that Daisy herself

ceased to reside on the property as early as 1986,
they pointed out that she did not effectively give
up her possession. Oscar and Daisy further
claimed that when their parents were still alive, the
latter mortgaged the property to a bank to secure
a loan. After their mother passed away, they

68

Since the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case,

all the proceedings in the case were void.[26]

Of course, Abad pointed out that the cited receipts

covered rents in a place called "D's Condominium"
in Sampaloc, Manila, and were only made to
appear through handwritten notations that they
were issued for rooms in the property subject of
the suit.[35] But a close examination of the receipts
shows that "D's Condominium" was just the name
that Daisy employed in her business of renting
rooms. The receipts did not necessarily describe
another place. Indeed, they provided blank spaces
for describing as the subject of rent the property
subject of this case. And, except for Abad's bare
claim that Teresita and his sons had long been in
possession before they sold it to him and his wife,
he offered no evidence to show that this was in fact
the case.

Abad moved for reconsideration but the CA denied

the same,[27] hence, in the present petition for
review.[28]
Questions Presented
The case presents the following questions:
1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently alleged in his
complaint the jurisdictional fact of prior physical
possession of the disputed property to vest the
MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and
2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad
sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior physical
possession of the property in question.

Abad assails as irregularly issued the barangay

certification that Oscar had been residing on the
subject property since 1967. He claims that it could
have been issued as a mere favor to a friend, the
barangay chairman having been Oscar's childhood
playmate[36] But Abad has no proof of these
allegations. He has not overcome the presumption
that the barangay chairman performed his official
duty and acted regularly in issuing such
certification.[37]

The Court's Rulings

Two allegations are indispensable in actions for
forcible entry to enable first level courts to acquire
jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiff had
prior physical possession of the property;
and,second, that the defendant deprived him of
such possession by means of force, intimidation,
threats, strategy, or stealth.[29]

Finally, Abad argued that with the title to the

property in his name, he has in his favor the right
to the actual, physical, exclusive, continuous, and
peaceful possession of the same. He pointed out
that his possession de facto began from the time of
the signing and notarization of the deed of
absolute sale, becoming de jure once the title was
issued in his name.[38]

There is no question that Abad made an allegation

in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy forcibly
entered the subject property. The only issue is with
respect to his allegation, citing such property as
one "of which they have complete physical and
material possession of the same until deprived
thereof." Abad argues that this substantially
alleges plaintiffs prior physical possession of the
property before the dispossession, sufficient to
confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action. The
Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is
not required to use in his allegations the exact
terminology employed by the rules. It is enough
that the facts set up in the complaint show that
dispossession took place under the required
conditions.[30]

It is of course true that a property owner has the

right to exercise the attributes of ownership, one of
which is the right to possess the property. But Abad
is missing the point. He is referring to possession
flowing from ownership which is not in issue in this
case. Possession in forcible entry cases means
nothing more than physical possession or
possession de facto, not legal possession in the
sense contemplated in civil law. Only prior physical
possession, not title, is the issue.[9]

It is of course not enough that the allegations of

the complaint make out a case for forcible entry.
The plaintiff must also be able to prove his
allegations. He has to prove that he had prior
physical possession[31] for this gives him the
security that entitles him to remain in the property
until a person with a better right lawfully ejects
him.[32]

For these reasons, the Court finds that Servillano

utterly failed to prove prior physical possession in
his favor. The absence of prior physical possession
by the plaintiff in a forcible entry warrants the
dismissal of the complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for
review of petitioner Servillano E. Abad
andAFFIRMS in their entirety the decision dated
March 8, 2007 and resolution dated June 19, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92617.
G.R. No. 178159
March 2, 2011

Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical

possession of the property after buying the same
since they immediately rented it to Teresita who
had already been using the property as a boarding
house. Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita
was an act of ownership that amounted to their
acquiring full physical possession of the same. [33]

SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA

DIONISIO, Petitioner,
vs.
WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.

But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita

began only in September 2002.[34] Oscar and Daisy,
on the other hand, have proved that they had been
renting spaces in the property as early as 2001 as
evidenced by receipts that they issued to their
lessees. This was long before they supposedly
entered the property, using force, in 2002.

DECISION
ABAD, J.:

69

The case is about a) amendments in the complaint

that do not alter the cause of action and b) the
effect in an unlawful detainer action of the
tolerated possessors assignment of his possession
to the defendant.

dismissal of the Dionisios action. The CA held that,

by amending their complaint, the Dionisios
effectively changed their cause of action from
unlawful detainer to recovery of possession which
fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC. Further,
since the amendment introduced a new cause of
action, its filing on August 5, 2003 marked the
passage of the one year limit from demand
required in ejectment suits. More, since jurisdiction
over actions for possession depended on the
assessed value of the property and since such
assessed value was not alleged, the CA cannot
determine what court has jurisdiction over the
action.

The Facts and the Case

Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands in
San Rafael, Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San
Mateo (Romualdo) cultivated. Upon Romualdos
death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruzs permission
to stay on the property provided she would vacate
it upon demand.

The Issues Presented

In September 1989 spouses Vicente and Anita

Dionisio (the Dionisios) bought the property from
Cruz.1 In April 2002, the Dionisios found out that
Emiliana had left the property and that it was
already Wilfredo Linsangan (Wilfredo) who
occupied it under the strength of a "Kasunduan ng
Bilihan ng Karapatan"2 dated April 7, 1977.

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the Dionisios
amendment of their complaint effectively
changed their cause of action from one of
ejectment to one of recovery of possession;
and

The Dionisios wrote Wilfredo on April 22, 2002,

demanding that he vacate the land but the latter
declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction
suit3 against him before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Rafael, Bulacan. Wilfredo filed an
answer with counterclaims in which he declared
that he had been a tenant of the land as early as
1977.

2. Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction

over the action before it.
The Rulings of the Court
One. An amended complaint that changes the
plaintiffs cause of action is technically a new
complaint. Consequently, the action is deemed
filed on the date of the filing of such amended
pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original
version. Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its
run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended
pleading. The Court acknowledges, however, that
an amendment which does not alter the cause of
action but merely supplements or amplifies the
facts previously alleged, does not affect the
reckoning date of filing based on the original
complaint. The cause of action, unchanged, is not
barred by the statute of limitations that expired
after the filing of the original complaint.7

At the pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to

amend their complaint. Despite initial misgivings
over the amended complaint, Wilfredo asked for
time to respond to it. The Dionisios filed their
amended complaint on August 5, 2003; Wilfredo
maintained his original answer.
The MTC issued a pre-trial order4 specifying the
issues. For the plaintiffs: (1) whether or not the
defendant can be ejected from the property and (2)
whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable rent for the use of the property,
damages, and attorneys fees. For the defendant:
(1) whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction to try
this case; (2) whether or not the defendant can be
ejected from the questioned property; and (3)
whether or not the defendant is entitled to
damages and attorneys fees.

Here, the original complaint alleges that the

Dionisios bought the land from Cruz on September
30, 1989; that Romualdo used to be the lands
tenant; that when he died, the Dionisios allowed
his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that
she would leave the land upon demand; that in
April 2002 the Dionisios discovered on visit to the
land that Emiliana had left it and that Wilfredo now
occupied it under a claim that he bought the right
to stay from Emiliana under a "Kasunduan ng
Bilihan ng Karapatan;" that the Dionisios did not
know of and gave no consent to this sale which had
not been annotated on their title; that the Dionisios
verbally told Wilfredo to leave the property by April
31, 2002; that their lawyer reiterated such demand
in writing on April 22, 2002; that Wilfredo did not
heed the demand; that the Dionisios wanted to get
possession so they could till the land and demolish
Wilfredos house on it; that Wilfredo did not give
the Dionisios just share in the harvest; and that

On May 3, 2004 the MTC rendered judgment,

ordering Wilfredo to vacate the land and remove
his house from it. Further, the MTC ordered
Wilfredo to pay the Dionisios P3,000.00 a month as
reasonable compensation for the use of the land
and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the
cost of suit.
On appeal,5 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC decision,
holding that the case was one for forcible entry. On
review,6 however, the Court of Appeals (CA)
rendered judgment on July 6, 2006, reversing the
decisions of the courts below, and ordering the

70

the Dionisios were compelled to get the services of

counsel for P100,000.00.

such possession became illegal upon plaintiffs

notice to defendant, terminating the latters right
of possession; (3) still, the defendant remains in
possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment
of his property; and (4) within a year from
plaintiffs last demand that defendant vacate the
property, the plaintiff files a complaint for
defendants ejectment.12 If the defendant had
possession of the land upon mere tolerance of the
owner, such tolerance must be present at the
beginning of defendants possession.13

The amended complaint has essentially identical

allegations. The only new ones are that the
Dionisios allowed Emiliana, Romualdos widow to
stay "out of their kindness, tolerance, and
generosity;" that they went to the land in April
2002, after deciding to occupy it, to tell Emiliana of
their plan; that Wilfredo cannot deny that Cruz was
the previous registered owner and that he sold the
land to the Dionisios; and that a person occupying
anothers land by the latters tolerance or
permission, without contract, is bound by an
implied promise to leave upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy.

Here, based on the allegations of the amended

complaint, the Dionisios allowed Emiliana, tenant
Romualdos widow, to stay on the land for the
meantime and leave when asked to do so. But,
without the knowledge or consent of the Dionisios,
she sold her "right of tenancy" to Wilfredo. When
the Dionisios visited the land in April 2002 and
found Wilfredo there, they demanded that he leave
the land. They did so in writing on April 22, 2002
but he refused to leave. The Dionisios filed their
eviction suit within the year.

To determine if an amendment introduces a

different cause of action, the test is whether such
amendment now requires the defendant to answer
for a liability or obligation which is completely
different from that stated in the original
complaint.8 Here, both the original and the
amended complaint required Wilfredo to defend his
possession based on the allegation that he had
stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of the
owners mere tolerance and that the latter had
demanded that he leave. Indeed, Wilfredo did not
find the need to file a new answer.

It is pointed out that the original complaint did not

allege that the Dionisios "tolerated" Emilianas
possession of the land after her husband died,
much less did it allege that they "tolerated"
Wilfredos possession after he took over from
Emiliana. But the rules do not require the plaintiff
in an eviction suit to use the exact language of
such rules. The Dionisios alleged that Romualdo
used to be the lands tenant and that when he
died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to
stay under a promise that she would leave upon
demand. These allegations clearly imply the
Dionisios "tolerance" of her stay meantime that
they did not yet need the land.

Two. Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no

jurisdiction to hear and decide the case since it
involved tenancy relation which comes under the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.9 But the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the
complaint.10 Besides, the records show that
Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he
was a tenant of the land. The MTC records show
that aside from the assertion that he is a tenant, he
did not present any evidence to prove the same. To
consider evidence presented only during appeal is
offensive to the idea of fair play.

As for Wilfredo, it is clear from the allegations of

the complaint that Emiliana assigned to him her
right to occupy the property. In fact that
assignment was in writing. Consequently, his claim
to the land was based on the Dionisios "tolerance"
of the possession of Emiliana and, impliedly, of all
persons claiming right under her.

The remaining question is the nature of the action

based on the allegations of the complaint. The RTC
characterized it as an action for forcible entry,
Wilfredo having entered the property and taken
over from widow Emiliana on the sly. The problem
with this characterization is that the complaint
contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in
possession of the property before Wilfredo
occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of
eviction suit.11 Nowhere in the recitation of the
amended complaint did the Dionisios assert that
they were in prior possession of the land and were
ousted from such possession by Wilfredos unlawful
occupation of the property.

True, the "Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan"

under which Emiliana transferred her tenancy right
to Wilfredo appears to have been executed in
1977, years before Cruz sold the land to the
Dionisios, implying that Wilfredo had already been
in possession of the property before the sale. But
what is controlling in ascertaining the jurisdiction of
the court are the allegations of the complaint. The
Dionisios alleged in their complaint that they were
the ones who allowed Emiliana (and all persons
claiming right under her) to stay on the land
meantime that they did not need it. The MTC and
the RTC gave credence to the Dionisios version.
The Court will respect their judgment on a question
of fact.

Is the action one for unlawful detainer? An action is

for unlawful detainer if the complaint sufficiently
alleges the following: (1) initially, the defendant
has possession of property by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, however,

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition,

REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92643 dated July 6,

71

2006, and REINSTATES the Decision of the

Municipal Trial Court of San Rafael, Bulacan, in Civil
Case 1160-SRB-2003 dated May 3, 2004.

G.R. No. 176341

compel Manuel to fulfill his obligation by turning

over the documents necessary to effect the
registration and transfer of titles in its name of the
properties assigned to it by Manuel.
Meanwhile, Edgardo continued to actas the
administrator of Torres Building allegedly on behalf
of Torres-Pabalan. He then set up in October 1989 a
law office (law office) with Atty. Augustus Cesar
Azura (Augustus) in the 2 nd floor of the building.
Torres Building was thereafter declared by TorresPabalan for tax purposes.6

July 7, 2014

PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES

CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.

On March 6, 1991, the SEC rendered judgment in

favor of Tormil,7 and this was later affirmed by the
SEC en banc.8 Manuel appealed to the CA. During
the pendency thereof, Pro-Guard entered into an
agreement with Edgardo in March 1994 for the
rentof a unit in the 3rd floor of Torres Building. As
payment, Pro-Guard was to provide security
servicesto Torres-Pabalan. Subsequently, the
CA,9 and later this Court,10 upheld the ruling in the
SEC case such that it became final and executory
on December 12, 1997.11 By October 1998, not
only were the titles to the subject parcels of land
registered in Tormils name,12 but also the tax
declaration over the Torres Building.13

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals
only from the time the demand to vacate was
served upon it and not from the time it began
occupying the disputed premises, petitioner ProGuard Security Services Corporation (ProGuard)
seeks recourse to this Court.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the
September 6, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58867 which denied
the Petition for Review filed therewith by Pro-Guard
as one of the petitioners. Likewise assailed is the
CA's Janu'!l)' 23, 2007 Resolution3 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereto.

On November 5, 1998, Tormil sent letters 14 to

Edgardo and Augustus (for the law office) and ProGuard asking them to validate their
possession/enter into a lease contract with Tormil
and at the same time settle their past and current
rentals. Since these letters were ignored, Tormil, on
November 16, 1998 sent them separate demands
to vacate the premises and pay the monthly
rentalof P20,000.00 from the time of their
occupation thereof untilthe same are actually
turned over to Tormil.15 As these were unheeded,
Tormil asserting right of possession based on its
ownership of the Pasay properties, filed before the
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) separate
ejectment suits against Edgardo and Augustus, and
Pro-Guard16 which were raffled to Branch44. The
cases were later on consolidated. In its complaints,
Tormil stated that it deemed prudent to have the
ownership issue over the premises resolved first in
the SEC case before it filed the ejectment cases in
order to prevent complication. It thus averred that
the occupancy by defendants of units in Torres
Building pending resolution of the SEC Case was
out of tolerance.

Factual Antecedents
On July 24, 1984, Manuel A.Torres, Jr.,
(Manuel)assigned to respondent Tormil Realty and
Development Corporation (Tormil) three parcels of
land located in Pasay Cityand all the improvements
thereon in exchange for shares of stock in the said
corporation.4 Despite the assignment, however,
title to the real properties remained in Manuels
name as he neither registered the transaction in
the Registry of Deeds nor provided Tormil the
necessary documents to have the titles over the
properties transferred inits name. Later,Manuel
unilaterally revoked the transaction.
Subsequently, Manuel, together with two other
persons, one of whom is Edgardo Pabalan
(Edgardo), established Torres Pabalan Realty,
Incorporated (Torres-Pabalan). As part of his capital
contribution, Manuelassigned the same aforesaid
parcels of land to Torres-Pabalan.In the meantime,
construction of the Torres Building on the subject
real properties was completed in1985 and its units
rented out. Edgardo, who was also then the
General Manager and Administrator of Tormil, acted
as the building administrator and occupied the 2
nd floor. He later resigned from his position inTormil
in September 1986.

Edgardo and Augustus disputed Tormils ownership

of the parcels of land where the building stands
and asserted that Torres-Pabalan was the owner of
the same. It was also the onewho funded the
buildings construction. Unfortunately, its tax
declarations over the building were
surreptitiouslyand unlawfully cancelled on the sole
basis of the SEC Case. Pro-Guard, for its part,
claimed that it was paying rentals to the
owner,Torres-Pabalan, in the form of security
services provided to the latter. It likewise called
attention to the fact that it was no longer in the
premises as Tormil forcibly ousted ittherefrom.

In March 1987, Tormil filed a case before the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
docketed as SEC Case No. 31535 (SEC case) to

72

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

Pabalans ownership of the building and on its right

to possess it.

The MeTC adjudged that Tormil has proven its right

to possess the property. Said court brushed aside
the claim that Torres-Pabalan owns the building
since its SEC Certificate of Registration was already
cancelled, and that the construction of the building
was completed in July 1985 or prior to the time
said corporation was incorporated in September
1986. Finding the defendants occupancy of the
units as only upon Tormils tolerance, the MeTC
concluded that their possession became unlawful
when Tormil decided to assert its right of ownership
over the building after the ruling in the SEC case
was upheld with finality by this Court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA adjudged Tormil tohave sufficiently proven
its case for unlawful detainer. It held that based on
its Torrens titles over the subject parcels of land
and the tax declarations over the building thereon,
Tormil has the right to possess the disputed
properties. It debunked the claim of Edgardo,
Augustus and Pro-Guard that the tax declarations
in Tormils nameare invalid, ratiocinating that their
issuance by the CityAssessor are presumed to have
been regularly performed.

Thus, in its June 28, 1999 Decision,17 the MeTC

ordered Edgardo and Augustus to vacate the unit
they possessed, as well as topay attorneys fees
and costs. With respect to Pro-Guard, it adjudged:

Ultimately, the CA denied the petition and affirmed

the RTC Decision,22 viz:
WHEREFORE, PREMISESCONSIDERED, THE Petition
is DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The Decision dated 15 December
1999 and Order dated 02 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 in Civil Case
Nos. 99-0618 & 99-[0619] are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

2. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security

Services Corporation and all persons
claiming rights under [it] to vacate and
surrender possession of Unit M, 3rd Floor,
Torres Building, 157 Buendia Ext., Sen. Gil
Puyat Avenue, Pasay City;

SO ORDERED.23

xxxx

In asking for a reconsideration, one aspect which

Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard objected to was
the order for them to pay P20,000.00 monthly
rental and the reckoning point of payment. ProGuard, in its Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration,24 argued that the CA should
havemodified the RTC judgment by reckoning the
payment from the date of Tormils notice to vacate.

4. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security

Services Corp. to pay [Tormil] the fair and
reasonable rental of the premises [in] the
amount of P20,000.00 per month with legal
interest from June, 1995 until the premises
is fully vacated;18
Contending that Tormil has no right to possess the
building, the defendants appealed to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City and the same was
raffled to Branch 109 thereof. In the meantime,
Pro-Guard informed the MeTC that it had already
vacated the premises as early asMarch 20, 1999.19

The CA found no reason to reverse its

judgment,25 impelling Pro-Guard to elevate the
case to this Court.
Issue

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

WHETHER THE [CA] ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE

DECISION OF THE [METC] AND THE [RTC] ON THE
AWARD OF THE [METC] IN RECKONING THE DATEOF
PAYMENT OF RENTALS IN THE AMOUNT
OF P20,000.00 PER MONTH WITH LEGAL INTEREST
FROM JUNE 1995 UNTIL THE PREMISES IS FULLY
VACATED CONTRARY TO PREVAILING LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.26

In its Decision20 dated December 15,1999, the RTC

did not find merit in the appeal, viz:
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to several
decision[s] of the Supreme Court and the provision
of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court to the
effect [that] the occupancy and possession of the
subject premises by the defendants-appellants
became illegal when they failed and refused to
heed the demand letters of herein plaintiff-appellee
to vacate the same and surrender possession
peacefully, the Court finds no cogent reason to
reverse the decision of the trial court and hereby
affirms the same IN TOTO.

Parties Arguments
Pro-Guard stresses that the CA erred in affirming
the lower courts award of P20,000.00 monthly
rental reckoned from the time it occupied the unit.
It contends that it cannot be blamed if it relied on
the representations of TorresPabalan when it
entered into a lease contract with it, the latter
being then in possession of the building. Pro-Guard
maintains that in any case, it owes no unpaid
rentals to Tormil for the entire period of its stay in
the building out of Tormils tolerance. On the other

SO ORDERED.21
On appeal to the CA, Edgardo, Augustus and ProGuard reiterated their arguments on Torres-

73

hand, Tormil argues that Pro-Guards stay out of

tolerance does not bar it from claiming arrears
from the time the latter occupied a unit in the
building. It contends that the demand to vacate
was not for the purpose of counting the reckoning
period for payment of rental arrears, but only for
the purpose of counting the prescriptive period to
file a case for unlawful detainer. Besides, ProGuards rentalpayments to Torres-Pabalan were not
valid as the latter was not its
authorizedrepresentative. To it, Pro-Guard, fully
aware of the pending legal dispute between Tormil
and Torres-Pabalan, should have consigned the
rental payments.

With regard to the effects of withdrawal of

tolerance, it is settled that:
x x x A person who occupies the land ofanother at
the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against him. His status is analogous
to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease
has expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possessionis
to be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate.32

It would appear that Pro-Guard no longer impugns

the uniform rulings of the MeTC, RTC, and CA, on
the right of Tormil to possessthe subject premises.
The only question it brought before this Court is
when to reckon its rental payments.

Thus, in Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., 33 the lessor

ended its tolerance of the sublessees occupation
of the property and demanded that they vacate the
premises on March 29, 1995. We upheld the
ejectment of the sublessees and ordered them to
pay monthly rentals beginning April 1995 until they
vacate the premises. Indeed, it is inconsistent to
demand payment of rentals during the period of
tolerance.

Our Ruling
While indeed Tormil, as the victor inthe unlawful
detainer suit, is entitled to the fair rental value for
the use and occupation of the unit in the building,
such compensation should not be reckoned from
the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but
from the time of the demand to vacate. "In
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is
necessarily in prior lawful possession of the
property but his possession eventually becomes
unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right
to possess."27 In other words, the entry is legal but
the possession thereafter became illegal.
Additionally, the Rules of Court requires the filing of
such action within a year after the withholding of
possession,28 meaning that "if the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, [then] an
ejectment proceeding (in this case unlawful
detainer) is proper x x x."29 Here, from the moment
Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit in March 1994
up to November 15, 1998, the right ofPro-Guard to
possess the premises was not challenged. It was
only after Tormil prevailed over Manuel in its
ownership of the same that it terminated ProGuards right to possess the unit it was occupying
through a letter to vacate dated November 16,
1998. Hence, it is only from that point that Tormil is
considered to have withdrawn its tolerance of ProGuards occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guards
possession became unlawful at that same moment.
This is supported by the allegation in the complaint
for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not
because of non-payment of rentals, but because of
withdrawal oftolerance. Tolerance or "[t]oleration
isdefined as the act or practice ofpermitting or
enduring something not wholly approved
of,"30 while tolerated acts are "those which by
reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
the property allowshis neighbor or another person
to do on the property; they are generally those
particular services or benefits which ones property
can give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permitsthem out of
friendship or courtesy."31

Incidentally, Tormil mentioned that Pro-Guard is

obliged to consign the payment of rentals. One
legal cause for consignation is when two ot more
persons claim the same right to collect.34 Various
claimants to a debtor's payment must have the
appearance of a right to collect such that the
debtor would have a reasonable doubt, not based
on negligence, as to who is entitled to the
payment.35
Whether Pro-Guard was indeed aware of the legal
dispute then pending before the SEC and
subsequently before the courts is of no moment.
When the dispute regarding the validity ofManuel's
assignment to Tonnil of the realties was pending
before the SEC, Tormil did not claim to Pro-Guard
that it is the true owner of the premises. It neither
sought payment of rentals which it now claims ProGuard should have consigned during the pendency
of its suit against Manuel. As such, from the
viewpoint of Pro-Guard, the lease contract
remained to be then between it and Torres-Pabalan.
The latter was occupying and running the building,
as evidenced by several tax declarations in its
name which, while not conclusive proofs of
ownership, nevertheless, are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner.36 Moreover,
Edgardo, who claimed to act on behalf of
TorresPabalan, administered the premises. ProGuard is not permitted to deny the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them.37

74

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 58867 are MODIFIED in
that Pro-Guard is to pay for the fair and reasonable
rental of the premises in the amount of P20,000.00
per month with legal interest beginning November
16, 1998 up to the time that the premises are fully
vacated.

above thru plaintiffs' implied

tolerance, or permission but
without contract with herein
plaintiffs. From the dates of their
occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect
any single centavo from
defendants, nor the latter pay to
plaintiffs any rental for their
occupancy therein;

G.R. No. 127850 January 26, 1998

6. On June 18, 1984, plaintiffs
herein, except Virgilio Arcal, filed
an ejectment suit against
substantially all of defendants
herein with the Municipal Trial
Court of Tanza, Cavite, docketed as
Civil Case No. 285 covering the
subject parcel of land in dispute:

MARIA ARCAL, JOSEFINA ARCAL, MARCIANA

ARCAL, and VIRGILIO ARCAL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DANILO BUCAL, COSTAN
& LETTY RICAFRENTE, RENIE & CENY
RICAFRENTE, SANCHO and LANIE
RICAFRENTE, CORA GONEZ, SOLLY GONEZ,
ENIE and FLORIDA RICAFRENTE, CARMEN
TAMBOC, BOY AGUILAR, NORMING ARCAL,
NORA and ALEX BOCITA, ELVIE TAHIMIC,
ANCHANG ARGUSON, IDRENG and JULIA
ARGUSON, LIZA ARGUSON, ACION ARGUSON,
BALENG and FELY ARGUSON, FIDENG and
CILENG MURANIA, ROSIE and ALDO CALAGO,
ENGAY and SHIRLEY RICAFRENTE, NENITA and
NARSING AGUILAR, ODIE DOZA, NENENG and
RAMON LUNGCAY, TISAY and ABET DONES,
YOLLY and ED PAULINO, ERIC and JENNIFER
PAULINO, CHARLIE PANGANIBAN, DELIA and
PATRICIO BUEZA, ELLEN DUEZA, BERTING and
NORMA BUEZA, ALICE and PILO RICAFRENTE,
DELLY and FREDO NUNEZ, ANDRO and ELLEN
JIMENEZ, CRISELDA and GORIO CLARETE,
NENA VELASCO, DANNY CLARETE, ERLIN and
NONONG IBONG, CHITA and RESTIE REYES,
SONNY and DONG REYES, and WALLY and
DAISY REYES, respondents.

