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Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
VARORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC., and.,d G.R. No. 161934
ARIA MARITIME CO., LTD.,
Promulgated:
Petitioners,
October 6, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision[1] dated February 28, 2003, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 55512, entitled Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. and Aria Maritime Co., Ltd. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division and Gil A. Flores, which
affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated May 25, 1999, and
Resolution[3] dated August 18, 1999, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC CN OCW RAB-IV-9-917-97-C, and its Resolution [4] dated
January 29, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof. The
assailed CA Decision ordered petitioners Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. and Aria
Maritime Co., Ltd., jointly and severally, to pay respondent Gil A. Flores the
balance of sickness wages in the amount of US$3,790.00, or its peso equivalent at
the time of actual payment, and to reimburse his medical and surgical expenses in
the total amount of P15,373.26, instead of P13,579.76. However, it dismissed all
the other claims of respondent for lack of merit.
IMPRESSION: Large disc herniation, ventral and right lateral at the L5S1 level with secondary right nerve root compression and edema. Small
disc protrusion also noted ventral and bilateral at the L4-L5. [7]
Dr. Igual observed that the CT scan showed large disc herniation L5-S1 with 2
nerve root compression and edema and recommended respondents confinement for
at least two weeks for P.T. [physical therapy] and medications; if not resolved, may
need surgical decompression.[8]
In a letter[9] to petitioner Varorient dated July 29, 1997, respondent, through
his counsel, stated that due to the gross and evident bad faith of petitioners in
refusing to grant him continued medical assistance until he becomes fit to work, as
recommended by their company doctors, he was forced to seek medical treatment
at his own expense.[10] Respondent demanded that petitioners should provide him
medical treatment and pay him sickness wages and disability compensation, within
five (5) days from receipt of the letter; otherwise, he would be constrained to
institute appropriate legal action against them.
In a Certification[11] dated November 7, 1997, Dr. Copernico J. Villaruel, Jr.,
attending orthopedic surgeon at the Philippine General Hospital, stated that
respondent has been admitted under his care from October 9 to 10, 1997 for
hemilaminectomy and foraminotomy of L4-L5 and L5-SI, due to the pain in his
right foot, and that respondent is now fit to go back to work.
Acting on the endorsement letter[12] dated November 24, 1997 by Labor
Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos, Dr. Francisco A. Estacio, Chief of the Medical and
Rehabilitation Division of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC),
submitted the Disability Evaluation Report[13] dated December 15, 1997, conducted
on the health condition of respondent, with the following findings:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
- Fairly developed fairly nourished
- Head, Eyes, Ears, Nose, and Throat no abnormal findings
- Heart and lungs no rales and no murmur appreciated
- Abdomen no abnormal finding
- Extremities no limitation of movements, no atrophy of muscles.
DIAGNOSIS:
- Large Herniated Disc L5 S1, with Nerve Roat Compression and Edema
- Small Disc Protrusion, L4 L5
RECOMMENDATION:
Based on ECC Schedule of Compensation, the Complainant deserves to
receive daily income benefit for the loss of income he incurred from
June 1997 to November 1997, plus reimbursement of hospital and
medical expenses for his injury, Herniated Disc.
On September 19, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint [14] against petitioners,
alleging that (1) per his employment contract, he boarded M/V Aria at Bangkok,
Thailand on April 16, 1997; (2) prior to his deployment, he was employed by
petitioner for the past 12 years; (3) during his employment and while in the
performance of his duties, he suffered injuries consisting of large disc herniation,
ventral and right lateral at the L5-S1 level with secondary right and nerve root
compression and edema, small disc protrusion also noted at ventral and bilateral at
the L4-L5; (4) due to petitioners refusal to provide for his medical treatment and
continued failure to pay his sickness wages amounting to US$4,800.00, he was
constrained to provide for his own medical expenses; (5) his injuries constituted
permanent and total disability which, under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 5,
series of 1994, would make petitioners liable for disability benefits under his
employment contract in the amount of US$60,000.00; and (6) his injury or
disability was directly and proximately due to the direct and vicarious acts of
negligence of petitioners and their agents. Respondent prayed that judgment be
rendered, declaring petitioners liable to reimburse his medical and hospital
expenses in the total amount of P103,969.00 and to pay him disability benefits in
the amount of US$60,000.00, sickness wages of US$4,800.00, compensatory
damages of US$604,800.00 (this amount was reduced to US$13,370.00 in his
Position Paper), moral damages of P1,100,000.00, and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees in such an amount as the labor arbiter may deem proper.
because upon his repatriation, he had received the amount of US$1,010.00 (or the
equivalent then of about P40,400.00) as settlement for his sickness wages and
other benefits, as evidenced by the Receipt and Quitclaim[17] dated June 25, 1997,
executed by respondent; and that respondent is not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. By way of counterclaim, they sought recovery of
litigation expenses, actual damages, and attorney's fees in an amount not less
thanP20,000.00 and, also, exemplary damages in an amount at the discretion of the
labor arbiter.
