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15 September 2015
Duty of the Prosecution is to Administer Justice

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and


investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them,
but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such
officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in
order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases
in which they have already filed the corresponding
informations. In the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one."
[Suarez vs. Platon et al., 69 Phil.
556(1940). J. Laurel.]
The above defects in the decision of the Sandiganbayan were
stressed by the Solicitor General, who has asked for the
petitioners acquittal. While his office ordinarily sustains
the respondent court as a matter of policy, he has seen fit
to deviate from this policy because he is convinced that
the petitioner is innocent. So is this Court.
For adhering to the ethical canon that the primary duty of
a public prosecutor is not to convict but to see that justice

is done, the Solicitor General deserves the commendation


of the Court. It is truly to his credit that while a conviction
could have been another feather in his cap, he did not
seek it at the expense of the petitioners honor and
liberty.
We repeat our counsel against ill-considered convictions based
only, as in this case, on unfounded surmises or, in other cases,
prejudgments and prejudices. Although these errors may at times
be corrected and undone on appeal, the stigma of a criminal
conviction, even if ultimately reversed, is never quite
washed away and remains to soil the innocent mans name
to his dying day.
[Soliman vs. Sandiganbayan, 145
SCRA 640(1986). J. Cruz.]
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new
trial.
However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration
against his own interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother
Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence the alleged confession
of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.
The people is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the
genuineness and due execution of his brothers affidavit in
the interest of justice and fair play.
Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the People of the
Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek
conviction of the accused but to see that justice is done.
Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
Canon 6These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.

Rule 6.01The primary duty of a lawyer engaged


in public prosecution is not to convict but to see
that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is
cause for disciplinary action.
The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, that prosecutors
represent a sovereign whose obligation to govern
impartially is [as] compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.
XXX
It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances
considering that the People does not raise any objection to a
new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be
specially commended for displaying once again such
statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor
Generals finest hour, indeed.
[Cuenca vs. Court of Appeals, 250
SCRA 485(1995). J. Francisco.
Citations omitted.]
At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General
and his staff for upholding the time-honored principle set
forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et
al., that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a
sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice
shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the
public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence shall
not suffer. The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests
of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the court
of origin for a new trial.
[Jose vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA
257(1976). J. Muoz Palma.]

Thereafter, on April 19 of this month, a Manifestation in lieu of


Brief was filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on
behalf of the People of the Philippines recommending the
reversal of the decision appealed from and the acquittal of
the appellant on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio. He
was quite emphatic about the matter too: Much as it is to be
desired that the author of the alleged abominable offense,
were it committed, be penalized and given the
corresponding
punishment
he
deserves,
punishing
appellant herein, who may be really innocent thereof, will
not serve the ends of justice but rather subvert it, which is
worse than the crime itself. A careful study of the evidence
of record yields the same conclusion. We accept such
recommendation.
XXX
It is thus easily understandable why counsel for appellant in the
able brief he submitted was quite vehement in his denunciation of
the decision rendered by the lower court. It is a fair appraisal
that the guilt of his client was not shown beyond
reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of
innocence was thus not overcome. The Solicitor General,
after a thorough study of the record, reached the same
conclusion, it could not be otherwise. He had to
recommend the acquittal of appellant. As mentioned at
the outset, we are in agreement.
XXX
It goes no further than to accept the plea of the Solicitor
General after a careful study of the record that the
accused is entitled to acquittal, his guilt not having been
shown beyond reasonable doubt. He is thus entitled to the
protection afforded by the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
[People vs. Poblador, 76
634(1977). J. Fernando.]

SCRA

The report of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza was


submitted to this Court on April 30, 1976. The dismissal of
the case was recommended.
XXX
It was his considered view therefore that there can be no
valid reason for proceeding with the investigation of the
case. Relying further on the legal presumption that a
lawyer is innocent of the charges preferred against him
until the contrary is proved and that he regularly
performed his duty as an officer of the Court in accordance
with his oath. [H]e recommended that the complaint
should be dismissed.
Such a recommendation merits approval.
[Santiago vs. Bustamante, 76 SCRA
527(1977). J. Fernando.]

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