7. Meanwhile, on September 18,

[1984], 3 Lucio Arvisu the alleged
son of Gaudencio Arvisu and
Natalia Ricafrente Arvisu, and
substantially all defendants herein
filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Trece Martires, Cavite, a
civil case for "Annulment of Title,
with Reconveyance and Damages"
against Salud Arcal Arbolante,
Marcelina Arcal (deceased), Maria
Arcal, Josefina Arcal and Marciana
Arcal which was docketed as Civil
Case No. TM-59. Defendants
therein, plaintiffs herein, filed their
Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim. On May 28,
[1985], 4 the said complaint was
ordered to be dismissed by the trial
court for failure to prosecute. . . .
An appeal was made to the Court
of Appeals but in the resolution of
the latter Court promulgated on
November 28, 1986, said appeal
was considered abandoned and
dismissed for failure of appellants
to file their brief. . . .

KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 40824 dated November 15, 1996
and its Resolution dated January 13, 1997.

8. Dissatisfied therefrom, on March

10, 1987, Lucio Ricafrente Arvisu,
one of the plaintiffs in the
immediately cited Civil Case No.
TM-59, filed another case for
"Registration of Claim Under
Section 8, RA 26", entitled "Lucio R.
Arvisu vs. Marcelina Arcal
(deceased), Maria Arcal, Josefina
Arcal, Marciana Arcal, and the
Register of Deeds of Trece Martires
City", docketed as Civil Case No.
TM-146 before the Regional Trial
Court of Branch 23, Trece Martires
City. Private respondent therein
filed a Motion to Dismiss basically
on the ground of lack of cause of
action and res adjudicata. In the
Order of the trial court dated July
22, 1988, the complaint filed by

Petitioners as plaintiffs filed on August 31,

1995 a complaint for unlawful detainer
docketed as Civil Case No. 370 before the
Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite
against private respondents as defendants.
Subject of the complaint was a 21,435
square meter parcel of land designated as
Lot No. 780 of the Santa Cruz de Malabon
Estate Subdivision, Cavite and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26277 in the
names of Maria, Josefina, Marciana and
Marcelina 1 Arcal. 2
The complaint alleged, among others, that:
5. Defendants herein occupied the
subject parcel of land described

75

Lucio Arvisu was dismissed though

he thereafter filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. . . . ;

1. To vacate the property in

question which they are occupying;
2. To remove their residential
houses and improvement
introduce(d) therein and return the
possession of the lot to the
plaintiff(s);

9. With regard to the ejectment suit

filed by plaintiffs herein, except
Virgilio Arcal, with the Municipal
Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite, the
said court rendered a favorable
judgment in favor of plaintiffs
ordering defendants therein,
among others, to vacate the
property in question and remove
residential houses and
improvements introduced therein
and return the possession thereof
to plaintiffs. . . . Unfortunately, on
appeal with the RTC, Branch 23,
Trece Martires City, by defendants
therein, the foregoing decision was
reversed and set aside, and the
said complaint for ejectment was
dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of the proper action after the
prejudicial question in Civil Case
No. TM-146 is resolved in a fair and
adversary proceeding. Said
decision attained finality for failure
of plaintiffs' former counsel to
interpose an appeal. . . . ;

3. To pay the plaintiffs the sum of

P200.00 as monthly rental for the
use and occupying (sic) of the
property from the date of the
demand letter made by the
plaintiff(s);
4. To pay plaintiffs the sum of
P20,000.00 by way of attorney's
fees and P3,000.00 as litigation
expenses; and
5. Ordering the cost of suit. 5
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 23, affirmed in toto the
municipal trial court's decision.6
Private respondents filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals,
arguing inter alia that "the respondent trial
court erred in not dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction, the complaint being one
for recovery of right of possession." 7

10. Upon the other hand, the

decision in Civil Case No. TM- 146
which dismissed the petition of
Lucio Arvisu was sustained by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision
promulgated on October 28,
1994. . . ;

The appellate court, ruling in favor of

private respondents, granted the petition,
reversed and set aside the decision of the
trial court and dismissed Civil Case No.
370. 8

11. Several demands were made

by plaintiffs for defendants to
vacate the premises in question,
the last written demand was made
by plaintiffs' lawyer on July 23,
1995, but they proved futile as
they refused and failed, and still
refuse and fail to vacate the
premises, to the damage and
prejudice of plaintiffs . . . .

In considering that the complaint was not

one for unlawful detainer, adverting that
private respondents had previously filed
complaints questioning petitioners'
ownership of the land, the appellate court
made the following disquisitions:
In commencing this suit for
unlawful detainer, private
respondents are banking on their
allegation that they merely
tolerated petitioners to stay on the
premises in question, but which
tolerance they already withdrew on
July 23, 1995. However, the other
allegations and admissions of
private respondents in their
complaint would show that the
case is not one of unlawful detainer
as petitioners did not actually
occupy the subject property upon
the tolerance of private
respondents.

Private respondents failed to file their

answer within the reglementary period,
prompting petitioners to file a motion to
render judgment. In a Decision dated
October 26, 1995, the municipal trial court
held that petitioners are registered owners
of the property and as such they have the
right to enjoy possession thereof. The
dispositive position of the decision reads:
Wherefore, finding the allegations
of the plaintiffs to be with merits
(sic), judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs ordering all
the defendants . . . :

76

First. Herein private respondents,

as plaintiffs, filed on June 18, 1984
an ejectment suit against
substantially all of herein
petitioners, as defendants, also
before the MTC of Tanza and this
was docketed as Civil Case No.
285. In that case, it was the
position of private respondents that
for humanitarian consideration
they tolerated petitioners to
construct their respective houses
on the subject premises sometime
in 1974. However, this tolerance
was withdrawn sometime in 1984
when demands to vacate were
made on petitioners by private
respondents before the
commencement of Civil Case No.
285. Consequently, this present
action for unlawful detainer based
on the same theory of tolerance
has no leg to stand on as in fact
the supposed tolerance given by
private respondents in 1974 was,
as they themselves admit, already
withdrawn way back in 1984.

Reconveyance and Damages"

before the RTC of Trece Martires,
Branch 23, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. TM-59. Although that
case was later dismissed for failure
to prosecute, there is no question
that its institution constituted an
open challenge to the title of
private respondents over the
premises in dispute. In effect,
petitioners never really recognized
private respondents as owners
thereof. With this position of
petitioners which private
respondents became aware of with
the filing of Civil Case No. TM-59,
the former can hardly be
considered to have occupied the
subject premises by mere tolerance
of the latter.
Fourth. On March 10, 1987, Lucio R.
Arvisu again commenced a suit for
"Registration of Claim Under
Section 8, R.A. 26" also before the
RTC of Trece Martires City, Branch
23, docketed as Civil Case No. TM146. Albeit dismissed later, this
case also served as an opposition
to private respondents' title over
the subject property. Thus, like Civil
Case No. TM-59, Civil Case No. TM146 also destroys private
respondents' theory of tolerated
possession.

Second. The MTC of Tanza decided

Civil Case No. 285 in favor of
private respondents. This decision
was reversed however on appeal
by the RTC of Trece Martires,
Branch 23. The RTC's decision then
gained finality for failure of private
respondents to elevate the case to
the property appellate court.
Without passing upon the propriety
of the decisions of both the MTC
and RTC in Civil Case No. 285, the
admission by private respondents
in that case that they withdrew
sometime in 1984 the tolerance
they supposedly extended to
petitioners stands. That is,
inasmuch as private respondents
admit that they already made a
demand to vacate upon petitioners
in 1984, they are bound by this
demand. And since they pursued
this demand with the filing of Civil
Case No. 285, no tolerance can be
spoken of in this present case.
Thus, the written demand to vacate
of July 3, 1995 made by private
respondents on petitioners did not
terminate any right of the latter to
stay on the subject premises
supposedly founded on tolerance.

We are therefore convinced that

the allegations of private
respondents in their own complaint
do not sufficiently support an
action for unlawful detainer. True,
the records will show that they are
the registered owners of the
property in dispute. As such, they
have the preferential right to be
the possessors thereof. But for this
right to be enforced and respected,
they will have to avail of the proper
remedy provided for by law and the
rules. 9
Hence this petition, where petitioners
assign to the appellate court the following
error:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED FINDING THAT THE
COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF TANZA,
CAVITE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER SUIT, AND IN
DISMISSING THE SAME FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION. 10

Third. As further alleged and

admitted by private respondents in
their complaint, a certain Lucio R.
Arvisu and substantially all of
petitioners filed against them on
September 18, 1984 an action for
"Annulment of Title, with

We grant the petition.

77

The jurisdiction of the court, as well as the

nature of the action, are determined by the
averments in the complaint. 11 We examine
the allegations of the complaint filed by
petitioners before the municipal trial court.

necessarily bound by an implied promise

that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against him. The status
of the possessor is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has
expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such case, the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date
of the demand to vacate. 18

To give the court jurisdiction to effect the

ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on
the land, it is necessary that the complaint
should embody such a statement of facts
as brings the party clearly within the class
of cases for which the statutes provide a
remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must
show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony. 12

The filing of the first ejectment case, Civil

Case No. 285, in 1984 signified that
petitioners sought the ouster of private
respondents from possession of the
property. Proceedings in the case were
however suspended with the filing of Civil
Case No. TM-59 for "Annulment of Title with
Reconveyance and Damages" by Lucio
Arvisu and several of private
respondents. 19 Civil Case No. TM-59 was
eventually dismissed and the judgment of
dismissal attained finality. 20 The ejectment
case was later resolved in favor of
petitioners, but on appeal, the case was
dismissed on July 6, 1992 "without
prejudice to the filing of the proper action
after the prejudicial question in Civil Case
No. TM-146 [filed by Lucio Arvisu against
petitioners following the dismissal of Civil
Case No. TM-59] is resolved in a fair and
adversary proceeding." 21 Civil Case No.
TM-146 which also sought the annulment
of petitioners' title to the property, was
eventually resolved against private
respondents on October 28, 1994. 22

From a reading of the allegations of the

complaint quoted above, we find that the
action is one for unlawful detainer.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that
they are the registered owners of the
subject property. The cases filed by a
certain Lucio Arvisu and several of the
private respondents casting doubt on
petitioners' ownership of the property,
namely Civil Case No. TM-59 for
'Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance
and Damages' and Civil Case No. TM-146
for 'Registration of Claim Under Section 8,
R.A. No. 26,' were resolved with finality
adverse to private respondents. 13
Petitioners also alleged in the complaint
that the possession of the property by
private respondents was with petitioners'
tolerance, 14 and that they (petitioners) had
served written demands upon private
respondents, the latest demand being on
July 23, 1995, but that private respondents
refused to vacate the property. 15

Because of the pendency of the cases

involving ownership, the proceedings in the
first ejectment case were suspended.
Petitioners could not but await the outcome
of these cases and preserve the status
quo in the meantime these were pending.
As the Court has stated:

The appellate court, however, made the

conclusion that from the allegations in the
complaint, it can be gleaned that private
respondents "did not actually occupy the
subject property upon the tolerance of
[petitioners]", 16 as tolerance was
withdrawn sometime in 1984 when
demands to vacate were made on private
respondents prior to the commencement of
Civil Case No. 285; therefore, unlawful
detainer is not the proper remedy.

In giving recognition to the action

of forcible entry and detainer the
purpose of the law is to protect the
person who in fact has actual
possession; and in case of
controverted right, it requires the
parties to preserve the status
quo until one or the other of them
sees fit to invoke the decision of a
court of competent jurisdiction
upon the question of ownership. It
is obviously just that the person
who has first acquired possession
should remain in possession
pending this decision; and the
parties cannot be permitted
meanwhile to engage in a petty
warfare over the possession of the
property which is the subject of the
dispute. To permit this would be
highly dangerous to individual

We disagree with the appellate court.

The rule is that possession by tolerance is
lawful, but such possession becomes
unlawful upon demand to vacate made by
the owner and the possessor by tolerance
refuses to comply with such demand. 17 A
person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is

78

security and disturbing to social

order. Therefore, where a person
supposes himself to be the owner
of a piece of property and desires
to vindicate his ownership against
the party actually in possession, it
is incumbent upon him to institute
an action to this end in a court of
competent jurisdiction; and he
cannot be permitted, by invading
the property and excluding the
actual possessor, to place upon the
latter the burden of instituting an
action to try the property right. 23

ownership.' 30 Also, the issue of ownership

raised in a separate case, such as
an accion publiciana or an action for
quieting of title, 31 is not prejudicial to an
ejectment suit and does not abate the
ejectment case.
In Wilman Auto Supply Corporation, et
al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Narvasa,
enumerated the cases which should not be
regarded as prejudicial to an ejectment
suit:
1. Injunction suits instituted in the
RTC by defendants in ejectment
actions in the municipal trial courts
or other courts of the first level
(Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920
[1966] do not abate the latter, and
neither do proceedings on
consignation of rentals (Lim Si v.
Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue,
et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81
[1950].

The proceedings involving ownership of the

subject property took all of ten years.
Through all these ten years, petitioners,
giving due respect to the judicial process,
allowed the matter of ownership to be
threshed out, without creating any
disturbance whatsoever on private
respondents' possession.
The complaint alleges that after the
termination of the second case filed by
Lucio Arvisu in 1994, petitioners sent
written demands upon private
respondents, the last being on July 23,
1995. 24 The rule is that a complaint for
unlawful detainer must be filed within one
year from demand, demand being
jurisdictional. 25 This one-year period is
counted from the last
demand. 26 Petitioners' letters of demand
preceded the filing of the complaint with
the municipal trial court on August 31,
1995.

2. An "accion publiciana" does not

suspend an ejectment suit against
the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez
v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981].
3. A "writ of possession case"
where ownership is concededly the
principal issue before the Regional
Trial Court does not preclude nor
bar the execution of the judgment
in an unlawful detainer suit where
the only issue involved is the
material possession or
possession de facto of the premises
(heirs of F. Guballa, Sr., v. C.A., 168
SCRA 139 [1988].

An unlawful detainer suit involves solely

the issue of physical or material possession
over the property or possession de facto,
that is, who between the plaintiff and the
defendant has a better right to possess the
property in question. 27 Where, however,
the issue is who has the better and legal
right to possess or to whom possession de
jure pertains, accion publiciana is
proper. 28 In the case at bar, petitioners'
complaint for unlawful detainer was
confined to recovery of de facto or physical
possession of the property and was
resorted to after private respondents had
indubitably failed in their suits assailing
petitioners' right of ownership.

4. An action for quieting of title to

the property is not a bar to an
ejectment suit involving the same
property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria,
46 SCRA 139 [1972].
5. Suits for specific performance
with damages do not affect
ejectment actions (e.g., to compel
renewal of a lease contract)
(Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA
1184 [1966]; Pardo de Tavera v.
Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632 [1968];
Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153
[1987]; Commander Realty, Inc. v.
C.A., 161 SCRA 264 [1988];

Notably, inferior courts retain jurisdiction

over ejectment cases even if the defendant
raises the question of ownership and the
question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding provisionally the issue of
ownership. 29 'A contrary rule would pave
the way for the defendant to trifle with the
ejectment suit, which is summary in
nature, as he could easily defeat the same
through the simple expedient of asserting

6. An action for reformation of

instrument (e.g., from deed of
absolute sale to one of sale
with pacto de retro) does not
suspend an ejectment suit between

79

the same parties (Judith v.

Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975].

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 15, 1996 and Resolution
dated January 13, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40824 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment
dated October 26, 1995 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 370 and the
judgment dated March 5, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 23
affirming said disposition of the inferior
court are hereby REINSTATED.

7. An action for reconveyance of

property or "accion reivindicatoria"
also has no effect on ejectment
suits regarding the same property
(Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549
[1963]; Salinas v. Navarro, 126
SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. C.A., 133
SCRA 520 [1984]; Drilon v.
Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987];
Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412
[1987]; Philippine Feeds Milling Co.,
Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 174 SCRA
108, Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517
[1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment
of sale and reconveyance], 177
SCRA 604 [1989]; Demamay v.
C.A., 186 SCRA 608 [1990];
Leopoldo Sy v. C.A. et al.
[annulment of sale and
reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818,
Aug. 2, 1991).

G.R. No. 164277

October 8, 2014

FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

8. Neither do suits for annulment of

sale, or title, or document affecting
property operate to abate
ejectment actions respecting the
same property (Salinas v. Navarro
[annulment of deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage and/or to
declare the same an equitable
mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983];
Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale
and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987];
Caparros v. C.A. [annulment of
title], 170 SCRA 758 (1989); Dante
v. Sison [annulment of sale with
damages] 174 SCRA 517; Galgala
v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
[annulment of document], 177
SCRA 288 [1989]).

Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged

tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the
possession is deemed illegal from the beginning.
Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an
improper remedy. But the action cannot be
considered as one for forcible entry without any
allegation in the complaint that the entry of the
defendant was by means of force, intimidation,
threats, strategy or stealth.
Antecedents
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose
and Gloria, inherited from their father, the late
Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land registered in the
latter's name under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-188 of the Registry of Deeds in Cebu
City with an area of 15,790 square meters, more or
less.1 On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition
among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share,
measuring 600 square meters, to respondent Atty.
Daryll A. Amante (respondent), with the affected
portion being described in the deed of absolute
sale Eliseo executed in the following manner:

Here, the appellate court conceded that

petitioners are the registered owners of the
subject property with the preferential right
to possession as an attribute of ownership.
No other issue is involved in the case, as
the question of ownership of the subject
property had been judicially settled. Quite
simply, the only matter for consideration of
the court is the issue of possession de
facto.

A portion of a parcel of land located at the back of

the Pleasant Homes Subdivision and also at the
back of Don Bosco Seminary, Punta Princesa, Cebu
City, to be taken from my share of the whole lot;
the portion sold to Atty. Amante is only 600 square
meters which is the area near the boundary facing
the Pleasant Homes Subdivision, Cebu City.2
On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of
money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of his share
inthe property to the respondent, with their deed of
absolute sale stating that the sale was with the
approval of Eliseos siblings, and describing the
portion subject of the sale as:

80

That the portion covered under this transaction is

Specifically located right at the back of the
seminary facing Japer Memorial School and where
the fence and house of Atty. Amante is located.3

the disputed property to him inasmuch as at the

time of the sale, the parcel of land left by their
father, which included the disputed property, had
not yet been partitioned, rendering Eliseo a mere
co-owner of the undivided estate who had no right
to dispose of a definite portion thereof; that as a
co-owner, Eliseo effectively conveyed to the
respondent only the portion that would ultimately
be allotted to him once the property would be
subdivided; that because the disputed property
was adjudicated to the petitioner under the deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition, she was its
owner with the consequent right of possession; and
that, as such, she had the right to demand that the
respondent vacate the land.

On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria

executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide
their fathers estate (consisting of the
aforementioned parcel of land) among
themselves.4 Pursuant to the deed extrajudicial
partition, OCT No. O-188 was cancelled, and on July
12, 1994 the Register of Deeds issued
TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. 6555, TCT No.
6556, TCT No. 6557 and TCT No. 65585 to the
petitioner, Gloria, Jose, and Eliseo, respectively. The
partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by
Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the
petitioner instead of to Eliseo.6

The MTCC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises,
and on the basis thereof, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, ordering the defendant; to:

Due to the petitioners needing her portion that

was then occupied by the respondent, she
demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several
demands, the last of which was by the letter dated
November 4, 1994,7 the respondent refused to
vacate, prompting her to file against him on
February 14, 1995 a complaint for ejectment and
damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Cebu City (MTCC), docketed as Civil Case No. R34426.8She alleged therein that she was the
registered owner of the parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 6555, a portion of which was being
occupied by the respondent, who had constructed
a residential building thereon by the mere
tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her
siblings had inherited from their father had not yet
been subdivided, and was thus still co-owned by
them; and that the respondents occupation had
become illegal following his refusal to vacate
despite repeated demands.

1) vacate from the portion, presently

occupied by him and whereon his building
stands, of that parcel of land locatedin
Cebu City covered by TCT No. 6555 and
registered in the nameof the plaintiff; and
to remove and/or demolish the building
and all the structures that may have been
built on said portion;
2) pay the plaintiff the rentalof P1,000.00 a
month for the portion in litigation from
November 21, 1994 until such time that
the defendant shall have vacated, and
have removed all structures from said
portion, and have completely restored
possession thereof to the plaintiff; and

The respondent denied that his possession of the

disputed portion had been by mere tolerance of
Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact the
owner and lawful possessor of the property, having
bought it from Eliseo; that the petitioner and her
siblings could not deny knowing about the sale in
his favor because they could plainly see his house
from the road; and that the deed of absolute sale
itself stated that the sale to him was with their
approval, and that they had already known that his
house and fence were existing; that before he
purchased the property, Eliseo informed him that
he and his co-heirs had already orally partitioned
the estate of their father, and that the portion
being sold to him was Eliseos share; and that with
his having already purchased the property before
the petitioner acquired it under the deed of
extrajudicial partition, she should respect his
ownership and possession of it.9

3) pay unto the plaintiff the sum

of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and the
sum of P5,000.00 for litigation expenses;
and
4) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.11
Decision of the RTC
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed
the judgment of the MTCC, and dismissed the
complaint,12holding that the summary proceeding
for ejectment was not proper because the serious
question of ownership of the disputed property was
involved, viz:
In the case at bar, by virtue of the deed of absolute
sale executed by Eliseo Quijano, one of the co-heirs
of Fe Quijano, in 1990 and 1991, the defendant
Atty. Amante took possession of the portion in
question and built his residential house thereat.
Itwas only in 1992 that the heirs of Bibiano Quijano
executed the deed of extrajudicial partition, and

Judgment of the MTCC

On February 5, 1996, the MTCC rendered its
decision in favor of the petitioner,10 ruling that the
deeds of sale executed by Eliseo in favor of the
respondent did not have the effect of conveying

81

instead of giving to Eliseo Quijano the portion that

he already sold to the defendant, the same was
adjudicated toplaintiff, Fe Quijano to the great
prejudice of the defendant herein who had been in
possession of the portion in question since 1990
and which possession is notpossession de facto but
possession de jure because it is based on 2 deeds
of conveyances executed by Eliseo Quijano. There
is, therefore, a serious question of ownership
involved which cannot be determined in a
summary proceeding for ejectment. Since the
defendantis in possession of the portion in question
where his residential house is built for several
years, and before the extrajudicial partition, the
possession of the defendant, to repeat, is one of
possession de jure and the plaintiff cannot eject
the defendant in a summary proceeding for
ejectment involving only possession de facto. What
the plaintiff should have done was to file an action
publiciana or action reinvindicatoria before the
appropriate court for recovery of possession and
ownership. However, since there is a pending
complaint for quieting of title filed by the
defendant against the plaintiff herein before the
Regional Trial Court, the matter of ownership
should be finally resolved in said
proceedings.13 Undaunted, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the RTC denied her motion on
November 13, 1996.14

the right to the co-possession of the estate,

including the disputed portion.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court on appeal by
certiorari,16 contending that the CA grossly erred in
holding that the respondent was either a co-owner
or an assignee with the right of possession over the
disputed property.17
The petitioner explains that the respondent, being
a lawyer, knew that Eliseo could not validly transfer
the ownership of the disputed property to him
because the disputed property was then still a part
of the undivided estate co-owned by all the heirs of
the late Bibiano Quijano; that the respondents
knowledge of the defect in Eliseos title and his
failure to get the co-heirs consent to the sale in a
registrable document tainted his acquisition with
bad faith; that being a buyer in bad faith, the
respondent necessarily became a possessor and
builder in bad faith; that she was not aware of the
sale to the respondent, and it was her ignorance of
the sale that led her to believe that the respondent
was occupying the disputed property by the mere
tolerance of Eliseo; thatthe partition was clearly
done in good faith; and that she was entitled to the
possession of the disputed property as its owner,
consequently giving her the right to recover it from
the respondent.18

Decision of the CA
The petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for
review.

To be resolved is the issue ofwho between the

petitioner and the respondent had the better right
to the possession of the disputed property.

On May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its

decision,15 affirming the decision of the RTC, and
dismissing the case for ejectment, but on the
ground that the respondent was either a co-owner
or an assignee holding the right of possession over
the disputed property.

Ruling
The petition for review on certiorarilacks merit.
An ejectment case can be eitherfor forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding
designed to provide expeditious means to protect
the actual possession or the right to possession of
the property involved.19The sole question for
resolution in the case is the physical or material
possession (possession de facto)of the property in
question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure)nor an averment of
ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive
the trial court from taking due cognizance of the
case. Hence,even if the question of ownership is
raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may
pass upon the issue but only to determine the
question of possession especially if the question of
ownership is inseparably linked with the question
of possession.20 The adjudication of ownership in
that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar
or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving the title to the property.21

The CA observed that the RTC correctly dismissed

the ejectment case because a question of
ownership over the disputed property was raised;
that the rule that inferior courts could pass upon
the issue of ownership to determine the question of
possession was well settled; that the institution of
a separate action for quieting of title by the
respondent did not divest the MTCC of its authority
to decide the ejectment case; that Eliseo, as a
coowner, had no right to sell a definite portion of
the undivided estate; that the deeds of sale Eliseo
executed in favor of the respondent were valid only
with respect to the alienation of Eliseos undivided
share; that after the execution of the deeds of sale,
the respondent became a co-owner along with
Eliseo and his co-heirs, giving him the right
toparticipate in the partition of the estate owned in
common by them; that because the respondent
was not given any notice of the project of partition
or of the intention to effect the partition, the
partition made by the petitioner and her co-heirs
did not bind him; and that, as to him, the entire
estate was still co-owned by the heirs, giving him

82

Considering that the parties are both claiming

ownership of the disputed property, the CA
properly ruled on the issue of ownership for the
sole purpose of determining who between them
had the better right to possess the disputed
property.

12. That defendant, before he acquired the land

from Eliseo Quijano was informed by the latter that
the portion sold to him was his share already; that
they have orally partitioned the whole lot before
defendant acquired the portion from him.28
His knowledge of Eliseos co-ownership with his coheirs, and of their oral agreement of partition
notwithstanding, the respondent still did not
exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo
made it appear to the respondent that the partition
had already been completed and finalized, the coheirs had not taken possession yet oftheir
respective shares to signify that they had ratified
their agreement, if any. For sure, the respondent
was no stranger to the Quijanos, because he
himself had served as the lawyer of Eliseo and the
petitioner herself.29 In that sense, it would have
been easy for him to ascertain whether the
representation of Eliseo to him was true. As it
turned out, there had been no prior oral agreement
among the heirs to partition the estate; otherwise,
Eliseo would have questioned the deed of
extrajudicial partition because it did not conform to
what they had supposedly agreed upon. Had the
respondent been vigilant in protecting his interest,
he could have availed himself of the rights
reserved to him by law, particularly the right to
take an active part in the partition and to object to
the partition if he wanted to. It was only on
September 30, 1992, or two years and five months
from the time of the first sale transaction, and a
year and two months from the time of the second
sale transaction, that the co-heirs executed the
deed of extrajudicial partition. Having been silent
despite his ample opportunity to participate in or
toobject to the partition of the estate, the
respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately
agreed upon by the Quijanos.

