UnitedStatesBankruptcyCourt

DistrictofNevada

Inre:
CaseNo.1514956
Chapter11
MarcJohnRandazza,
Debtor

ObjectiontoDischargeDebt

I,CounterPlaintiffCrystalCoxinDistrictofNevadaCaseCoxv.Randazzaetal,
2:12cv02040JADPALandinNinthCircuitAppealCase,UNITEDSTATESCOURTOF
APPEALSCase:1515610,herebyobjecttothedischargeofdebtofMarcJ.Randazzain
regardtotheabovementionedcase.

I,CounterPlaintiffCrystalCoxhavevalidclaimsinthiscase.Iamaninjuredparty,andentitled
toclaimsofMalpracticeandDefamationasIhaveproveninthiscaseandamawaitinga
mandatorysettlementarbitration.

I,CounterPlaintiffCrystalCoxamentitledto10milliondollarsfromMarcRandazza,my
exattorney,asthecounterclaimsinthiscaseclearlyspellout.

CoxclaimssheisentitledtoatleasttheamountofcoverageRandazzahasorhadin
connectiontohisattorney/lawlicenseinseveralstates.Randazzaisliableforhiswillfuland
maliciousinjuriescausedtoCrystalCoxandCoxobjecttothedischargeofthisdebt.

Coxcanprovidethiscourtwithmoredetailsoftheabovementionedcaseuponrequest.

WillfulandMaliciousInjuriesareNotDischargeableinBankruptcy

CoxclaimsthatRandazzacannotdischargehisfinancialresponsibilitiestothiscaseasamatter
oflaw.

From1904until1998,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinterpretedthewillfulandmalicious
injuryexceptionverybroadly.Toexceptadebtfromdischargeundertheexception,oneonly
neededtoprovethatthedebtorsactwasintentionalandnecessarilycausedinjury.The
existenceofmalicewasassumedfromthefactthatanintentionalactcausedtheinjury.
1


MarcRandazza,Cox'sexattorneycausedherinjuryandhedidsowithwillfulandmalicious
intentandwithclearknowledgeofwhathewasdoing.Heisanexpertinthisareaoflawand
usedittodeliberatelyandwillfullycauseCoxharm

Thischangedin1998,whentheSupremeCourtdecidedthecaseofKawaahuauv.Geiger.In
thatcase,adoctortreatedapatientsfootinfectionwithoralpenicillininsteadofintravenous
penicillinbecauseoralpenicillinwaslessexpensive.Ajuryawardedthepatientalarge
judgmentinamalpracticesuitagainstthedoctorandthedoctor,whodidnothavemalpractice
insurance,declaredbankruptcy.Thepatientsoughttohavethedebtdeclarednondischargeable
underthewillfulandmaliciousinjuryexception.

TheSupremeCourtnotedthat,asusedinSection523(a)(6),thewordwillfulreferstotheinjury
ratherthantotheact.Therefore,theCourtheldthatthewillfulandmaliciousinjuryexception
onlyappliestointentionalinjuriesthatthelawcallsintentionaltorts,notrecklessornegligent
torts,likethedoctorsmalpractice.

Thiswasanintentionaltort.MarcRandazzaintentionallyharmedhisformerclientCrystalCox
andwithfullknowledgeofthelawanduseofthoselawstocausefurtherharmtoCox.

CoxobjectstotheDischargeofDebtintheRandazzav.Coxcounterclaims,asifthiscourt
dischargeshisdebtsthenwhatistopreventallattorneysfromcausingsuchharmtotheir
clients,filingbankruptcyandmovingontocreatemorevictims?

CoxclaimsthatperSection523(a)(6)ofthebankruptcycodemakesdebtsnondischargeableif
theyarisefrom"willfulandmaliciousinjurybythedebtortoanotherentityortothepropertyof
anotherentity."

CounterPlaintiffCoxhasaclearandconvincingcaseintheDistrictofNevadathatprovesthat
Randazzahadwillfulintent,fullknowledgeofhisactionsandthathecaused"willfuland
maliciousinjurybythedebtortoanotherentityortothepropertyofanotherentity."Cox'sclaims
ofDefamationandMalpracticeagainstattorneyMarcJ.Randazzaarevalidandarenot
dischargeable.

Coxclaimsthatifattorneyscanharmtheirclientsthensimplyfilebankruptcythenthissetsa
precedentforallattorneystoviolatetheirclientsrightsintentionallywithmaliceandthensimply
filebankruptcyleavingtheclienttoalifeofruincausedbythem.

Coxhasarightforthismattertomoveforwardandtobeawardedreliefasamatteroflaw.

ClaimsofDefamation
320Assault,Libel,andSlander
28:1332DiversityLibel,Assault,Slander

Intentionaltortsarenotdischargeable.Cox'sclaimsagainstMarcRandazzaareregarding
intentionaltortsandhiswillfulandintentionalinjurytoCox,hisformerclient.

ClaimsofDefamationareassault,andtheclaimsofDefamationinthiscasewereintentionalas
MarcRandazza,CrystalCoxsexattorneyofRandazzaLegalGroupknewwhathewas
posting,publishing,speakingandfilinginarbitrationswasnottrueandwasmaliciousflatout
liesthathe,asherformerattorney,knewwerelies.

Section523(a)(6)ofthebankruptcycodemakesdebtsnondischargeableiftheyarisefrom
"willfulandmaliciousinjurybythedebtortoanotherentityortothepropertyofanotherentity."
Coxsclaimsdoarisefromsuchcauseofaction.

