GARCILLANO vs HRET

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that
placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the
Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo
Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the
respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility
and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely.
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies
of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees
be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in
their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees
directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly
stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a
privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to
provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens, wheres, whos and whys" of the
alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to
participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate Committee
on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two

bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon
aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to
conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the
use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the
Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public
officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of
Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar
the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello
Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo
G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes
filed their Comment16on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No.
179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties standing,
argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of
the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has
relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has
been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly
recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the
National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that
"this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the
Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he
is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of
the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner
Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions and charges of electoral fraud.
The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are
concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt
to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of
public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional
processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that
intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient
petitioners Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the continuous conduct by the
Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It
should be noted that inFrancisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own
rightsas taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar
and of the legal professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional
acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge
advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to
the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases
climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our
prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing
conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the
decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to
hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot
question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has
become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question
as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an
injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from
including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the
records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on
the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for
being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III -

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure,
in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set
forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section
21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published
rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules
of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before
it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates
membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the
following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present
Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years
each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators
to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority
of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning inArnault v. Nazareno,
the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators
continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Proceduremust be republished by
the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration)
in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly,
there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with
each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-today business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

XLIV

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same
status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound
by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with
the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the
same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct
of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senates main rules of procedure)
states:
RULE
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

LI

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin
their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or
revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before
its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for
its approval.
RULE
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

LII

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they
are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after
an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in
which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the
date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from
theRules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity
of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets
of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the
next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available
to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance
of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only
in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not
these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at
the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,"
precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages
and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial
notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited
by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published
rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the
consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello
Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.

NUEZ vs APAO

PER CURIAM:
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court personnel
peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be bought and sold,
ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in
eradicating the so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the
offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.1
The above pronouncement of this Court in the case of Mendoza vs. Tiongson2 is applicable to the case at
bar.
This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct3 against Elvira Cruz-Apao
(Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth (15th)
Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The complaint arose out of respondents solicitation of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision
of the latters pending case in the CA,4 more particularly, CA-G.R. SP No. 73460 entitled "PAGCOR vs.
Zaldy Nuez."5 Complainant initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television
program Imbestigador of GMA Network,6 the crew of which had accompanied him to the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime CommissionSpecial Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacaang where he filed
a complaint for extortion7 against respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation by
elements of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the
Jollibee Restaurant, 2nd Floor, Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila,8 the
place where the supposed hand-over of the money was going to take place.
Respondents apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment operation prompted
then CA Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme Court Justice) to issue Office Order No.
297-04-CG9(Order) which created an ad-hoc investigating committee (Committee).10 The Committee
was specifically tasked among others to conduct a thorough and exhaustive investigation of respondents
case and to recommend the proper administrative sanctions against her as the evidence may warrant.11
In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the Committee conducted an investigation of the case and
issued aResolution12 dated 18 October 2004 where it concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and
Serious Misconduct against respondent existed. The Committee thus recommended respondents
preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending formal investigation of the charges against her.13 On
28 January 2005, the Committee submitted a Report14 to the new CA Presiding Justice Romeo A.
Brawner with its recommendation that respondent be dismissed from service.
Based on the hearings conducted and the evidence received by the Committee, the antecedent facts are as
follows:
Complainants case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than two
years.15 Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainants reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction

and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not
reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case.16 Desiring an expeditious decision of his
case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latters
employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone
conversation17 and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS,18complainant
informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly, complainant thought that
respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a
favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was
in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).19
Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long
time, to which respondent replied, "Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala kang pera,
pasensiya na."20Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent held firm
asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to make the decision.21
Respondent even admonished complainant with the words "Wala tayo sa palengke iho!"22 when the latter
bargained for a lower amount.23
Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the
decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador.24 The crew of the TV
program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for
extortion.25 Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for
the money26 and to set up a meeting with her.27 Upon learning that respondents offer of a favorable
decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the
entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigadorin cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2nd Floor of
Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg.,28 the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Patricia
Siringan (Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-inlaw.29 During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter
together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out.30 Respondent
also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision
only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be appealed later.31
When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male researcher
whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA Fifth (5th) Division
where complainant case was pending.32 She also claimed that she will not get any part of the money
unless the researcher decides to give her some.33
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent asserted
that the amount was fixed. She even explained that this was their second transaction and the reason why
the amount was closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on a previous occasion, only
Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) was paid by the client despite the fact that the amount had
been pegged at One Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00).34 Complainant then

proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the
balance of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the decision had been
released.35 However, respondent refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having learned their
lesson from their previous experience for as then, the client no longer paid the balance of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come out.36
Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the first meeting. After
reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, "Ah, panalo ka."37 The parties set the next meeting
date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed over by
complainant to respondent then.38
On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo Maclang (Maclang)
as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena (Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and
PO2 Edgar delos Reyes39 arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at Jollibee.40 Nuez and Siringan arrived
at past noon and seated themselves at the table beside the one occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and
Villena. Complainant had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles of
marked money and paper money which was to be given to respondent.41 The envelope did not actually
contain the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded by respondent, but instead contained paper
money in denominations of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as well as newspaper cut-outs.42 There were also ten (10) authentic One
Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet powder by the
PAOCTF.43 The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away44 and there were also three
(3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table operating a mini DV camera that was secretly
recording the whole transaction.45
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m.46 She appeared very nervous and suspicious during the
meeting.47Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her, precisely like those that were
shown onImbestigador.48 She thus refused to receive the money then and there. What she proposed was
for complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would
receive the money.49
More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen around and she was
afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered, she would suddenly be arrested and
handcuffed.50 At one point, she even said, "Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain, bakit hindi pa sila
umaalis?,"51 referring to Banay and Villena at the next table. To allay respondents suspicion, the two
agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see what was going
on.52
Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour.53 Complainant and Siringan
bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When respondent finally touched the
unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to
the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning.54 Respondent
became hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the restaurant.55
On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she went to the
restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).56

Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found
positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money.57 She was later detained at the
WPD Headquarters.
At seven oclock in the evening of 28 September 2004, respondent called Atty. Lilia Mercedes
Encarnacion Gepty (Atty. Gepty), her immediate superior in the CA at the latters house. 58 She tearfully
confessed to Atty. Gepty that "she asked for money for a case and was entrapped by police officers and
the media."59 Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty asked why she had done such a thing to which respondent
replied, "Wala lang maam, sinubukan ko lang baka makalusot."60 Respondent claimed that she was
ashamed of what she did and repented the same. She also asked for Atty. Geptys forgiveness and help.
The latter instead reminded respondent of the instances when she and her co-employees at the CA were
exhorted during office meetings never to commit such offenses.61
Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report62 of her conversation with their divisions chairman, Justice Martin
S. Villarama. She reduced the report into writing and submitted the same to then PJ Cancio Garcia on 29
September 2004.63 She also later testified as to the contents of her report to the Committee.
During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation and
not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came not
from her but from complainant. To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it
was complainant who allegedly offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She
likewise claimed that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt. Maclang
who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the
administrative case against her be dismissed.
This Court is not persuaded by respondents version. Based on the evidence on record, what happened
was a clear case of entrapment, and not instigation as respondent would like to claim.
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and he himself becomes a
co-principal.64
In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because respondent
demanded the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a
favorable decision of the latters pending case. Complainants narration of the incidents which led to the
entrapment operation are more in accord with the circumstances that actually transpired and are more
credible than respondents version.
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent
duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in
exchange for a favorable decision of the formers pending case with the CA. The text messages were
properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence65 which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications
shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge
thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone
number reflected in complainants cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.66 Moreover,
any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when
she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and
complainant.67 It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied.68 We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Complainants testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latters demand for One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the
reporter ofImbestigador who was present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the
parties actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of
September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondents evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an
acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met. Respondents own
testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the
statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective
memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainants cellphone and which
reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she
did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant. Thus, during the 17
November 2004 hearing, where respondent was questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando, the following
transpired:
Q:

After reading those text messages, do you remember having made those text messages?

(Respondent)
A:

Only some of these, your honors.

Justice Salazar-Fernando: Which one?

A:

Sabi ko po magpunta na lang sila sa office. Yung nasa bandang unahan po, your Honors.

Q:

What else?

A:

Tapos yung sabi ko pong pagpunta niya magdala siya ng I.D. or isama niya sa kanya si Len David.

Q:
Okay, You remember having texted Zaldy Nuez on September 23, 2004 at 1309 which was around
1:09 in the afternoon and you said "di me pwede punta na lang kayo dito sa office Thursday 4:45
p.m.Room 107 Centennial Building.
A:

Yes, your Honors.

Q:
And on September 23, 2004 at 1731 which was around 5:31 in the afternoon you again texted
Zaldy Nuez and you said "Sige bukas nang tanghali sa Times Plaza, Taft Avenue, corner U.N. Avenue.
Magdala ka ng I.D. para makilala kita o isama mo si Len David.
A:

Opo, your Honors.

Q:
How about on September 23 at 5:05 in the afternoon when you said "Di pwede kelan mo gusto
fixed price na iyon."
A:

I dont remember that, your Honors.

Q:
Again on September 23 at 5:14 p.m. you said "Alam mo di ko iyon price and nagbigay noon yung
gagawa. Wala ako doon." You dont also remember this?
A:

Yes, your Honors.

Q:
September 27 at 1:42 p.m. "Oo naman ayusin nyo yung hindi halatang pera". You also dont
remember that?
A:

Yes Your Honors.

Q:
September 27 at 1:30 in the afternoon, "Di na pwede sabi sa akin. Pinakaiusapan ko na nga ulit
iyon." You dont remember that?
A:

No, your Honors.69

Respondent would like this Court to believe that she never had any intention of committing a crime, that
the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from complainant and that it was complainant
and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and texting her,
not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
This claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least. Had the offer of a million pesos really come
from complainant and had she really intended to stop the latter from corrupting her, she could have
simply refused to answer the latters messages and calls. This she did not do. She answered those calls
and messages though she later claimed she did not remember having sent the same messages to
complainant. She could also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding Justice, an action which
respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under the circumstances.70 But this
course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because she never expected things to end this
way.71
While claiming that she was not interested in complainants offer of a million pesos, she met with him not
only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop pestering her. If respondent felt that telling
complainant to stop pestering her would be more effective if she did it in person, the same would have
been accomplished with a single meeting. There was no reason for her to meet with complainant again on
28 September 2004 unless there was really an understanding between them that the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) will be handed over to her then. Respondent even claimed that she became afraid of

complainant when she learned that the latter had been dismissed by PAGCOR for using illegal
drugs.72 This notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28 September 2004.
Anent complainants narration of respondents refusal to reduce the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000.000.00) based on the lesson learned from a previous transaction, while admitting that she actually
said the same, respondent wants this Court to believe that she said it merely to have something to talk
about.73 If indeed, respondent had no intention of committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the Court why
she had to make up stories merely to test if complainant could make good on his alleged boast that he
could come up with a million pesos. It is not in accord with ordinary human experience for an honest
government employee to make up stories that would make party-litigants believe that court decisions may
be bought and sold. Time and again this Court has declared, thus:
"Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the proper discharge of his duty and
it behooves everyone to steer clear of any situations in which the slightest suspicion might be cast on his
conduct. Any misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived, is likely to reflect adversely on the
administration of justice."74
Respondent having worked for the government for twenty four (24) years, nineteen (19) of which have
been in the CA,75 should have known very well that court employees are held to the strictest standards of
honesty and integrity. Their conduct should at all times be above suspicion. As held by this Court in a
number of cases, "The conduct or behavior of all officials of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility."76 Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by among others, strict propriety
and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary.77
Respondents actuations from the time she started communicating with complainant in July 2004 until the
entrapment operation on 28 September 2004 show a lack of the moral fiber demanded from court
employees. Respondents avowals of innocence notwithstanding, the evidence clearly show that she
solicited the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a favorable
decision. The testimony of Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondents confession immediately after the
entrapment operation, unmistakably supports the finding that respondent did voluntarily engage herself in
the activity she is being accused of.
Respondents solicitation of money from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision violates Canon
I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect on 1 June 2004 pursuant to A.M. No. 0306-13-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly provide:
"SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted
benefits,privileges or exemption for themselves or for others."
"SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or
implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions." (Underscoring
supplied)
It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel specifically
provides:

INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES

"SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court
governing the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the judiciary are deemed
incorporated into this Code."
By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant, respondent committed
an act of impropriety which immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the peoples
confidence in it.
In the recent case of Aspiras vs. Abalos,78 complainant charged respondent, an employee of the Records
Section, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for allegedly deceiving him into giving
her money in the total amount of Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P52,000.00) in exchange for his acquittal in
a murder case on appeal before the Supreme Court. It turned out that respondents representation was
false because complainant was subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court.79
The Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos guilty of serious misconduct and ordered her
dismissal from the service. This Court aptly held thus:
"In Mirano vs. Saavedra,80 this Court emphatically declared that a public servant must exhibit at all times
the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task, and by the very
nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate,
and invigorate the principle that public office is a public trust, solemnly enshrined in the Constitution."81
Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against Datu Alykhan T. Amilbangsa of the Sharia Circuit Court,
Bengo, Tawi-Tawi,82 this Court stated:
"No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than the judicial
office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. Court
employees in particular, must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity charged as they are with
safeguarding the integrity of the court . . . . The High Court has consistently held that persons involved in
the administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the
public service. He should refrain from financial dealings which would interfere with the efficient
performance of his duties.83 The conduct required of court personnel must always be beyond
reproach."84
The following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Yrastorza, Sr. vs. Latiza, Court Aide, RTC
Branch 14 Cebu City85 is also worth remembering:
"Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is the price
one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery dispensing justice
from the lowliest clerk to the presiding judge must conduct themselves with utmost decorum and
propriety to maintain the publics faith and respect for the judiciary. Improper behavior exhibits not only a
paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a great disrespect to the court itself. Such demeanor
is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee."86

In view of the facts narrated above and taking into account the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the
Committee in their Report87 recommended that respondent be dismissed from government service for
GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel.88
Finding the Committees recommendation to be supported by more than substantial evidence and in
accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the recommendation is well taken.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT
PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations. Her retirement and all benefits except accrued leave credits are hereby
FORFEITED.
SO ORDERED.

BARTOLOME vs MARANAN

PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter started through the sworn affidavit complaint1 in the vernacular, dated
December 16, 2009, that Ella M. Bartolome (complainant) filed against Rosalie B. Maranan [respondent,
Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite], charging her with
extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of P200,000.00, which
was later reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage. She
further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case decided in her favor without the need of
court appearances during the proceedings of the case. For a clear and complete picture of the accusations
against the respondent, we quote verbatim the pertinent portions of the complainants narration of the
incidents that gave rise to the filing of the present administrative complaint
xxxx
2. Na noong October 21, 2009 nakilala ko si ROSALIE MARANAN na isang stenographer sa Regional
Trial Court ng Imus, Cavite. Nasabihan ko siya ng aking kagustuhan na magsampa ng annulment of
marriage case. Agad niya akong inalok at pinangakuan na kaya niyang ipasok ang aking annulment case
sa RTC, Br. 20, Imus, Cavite kung saan siya nagtratrabaho. Noong una ang hinihingi niya sa akin ay
halagang TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) pero humingi ako sakanya ng discount
at pumayag siya sa ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P160,000.00). Ako po ay
naengganyo na magtiwala sa kanya dahil nangako siya na siya na ang bahala sa lahat. May kausap na daw
siyang abogado na pipirma sa petisyon koat di ko na daw kailangan pang umappear sa korte. Sinabi niya
na malakas daw siya sa judge at sa fiscal at siya lang daw ang pinapayagan na magpasok ng mga
aaregluhin na kaso sa kanilang korte. Sinabi niya din na kasama na sa P160,000.00 ang para sa judge at sa
fiscal kaya siguradong maaaprubahan ang aking annulment case sa mabilis na panahon. Kasama po ng
Affidavit Complaint na ito ang transcript at ang SIM Carday aking ipadadala kapag ako ay makasigurado
na ang Korte Suprema ay poprotektahan ang mga ebidensya laban kay MARANAN sapagkat rito lahat
nakatagon (sic) ang mga text messages at nakarecord lahat ng calls nitong si ROSALIE MARANAN sa
akin na nagpapatunay ng panghihingi niya sa akin ng pera at pangako na aaregluhin niya ang aking
annulment of marriage case. Ang cellphone number po na nagaappear dito sa SIM ay kay ROSALINA
MARANAN, ang numero niya ay 09175775982. Maaaring nagpalit na ng numero ang inirereklamo ko
kung kayat maganda rin na ipag-utos ang pag-alam ng detalye mula sa Globe Telecoms kung saan postpaid subscriber ang may-ari ng numero na iyan. [Emphasis supplied]
To put an end to the respondents extortion activities, the complainant decided to report the matter to the
police authorities. During the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus Police Station,
the respondent was apprehended inside the premises of the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in the act of
receiving the money from the complainant.
In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint the transcribed
electronic communications (text messages) between her and the respondent;2 a copy of an Electronic

Psychiatric History form given to her by the respondent for her to accomplish in filing the petition for
annulment of marriage;3 a copy of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the respondent was
apprehended during the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus Police Station on
November 11, 2009 at 2:40 p.m.;4 and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing the video taken during
the entrapment operation conducted against the respondent.5
The Court, in a 1st Indorsement6 dated March 19, 2010, required the respondent to comment onthe
complaint against her.
In her Comment dated May 27, 2010,7 the respondent denied the accusations against her. She alleged her
belief that Bartolome is a fictitious name as the affidavit-complaint does not indicate the complainants
exact address. She asserted that her detention at Imus Police Station does not prove her culpability since
no actual criminal charges were filed against her. She claimed that the lapse of six (6) months from the
time of the alleged incident indicates that the complaint is pure and simple harassment orchestrated by a
lawyer or litigant who has a grudge against her and who wants to publiclybesmirch her reputation. In
support of her defense, the respondent mentioned that even Judge Fernando L. Felicen (Judge Felicen),
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite interceded for her release from detention.
On July 29, 2010, the complainant sent a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),8 without
indicating her address, alleging that she has to constantly change residence because unidentified persons
had been seen in their neighborhood asking questions about her. She has also been receiving text
messages from the respondent telling her that her complaint would only be dismissed because she knows
people in the Supreme Court. The respondent also threatened retaliation against her after the case is
terminated. The complainant further claimed that the pieces of evidence she submitted are sufficient to
prove the respondents anomalous activities, and prayed for the immediate resolution of her complaint.
Based on the complainants pleadings and evidence, the OCA, (through then Deputy Court Administrator
Nimfa C. Vilches and OCA Chief of Legal Office Wilhelmina D. Geronga) submitted its Report to the
Court dated May 9, 2011,9 finding enough evidence to prove the respondents involvement in anomalous
activities and recommending that
1) OCA IPI No. 10-3352-P be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2) respondent Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch20, Imus, Cavite,
be found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and
3) respondent Maranan be immediately DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except her accrued leave credits, and withperpetual disqualification from employment in any
government agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned and controlled corporations.
In a Resolution dated September 5, 2011,10 the Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit their case for resolution on the basis of the pleadingsfiled. The respondent filed her
Manifestation dated November 17, 201111 submitting the case for resolution by the Court. She reiterated
her complete innocence and "vigorous" and "vehement" denial ofthe allegations against her. She insisted
that the present complaint against her is plain and simple harassment and a vexatious suit by the
complainant who either has a grudge against her or must have been used by another person with a grudge
against her. All she did was tosecure the services of a lawyer at the complainants request; this act, she