The disputed property originally formed part of the

estate of the late Bibiano Quijano, and passed on
to his heirs by operation of law upon his
death.22 Prior to the partition, the estate was
owned in common by the heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased.23 In a coownership, the undivided thing or right belong to
different persons, with each of them holding the
property pro indivisoand exercising her rights over
the whole property. Each co-owner may use and
enjoy the property with no other limitation than
that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners. The underlying rationale is that until a
division is actually made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined, and every co-owner
exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition
to his use and enjoyment of it.24
Even if an heirs right in the estate of the decedent
has not yet been fully settled and partitioned and
is thus merely inchoate, Article 49325 of the Civil
Codegives the heir the right to exercise acts of
ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the
disputed property to the respondent in 1990 and
1991, he was only a co-owner along with his
siblings, and could sell only that portion that would
beallotted to him upon the termination of the coownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the
disputed property in the respondent but transferred
only the sellers pro indiviso share to him,
consequently making him, as the buyer, a coowner of the disputed property until it is
partitioned.26

There is no question that the holder of a Torrens

title is the rightful owner of the property thereby
covered and is entitled to its
possession.30 However, the Court cannot ignore
thatthe statements in the petitioners complaint
about the respondents possession of the disputed
property being by the mere tolerance of Eliseo
could be the basis for unlawful detainer. Unlawful
detainer involves the defendants withholding of
the possession of the property to which the plaintiff
is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the
formers right tohold possession under the
contract, whether express or implied. A requisite
for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is
that the possession was originally lawful, but
turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the
right to possess.

As Eliseos successor-in-interest or assignee, the

respondent was vested with the right under Article
497 of the Civil Codeto take part in the partition of
the estate and to challenge the partition
undertaken without his consent. 27Article 497
states:
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the coowners may take part in the division of the thing
owned in common and object to its being effected
without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn
any partition already executed, unless there has
been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding
a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without
prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to
maintain its validity.

To show that the possession was initially lawful, the

basis of such lawful possession must then be
established. With the averment here that the
respondents possession was by mere tolerance of
the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be
proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not
suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the
overt acts indicative of her or her predecessors
tolerance, or her co-heirs permission for him to

The respondent could not deny that at the time of

the sale he knew that the property he was buying
was notexclusively owned by Eliseo.1wphi1 He
knew, too, that the co-heirs had entered into an
oral agreement of partition vis--vis the estate,
such knowledge being explicitly stated in his
answer to the complaint, to wit:

83

occupy the disputed property.31 But she did not

adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to be
herself not clear and definite as to his possession
of the disputed property being merely tolerated by
Eliseo, as the following averment of her petition for
review indicates:

Mangaser, represented by his Attorney-in-fact

Eustaquio Dugenia, "a case of forcible entry and
damages.
The Facts
On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto
Mangaser, represented by his attorney-in-fact,
Eustaquio Dugenia (petitioner), filed a complaint
for Forcible Entry with Damages against
respondent Dionisio Ugay (respondent) before the
Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union (MTC). In his
complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the
registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land
situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an
area of 10,632 square meters and covered by OCT
No. RP-174 (FP-13 787) and Tax Declaration No.
014-00707; that on October 31, 2006, petitioner,
discovered that respondent stealthy intruded and
occupied a portion of his property by constructing a
residential house thereon without his knowledge
and consent; that he referred the matter to the
Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa for conciliation,
but no settlement was reached, hence, a
certification to file action was issued by the Lupon;
and that demand letters were sent to respondent
but he still refused to vacate the premises, thus, he
was constrained to seek judicial remedy.3

6.9. Their ignorance of the said transaction of sale,

particularly the petitioner, as they were not duly
informed by the vendor-co[-]owner Eliseo Quijano,
[led] them to believe that the respondents
occupancy of the subject premises was by mere
tolerance of Eliseo, so that upon partition of the
whole property,said occupancy continued to be
under tolerance of the petitioner when the subject
premises became a part of the land adjudicated to
the latter;32 (emphasis supplied) In contrast, the
respondent consistently stood firm on his assertion
that his possession of the disputed property was in
the concept of an owner, not by the mere tolerance
of Eliseo, and actually presented the deeds of sale
transferring ownership of the property to him.33
Considering that the allegation ofthe petitioners
tolerance of the respondents possession of the
disputed property was not established, the
possession could very well be deemed illegal from
the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful
detainer has to fail.34 Even so, the Court would not
be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for
forcible entry because the complaint contained no
allegation thathis entry in the property had been
by force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.

Respondent denied the material allegations of the

complaint and put up the following defenses, to
wit: that he had been a resident of Samara,
Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached
the age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of
land in that place then known as Sta. Lucia,
Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of
land was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba,
La Union due to a survey made by the government;
that he introduced more improvements on the
property by cultivating the land, and in March
2006, he put up a "bahay kubo"; that in October
2006, he installed a fence made of "bolo" to secure
the property; that in installing the fence, he was
guided by the concrete monuments which he knew
to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner's
property; that while he could not locate some of
the monuments, he based the boundaries on his
recollection since he was around when these were
installed; that he knew the boundaries of
petitioner's property because he knew the extent
of the "iron mining" activities done by a company
on the said property; that petitioner was never in
actual possession of the property occupied by him,
and it was only on October 31, 2006 when he
discovered the al legccl intrusion; that it was not
correct to say that he refused to vacate and
surrender the premises despite receipt of the
demand letters because in his letter-reply, he
assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate
the premises if he would only be shown to have
intruded into petitioner's titled lot after the
boundaries were pointed out to him; and that
instead of shmving the boundaries to him,
petitioner filed an action for forcible entry before
the MTC.4

Regardless, the issue of possession between the

parties will still remain. To finally resolve such
issue,they should review their options and decide
on their proper recourses. In the meantime, it is
wise for the Court to leave the door open to them
in that respect. For now, therefore, this recourse of
the petitioner has to be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on May 26, 2004 subject to the
MODIFICATION that the unlawful detainer action is
dismissed for being an improper remedy; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
G.R. No. 204926

December 3, 2014

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his

Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO
DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside the June 13, 2012
Decision1 and the December 5, 2012 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
122153, entitled "Dionisio Ugay v. Anacleto C.

84

MTC Ruling

3. REMOVE all the improvements he

introduced therein;

On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of

respondent. It stated that petitioner failed to
adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied
by respondent was within his lot titled under OCT
No. RP-174 (13 789). The MTC opined that
petitioner could have presented a relocation
survey, which would have pinpointed the exact
location of the house and fence put up by
respondent, and resolved the issue once and for
all.6 It also explained that petitioner failed to prove
his prior physical possession of the subject
property. The OCT No. RP-174(13789) registered
under petitioner's name and the Tax Declaration
were not proof of actual possession of the property.
The dispositive portion of which reads:

4. PAY attorney's fees in the amount

Php20,000.00 to plaintiff-appellant, and
pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Undaunted, respondent appealed to the CA.
CA Ruling
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. Citing Quizon v. Juan,14 it emphasized that
petitioner must allege and prove that he was in
prior physical possession of the property in dispute.
The word "possession," as used in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing more
than physical possession, not legal possession in
the sense contemplated in civil law. The CA wrote
that petitioner was not in physical possession
despite the presentation of the OCT No. RP174(13789) and his tax declarations.15 It reiterated
that when the law would speak of possession in
forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession
or possession de facto, as distinguished from
possession de Jure. What petitioner proved was
legal possession, not his prior physical possession.
Furthermore, the CA stated that the RTC misquoted
Nunez v. SLTEAS Pheonix Solutions 16 by giving the
wrong notion of what kind of possession was
contemplated in forcible entry cases. In other
words, physical possession was the crux in forcible
entry, not possession that stemmed upon
ownership.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff (petitioner) having failed

to establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.7
RTC Ruling
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial
Court of Bauang, La Union (RTC) and the case was
raffled to Branch 33.
In its August 23, 2011 Decision,8 the RTC reversed
the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. It
relied on the cases of Barba v. Court of
Appeals9 and Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions,
Inc.,10 which held that in ejectment cases,
possession of the land did not only mean actual or
physical possession but also included the subject of
the thing to the action of one's will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right. The RTC stated that petitioner had
clearly shown his possession of the property as
evidenced by his OCT No. RP-174(13 789) issued in
March 1987 and tax declaration, dating back as
early as 1995.11 It added that the boundaries of the
property were clearly indicated in the title, thus,
there was no need to conduct a survey. As the
owner, petitioner knew the exact metes and
bounds of his property so that when respondent
intruded stealthily, he filed the subject suit.12 The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for

Review is GRANTED, accordingly, the Decision
dated August 23, 2011 and Order dated October
25, 2011, of the RTC Branch 33, Bauang, La Union
in Civil Case No. 2029-BG are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC dated April 26,
2011 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration,19 dated July 6, 2012, but it was
subsequently denied by the CA in a
Resolution,20 dated December 5, 2012. It reads:

WHEREFORE, after a thorough perusal of the facts

and evidence in this case, this Court reverses the
decision of the MTC, Caba, La Union, dated April
26, 2011 and rules in favor of plaintiffappellant
(petitioner) and against defendant-appellee
(respondent), ordering the latter and all other
persons claiming rights under him to:

This Court, after a meticulous study of the

arguments set forth in the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent, finds no
cogent reason to revise, amend, much less reverse,
the assailed Decision dated June 13, 2012. The
Motion for Reconsideration is, thus, DENIED

1. VACATE the portion of the subject

property encroached by him;
2. SURRENDER actual physical possession
of the subject portion peacefully to
plaintiff-appellant;

SO ORDERED.21
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following

85

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED

TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF
PETITIONER WHICH MAY ESTABLISH PRIOR
POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY BY HEREIN
PETITIONER.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs

must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they
were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c)
that the action was filed within one (1) year from
the time the owners or legal possessors learned of
their deprivation of the physical possession of the
property.28

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS VALID.22

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings:

who is entitled to physical or material possession of
the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not
possession de Jure? Issues as to the right of
possession or ownership are not involved in the
action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except
only for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession.29

Petitioner argues that in ejectment cases,

possession of the land does not only mean actual
or physical possession or occupation but also by
the fact that a land is subject to the action of one's
will or by proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right; that the CA
should have considered OCT No. RP-174(13789) his
tax declaration as proofs of prior physical
possession over the property; and that the
issuance of the same are considered to by law as
proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right. Petitioner cited Tolentino, as
one of the authors and experts in Civil law, stating
that the "proper acts and formalities" refer to
juridical acts, or the acquisition of possession by
sufficient title, inter vivas or mortis causa, onerous
or lucrative. These are the acts which the law gives
the force of acts of possession.

As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry

suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior
physical possession or possession de facto, not
possession de Jure or legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and
the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment
case."30
The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a
number of cases31 that while prior physical
possession is an indispensable requirement in
forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in
respondent's position is evident from the principle
that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right. The case of Quizon v.
Juan,32 which surprisingly was relied on by the CA,
also stressed this doctrine.

Petitioner also avers that the December 5, 2012 CA

Resolution was not valid as it did not state the legal
basis required by the Constitution.
On May 28, 2013, respondent filed his
Comment23 before this Court. He stated that the
issues raised and the arguments presented by
petitioner have been thoroughly resolved and ruled
upon by the CA. The appellate court did not err in
reversing the RTC decision because petitioner was
never in prior physical possession of the property
in dispute. Respondent asserts that he has been in
prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious,
exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept
of an owner of the property in dispute.24

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These

are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations,
succession, execution and registration of public
instruments, inscription of possessory information
titles and the like.33 The reason for this exceptional
rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does
not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession.34 It is sufficient that petitioner
was able to subject the property to the action of his
will.35 Here, respondent failed to show that he falls
under any of these circumstances. He could not
even say that the subject property was leased to
him except that he promised that he would vacate
it if petitioner would be able to show the
boundaries of the titled lot.

On March 28, 2014, petitioner filed his

Reply,25 reiterating the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS
Phoenix Solutions, Inc.,26where a party was able to
demonstrate that it had exercised acts of
ownership over the property by having it titled in
its name and by paying real property taxes on it.
Petitioner also laments the wrongful insistence of
respondent that his possession over the property
was one in the concept of an owner. To petitioner's
mind, respondent failed to adequately adduce
evidence to show proof of his right to possess the
property when his possession came under attack
with the filing of the subject case. 27

In the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions,

inc., 36 the subject parcel was acquired by the
respondent by virtue of the June 4, 1999 Deed of

86

Assignment executed in its favor by Spouses Ong

Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The petitioner in
the said case argued that, aside from the
admission in the complaint that the subject parcel
was left idle and unguarded, the respondent's
claim of prior possession was clearly negated by
the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof
since 1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner
and said: Although it did not immediately put the
same to active use, respondent appears to have
additionally caused the property to be registered in
its name as of February 27, 2002 and to have paid
the real property taxes due thereon alongside the
sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the
light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently
did not matter that, by the time respondent
conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003,
petitioner hml already been occupying the land
since 1999.

question of possession is intertwined with the issue

of ownership. But this provision is only an
exception and is allowed only in this limited
instance - to determine the issue of possession and
only if the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. 39
This Court is of the strong view that the issue of
ownership should be provisionally determined in
this case. First, the juridical act from which the
right of ownership of petitioner arise would be the
registration of the free patent and the issuance of
OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the Torrens
title suggests ownership over the land. Second,
respondent also asserts ownership over the land
based on his prior, actual, continuous, public,
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner of the property in
dispute.40 Because there are conflicting claims of
ownership, then it is proper to provisionally
determine the issue of ownership to settle the
issue of possession de facto.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Hence, in that case, the Court ruled that such
juridical acts were sufficient to establish the
respondent's prior possession of the subject
property.

Returning to the case, this Court cannot agree with

the CA that petitioner's OCT No. RP-174(13789)
and his tax declarations should absolutely be
disregarded. The issuance of an original certificate
of title to the petitioner evidences ownership and
from it, a right to the possession of the property
flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that a person
who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled
to the possession thereof.41

The case of Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property

Developer, Inc.,37 also involves an action for
forcible entry. On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji,
Inc. acquired a residential lot situated in Matin a,
Davao City, which was covered by TCT No. T82338. On June 13, 1981, it transferred the said lot
to respondent DMC. Alleging that the petitioner
forcibly entered the property in December 1993,
the respondent filed on March 28, 1994 a
complaint for forcible entry. One of the issues
raised therein was whether respondent DMC had
prior possession of the subject property, to which
the Court answered in the affirmative. It ruled that:

Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with

tax declarations. While tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or constructive possession.42 Together with the
Torrens title, the tax declarations dated 1995
onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his
claim of possession over the land before his
dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent.

Prior possession of the lot by respondent's

predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of
the execution and registration of public
instruments and by the fact that the lot was
subject to its will from then until December 1,
1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the
premises and deprived the former of possession
thereof.

The CA was in error in citing the case of De Grano

v. Lacaba43 to support its ruling. In that case, the
respondent tried to prove prior possession, by
presenting only his tax declarations, tax receipt
and a certification from the municipal assessor
attesting that he had paid real property tax from
previous years. The Court did not give credence to
his claim because tax declarations and realty tax
payments are not conclusive proof of possession.
The situation in the present case differs because
aside from presenting his tax declarations, the
petitioner submitted OCT No. RP-174(13 789)
which is the best evidence of ownership from
where his right to possession arises.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the case at bench, the Court finds that
pet1t1oner acquired possession of the subject
property by juridical act, specifically, through the
issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth Act
No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the
Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987.38
Before the Court continues any further, it must be
determined first whether the issue of ownership is
material and relevant in resolving the issue of
possession. The Rules of Court in fact expressly
allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the

Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of

petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that
he had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious,
exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept
of an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by
provisionally resolving the issue of ownership, the

87

Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior

possession of the subject property. When petitioner
discovered the stealthy intrusion of respondent
over his registered prope1iy, he immediately filed a
complaint with the Lupong Tagapamayapa and
subsequently filed an action for forcible entry with
the MTC. Instead of taking the law into his own
hands and forcefully expelling respondent from his
property, petitioner composed himself and followed
the established legal procedure to regain
possession of his land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June

13, 2012 Decision and the December 5, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The August 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union, is hereby
REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 203760

December 3, 2014

HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother

and natural guardian, SUSAN G.
CANENCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN LUMONTAD, Respondent.

If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and

disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession,
then it would create an absurd situation. It would
be putting premium in favor of land intruders
against Torrens title holders, who spent months, or
even years, in order to register their land, and who
religiously paid real property taxes thereon. They
cannot immediately repossess their properties
simply because they have to prove their literal and
physical possession of their property prior to the
controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to
resort to ordinary civil procedure by filing either an
accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria and
undergo arduous and protracted litigation while the
intruders continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of
another man's land. It will defeat the very purpose
of the summary procedure of an action for forcible
entry.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are
the Decision2 dated September 29, 2011 and the
Resolution3dated October 1, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113046 which set
aside the Decision4dated August 20, 2009 and the
Order5 dated January 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74 (RTC) in Sp. Civil
Case No. 08-744, finding that the action instituted
by petitioner was not one for forcible entry, but for
recovery of ownership and possession, hence,
within the original jurisdiction of the latter.
Consequently, the CA ordered the remand of the
case to the R TC for trial on the merits.

The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits

is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal
disorder and to compel the party out of possession
to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain
what he claims is his. Ejectment proceedings are
summary in nature so the authorities can speedily
settle actions to recover possession because of the
overriding need to quell social disturbances.44

The Facts
This case originated from a forcible entry
Complaint6 dated July 3, 2007 filed by petitioner
Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and
natural guardian Susan G. Canencia (petitioner),
against respondent Susan Lumontad (respondent)
before the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal
(MTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 1929.

As to the other requirements of an action for

forcible entry, the Court agrees with the RTC that
petitioner had sufficiently complied with them.
Petitioner proved that he was deprived of
possession of the property by stealth.1wphi1The
complaint was also filed on October 30, 2007,
within the one year reglementary period counted
from the discovery of the stealthy entry by
respondent to the property on October 31, 2006.

In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he is one of

the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier (Vicente), who
was the owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.)
parcel of land located at Corner Malaya and
Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay Rizal
(subject land),7 covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No.
00-TY-002-11458.8 Since his birth, petitioners
family has lived in the residential house erected
thereon.9 Upon Vicentes death, petitioner,
together with his mother, continued their
possession over the same. On March 26, 2007,
respondent gained entry into the subject land and
started to build a two (2)-storey building (subject
building) on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof, despite
petitioners vigorous objections and protests.10 The
dispute was submitted to barangay conciliation but
no amicable settlement was reached between the
parties.11 Thus, petitioner was constrained to file
against respondent the instant forcible entry
complaint, averring, in addition to the foregoing,
that reasonable compensation for the use and

The second issue raised is the validity of the CA

Resolution dated December 5, 2012. Petitioner
alleges that the CA denied his reconsideration
without indicating its legal basis in violation of the
mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that no petition for
review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor. This
requirement, however, was complied with when the
CA, in its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, stated that it "finds no cogent
reason to reverse, amend, much less reverse the
assailed Decision, dated June 13, 2012." 45

88

occupancy of the above-said portion may be fixed

at 5,000.00 per month.12

Preliminarily, the RTC ruled that the facts averred

in petitioners complaint namely, that petitioner,
through his late father, owned and possessed the
subject land, and that by means of force and
intimidation, respondent gainedentry thereto25
show that his cause of action is indeed one of
forcible entry that falls within the jurisdiction of the
MTC.26

In her Answer13 dated July 30, 2007, respondent

admitted that during Vicentes lifetime, he indeed
was the owner and in physical possession of the
subject land.14 Nevertheless, she claimed tobe the
owner of the portion where the subject building
was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00TY-002-1303115 in her name.16 Hence, she took
possession of the said portion not as an illegal
entrant but as its owner.17

On the merits, the RTC found that petitioner, being

the owner and possessor of the property in
question, has the right to be respected in his
possession and that respondent forcibly and
unlawfully deprived him of the same.27

The MTC Ruling

Unconvinced, respondent moved for

reconsideration,28 which was, however, denied in
an Order29 dated January 18, 2010, prompting
petitioner to file an appeal before the CA.

In a Judgment18 dated November 11, 2007, the MTC

dismissed the complaint for want of cause of action
and lack of jurisdiction.19
It found that Vicente actually subdivided the
subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot, with an
area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner,
while the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m.
and where the subject building was erected, was
given toone Anthony de la Paz Javier (Anthony),
son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but
was eventually acquired by respondent from the
latter through sale.20 Based on this finding, the MTC
concluded that petitioner had no cause of action
against respondent since she was merely
exercising her rights asthe owner of the 172.80 sq.
m. subdivided lot.21

The CA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated September 29, 2011, the CA
set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to
the latter court for trial on the merits.31
It held that the issue of possession of the subject
land is intimately intertwined with the issue of
ownership, such that the former issue cannot be
determined without ruling on who really owns such
land. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial
on the merits in the exercise of the latters original
jurisdiction in an action for recovery of ownership
and possession pursuant to Section 8 (2), Rule 40
of the Rules of Court.32

Also, the MTC observed that petitioners complaint

failed to aver the required jurisdictional facts as it
merely contained a general allegation that
respondents entry into the disputed portion was
made by means of force and intimidation, without
specifically stating how, when, and where were
such means employed. With such failure, the MTC
intimated that petitioners remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria
instituted before the proper forum.22 Dissatisfied,
petitioner appealed to the RTC.

This notwithstanding, the CA still concluded that

respondent had the subject building constructed in
the concept of being the owner of the 172.80 sq.
m. portion of the subject land.33 In this relation, it
was observed that petitioner gave a misleading
description of TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, considering
that said tax declaration only covered petitioners
family house and not the subject land where said
improvement was built, as petitioner alleged in his
complaint.34 In truth, the CA found that the subject
land is separately covered by TD No. 00-TY-0029660,35 which was cancelled when the land was
subdivided into two (2) lots, namely: (a) the 187.20
sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-0021282536 given by Vicente to petitioner; and (b) the
172.80 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-0021282437 given by Vicente to Anthony, which the
latter sold to respondent, resulting in the issuance
of TD No. 00-TY-002-1303138 in her name.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision23 dated August 20, 2009, the RTC
reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and
accordingly ordered respondent to vacate the
disputed portion and surrender possession thereof
to petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent to pay
petitioner the amounts of P5,000.00 a month from
March 2007, until she vacates said portion, as
reasonable compensation for its use and
occupation, and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees,
including costs of suit.24

Further, the CA stated that petitioner was not able

to sufficiently establish that respondent employed
force and intimidation in entering the 172.80 sq. m.
portion of the subject landas he failed to
demonstrate the factual circumstances that
occurred during his dispossession of said
property.39

89

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration,40 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution41 dated October 1, 2012, hence, this
petition.

the same and, thereafter, erected a building

thereon. Clearly, with these details, the means by
which petitioners dispossession was effected
cannot be said to have been insufficiently alleged
as mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later affirmed
by the CA. The "how" (through unlawful entry and
the construction of the subject building), "when"
(March 26, 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m.
portion of the subject land) of the dispossession all
appear on the face of the complaint. In Arbizo v.
Sps. Santillan,45 the Court held that the acts of
unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting
a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the
prior possessor, would necessarily imply the use of
force,46 as what had, in fact, been alleged in the
instant complaint. Hence, it was erroneous to
conclude that petitioner only made a general
allegation that respondents entry in the premises
was made by means of force and
intimidation47 and, consequently, that a forcible
entry case was not instituted before the MTC.
Given that a forcible entry complaint had been
properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus erred in
ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial
on the merits in an action for recovery of
possession and ownership, otherwise known as an
accion reivindicatoria,48 pursuant to Paragraph 2,
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which
reads:

The Issue Before the Court

The main issue for the Courts resolution is whether
or not the CA correctly set aside the RTC Ruling and
ordered the remand of the case to the latter court
for trial on the merits in anaction for recovery of
ownership and possession.
The Courts Ruling
Although the Court finds that the complaint was
indeed one for forcible entry, petitioners case
nonetheless fails to impress on the merits.
A. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry.
The Court disagrees with the findings of both the
MTC and the CA that the allegations in the
petitioners complaint do not make a case for
forcible entry but another action cognizable by the
RTC.42
As explicated in the case of Pagadora v.
Ilao,43 "[t]he invariable rule is that what determines
the nature of the action, as well as the court which
has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in
the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which
[Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a
summary remedy, and must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the
complaint must necessarily allege that one in
physical possession of a land or building has been
deprived of that possession by another through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is
not essential, however, that the complaint should
expressly employ the language of the law, but it
would suffice that facts are set up showing that
dispossession took place under said conditions. In
other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior
to the defendants act of dispossession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been
in prior physical possession of the property. This
requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the
allegations demonstrate a cause of action for
forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the subject matter."44

SEC. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without

trial; lack of jurisdiction. x x x.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower
court without jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss
the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but
shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the
admission of amended pleadings and additional
evidence in the interest of justice.
Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by
express provision of Section 33 (2)49 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129,50 in relation to Section 1,51 Rule
70, of the Rules of Court.52 Even in cases where the
issue of possession is closely intertwined with the
issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain
exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment
cases,53 as they are given the authority to make an
initial determination of ownership for the purpose
of settling the issue of possession.54 It must be
clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title
tothe property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to
the issue of ownership.55

A plain reading of petitioners complaint shows that

the required jurisdictional averments, so as to
demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry,
have all been complied with. Said pleading alleges
that petitioner, as the original owners, i.e.,
Vicentes, successor-in-interest, was in prior
physical possession of the subject land but was
eventually dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion
thereof on March 26, 2007 by respondent who,
through force and intimidation, gained entry into

B. Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint.

Notwithstanding petitioners proper classification of
his action, his forcible entry complaint,
nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits,
considering that he had failed to justify his right to

90

the de facto possession (physical or material

possession) of the disputed premises.1wphi1

On March 7, 2000, petitioner sent respondents a

demand letter4 to vacate the riceland within 10
days from receipt thereof, but as her demand went
unheeded, she filed on April 5, 2000 a
Complaint5 against respondents for unlawful
detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
Victoria, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 826,
praying that respondents be directed to vacate the
riceland and to pay P400,000.00 per year from
September 1998 until they vacate, as reasonable
compensation for the use of the
property, P120,000.00 as attorneys fees,
and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses.6

As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458,

or the supposed document from which petitioner
hinges his right to the de facto possession of the
subject land, only covers his house and not the
entire land itself. Nothing appears on record to
show that he has the right to the de facto
possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion which, on
the contrary, appears to be consistent with the
claim of ownership of respondent in view of TD No.
OOTY-002-13031 covering the same property as
registered in her name. Thus, with no evidence in
support of petitioner's stance, and the counterevidence showing respondent's right to the de
facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion as its
ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must
necessarily fail.

