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3.

14

Trial
Order of trial
Reverse trial when complaint is admitted

(1) YU V. MAGPAYO, 44 SCRA 163

Reverse trial also in criminal cases

When trial dispensed with; absence of party


(2) REPUBLIC V. VDA DE NERI, G.R. 139588 (2008)
(3) SPOUSES CALO V. SPOUSES TAN, G.R. 151266 (2005)
3.15

Consolidation
Test is common questions of fact or of law

(4) ACTIVE V. COURT OF APPEALS, 181 SCRA 774


(5) SUPERLINES V. VICTOR, 124 SCRA 939
DOCTRINE: Considerations OF judicial economy and administration,
as well as the convenience of the parties for which rules on
procedure and venue were formulated, dictate that it is the Cavite
court, rather than the Gumaca court, which seves as the more
suitable forum for the determination of the rights and obligations
of the parties concerned.
FACTS: A Pantranco bus collided with a Superlines bus in Calauag,
Quezon, which resulted in the death of Cayetano Moralde, a
passenger of the Pantranco bus. Superlines filed an action for
damages before CFI Gumaca against Pantranco and its driver.
Subsequently, the heirs of Moralde filed a case against Pantranco
and Superlines before RTC Cavite. Superlines filed a motion to
dismiss the Cavite case on the ground of pendency of another
action. Respondent judge denied the motion on the ground that the
2 cases involved different parties and different causes of action.
Superlines contend that Moraldes should pursue their claim for
damages by intervening in the Gumaca action pursuant to Rule 12,
Sec 2 ROC. They argued that since both cases are founded on the
same facts, any judgment rendered therein will amount to res
judicata in the Cavite case.
ISSUE: WON the Gumaca case should be consolidated with the
Cavite case
HELD: Yes. There is, however, a more pragmatic solution to the
controversy at bar; and that is to consolidate the Gumaca case

with the Cavite case. Considerations of judicial economy and


administration, as well as the convenience of the parties for which
the rules on procedure and venue were formulated, dictate that it
is the Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca court, which serves as
the more suitable forum for the determination of the rights and
obligations of the parties concerned. As observed by both the trial
and appellate courts, to require private respondents who are all
residents of Kawit, Cavite, to litigate their claims in the Quezon
Court would unnecessarily expose them to considerable expenses.
On the other hand, no like prejudice would befall the defendants
transportation companies if they were required to plead their
causes in Cavite, for such change of venue would not expose them
to expenses which are not already liable to incur in connection with
the Gumaca case.
(6) STEEL CORP OF THE PHILS V. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, 635 SCRA
403
(7) DEUTSCHE BANK AG V. COURT OF APPEALS, 667 SCRA 82
(8) PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V. EXCELSA INDUSTRIES,
SCRA 669 SCRA 470
(9) TESTON V. DBP, G.R. 144374 (2005)
(10)
ESPINOZA V. UOB, G.R. 175380 (2010)

Consolidation of civil and criminal cases

Consolidation of cases on appeal


3.16

(11)

Demurrer to Evidence
Concept of demurrer
Effect of denial or grant of demurrer to evidence

NEPOMUCENO V. COMELEC, 126 SCRA 472

(12)
RADIOWEALTH V. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. 138739 (2000)
DOCTRINE: Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff's
evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial
court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but
on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and
reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to
present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition,
resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as
a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
FACTS: Spouses Del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed
and delivered in favor of Radiowealth a promissory note for
P138,948. Unfortunately, respondents defaulted on the monthly

installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed to pay their


obligations under their promissory note. Radiowealth, then, filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money. After the petitioner
offered its evidence and rested its case, Del Rosario filed a
demurrer to evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. The trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to
substantiate its claims, the evidence it had presented being merely
hearsay. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Aggrieved,
Radiowealth filed a petition for review on certiorari questioning the
decision rendered by the appellate court. Radiowealth contends
that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant
should be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence,
and the appellate court should render judgment on the basis of the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for
further proceedings" would be an outright defiance of Rule 33,
Section 1 ROC. On the other hand, spouses Del Rosario argue that
the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim, simply on
the ground that they lost their right to present evidence in support
of their defense when the Demurrer to Evidence was reversed on
appeal. They stress that the CA merely found them indebted to
petitioner, but was silent on when their obligation became due and
demandable.
ISSUE: WON Del Rosario can still present evidence after the CAs
reversal of the dismissal on demurrer of evidence
HELD: No. Rule 33, Sec 1 ROC provides: After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he
shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a
dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff's evidence) on the ground that
upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the
dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for
an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the
case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed
to hear and receive the defendant's evidence so that all the facts
and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed

before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in


case of appeal. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the
same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and
the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his
right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been
deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff's
case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which
reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment
on the merits on the basis of plaintiff's evidence. In other words,
defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence
retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court
disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on
appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and
reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to
present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition,
resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as
a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
(13)

CASENT REALTY V. PHIL BANKING, G.R. 150731(2007)

3.17

(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

Judgment on the Pleadings


Generally applicable when there is no tender of issue
Denial in answer may not amount to tender of issue

MANUFACTURERS V. DIVERSIFIED, 173 SCRA 357


PACIFIC REHOUSE CORP V. EIB SECURITIES, 633 SCRA 214
REILO V. SAN JOSE, G.R. 166393 (2009)
SPOUSES SONG V. ROBAN LENDING, G.R. 172592 (2008)
DORIS SUBANUM V. AURORA GO, G.R. 163280 (2010)

3.18

Summary Judgments
Distinguished from Judgment on the pleadings

(19)
VERGARA V. SUELTO, 156 SCRA 753
DOCTRINE: Summary judgment must not be confused with
judgment on the pleadings. The essential question in determining
whether a summary judgment is proper is not whether the answer
does controvert the material allegations of the complaint but
whether that controversion is bona fides and not whether the
answer does tender valid issues as by setting forth specific denials
and/or affirmative defenses but whether the issues thus tendered
are genuine, or fictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith.

FACTS: Vergara alleged that he is the owner of a commercial


building and that private respondents were the lessees thereof.
Having defaulted in their payments, Vergara filed an action for
unlawful detainer. Private respondents denied having paid rents to
Vergara and raised as an affirmative defense, ownership over the
land. Subsequently, Vergara filed a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the
respondents answer specifically denied material allegations in the
complaint and even set up an affirmative defense. Thus, such
answer did not merely consist of a general denial but definitely
tendered a genuine issue which cannot be resolved by resort to a
summary judgment.

But even if the answer does tender issues and therefore a


judgment on the pleadings is not proper-a summary judgment may
still be rendered on the plaintiffs motion if he can show to the
Courts satisfaction that except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," that is to say,
the issues thus tendered are not genuine, are in other words sham,
fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, patently unsubstantial.
(20)
(21)

DIMAN V. ALUMBRES, 299 SCRA 459


NOCOM V. CAMERINO, G.R. 182984 (2009)

How motion for summary judgment is considered


Hearing on motion is only for determining whether
issues are genuine or not, not to receive evidence
on the issues set up in the pleadings
Motion is proven through affidavits, depositions
and admissions submitted by movant

Propriety of summary judgment

(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)

NATALIA V. VALLEZ, 173 SCRA 536


GRAND FARMS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 193 SCRA 748
MONTEREY FOODS CORP V. ESERJOSE, 410 SCA 627
EVANGELISTA V. MERCATOR FINANCE, 409 SCRA 410

ISSUE: WON the summary judgment is proper


HELD: Yes. The defendants answer appears on its face to tender
issues. It purports to deal with each of the material allegations of
the complaint, and either specifically denies, or professes lack of
knowledge or information to form a belief as to them. It also sets
up affirmative defenses. However, the issues raised are sham, not
genuine.
Summary judgment must not be confused with judgment on the
pleadings. The essential question in determining whether a
summary judgment is proper is not whether the answer does
controvert the material allegations of the complaint but whether
that controversion is bona fides and not whether the answer does
tender valid issues as by setting forth specific denials and/or
affirmative defenses but whether the issues thus tendered are
genuine, or fictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith.
Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegation of the adverse partys pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. The
answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not
comply with the requirements for a specific denial and it would
admit the material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings not
only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but also
if it omits to deal with them at all.
Thus, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material
averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses, a
judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be proper.