ClaimsofAttorneyMalpractice

CoxhasclaimsofMalpracticeagainstherformerattorneyMarcRandazza.Randazzawillfully
andmaliciouslycausedCoxharmandwithfullintentandknowledgehewasdoingso.He
endangeredCox,maliciouslydefamedCox,madefalseswornstatementstocourtsand
arbitrator's,stalkedher,andputherinconstantduressforyearsuponyears.Andhedidso
deliberatelyandwithsuperiorknowledgeofthelaw.

InKawaauhauv.Geiger,theCourtheldthatamedicalmalpracticejudgmentbasedupon
debtorsnegligentorrecklessconductwasnotexemptfromdischargeunder523(a)(6).There
thedebtorhadrenderedinadequatemedicalcareforafootinjuryultimatelyplaintiffsleghadto
beamputatedbelowtheknee.AjuryfoundDr.Geigerliableandawardedapproximately
$355,000indamages.

InGeigerssubsequentbankruptcy,thebankruptcycourtfoundthemalpracticejudgment
nondischargeableasadebtforwillfulandmaliciousinjury,exceptedfromdischargeby11
U.S.C.523(a)(6).

MarcRandazzaintentionallyrenderedinadequate,unlawfulservicestoCoxasherattorneyand
indoingsocausedherharm.TheEighthCircuit,enbanc,reversed,holdingthatthe523(a)(6)
exemptionfromdischargewaslimitedtodebtsbasedonwhatthelawhasforgenerations
calledanintentionaltort.TheSupremeCourtrejectedtheargumentthatthemalpracticeaward
fitwithintheexceptionbecausethedefendanthadintentionallyrenderedinadequatemedical
careto[her]thatnecessarilyledtoherinjury,andaffirmedtheEighthCircuit.

ThecourtinGrossstated:[Thedebtors]interpretationoftheGeigercaseasrequiringaspecific
intenttocauseinjuryfor523(a)(6)nondischargeability,isincorrect.TheSupremeCourt,in
Geiger,didnotdefinetheprecisestateofmindrequiredtosatisfythe523(a)(6)willfulness
imperative.Anintentionalwrongfulactthatnecessarilycausesinjurymeetsthewillfulness
standardunderGeiger.4COLLIERONBANKRUPTCY523.13[1],at52392(LawrenceP.King,
etal.eds.,15thed.2001).

TheSupremeCourtagreedthatplaintiffsmedicalmalpracticejudgmentwasdischargeable
becauseitwasnotbasedonintentionalconduct,butratheronconductthatwasnegligentor
reckless.TheCourtstatedthatnondischargeabilitytakesadeliberateorintentionalinjury,not
merelyadeliberateorintentionalactthatleadstoinjury.However,Randazzadeliberatelytook
Cox'scasetosabotagehercaseandcauseherharm.Randazzawasintentionallyrecklessand
negligentandwithfullknowledgeofthelawasaprofessionalattorney,heknewwhathewas
doing.

JahrlingisanIllinoislawyerwhofiledforbankruptcyprotection.Acreditorwhohadwonalegal
malpracticejudgmentagainstJahrlingsoughttoblockthedischargeofthatobligationinthat
bankruptcyproceeding.

TheEstateseekstoexceptfromdischargea$26,000statecourtlegalmalpracticejudgment
enteredagainstJahrlingin2007.ItalsoseekstodenytheDebtoradischarge.TheAmended
ComplaintassertscausesofactionunderfourBankruptcyCode(Code)sections:523(a)(4)
denialofdischargeofaparticulardebtduetodefalcationbyafiduciary523(a)(6).In
otherwordsthecreditorwasclaimingthatJahrlingbreachedhisfiduciarydutytothecreditor
andthereforecouldnotdischargethedebtinhisbankruptcyproceeding.

In2003,Jahrlingbecameinvolvedinarealestatetransactioninwhichhewasretainedto
representStanleyCora(aged90atthetime)inasaleofhishometoBohdanDemkov
(Demkov)andNadjaKoval(Koval).Corawantedtoselltheproperty,butwantedtoretaina
lifeestatesothathecouldcontinuetoliveintheproperty.Afterthehomewassoldfor$35,000,
DemkovandKovalmovedtoevictCorafromtheproperty.Jahrlingreceived$400attheclosing
ofthesale.

Afterthesale,CorasuedDemkovandKovalforrescissionandsuedJahrlingforlegal
malpractice.

TheCircuitCourtofCookCountyenteredjudgmentinfavorofCoraandagainstJahrlinginthe
legalmalpracticeactionbecause(a)JahrlingdidnotcommunicatewithCorawhoonlyspoke
Polish(b)JahrlingreliedonthelawyerforthebuyerstocommunicatewithCora(c)thehome
wassoldforonethirdofitsmarketvalue.In2007,Corawasawardedajudgmentof$26,000
againstJahrling.

Yearslater,Jahrlingsoughttodischargethe$26,000legalmalpracticeawardinbankruptcy.
4


TheBankruptcyCourtinthatcaseheldthatthedebtwasnotdischargeable.

RandazzawillfullyharmedCoxandcannotdischargetheclaims.

I,CrystalCoxobjecttothedischargeofadebt/interestofMarcRandazzaowedtomeasper
mylegalandconstitutionalrightandrighttodueprocessandper11U.S.C.523(a)(6).

/s/CrystalL.Cox
_________________________
CrystalL.Cox,ProSeCreditor

CertificateofService

Sentto

BankruptcyCLerksOffice
300LasVegasBlvd.South
LasVegas,NV89101

AND

emailedtoZ.Larson,Randazzaattorney
zlarson@lzlawnv.com