In their Answer7 dated April 26, 2000, respondents

admit the execution of the Contract to Sell but
deny that it contains all the agreements of the
parties. They allege that petitioner has no cause of
action against them because the three-year period
within which to pay the purchase price has not yet
lapsed; that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
case because the complaint failed to allege that a
demand to pay and to vacate the riceland was
made upon them.8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly,

petitioner's forcible entry complaint in Sp. Civil
Case No. 08-744 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 158231

June 19, 2007

On August 2, 2001, the MTC rendered a

Decision,9 the dispositive portion of which reads:

BABY ARLENE LARANO, Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION and RAFAELA T.
CALENDACION,** Respondents.
*

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering defendants, as follows:
1.) To immediately vacate the premises in question;

DECISION

2.) To pay the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY

FIVE THOUSAND (P365,000.00) PESOS as a
reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property;

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 dated May 13, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68272
which dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer of Baby Arlene Larao (petitioner) against
Spouses Alfredo and Rafaela Calendacion
(respondents).

3.) To pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS

for and attorney's fees; and
4.) To pay FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as
litigation expenses, plus costs.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated in

Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria, Laguna
covered by TCT No. 175241 of the Register of
Deeds of Laguna. On September 14, 1998,
petitioner and respondents executed a Contract to
Sell whereby the latter agreed to buy a 50,000square meter portion of petitioner's riceland
forP5Million, with P500,000.00 as down payment
and the balance payable in nine installments
of P500,000.00 each, until September 2001.2

Respondents filed an appeal with the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
docketed as Civil Case No. SC-4141.11 On
December 3, 2001, the RTC rendered a
Decision,12 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby affirmed subject to the modification that
defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the amount
of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (P400,000.00), as
yearly reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of said riceland computed from 1999
until such time that defendants have actually
vacated the same.

Pending full payment of the purchase price,

possession of the riceland was transferred to
respondents under the condition that they shall
account for and deliver the harvest from said
riceland to petitioner. Respondents, however, failed
to pay the installments and to account for and
deliver the harvest from said riceland.3

SO ORDERED.13

91

Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review

with the CA.14 For failure to file her comment
despite receipt of CA Resolution15 dated May 8,
2002 which required her to file a comment,
petitioner was deemed to have waived her right to
file comment to the petition in CA Resolution dated
August 28, 2002.16

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that

verification is just a formal requirement; that
petitioner waived her right to question the defect
when she failed to submit her comment; that the
CA correctly pointed out that the present case
involves one that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation since the crux of the matter is the rights
of the parties based on the Contract to Sell.

On May 13, 2003, the CA rendered a

Decision17 setting aside the Decision of the RTC and
dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer. The
CA nullified the proceedings before the MTC for
want of jurisdiction. It held that the issues in the
case - whether or not there was a violation of the
Contract to Sell, whether or not such violation
gives the petitioner the right to terminate the
contract and consequently, the right to recover
possession and the value of the harvest from the
riceland - extend beyond those commonly involved
in unlawful detainer suits where only the issue of
possession is involved; that the case is not a mere
detainer suit but one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, placing it under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC, not the MTC.

The petition is bereft of merit.

As to the contention of petitioner that the CA
should not have taken cognizance of the petition
for review because it was not verified, as required
by the Rules, this Court has held in a number of
instances that such a deficiency can be excused or
dispensed with in meritorious cases, the defect
being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.19The
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is
formal.20 Such requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance
with which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective.21Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and
not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith.22 The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the
pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with
the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may thereby be served.23

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the present petition

anchored on the following grounds:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave error in giving due course to the private
respondents' petition for review notwithstanding
the fact that said petition contains no verification
to the effect that the allegations therein were read
and understood by the private respondents and
that they are true and correct of their own or
personal knowledge or based on authentic records,
as required by the rules.

Besides, petitioner did not raise the issue of lack of

verification before the CA. She did not file a
comment to the petition and it is too late in the day
to assail such defect, as she is deemed to have
waived any objection to the formal flaws of the
petition. Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the
lower court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.24

2. The respondent Court of Appeals grievously

erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the
Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the
case for unlawful detainer, and thus the Regional
Trial Court likewise has no jurisdiction on appeal to
decide the case for unlawful detainer, which
allegedly involves a matter incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

The main issue being raised in the present petition

is whether the complaint is one for unlawful
detainer.

3. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not

affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated December 3, 2001, modifying the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court dated August 2, 2000 both
ordering the eviction of private respondents from
the subject property and payment of the
reasonable value of the use of the subject
premises.18

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in ejectment

cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in
the complaint.25It cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed
by the defendant.26Neither can it be made to
depend on the exclusive characterization of the
case by one of the parties.27 The test for
determining the sufficiency of those allegations is
whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer of the plaintiff.28

Petitioner contends that the CA should have

dismissed outright the petition for review filed
before it since it contains no verification as
required by the Rules; and that the CA, in finding
that the complaint before the MTC was not one for
unlawful detainer but for specific performance, did
not limit itself to the allegations in the complaint
but resorted to unrestrained references, deductions
and/or conjectures, unduly influenced by the
allegations in the answer.

The facts upon which an action for unlawful

detainer can be brought are specially mentioned in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:

92

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and

when. Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs. (Emphasis
supplied)

A review of the Complaint of petitioner discloses

these pertinent allegations: petitioner owns the
subject riceland; she executed a Contract to Sell in
favor of respondents; pending full payment of the
purchase price, possession of subject riceland was
transferred to respondents subject to accounting
and delivery of the harvest to petitioner;
respondents failed to pay the installments and to
account for and deliver the harvest; petitioner
asked respondents to vacate the subject riceland,
but they failed to do so. Accordingly, petitioner
prayed for judgment ordering respondents to
vacate the subject riceland and to pay P400,000.00
per year from September 1998 until they vacate as
reasonable compensation for the use of the
property, P120,000.00 as attorney's fees,
andP50,000.00 as litigation expenses.
It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in
the Complaint failed to constitute a case of
unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the
Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents had
violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However,
the Complaint failed to state that petitioner made
demands upon respondents to comply with the
conditions of the contract the payment of the
installments and the accounting and delivery of the
harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day
period granted respondents to vacate even fell
short of the 15-day period mandated by law. When
the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer,
the MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the
case.36

In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally

lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess; hence, the
issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such
action, the defendant is in actual possession and
the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of
the defendants right to continue in possession. 29
Applied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor,
must comply with two requisites for the purpose of
bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be
failure to pay the installment due or comply with
the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there
must be demand both to pay or to comply and
vacate within the periods specified in Section 230of
Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land and 5
days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers
to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful
detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdiction
requirement of demand in order that said cause of
action may be pursued.31

An allegation of a violation of a contract or

agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the
presentation of competent evidence, upon which
an MTC judge might make a finding to that effect,
but certainly, that court cannot declare and hold
that the contract is rescinded. The rescission of
contract is a power vested in the RTC.37 The
rescission of the contract is the basis of, and
therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality of
a party's possession of a piece of realty.38 Without
judicial intervention and determination, even a
stipulation entitling one party to take possession of
the land and building, in case the other party
violates the contract, cannot confer upon the
former the right to take possession thereof, if that
move is objected to.39

Both demands to pay installment due or adhere

to the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate
are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in
order that an ejectment suit may be filed.32 It is the
vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the
premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which
makes unlawful the withholding of the
possession.33 Such refusal violates the vendor's
right of possession giving rise to an action for
unlawful detainer.34 However, prior to the
institution of such action, a demand from the
vendor to pay the installment due or comply with
the conditions of the Contract to Sell and to vacate
the premises is required under the aforequoted
rule.

Clearly, the basic issue raised in the complaint of

petitioner is not of possession but interpretation,
enforcement and/or rescission of the contract, a
matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC to
hear and determine.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated May 13, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68272 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or

violation of the terms of the Contract to Sell does
not automatically render a person's possession
unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demand
must be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the
MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.35

G.R. No. 107741 October 18, 1996

93

FRANCISCO BERNARTE, BENEDICTO DANAN,

BIENVENIDO BELLEZA, ROBERTO MALLARI,
FELICIANO MALLARI, PESCASIO DIMARUCUT,
REYNALDO TIMBANG, ALFREDO SANTOS,
FEDERICO SANTOS, LAMBERTO DANAN, JESUS
CASTRO, VICTORINO TALA, MARIANO
SANTOS, IGNACIO CASTRO DE LA CRUZ,
WILFREDO TAPALLA, REYNALDO OSBUAL,
ANTONIO SANTOS, TEOFILO MUNOZ, MANUEL
NAGUIAT, FELISICIMO MACASPAC, ROMAN
BERNAL, JR., FAUSTINO PANGAN, FRANCISCO
MACASPAC, CARLITO AGUILUZ, FIDEL
CASTRO, SALVADOR TALA, ROMEO TALA,
LUCIANO MANLAPAZ, TOMAS PAULE, DANNY
MANUEL, BENIGNO PORTALES, CONRADO
MALLARI, MARTA DANAN, REGINA TIMBANG,
CONCHITA VISDA, AMELIA ALFARO, VIOLETA
ALFARO, CONCHITA MALIT, SEVERINA RIVERA,
FLORENCIA PAULE, ROSITA BERNAL, GLORIA
MALLARI, LILIA SERRANO, NORMA CABUANBAUTISTA and ANITA MANGANIT,petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, The Hon. CARLOS
BARTOLO, Municipal Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Lubao, Pampanga, THE
PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF THE PROVINCE OF
PAMPANGA, MAJOR JESUS MANINANG (PNP),
SPO3 CARLOS GUINTO (PNP), SPO1 JESUS
KABILING (PNP), SPO4 EDGARDO LALIC (PNP)
& SPO4 DOMINADOR LACANLALE (PNP) and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 50,
GUAGUA, PAMPANGA, respondents.

Rustico Coronal, the civil lessee, and taken

over by plaintiff-owners. Alleging further
that there had been "definite" findings and
rulings by the Department of Agrarian
Reform" that "no tenancy relationship"
existed between the parties, petitioners
herein continued to forcibly enter, intrude
into and molest the possession of the over
the land in question in violation of Section
73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657. The
complaint prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin
petitioners from entering into the land and
intruding in the possession thereof and,
after hearing, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction which should be
made permanent after a full-blown trial.
In their answer, 3 petitioners averred that
they had been in continuous and peaceful
possession of their respective tillages since
1950 when the late Teodorica Arastia was
still the administratrix of the landholding in
question. They moved for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction as it was the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
through the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
pursuant to Section 50 of Republic Act No.
6657, that had jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, petitioners asserted that due to
the malicious and evil intentions of
plaintiffs in harassing and ejecting them
from the land, they suffered actual, as well
as moral damages, for their failure to
harvest their standing crops.

ROMERO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the
decision 1 dated November 19, 1992 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29284
dismissing for lack of merit the petition
for habeas corpus of petitioners.

Inasmuch as the complaint was very

specific as regards petitioners' commission
of acts prohibited by Section 73 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6657 and pursuant to
Section 57 thereof, 4 the lower court denied
the motion to dismiss on November 2,
1989. It issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering petitioners "and/or any
other person acting in their command
and/or their behalf to desist and refrain
from occupying their respective portions
they are allegedly cultivating pending the
termination of this litigation, and/or unless
a contrary order is issued by this Court." 5

The records show that on October 5, 1989,

Estrella Arastia, in her own behalf and as
attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Teodorica
Reinares Arastia, Leticia ArastiaMontenegro and Juanita Arastia, filed a
complaint for violation of Section 73 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) before the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 48 in its capacity as a
Special Agrarian Court.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration

praying that the writ of preliminary
injunction be set aside and that the case
be dismissed for lack of merit was denied
by the lower court on April 25, 1990. It
reiterated the writ of preliminary injunction
in the Order of July 31, 1991 which
deputized members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) based in Lubao and
Guagua, Pampanga, to enforce the said
writ. On April 23, 1992, the complaint was
amended to reflect the names of the "John
Does" originally impleaded therein and who
had been identified.

Docketed as Agrarian Case No. 2000, the

complaint 2 alleged that after the EDSA
Revolution, herein petitioners, who
organized themselves into the Anibang
Manggagawa sa Agricultura (A.M.A.),
illegally intruded into the land located at
Lubao, Pampanga (with an aggregate area
of around 210 hectares) of the plaintiffs,
burned the existing sugarcane plants and
started to cultivate small portions thereof.
As a result, the land was abandoned by

94

Subsequently, on July 17, 1991, petitioners

filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 100663
and entitled "Jesus Bernal, et al. v. Estrella
Arastia, et al.," assailing the jurisdiction of
the lower court over Agrarian Case No.
2000. on July 31, 1991, this Court
dismissed the petition for failure to comply
with Circular No. 1-88, specifically No. 4
thereof, requiring a "verified statement of
the date when notice of the judgment,
order or resolution subject of the petition
was received, when a motion for
reconsideration was filed and when notice
of the denial thereof was received." 6

On December 7, 1990, based on the

findings of the BARCs, the DARAB issued an
order 8 declaring the 300-hectare land as
within the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; maintaining
petitioners' "possession and cultivation of
their respective landholdings" from where
"they where forcibly ejected on September
29, 1989" and "restraining the respondent
or any other persons acting in her behalf
from entering, intruding, and disturbing the
farming activities of the said petitioners in
their respective farmholdings;" directing
the MARO of Lubao, Pampanga and the
DAR employees concerned "to process and
take appropriate action on the petition for
coverage under Republic Act 6657 of their
respective farmholdings in accordance with
the rules and regulations of the DAR," and
dismissing for lack of merit the claims for
damages. 9

Meanwhile, on November 29, 1989,

petitioners filed before the DARAB a
complaint 7 against Estrella Arastia.
Docketed as DARAB Case No. 161-P'89, the
complaint alleged that on September 25,
1989, through the use and employ of
armed men, Estrella Arastia forcibly evicted
and drove them out of their landholdings,
harvested and appropriated their standing
rice crops, destroyed their vegetable crops,
took their deep well and set fire on their
houses. As a consequence thereof, they
suffered damages in the total amount of
P3,300,000.00 for which Estrella Arastia
should be held liable. They prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or restraining order to enjoin defendant
therein from preventing their re-entry and
re-occupation of the landholdings pending
the resolution of the case.

The petitioners, having filed a bond in the

amount of five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), on September 29, 1992, the
DARAB issued the writ of preliminary
injunction 10 they had prayed for.
Consequently, with the assistance of two
(2) police officers assigned by the Chief of
Police of Lubao, Sheriff Joselito B. Dollente
served the writ on September 30, 1992, in
the presence of some barangay officials
and the CAFGU-CVO in charge. Since
Estrella Arastia was not in her provincial
address, a certain Primitivo Maninang
received the writ for her.

Pursuant to Section 19 of Executive Order

No. 229 and Section 47 of Republic Act No.
6657, the case was referred to the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) of barangays San Isidro, Santiago,
San Rafael and Lourdes in Lubao,
Pampanga for fact-finding and exploration
of the possibility of an amicable
settlement. After conducting the necessary
proceedings, the BARCs found that
petitioners had been in possession and
cultivation of their respective farmholdings.
This fact was contained in the report dated
May 23, 1988 of Mr. Vicente Jimenez,
CARPO/Officer-in-Charge, Provincial Office
of Pampanga, to the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform which was
transmitted to the DARAB on September
18, 1989.

On October 7, 1992, on the strength of the

said writ of preliminary injunction in DARAB
Case No. 161-'89, petitioners resumed
occupation and cultivation of the subject
land. Such actions resulted in the dispatch
of several policemen to the area. They
reminded petitioners of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued earlier in
Agrarian Case No. 2000 and ordered them
to leave the land in dispute. Upon their
refusal to leave, the policemen arrested
them and subsequently charged them with
resistance and/or disobedience to the
lawful order of persons in authority before
the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao. On the
same day, however, they were released
from police custody on the recognizance of
Atty. Zenaida Ducut.
Insisting on their right to work on the land
in accordance with the writ issued in
DARAB Case No. 161-'89, the following day,
October 8, 1992, petitioners again entered
the land. Without a warrant of arrest,
herein respondent police officers named
Jesus Maninang, Carlos Guinto, Jesus
Kabiling, Edgardo Lalic and Dominador
Lacanlale arrested petitioners for having
entered the landholding and for resisting
and intimidating said police officers.

However, despite receipt of summons and

the DARAB orders of June 5, 1990,
September 19, 1990 and October 5, 1990,
Estrella Arastia did not file an answer nor
comply with said orders. DARAB construed
this as her waiver and affirmation of what
had been submitted by petitioners, and
that she had no evidence to submit for its
consideration.

95

Recovered from petitioners' possession

were seven (7) assorted bolos used in
cultivating the land. 11

questioning the said Regional Trial

Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ
of preliminary injunction in
Agrarian Case No. 2000. Said
petition in G.R. No. 100663 was
dismissed for non-compliance with
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-88.
Entry of final judgment thereon
was made by the Supreme Court
on October 10, 1991.

Petitioners were detained at the municipal

jail of Lubao, Pampanga on October 8,
1992. On even date, they were charged
with direct assault upon agents of a person
in authority under Criminal Case No. 5999.
On October 14, 1992, the said municipal
court ordered the transfer of petitioners to
the provincial jail in San Fernando,
Pampanga on the ground that the case fell
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court and the fact that petitioners, having
refused to receive copy of the complaint
and the affidavits of the complainants, did
not "intend to file counter-affidavit." On
October 16, 1992, the municipal court also
ordered that the records of the case be
forwarded to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in San Fernando, Pampanga for
appropriate action. On October 21, 1992,
the Provincial Prosecutor filed an
information for direct assault upon agent of
a person in authority which was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 3171 before the
Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga.
Arraignment was set for December 1, 1992
at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

As matter (sic) now stands, the

said RTC, Branch 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga, has not been declared
as without jurisdiction over
Agrarian Case No. 2000 and
therefore, the said writ of
preliminary injunction it issued is in
order.
In fine, since at the time the
petitioners were arrested, the PNP
team was enforcing a lawful order
of the same RTC and in seriously
resisting the same the appellants
intimidated the PNP team
committing the alleged crime of
Direct Assault Upon An Agent of A
Person In Authority, a warrant was
not necessary for their arrest, as
provided in Sec. 5(a), Rule 113,
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

After the filing of the information for direct

assault or on October 23, 1992, petitioners
filed before this Court a petition for habeas
corpus under G.R. No. 107399 questioning
the legality of their arrest and detention.
On October 28, 1992, this Court issued the
writ returnable to the Acting Presiding
Justice of the Court of the Appeals. The
return of the writ was filed on November 9,
1992. In due course, on November 19,
1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for lack of merit in the herein
questioned Decision which held in part as
follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant;
when lawful. A
peace officer or
private person
may, without a
warrant, arrest a
person;
(a) When an
offense has in fact
just been
committed, and he
has personal
knowledge of facts
indicating that the
person to be
arrested has
committed it;

The petitioners' claim that they

were exercising their rights when
they were working and farming on
the said land pursuant to the
preliminary injunction issued in
DARAB Case No. 161-P'89, and that
the preliminary injunction issued by
the RTC being enforced by the
respondent PNP Team is unlawful
for said RTC, Br. 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga has no jurisdiction over
Agrarian Case No. 2000, deserves
scant consideration. As brought out
by respondents and verified from
the records of the Supreme Court,
the petitioners had filed therewith
a certiorari petition entitled "Jesus
Bernal, et al. v. Hon. Eli G. C.
Natividad, et al." (G.R. No. 100663)

In the light of the foregoing, the

issue regarding the validity of the
four warrants of arrest issued
against the petitioners need not be
taken up.
Let it also be stated that there is no
explicit rule requiring a judge, after
an accused has been arrested
without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the regional trial
court and later charged in a
complaint or information

96

comformably with the provisions of

Rule 112, Section 7 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure to still
issue a warrant of arrest or order of
commitment for the said accused
(Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Gloria Jopson Asuncion [G.R. L-No.
84907, Minute Resolution, First
Division, November 3, 1988]). As
explained by the Supreme Court,
such rule is not provided since the
accused is already under detention
so that the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest or an order for his
commitment would be an absolute
superfluity, considering that the
need of a warrant of arrest arises
only when the accused is at large
as under Rule 113, Section 1 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
means "the taking of a person in
custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the
commission of an offense," and
that the obvious purpose of the
warrant is for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused (Re: Petition of Habeas
Corpus of Gloria Jopson
Asuncion, supra).

The writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102

of the Rules of Court extends "to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." The function of the special
proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire
into the legality of one's detention. 18 In all
petitions for habeas corpus, the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention from the moment
petitioner was taken into custody up to the
moment the court passes upon the merits
of the petition and "only after such a
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the
due process clause of our Constitution has
been satisfied." 19

Petitioners received a copy of said Decision

on November 20, 1992, a Friday. On
November 23, 1992, they filed in this Court
a motion for an extension of two (2) days
within which to file a petition for review
oncertiorari. They followed the motion with
another requesting an additional two (2)
days within which to file said petition. They
eventually filed the instant petition on
November 27, 1992.

Even if the arrest of a person is

illegal, supervening events may bar
his release or discharge from
custody. What is to be inquired into
is the legality of his detention as of,
at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is
at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102,
be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the application. Among
such supervening events is the
issuance of judicial process
preventing the discharge of the
detained person . . . . . Another is
the filing of a complaint or
information for the offense for
which the accused is detained, as
in the instant case. By then, the
restraint of liberty is already by
virtue of the complaint or
information and, therefore, the writ
of habeas corpus is no longer
available. Section 4 of Rule 102
reads in part as follows: "Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person
charged with . . . an offense in the
Philippines."

However, once the person detained is duly

charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His
remedy then is the quashal of the
information and/or the warrant of arrest
duly issued. 20 The reason for the issuance
of the writ were becomes more unavailing
when the person detained files a bond for
his temporary release. Thus, in Velasco
v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court said:

On December 22 and 29, 1992 and January

21, 1993, thirty (30) of the forty-five (45)
petitioners posted bail in Criminal Case No.
5999 for direct
assault. 12 As of May 18, 1993, only three
(3) remained detained at the provincial
jail. 13 In their Memorandum which was
received by the Court on May 17, 1995,
petitioners furnished the information that
"most if not all of the petitioners were
already released on bail and therefor
cannot avail of the writ of habeas
corpus for being moot and
academic." 14And yet, invoking Soriano
v. Heirs of Domingo
Magali (sic), 15 Malabanan
v. Hon. Ramento 16 and Salonga
v. Pano 17where the Court considered the
issues raised notwithstanding that certain
events had supervened to render the case
moot and academic, petitioners insist that
dismissal of the case on such ground
should not bar the resolution of this case
on the merits.

xxx xxx xxx

97

It may also be said that filing his

motion for bail, Larkins admitted
that he was under the custody of
the court and voluntarily submitted
his person to its jurisdiction. In De
Asis vs. Romero (41 SCRA 235, 240
[1971]), this Court stated:

Petitioners posit the view that resolution of

the instant petition for habeas corpus is
interrelated with the issue as to which of
the two writs of preliminary injunction
affecting then should prevail. They contend
that the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the DARAB, not that earlier
issued by the Regional Trial Court in
Agrarian Case No. 2000, is the valid one
because the regular court had no
jurisdiction over said agrarian case.
Therefore, petitioners aver, the invalidity of
the writ being enforced by police
authorities could only result in the
invalidity of their arrest. They further assert
that, even if their petition in G.R. No.
100663 questioning the validity of the
issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction in Agrarian case No. 2000 was
dismissed, such dismissal "on a formal
technicality does not amount to rendering
as valid the otherwise void writ of
preliminary injunction" issued in said
case. 23

De Asis could have,

right after his
arrest, objected to
the regularity of
the issuance of the
warrant of arrest in
question.
Instead he not only
filed a petition for
bail with the lower
court, thereby
accepting the
court's jurisdiction
over his person,
but he also
pleaded, on
arraignment, to the
information filed
against him.
(emphasis
supplied)

The petition in G.R. No. 100663 was

dismissed for noncompliance with Circular
No. I-88. Contrary to petitioners'
contention, however, such a dismissal
through a minute resolution was one on the
merits of the petition. Thus, where a first
petition for certiorari was dismissed for
noncompliance with paragraph 4 of Circular
No. I-88 and another petition, complying
with said circular and basically reiterating
the same issues raised in the first petition
was filed a year later, the Court dismissed
the second petition and severally censured
counsel for petitioner for refiling the same
petition. In a Resolution, the Court stated
as follows:

The filing of a petition or motion for

bail in cases where no bail is
recommended has the same legal
import and effect as the posting of
bail in cases where bail is
recommended. It is settled that the
giving or posting of bail by the
accused is tantamount to
submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
The instant petition for habeas corpus has
thus been rendered moot and academic by
the filing against petitioners of charges for
direct assault on October 8, 1992 before
the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao which, on
being forwarded to the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga upon the filing of an
information for direct assault on October
21, 1992 became Criminal Case No. 3171,
even before the filing of the petition
forhabeas corpus docketed as G.R. No.
107399. Their subsequent filing of
bailbonds to secure their provisional liberty
sealed the mootness of the instant petition.

. . . (I)t is equally axiomatic that

minute resolutions of this Court,
denying due course to petitions, or
dismissing cases summarily for
failure to comply with the formal or
substantial requirements laid down
therefor by the law are actually
dispositions on the merits (SEE
Smith Bell & Co. v. Court of
Appeals, 197 Phil. 201 [1991]
citing: Policarpio v. PVB, 106 Phil.
125; Commercial Union v. Lepanto,
86 SCRA 79, Novino v. Court of
Appeals, 83 SCRA 279),
constituting res
judicata. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

As stated above, under the circumstances,

petitioners' remedy would have been the
quashal of the information in case they
have valid reasons therefor. In any event,
the Court shall consider the principal issues
raised in the instant petition for habeas
corpus in the interest of justice and if only
to clarify certain procedural
misconceptions which appear to confuse
petitioners and their counsel. 22

Hence, even though the Court did not

explicitly resolve G.R. No. 100663 on the
merits, its dismissal on the ground of
noncompliance with Circular No. I-88 had
the effect of resolving the issues raised
therein. While it may be argued that said
circular is merely a remedial measure
which should not unduly affect the

98

substantive aspects of a case, its force and

effect must at all times be upheld for, after
all, it was designed for the orderly
administration of justice.

from the land on the ground that no

tenancy relationship existed between
them. However, her invocation of Sec. 73
(b) of Republic Act No. 6657 which
considers as a prohibited act "forcible entry
or illegal detainer by persons who are not
qualified beneficiaries under this Act to
avail themselves of the rights and benefits
of the Agrarian Reform Program," obviously
led the court to docket the case as
Agrarian Case No. 2000 and assume
jurisdiction over it as a special agrarian
court. 28

As regards the issue of jurisdiction over the

dispute between them and the Arastias,
petitioners should be reminded that the
allegations in a compliant are
determinative factors of said issue. On this
matter, the Court declared:
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter
is determined upon the allegations
made in the complaint, irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled
or not entitled to recover upon the
claim asserted therein a matter
resolved only after and as a result
of the trial. Neither can the
jurisdiction of the court be made to
depend upon the defenses made
by the defendant in his answer or
motion to dismiss. If such were the
rule, the question of jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely upon
the defendant. 25

Such actions were in consonance with

Section 56 29 and 57 of said law which vest
upon the Regional Trial Court, acting as a
Special Agrarian Court, with jurisdiction
over two classes of agrarian-related cases:
(1) "petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2)
"prosecution of all criminal offenses" under
the same law. A criminal offender under
Republic Act No. 6657 is, pursuant to
Section 74 of the law, "(a)ny persons who
knowingly and willfully violates the
provisions of this Act." 30 Thus, the lower
court correctly assumed jurisdiction over
Agrarian Case No. 2000.

