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CASE DIGESTS LEGAL ETHICS

CANONS 18-22
ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON vs. ATTY. RAMIL E.
MACALALAD A.C. No. 8158
FACTS: Atty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Regional Office 8, Tacloban City. Although he is
in public service, the DENR Secretary has given him the
authority to engage in the practice of law.
While on official visit to Eastern Samar in October 2005,
Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon so Atty.
Solidon asked Atty. Macalalad to handle the judicial titling
of a parcel of land located in Borongan, Eastern Samar
and owned by Atty. Solidons relatives. For a
consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos , Atty. Macalalad
accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight
(8) months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining
balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was to
be paid when Atty. Solidon received the certificate of title
to the property.
In the Complaint, Atty. Solidon claimed that he tried to
contact Atty. Macalalad to follow-up on the status of the
case six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees. He
did this through phone calls and text messages to their
known acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through
a letter sent by courier to Atty. Macalalad. However, he
did not receive any communication from Atty. Macalalad.
In the Answer, Atty. Macalalad posited that the delay in
the filing of the petition for the titling of the property was
caused by his clients failure to communicate with him. He
also explained that he had no intention of reneging on his
obligation, as he had already prepared the draft of the
petition. He failed to file the petition simply because he
still lacked the needed documentary evidence that his
clients should have furnished him. Lastly, Atty. Macalalad
denied that Atty. Solidon tried to communicate with him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Macalalad is guilty of
negligence in handling his case.
HELD: We fully considered the evidence presented and
we are fully satisfied that the complainants evidence, as
outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of
proof in proving Atty. Macalalads negligence, thus,
violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the
responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost
diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client
with competence and diligence, and to exert his best
efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest
of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in
the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the
cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and
due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. The records
in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he
committed when he failed to file the required petition. He
cannot now shift the blame to his clients since it was his
duty as a lawyer to communicate with them. At any rate,
we reject Atty. Macalalads defense that it was his clients
who failed to contact him. We consider, too, that other
motivating factors specifically, the monetary

consideration and the fixed period of performance


should have made it more imperative for Atty. Macalalad
to promptly take action and initiate communication with
his clients. He had been given initial payment and should
have at least undertaken initial delivery of his part of the
engagement.
Atty. Macalalad was suspended for six months and was
ordered to retitn tne amount of Php 50, 000 with interest
of 12% per annum.

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA vs.


ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA A.C. No. 7907
FACTS: In the Complaint of the spouses Aranda, they
alleged that Atty. Elaydas handling of their civil case was
sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow
elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence.
However, they were surprised that an adverse judgment
was rendered against them resulting to the loss of their
Mitsubishi Pajero. Apparently, Atty. Elayda failed to inform
the spouses of the date of hearing as well as the order of
judgment. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was
interposed by the lawyer as well. In his reply, Atty. Elayda
said that the spouses did not bother to keep in touch with
him and they were the ones who neglected their case in
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Elayda should be sanctioned
by the court.
HELD: From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is
duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of his
clients. He should be conscientious, competent and
diligent in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda should
give adequate attention, care, and time to all the cases he
is handling. As the spouses Arandas counsel, Atty.
Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said
spouses case and is obligated to exert all efforts to
present every remedy or defense authorized by law to
protect the cause espoused by the spouses Aranda.
Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda
even admitted that the spouses Aranda never knew of the
scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to
him and that he did not know the spouses whereabouts.
While it is true that communication is a shared
responsibility between a counsel and his clients, it is the
counsels primary duty to inform his clients of the status
of their case and the orders which have been issued by
the court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an
inquiry about the developments in their case. Close
coordination between counsel and client is necessary for
them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to
effectively monitor the progress of the case. Besides, it is
elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to
exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to
have constant communication with each other. Again,
Atty. Elaydas excuse that he did not have the spouses
Arandas contact number and that he did not know their
address is simply unacceptable.
Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the legal profession. His
conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due
diligence in handling his clients case but in fact
abandoned his clients cause. He proved himself

unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his helpless


clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his
clients, but also to the Court of which he is an officer.
On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a
lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether or not it is for a fee or free.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended a 6 month
suspension. This was adopted by the court.
ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES vs. ATTY. JACINTO D.
JIMENEZ A.C. No. 6691
FACTS: Complainant Atty. Briones is the Special
Administrator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson. Respondent
Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel for the Heirs of the
late Luz J. Henson. Atty. Jimenez filed with the RTC a
notice of appeal questioning the payment of commission
to Atty. Briones. Atty. Jimenez filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, appointing the firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to
conduct an audit at the expense of the late Luz J. Henson.
Atty. Briones.
Consequently, Atty. Jimenez and the Heirs filed a criminal
complaint and executed an affidavit against Atty Briones
for resisting and seriously disobeying the RTC Order.
Atty. Briones filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Jimenez for forum shopping and violation of Canons
19 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact,
did not violate Rule 19.01 because he assisted the Heirs
in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant
after the latter ignored the demand letters sent to him; and
that a lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost
prudence and capability.
ISSUE:
HELD: The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent
is not guilty of forum shopping. Records show that
respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J.
Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as CAG.R.SP No. 70349 assailing the Order of March 12, 2002
appointing the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo and Co.as
auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 71488 assailing the Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as
it directed the payment of commission to complainant. It
is evident that there is identity of parties but different
causes of action and reliefs sought. Hence, respondent is
not guilty of forum shopping There is sufficient ground in
support of complainants claim that respondent violated
Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand
letters, respondent opted to file said criminal complaint in
behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of
the court. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with
zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers
performance of his duties towards his client must be
within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same
Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers
to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and
the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to

unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed


rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of
the state the administration of justice. While lawyers
owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and
zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not
forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the
court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
The Order referred to is the third part of the assailed Order
dated April 3, 2002 which directs complainant to deliver
the residue to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. As
aptly pointed out by complainant, respondent should have
first filed the proper motion with the RTC for execution of
the third part of said Order instead of immediately
resorting to the filing of criminal complaint against him. A
mere perusal of the rest of the Order dated April 3, 2002
readily discloses that the approval of the report of
complainant as Special Administrator was suspended
prior to the audit of the administration of complainant.
Consequently, the RTC would still have to determine and
define the residue referred to in the subject Order. The
filing of the criminal complaint was evidently premature.
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO A.C. No. 5736
June 18, 2010
FACTS: According to RBCI, respondent and his clients
(Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and
intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over
the management and the premises of RBCI. They also
forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank
manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their
own staff to run the bank.
In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations.
Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with
the authority granted upon him by the NazarenoRelampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board
of Directors of RBCI.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present
any evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent
added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were
never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and
that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or
certified true copies. IBP, through its Commissioner, said
that respondent had no legal basis to implement the
takeover of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab
without any semblance of legality whatsoever.
Respondent appealed from the IBPs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florido violated Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer
to impress upon his client compliance with the law and
principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client.
It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and
lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing
an intentional wrong to their adversaries.
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration
of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be

scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means,


not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict
Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice
of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision.
MIRANDA vs. CARPIO
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of
a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square meters located
at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila. In
1994,
complainant
initiated
Land
Registration
Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration of
the aforesaid property. The case was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275.
During the course of the proceedings, complainant
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as
counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty.
Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,[2] complainant and respondent
agreed that complainant was to pay respondent Twenty
Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and
Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee.
Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as
evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the
last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the
additional
amount
of
Ten
Thousand
Pesos
(PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a memorandum,
which he said would further strengthen complainant's
position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the total
area of the subject property as additional fees for his
services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for
it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant
co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he
could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by
respondent without the knowledge and approval of his coheirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy
respondent's demands, the latter became furious and
their relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered which
transmitted the decree of registration and the original and
owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the
owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the
same had already been claimed by and released to
respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000,
complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked
him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which
he had claimed without complainant's knowledge,
consent and authority. Respondent insisted that
complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20%
share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in
exchange for which, respondent would deliver the owner's
duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused
the demand, for not having been agreed upon.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6,
2000, respondent registered an adverse claim on the

subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on


the payment of his legal services was 20% of the property
and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not
returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to
complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands
to effect the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carpio has violated Canon
20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the
presence of the following elements concur: (1) lawyerclient relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's
funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim
for attorney's fees.[9] Further, the attorney's retaining lien
is a general lien for the balance of the account between
the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents
and funds of the client which may come into the attorney's
possession in the course of his employment.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of
any agreement between the complainant and the
respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area
covered by OCT No. 0-94. Clearly, there is no unsatisfied
claim for attorney's fees that would entitle respondent to
retain his client's property.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to
complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees
sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the
exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no
means is an absolute right, and cannot at all justify
inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to
his client when due or upon demand.
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by
unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver the title of the
complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of
an alleged entitlement to additional professional fees. He
has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees,
respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is highly improper
for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon
his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon
at the time of the engagement of his services.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is
employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In
such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he
merits for his services, as much as he has earned.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the
payment of additional professional fees on the basis of the
principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum
meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a
basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the
absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his
client." In the present case, the parties had already
entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the
respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit
does not fully find application because the respondent is
already compensated by such agreement.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,

effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to


RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision.
He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
TERESITA D. SANTECO vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE
FACTS: Complainant averred that she was the defendant
in an action for ejectment in which a judgment was
rendered against her. Sometime in February 1997, during
the pendency of the ejectment case, complainant filed an
action to Declare Deed of Absolute Sale Null and Void
and for Reconveyance with Damages. On or before
March 1998, complainant terminated the services of her
then counsel and engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Luna B. Avance as her counsel de parte in both
cases. Complainant agreed to and did pay respondent
P12,000.00 as acceptance fee for her services. In June
1997 and August 2000, complainant paid respondent the
sums of P1,500.00 and P500.00 respectively in full
satisfaction of their acceptance fee. However, respondent
refused to issue to complainant the corresponding
receipts therefor, despite demands to do so.
In an Order, the Presiding Judge of Branch 147 of the
Makati City RTC expunged from the record the testimony
of a witness for complainant, who was one of the plaintiffs
therein. Respondent, as her counsel, filed a Motion to
Reconsider and/or Set Aside Order. The motion was
denied by the trial court.
Subsequently, respondent made representations with
complainant that she was going to file a petition for
certiorari and as a consequence respondent charged
complainant P3,900.00, which the latter paid. Apparently,
no petition was filed.
Complainant further averred that respondent told her to
go to the court to claim the check for the supersedeas
bond and have the same encashed with the Landbank.
However, upon verification with the MTC, she discovered
that there was no such check and that she needs to
present the official receipt to withdraw said deposit. She
tried to recover the official receipt from respondent but the
latter kept avoiding her.
Thus, complainant filed an action against respondent
before the Barangay Office of Barangay Nangka, Marikina
City. Respondent, however, repeatedly failed to appear at
the conciliation proceedings, despite notice of the
hearings, prompting the Lupong Tagapayapa, to issue a
certification to file action. Complainant filed administrative
case against respondent. IBP found out that: respondent
violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for having failed to account to the
complainant the official receipt of the supersedeas bond
she got from complainant to withdrew (sic) the same from
the court relative to the ejectment case.
Respondent also violated Canon 18.03 for having failed
to file the [petition for] certiorari before the Court of
Appeals as she promised the complainant and even got
litigation expenses relative to the same.
Likewise, respondent violated Canon 20 when she
discontinued her legal services for complainant without
any notice of withdrawal and even ignored the issuances
of the Commission for her to answer the complaint filed

against her. IBP adopted the penalty of two years of


suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Avance violated the CPR.
HELD: While we agree that indeed respondent is liable,
we find the recommended penalty not commensurate to
the degree of her malfeasance.
There can be no question that respondent was grossly
remiss in the performance of her duties as counsel for
complainant. The records show that in engaging the
services of respondent, complainant agreed to and did
pay respondent P12,000.00 as acceptance fee. It also
appears that on April 20, 1998, a witness for complainant
in Civil Case No. 97-275 testified before the court on
direct examination. For lack of material time, the crossexamination was reset to June 1, 1998. However, the
witness failed to attend the hearing on the said date.
Respondent, on the other hand, arrived late. Thus, on
motion of adverse counsel, the trial court ordered that the
testimony of the witness be stricken off the record.
These incidents show respondents lackadaisical manner
in handling her clients cause. Again, for respondents
failure to appear during the hearings scheduled on August
23 and 27, 1999, Civil Case No. 97-275 was dismissed
for failure to prosecute.
Even as the aforesaid motion for reconsideration was
pending, she made representations with complainant that
she would file a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the trial courts dismissal of Civil Case
No. 97-275. For the filing and preparation thereof, she
charged and was paid the sum of P3,900.00 by
complainant.[23] Respondent, however, did not file the
petition without notifying the complainant.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him. Her negligence in connection therewith
shall render her liable.
Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld
from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar
and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community
to the legal profession.
Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of
her duties, respondent abruptly stopped appearing as
complainants counsel even as proceedings were still
pending with neither a withdrawal nor an explanation for
doing so. This was in gross violation of the following:
CANON 22. A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS
SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON

NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.