3.19

Movant may be either party


Judgments
Requirements
Written and signed by judge
Must contain findings of fact and law applied
Must contain a dispositive portion
Filed with the clerk of court
Rendition reckoned from filing with clerk
Must be served on parties
May be amended before finality upon motion or motu
proprio
Entry upon finality
Entry determines prescriptive periods
Final judgment not subject to amendment
Separability of judgments

(26)
VELARDE V. SJS, G.R. 159357 (2004)
DOCTRINE: The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in
writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts

and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason
or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can
point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings
on points of law with which he disagrees.
FACTS: SJS filed a petition for declaratory relief before RTC Manila
against Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erano Manalo, Br. Eddie
Villanueva, and Br. Eliseo Soriano. Respondent SJS sought the
interpretation of several constitutional provisions, among them the
separation of Church and State, and the declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of the acts of said religious leaders in
endorsing a candidate for an elective office. Petitioner Velarde filed
a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy. The
trial court denied Velardes motion. In its order, the RTC judge did
not provide a statement of facts and dispositive portion. As such,
Velarde and Soriano filed separate motions for reconsideration
before the trial court were denied.

3.20

(31)

BANCO FILIPINO V. CAMPOS, 63 SCRA 180

ISSUE: WON the RTC decision conform to the form and substance
required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court
HELD: No. The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in
writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason
or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can
point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings
on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning.
Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a
litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as
well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court.
(27)
MIRANDA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 71 SCRA 295
(28)
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO, 457 SCRA 400
(29)
BRIONES-VASQUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 144882
(2005)
(30)
NAVARRO V. METROBANK, G.R. 165697 (2009)

(32)

Remedies from Judgments (same court, same case)


New trial or reconsideration
FAMEN
Fraud as a ground must be extrinsic, not intrinsic. It
is intrinsic when done by a party during trial (use of
forged documents etc.), extrinsic when employed
outside the court (concealing a witness or colluding
with a party)
Accident and mistake as ground must be based on
a well-engendered belief ordinary prudence could
not guard against
Excusable negligence as ground will depend on
circumstances
Newly discovered evidence
Must be material and not discoverable during trial

Motion for reconsideration


New trial distinguished from reconsideration
o Grounds
o Results when granted
o Remedy when denied (appeal
judgment)
Relief from judgment
Not available for lost remedy

from

TUAZON V. COURT OF APPEALS, 256 SCRA 158

(33)
SPOUSES QUE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 1507397
(2005)
DOCTRINE: Under Rule 38, Sec 1, the court may grant relief from
judgment only when a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. As used in that
provision, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which
relates to the case. "Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party
from having a trial or presenting his case to the court.
FACTS: Costales filed an action against Urian (Lorenzos
grandniece) and spouses Que for ownership and possession of the
subject property on the ground that she inherited the property