In her complaint in Agrarian Case No. 2000,

Estrella Arastia alleged that she and the
rest of the plaintiffs therein were the
registered owners of the parcels of land in
question which herein petitioners illegally
intruded into, damaged and cultivated
under the status of holding "actual title
over the properties;" that the definite
findings and rulings of the DAR showed
that "no tenancy relationship" existed
between the parties and that petitioners
were definitely not qualified beneficiaries
of the rights and benefits under Republic
Act No. 6657 as they were not in any way
tenants and/or legitimate tillers of the
subject land, and that the acts of
petitioners violated Section 73 (b) of said
law.

It was within petitioners' rights to question

the issuance of the writ before this Court
through G.R. No. 100663. However, in filing
the petition, they failed to comply with
Circular No. 1-88. The consequent
dismissal of the case for noncompliance
with said circular deprived this Court with
authority to look into the validity of the writ
once again. To repeat, such dismissal
constituted res judicata on the issue of
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Consequently, petitioners are treading on
shaky ground in questioning the legality of
their arrest in this petition for habeas
corpus for the reason that the police
officers were enforcing a writ of preliminary
injunction illegally issued in Agrarian Case
No. 2000 and, in the same breath, allege
that they could use force or "legally resist
and even intimidate another, be he a
private individual or an agent of a person
in authority, who interferes with the
legitimate exercise of (his) rights" 31 as
possessors and cultivators of the Arastia
property.

Petitioner's raising the issue of jurisdiction

in their answer to the complaint did not
automatically divest the lower court of
jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000.
The court had to continue exercising
authority to hear the evidence for the
purpose of determining whether or not it
had jurisdiction over the case. In a plethora
of cases, this Court has made the
pronouncement that once jurisdiction is
vested, the same is retained up to the end
of the litigation. 26 After such hearing, if
tenancy had in fact been shown to be the
real issue, then the court should dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction. 27

If indeed petitioners are tenants of the

Arastias under the law, 32 they are not
without other legal recourses. Certainly,
through their counsel, who appear to be
zealous in protecting whatever rights
petitioners believe they may have, they
should pursue DARAB Case No. 161-P'89
and whatever actions are available for

It should be pointed out, moreover, that in

filing Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella
Arastia was merely ejecting petitioners

99

them under the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law of 1988.

Subsequently, plaintiff in the lower court filed

an injunction bond which was approved by
respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued against the defendants,
including herein complainant. A seizure order
followed which directed respondent Sheriff to seize
the palay from the land in question.[4]

Although it is well-accepted that a court

should always strive to settle the
controversy in a single proceeding, leaving
no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation, 33 this rule cannot apply if
the result would negate the rational
application of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners may not engage in procedural
shortcuts to revive the settled issue of the
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in Agrarian Case No. 2000 allegedly
on the ground of the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties in the
instant petition for habeas corpus arising
from their arrest for having assaulted
persons in authority.

In the complaint now before this Court,

complainant details several allegations as follows:
(1) That the land subject of the forcible entry case
is an agricultural riceland, thus, it is the
Department of Agrarian Reform which has original
and exclusive jurisdiction, and not the respondent
Judge's court;

[A.M. MTJ-96-1085. October 8, 1998]

(2) That the plaintiffs injunction bond was approved

by respondent Judge without first serving a copy to
the complainant resulting in a violation of due
process. Complainant avers that it left her no
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the
bond. Further, a copy of the writ of injunction was
not served on complainants counsel;

SALVACION
P.
ONQUIT, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA, and
SHERIFF
IV
DANILO
O.
MATIAS, respondents.

(3) That a notice regarding the Motion for Issuance

of Seizure Order was not served on the
complainant thereby depriving her of a chance to
oppose it;

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review

on certiorari is hereby DENIED. No costs.

RESOLUTION

(4) That respondent Judge has been heard saying

that complainant and his co-defendants ought to
leave the land because it is certain that they will
lose their case;

QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative complaint charging
respondents, namely: Judge Aurora BinamiraParcia, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (5th Judicial
Region), Ligao-Oas, Albay, with grave abuse of
authority, bias and grave misconduct; and, Sheriff
IV Danilo O. Matias, with grave misconduct,
misbehavior in the performance of his official
duties, and collusion.[1]

(5) And that, with regard to respondent Sheriff,

upon the issuance of the seizure order, he seized
all the palay harvested without issuing a receipt,
despite demand therefor, and delivered the palay
to the plaintiff.[5]
In her Comment, respondent Judge asserts
principally that the complaint was maliciously filed
to harass her. She recounts that ejectment cases
were earlier filed before her sala against some of
complainants family members involving different
areas of the disputed lot. In these separate cases,
respondent Judge ordered their ejectment,[6] which
she claims is the reason for complainants
vindictiveness. She claims moreover, that in a
Special Civil Case (No. 1852) filed against her
before the Albay Regional Trial Court, to restrain
her from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 1048L, she nevertheless proceeded Civil Case No. 1048L, after the special civil case was dismissed. She
then ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, and required an injunction bond from
complainants opponents.[7] All these were resented,
according to the respondent Judge, by the
complainant.

The charge against respondent Judge stems

from a forcible entry case[2] with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with damages. Said case was assigned
to her sala. The complainant and her two brothers
were therein co-defendants. Complainant raised
the issue of jurisdiction stating that said case falls
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) because it
involves
tenancy
over
an
agricultural
land. Thereafter,
complainant
and
her
codefendants filed with respondent Judge, an ExParte Motion for Disqualification, Request for
Disqualification and Request for Resolution.
Basically, these motions were founded on the trial
courts alleged lack of jurisdiction. In a single Order,
[3]
respondent Judge denied all three motions ruling
that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in
the complaint and not those raised by defendants.
Moreover, according to respondent Judge , the
claim regarding the nature of the case at bar would
not automatically divest the court of its jurisdiction.

With regard to the averment by complainant

that she and her co-defendants were not furnished
a copy of the bond before its approval, respondent
Judge replies that the records of the case would

100

show that complainants counsel was furnished with

a copy of the Motion to Admit Bond. Furthermore,
even granting that the complainant and codefendants were not furnished with a copy of the
bond, the failure to serve a copy would be merely a
formal defect. She states that complainant should
have asked the court to furnish the parties with a
copy, but complainant failed to do so.[8]

Concerning the charges of Grave Misconduct,

Misbehavior in the Performance of Official Duties
and Collusion against respondent Sheriff, he states
in his Comment that when the Clerk of Court
received the Seizure Order, he was ordered to
implement it immediately. Police assistance was
requested from the station commander to
accompany respondent Sheriff in entering the
ricefield. He stated that despite the heavy rain in
the area he found complainant and her codefendants harvesting the palay. Said palay was
seized as ordered and placed inside sacks, and
then brought by him to the Hall of Justice. Early the
following morning, he went to the Hall of Justice,
and had the palay, although wet, threshed and
cleaned. He decided that it was best to turn over
the palay to the wife of the plaintiff due to the fact
that the grains were dripping wet from the previous
days rains and if not dried immediately would
deteriorate as, in fact, there were already grains
showing signs of germination. A copy of the receipt
of the Sheriffs Return of Service was signed by the
wife of plaintiff. He admits though that the vehicle
used in transporting the seized palay was provided
for by plaintiff, which he concluded was the reason
behind the alleged collusion between him and
plaintiff.

In response to the accusation regarding her

order denying the Motion to Fix Defendants Bond
and to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
she states that the injunction bond posted by
plaintiff was sufficient to cover damages to
which complainant and her co-defendants might be
entitled, in case a judgment would be rendered in
their favor.[9]
As for the questioned seizure order,
respondent Judge maintains that the reason for this
order was that even after the issuance of an
injunction, complainant and co-defendants reentered the land in question and harvested the
palay thereon. It was an ex-parte motion which she
had to grant considering the urgency of the matter,
keeping in mind that there was an injunction
bond for the benefit of complainant and codefendants.[10]

On the charge by complainant that he refused

to issue a receipt upon seizure, respondent Sheriff
replied that he could not do so immediately upon
seizure as the palay was not yet threshed and he
would only know the number of cavans seized after
such was threshed and cleaned. He claims that he
did this the next day after the palay was threshed
and cleaned. Only then was it quantifiable as to the
number
of
cans
in
which
they
were
stored. Respondent Sheriff then furnished the
receipt to complainants counsel of record, together
with the Sheriffs Return of Service.[14]

Respondent Judge denies ever talking to

complainant in her chambers. According to her, it
was Merle Porte, a sister of complainant and not a
party to the case, who approached respondent
Judge in the afternoon of April 10, 1996. Porte
pleaded that her brothers and sisters be allowed to
harvest the palay and that they would settle the
matter with the plaintiff in said case. Respondent
Judge states that her reply was for Porte to discuss
the matter with their lawyer instead of personally
speaking with her. Further, respondent Judge
denies for being totally untrue the incident alleged
by complainant wherein she was allegedly
confronted concerning a purported payment to her
of P20,000 by plaintiff. According to respondent
Judge, it was actually complainants counsel, a
former professor of respondent Judge, who went
inside her chambers to ask that she should deny
the plaintiffs request for an injunction.[11] For the
satisfaction of complainant and her co-defendants,
respondent Judge inhibited herself from rendering
judgment in Civil Case No. 1048-L and from further
hearing the Petition for Contempt filed by
plaintiff against complainant.[12]

Complainant subsequently filed a Reply to

each of the Comments submitted by respondent
Judge and respondent Sheriff. The Reply to the
Comment of respondent Judge centered on the fact
that there was personal bias involved, which
accounted for the way respondent Judge conducted
herself towards the hearing of complainants case.
[15]
As to her Reply to the respondent Sheriffs
Comment, complainant denied the allegation that
they reacted defiantly to the writ of preliminary
injunction. According to complainant, the land was
owned by another family who, together with her
co-defendants, were the actual occupants thereof.
Further, complainant maintains that aside from the
illegality of the seizure order, the respondent
Sheriff made an error in his Sheriffs Return, when
he reported his estimate of the seized palay way
below the actual volume of the palay.[16]

In sum, respondent Judge avers to this Court

that from the outset complainant and her codefendants were already doing all that they could
do to disqualify her from taking cognizance of Civil
Case No. 1048-L. As a matter of fact, when the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao,
Albay, denied the plaintiff's petition seeking
respondent Judge to be disqualified from hearing
said
case,
complainant
filed
a
similar
administrative case against the Presiding Judge.[13]

Considering the Complaint, the Comments,

and the Reply as well as the pleadings and exhibits
submitted, we find no grave abuse of authority,
grave misconduct and bias on the part of
respondent Judge.

101

The fact that respondent Judge took

cognizance of the forcible entry case did not taint
her action with grave abuse of authority, even if
defendant had alleged that the land in question
was under agricultural tenancy, and that there was
an issue of jurisdiction. Well-settled is the principle
that the courts shall not be divested of jurisdiction
over a case merely by what is raised in the answer.
What determines the nature of an action and a
court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up
by the plaintiff.[17] Basic is the rule that the material
averments in the complaint, which in this case is
for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the
court. And, jurisprudence dictates that the court
does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment
case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a
defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties.[18] It is the duty of
the court to receive evidence to determine the
veracity of allegations of tenancy.In an Order of
respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was
ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the
land in question is an irrigated riceland, but not
tenanted.[19] This matter was even brought up on a
petition for certiorari with prohibition to the
Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, but said
petition was denied.[20] These antecedents are
sufficient to convince us that the respondent Judge
did not act with grave abuse of authority in
assuming jurisdiction over the case filed in her
sala.

We also find that there was no impropriety on

the part of respondent Judge when she issued the
seizure order. It was apparent that the complainant
and her co-defendants showed defiance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. This was all the more
demonstrated when they re-entered the land and
harvested the palay, in direct and open violation of
the writ. The order to seize the harvested palay
was issued to preserve the status quo, and in no
way done with grave abuse of authority.
The charges of bias imputed on respondent
Judge, specifically, that she received money from
the plaintiffs and that she told complainant that
they will surely lose the case, are only allegations
which are not supported by evidence apart from
the
self-serving
statements
made
by
complainant. Given no support on the record, we
are not persuaded by said accusations hurled by
complainant simply because there is no evidence
thereon to implicate the respondent Judge.
With regard to the charges against respondent
Sheriff, we find that his actuation of immediately
implementing the seizure order did not constitute
grave misconduct nor was it an act of collusion
with the adverse party. He did what was expected
of any sheriff given charge of enforcing a court
order. When a writ is placed in the hands of a
sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in
accordance with its mandates.[22]

With regard to the allegation of having failed

to furnish to the defendants a copy of the bond and
the writ of preliminary injunction, we give credence
to the findings made by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as follows:

Neither are we convinced that respondent

Sheriff was remiss in his duty to issue a receipt for
the palay he seized. Admittedly, he did not issue
the receipt on the spot, but we accept the reason
stated earlier for issuing it when the palay was
already cleaned and measured, next day. From the
record,
complainant
made
no
averment
that respondent Sheriff derived pecuniary benefit
in not immediately giving complainant a receipt. It
was reasonable to briefly wait until measurement
could be made as to the volume of the palay after
being cleaned and threshed before issuance of the
receipt. In the absence of contrary evidence, the
presumption prevails that the sheriff has regularly
performed his official duty.[23]

However, Section 8, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of

Court in conjunction with Section 3, Rule 70 thereof
provides that the [p]arty filing the bond shall
forthwith served (sic) a copy of such bond on the
other party, who may except to the sufficiency of
the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon. This
means that the plaintiff and not the Court or the
respondent Judge for that matter, who (sic) is duty
bound to serve a copy of the injunction bond to the
defendants. x x x Nevertheless, the failure of the
plaintiff to serve a copy of the injunction bond to
the defendant is merely a formal defect and not a
reversible error. For in this case the defendant may
ask the [c]ourt to order the plaintiff to serve upon
him the copy of the bond.

On the matter of where to deposit the seized

palay, however, it was incumbent on respondent
Sheriff to deliver the palay to the court considering
it was still considered property in custodia
legis. Deposit of seized items in litigation is not a
discretionary matter. Until the court had made its
decision as to the disposal of the palay, the
presumption was that the seized palay should
remain in the court's custody, hence to be
deposited in court. Respondent Sheriff should not
have handed them over to the plaintiff in the
absence of a directive to that effect in the seizure
order.However, this Court takes note of the
circumstances surrounding respondent Sheriffs
delivery to the plaintiff of what was seized.
Although the palay was already threshed and
cleaned, it was still dripping wet from the previous

xxxxxxxxx
On the other hand, the records belie the claim of
complainant that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was not served to (sic) the defendants. Records
show that said writ was served to (sic) the
defendants on February 16, 1996 at their residence
but all refused to acknowledge receipt therefor,
nevertheless the executing Sheriff left each a copy
to (sic) the defendants (Annex H, rollo, p.41).[21]

102

days heavy rains and respondent Sheriff felt that if

not dried immediately the grains would deteriorate
and might just eventually be rendered useless. This
leads us to conclude that there was no bad faith in
his acts. Furthermore, he documented his turnover
of the seized grains in the presence of witnesses
from the barangay. His actuation was without
malice and could be deemed not unreasonable
under the circumstances obtaining, although not in
strict compliance with official duty concerning a
matter in custodia legis.

Unknown to Cruz, however, Perez filed an

application for issuance of title covering the subject
land with the Land Management Section,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR),
Region
III,
San
Fernando
City,
Pampanga. When Cruz learned of Perezs design, he
immediately opposed the application. Accordingly,
Cruz demanded that Perez remove his house from
the land and vacate the same. When petitioner
failed to heed the demand, respondent filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against him.[7]

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to

DISMISS the administrative charges against
respondent Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia for lack of
merit. The charges against respondent Sheriff
Danilo Matias are also DISMISSED, but he is hereby
ADMONISHED to strictly observe always the rules
and regulations governing the performance of his
duties in regard to the enforcement of seizure
orders of the court.

Perez denied Cruzs ownership of the

property. He claimed to be owner of the lot in
question, having inherited the same from his
grandmother. He asserted that he had been in
continuous possession for many years. To support
his claim, Perez presented Tax Declaration No.
26682 and official receipts of tax payments. Perez
submitted that the MTC had no jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 979, as the issue involved was one of
ownership, not mere possession, of the land.

G.R. No. 142503. June 20, 2003]

On February 12, 1992, the MTC dismissed Civil
Case No. 979 on the ground of want of jurisdiction,
holding that the main issue is one of ownership,
not mere possession de facto.[8] Cruz appealed said
decision to the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13,
as Civil Case No. 206-M-92.

ROMUALDO
C.
PEREZ, petitioner, vs.
APOLONIO CRUZ, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Meanwhile, on March 31, 1992, the Regional

Executive Director of the DENR, Region III,
disapproved the survey of Lot No. 5075 [9], Cad.
304-D, submitted by Perez, thereby sustaining
Cruzs opposition. Cruz was then directed to file the
appropriate public land application for the land
subject of the controversy.[10]

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to

reverse the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 21, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34979, as
well as its resolution[2] dated March 10, 2000,
denying
herein
petitioners
Motion
for
Reconsideration. That decision had set aside the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 404-M-94,
which ruled that the Municipal Trial Court of
Hagonoy, Bulacan had no jurisdiction to hear and
try the ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No.
979.

On June 29, 1992, the RTC of Malolos, Branch

13, rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 206-M92, reversing the MTC ruling, and ordering the
remand of the records of Civil Case No. 979, for
trial on the merits.[11]
On remand, the MTC decided Civil Case No.
979 as follows:

The factual backdrop of this case, as drawn

from the records, are as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court

finds for the plaintiff and against
the defendant ordering the latter
to:

The instant controversy arose from an

ejectment case filed by herein respondent Apolonio
Cruz before the MTC of Hagonoy in 1991. The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 979, alleged
that Cruz is the owner of Residential Lot No. 5095
declared in his name as per Sworn Statement Index
No. 14-0248-537, as required by Sec. 6 of P.D. No.
464, as amended by P.D. No. 1621. [3]Cruz averred
that he inherited this lot from his mother, Salvestia
Crisostomo[4] who, in turn, acquired the same from
herein petitioner
Romualdo
Perez,
through
a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan. [5] Cruz claimed
that Perez requested his permission to build his
house on a small portion of said property, as Perez
had nowhere to erect his dwelling on. This request
was granted, as they are close relatives.[6]

1. remove his house and vacate the

plaintiffs lot and deliver the
possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. pay plaintiff the amount of P100.00 a
month as rental reckoned from the
date of the filing of the complaint
until the complete possession
thereof is delivered to the plaintiff;
3. pay plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00
as attorneys fees; and

103

4. pay the costs of suit.

Branch 13 that as early as August 9, 1951, [16] the

predecessor of respondent Cruz already had
possession.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Perez then moved for reconsideration, but the

appellate court denied it.

Perez seasonably appealed the foregoing

judgment to the RTC of Malolos, this time in Branch
10, docketed as Civil Case No. 404-M-94. On
August 1, 1994, the RTC of Malolos, Branch 10,
decided Civil Case No. 404-M-94 as follows:

Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari, with

petitioner Perez assigning the following errors:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

REVERSING the appealed decision.

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING OR IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT THIS CASE
MUST BE DISMISSED FOR THE
INFERIOR COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION DUE TO:

Pursuant to Section 10, Rule 41 of the Revised

Rules of Court, let the entire record of this case be
remanded to the court of origin.
SO ORDERED.[13]

A. THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP WHICH

IS CRUCIALLY INTERTWINED
WITH POSSESSION; and

The RTC of Malolos, Branch 10, found that in

Civil Case No. 979, the question of ownership was
inextricably intertwined with the issue of
possession. Since the issue of possession could not
be resolved without first addressing the question of
ownership, Civil Case No. 979 should have been
dismissed, following case law.

B. THE SUPPOSED TOLERANCE

GIVEN BY RESPONDENT TO
PETITIONER, WHICH IS NOT
A LEGAL BASIS EITHER FOR
FORCIBLE ENTRY OR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

Cruz then elevated the matter to the Court of

Appeals by way of petition for review. Cruz
theorized that inasmuch as the decision of the RTC
of Malolos, Branch 13, holding that the issue in
Civil Case No. 979 was not ownership but
possession de facto, had become final, it was error
for Branch 10 to rule on said issue and reverse
Branch 13s ruling.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN REVERSING OR SETTING
ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT FOR APPARENTLY,
RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR EJECTMENT AGAINST
PETITIONER (DEFENDANT).[17]

On August 21, 1995, the appellate court

disposed of the controversy as follows:

The principal question for resolution now

concerns the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and
decide Civil Case No. 979 for ejectment.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is

GRANTED and the decision of the public
respondent dated August 1, 1994 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is
rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court, dated January 24, 1994, in favor of
plaintiff-petitioner. We make no pronouncement as
to cost.

Petitioner Perez contends that the alleged

tolerance given by respondent to him in occupying
the land does not give rise to a cause of action for
unlawful detainer but rather accion publiciana,
which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
[18]
Citing Velez v. Avelino,[19] he insists that where
the preponderance of evidence shows that the
occupancy by the defendant of the lot in question
is due to the tolerance of the owners thereof and
against the latters will, the case becomes one
for accion publiciana, which falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.[20]

SO ORDERED.[14]
The Court of Appeals held that the decision of
the Regional Director of Lands disapproving the
survey application of petitioner Perez and affirming
the right of respondent Cruz to file the application
for titling of the subject land rendered moot and
academic the possessory action in the RTC. Said
decision awarding the land to Cruz gave him a
better right of possession over the disputed lot as
against Perez, a non-awardee. [15] It likewise held
that the RTC of Malolos, Branch 10, erred in
reversing the decision of the RTC of Malolos,
Branch 13, because said decision already acquired
finality. The Court of Appeals agreed with Branch
13 that the issue involved respondents right of
prior possession, and sustained the ruling of

Respondent, in his Memorandum, counters

that it is erroneous for petitioner to conclude that
the mere defense of claim of ownership over the
lot in question divests the MTC of jurisdiction over
the case for unlawful detainer.[21]
It is hornbook law that jurisdiction is
determined by the averments in the complaint. In
civil cases, if a complaint is filed involving a subject
matter within the jurisdiction of an inferior court,
but if after the trial, it appears that the subject

104

matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a

superior court, the inferior court cannot render
judgment but must dismiss the case.[22]

deed is invalid as his signature thereon is a

forgery. Cruz, in turn, points out that the State
Prosecutor assigned to Malolos dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public document
filed by petitioner, docketed as I.S. No. 92-1296, for
insufficiency of evidence.[27] Petitioner Perez is
silent on this allegation of Cruz before us, nor is
there any showing in the records that Perez
appealed the dismissal of I.S. No. 92-1296 to the
Department of Justice.

In the complaint for ejectment filed before the

Hagonoy MTC, it was alleged by plaintiff Cruz that
defendant (now petitioner) Perez pleaded that he
be allowed to construct his house as he had no
other parcel of land on which to build a house. The
complaint further alleged that it was by mere
tolerance that Cruz, now respondent herein,
allowed Perez to occupy a small portion of the
lot.Petitioner Perez constructed his house without
paying any rent for the reasonable use and
occupancy of said portion of Cruzs lot.[23]

Equally telling is the factual finding by the

Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Region III,
that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption
of regularity of the notarized Deed of Sale upon
which
respondent
based
his
claim
of
ownership. Thus, the DENR likewise disbelieved
Perezs claim of forgery. Needless to stress, findings
of fact of an administrative agency are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, for as long as
substantial
evidence
supports
said
factual
findings. It is not the task of an appellate court to
weigh once more the evidence submitted before
the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency
concerning sufficiency of evidence.[28] All things
considered, we are persuaded that respondent
Cruz successfully proved his right to retain
possession of the disputed parcel of land.

Taking the allegations in the complaint as

basis, in our view, there is no doubt that the case is
one for unlawful detainer. The Hagonoy MTC had
the jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No.
979.
Petitioners
reliance
on Avelino
is
inappropriate. Decided in 1984, Avelino has been
superseded by our decision in Banco de Oro
Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals,
promulgated on February 21, 1990. In Banco de
Oro, we held that a person who occupies the land
of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by the implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.[24]

However, the question of ownership is yet to

be
resolved
with
finality
and
conclusiveness. Although
the
DENR
has
disapproved the cadastral survey submitted by
petitioner Perez, he could contest respondent Cruzs
application for said lot, which yet remains to be
titled. That administrative agency should be the
arena where the parties could first tackle the issue
of ownership.