(Italics supplied)
It must be remembered that while the right of the client to
terminate the relation is absolute, i.e., with or without
cause, the right of the attorney to withdraw or terminate
the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably
restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination. He
is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.
The grounds wherein a lawyer may withdraw his services
are well-defined, and the abruptness of respondents
withdrawal hardly fits into any of them. Be that as it may,
whether or not a lawyer has a valid cause for withdrawing
from a case, he cannot just do so and leave the client out
in the cold unprotected. An attorney may only retire from
a case either by written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in
which event the lawyer should see to it that the name of
the new counsel is recorded in the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent
ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. She is
directed to return to complainant the amount of P3,900.00
within ten (10) days from notice.
BUN SIONG YAO vs. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO
FACTS: The complainant alleged that since 1987 he
retained the services of respondent as his personal
lawyer; that respondent is a stockholder and the retained
counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation and
Solar Textile Finishing Corporation of which complainant
is a majority stockholder; that complainant purchased
several parcels of land using his personal funds but were
registered in the name of the corporations upon the
advice of respondent; that respondent, who was also the
brother in-law of complainants wife, had in 1999 a
disagreement with the latter and thereafter respondent
demanded the return of his investment in the corporations
but when complainant refused to pay, he filed eight
charges for estafa and falsification of commercial
documents against the complainant and his wife and the
other officers of the corporation; that respondent also filed
a complaint against complainant for alleged noncompliance with the reportorial requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and
another complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Malabon City for alleged violation of Section 75 of the
Corporation Code; that respondent also filed a similar
complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
Complainant alleged that the series of suits filed against
him and his wife is a form of harassment and constitutes
an abuse of the confidential information which respondent
obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel.
Complainant argued that respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests when he filed several
suits not only against the complainant and the other
officers of the corporation, but also against the two

corporations of which he is both a stockholder and


retained counsel.
Respondent claimed that he handled several labor cases
in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing Corporation; that the
funds used to purchase several parcels of land were not
the personal funds of complainant but pertain to Solar
Farms & Livelihood Corporation; that since 1999 he was
no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation; that he never used any confidential
information in pursuing the criminal cases he filed but only
used those information which he obtained by virtue of his
being a stockholder. He further alleged that his requests
for copies of the financial statements were ignored by the
complainant and his wife hence he was constrained to file
criminal complaints for estafa thru concealment of
documents; that when he was furnished copies of the
financial statements, he discovered that several parcels
of land were not included in the balance sheet of the
corporations; that the financial statements indicated that
the corporations suffered losses when in fact it paid cash
dividends to its stockholders, hence, he filed additional
complaints for falsification of commercial documents and
violation of reportorial requirements of the SEC.
On July 19, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner2
submitted a Report and Recommendation3 finding that
from 1987 up to 1999, respondent had been the personal
lawyer of the complainant and incorporator and counsel
of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation. However, in
1999 complainant discontinued availing of the services of
respondent in view of the admission of his (complainants)
son to the bar; he also discontinued paying dividends to
respondent and even concealed from him the
corporations financial statements which compelled the
respondent to file the multiple criminal and civil cases in
the exercise of his rights as a stockholder. The
investigating commissioner further noted that respondent
is guilty of forum shopping when he filed identical charges
against the complainant before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Malabon City and in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. It was also
observed that respondent was remiss in his duty as
counsel and incorporator of both corporations for failing to
advise the officers of the corporation, which he was
incidentally a member of the Board of Directors, to comply
with the reportorial requirements of the SEC and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Instead, he filed cases
against his clients, thereby representing conflicting
interests.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has violated the CPR.
HELD: We agree with the findings and recommendation
of the IBP. We find that the professional relationship
between the complainant and the respondent is more
extensive than his protestations that he only handled
isolated labor cases for the complainants corporations.
Aside from being the brother-in-law of complainants wife,
it appears that even before the inception of the
companies, respondent was already providing legal
services to the complainant.
It appears that the parties relationship was not just
professional, but they are also related by affinity. The
disagreement between complainants wife and the
respondent affected their professional relationship.