from Lorenzo. When she filed her complaint, spouses Que had
taken possession of the property and declared the land in their
name for tax purposes. It appears that petitioners obtained the
services of one Atty. Ranot to represent them. However, Atty. Ranot
failed to file petitioners answer. as such, Costales moved to
declare them in default. During the hearing, Urian manifested that
Atty. Ranot was still preparing the answer. The trial court found
Urians manifestation unmeritorious and granted respondents
motion to present her evidence ex parte. After the trial, the court
held in favor of respondent Costales. Petitioners, through their new
counsel, sought reconsideration or new trial, which the trial court
denied.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to relief from judgment
HELD: No. Under Rule 38, Sec 1, the court may grant relief from
judgment only when a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence" In their
petition for relief from judgment in the trial court, petitioners
contended that judgment was entered against them through
"mistake or fraud" because they were allegedly under the
impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed "the necessary
pleading." This is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under
Section 1. As used in that provision, "mistake" refers to mistake of
fact, not of law, which relates to the case. "Fraud," on the other
hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his
case to the court. Clearly, petitioners' mistaken assumption that
Atty. Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither
mistake nor fraud.
Under Section 1, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally
imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it
is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party
to disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere
subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should
do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and
not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.
(34)

MONZON V. SPOUSES RELOVA, G.R. 171827 (2008)


-

Available only versus final judgment

Distinguished from New trial or reconsideration


o Grounds
o When/how invoked
o Result when granted
o Remedy when denied (no more appeal)
Annulment of judgment (not same court, not same
case)

(35)
DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORP V. COURT OF APPEALS, 681
SCRA 580
(36)
SPOUSES ARENAS V. QUEZON CITY DEVT BANK, G.R.
166819 (2010)
3.21

(37)

INVESTMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS, 147 SCRA 334

(38)

Execution of Judgments
Only a final judgment that disposes of the action is
subject to execution
Final judgment versus final and executory judgment

Test of a final judgment: Does it leave something for


the court to do with respect to the merits of the case?
Execution a matter of right when judgment final and
executory, but only upon motion
Judgment becomes final by operation of law, i.e. when
no appeal has been taken within the period provided
by law
Enforcement of judgment (execution) is ministerial and
mandatory once it becomes final, subject to certain
exceptions
Execution before finality of judgment, only upon good
reasons

BF CORP V. EDSA SHANGRI-LA, 294 SCRA 109

Discretionary executions, when stayed

(39)
CITY OF MANILA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 72 SCRA 98
(40)
VALENCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 184 SCRA 561
DOCTRINE: The existence of good reasons is principally what
confers such discretionary power in granting a motion for
execution pending appeal. Absent any such good reason, the

special order of execution must be struck down for having been


issued with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS: Petitioner Valencia filed a civil case before RTC Malolos for
the recisssion of a lease contract (over a fishpond) against private
respondents Bagtas. During the pendency of the case, the lease
contract expired and the property was returned to Valencia. The
trial court held that the issue of rescission had become moot and
academic, and the only remaining issue was the matter of
damages. Subsequently, Bagtas filed a motion for execution
pending appeal, which the court granted after Bagtas filed a bond
in the amount of P330,000.

(41)
4.2
4.3

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for
execution pending appeal
HELD: No. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that in
order that there may be a discretionary issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal the following requisites must be
satisfied: (a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party; (b) There must be a good reason for
issuing the writ of execution; and (c) The good reason must be
stated in a special order.
CAB: The ground relied upon by the trial court in allowing the
immediate execution, as stated in its order of March 20, 1989, is
the filing of a bond by private respondents. The rule is now settled
that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good
reason for ordering execution pending appeal.

(42)
4.4

(43)

4.

Who may Appeal


What are Appealable

What are final judgments


When does a judgment or order become final
Final judgments vs. judgments that are final and
executory
What are not appealable and why are they not?
Test of final nature is when it completely disposes
of the case
Exception Sec 1, Rule 41 ROC (a-g) in which cases
remedy is by Rule 65
DM FERRER & ASSOCIATES V. UST, G.R. 189496 (2012)
Modes of Appeal

Ordinary appeal (by mere notice of appeal with court


rendering judgment)
MTC to RTC
RTC to CA
No extension of period to file notice of appeal
NEYPES V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 141524 (2005)

Execution before or after death of judgment obligor will


depend on the nature of the judgment, i.e. recovery of
property versus money judgments

APPEALS
4.1 Nature of Appeal as Remedy

Guard against judgments of unskilled and unfair judges

DACUITALL V. LM ENGINEERING CORP, 629 SCRA 702

To consider the mere posting of a bond a 'good reason' would


precisely make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal
routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be
executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all
that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to
answer for the damages that might result therefrom. This is a
situation, to repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law.