claimed, does not constitute graft and corruption, gross misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a court
employee and extortion.
The complainant did not respond to our September 5, 2011 Resolution as it was returned unserved on her.
Wenevertheless considered the case submitted for resolution considering her letter of July 16, 2010
praying for the immediate resolution of her complaint.
In our Internal Resolution dated December 7, 2011,12 we resolved to refer the complaint to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCA responded through its Memorandum of July 16, 2012,13 finding that the pieces of evidence on
record establish the guilt of the respondent on the charges of Gross Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service filed against her. It recommended that the respondent be found guilty of
the offenses charged and be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except her
accrued leave credits and with perpetual disqualification from employment in any government agency.
The Court fully agrees with the OCAs recommendation.
The respondents bare denial cannot overcome the evidence supporting the complainants accusation that
she demanded money on the promise that she would facilitate the annulment of her (complainants)
marriage. The respondents actions from the time the complainant started communicating with her on
October 21, 2009 and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS,14 until the
entrapment operation on November 11, 2009, showed that the complaint is indeed meritorious. The
respondents text messages sent to the complainant corroborate that she promised to expedite in
exchange for a monetary consideration ofP160,000.00 and that she would provide the lawyer who would
file the annulment case the complainants annulment case once it is filed:15
21/19/09 8:40pm
Sino po to
21/10/09 8:53pm
Sino nagrefer sayo sakin ano pangalan?
21/10/09 8:54pm
San mo nakuha # ko
21/10/09 9:05pm
Ako rin magbibigay lawyer sayo
21/10/09 9:13pm
D kaba tlaga makakatawag ngayon
21/10/09 9:18pm
Ako n lang tatawag sayo kc mahirap ang txt lang

21/10/09 9:24pm
Tawag n lng ako ha
21/10/09 9:49pm
Natitiwala ako sayo ha dahil hindi lahat pinagbibigyan namin. Sally n lang tawag mo sakin nagtataka lng
kc ako kanina kc buong buong buo yung txt ng name ko e.
21/10/09 9:51pm
Ay sorry mali pala sabi ko sayo 160k pala singil namin
22/10/09 10:05am
Gud am. Ano pwede k bukas
22/10/09 10:25am
ls txt bak naghihintay po kme
22/10/09 10:51am
Bukas lng available si atty
22/10/09 10:56am
Sana kung makakagawa ka daw paraan bukas kahit 40k n lng muna down tapos 3pm bukas
22/10/09 11:04am
Ok pero d kita pilipilit ha nasayopa din and decision yan ang sakin lng kc nagmamadali k at tsaka yun ang
free time ng lawyer ha
22/10/09 11:11am
Ella pakihusto mo n daw pala 50k at ibabayad daw mua sa psychiatrist at osg kahit sa susunod n lng daw
yung sa kanya
22/10/09 1:09pm
The complainant described the respondent as an influence peddler in the courts of Imus, Cavite who acts
as a conduit to judges, prosecutors and private law practitioners.
In her comment to the complaint,the respondent admitted that "she suggested to the complainant the name
of a lawyer friend, Atty. Renante C. Bihasa (Atty. Bihasa), and forwarded to her the cell phone number of
this lawyer so that theycould discuss the case." While she was in detention at Imus Police Station, she
called Atty. Bihasa, who told her that he was on his way and assured her that he had already asked his
lawyer friends to assist her. Atty. Bihasa arrived at about five oclock in the afternoon. As it was already
beyond office hours, she was told by Atty. Bihasa of the possibility that she would be detained pending
investigation. Atty. Bihasa returned the following day and was joined by Judge Felicen and her

officemates. Judge Feliceninterceded in her behalf that she begiven permission by the police officers to
leave her detention in order to take a bath and change clothes. She was granted permission, with the full
guaranty of Judge Felicen that she would return.16
In an affidavit17 dated May 28, 2010, Atty. Bihasa corroborated the respondents allegations. In his
affidavit, he narrated that upon receiving a call from the respondent that she was being detained, he
immediately called up two (2) of his lawyer friends based at Imus, Atty. Wilfredo P. Saquilayan and Atty.
Jose Emmanuel Montoya, to assist the respondent. As he arrived at Imus Police Station at around past
four oclock in the afternoon, he told the respondent of the probability of her detention until formal
charges were filed against her. According to him, "[he] took it upon [himself] to assist[the respondent] on
that date and accompanied her while the police officers of Imus PNP were doing their routine work on
suspects."
Atty. Bihasa further narrated thaton the next day at about five oclock in the afternoon, he went backto
Imus Police Station to wait for the complainant. After a few hours, the respondents co-workers, including
Judge Felicen arrived. They waited for the complainant until seven oclock in the evening but she failed
to come. Only the complainants lawyer arrived who informed the police investigator that the complainant
cannot come out of fear because of the death threats she received.18
The concern that Atty. Bihasa and Judge Felicen showed to the respondent while under detention at Imus
PNP Station gives rise to the suspicion that they have knowledge and tolerate the respondents anomalous
activities. The respondents text messages to the complainant support this suspicion:19
At tsaka alam mo naman nakailang appointment n tayo sa abogado hiyang hiya nga ako kahapon e
7/11/09 3:13pm
Tawagan ko muna si judge kung pwede pa kami tumanggap hanggang wed
7/11/09 3:15pm
Try ko lng
7/11/09 3:25pm
Hanggang Tuesday na lg tayo after nun nxt year na. Yan ang sabi
7/11/09 3:28pm
Sayang kc ang haba n ng time mo dp natuloy sabi ko naman sayo e kapag inabot ng naghigpit dn pwede
none appearance. Yun nagan nagpatulong sakin kahapon lng tumawag yun d sana nagka sabay n kayo
7/11/09 3:59pm
Ok po mit po tayo bukas 10 am sinabi ko napo kay atty. Tnx po. See you po
Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions.
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom
sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of