Anent petitioners claim that the issue is not

one
of
mere
possession
but
rather
of
ownership, Dehesa
v.
Macalalag[25] is
instructive. For in Dehesa, we held that in
ejectment cases, the defendant cannot deprive the
court of jurisdiction by simply claiming ownership
of the property involved. Precisely with the aim of
preventing a possible anomaly, the provisions of
the Rules of Court governing unlawful detainer and
forcible entry were revised. When the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of physical possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.[26] Should the
inferior court make any determination on the issue
of ownership, the same shall not be conclusive and
shall be without prejudice to the right of the parties
to ventilate before the proper court their claims of
ownership over the same land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack

of merit. The assailed decision dated August 21,
1995 and the resolution dated March 10, 2000,
both by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP 34979,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 152423

December 15, 2010

SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and

VICTORIA SORDEVILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIA COPRADA, Respondent.
DECISION

The controversy in this case has undergone

permutations since March 1991, when Civil Case
No. 979 was filed before the MTC of Hagonoy,
Bulacan. Both parties claim ownership over the
same parcel, which is yet untitled. Both parties
have submitted tax declarations to support their
respective claims. However, in addition to tax
declarations, respondent Cruz presented a
notarized Deed of Sale, which shows that petitioner
Perez sold already the subject land to respondents
mother. Before us, however, Perez insists that said

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 and the
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, dated April 6,
2001 and February 15, 2002, respectively, (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 49994.
The antecedents are as follows:

105

On February 24, 1997, petitioners, spouses Marcos

Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla (Victoria) filed an
ejectment case3 against respondent Maria V.
Coprada before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna.
Petitioners claimed that they are the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated in M.H. Del Pilar
St., Barangay San Miguel, Majayjay, Laguna,
containing an area of Two Hundred Fifty-Three (253)
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-93542. In 1945, respondent was
able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and
her family to use and occupy the land for their
residence, under the condition that they will vacate
the premises should petitioners need to use the
same. Respondent and her family were allowed to
construct their residential house. Since then, the
petitioners never made an attempt to drive them
away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her
eight children have no other place to live in. Also,
respondent and her family have been occupying
the subject premises free of rent, including
payment of realty taxes. Respondent's present
circumstances have completely improved, i.e.,
some of her children are already working; they are
regularly sending her financial assistance; and she
has acquired her own residential house at
Barangay Panglan, Majayjay, Laguna. Because of
this, petitioners verbally demanded that
respondent vacate the subject land, but the latter
refused. Thus, petitioners were forced to send a
demand letter dated August 22, 1996, giving
respondent until November 30, 1996 to vacate the
subject premises. However, respondent still
ignored said demand, which prompted petitioners
to bring a complaint before the barangay
authorities. No settlement was reached, hence, a
certification to file action in Court was issued.
Petitioners were, therefore, constrained to lodge an
ejectment case against the respondent before the
MCTC.

respondent built on the subject land a semiconcrete structure. Respondent stated that
petitioners' claim is barred by laches. Even
granting, without admitting, that respondent's
claim of ownership over the property is improper
because petitioners are the registered owners
thereof, respondent argued that she is a builder in
good faith, because she was able to build the
structure on the subject lot with the prior
permission of the owner.
In its Decision4 dated September 11, 1997, the
MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.
It held that laches had already set in which
prevented petitioners from questioning the validity
of the purported sale between Victoria and Maria.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed
the MCTCs judgment. The RTC ruled that
respondent's occupation of the subject property
was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance and
permission. Hence, respondent is bound by an
implied promise that she will vacate the property
upon demand. Thus, her possession over the
subject property became unlawful after the
petitioners demanded her to vacate the property.
The RTC found that respondent failed to prove the
alleged oral sale and that petitioners have
adequately proven that they are entitled to the
possession of the subject land as registered owners
thereof. The RTC ordered the respondent and all
other persons claiming rights under her to vacate
and surrender the possession of the subject land to
the petitioners and to remove any and all
improvements she introduced on the parcel of
land.5
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the RTC in an Order 6 dated
November 24, 1998. Obviously dissatisfied by the
Decision, respondent filed with the CA a petition for
review with prayer for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction.7

Respondent admitted that petitioners are the

registered owners of the subject land. However,
she averred that in 1945, it was Emiliana Coprada
(petitioner Victoria Sordevilla's mother and original
owner of the subject land) and not the petitioners
who gave permission to her late husband Brigido
Coprada to use the subject lot. Emiliana allowed
her nephew Brigido and his family to occupy the lot
as their permanent abode, because of her love and
affection for her nephew, and also, due to the fact
that the said lot is virtually a wasteland.
Thereafter, Brigido and his family cleared the area
and built therein a nipa hut to dwell in. When
Emiliana died, the ownership of the property was
inherited by her only child, petitioner Victoria
Sordevilla. Respondent alleged that sometime in
the early 1960's, petitioner Victoria offered the said
lot for sale for P2,000.00 to respondent, who
readily agreed. The purchase price was paid in
installments and was fully paid in 1962. Due to
their close relationship, the agreement was never
reduced to writing. Respondent further maintained
that since the execution of the oral sale of the
subject lot, she has been the one paying the realty
taxes due on the property. After the sale,

In its Decision dated April 6, 2001, the CA granted

respondent's petition, reversed the Decision of the
RTC and affirmed in toto the Decision of the MCTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA in a Resolution 8 dated
February 15, 2002. Hence, the instant petition
raising the following grounds:
I
THE RIGHT OF THE REGISTERED OWNERS TO
RECOVER POSSESSION IS NEVER BARRED BY
LACHES AND/OR THE PERSON WHO HAS A
TORRENS TITLE OVER A PARCEL OF LAND IS
ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION THEREOF.
II
THE OWNERSHIP AND RIGHT OF PETITIONERS TO
RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY UNPROVEN ORAL SALE.

106

III

In the case at bar, petitioners' cause of action for

unlawful detainer is based on their ownership of
the land covered by TCT No. T-93542 and on their
claim that they merely tolerated respondent's stay
thereat. Respondent's possession, as well as those
persons claiming right under her, became unlawful
upon her refusal to vacate the premises. Petitioners
contend that since they are the registered owners
of the subject land, they are entitled to the
possession thereof and their right to recover
possession over it is never barred by laches. They
maintain that respondent's claim of ownership is
based on an unproven oral sale, which does not
exist. Further, respondent cannot rely on the Tax
Declarations as she was paying taxes in the
petitioners' name, as the declared owners of the
property. Moreover, she started paying the taxes
only in 1984 despite her claim that the property
was sold to her in 1962. Even assuming that the
sale took place in 1962, respondent is guilty of
laches as she failed to take any positive action for
the delivery and conveyance to her of the portion
of the property she is occupying. Finally,
respondent cannot collaterally attack the title of
the petitioners to the subject land.

LACHES HAD SET IN AGAINST [RESPONDENT].

IV
THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS NOT SUBJECT TO
COLLATERAL ATTACK.9
The petition is meritorious.
The pertinent point of inquiry in this case is
whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to
evict respondent from the subject property.
An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is
governed by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and
when. - Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.

On her part, respondent, although admitting that

the property is registered in petitioners' name,
claimed that the 100-square-meters portion of the
property, where her house was erected, was
already sold to her by petitioner Victoria. Thus, by
virtue of the sale, she and her family have the right
to possess the said property. The non-presentation
of receipt and deed of sale, non-delivery of the
owner's certificate of title, and her payment of the
real property taxes in the name of the petitioners
were due to the close relationship between the
parties and the existing practice of palabra de
honor in their day to day transactions. Respondent
further alleged that she is not guilty of laches;
rather, it is the registered owners' right to recover
possession of their property which is barred by
laches.

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the

defendant was originally legal, as his possession
was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an
express or implied contract between them.
However, defendant's possession became illegal
when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate
the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under their
contract, and defendant refused to heed such
demand.10

In the present case, respondent failed to present

evidence to substantiate her allegation that a
portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. In fact,
when petitioners sent a letter12 to the respondent,
demanding her to vacate the subject property, the
respondent, in reply13 to the said letter, never
mentioned that she purchased the subject land in
1962. If the sale really took place, the respondent
should have immediately and categorically claimed
that in her letter response. Clearly therefore,
respondent's submission that there was an oral
sale is a mere afterthought.

The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer

case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of
ownership is raised by any of the parties, the
courts may pass upon the same in order to
determine who has the right to possess the
property. The adjudication is, however, merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to
the property.11 Since the issue of ownership was
raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution
boils down to which of the parties' respective
evidence deserves more weight.

On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject

property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-93542, registered in the name of the
petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven
claim that she acquired a portion of the property
from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the
Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners'
title over the subject property is evidence of their
ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in
land registration that the certificate of title serves

107

as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible

title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule
is that the person who has a Torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof.14

addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable
considerations and should not be used to defeat
justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice.19

Further, respondent's argument that petitioners are

no longer the owners of a portion of the subject
land because of the sale in her favor is a collateral
attack on the title of the petitioners, which is not
allowed. The validity of petitioners' certificate of
title cannot be attacked by respondent in this case
for ejectment. Under Section 48 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or canceled, except in a direct proceeding
for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue
of the validity of the title of the petitioners can only
be assailed in an action expressly instituted for
that purpose. Whether or not the respondent has
the right to claim ownership over the property is
beyond the power of the trial court to determine in
an action for unlawful detainer.15

Respondent first acquired possession of the subject

lot by mere tolerance. From 1945 until the filing of
the complaint for ejectment in 1997, the nature of
that possession has never changed. Petitioners
allowed the respondent to possess the property
with the knowledge that the respondent will vacate
the same upon demand. Hence, until such demand
to vacate was communicated by the petitioners to
the respondent, petitioners are not required to do
any act to recover the subject land, precisely
because they knew of the nature of the
respondent's possession, i.e., possession by mere
tolerance. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners
are guilty of failure or neglect to assert a right
within a reasonable time. Further, after the
petitioners gave a demand letter to the respondent
giving the latter until November 30, 1996 to vacate
the subject premises, which respondent failed to
heed, they immediately filed a complaint before
the barangay authorities and, thereafter, lodged an
ejectment case before the MCTC on February 24,
1997. In sum, We find that petitioners are not
guilty of laches as would bar their claim to the
property in question.

In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,16 citing the case of Co v.

Militar,17 the Court held that:
[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country
because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim
of ownership is established and recognized.

In contrast, respondent, who is claiming that a

portion of the property was sold to her in 1962, has
herself failed within a long period of time to have
that portion transferred in her name. Respondent
had to wait for almost 35 years since 1962, and
were it not for the filing of the ejectment suit in
1997, she would not have bothered to assert her
rights under the alleged sale. Respondent's failure
to assert that right only goes to prove that no sale
ever transpired between the parties.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is

indefeasible and binding upon the whole world
unless and until it has been nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory
and decisional law, the power to pass upon the
validity of such certificate of title at the first
instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial
Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of
title.

Moreover, as the registered owners, petitioners'

right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property is not barred by laches. In Gaudencio
Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson, as
Attorney-in-Fact v. Spouses Ildefonso Perlas and
Pacencia Perlas and Spouse Rogelio Pobre and
Melinda Fogata Pobre,20 the Court held that:

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to

the possession of the property, which is one of the
attributes of ownership. x x x
Anent the issue on laches, the CA's ruling that
petitioners' long inaction to assert their rights over
the subject land bars them from recovering the
same is without basis. Also, the doctrine invoked
by the appellate court that a registered owner may
loose his right to recover its possession by reason
of laches is not applicable here.

x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a

right to eject any person illegally occupying
his property. This right is imprescriptible and
can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v.
Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it.18 There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each
case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances, with the question of laches

As registered owners of the lots in question, the

private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right
is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they
were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the
property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to
demand the return of their property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely

108

tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by

laches.

Appeals, dated April 6, 2001 and February 15,

2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994,
affirming the Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1875,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
Branch 26, in Civil Case No. SC-3580,
is REINSTATED.

Since respondent's occupation of the subject lot is

by mere tolerance or permission of the petitioners,
without any contract between them, respondent is
bound by an implied promise that she will vacate
the same upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
her.21

G.R. No. 157985 December 2, 2005

In respondent's Answer filed before the MCTC, she

claimed that since she was able to build a structure
on the subject lot with the prior permission from
the owner, she is a builder in good faith and thus
entitled to be reimbursed the necessary and useful
expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Without such
reimbursement, she has the right of retention over
the property and she cannot just be ejected from
the premises.

ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA

ABAYATA, ANTONIO ALEGRE, REMEDIOS
ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY ARQUILLOS,
LOURDES BAGARESE, EUGENIA BARAQUIL,
PRECIOS BASOY, RANNY BASOY, FELY
BERMEJO, CARLOS BO, JUN BO, ALEX BORRES,
ANNA MARIE CORDOVA, ESPERANZE
CORDOVA, EDWIN DEPETILLO, ROMULO
FERRY, LEONISA GABRIEL, MA. FE GABRIEL,
SALOME CORDOVA, ELEN JACOB, JEREMIAS
JACOB, OLIVIA LERIN, CRISELDA MADEJA,
JOMARI MANONG, NESTOR MANONG,
VALENTIN MANONG, EDMUNDO/FELY MINA,
TEDDY PARUAN, SALVACION PASCUA,
ROMMEL POLISTICO, DANIEL/NANCY PRADO,
ARMANDO ROMERO, SANCHO VILLAFUERTE,
and FERNANDO YAMID, Petitioners,
vs.
CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and
REYNALDO T. NEPOMUCENO, Respondents.

Respondent's argument does not hold water. Since

respondent's occupation of the subject property
was by mere tolerance, she has no right to retain
its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
She is aware that her tolerated possession may be
terminated any time and she cannot be considered
as builder in good faith.22 It is well settled that both
Article 44823 and Article 54624 of the New Civil
Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons
whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance
of its owners are not possessors in good faith. 25 At
the time respondent built the improvements on the
premises in 1945, she knew that her possession
was by mere permission and tolerance of the
petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a
person who builds on land with the belief that she
is the owner thereof.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Order1 dated April 30, 2003 and
the Special Order of Demolition2 dated May 9,
2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Paraaque City, Branch 77. Petitioners had applied
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) but the Court in a resolution3 dated May 15,
2003 denied the application.

Respondent's reliance on her payment of realty

taxes on the property is unavailing. She started
paying taxes only in 1984 despite her claim that
she bought the property in 1962. Further, aside
from the rule that tax declarations and
corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove
title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as
they are not conclusive evidence of the same,26 the
RTC found that although the payment for said taxes
were received from respondent, the declared
owner was petitioner Victoria.

The facts in this case, culled from the record, are

as follows.
The present controversy arose from a complaint for
ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 11799, filed
before the MeTC by private respondents Cecilia B.
Palisoc and Marina B. Mata. In a decision 4 dated
February 27, 2002, the court declared respondents
as the rightful possessors of the properties in
dispute. It also ordered the petitioners to vacate
the premises and pay to private respondents the
rentals.

It must be stressed, however, that the court's

adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case is
merely provisional, and affirmance of the RTC's
decision would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the
property, if and when such action is brought
seasonably before the proper forum.27

Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 while private
respondents moved for execution pending appeal.
On January 8, 2003, the RTC affirmed the MeTC
decision with the modification that petitioners must
start paying rentals from the date of the appealed
decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision and the Resolution of the Court of

109

On January 28, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for

Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of
a Writ of Execution. In an order dated March 3,
2003, the RTC denied the motion and granted
private respondents motion for execution for
failure of petitioners to post a supersedeas bond or
to pay the back rentals. Thus, a writ of execution
pending appeal was issued. On March 7, 2003,
petitioners were served with the writ and notice to
vacate.

COURT, AND/OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY

PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.6
Simply, the issue is, are the Orders of the MeTC
proper?
Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC
violated the mandatory requirements of Section
287 of Rep. Act No. 7279 since there was no 30-day
notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition
and there had been no consultation on the matter
of resettlement. They also claim that there was
neither relocation nor financial assistance given.
They insist that the MeTC orders are patently
unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the
law.8

On March 11, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to

Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution. On
March 14, 2003, private respondents filed a Motion
to Issue a Special Order of Demolition since
petitioners refused to vacate the premises. The RTC
deferred action on the motions to allow petitioners
to exhaust legal remedies available to them.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Supplement to the
Motion to Defer Implementation of Writ of
Execution and Opposition to Motion to Issue Special
Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of
Republic Act No. 72795 was not complied with.

Private respondents for their part argue that Rep.

Act No. 7279 is not applicable. They aver that there
was no proof that petitioners are registered as
eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries in
accordance with procedure set forth in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing the
Registration of Socialized Housing Beneficiaries
issued by the Department of Interior and Local
Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council. They aver that
even if Rep. Act No. 7279 was applicable, the
required notices under the law had already been
complied with. According to them, petitioners were
already notified on March 7, 2003 of an impending
demolition, when the writ of execution was served.9

On April 4, 2003, private respondents filed a Motion

Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order
of Demolition. In an order dated April 11, 2003, the
RTC declared the decision denying petitioners
appeal final and executory, and remanded the
records of the case to the MeTC without acting on
the motions.
However, on April 10, 2003, petitioners filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before the
Court of Appeals. They also filed an Urgent
Vigorous Opposition and Motion to Suspend
Proceedings on respondents Motion Reiterating
the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of
Demolition before the MeTC.

We find for respondents.

Under Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and
detainer action is immediately executory to avoid
further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the
courts duty to order the execution is practically
ministerial.11 The defendant may stay it only by (a)
perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond;
and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or
reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the property during the pendency of
the appeal.12 Once the Regional Trial Court decides
on the appeal, such decision is immediately
executory under Section 21,13 Rule 70, without
prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for
review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court.14

The MeTC set the Motion for the Issuance of Special

Order of Demolition for hearing. The court granted
said motion on April 30, 2003, but gave petitioners
five (5) days from receipt of its order to voluntarily
vacate the premises and remove all structures and
improvements made thereon.
On May 6, 2003, MeTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo T.
Nepomuceno reported that petitioners refused to
vacate the premises. Petitioners instead filed a
Motion to Quash and Recall the Order dated April
30, 2003 and/or Special Order of Demolition. The
MeTC denied the motion and issued the Special
Order of Demolition on May 9, 2003.

However, petitioners failed to file a petition for

review. Records show that petitioners received on
March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their
motion for reconsideration. They had until March
27, 2003 to file a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals. Instead, they filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003. In said
petition, which is still pending, petitioners
contended that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and
insisted that the latter court had no jurisdiction
over the complaint.

Hence, this petition where petitioners raise the

lone error that
THE COURT A QUO, IN BRUSHING ASIDE REPUBLIC
ACT [NO.] 7279 IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE
AGAINST THESE UNDERPRIVILEGED PETITIONERS,
HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT
THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME

110

The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of

the judgment on the merits in the instant case is
appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to
the court rendering the judgment is its lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise
of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of
discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in
the decision. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal prohibits the resort to
certiorari because one of the requirements for the
latter remedy is that "there should be no appeal." 15

JUDGE LORIFEL LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC,

Branch 77, Paraaque City and ELISA
MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the July 16,
1998 decision of the Court of Appeals [1] in CA-G.R.
SP No. 46861 (a) declaring null and void the
injunction orders respectively issued by Judge
Amelita Tolentino[2] in Civil Case No. 96-0253, for
Expropriation, and Judge Rolando G. How in Civil
Case No. 96-0480, for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction; and (b) ordering the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 78, to
enforce its July 8, 1996 Writ of Demolition. The
dispositive portion read:

Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before

the Court of Appeals was filed as a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and
cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where
the latter remedy is available but was lost through
fault or negligence.16 Thus, the filing of the petition
for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from
becoming final and executory.17 The RTC acted
correctly when it remanded the case to the court of
origin in the order dated April 11, 2003.18

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the injunction

orders subject of the instant petition are hereby
DECLARED NULL AND VOID. Corollary thereto, the
Court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 78,
Paraaque, is hereby directed to ENFORCE its Writ of
Demolition dated July 8, 1996. [3]

Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for

issuing the assailed orders to enforce the RTC
judgment. Both orders were issued after the
requisite notice and hearing. Moreover, the Court
of Appeals did not issue any writ of preliminary
injunction to stay the execution of the judgment.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in
her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of
Macaria Maglaqui, filed on March 16, 1993 a
complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No.
8550) against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other
persons[4] who were occupying several parcels of
land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville,
United Paraaque Subdivision IV, Metro Manila.
These parcels of land are covered by individual
transfer certificates of title[5] registered in the name
of Macaria Maglaqui, private respondents mother.

Petitioners tried to stay the execution of the order

of demolition by filing a petition for review with
prayer for TRO before us. We earlier denied said
prayer for TRO. We also find petitioners contention
that the said orders violated Rep. Act No. 7279,
particularly Section 28(c),19 totally without merit.
Under the provision, eviction or demolition may be
allowed when there is a court order for eviction and
demolition, as in the case at bar. Moreover, nothing
is shown on record that petitioners are
underprivileged and homeless citizens as defined
in Section 3(t) of Rep. Act No. 7279. 20 The
procedure for the execution of the eviction or
demolition order under Section 28(c) is, in our
view, not applicable.

The MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78,

eventually decided in favor of private respondent.
On appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 66. Mogar et al. elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed
by the appellate court on December 12, 1994. After
the dismissal became final, a writ of demolition
was issued by the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch
78. The writ, however, was not immediately
implemented because the case was transferred to
Branch 77 of the same court. On February 6, 1997,
Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC of
Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided over by Judge
Rolando G. How, to enjoin the implementation of
the writ of demolition. However, this petition was
denied and subsequently, an alias writ of
demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of
MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin.

It also appears that the order of demolition had

already been executed. Petitioners had already
vacated the area and private respondents now
possess the properties free from all occupants, as
evidenced by the sheriffs turn-over of possession
dated May 19, 2003. Thus, the instant case before
us has indeed become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review assailing the
Order dated April 30, 2003 and the Special Order of
Demolition dated May 9, 2003 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 77,
is DENIED for mootness and lack of merit.
G.R. No. 136274. September 3, 2003]

The alias writ of demolition was, again, not

executed, this time due to the ex parte issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita
Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case

SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION,

represented
by
FLORO
ARAGAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. ACTING PRESIDING

111

(Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of

Paraaque against the Testate Estate of Macaria
Maglaqui.

(Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of

Paraaque has been rendered moot by the dismissal
of that case. This Court, in a Resolution dated
January 29, 2003,[7] ordered the presiding judge of
the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 274 to report on
the status of the expropriation case filed by the
Municipality of Paraaque against herein private
respondent. The presiding judge reported that the
case was already dismissed on June 1, 1999 in an
order issued by then Presiding Judge Amelita
Tolentino who granted the motion to dismiss filed
by herein private respondent. Said dismissal was
not challenged by the Municipality of Paraaque. [8]

Meanwhile,
another
group
of
persons
occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F
and I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer case,
organized
themselves
into
the
Sunflower
Neighborhood
Association
(Sunflower),
the
petitioner herein. On November 18, 1996,
Sunflower, represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a
complaint
for
prohibition/injunction
with
preliminary injunction against private respondent
also with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257.
Sunflower argued that its members should be
excluded from the demolition order as they were
not parties to the original unlawful detainer case.
To include their houses in the demolition would be
to deprive them of due process. This time, Judge
How granted the injunction and ordered the
exclusion of the houses belonging to petitioner
from demolition.

The basic issue before us is whether

petitioners members, who were not parties to the
unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the
land subject of this case.
We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled
that,
although
an
ejectment
suit
is an
action in personam wherein
the
judgment
is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded
and given an opportunity to be heard, the
judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not
been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser,
squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently
occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;
(b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the
permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee
pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f)
a member of the family, relative or privy of the
defendant.[9]

Thus, private respondent filed a petition for

certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals (CA GR SP No. 46861) assailing
both the injunction orders issued by Judge Tolentino
in the expropriation case and by Judge How in the
prohibition case.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private
respondent holding that, as the judgment in the
unlawful detainer case had already become final,
the execution could not be enjoined.Consequently,
the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued
another alias writ of demolition on September 14,
1998.

In the case at bar, the records show that

petitioners members are trespassers or squatters
who do not have any right to occupy the property
of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the
ownership of the parcels of land in question. In
fact, it even admitted that the subject property is
owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private
respondent.[10] Petitioner failed to establish any
right which would entitle its members to occupy
the land in any capacity, whether as lessees,
tenants and the like. Petitioners only defense
against the eviction and demolition orders is their
supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer
case. This defense, however, has no legal support
since its members are trespassers or squatters who
are bound by the judgment.

In order to stay the execution of the writ of

demolition, Sunflower filed on January 7, 1999 an
urgent motion in this Court for the issuance of
a status quo order. This we granted in a resolution
dated January 20, 1999. Prior to the issuance of our
resolution, however, the writ of demolition was
implemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner thus
filed a motion to allow its members to return to the
premises, which we granted in another resolution
dated April 28, 1999. Thereafter, we required both
parties to submit their memoranda.
Sometime in November 1998, the group of
Mogar et al. filed in this Court a petition for review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR SP
No. 46861. However, we dismissed the same on
January 18, 1999 for failure of said petitioners to
comply with certain procedural requirements,
including their failure to submit a certification of
non-forum shopping.[6]

Petitioners argument that the parcels of land

occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G) were
not included in the original ejectment complaint
has no basis. The complaint private respondent
filed with the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78,
clearly included Lots I-F and I-G as part of the
subject matter under litigation in the unlawful
detainer
case.[11] Thus,
petitioners
members,
together with all the parties in the unlawful
detainer case, must vacate the disputed land.

For its part, petitioner Sunflower likewise

assailed the same decision of the Court of Appeals
in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Court commiserates with respondent,

already in her twilight years, who has been
unlawfully deprived of her land for a good number
of years. Thus, we exhort the court of origin to

Before we proceed, it should be pointed out

that any issue relating to the expropriation case

112

execute this decision with reasonable dispatch,

consistent with the requirements of Section 28 of
RA 7279 and EO 152, [12] on eviction and
demolition.

(2) That Miaque be ordered to immediately

pay the ATO the amount of not less
than P1,296,103.10, representing unpaid
space rental and concessionaire privilege
fees as of October 15, 2000 plus interest
and additional rental and fees which may
be proven during the trial.3

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED

and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED
G.R. No. 173616

The MTCC subsequently rendered a Decision4 dated

May 27, 2002 the dispositive part of which reads:

June 25, 2014

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding

[Miaque] to be unlawfully detaining the following
premises and orders [him], his men and privies to:

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

(ATO), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH
DIVISION) and BERNIE G.
MIAQUE, Respondents.

a. vacate the 800[-]square meter

Refreshment Parlor fronting the New
Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport. [Miaque] is
further ordered to pay [the ATO] the rental
and concessionaire privilege fee[s]
accruing from November 1986 to October
2000, totaling P460,060.70, plus
differential billings from January 1990 to
July 1993 for P4,652.60 and interest
charges from January 2000 to October
2000 for P2,678.38 or a total amount
of P467,397.68 as of October 2000, less
the payments made by [Miaque] under
Official Receipt No. 4317842 dated
December 1998, and the monthly current
lease/concession privilege fee from
November 2000 until [Miaque] shall have
vacated the premises;

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) seeks the nullification
of the Court of Appeals' Resolution1 dated March
29, 2006 and Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. The Resolution dated
March 29, 2006 granted the application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) of Bernie G.
Miaque, while the Resolution dated May 30, 2006
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo despite
Miaque's alleged continued failure and refusal to
make current the supersedeas bond and to pay to
the A TO the rental and concession privilege fees.