In their Supplement to Position Paper,[18] petitioners averred that respondent
sought another employment with Tara Trading Shipmanagement, Inc. (for and in
behalf of Amethyst Shipping Co.), on board M/V Luna Azul, for a period of twelve
(12) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$967.00 at 48 hours of work
weekly, overtime pay of US$535.00/month (US$6.24 per hour beyond 105 hours),
and vacation leave with pay of 3 days a year (or US$98.00 a month), as evidenced
by his Contract of Employment,[19] Seafarer Info-Sheet[20] and POEA Overseas
Employment Certificate.[21]
On September 7, 1998, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
Ramos dismissed respondent's complaint for permanent and total disability
benefits, sickness wages and all other claims and, likewise, petitioners'
counterclaim for damages, for
lack
of
merit. The labor arbiter found that
petitioners have substantially complied withall their obligations to
respondent under the POEA-approved employment contract. He debunked
respondent's claim for permanent and total disability benefits because respondent
had been duly proven and declared to be fit to work not only by the hospital of his
choice, i.e., Philippine General Hospital, but also by the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC); that respondent withdrew his claim during the pendency of
the proceedings, although with reservation to re-file the same; and that respondent
is now on board M/V Luna Azul on an overseas deployment. He upheld the validity
of the Receipt and Quitclaim executed by respondent and stated that respondent
had received reimbursement of his medical expenses in the amount P4,896.50. He
declared that respondent is no longer entitled to sickness wages as it would amount
to double recovery of benefits, as provided for under Paragraph 11, Section 4 of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract.
On May 25, 1999, the NLRC rendered a Decision which reversed and set
aside the Decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that respondent is entitled to
sickness wages and to free medical and hospital treatment for the injury he
sustained during the term of his contract, pursuant to Section C 4(b) and (c), Part II
of the Standard Employment Contract Governing All Filipino Seamen On Board
Ocean-Going Vessels, which obligates the employer to: (1) provide continuous
medical treatment to the repatriated injured seaman until such time he is declared
fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated
physician; and (2) pay the injured seaman one hundred percent (100%) of his basic
wages from the time he leaves the vessel for treatment until he is declared fit to
work, but in no case shall this period exceed 120 days. The NLRC observed that
petitioners cannot be considered to have adequately discharged their obligation in
providing continuous treatment for respondent, as they failed to follow through
their company-designated physicians recommendation, which required respondent
to undergo a two-week confinement and physical therapy and, if the injury remains
unresolved, for respondent to have surgical decompression. As a consequence,
respondent was constrained to seek treatment and surgery from a doctor other than
the company-designated physician. The NLRC also declared that respondent is
entitled to sickness wages equivalent to 120 days in the amount of US$4,800.00,
less the amount of US$1,010.00 which he had received, as full settlement of the
claim from the petitioners, per Receipt and Quitclaim dated June 25, 1997, or a net
total of US$3,790.00. However, the NLRC denied respondent's claim for
compensatory damages, as the contractual benefit of sickness wages provided for
under the Standard Contract is already a compensatory measure intended to assist
the injured seaman during the term of his contract. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE. Respondents Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. and Aria Maritime
Co., Ltd., are, jointly and severally, ordered to pay complainant Gil A.
Flores the Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of
THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY US DOLLARS
(US$3,790.00), plus THIRTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-NINE and 76/00 PESOS (P13,579.76), representing the
balance of the sickness wages and reimbursement of medical and
surgical expenses.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Petitioners sought
exoneration from liability, while respondent averred that the NLRC erred in
dated
May
25,
1999
is
AFFIRMED
with
As the CA denied their motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated January
29, 2004, petitioners filed this present petition.
Petitioners contend that respondent is not entitled to sickness wages, as this would
be tantamount to unjust enrichment and double recovery on the part of
respondent.They maintain that they had paid him US$1,010.00 as full payment of
his salaries and benefits, including his medical treatment and, by reason thereof,
respondent executed the Receipt and Quitclaim. They also claim that prior to his
departure from the country and actual deployment overseas, respondent and his
wife received financial accommodations in the form of cash advances, i.e.,
US$1,000.00, per cash voucher dated April 16, 1997, signed by respondent; and
US$2,790.00, per cash voucher dated April 21, 1997, signed by Crisanta Flores
(wife of respondent), or the total amount of US$3,790.00. According to petitioners,
since the amount of US$3,790.00 remained unpaid by respondent and his wife,
therefore, they can properly offset the said amount with the sickness wages they
would be paying to respondent.