which is not recorded or retained.20 It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
communications or has personal knowledge thereof.21 In the present case, we have no doubt regarding
the probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering the present case. The complainant,
who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these text
messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982. The
respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging
and thatthe cellphone number reflected in the complainants cellphone from which the text messages
originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the
Imus Cavite Police conducted22
Sally:
Halika dito sa office, sa clerk of court. Pupunta ka ngayon? O sige, sige, pupunta ka ngaun? Ah sige OK,
salamat! Ang number ko
Lalaki:
Ibigay ko sa kanya?
Sally:
Oo, ang number ko ay 09175775982, ok thank you.
The complainant submitted two (2) copies of the VCD23 containing pictures taken during the entrapment
conducted by the Imus Cavite Police on November 11, 2009.24
Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of events,
acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and
shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other
person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
We viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment operation. The complainant herself
certified that the video and text messages are evidence of her complaint against the respondent, "Sapat at
malinaw ang lahat ng ebidensya na kasama ng aking reklamo na nagpapatunay na totoo lahat ang
nakasaad sa aking reklamo. Kitang kita sa video at sa mga text messages niya ang kanyang modus
operandi at paggamit niya ng pwesto sa gobyerno upang makapanghingi ng malaking pera sa mga
inosenteng tao." It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied.25 A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC specifically provides that these rules shall be
liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases.
The Court totally agrees with the OCAs finding that the respondent is guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The respondents assertion that Bartolome is a
fictitious name because the complainant has not stated in her complaint her exact address is preposterous
in light of the evidence of direct personal and text message contacts between them. In the absence of
supporting evidence, the claim that the complaint against her is pure and simple harassment orchestrated
by persons with grudge against her, is mere conjectural allegation.

As a public servant, nothing less than the highest sense of honesty and integrity is expected of the
respondent at all times.26 She should be the personification of the principle that public office is a public
trust.27 The respondent unfortunately fell extremely short of the standards that should have governed her
life as a public servant. By soliciting money from the complainant, she committed a crimeand an act of
serious impropriety that tarnished the honor and dignity of the judiciary and deeply affected the peoples
confidence in it. She committed an ultimate betrayal of the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, thereby creating the impression that decision can be bought
and sold.28 The Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the socalled "bad-eggs" in the
judiciary.29 We have been resolute in our drive to discipline and, if warranted, to remove from the service
errant magistrates, employees and even Justices of higher collegiate appellate courts for any infraction
that gives the Judiciary a bad name. To stress our earnestness in this pursuit, we have, in fact, been
unflinching in imposing discipline on errant personnel or in purging the ranks of those undeserving to
remain in the service.30
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer Ill, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and is accordingly DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to re-employment
in any government agency including government-owned or controlled corporations. Her retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits are ordered forfeited.1wphi1 This decision shall be immediately
executory.
The Court further Resolves to REQUIRE Judge Fernando L. Felicen, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Imus, Cavite and Atty. Renante C. Bihasa, to file their Comments on their alleged participation in the
anomalous activities of the respondent, within fifteen ( 15) days from notice. This directive is without
prejudice to the investigation of all or selected employees and officials of the Branch, who may have
participated in anomalous transactions relating to annulment of marriage.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to submit to this Court, within thirty (30) days, a
list of the annulment of marriage decisions of Judge Fernando L. Felicen for the past ten (10) years,
indicating therein the judgments made and the names of participating lawyers and prosecutors.
The Office of the Chief Attorney shall analyze the submitted data, including the records of and the
proceedings in the listed cases, and recommend to the Court the actions it should take in the event a
pattern of corruption involving annulment of marriage cases emerges. The Office of the Chief Attorney is
given ninety (90) days from receipt of the Office of the Court Administrator's list, within which to submit
its recommendations to the Court.
The Office of the Court Administrator shall likewise refer this administrative case and its records to the
Ombudsman for whatever action it may take within its jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

NPC vs CODILLA

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005, which
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the National Power Corporation seeking to set aside the
Order2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 19 dated 16 November 2004, denying
admission and excluding from the records plaintiffs (herein petitioner) Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H"
and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its submarkings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge 209 which
was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu
RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages
caused on petitioners power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein private
respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of
Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss which
was subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai
Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss which was also denied by public respondent Judge in an
Order issued on 24 January 2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the
lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions
thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their
respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and
excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J"
and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its submarkings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings. According to the court a quo:
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed respectively by the
defendants. The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals
of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff
attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are
equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence (Comment to
Defendant Wallem Philippines Objections and Motion to Strike). But as rightly pointed out in defendant
Wallems Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence
defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects

the electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic
document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be authenticated (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules
on Electronic Evidence), which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the
admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was not
executed, much less presented in evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside from their being not
properly identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals thereof was not established by any
competent proof.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and its submarkings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings,
"Q" and its sub-markings, and "R" are hereby DENIED admission and excluded from the records.
However, these excluded evidence should be attached to the records of this case to enable the appellate
court to pass upon them should an appeal be taken from the decision on the merits to be rendered upon
the termination of the trial of this case.
Exhibits "S" and its sub-markings are also DENIED admission for lack of proper identification since the
witness who brought these pictures expressly admitted that he was not present when the photos were
taken and had not knowledge when the same where taken.3
Upon denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 20 April 2005, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals
maintaining that public respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its submarkings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings,
"O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R", and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari,
the pertinent portions of which elucidate:
After a judicious scrutiny of the record of the case on hand, together with the rules and jurisprudence
which are applicable in the premises, we have come up with a finding that the petition for certiorari filed
in this case is not meritorious.
It appears that there is no sufficient showing by the petitioner that the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders in Civil Case No. CEB-18662. As what our
jurisprudence tells us, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction x x x.