(b) vacate the 310[-]square meter

Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo
Terminal Building which was reduced to a
total of 183 square meters in 1998 (51.56
square meters inside the pre-departure
area and 126.72 square meters outside the
pre-departure area). [Miaque] is also
ordered to pay [the ATO]
rentals/concessionaires privilege fee[s]
from January 16, 1992 to October 15, 2000
in the total amount ofP719,708.43 and
from October 16, 2000, to pay the current
monthly lease/concessionaire privilege fees
until [Miaque] shall have vacated the
premises; and

The proceedings on the main case of ejectment

MTCC of Iloilo City: Civil Case No. 01 (38)
In May 2001, the ATO filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City, Branch 3. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 01 (38). The ATO sought
the following, among others:
(1) That Miaque be ordered to permanently
vacate and peacefully return to the ATO
possession of:

(c) vacate the area occupied or used by

[Miaque] incident to his operation of the
Porterage Service within the Iloilo Airport.
[Miaque] is further ordered to pay Tender
Offer Fee due from March 1992 to October
2000 in the total amount of P108,997.07.
[Miaque] is further ordered to pay the
current monthly concession privilege fee
from October 2000 until such time that
[Miaque] shall have vacated the premises.

(a) the 800-square meter

Refreshment Parlor fronting the
New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport;
(b) the 310-square meter
Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the
Iloilo Airport Terminal; and
(c) all areas occupied or otherwise
utilized by Miaque incident to his
operation of the Porterage Service
within the Iloilo Airport; and

Costs against [Miaque].5

RTC of Iloilo City: Civil Case No. 02-27292

113

Miaque appealed the MTCC Decision to the RTC of

Iloilo City, Branch 24. It was docketed as Civil Case
No. 02-27292. The RTC, in its Decision 6 dated June
7, 2003, affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety.
Miaques motion for reconsideration was
denied.7 Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. SP No. 79439
Miaque questioned the RTC Decision in the Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, on September 25, 2003. In a
Decision8 dated April 29, 2005, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the
RTC Decision. Miaque moved for reconsideration
but it was denied in a Resolution dated January 5,
2006.9

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and

enjoining the ATO and all persons acting in its
behalf from enforcing the respective Decisions of
the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439
is pending. Thus, after the dismissal of Miaques
petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the
ATO filed another urgent motion for execution of
the RTC Decision. In its motion, the ATO pointed out
that the supersedeas bond filed by Miaque had
lapsed and was not renewed and that the rental
and concessionaire privilege fees have not been
paid at all in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court.19 Miaque again opposed the ATOs
urgent motion for execution,20 while the ATO filed a
supplemental urgent motion for execution stating
that Miaques appeal in the Court of Appeals had
been dismissed.21

Supreme Court: G.R. No. 171099

Miaque brought the case to this Court in a petition
for review, docketed as G.R. No. 171099. In a
Resolution10dated February 22, 2006, the petition
was denied as no reversible error in the Court of
Appeals Decision was sufficiently shown. The
motion for reconsideration of Miaque was denied
with finality.11

In an Order22 dated June 1, 2005, the RTC granted

the ATOs urgent motion for execution and issued a
Writ of Execution23 dated June 2, 2005. On the basis
of the said writ, a notice to vacate was given to
Miaque.24 On June 3, 2005, Miaque filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated June 1,
2005, with prayer to set aside the writ of execution
and notice to vacate.25 At the same time, he filed a
motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 praying that the
Court of Appeals order the RTC judge and the
concerned sheriffs to desist from implementing the
writ of execution.26 Thereafter, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution27 dated June 14, 2005 ordering
the sheriffs to desist from executing the Decisions
of the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No.
79439 is still pending. However, on June 15, 2005,
before the concerned sheriffs received a copy of
the Resolution dated June 14, 2005, the said
sheriffs implemented the writ of execution and
delivered the possession of the following premises
to the ATO:

The proceedings on execution

As an incident of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the Court
of Appeals issued on February 27, 2004 a
temporary restraining order (TRO) effective for a
period of 60 days and required Miaque to post a
bond in the amount ofP100,000.00.12 After the
lapse of the TRO, the ATO filed an urgent motion
for the execution of the RTC Decision pursuant to
Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This was
opposed by Miaque.13
In an Order14 dated August 2, 2004, the RTC
granted the ATOs motion:

(a) the Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo

Terminal Building in the reduced area of
183 square meters; and

Wherefore, in view of the above consideration, the

court finds merit [i]n the reasons given in the
motion of [the ATO] and hereby Grants the
issuance of a Writ of Execution.

(b) the area which Miaque occupied or used

incident to his operation of the Porterage
Service within the Iloilo Airport.

Pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure, which mandates that the
judgment of this Court being immediately
executory in cases of this nature, let a writ of
execution shall issue, ordering the sheriff of this
Court to effect its Decision dated June 7, 2003,
affirming the Decision of the MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo
City.

The sheriffs who implemented the writ then filed a

return of service28 and issued reports of partial
delivery of possession.29 However, Miaque
subsequently regained possession of the said
premises on the strength of the Court of Appeals
Resolution dated June 14, 2005.30

Furnish copies of this order to the Asst. Solicitor

Almira Tomampos of the Office of the Solicitor
General and Atty. Rex Rico, counsel for [Miaque].15

On February 9, 2006, after the Court of Appeals

issued its Resolution dated January 5, 2006
denying Miaques motion for reconsideration of the
Decision dated April 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, the ATO filed with the RTC a motion for the
revival of the writs of execution dated August 16,
2004 and June 2, 2005.31 This was opposed by
Miaque.32 After the RTC heard the parties, it issued
an Order33 dated March 20, 2006 granting the
ATOs motion and revived the writs of execution
dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005. Miaque

Miaque sought reconsideration of the above Order

but the RTC denied the motion in an Order 16 dated
August 13, 2004. Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ
of Execution dated August 16, 2004.17
However, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution18 dated August 18, 2004 ordering the

114

filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC

denied it.34

"The rule is that, if the judgment of the

metropolitan trial court is appealed to the RTC and
the decision of the latter itself is elevated to the CA
whose decision thereafter became final, the case
should be remanded through the RTC to the
metropolitan trial court for execution."

A new case in the Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. CEB-SP

No. 01603
On March 28, 2006, Miaque filed a petition35 for
certiorari (with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or
writ of preliminary injunction) in the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603,
where he assailed the RTCs Order dated March 20,
2006. He prayed, among others, that the
implementation of the writs of execution be
enjoined. It is here where the Court of Appeals
issued the Resolutions being challenged in this
case, namely, the Resolution dated March 29, 2006
issuing a TRO effective for 60 days, and Resolution
dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the implementation of the
writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and
June2, 2005. In particular, the Resolution dated
May 30, 2006 reads: Before us for resolution is
[Miaque]s application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction that would restrain the
respondent judge, Sheriffs Marcial B. Lambuso,
Winston T. Eguia, Camilo I. Divinagracia, Jr. and Eric
George S. Luntao and all other persons acting for
and in their behalves, from enforcing the orders
issued by the respondent judge on March 20, 2006
and March 24, 2006, including the writ[s] of
execution issued pursuant thereto, while the
petition in the case at bench is still pending with
us.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, a

WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby
ordered or caused to be issued by us enjoining the
respondent judge, Sheriffs Marcial B. Lambuso,
Winston T. Eguia, Camilo I. Divinagracia, Jr. and Eric
George S. Luntao and all other persons acting for
and in their behalves, from enforcing the orders
issued by the respondent judge on March 20, 2006
and March 24, 2006, including the writ[s] of
execution issued pursuant thereto, while the
petition in the case at bench is still pending with
us.
This is subject to the petitioners putting up of a
bond in the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS(P100,000.00) to the effect that he will pay
to the respondent ATO all damages which said
office may sustain by reason of the injunctive writ
if we should finally decide that [Miaque] is not
entitled thereto.36
The present petition
The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and the
subsequent writ of preliminary injunction through
the Order dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution
dated May 30,2006, respectively. According to the
ATO, the Court of Appeals ignored the
governments right under the law, Rules of Court,
jurisprudence and equity to the possession as well
as to the payment of rental and concession
privilege fees which, at the time of the filing of this
petition, already amounted to P2 Million. Such right
had already been decided with finality by this
Court, which affirmed the Decision dated April 29,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, but the Court of Appeals has repeatedly
thwarted it. The RTC acted properly and pursuant
to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court when it
issued the writs of execution.37 Moreover, the ATO
asserts that a TRO cannot restrain an accomplished
fact, as the RTCs writ of execution dated June 1,
2005 had already been partially implemented.38

After examining judiciously the record in this case,

together with the submissions and contentions of
the parties, we have come up with a finding and so
hold that there is a sufficient showing by [Miaque]
that the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enumerated in Section 3 of
Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court exist.
We find that [Miaque] has a right in esse to be
protected and the acts against which the injunction
is sought to be directed are violative of said right.
To our mind, [Miaque] appears to have a clear legal
right to hold on to the premises leased by him from
ATO at least until such time when he shall have
been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution
of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in
Iloilo City, which is the court of origin of the
decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79439 on April 29, 2005. Under the attendant
circumstances, it appears that the respondent
judge orthe RTC in Iloilo City has no jurisdiction to
order the issuance of such writ of execution
because we gave due course to the petition for
review filed with us in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and, in
fact, rendered a decision on the merit in said case,
thereby divesting the RTC in Iloilo City of
jurisdiction over the case as provided for in the
third paragraph of Section 8(a) of Rule 42of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court. In City of Manila vs.
Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362, as cited in Mocles
vs. Maravilla, 239 SCRA 188, the Supreme Court
held as follows:

The ATO also argues that, by his admission that the

issues in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 and CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01603 are exactly the same, Miaque has
committed forum shopping. In this connection, the
ATO points out that, in his opposition to the ATOs
motion for additional period of time to file its
comment on Miaques petition in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01603, Miaque pointed out the similarity of the
core issues in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01603, to wit:
b) The legal issues raised by the petition
[in CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603] are very

115

simple and not complicated. In fact, the

threshold issue, i.e., whether or not
respondent court (RTC) has jurisdiction to
issue the writ of execution after the appeal
over its decision had been perfected and
the petition for review [in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439] given due course, is exactly the
same one earlier raised by [the ATO itself
in its] "Motion for Reconsideration" of the
Resolution dated June 14, 2005, in CA G.R.
No. 79439, entitled "Bernie G. Miaque vs.
Hon. Danilo P. Galvez and Air
Transportation Office (ATO)", (same parties
in this proceeding), then pending before
the 20th Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu
City.

Miaque also asserts that the ATOs claim that the

RTCs writ of execution had been partially
implemented is not true and that he is in
possession of the entire subject premises when the
Court of Appeals issued the TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction being challenged in this
case.
Finally, Miaque alleges that no writ may be issued
to enforce the MTCC Decision as the said decision
had already been novated by his deposit
of P319,000.00 to the ATOs account with the Land
Bank of the Philippines in February 2006.43
This Court, in a Resolution44 dated August 14, 2006,
issued a TRO enjoining the Court of Appeals,
Miaque, and his agents and representatives from
implementing the Resolution dated March 29, 2006
and the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01603.

Hence, all that [the ATO has] to do is simply to

reiterate [its] said arguments, the law and
jurisprudence [it has] earlier invoked and, if [it
wishes], add some more arguments, laws or
jurisprudence thereto. Such an exercise would
definitely not require a sixty (60) day period. A ten
(10) day period is more than sufficient.39

The Courts ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The ATO further contends that the subject premises

form part of a public utility infrastructure and,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1818, the
issuance of a TRO against a public utility
infrastructure is prohibited.40

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the challenge to

the Order dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO,
effective for 60 days, is moot as its effectivity had
already lapsed.

The ATO adds that Miaques petition for certiorari

in CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603 introduces a new
matter which is the alleged novation of the MTCC
Decision when he deposited the amount
of P319,900.00 to the Land Bank of the Philippines
account of the ATO in February 2006. At any rate,
the ATO asserts that its tenacity in pursuing the
execution of the judgment against Miaque belies its
consent to the alleged novation.41

Cutting through the tangled web of issues

presented by the contending parties, the basic
question in this petition is whether or not the Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 which
granted petitioners application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01603.

For his part, Miaque argues that this Court has no

jurisdiction to dismiss a petition still pending with
the Court of Appeals. Thus, the ATO cannot
properly pray that this Court dismiss CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603. According to Miaque, the jurisdiction
of this Court is limited only to the determination of
whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in issuing a TRO and,
subsequently, a preliminary injunction in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01603. In this connection, Miaque
insists that the Court of Appeals acted well within
its jurisdiction in the issuance of both the Order
dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO and the
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603. As this Court has effectively affirmed the
MTCC Decision, then it is the MTCC and not the RTC
which should have directed the execution of the
MTCC Decision. Moreover, the RTC had no
jurisdiction to issue the writs of execution dated
August 16, 2004 and June 1, 2005 because the said
court already lost its jurisdiction when Miaque filed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals on September
25, 2003, which appeal was given due course.42

Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides

the key to that question: Sec. 21. Immediate
execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional
Trial Court against the defendant shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure:
Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall
be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same in accordance
with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases
governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be
deemed repealed. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

116

The above provisions are supplemented and

reinforced by Section 4, Rule 39 and Section 8(b),
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which respectively
provide:

appellate courts discretion, suspended or

modified.
The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is
immediately executory -- is emphasized by the fact
that no resolutory condition has been imposed that
will prevent or stay the execution of the RTCs
judgment.45 The significance of this may be better
appreciated by comparing Section 21 of Rule 70
with its precursor, Section 10, Rule 70 of the 1964
Rules of Court which provided:

Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal.

Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership,
accounting and support, and such other judgments
as are now or may hereafter be declared to be
immediately executory, shall be enforceable after
their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal
taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the
trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate
court in its discretion may make an order
suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the
injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of
support.

Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of

Appeals or Supreme Court. Where defendant
appeals from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance, execution of said judgment, with respect
to the restoration of possession, shall not be stayed
unless the appellant deposits the same amounts
and within the periods referred to in section 8 of
this rule to be disposed of in the same manner as
therein provided.

The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as

to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper
for the security or protection of the rights of the
adverse party.

Under the old provision, the procedure on appeal

from the RTCs judgment to the Court of Appeals
was, with the exception of the need for a
supersedeas bond which was not applicable,
virtually the same as the procedure on appeal of
the MTCs judgment to the RTC. Thus, in the
contemplated recourse to the Court of Appeals, the
defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could also
prevent the immediate execution of the judgment
by making the periodic deposit of rentals during
the pendency of the appeal and thereby
correspondingly prevent restitution of the premises
to the plaintiff who had already twice vindicated his
claim to the property in the two lower courts. On
the other hand, under the amendatory procedure
introduced by the present Section 21 of Rule 70,
the judgment of the RTC shall be immediately
executory and can accordingly be enforced
forthwith. It shall not be stayed by the mere
continuing deposit of monthly rentals by the
dispossess or during the pendency of the case in
the Court of Appeals or this Court, although such
execution of the judgment shall be without
prejudice to that appeal taking its due course. This
reiterates Section 21 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure which replaced the appellate
procedure in, and repealed, the former Section 10,
Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court.46 Teresa T.
Gonzales LaO & Co., Inc. v. Sheriff Hatab47 states:

xxxx
Sec. 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.
(a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review
and the payment of the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees, the appeal is deemed perfected
as to the petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the
case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.
However, before the Court of Appeals gives due
course to the petition, the Regional Trial Court may
issue orders for the protection and preservation of
the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal.
(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rules on
Summary Procedure, the appeal shall stay the
judgment or final order unless the Court of
Appeals, the law, or these Rules shall provide
otherwise. (Emphases supplied.)

Unlike Rule 70 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court

where the defendant, after perfecting his appeal,
could prevent the immediate execution of the
judgment by taking an appeal and making a
periodic deposit of monthly rentals during the
pendency of the appeal thereby preventing the
plaintiff from taking possession of the premises in
the meantime, the present wording of Section 21,
Rule 70 explicitly provides that the judgment of the
regional trial court in ejectment cases appealed to
it shall be immediately executory and can be
enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a
higher court.48 (Emphasis supplied.)

The totality of all the provisions above shows the

following significant characteristics of the RTC
judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the
defendant-appellant is immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further
appeal that may be taken therefrom; and
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed
by an appeal taken therefrom, unless
otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the

117

The RTCs duty to issue a writ of execution under

Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be
compelled by mandamus.49 Section 21 of Rule 70
presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry
or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the
RTCs judgment and appeals to a higher court. It
authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of
execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its
due course.50 The rationale of immediate execution
of judgment in an ejectment case is to avoid
injustice to a lawful possessor.51 Nevertheless, it
should be stressed that the appellate court may
stay the writ of execution should circumstances so
require.52

pursuant to Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of

Court. On the other hand, execution of the RTCs
judgment under Section 21, Rule 70 is not
discretionary execution but a ministerial duty of
the RTC.54 It is not governed by Section 2, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court but by Section 4, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court on judgments not stayed by
appeal. In this connection, it is not covered by the
general rule, that the judgment of the RTC is
stayed by appeal to the Court of Appeals under
Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, but
constitutes an exception to the said rule. In
connection with the second characteristic of the
RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it,
the consequence of the above distinctions between
discretionary execution and the execution of the
RTCs judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to
the Court of Appeals is that the former may be
availed of in the RTC only before the Court of
Appeals gives due course to the appeal while the
latter may be availed of in the RTC at any stage of
the appeal to the Court of Appeals. But then again,
in the latter case, the Court of Appeals may stay
the writ of execution issued by the RTC should
circumstances so require.55 City of Naga v. Hon.
Asuncion56 explains:

The second characteristic -- the judgment of the

RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom
reinforces the first.1wphi1 The judgment of the
RTC in an ejectment case is enforceable upon its
rendition and, upon motion, immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal taken therefrom. The
execution of the RTCs judgment is not
discretionary execution under Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 2. Discretionary execution.

This is not to say that the losing defendant in an

ejectment case is without recourse to avoid
immediate execution of the RTC decision. The
defendant may x x x appeal said judgment to the
Court of Appeals and therein apply for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Thus, as held in Benedicto v.
Court of Appeals, even if RTC judgments in unlawful
detainer cases are immediately executory,
preliminary injunction may still be granted.
(Citation omitted.)

(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order

pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial
court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is
in possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time
of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final
order even before the expiration of the period to
appeal.

To reiterate, despite the immediately executory

nature of the judgment of the RTC in ejectment
cases, which judgment is not stayed by an appeal
taken therefrom, the Court of Appeals may issue a
writ of preliminary injunction that will restrain or
enjoin the execution of the RTCs judgment. In the
exercise of such authority, the Court of Appeals
should constantly be aware that the grant of a
preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound
discretion of the court with the caveat that it
should be made with great caution.57

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion

for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial
judgments. A several, separate or partial
judgment may be executed under the same terms
and conditions as execution of a judgment or final
order pending appeal.

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

event which must be granted only in the face of
actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of
the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the
requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction
are present in the case before it. In the absence of
the same, and where facts are shown to be
wanting in bringing the matter within the
conditions for its issuance, the ancillarywrit must
be struck down for having been rendered in grave
abuse of discretion.58

Discretionary execution is authorized while the trial

court, which rendered the judgment sought to be
executed, still has jurisdiction over the case as the
period to appeal has not yet lapsed and is in
possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time
of the filing of the motion for execution. It is part of
the trial courts residual powers, or those powers
which it retains after losing jurisdiction over the
case as a result of the perfection of the appeal.53 As
a rule, the judgment of the RTC, rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, being sought
to be executed in a discretionary execution is
stayed by the appeal to the Court of Appeals

In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case

No. 01 (38), of the RTC in Civil Case No. 02-27292,
and of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79439

118

unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to

possession of the property and the corresponding
obligation of Miaque to immediately vacate the
subject premises. This means that the MTCC, the
RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque
does not have any right to continue in possession
of the said premises. It is therefore puzzling how
the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction with the sweeping
statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear
legal right to hold on to the premises leased by him
from ATO at least until such time when he shall
have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of
execution of judgment caused to be issued by the
MTCC in Iloilo City, which is the court of origin of
the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79439." Unfortunately, in its Resolution
dated May 30, 2006 granting a writ of preliminary
injunction in Miaques favor, the Court of Appeals
did not state the source or basis of Miaques "clear
legal right to hold on to the [said] premises." This is
fatal.

the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and

June 1, 2005 in its Order dated March 20, 2006,
after the Court of Appeals denied Miaques motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439. Indeed, the said writs of
execution need not even be revived because they
continue in effect during the period within which
the judgment may be enforced by motion, that is
within five years from entry of judgment, pursuant
to Section 14,60 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 661 of the same Rule.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is
(1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias.62 In this case, the Court of Appeals
issued the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting
Miaques prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
contrary to Section 21, Rule 70 and other relevant
provisions of the Rules of Court, as well as this
Courts pronouncements in Teresa T. Gonzales LaO
& Co., Inc.63 and Nisce.64 Thus, the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued
the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603.

In Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.,59 this Court

stated that, in granting or dismissing an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction, the court must
state in its order the findings and conclusions
based on the evidence and the law. This is to
enable the appellate court to determine whether
the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the
plea for injunctive relief. In the absence of proof of
a legal right and the injury sustained by one who
seeks an injunctive writ, an order for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified.
Thus, where the right of one who seeks an in
junctive writ is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary
injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of an actual
existing right is not a ground for a preliminary
injunction.

This Court notes that the controversy between the

parties in this case has been unduly protracted,
considering that the decisions of the MTCC, the
RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court in favor of
the ATO and against Miaque on the ejectment case
are already final and executory. The Court of
Appeals should therefore proceed expeditiously in
resolving CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 is ANNULLED
for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. The Court of Appeals is directed to
conduct its proceedings in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603 expeditiously and without delay

The sole basis of the Court of Appeals in issuing its

Resolution dated May 30, 2006 is its view that the
RTC "has no jurisdiction to order the issuance of
[the] writ of execution" because, when it gave due
course to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, the RTC was already divested of jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to the third paragraph of
Section 8(a), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The
Court of Appeals is mistaken. It disregards both (1)
the immediately executory nature of the judgment
of the RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule that
such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an
appeal taken there from. It ignores the nature of
the RTCs function to issue a writ of execution of its
judgment in an ejectment case as ministerial and
not discretionary.

G.R. No. 196219

July 30, 2014

SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA

DELA CRUZ-TABINO, Petitioners,
vs.
LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set
aside the August 25, 2010 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957, entitled "Lazaro
M Tabina, Petitioner, versus Spouses Mauricio
Tabina and Leonila dela Cruz-Tabina, Respondents,"
as well as its March 18, 2011 Resolution3 denying
reconsideration of the assailed judgment.

The RTC was validly exercising its jurisdiction

pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court when it issued the writs of execution dated
August 16, 2004 and June 2,2005. While the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 enjoined the
execution of the RTCs judgment during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the RTC revived

Factual Antecedents

119

Proclamation No. 5184 (Proc. 518) e)(cluded from

the operation of Proc. 4235 which established the
military reservation known as Fort Bonifacio
situated in the then municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Pateros and Paraaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay
City certain portions in said reservation known
and identified as BarangaysCembo, South Cembo,
West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and
Pitogo, situated in Makati, and declared the
sameopen for disposition in accordance with
Republic Act (RA) No. 274,6 and RA 7307 in relation
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141.8

Petitioners counteredin their Answer13 that

respondent had no right to eject them; that the
parties trueagreement was that petitioners would
act as caretakers of respondents Lot 3, and for
this, respondent would pay petitioners a monthly
salary of P800.00; that respondent failed to honor
the agreement; and that relative to Lot 2, there
was a pending Protest filed with the Regional
Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)National Capital Region.
Protests in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources

Among others, Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area

of 300 square meters for disposition to any bona
fideoccupants/residents of said BarangaysCembo,
South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo,
Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo who have resided in
or occupied such areas on or before January 7,
1986.

It appears that petitioners and respondent both

filed Protests with the DENR relative to Lots 2 and
3. In a June 13, 2006 Decision, respondents Protest
docketed as Case No. 2004-821 and entitled
"Lazaro M. Tabino, Protestant, versus Mauricio
Tabino and Leonila C. Tabino, Protestees" was
resolved as follows:

In 1985, petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) a

technical sergeant in the military and his brother,
respondent Lazaro M. Tabino a colonel in the
military occupied a 353-square meter lot in
Pembo, Makati City. Mauricio established residence
within the lot, while respondent continued to reside
in Novaliches, Quezon City.9The lot was later
subdivided into two portions, denominated as Lots
2 and 3, Block 255, Zone 12, Group 10,
Sampaguita Extension, Pembo, Makati City.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

Protest should be as it is hereby "DENIED" for lack
ofmerit. The MiscellaneousSales Application filed
by Mauricio Tabino over Lot 2, Block 255, Zone 12,
Group 190, Sampaguita St., Pembo, Makati should
now be given due course by this Office. x x x14

Lot 2 containing an area of 184 squaremeters

was applied for coverage under Proc. 518 by
Mauricio, while Lot 3 containing an area of 169
square meters was applied for by respondent.
Respondent was later on issued by the Fort
Bonifacio Post Commander a Revocable Permit10 to
occupy his lot, but the permit authorized him to
occupy an area of only 150 square meters.

The DENR held in Case No. 2004-821 that

respondent is not qualified to acquire Lot 2 under
Proc. 518 since he was already awarded a home lot
in Fort Bonifacio, specifically Lot 19, Block 22, Fort
Bonifacio (AFPOVAI), Taguig. Moreover, he failed to
provethat Mauricio was not a bona
fideresident/occupant of Lot 2; on the contrary, it
has been shown that Mauricio, and not respondent,
has been in actual possession and occupation of
the lot.

In 1988, Lot 3 was awarded to respondent, and a

Certificate11 to such effect was issued by the
Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau).

In an August 28, 2007 Order,15 the above

disposition was reiterated after respondents
motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment

case against Mauricio and the latters wife, Leonila
dela Cruz (petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati (MeTC). Docketedas Civil Case No.
85043 and assigned to Branch 64, the ejectment
case is based on the theory that respondent is the
true and sole owner of the 353-square meter lot;
that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of
circumventing the 300-square meter limit set by
Proc. 518 by asking the latter to apply for the
purchase of a portion of the lot after subdividing
the same into two smaller lots; that Mauricios stay
in the premises is merelyby tolerance of
respondent; that petitioners introduced permanent
structures on the land; and that petitioners refused
to vacate the premises upon respondents formal
demand. Respondent thus prayed that petitioners
be ordered to vacate Lots2 and 3 and to pay the
former rentals, attorneys fees, and costs of suit. 12

On the other hand, petitioners Protest,docketed as

Case No. 2005-939 and entitled "Leonila Tabino and
Adrian Tabino, Protestants, versus Lazaro Tabino
and Rafael Tabino, Respondents", was resolved in
an August 28, 2007 Order,16 which decreed thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Protest
lodged before this Office on 21 January 2005 by
Leonila Tabino and Adrian Tabino as against the
Application of Lazaro/Rafael Tabino over Lot 3, Blk.
255, Zone 12, Pembo, Makati City is, as it is hereby
"GRANTED". As a consequence, the MSA
(Unnumbered) of Rafael H. Tabino is hereby
CANCELLED and DROPPED from the records of the
Office. Thus, the Order dated July 16, 2004 re:
Cancellation Order No. 04-032 should be, as it is
hereby SET ASIDE. After the finality of this
Decision, Claimant-Protestant Adrian Tabino may
now file his land application over the subject lot.

