Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH L. SMITH,
In Propria Persona
23636 Genesee Village Rd.
Golden, Colorado, 80401
(303) 526-5451
Oral argument is DEMANDED.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
REQUIRED STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.
III. Both Courts Used the Wrong Legal Standard In Their Review . . . . . .
14
18
20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PRIMARY AUTHORITIES
(and point of reliance)
Page
20
12
12
6, 7
6, 17
12
OTHER CASES
Page
OTHER CASES
Page
8
17
19
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
28 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10
28 U.S.C. 1257(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10
28 U.S.C. 1291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
28 U.S.C. 1294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
28 U.S.C. 1331 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
28 U.S.C. 1361 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13
28 U.S.C. 1391(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
28 U.S.C. 2071(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
28 U.S.C. 2072(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
28 U.S.C. 2072(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Fed. R. App. R. 35(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Fed. R. App. R. 40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
N.H. Const. art. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-71 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
OTHER AUTHORITIES
A Nation Mesmerized and Seduced, UVA Lawyer (Fall, 2012) . . . . . . . . . . various
Annual Report, Dir. of the Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts. (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
Bacon, Francis, Essays LVI (Of Judicature) (1620) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20
Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765). . . . . .
11
Breyer, Stephen, et al., Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice (Sept. 2006) . . . . . .
19
Breyer, Stephen, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judges View (2010). . . .
9
4
Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff-Appellant Kenneth Smith, in propria persona and first-person, submits this Petition for Rehearing and/or En Banc Review pursuant to Fed. R. App.
P. 35(a)(1) and (c) and 40 (invoking the 45-day rule), stating as follows:
REQUIRED STATEMENT
The Panels conclusory decree conflicts with a prior decision of this Court, as
the instant appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation, a question of law
this Court reviews de novo. United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir.
2004). Furthermore, it raises a question of exceptional importance, for if judges
are allowed to dismiss challenges to the constitutionality of statutory provisions
sua sponte without even one word of analysis, it makes a mockery of the rule of
law. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). And if this Court doesnt
have jurisdiction to decide the simple question of law presented, who does?
ARGUMENT
On its face, the Panel opinion is a deliberate and conscious effort by this Court
to conceal the nature of this case, in a transparent effort to evade public scrutiny. I
defy anyone to read their facially arbitrary decree and tell me what was at issue.
Lets keep it simple. As I have the right to equal and impartial justice under
the law, Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 468 (1891), I have a right to the reversal
of an indisputably erroneous lower court decision. Ergo, 28 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1)
and 1257(a) (permitting discretionary certiorari review) are unconstitutional.
v. Texas, 139 U.S. at 468. Accordingly, given that no man can be a judge in his
own case, and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), it logically follows that when
an appellate panel decides a matter in which they are proper party defendantsas
is the case in Smith v. Mullarkey, 121 P.3d 890 (Colo. 2005) (per curiam)1I am
entitled to a reversal of that ersatz decision. Furthermore, if a remedy is extended
to the plaintiffs in Murchison, supra, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc.,
556 U.S. 868 (2009), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), and even Dr. Bonhams
Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 107a (C.C.P.),2 I am entitled to relief consonant with those
precedents. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
As a matter of both law and logic, a right cannot exist without a remedy for its
breach. Ashby v. White [1703] 92 Eng.Rep. 126, 136 (H.C.); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) ("To take away all remedy for the enforcement of a
right is to take away the right itself."). As the only remedies for judicial miscon-
The rule of necessity does not apply here, as was pointed out to the Court in the Opening Brief at 7 &
n. 11. In short, as Colorado law authorizes judges of the states Court of Appeals to serve in the place of
conflicted Justices, there is no necessity and accordingly, the Rule does not apply.
2
It certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment to subject [a mans] liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching
a conclusion against him in his case. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added). Accord, e.g.,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., supra, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822-825 (1986);
Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58-62 (1972); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215-216 (1971)
(per curiam). There is no contrary authority.
8
duct on such a colossal scale are certiorari review and an action in tort, Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Defendants had a duty to review either Smith v.
Bender, 350 F. App'x 190 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 2009), or Smith v. Mullarkey, supra.
Not only is the claim not patently frivolous, but the 120-word3 arbitrary decree of
the Panel makes a mockery of the Due Process Clause.4
Excluding citations (which dont support the proposition), or a statement denying oral argument.
As Professor Tribe writes, due process has two elemental components: the right to be heard and the
right to hear why. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 744 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis in original)."The
touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). As Justice Breyer observes, judges have an obligation to provide
legally defensible reasoning in a publicly accessible format, Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy
Work: A Judges View 83 (2010), no matter how objectively absurd the complaint is. See United States ex
rel. Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D.Pa. 1971) (representative example).
5
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 Va. L. Rev. 253, 255
(2009).
6
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Cosmic Constitutional Theory 6 (Oxford Pr. 2012).
4
way march aggrandizing judicial power, arguing that theories of originalism, the
living Constitution, and Posnerian pragmatism have imparted unfettered discretion to the courts.7 But like Brother Jimmy, Judge Wilkinson has sinned.
7
8
A Nation Mesmerized and Seduced, UVA Lawyer 40-1 (Fall, 2012) (interview).
Id. at 38.
10
plainly met. And as the decision being appealed was a final decision, 28 U.S.C.