In the case at bench, what has been shown to the contrary by the totality of the record on hand is that the
respondent judge acted correctly and within the pale of his sound discretion in issuing the assailed order,
dated November 16, 2004, in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces of petitioners documentary evidence which were denied admission by
the respondent judge were not properly identified by any competent witness. As pointed out by the
respondent Bangpai Shipping Company in its comment on the petition filed in this case which reproduces
some excerpts of the testimonies in the court a quo of Atty. Marianito De Los Santos, Engr. Nestor
Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I. Pagaling, the said witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and
participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of documentary evidence denied admission by
respondent judge x x x. In other words, there was lack of proper identification of said pieces of
documentary evidence. x x x.
Then another ground for denying admission of petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P,
Q, R, and S by the respondent judge is that said pieces of documentary evidence were merely photocopies
of purported documents or papers. There is no gainsaying the fact that the respondent judge acted within
the pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said documentary evidence. Section 3 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that, when the subject of inquiry are
the contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents themselves,
except in certain cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the nonpresentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions.
As aptly pointed out by the respondent judge in the order issued by him on November 16, 2004:
"x x x The record shows that the plaintiff (petitioner herein) has been given every opportunity to present
the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced said originals."
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent judges denial of admission of its
aforementioned documentary evidence.
Of course, the petitioner tries to contend that the photocopies of documents offered by it are equivalent to
the original documents that it sought to offer in evidence, based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence
which were in force and effect since August 1, 2001. However, such a contention is devoid of merit. The
pieces of documentary evidence offered by the petitioner in Civil Case CEB-18662 which were denied
admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute as electronic evidence as defined in the
Rules on Electronic Evidence. The informations therein were not received, retrieved or produced
electronically. The petitioner has not adequately established that its documentary evidence were electronic
evidence. it has not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents,
assuming arguendo that they are. Lastly, the petitioner has not properly established by affidavit pursuant
to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said
documentary evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying admission of the aforementioned documentary evidence of petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of argument that the respondent judge committed an error in
denying the aforementioned documentary evidence of the petitioner, still the petition for certiorari filed in

this case must fail. Such error would at most be only an error of law and not an error of jurisdiction.
In Lee vs. People, 393 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court of the Philippines said that certiorari will not lie in
case of an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the
petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed orders issued by respondent judge in Civil Case
No. CEB-18662.4
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition.
The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioners obstinate contention that the photocopies it
offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on its
inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court, the
photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its
own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of
written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catchall proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means".
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as
contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic
Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall enumerate the following documents
offered as evidence by the petitioner, to wit:
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with "RECEIVED"
stamped thereon, together with a handwritten date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of damages of petitioners power barges 207 and
209 prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems Corporation and manually signed by Messrs. Rex
Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest Form which was filled up and accomplished
by Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed by him. Portions of the Jurat were
handwritten, and manually signed by the Notary Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by
petitioner which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;

7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the breakdown of the cost estimate, manually signed by
Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of
the date it was received, and other handwritten notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum written using a manual
typewriter, signed manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten notation when it was
received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity supply and operation and maintenance
agreement between petitioner and Hopewell, containing handwritten notations and every page containing
three unidentified manually placed signatures;
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination with attachments addressed to Rex Joel C.
Malaluan, manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten notation of the date it was received.
The sub-markings also contain manual signatures and/or handwritten notations;
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination with attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer
and manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain manual signatures and/or handwritten
notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document marked as Annex C;
13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista
and by the Notary Public, with other handwritten notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary Public,
together with other handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which
a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.5 It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document.6
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is
relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is
presented in evidence as proof of its contents.7 However, what differentiates an electronic document from
a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all
of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may
be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed
manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,

retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced
through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus
declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that
the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the
records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings,
"K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its
sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best
evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the
onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was
designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the
withholding of the originals.8 But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention
of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law.9 The importance of the precise
terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence
of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best
evidence rule.10
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no evidence of a writing
the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence
by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.11 The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the
predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents;12 (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona

fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. 13 However, in
the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to
establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of
the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities given
by the trial court for it to present the originals of the photocopies it presented yet comes before us now
praying that it be allowed to present the originals of the exhibits that were denied admission or in case the
same are lost, to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence. Had petitioner presented the
originals of the documents to the court instead of the photocopies it obstinately offered as evidence, or at
the very least laid the predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not have
unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court and finally to this Court for adjudication. Had it not
been for petitioners intransigence, the merits of petitioners complaint for damages would have been
decided upon by the trial court long ago. As aptly articulated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has only
itself to blame for the respondent judges denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary
evidence and consequently, the denial of its prayer to be given another opportunity to present the originals
of the documents that were denied admission nor to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary
evidence in case the same has been lost.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

NOGALES vs PEOPLE

At bench is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Fredrik Felix
P. Nogales, Giancarlo P. Nogales, Rogelio P. Nogales, Melinda P. Nogales, Priscila B. Cabrera, PhilPacific Outsourcing Services Corp. and 3 x 8 Internet, represented by its proprietor Michael Christopher
A. Nogales(petitioners) against respondents People of the Philippines and Presiding Judge Tita Bughao
Alisuag (Judge Alisuag) of Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Manila (RTC).
The petition challenges the August 19, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
105968, which affirmed with modification the August 6, 2008 Order2 of Judge Alisuag of the RTC; and
its January 25, 2010 Resolution,3 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
THE FACTS:
On July 30, 2007, Special Investigator Garry Meez (SI Meez) of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)applied for a search warrant before the RTC to authorize him and his fellow NBI
agents or any peace officer to search the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services
Corporation (Phil-Pacific) and to seize/confiscate and take into custody the items/articles/objects
enumerated in his application. The sworn application, docketed as Search Warrant Proceedings No. 0711685,4 partially reads:
SWORN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

That he has been informed, verily believes and personally verified that JUN NICOLAS, LOREN
NUESTRA, FREDRICK FELIX P. NOGALES, MELINDA P. NOGALES, PRISCILA B. CABRERA
and/or occupants PHIL-PACIFIC OUTSOURCING SERVICES CORP. located at Mezzanine Flr.,
Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila have in their
possession/control and are concealed in the above-mentioned premises various material[s] used in the
creation and selling of pornographic internet website, to wit:
1. Computer Sets
2. Television Sets
3. Internet Servers
4. Fax Machines
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials
6. Web Cameras
7. Telephone Sets