120

SO ORDERED.17

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the

complaint as well as defendants counterclaim are
herebyordered Dismissed. No costs.

The ruling in Case No. 2005-939 is similar to the

pronouncement in Case No. 2004-821: that
respondent was disqualified from acquiring any
more lots within Fort Bonifacio pursuant to Proc.
518, since he was previously awarded a home lot
therein, specifically Lot 19, Block 22, PEMBO,Fort
Bonifacio (AFPOVAI), Taguig; that respondent is not
a bona fideresident/occupant of Lot 3, as he and
his family actually resided in Novaliches, Quezon
City; and that Mauricio has been in actual
possession and occupation of Lot 3 since 1985.

SO ORDERED.19
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Respondent appealed before the Makati Regional
Trial Court (RTC),20 but in a February 19, 2009
Decision21 the RTC affirmed the MeTC in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 64, Makati City
dated April 4, 2008 in Civil Case No. 85043 is
hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On April 4, 2008, a Decision18 was rendered in Civil
Case No. 85043, as follows:

SO ORDERED.22

The only issue to be resolved in this action to

recover possession of the subject property is the
question on who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the premises. In ejectment
cases, the word "possession" means nothing more
than physical possession, not legal possession, in
the sense contemplated in civil law.

The RTC agreed with the MeTC in ruling that

respondent is not entitled to possession of the
disputed premises on account of the DENR findings
in Case Nos. 2005-939 and 2004-821 that
petitioners are registeredclaimants and bona
fideresidents thereof, and have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
thereof under a bona fideclaim of ownership,while
respondent was permitted to occupy an area of
only 150 square meters and not more; petitioner
would be in direct violation of his permit ifhe were
to occupy more than the allowed area stated in
said permit.

It is undisputed that the revocable permit extended

to the plaintiff was to occupy a parcel of land
withan area of 150 square meters. Suffice it to say
that beyond the 150 square meterswould be
contrary to the permit extended to the plaintiff to
occupy the lot. Plaintiff therefore, would violate the
provisions of the revocable permit if he goes
beyond whatwas specified therein or up to 150
square meters. When the land was declared open
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274
and Republic Act No. 730 both parties applied in
their respective name pursuant to the size of the
land which they are permitted. Since then
defendants have been in possession of the subject
property up to the present pursuant to the permit
to occupy the subject land. Furthermore,
defendants had acquired the property in their own
name, a valid claim to establish possession.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent filed his Petition for Review23 with the
CA, assailing the RTC Decision and insisting that he
had a better right of possession since he was the
bona fideoccupant of the disputed lot and Mauricio
was merely his caretaker. He added that in 1994,
Mauricio executed an Affidavit24 (1994 affidavit)
acknowledging that respondent was the true owner
of Lot 2 and that he was merely allowed by the
latter to occupy the same and introduce
improvements thereon; this operated as an
admission against interest which may be used
against petitioners. Finally, respondent argued that
the decision in the DENR Protest is not yet final and
executory on account of his pending appeal; thus,
the courts may not rely on the findings contained
therein. On August 25, 2010, the CA issued the
assailed Decision, which held thus:

Plaintiffs contention thatdefendants stay on the

premises is by mere tolerance is devoid of merit.
Well-established is the rule that findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision or order
is not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. The
order dated August 28, 2007 by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources affirming its
previous decision in Case No. 2004-821 dated
June13, 2006 clearly stating therein that
defendants are awardees of Lot 2, Block 255, Zone
12, Sampaguita Street, Pembo, Makati City, are
accorded with respect and finality. Truly,
defendants are rightful possessors of the subject
property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed
decisions ofthe RTC and the MeTC are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ejectment suit filed
by the petitioner against the respondents over Lot
Nos. 2 and 3 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
respondents are ordered to vacate the subject
premises.
SO ORDERED.25

xxxx

121

In reversing the trial court, the CA held that the

1994 affidavit which petitioners do not dispute
should be taken as an admission by Mauricio that
he was merely appointed by respondent as the
caretaker of Lot 2, and that respondent is the true
possessor and owner thereof. This being the case,
petitioners occupy the premises by mere tolerance
of respondent, and are boundto the implied
promise that they shall vacate the sameupon
demand. The CAadded that while respondent was
authorized to occupy only 150 square meters, this
was irrelevant since the only issue that must be
resolvedin an unlawful detainer case is actual
physical or material possession, independent of
any claim of ownership; since respondent has
satisfactorily shown by preponderant evidence that
he was in actual possession of Lots 2 and 3, he is
entitled to recover the same from petitioners.

In their Petition and Reply,27 petitioners seek a

reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and the
reinstatement of the MeTCs April 4, 2008 Decision,
arguing that the ejectment case constituted an
attack on the DENR rulings in Case Nos. 2004-821
and 2005-939 which disqualified respondent from
acquiring Lots 2 and 3 on the ground that he was
already an awardee of a lot within Fort Bonifacio;
that Mauricio has been in actual possession and
occupation of Lots 2 and 3 since 1985; and that
respondent is not a bona fideresident/occupant of
Lot 2 or 3 which is not allowed, as it encroached
on the administrative authority of the DENR. They
argue that respondent should not have resorted to
the ejectment case; instead, he should have
exhausted all administrativeremedies made
available to him through the DENR. Petitioners add
that respondent is guilty of forum-shopping in filing
the ejectment case without awaiting resolution of
the pending DENR Protests, which necessarily
touched upon the issue of possession.

The CA also held that while respondents

application for Lot 2 was denied by the DENR in its
June 13, 2006 Decision since he was already an
awardee of another lot within Fort Bonifacio, the
issue of possession was not touched upon. For this
reason, the DENR Decision has no bearing on the
unlawful detainer case. Additionally, the DENR
rulings are still the subject of appeals, and thus
could not have conclusive effect.

Respondents Arguments
Respondent argues in his Comment28 that
petitioners are estopped from claiming that the
ejectment case indirectlyattacked the DENR rulings
and that it constituted forum-shopping, since these
issues were not raised by petitioners in their
pleadings below; thatthe courts are not divested of
jurisdiction over the ejectment case, since the only
issue involved therein is possession and not who is
entitled to a miscellaneous sales application
covering the disputed lot which the DENR is
tasked to determine; and thatas a consequence of
Mauricios 1994 affidavit, petitioners are estopped
from questioning respondents possession.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but in a

March 18, 2011 Resolution, the CA stood its
ground. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. CAN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE
DENR IN RESOLVING CONFLICTING CLAIMS
AS TO WHO HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF
POSSESSION BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND
RESPONDENT OVER SUBJECT PARCELS OF
LOT BE NULLIFIED BY THE COURT UNDER
AN EJECTMENT CASE?

Our Ruling
The Court partially grants the Petition.
Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners
may not raise the issues of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and forum-shopping, after
having voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC trying the
ejectment case. Besides, these issues are being
raised for the first time at this stage of the
proceedings. Moreover, petitioners in the instant
Petition pray for the reinstatement of the MeTC
Decision;as such, they cannot be allowed to
simultaneously attack and adopt the proceedings
or actions taken by the lower courts.

2. HAS THE COURT VALIDLY ACQUIRED

JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE
ON REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY WITHOUT HAVING
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FIRST
EXHAUSTED?
3. HAS RESPONDENT VIOLATEDTHE RULE
AGAINST FORUM- SHOPPING IN FILING
EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST PETITIONERS
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
MISCELLANEOUS SALES APPLICATION
CASES BEFORE THE DENR WHICH
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY, IN EXERCISE OF ITS
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION, HAS FIRST
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME
PARTIES, SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND
SAME ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW?26

Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate

court erred in ordering petitioners to vacate the
premises. With the pendency of the DENR Protests
Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 respondents
claim of possession and his right to recover the
premises is seriously placed in issue. If the
ejectment case Civil Case No. 85043 is allowed
to proceed without awaiting the result of the DENR
Protests, then a situation might arise where the
existing structures thereon would have to be
demolished. If petitioners position, as affirmed by

Petitioners Arguments

122

the DENR, is further upheld with finality by the

courts, then it would mean that respondent had no
right to occupy or take possession of the subject
lots, which thus negates his right to institute and
maintain the ejectment case; and an injustice
would have occurred as a consequence of the
demolition of petitioners residence and other
permanent improvements on the disputed lots.

Moreover, notwithstanding the issue of physical

possession having been ruled upon by the Court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 107957, it is well to note that in the
case of Estrella vs. Robles, it was explained that
the Bureau of Lands determines the respective
rights of rival claimants to public lands, but it does
not have the wherewithal to police public lands.
Neither does it have the means to prevent
disorders or breaches of the peace among the
occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition
and alienation and any power to decide disputes
over possession is but in aid of making the proper
awards.

Indeed, DENR Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939

have found their way to the CA, and the
pronouncementsof the latter do not exactly favor
respondent. Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 125056,
entitled "Lazaro M. Tabino, Petitioner, versus
Mauricio M. Tabino and Leonila C. Tabino,
Respondents," the CA dismissed respondents
Petition for Review of the DENR Secretarys
affirmance of the DENR NCR Regional Executive
Directors June 13, 2006 Decision in Case No. 2004821. In its January 13, 2014 Decision,29 the CAs 6th
Division held as follows:

xxxx
In disposing of the case of Estrella, the Supreme
Court held that, "Under the Public Land Act, the
Director of Lands primarily and the DENR Secretary
ultimately have the authority to dispose of and
manage public lands. And while the DENRs
jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the
authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of
possession, the DENRs decision would prevail with
regard to the respective rights of public land
claimants. Regular courts would have no
jurisdiction to inquire intothe validity of the award
of the public land."

The DENR Secretary, acting through the OIC,

Assistant Secretary for Legal Services, denied the
appeal on the basis that upon findings of the
Regional Executive Director, Mauricio has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
based on the disposition of Public Lands. The DENR
further ruled that upon ocular inspection made, it
was ascertained that 1) per records, Mauricio is a
survey claimant of Lot 2, Block 255, Psd-a30054204 with an area of 184 sq.m. situated in
Pembo, Makati City; 2) that the land is residential
in nature, a house stands erected in said area
where Mauricio and his family reside; 3) that a
portion of the said area is being utilized as a
carinderiaand a sari-sari store as their familys
business; 4) thatMauricio is occupying the area
since 1985 up to the present; 5) that Lazaro Tabino
(petitioner) is actually residing in Quezon City; and,
6) the Yvonne Josephine Tabino, petitioner Lazaro
Tabino and Rafael Tabino are bonafideresidents of
Quezon City for noless than twenty years, per
Certification of Barangay Chairman Almario
Francisco on 2 September 2004 of Barangay San
Agustin, Novaliches, Quezon City. Further, the
DENR held that the above findings were never
refuted by the petitioner.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds no reason

to disturb the ruling of public respondent DENR in
its disposition of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
In the second case decided by the CA CA-G.R. SP
No. 126100 entitled "Lazaro M. Tabino and Rafael
H. Tabino, Petitioners, versus Leonila C. Tabino and
Adrian C. Tabino, Respondents" relative to the
disposition in DENR Case No. 2005-939, the
appellate courts 9th Division held in a June 28,
2013 Decision30 that
We agree with the respondents and dismiss the
petition for petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

On this point, it is worth stressing that the courts

generally accord great respect, if not finality, to
factual findings of administrative agencies because
of their special knowledgeand expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction. Echoing the
explanation of the private respondent DENR, citing
the case of Ortua vs. Encarnacion, the findings of
facts of the Director of Land (now the Regional
Director) is conclusive in the absence of any
showing that such decision was rendered in
consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other
than error of judgment in estimating the value or
effect ofevidence, regardless of whether or not it is
consistent with the preponderance of evidence, so
long as there is some evidence upon which the
findings in question could be made.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies is a cornerstone of Our judicial system.
The thrust of the ruleis that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions
and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence.
The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails
lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy
away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.
Another important reason for the doctrine of
exhaustion is the separation of powers, which
enjoins the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-

123

interference with matters coming primarily (albeit

not exclusively) withinthe competence of the other
departments. The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to resolve
questions addressed to their particular expertise
and that errors committed by subordinates in their
resolution may be rectified by their superiors if
given a chance to do so. Strict enforcement of the
rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable
number of avoidable cases which otherwise would
burden their heavily loaded dockets.

judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just

and less productive of confusion and disturbance of
physical possession, with all its concomitant
inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in
which the issue of legal possession, whether
involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain,
should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed
with it, the effects of any order or decision in the
unlawful detainer case in order to await the final
judgment in the more substantive case involving
legal possession or ownership. It is only where
there has been forcible entry that as a matter of
public policy the right to physical possession
should be immediately set at rest in favor of the
prior possession regardless of the fact that the
other party might ultimately be found to have
superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to
discourage any attempt to recover possession thru
force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to
the courts.34

Thus, the party with an administrative remedy

must not only commence with the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also
pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary
and premature resort to the court. The nonobservance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies results in lack of cause of
action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of
Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.

More significantly, Amagan v. Marayag35 dictates,

thus
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be
abated or suspended by the mere filing before the
regional trial court (R TC) of another action raising
ownership of the property as an issue. As an
exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may
be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of
equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners'
house would result from the enforcement of the
municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgrnent.36

Indeed, the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies admits of exceptions, but
none of these apply in this
case.1wphi1 Consequently, Lazaro and Rafael
should have first appealed to the Office ofthe
President, which has the power to review the
orders or acts of the DENR Secretary, being his
subordinate, before coming to Us through a
petition for review. x x x

In light of the developments in the DENR Protests,

the Court cannot in good conscience order the
petitioners to vacate the premises at this point.
The better alternative would be to await the
outcome of these Protests, before any action is
taken in the ejectment case.

xxxx
FOR THESE REASONS, WeDISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The assailed August 25, 2010 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957 is MODIFIED,
in that the directive for petitioners to vacate the
suqject premises is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

In Samonte v. Century Savings Bank,31 this Court

made the following pronouncement:
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to
await the outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda.
de Legaspi v. Avendao, and Amagan v. Marayag,
we ordered the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings on considerations of equity. We
explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein
would mean a demolition of their house and would
create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and
expense. Needlessly, the court would be wasting
much time and effort by proceeding to a stage
wherein the outcome would at best be temporary
but the result of enforcement would be permanent,
unjust and probably irreparable.32

Accordingly, the proceedings in the ejectment

case, Civil Case No. 85043, are ordered
SUSPENDED until the proceedings in DENR Case
Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 are concluded. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG,
CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS
MANALANG,Petitioners, v. BIENVENIDO AND
MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents.

On the other hand, Vda. de Legaspi v. Hon.

Avendao,33 which Samonte refers to, states:
x x x Where the action, therefore, [is] one of illegal
detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible
entry, and the right ofthe plaintiff to recover the
premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

124

In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall decide the appeal of
the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in
unlawful detainer or forcible entry cases on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
briefs as may be required by the RTC. There is no
trial de novo of the case.cralawred

and the action was brought within one year from

such withholding of possession the proper action
was ejectment which was within the jurisdiction of
the MTC; and that the case was not a boundary
dispute that could be resolved in an accion
reinvidicatoria, considering that it involved a
sizeable area of property and not a mere
transferring of
boundary.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Case

Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1,7 ultimately

dismissed the complaint and counterclaim for lack
of merit through the decision rendered on August
31, 2000,8 ruling that the petitioners failed to
adduce clear and convincing evidence showing
that the respondents had encroached on their
property and had been occupying and possessing
property outside the metes and bounds described
in Bienvenido Bacanis OCT No. N-216701; that the
preponderance of evidence was in favor of the
respondents right of possession; and that the
respondents counterclaim for damages should also
be dismissed, there being no showing that the
complaint had been filed in gross and evident bad
faith.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on

October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
68419,1whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC, Branch 49, in
Guagua, Pampanga, and reinstated the judgment
rendered on August 31, 2000 by the MTC of
Guagua, Pampanga dismissing their complaint for
unlawful detainer and the respondents
counterclaim. They also hereby assail the
resolution promulgated on January 24, 2003
denying their motion for
reconsideration.2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Antecedents

Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC.

Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang,

Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M. Gonzales, Ladislao
Manalang and Luis Manalang were the co-owners
of Lot No 4236 with an area of 914 square meters
of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. The
land was covered by approved survey plan Ap-03004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents
Lot No. 4235 covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. N-216701. In 1997, the petitioners
caused the relocation and verification survey of Lot
4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed
that the respondents had encroached on Lot No.
4236 to the extent of 405 square meters. A
preliminary relocation survey conducted by the
Lands Management Section of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
confirmed the result on the encroachment. When
the respondents refused to vacate the encroached
portion and to surrender peaceful possession
thereof despite demands, the petitioners
commenced this action for unlawful detainer on
April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua (Civil Case No.
3309), and the case was assigned to Branch 2 of
that court.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to

conduct a relocation survey to determine their
allegation of encroachment, and also heard the
testimony of the surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel Limpin,
then Acting Chief of the Survey Section of the
CENR- DENR.
On September 19, 2001,10 the RTC rendered its
judgment whereby it reversed and set aside the
MTCs decision of August 31, 2000, observing that
the respondents had encroached on the
petitioners property based on the court-ordered
relocation survey, the reports by Engr. Limpin, and
his testimony;11 that the respondents could not rely
on their OCT No. N-216701, considering that
although their title covered only 481 square
meters, the relocation survey revealed that they
had occupied also 560 square meters of the
petitioners Lot No. 4236;12 that the petitioners did
not substantiate their claims for reasonable
compensation, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses; and that, nevertheless, after it had been
established that the respondents had encroached
upon and used a portion of the petitioners
property, the latter were entitled to
P1,000.00/month as reasonable compensation from
the filing of the complaint up to time that the
respondents actually vacated the encroached
property, plus P20,000.00 attorneys
fees.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2)

dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of
jurisdiction based on its finding that the action
involved an essentially boundary dispute that
should be properly resolved in an accion
reivindicatoria.4 It stated that the complaint did not
aver any contract, whether express or implied,
between the petitioners and the respondents that
qualified the case as one for unlawful detainer; and
that there was also no showing that the
respondents were in possession of the disputed
area by the mere tolerance of the petitioners due
to the latter having become aware of the
encroachment only after the relocation survey held
in 1997.

The respondents moved for reconsideration, but

the RTC denied their motion for its lack of
merit.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The respondents appealed.
On October 18, 2002, the CA promulgated its
assailed decision,15viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appealed RTC decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decisions of the
MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branches 1 and 2, are
REINSTATED.

On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC

(Branch 2), and remanded the case for further
proceedings,5 holding that because there was an
apparent withholding of possession of the property

125

encroachment into anothers property, qualified as

an ejectment case that was within the jurisdiction
of the MTC; and that the respondents were barred
by laches for never questioning the RTCs February
11, 1999 ruling on the issue of
jurisdiction.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA concluded that the RTC, by ordering the
relocation and verification survey in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction upon motion of the
petitioners and over the objection of the
respondents, and making a determination of
whether there was an encroachment based on
such survey and testimony of the surveyor, had
acted as a trial court in complete disregard of the
second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. It declared such action by the
RTC as unwarranted because it amounted to the
reopening of the trial, which was not allowed under
Section 13(3) Rule 70 of theRules of Court. It
observed that the relocation and verification
survey was inconclusive inasmuch as the surveyor
had himself admitted that he could not determine
which of the three survey plans he had used was
correct without a full-blown trial.

In contrast, the respondents assail the relocation

and verification survey ordered by the RTC as
immaterial, because (a) it could not vest a right of
possession or ownership; (b) the petitioners were
mere claimants, not the owners of the property; (c)
the petitioner had never been in possession of the
area in question; and (d) cadastral surveys were
not reliable. Hence, they maintain that whether or
not the relocation and verification survey was
considered would not alter the outcome of the
case.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment
in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing
or trial de novo.26 In this connection, Section 18,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA held that considering that the petitioners

complaint for unlawful detainer did not set forth
when and how the respondents had entered the
land in question and constructed their houses
thereon, jurisdiction did not vest in the MTC to try
and decide the case; that the complaint, if at all,
made out a case for either accion
reivindicatoria or accion publiciana, either of which
fell within the original jurisdiction of the RTC; and
that the RTCs reliance on Benitez v. Court of
Appeals16 and Calubayan v. Ferrer17 was misplaced,
because the controlling ruling was that
in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,18 in which the
complaint was markedly similar to that filed in the
case.

Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession;

not conclusive in actions involving title or
ownership. x x x.
xxxx
The judgment or final order shall be
appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court.(7a)

The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA

denied their motion for its lack of merit in the
resolution of January 24,
2003.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by

ordering the conduct of the relocation and
verification survey in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and by hearing the testimony of the
surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its
holding of a trial de novo. The violation was
accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately
decided the appeal based on the survey and the
surveyors testimony instead of the record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin.

Issues
Hence, this appeal.
The petitioners contend that the RTC had authority
to receive additional evidence on appeal in an
ejectment case because it was not absolutely
confined to the records of the trial in resolving the
appeal; that the respondents were estopped from
assailing the relocation and verification survey
ordered by the RTC because they had actively
participated in the survey and had even crossexamined Engr. Limpin, the surveyor tasked to
conduct the survey;20 that Engr. Limpins testimony
must be given credence, honoring the wellentrenched principle of regularity in the
performance of official functions;21 that the RTC did
not conduct a trial de novo by ordering the
relocation and verification survey and hearing the
testimony of the surveyor; that the desirability of
the relocation and verification survey had always
been part of the proceedings even before the case
was appealed to the RTC;22 that, in any case, the
peculiar events that transpired justified the RTCs
order to conduct a relocation and verification
survey;23 that the case, because it involved

Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309

was an ejectment case within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the
allegations of the complaint. Accordingly, the
pertinent allegations of the petitioners complaint
follow:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. Plaintiffs are co-owners of land known as Lot no.
4236 of the Guagua cadastre. Plaintiffs inherited
the said parcel of residential land from Tomasa B.
Garcia-Manalang who is the absolute owner of the
said property and the same is declared for taxation
purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No.
07014906, a copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex A;

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3. Lot No. 4236 is covered by an approved plan,

Plan Ap-03-004154 (a copy made Annex B) and it
consists of 914 square meters;

P10,000.00.27
Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be
dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a nonsummary action like accion reivindicatoria. In our
view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute
must be resolved in the context of accion
reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The
boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property
claimed by the defendant formed part of the
plaintiffs property. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, the proceedings under which are limited to
unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the
possession of the premises upon the expiration or
termination of his right to hold such possession
under any contract, express or implied. The
defendants possession was lawful at the
beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the
expiration or termination of his right of possession.
In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is
illegal from the very beginning, and the issue
centers on which between the plaintiff and the
defendant had the prior possession de facto.

4. Adjacent to plaintiffs [p]roperty is Lot No. 4235

of the Guagua Cadastre and covered by approved
plan As-03-00533 (copy made Annex C) which is
being claimed by defendants and is the subject
matter of Cadastral Case No. N-229 of the Regional
Trial Court of Guagua, Branch 53 where a decision
(copy made Annex D) was rendered by said court
on August 28, 1996 confirming the title over said
lot in favor of defendant Bienvenido Bacani. The
said decision is now final and executory
5. On February 23, 1997, plaintiffs caused the
relocation and verification survey of cadastral Not
No. 4236 of the Guagua Cadastre belonging to
plaintiff and the adjoining lots, particularly Lot No.
4235 being claimed by defendants;
6. The relocation and verification survey conducted
by Engr. Rufo R. Rivera, a duly licensed Geodetic
Engineer per plan (copy made Annex F) revealed
that defendants had encroached an area of 405
square meters of the parcel of land belonging to
plaintiffs. In fact, the whole or part of the houses of
the said defendants have been erected in said
encroached portion;

Thirdly, the MTC dismissed the action because it

did not have jurisdiction over the case. The
dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the
allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought by the complaint determine the
nature of the action and the court that has
jurisdiction over the action.28 To be clear, unlawful
detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied.29 To vest in the MTC the
jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of
the respondents as the occupants in unlawful
detainer, therefore, the complaint should embody
such a statement of facts clearly showing the
attributes of unlawful detainer.30 However, the
allegations of the petitioners complaint did not
show that they had permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the portion of their property by the
respondents; or how the respondents entry had
been effected, or how and when the dispossession
by the respondents had started. All that the
petitioners alleged was the respondents illegal
use and occupation of the property. As such, the
action was not unlawful detainer.

7. Sometime in June of 1997, plaintiffs through

plaintiff Concepcion Gonzales lodged a complaint
before the Barangay Council of San Juan, Guagua,
Pampanga against defendants regarding the
encroached portion. A preliminary relocation
survey was conducted by the Lands Management
Sector of the DENR and it was found that indeed,
defendants encroached into the parcel of land
belonging to plaintiffs. This finding was confirmed
by the approved plan Ap-03-004154;
8. Since defendants refused to vacate the premises
and surrender the peaceful possession thereof to
plaintiff, the Barangay Captain of San Juan,
Guagua, Pampanga issued a certification to file
action (copy made Annex G) dated March 4, 1997
to enable the plaintiff to file the appropriate action
in court;
9. On March 10, 1997, plaintiffs sent a formal
demand letter (copy made Annex H) to
defendants to vacate the premises and to pay
reasonable compensation for the use of the said
encroached portion;
10. Despite receipt of said demand letter per
registry return cards attached to the letter,
defendants failed and refused to vacate the
encroached portion and surrender the peaceful
possession thereof to plaintiffs;

Lastly, the conclusion by the MTC that the

petitioners failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondents had encroached on
the petitioners property was also warranted. In
contrast, the only basis for the RTCs decision was
the result of the relocation and verification survey
as attested to by the surveyor, but that basis
should be disallowed for the reasons earlier
mentioned. Under the circumstances, the
reinstatement of the ruling of the MTC by the CA
was in accord with the evidence.chanrobleslaw

11. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable

compensation in the amount of P 3,000.00 from
defendants for the illegal use and occupation of
their property by defendants;
12. By reason of the unjust refusal of defendants to
vacate the premises and pay reasonable
compensation to plaintiffs, the latter were
constrained to engage the services of counsel for
P30,00.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance and
incur litigation expenses in the amount of

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision

promulgated on October 18, 2002;
and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of
suit.

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