Respondent denies that he and his wife were given cash advances while he was on
board; that he had received the amount of US$1,010.00 from the petitioners as
settlement of all his claims; and that the Receipt and Quitclaim dated June 25,
1997, allegedly executed by him, was a falsified document as the signature
appearing therein was a forgery.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, respondent is entitled to sickness wages. The
shooting pain on his right foot is an injury which he suffered during the course of
his employment and, therefore, obligates petitioners to compensate him and
provide him the appropriate medical treatment.
This is in consonance with the mandated provisions under Section 20 B (1), (2),
(3), (4), and (5) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment
of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels, [24] pursuant to Department
Order No. 4, series of 2000, of the Department of Labor and Employment (by then
Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma), adopted on May 31, 2000, which
provides that:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related
injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages
during the time he is on board the vessel;
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a
foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical,
serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment, as well as board and
lodging, until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention
arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the
employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability
has been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work, or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency
within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer
to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment,
a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably
presumed as work related.
5. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment,
the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the
seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work, but the
employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his
former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either
injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the
schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of
his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and
the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was
contracted.
On June 21, 1997, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines and declared fit to
work on November 7, 1997, or a total period of 141 days. Applying the said
provisions of the Standard Contract, respondent is entitled to receive sickness
wages, covering the maximum period of 120 days, or the amount of
US$4,800.00. The NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, found that petitioners are liable
to pay respondent the total amount of US$3,790.00 (US$4,800.00 less the amount
of US$1,010.00 which he already received by virtue of the Receipt and Quitclaim
dated June 25, 1997).
As pointed out by the CA, petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC Decision dated May 25, 1999, raised for the first time that they had given
the amount of US$3,790.00 to respondent and belatedly submitted two (2) cash
vouchers, i.e., US$1,000.00, dated April 16, 1997, which was signed by
respondent; and US$2,290.00, dated April 21, 1997, which was signed by
respondent's wife Cristina Flores, or a total of US$3,790.00. The CA observed that
the said cash vouchers do not bear the name and logo of petitioners, unlike the
check voucher they issued for the reimbursement of the medical expenses of
respondent amounting toP4,896.50, and that these vouchers were supposedly
already in existence or in the possession of the petitioners since April 1997, but
they never interposed such fact in their pleadings, e.g., Position Paper, Supplement
to Respondent's Position Paper, or Opposition to Complainant's Appeal. The Court
sees no reason to disturb this factual finding.
Moreover, petitioners were remiss in providing continuous treatment for
respondent in accordance with the recommendation of their company physician
that respondent should undergo a two-week confinement and physical therapy and,
if his condition does not improve, then he would have to be subjected to surgical
decompression to alleviate the pain on his right foot. Respondent's ailment required
urgent medical response, thereby necessitating him to seek immediate medical
attention, even at his own expense. The CA enumerated the medical expenses of
respondent for which petitioner would be liable. Thus,
[w]hile we agree substantially with the NLRCs decision in
allowing the reimbursement of P13,579.76, we disagree with its findings
that the receipts for medicines were not covered by prescriptions. Dr.
Irene Igual recommended the continued use of neo-pyrozon, ne[u]robin,
and myonal [and], thus, respondent should accordingly be reimbursed for
the purchase of these medicines. The records disclose the following
purchases:
1. Mercury Drug Receipt No. 535112 (Annex F)
Myonal - P97.50
Neo-pyrozon - 71.50 - P169.00
2. Mercury Drug Receipt No. 532746 (Annex F-1)
Ne[u]robin - P76.00
Myonal - 97.50 - P173.50
3. Mercury Drug Receipt No. 533708 (Annex F-2)
Neo-pyrazon - P71.50
Neurobin - 76.00
Myonal - 97.50 - P244.00
4. Mercury Drug Receipt No. 251929 (Annex F-3)
Pyrazon - P71.50 - P71.50
5. Mercury Drug Receipt No. 251931 (Annex F-4)
Myonal - P97.50 - P97.50
08 September 2010
FACTS:
In the 1990s, Petitioner hired Respondents Calibod, Laquio, Santander, Saile
Padilla, Andalahao, Decipulo and Montederamos, as teachers, and respondent
Palacio as guidance counselor. In accordance to DECS Memorandum No. 10, S.
1998 pursuant to RA 7836, the Petitioner informed the respondents that they
cannot be re-accepted for the school year 2000-2001 for not having passed the LET
(Licensure Examinations for Teachers), nor can they continue with their teaching
profession.