8. Photocopying Machines
9. List of clients and
10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.
The application for Search Warrant No. 07-11685 of SI Meez was acted upon by Judge Alisuag. On
August 3, 2007, a hearing was conducted wherein Judge Alisuag personally examined SI Meez and two
other witnesses in the form of searching questions and their answers thereto were duly recorded by the
court. The witnesses affidavits were also submitted and marked as supporting evidence to the application
for the issuance of a search warrant. On the same date of the hearing, the application was granted and the
corresponding Search Warrant,5issued. The said search warrant is quoted as follows:
SEARCH WARRANT
TO: ANY PEACE OFFICER
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath applicant SI III GARY I.
MEEZ of the Special Task Force Division, National Bureau of Investigation, and his witnesses,
ISABEL CORTEZ y ANDRADE of 167 5th Avenue, Caloocan City and MARK ANTHONY C.
SEBASTIAN of No. 32 Arlegui Street, San Miguel Quiapo, Manila that there are good reasons to believe
that VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 201 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED IN
RELATION TO R.A. 8792 (ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT) has been committed and that JUN
NICOLAS, LOREN NUESTRA, FREDERICK (sic) FELIX P. NOGALES, GIAN CARLO P.
NOGALES, ROGELIO P. NOGALES, MELINDA P. NOGALES, PRISCILA B. CABRERA and/or
OCCUPANTS OF PHIL. PACIFIC OUTSOURCING SERVICES CORPORATION located at Mezzanine
Floor, Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila, have in their
possession and control of the following:
1. Computer Sets
2. Television Sets
3. Internet Servers
4. Fax Machines
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials
6. Web Cameras
7. Telephone Sets
8. Photocopying Machines
9. List of clients and
10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search any time of the DAY of the premises mentioned
above which is Mezzanine Floor, Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Sebastian St., University Belt,
Manila and take possession of the following:
1. Computer Sets
2. Television Sets
3. Internet Servers
4. Fax Machines
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials
6. Web Cameras
7. Telephone Sets
8. Photocopying Machines
9. List of clients and
10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.
and bring to this Court the said properties and persons to be dealt with as the law may direct. You are
further directed to submit a return within ten (10) days from today.
On August 8, 2007, SI Meez submitted a Return of Search Warrant6 to the RTC manifesting that in the
morning of August 7, 2007, the operatives of the Special Task Force of the NBI implemented the said
search warrant in an orderly and peaceful manner in the presence of the occupants of the described
premises and that the seized items were properly inventoried in the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized.
The items seized were the following:
1. Ten (10) units of Central Processing Units (CPUs);
2. Ten (10) units of monitors;
3. Ten (10) units of keyboard;
4. Ten (10) units of mouse; and
5. Ten (10) units of AVRs.
The RTC then issued an order granting the prayer of SI Meez to keep the seized items in the NBI
evidence room and under his custody with the undertaking to make said confiscated items available
whenever the court would require them.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, the named persons in the search warrant filed a Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties.7 In the said motion, petitioners cited the following
grounds:

A. Respondents do not have programmers making, designing, maintaining, editing, storing, circulating,
distributing, or selling said websites or the contents thereof;
B. Respondents do not have any website servers;
C. Respondents do not own the websites imputed to them, which are actually located outside the
Philippines, in foreign countries, and are owned by foreign companies in those countries;
D. The testimony of the witnesses presented by the NBI are contradicted by the facts of the case as
established by documentary evidence;
E. The NBI withheld verifiable information from the Honorable Court and took advantage of the limited
knowledge of courts in general in order to obtain the search warrant for their personal intentions;
F. The NBI raided the wrong establishment; and
G. The element of publicity is absent.
On December 26, 2007, the RTC denied the motion8 stating, among others, that:
1.) It cannot be said that publicity is not present. The Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corp., is actually
persuading its clients, thru its agents (call center agents), to log-on to the pornographic sites listed in its
web page. In that manner, Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation is advertising these
pornographic web sites, and such advertisement is a form of publicity.
2.) Even if some of the listed items intended to be seized were not recovered from the place where the
search was made, it does not mean that there was no really crime being committed. As in fact,
pornographic materials were found in some of the computers which were seized.
3.) In the same way that the names listed in the Search Warrant were not arrested or not in the premises
subject of the search, it does not mean that there are no such persons existing nor there is no crime being
committed.
4.) As a rule, Search Warrant may be issued upon existence of probable cause. "Probable cause for a
search is defined as such fact and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be reached." Hence, in implementing a Search Warrant, what matters most is the
presence of the items ought to be seized in the place to be searched, even in the absence of the authors of
the crime committed.
5.) The Search Warrant was issued in accordance with Secs. 3 to 6, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Search Warrant may be quashed or invalidated if there is an impropriety in its issuance or
irregularity in its enforcement. Absent such impropriety or irregularity, quashal is not warranted.
Undaunted, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said order on the following grounds: (a) the
trial court erred in holding that there was no impropriety or irregularity in the issuance of the search
warrant; (b) the trial court erred in holding that there was no irregularity in its enforcement; and (c) the
trial court erred in holding that publicity was present.

On February 19, 2008, petitioners requested the RTC to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to
SI Meez and the witnesses Isabel Cortez and Mark Anthony Sebastian directing them to appear, bring
the records evidencing publicity of pornographic materials and testify in the hearing set on March 7,
2008.
Meanwhile, in a resolution dated February 21, 2008,9 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended
that the complaint for violation of Article 20110 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against petitioners be
dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence and the same was approved by the City Prosecutor. Hence, on
May 6, 2008, petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Release Seized Properties11 manifesting that the
complaint against them was dismissed, and that, for said reason, the State had no more use of the seized
properties.
On August 6, 2008, the RTC issued the assailed second order,12 which denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners. The RTC, however, partially granted the prayer of petitioners. Judge
Alisuag wrote:
Be it noted that the proceedings held by this Court when it heard the Application for Search Warrant by
NBI Special Investigator Meez is very much different [from] the case resolved by the Office of the City
Prosecutor. The case before the Office of the City Prosecutor, while the same [was] dismissed cannot be
the ground to release the seized properties subject of the Search Warrant issued by the Court. When the
Court issued the Search Warrant, indeed, it found probable cause in the issuance of the same, which is the
only reason wherein Search Warrant may be issued.
On the case heard by the Office of the City Prosecutor, the Resolution has its own ground and reason to
dismiss it.
xxx

xxx

xxx

That the subject of the Search Warrant which is now under the custody of the NBI [was] made subject of
the case and as well as the witnesses for that case which was resolved by the Office of the City Prosecutor
is of no moment.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is Denied.
The Motion to Release Seized Properties is partially granted.
Accordingly therefore, let the computer sets be hereby returned to the respondents. The CPU and all the
rest of the softwares containing obscene materials which were seized during the implementation of the
valid Search Warrant are hereby retained in the possession of the National Bureau of Investigation thru
applicant Special Investigator Garry J. Meez.
SO ORDERED.13
Not in conformity, petitioners sought relief with the CA via a special civil action for certiorari alleging
that Judge Alisuag committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
she partially granted the motion of petitioners for the release of the seized properties such that only the
monitor sets were released but the CPUs and the softwares were retained under the custody of the NBI.