1291, and all appeals from that court are heard by this Circuit, 28 U.S.C. 1294,
this was an appeal this Circuit had a duty to hear.
exercise of existing jurisdiction, but not to control his decision." Ex parte Roe,
234 U.S. 70, 72 (1914).
The "plain meaning" rule10 is that when the text of a statutory provision "is not
ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to search
for its meaning beyond the instrument." Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670
(1889), and if the terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is presumetively complete. As Cardozo adds, courts may not "pause to consider" whether a
better statute might have been written, but are compelled to "take the statute as we
find it." Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1933), and therefore, the case must
be "a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain
meaning of words ... in search of an intention which the words themselves did not
suggest." United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 96 (1820). Ergo, it is incumbent
upon the courts to explain why Section 1361 should not be read literally, why the
conclusory declaration that my claim is frivolous without explaining what standards were used or what law was relied on does not violate my right to procedural
due process, and why I am not entitled to a transparent and coherent opinion. Cf.,
Driskell v. Homosexuals, No. 8:15-cv-158-JMG (D.Nebr. May 6, 2015).
10
1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 68-72 (1765); see also, e.g., United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805), Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
12
11
Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 6 (Oct. 5, 2011) (statement of Defendant Scalia).
13
12
Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 576 U.S. __ (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2).
Id., Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3).
14
Abraham Lincoln, Speech (on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Springfield, IL), Oct. 16, 1854.
13
15
15
16
that they do not intend to publish. Because these opinions will not be binding
precedent in any court, a judge may be less careful about his legal analysis,
especially when dealing with a novel issue of law.19
To reiterate: [W]hen you walk into a doctors office, you want the physician
attentive to you, not the patient before or the patient after. Well, people have the
right to expect that same attention from a judge.20 I agree with Judge Wilkinson.
So, why doesnt Judge Wilkinson agree with Judge Wilkinson?
Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 124 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1998) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added);
accord, e.g., Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, Legal Affairs (Jul./Aug.
2004), available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp.
20
A Nation Mesmerized," UVA Lawyer at 41.
19
17
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-71 (1996)which, by its terms, only
applies to lawsuits by prisoners filing suit in forma pauperis. Whereas 28 U.S.C.
1915(e)(2) empowers a judge to dismiss an IFP suit sua sponte at any time, as I
have never been a prisoner in a correctional institution, that statute is inapplicable.
It was plain error, both at this level and below.
21
22
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Order, Smith v. Thomas, No. 10-395 (U.S. entered Mar. 7, 2011) (mass recusal).
18
tent to sit on a federal bench, and should be encouraged to retire immediately. But
I expected a lot more game from Harvie Wilkinson. I have every right to expect
a decision grounded in law, and an opinion that proves it. Wisconsin v. Allen, 778
N.W.2d 863, 877-78 (2010) (per curiam).
Look. We get it. The typical federal judge would rather sodomize his mothers
corpse than issue a ruling yielding a scintilla of the power The Tribe has illicitly
usurped.23 One would expect that one of the nations foremost advocates of judicial restraint would practice it, but it is hard to find a more outcome-driven opinion. Is it really too much to expect you to read briefs? To write opinions?
23
I have cited at least a hundred sources for this proposition, but here, I need not go any further than the
words of one J. Harvie Wilkerson: I think its brought us away from certain fundamental aspects of the
judicial role, the most important of which is judicial restraint. You would think after more than a
century of misadventures with this kind of thing that we would have learned, but apparently not.
Here is the money shot: I dont want this to become a one-way ratchet where living constitutionalists
come up with a series of decisions not legally grounded and say, Aha, weve got you. Its now precedent
and you have to respect it. Its always a one-way ratchet and we go more and more down the road
to amplifying judicial power. "A Nation Mesmerized," UVA Lawyer at 38-41 (emphasis added).
It is not that we havent learned, so much as power is more addictive than crystal meth. Judges dont
want to learn, and as Jefferson predicted, they would eventually become dictators. Examples of judges
placing their fingers on the scales of justice to amplify the power of The Tribe include United States v.
Callender, 25 F.Cas. 239 (D.Va. 1800) (Chase, J., riding circuit) (usurping jurys constitutional authority
to decide questions of law); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1872) (invented absolute judicial immunity);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (rewriting the Eleventh Amendment); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) (rewriting the Civil Rights Act to protect colleagues on the state bench); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 (1978) (expands absolute judicial immunity beyond all semblance of reason); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (sovereign immunity no longer waivable by implication); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004) (judicial veto of human rights treaty); Chambers, supra (arbitrary expansion of the
courts inherent powers), et al., ad nauseum. The Breyer Commission calls it "undue guild favoritism,"
Stephen Breyer, et al., Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to
the Chief Justice (Sept. 2006) at 1, and it is ALWAYS a one-way ratchet.
19
CONCLUSION
(Due Process Is InconvenientTo Those Who Wield Power)
When the Framers entrusted the judicial Power to our courts, they actually had
something in mind. From time immemorial, it had been understood that the office
of the judge was jus dicere, Francis Bacon, Essays LVI (Of Judicature) (1620): the
power to interpret the law, as opposed to writing it. Litigants had the right to have
plainly erroneous rulings reviewed by the Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari,
resulting in published decisions binding every court in the land. And yes, it might
create chaos to restore that essential right of citizenship. But the Constitution was
intended to be inconvenientto those who wield power.
In one fell swoop, a Panel of this Circuit has literally defenestrated the Bill of
Rights. We have a right to equal justice under law, Leeper, supra, but no way
to enforce it. We are naked and exposed in a violent hailstorm of judicial caprice,
where we dont even have an enforceable right to a fair and independent tribunal.
Cf., Commodity Futures Trading Commn v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986). The
rulings below are not judicial decisions, but the ukases of black-robed Czars.
This matter must be REMANDED to the Panel or slated for en banc review.
Submitted this [to come] day of October, 2015,
_/s/__________________________________
20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
As service of process has been illicitly denied, there is literally no one to serve.
I have, however, mailed courtesy copies to the putative Appellants at their places
of business and/or residences.
21