They filed a complaint contesting that their termination as highly irregular and
premature. They averred their right to security of tenure despite the requirements
set by the PRC for they had special permits to teach and the civil service eligibility
required under the law. In addition to this, the deadline for teachers to register
under the Memorandum was set to 19 September 2000, but the petitioner decided
to terminate them as early as 31 March 2000. Lastly, the acceptance of the
Petitioner of other teacher who do not also possess the required eligibility under
the Memorandum showed evident bad faith.
LA Decision:
The LA adjudged the petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal. Thus, petitioner was
ordered to reinstate the respondents or to pay them separation pay at the rate of
month wage for every year of service, plus limited backwages.
NLRC Decision:
The NLRC upheld the LAs decision, stating that the grounds relied upon by the
petitioner or dismiss the respondents are not among those enumerated by the Labor
Code and that the respondents are regular employees, who cannot be removed
without just cause.
CA Decision:
The CA upheld both the decisions of the LA and the NLRC. It further held that the
Petitioner should have adopted a contingency plan if in case the respondents still
have not complied with the aforementioned requirements when the deadline has
arrived. The CA also observed that the petitioners ulterior motive for the
termination may have been the result of a confrontation between the principal and
the respondents. However, as regards to Padilla, Palacio, Andalahao and Decipulo,
the CA found them to be merely probationary; therefore, there is no illegal
dismissal to speak of.
ISSUE(S):
Whether the dismissal of the respondents were premature because it was effected
prior to the deadline set by the PRC to acquire their license.
Whether the respondents are entitled to backwages from March to 19 September
2000, because it is only on such date that they were already dismissible for cause.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the decisions of the LA, the NLRC and the
CA. It is incumbent upon the Court to afford full protection to labor.The law has
provided a specific timeframe within which respondents could comply, petitioner
has no right to deny them of this privilege accorded to them by law. In so far as
Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montedramos are concerned, being
dismissed on March 2000 was premature. However, Saile is not qualified to take
the LET, therefore, no prematurity is to speak of on her end. Petitioners intention
and desire not to put the students education and school operation in jeopardy is
neither a decisive consideration for respondents termination prior to the deadline
set by law. The prejudice that respondents retention would cause to the schoold
operation is only trivial.
Yes. The respondents are entitled to limited backwages computed from 31 March
2000 to September 2000 in favor of Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and
Montederamos. The Petitioner cannot possibly presume that respondents could not
timely comply with the requirements set by law.
While the LA found that Jumuad was not completely blameless for the
anomalies discovered, she was of the view that the employers prerogative to
dismiss or layoff an employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion and
should be tempered with compassion and understanding.[20] Thus, the dismissal was
too harsh considering the circumstances. After finding that no serious cause for
termination existed, the LA ruled that Jumuad was illegally dismissed. The LA
disposed:
WHEREFORE, VIEWED FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainants dismissal as
ILLEGAL. Consequently, reinstatement not being feasible,
respondents HI-FLYER FOOD, INC. AND OR JESUS R.
MONTEMAYOR are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
complainant PAMELA FLORENTINA P. JUMUAD, the total
amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS (336,400.00), Philippine currency,
representing Separation Pay, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, through the Cashier of this Arbitration Branch.
Further, same respondents are ordered to reimburse
complainant an amount equivalent to 40% of the value of her car
loaned pursuant to the car loan entitlement memorandum.
Other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.[21]
Both Jumuad and Hi-Flyer appealed to the NLRC. Jumuad faulted the LA for not
awarding backwages and damages despite its finding that she was illegally
dismissed. Hi-Flyer and Montemayor, on the other hand, assailed the finding that
Jumuad was illegally dismissed and that they were solidarily liable therefor. They
also questioned the orders of the LA that they pay separation pay and reimburse the
forty percent (40%) of the loan Jumuad paid pursuant to Hi-Flyers car entitlement
program.
Echoing the finding of the LA that the dismissal of Jumuad was too harsh, the
NLRC affirmed in toto the LA decision dated August 10, 2006. In addition, the
NLRC noted that even before the Irregularities Report and Notice of Charges were
given to Jumuad on September 5, 2005, two (2) electronic mails (e-mails) between
Montemayor and officers of Hi-Flyer showed that Hi-Flyer was already determined
to terminate Jumuad. The first e-mail[22] read:
From: Jess R. Montemayor
Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 5:59 PM
To: bebe chaves; Maria Judith N. Marcelo; Jennifer Coloma
Ravela; Bernard Joseph A. Velasco
Cc: Odjie Belarmino; Jesse D. Cruz
Subject: RE: 049 KFC Cocomall Food Safety Risk/Product Quality
Violation
The second e-mail,[23] sent by one Bebe Chaves of Hi-Flyer to Montemayor and
other officers of Hi-Flyer, reads:
From: bebe chaves
Sent: Sat 9/3/2005 3:45 AM
To: Maria Judith N. Marcelo
CC: Jennifer Coloma Ravela; Goodwin Belarmino; Jess R.