The CA affirmed with modification the assailed August 6, 2008 Order of the RTC. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the assailed order issued by the respondent Judge
on August 6, 2008 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the CPUs and softwares which were
ordered to be retained by the NBI through SI Meez shall be released in favor of the petitioners
herein with the condition that the hard disk be removed from the CPUs and be destroyed. If the softwares
are determined to be unlicensed or pirated copies, they shall be destroyed in the manner allowed by law.
SO ORDERED.14 [Underscoring supplied]
The CA explained:
1.) It is undisputed that the seized computer units contained obscene materials or pornographic files. The
hard disk technically contains them but these files are susceptible to modification or limitation of status;
thus, they can be erased or permanently deleted from the storage disk. In this peculiar case, the obscene
materials or pornographic files are stored in such a way that they can be erased or deleted by formatting
the hard disk without the necessity of destroying or burning the disk that contains them. By structure, the
hard drive contains the hard disk and the hard drive can be found in the CPU. These obscene materials or
pornographic files are only stored files of the CPU and do not permanently form part of the CPU which
would call for the destruction or much less retention of the same.
2.) Notwithstanding, with the advancement of technology, there are means developed to retrieve files
from a formatted hard disk, thus, the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is the reliable manner to
permanently remove the obscene or pornographic files. With regard to the softwares confiscated and also
ordered to be retained by the NBI, nothing in the evidence presented by the respondents shows that these
softwares are pornographic tools or program customized just for creating obscene materials. There are
softwares which may be used for licit activities like photograph enhancing or video editing and there are
thousands of softwares that have legitimate uses. It would be different if the confiscated softwares are
pirated softwares contained in compact discs or the pre-installed softwares have no license or not
registered; then, the NBI may retain them. In the particular circumstances of this case, the return of the
CPUs and softwares would better serve the purposes of justice and expediency.
3.) The responsibilities of the magistrate do not end with the granting of the warrant but extend to the
custody of the articles seized. In exercising custody over these articles, the property rights of the owner
should be balanced with the social need to preserve evidence which will be used in the prosecution of a
case. In the instant case, the complaint had been dismissed by the prosecutor for insufficiency of
evidence. Thus, the court had been left with the custody of highly depreciable merchandise. More
importantly, these highly depreciable articles would have been superfluous to be retained for the
following reasons: (1) it was found by the prosecutor that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that
the petitioners violated Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 8792 (Electronic
Commerce Act); (2) the obscene materials or pornographic files can be deleted by formatting or removing
the hard disk from the CPUs without destroying the entire CPU; and (3) the petitioners did not dispute
that the files found in the seized items were obscene or pornographic but the said devices are not obscene
or illegal per se. Hence, where the purpose of presenting as evidence the articles seized is no longer
served, there is no justification for severely curtailing the rights of a person to his property.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated January 25, 2010.15
Undeterred, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari16 with this Court anchored on the following:
GROUNDS:
6.1. The decision by the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the respondent trial judge constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it violates the constitutional
proscription against confiscation of property without due process of law, and there is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
6.2. Since the case involves pornography accessible in the internet, this is a case of first impression and
current importance.17 [Emphases ours]
ISSUE
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in ordering the removal and
destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and obscene materials.
THE COURTS RULING
Petitioners argue that there is no evidence showing that they were the source of pornographic printouts
presented by the NBI to the RTC or to the City Prosecutor of Manila in I.S. No. 07H-13530. Since the
hard disks in their computers are not illegal per se unlike shabu, opium, counterfeit money, or
pornographic magazines, said merchandise are lawful as they are being used in the ordinary course of
business, the destruction of which would violate not only procedural, but substantive due process. 18
The argument of petitioners is totally misplaced considering the undisputed fact that the seized computer
units contained obscene materials or pornographic files. Had it been otherwise, then, petitioners
argument would have been meritorious as there could be no basis for destroying the hard disks of
petitioners computer units.
While it may be true that the criminal case for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code was
dismissed as there was no concrete and strong evidence pointing to them as the direct source of the
subject pornographic materials, it cannot be used as basis to recover the confiscated hard disks. At the risk
of being repetitious, it appears undisputed that the seized computer units belonging to them contained
obscene materials or pornographic files. Clearly, petitioners had no legitimate expectation of protection of
their supposed property rights.
The CA is correct in stating that the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is a reliable way of
permanently removing the obscene or pornographic files.1wphi1 Significantly, Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 969 is explicit. Thus:
Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings,
sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be
governed by the following rules:
a. Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed.

b. Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral
literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture, paintings or other materials and other articles involved in
the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall nevertheless be forfeitedin favor of the government to
be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
Clearly, the provision directs the forfeiture of all materials involved in violation of the subject law. The
CA was lenient with petitioners in modifying the ruling of the RTC in that the CPUs and softwares, which
were initially ordered to be retained by the NBI, should be released in their favor with only the hard disk
removed from the CPUs and destroyed. If the softwares are determined to be violative of Article 201 of
the RPC, unlicensed or pirated, they should also be forfeited and destroyed in the manner allowed by law.
The law is clear. Only licensed softwares that can be used for legitimate purposes should be returned to
petitioners.
To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials involved in the
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted.1awp++i1
Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the destruction of the hard
disks and the softwares used in any way in the violation of the subject law addresses the purpose of
minimizing if not totally eradicating pornography. This will serve as a lesson for those engaged in any
way in the proliferation of pornography or obscenity in this country. The Court is not unmindful of the
concerns of petitioners but their supposed property rights must be balanced with the welfare of the public
in general.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 19, 2009 Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION in that only the CPUs and those softwares determined to be licensed and used
for legitimate purposes shall be returned in favor of the petitioners. The hard disk drives containing the
pornographic materials and the softwares used in any way in violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, unlicensed or pirated shall be forfeited in favor of the Government and destroyed.
SO ORDERED.