Prevention as much as correction of mistakes


Not a right but a mere privilege, thus may be lost

(44)

Interrupted
by
Motion
for
new
trial
or
reconsideration
If New trial or reconsideration denied, fresh period
to appeal
Payment of docket fees must accompany notice of
appeal
Petition for review (by filing petition with CA under Rule
42)
Second level of review
Review of judgment in exercise of appellate
jurisdiction
RTC (appellate jurisdiction) to CA
Not a matter of right; discretionary on part of CA

ONG V. TATING, 140 SCRA 265

(45)

Appeal by certiorari (filing petition with SC)


Appeal to SC
o From RTC on questions of law only (Rule 41)

UMC V. VELASCO, 98 SCRA 545


o
o

From final order or resolution of CA or SB


(Rule 45) but only on questions of law
Appeal to SC not a matter of right (Rule 45,
Sec 6)

(46)
CHEESMAN V. IAC, 193 SCRA 93
(47)
SUMBINGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 155 SCRA 24
DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that appeals from the Court of Appeals
are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion on the part
of this Court, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor.
FACTS: Demerin et al, filed a complaint against Sumbingco seeking
reinstatement as tenants on the latters 2 haciendas and
damages. They alleged that prior to Sumbingcos purchase of the
property, they were already tenants in the haciendas. The Court of
Agriarian Relations dismissed the complaint; it rejected the
evidence offered by private respondents to substantiate their
claims as tenants, declaring the evidence as implausible and
tainted by material inconsistencies. On appeal, CA reversed the
judgement of CAR and ruled in favor of private respondents.
ISSUE: WON the appeal to the SC was proper
HELD: No. It is axiomatic that appeals from the Court of Appeals
are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion on the part
of this Court, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. In other words, appeals from the Court
of Appeals are not entertained as a matter of routine; they may be
rejected out of hand in the exercise of this Court's sound judicial
discretion. The prescribed mode of appeal is by certiorari, limited
only to issues or questions of law which must be distinctly set forth
in the petition for review on certiorari. The findings of fact of the
Appellate Court are conclusive even on this Court, subject only to a
few well defined exceptions (none of which is present in the instant
case). It is incumbent on the appellant to make out a sufficiently
strong demonstration of serious error on the part of the Court of

Appeals, and adduced special and important reasons to justify the


exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction,
failing in which this Court will decline to wield its invoked power of
review and will dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is without
merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or the questions raised
are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
CAB: A thoroughgoing review of the record discloses that contrary
to this Court's first impression, which initially led it to give due
course to both petitions in its case, there is no special and
important reason to justify this Court's exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. The issues raised are principally factual, and such of
those issues as may be characterized as legal are not sufficiently
weighty or substantial to warrant consideration and review.
o What is question of law
Read: MACAWILI and LAND BANK cases
(48)
(49)

Petition for review on certiorari vs petition for


certiorari

NEW YORK MARINE V. COURT OF APPEALS, 249 SCRA 416


YBANEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 253 SCRA 540
-

Rules on appeals summarized

(50)
MACAWILI GOLD MINING V. COURT OF APPEALS, 297 SCRA
602
(51)
LAND BANK V. RAMOS, 685 SCRA 540
4.5

When does Court lose Jurisdiction relative to the filing of


Notice of Appeal

May notice of appeal be contested? Dismissed by


court?

Duty of court when notice of appeal filed

Dilatory appeals

4.6

Improper Appeals

To CA from RTC on questions of law

To SC via notice of appeal

To CA on notice of appeal from RTC decision rendered


in appellate jurisdiction

The above modes will merit dismissal; no transfer to


correct court will be allowed
(Exception: When appeal to SC on questions of law and
fact in which case, the case will be remanded to CA)

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