Montemayor
Subject: RE: 049 KFC Cocomall Food Safety Risk/Product Quality
Violation
Jojo,
Just an update of our meeting yesterday with Jennifer. After
having reviewed the case and all existing documents, we have
decided that there is enough ground to terminate her services.
IR/Jennifer are working hand in hand to service due notice and
close the case.
According to the NLRC, these e-mails were proof that Jumuad was denied due
process considering that no matter how she would refute the charges hurled against
her, the decision of Hi-Flyer to terminate her would not change.[24]
Sustaining the order of the LA to reimburse Jumuad the amount equivalent to 40%
of the value of the car loan, the NLRC explained that Jumuad enjoyed this benefit
during her period of employment as Area Manager and could have still enjoyed the
same if not for her illegal dismissal.[25]
Finally, the NLRC held that the active participation of Montemayor in the
illegal dismissal of Jumuad justified his solidary liability with Hi-Flyer.
Both Jumuad and Hi-Flyer sought reconsideration of the NLRC Decision but their
respective motions were denied on November 29, 2007.[26]
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, Hi-Flyer appealed the
case before the CA in Cebu City.
On April 20, 2009, the CA rendered the subject decision reversing the decision of
the labor tribunal. The appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (4th Division) dated 28 September 2007 in NLRC
Case No. V-000813-06 (RAB Case No. VII-10-2269-05, as well as
the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the Honorable Labor
Arbiter Julie C. Ronduque, and the 29 November 2006 Resolution
of the NLRC denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
dated 08 November 2007, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[27]
Contrary to the findings of the LA and the NLRC, the CA was of the opinion that
the requirements of substantive and procedural due process were complied with
affording Jumuad an opportunity to be heard first, when she submitted her written
explanation and then, when she was informed of the decision and the basis of her
termination.[28] As for the e-mail exchanges between Montemayor and the officers
of Hi-Flyer, the CA opined that they did not equate to a predetermination of
Jumuads termination. It was of the view that the e-mail exchanges were mere
discussions between Montemayor and other officers of Hi-Flyer on whether
grounds for disciplinary action or termination existed. To the mind of the CA, the
e-mails just showed that Hi-Flyer extensively deliberated the nature and cause of
the charges against Jumuad.[29]
On the issue of loss of trust and confidence, the CA considered the deplorable
sanitary conditions and the cash shortages uncovered at three of the seven KFC
branches supervised by Jumuad as enough bases for Hi-Flyer to lose its trust and
confidence in her.[30]
With regard to the reimbursement of the 40% of the car loan as awarded by the
labor tribunal, the CA opined that the terms of the car loan program did not provide
for reimbursement in case an employee was terminated for just cause and they, in
fact, required that the employee should stay with the company for at least three (3)
years from the date of the loan to obtain the full 40% subsidy. The CA further
stated that the rights and obligations of the parties should be litigated in a separate
civil action before the regular courts.[31]
The CA also exculpated Montemayor from any liability since it considered
Jumuads dismissal with a just cause and it found no evidence that he acted with
malice and bad faith.[32]
Hence, this petition on the following
GROUNDS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN UPHOLD[ING] AS VALID THE TERMINATION
OF PETITIONERS SERVICES BY RESPONDENTS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
TH
4 DIVISION OF CEBU CITY WHICH AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER JULUE RENDOQUE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
TH
4 DIVISION OF CEBU CITY WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT
OF FORTY PERCENT (40%) OF THE CAR VALUE
BENEFITS.
Jumuad was terminated for neglect of duty and breach of trust and
confidence. Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to exercise
slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Fraud and
willful neglect of duties imply bad faith of the employee in failing to perform his
job, to the detriment of the employer and the latters business. Habitual neglect, on
the other hand, implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time,
depending upon the circumstances. It has been said that a single or an isolated act
of negligence cannot constitute as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee.
[35]
To be a ground for removal, the neglect of duty must be both gross and habitual.
[36]
On the other hand, breach of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of
employment, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position
of trust and confidence, where greater trust is placed by management and from
whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The betrayal of this
trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.[37]
It should be noted, however, that the finding of guilt or innocence in a charge
of gross and habitual neglect of duty does not preclude the finding of guilty or
innocence in a charge of breach of trust and confidence. Each of the charges must
be treated separately, as the law itself has treated them separately. To repeat, to
warrant removal from service for gross and habitual neglect of duty, it must be
shown that the negligence should not merely be gross, but also habitual. In breach
of trust and confidence, so long as it is shown there is some basis for management
to lose its trust and confidence and that the dismissal was not used as an occasion
for abuse, as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper, and unjustified
and is genuine, that is, not a mere afterthought intended to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith, the free will of management to conduct its own business affairs
to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.