Complainants refusal to disclose certain financial records


prompted respondent to retaliate by filing several suits.
The long-established rule is that an attorney is not
permitted to disclose communications made to him in his
professional character by a client, unless the latter
consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client arises at the inception of their
relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation,
nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of
relation between them. It even survives the death of the
client.
Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations,
respondents act of filing multiple suits on similar causes
of action in different venues constitutes forum-shopping,
as correctly found by the investigating commissioner. This
highlights his motives rather than his cause of action.
Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order
to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has
inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his
dealings with complainant and complainants companies
for his own end. Lawyers must conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public
at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.8 Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their
profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a
tool for instigating hostility against any personmost
especially against a client or former client.
In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount to a
breach of his duty to uphold good faith and fairness,
sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo
A. Aurelio is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon receipt
of this Decision.
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and
CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, vs. ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P.
PORTUGAL
FACTS: On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco,
SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin were
involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death
of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a
result, Informations were filed against them before the
Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The
accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due
trial, the Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty of two
counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of
herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but
it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001.
Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion
for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with
the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.3
Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent
also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
(Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002. Thereafter, complainants
never heard from respondent again despite the frequent
telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent

did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to


respondents last known address only to find out that he
had moved out without any forwarding address. More
than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were
constrained to personally verify the status of the ad
cautelam petition as they had neither news from
respondent about the case nor knowledge of his
whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the
Court had already issued a Resolution4 dated 3 July
2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment
of docket fees.
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had
attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been
issued against the accused because respondent, whose
whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent
the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from
lapsing.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement
undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere
effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the
Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly
irregular character, respondent also made informal but
urgent and personal representation with the members of
the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the
decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the
efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other
professional obligations were neglected and that all these
were done without proper and adequate remuneration. As
to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it
was filed on time.
He considered the fact that it was a case he had just
inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his
handling the case on his other equally important
professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial
consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel
to the United States to explore further professional
opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as
counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando
Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person
between respondent and complainants, explaining his
decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the
Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the
accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter
through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not
locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.
ISSUE: Whether respondent committed gross negligence
or misconduct in handling the criminal case, which
eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with
finality.
HELD: In a criminal case like that handled by respondent
in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to
be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only
the property of the accused which stands to be lost but
more importantly, their right to their life and liberty.
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam
petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent
filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave
to File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the
attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should
have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a

prohibited pleading13 and it rests on the sound discretion


of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect,
the motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal.
Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their
right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for
extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say he filed
the ad cautelam petition on time.
As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused
and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high
standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform
to safeguard the rights of his clients. The Court notes that
though respondent represented to the accused that he
had changed his office address, still, from the examination
of the pleadings14 he filed, it can be gleaned that all of
the pleadings have the same mailing address as that
known to complainants. Of course, the prudent step to
take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the
adverse resolution since they had constantly called
respondents office to check the status of the case. Even
when he knew that complainants had been calling his
office, he opted not to return their calls.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his
appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is
presumably steeped in court procedures and practices,
should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead
of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed
this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he
had already given instructions to his clients on the proper
way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as
suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he
was negligent in handling the case of the accused.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute
right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime
with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw
or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is,
however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental
rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to
carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it
without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw
from a case before its final adjudication arises only from
the clients written consent or from a good cause.
The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was
no formal engagement between the parties and that he
made all his efforts for the case without adequate and
proper consideration.

Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive


appellation respondent called the shooting incident that
the accused was engaged in. Rule 14.0124 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to
discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the
latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually
branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged"
the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still
it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when
even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO vs. ATTY.
EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO RE: PETITION (FOR

EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L.


MACARUBBO
FACTS: For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys. Records show that in the Decision1 dated
February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from
the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous
marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third
marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first
marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts
constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon
1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Aggrieved,
respondent
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy3
which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution4
dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012,
respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the
Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present
suit as a second motion for reconsideration and
accordingly, denied it for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty.Macarubbo be granted with
jjudicial clemency to reinstate his name in the roll of
attorneys.
HELD: In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall
include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials
of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption
of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform. 3. The
age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still
has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use
by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a
showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or
legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There
must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may
justify clemency.

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the


applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to
the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court
finds the instant petition meritorious. Respondent has
sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his
indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life.
He has asked forgiveness from his children by
complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship
with them as shown by the herein attached pictures.11
Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent
returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted

his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing


mother until her death in 2008.12 In 2009, he was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile,
Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local
Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the
Assessors Office, which office he continues to serve to
date.13 Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the
University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College
during the School Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent
likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by
helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
Records further reveal that respondent has already
settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant
Teves. He sends regular support to his children in
compliance with the Courts directive.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to
the practice of law.1wphi1 He is, however, reminded that
such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral
uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the
law are continuing requirements.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is
hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.

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