After an assiduous review of the facts as contained in the records, the Court is
convinced that Jumuad cannot be dismissed on the ground of gross and habitual
neglect of duty. The Court notes the apparent neglect of Jumuad of her duty in
ensuring that her subordinates were properly monitored and that she had dutifully
done all that was expected of her to ensure the safety of the consuming public who
continue to patronize the KFC branches under her jursidiction. Had Jumuad
discharged her duties to be highly visible in the restaurants under her jurisdiction,
monitor and support the day to day operations of the branches and ensure that all
the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and
serviced, the deplorable conditions and irregularities at the various KFC branches
under her jurisdiction would have been prevented.
Considering, however, that over a year had lapsed between the incidences at KFCGaisano and KFC-Bohol, and that the nature of the anomalies uncovered were each
of a different nature, the Court finds that her acts or lack of action in the
performance of her duties is not born of habit.
Despite saying this, it cannot be denied that Jumuad willfully breached her duties
as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence of Hi-Flyer. First, there is no
denying that Jumuad was a managerial employee. As correctly noted by the
appellate court, Jumuad executed management policies and had the power to
discipline the employees of KFC branches in her area. She recommended
actions on employees to the head office. Pertinent is Article 212 (m) of the Labor
Code defining a managerial employee as one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Based on established facts, the mere existence of the grounds for the loss of
trust and confidence justifies petitioners dismissal. Pursuant to the Courts ruling
inLima Land, Inc. v. Cuevas,[38] as long as there is some basis for such loss of
confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the
employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of
his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded of his position, a managerial employee may be dismissed.
In the present case, the CERs reports of Hi-Flyer show that there were anomalies
committed in the branches managed by Jumuad. On the principle
of respondeatsuperior or command responsibility alone, Jumuad may be held
liable for negligence in the performance of her managerial duties. She may not
have been directly involved in causing the cash shortages in KFC-Bohol, but her
involvement in not performing her duty monitoring and supporting the day to day
operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the
restaurant were properly maintained and serviced, could have truly prevented the
whole debacle from ever occurring.
Moreover, it is observed that rather than taking proactive steps to prevent the
anomalies at her branches, Jumuad merely effected remedial measures. In the
restaurant business where the health and well-being of the consuming public is at
stake, this does not suffice. Thus, there is reasonable basis for Hi-Flyer to withdraw
its trust in her and dismissing her from its service.
The disquisition of the appellate court on the matter is also worth mentioning:
In this case, there is ample evidence that private respondent
indeed committed acts justifying loss of trust and confidence of
Hi-Flyer, and eventually, which resulted to her dismissal from
service. Private respondents mismanagement and negligence in
supervising the effective operation of KFC branches in the span of
less than a year, resulting in the closure of KFC-Gaisano due to
deplorable sanitary conditions, cash shortages in KFC-Bohol, in
which the said branch, at the time of discovery, was only several
months into operation, and the poor sanitation at KFC-Cocomall.
The glaring fact that three (3) out of the seven (7) branches under
her area were neglected cannot be glossed over by private
respondents explanation that there was no negligence on her part
as the sanitation problem was structural, that she had been
usually busy conducting management team meetings in several
branches of KFC in her area or that she had no participation
whatsoever in the alleged cash shortages.
xxx
It bears stressing that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found
that private respondent was indeed lax in her duties. Thus, said
the NLRC: xxx [i]t is Our considered view that xxx complainant
cannot totally claim that she was not remiss in her duties xxx. [39]
PLDT v. Teves
GR No. 143511: November 15, 2010
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Petitioner, v. Joey B. Teves,
Respondent
Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent was employed as Clerk of PLDT until he was terminated because he violated
the (3) unauthorized leaves of absence committed within 3 years, contrary to the policy of
PLDT. From 1990 and 1992, there were 3 instances of unauthorized leaves of absence from
the Respondent. On the final instance, the explanation of Teves was unmeritorious, which
led to his dismissal. He filed a complaint of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
The Arbiter found out that the dismissal was legal, but it ordered PLDT to give 20,000 php to
Teves. Teves appealed to the NLRC, which reversed the Arbiters decision. It upheld the
validity of the absence on account of Teves wife having complications during childbirth.
PLDT filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
The CA found that respondent's comportment cannot be characterized as grave so as to
constitute grave misconduct; that his first two leaves of absence were satisfactorily justified
ISSUE:
1. Whether the conduct of Teves warrants and justifies dismissal
HELD:
No. But the petition is partially granted.
Labor Law: Termination of Employment
Even assuming that respondent's absenteeism constitutes willful disobedience, such
offense does not warrant respondent's dismissal.Not every case of insubordination or willful
disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal. There must be
a reasonable proportionality between the offense and the penalty.
While management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose
appropriate penalties on erring workers, pursuant to company rules and regulations,
however, such management prerogatives must be exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws and valid agreements. The
Court is wont to reiterate that while an employer has its own interest to protect, and
pursuant thereto, it may terminate an employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss
or lay off an employee must be exercised without abuse of discretion.Its implementation
should be tempered with compassion and understanding.The employer should bear in mind
that, in the execution of said prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employees
position, but his very livelihood,his very breadbasket.
However, since one of the instances is unjustified, it is to be subtracted from the
reinstatement.
Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED.
COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Respondent.
October 6, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------x
DECISION
xxxx
While the case was still pending appeal before the NLRC, Del
Villar received a letter dated April 28, 1998, signed by one Virgilio
B. Jimeno for the Company, which read:
Dear Mr. Del Villar:
xxxx
Just like the Labor Arbiter, the Court of Appeals held the
Company liable for the following but in reduced amounts:
Albeit We are inclined to reinstate the decision
dated March 3, 1998 of the Labor Arbiter, We feel,
however, that the amount of moral and exemplary
damages thereunder awarded to [Del Villar] to the tune
We do not agree.
We answer
Hermano[19]:
affirmatively. As
we
explained
in Perez
v.
period of 60 days from May 21, 1999 within which to file his
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Keeping in mind
the rule that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded
and the last day included, [21] exactly 60 days had elapsed from
May 21, 1999 when Del Villar filed his Petition with the appellate
court on July 20, 1999. Hence, without a doubt, Del Villars Petition
for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 53815 was seasonably filed.
Jurisprudence
recognizes
the
exercise
of
management
prerogative. For this reason, courts often decline to interfere in
legitimate business decisions of employers. In fact, labor laws
discourage interference in employers judgment concerning the
conduct of their business.[23]
The Company and its officials attempt to justify the transfer of Del
Villar by alleging his unsatisfactory performance as Transportation
Services Manager. In its Petition, the Company disclosed that:
4.1. As Transportation Services Manager, [Del Villar]
displayed an utterly woeful performance. He was unable
to submit basic data as to type and brand of vehicles with
highest/lowest maintenance cost as requested. [Del Villar]
could not even update the records of his office. He never
complied with his commitments on submission of reports
and his claims of the availability of such reports were
never substantiated.
San Juan averred in his Affidavit that Del Villar was inept and
incompetent as Transportation Services Manager; and was even
more unqualified to take over the new position of Transportation
and Refrigeration Services Manager, which involved additional
functions related to Refrigeration. It was for this reason that Del
Villar was transferred to the position of Staff Assistant to the
Corporate Purchasing and Materials Control Manager.
Second, the two posts are not of the same weight in terms of
duties and responsibilities. Del Villars position as Transportation
Services Manager involved a high degree of responsibility, he
being in charge of preparing the budget for all of the vehicles of
the Company nationwide. As Staff Assistant of the Corporate
Purchasing and Materials Control Manager, Del Villar contended
that he was not assigned any meaningful work at all. The
Company utterly failed to rebut Del Villars contention. It did not
even present, at the very least, the job description of such a Staff
Assistant. The change in the nature of work resulted in a
Third, while Del Villars transfer did not result in the reduction
of his salary, there was a diminution in his benefits. The Company
admits that as Staff Assistant of the Corporate Purchasing and
Materials Control Manager, Del Villar could no longer enjoy the
use of a company car, gasoline allowance, and annual foreign
travel, which Del Villar previously enjoyed as Transportation
Services Manager.
Fourth, it was not bad enough that Del Villar was demoted, but he
was even placed by the Company under the control and supervision
of Pineda as the latters Staff Assistant. To recall, Pineda was one of
the Company officials who Del Villar accused of defrauding
the Company in his Report dated January 4, 1996. It is not too
difficult to imagine that the working relations between Del Villar,
the accuser, and Pineda, the accused, had been strained and
hostile. The situation would be more oppressive for Del Villar
because of his subordinate position vis--vis Pineda.
As they are, they are grossly inadequate and mainly selfserving. More compelling evidence would have been
a comparison of the old and new staffing patterns,
a description of the abolished and newly created
positions, and proof of the set business targets
and failure to attain the same which necessitated
the reorganization or streamlining.[37] (Emphases
ours.)
SO ORDERED
Respondent, along with 20 other drivers, was tasked to deliver bags of sugar from Cagayan
de Oro City to Coca-Cola Bottlers Plant in Davao City on 4 December 2004.All drivers, with
the exception of Yuag who could not be reached through his cellphone, reported their
location as instructed.The Coca-Cola Plant in Davao later reported that the delivery had a
suspiciously enormous shortage.
When confronted about the shortage and his failure to report his loacation, respondent did
not respond to petitioner. Thereafter he was instructed to "just take a rest" which respondent
construed as a constructive dismissal. After respondent demanded that his separation be
made in writing, petitioner insisted that respondent return the next day and take a rest.
Respondent however, went to file a complaint with the BLR for illegal dismissal and asked
for his separation pay and 13th month pay; alleging that he was dismissed based on his
non-returned call.
The Labor Arbiter however, sustained the dismissal for lack of substantial proof to sustain
the allegation of illegal dismissal and that parties were under an employer-employee
relationship. Upon appeal with the NLRC, the LA decision was reversed because
respondent was deemed to be under preventive suspension without pay. A motion for
reconsideration was made but was denied for being filed out of the reglamentary period.
On appeal through certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the court ruled on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship and reversed the NLRC decision by reinstating the Labor
Arbiters decision instead with modification to the award for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed error in reversing the NLRC decision.
HELD:
Petitioner is correct in its argument that there must first be a finding on whether the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion and on what these acts were.In this case, the CA
seemed to have forgotten that its function in resolving a petition for certiorari was to
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of public respondent NLRC.The CA proceeded to review the records
and to rule on issues that were no longer disputed during the appeal to the NLRC, such as
the existence of an employer-employee relationship.The pivotal issue before the NLRC was
whether petitioners telling respondent to take a rest, or to have a break, was already a
positive act of dismissing him.
Furthermore, the NLRC Resolution that reversed the LA Decision had nothing in it that was
whimsical, unreasonable or patentlyviolative of the law.It was the CA which erred in finding
faults that were inexistent in the NLRC Resolution.
In addition to this, the CA erroneously modified the NLRC decision when it can no longer be
modified for being filed out of time. It is not a mere technicality that the CA may brush aside.
The NLRC Resolution sought to be set aside had become final and executory 25 days
before respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration.Thus, subsequent proceedings and
modifications are not allowed and are deemed null and void.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ST.
PAUL
COLLEGE
QUEZON CITY, SR. LILIA
THERESE
TOLENTINO,
SPC, SR. BERNADETTE
RACADIO,
SPC, and SR.
SARAH MANAPOL,
Petitioners,
- versus-
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.
REMIGIO MICHAEL A.
Promulgated:
ANCHETA II and CYNTHIA
A. ANCHETA,
September 7, 2011
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review[1] dated November 18, 2005 of petitioners St.
Paul College, Quezon City, et al. which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision[2] dated July 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
Resolution[3] dated September 29, 2005, reversing the Decision[4] dated February
28, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the
Decision[5] dated November 20, 2000 of the Labor Arbiter.
As culled from the records, the antecedent facts are the following:
Petitioner St. Paul College, Quezon City (SPCQC) is a private Catholic educational
institution. It is represented by its President, petitioner Sr. Lilia Therese Tolentino,
SPC, the College Dean, Sr. Bernadette Racadio, SPC, and the Mass
Communication Program Director, Sr. Sarah Manapol, SPC. The respondents,
Spouses Remigio Michael A. Ancheta II and Cynthia A. Ancheta are former
teachers of the same school.
Respondent Remigio Michael was hired by the SPCQC as a teacher in the General
Education Department with a probationary rank in the School Year (SY) 19961997 which was renewed in the following SY 1997-1998. His wife, respondent
Cynthia was hired by the same school as a part time teacher of the Mass
Communication Department in the second semester of SY 1996-1997 and her
appointment was renewed for SY 1997-1998.
On February 13, 1998, respondent Remigio Michael wrote a letter [6] to petitioner
Sr. Lilia, signifying his intention to renew his contract with SPCQC for SY 19981999. A letter[7] of the same tenor was also written by respondent Cynthia
addressed to petitioner Sr. Lilia.
Petitioner Sr. Bernadette, on March 9, 1998, sent two letters [8] with the same
contents to the respondent spouses informing them that upon the recommendation
of the College Council, the school is extending to them new contracts for SY 19981999.
A letter[9] dated April 22, 1998 was sent to petitioner Sr. Bernadette and signed by
some of the teachers of SPCQC, including the respondent spouses. The said letter
contained the teachers' sentiments regarding two school policies, namely: first, the
policy of penalizing the delay in encoding final grades and, second, the policy of
withholding salaries of the teachers. Meanwhile, a letter[10] dated April 21, 1998
(the date, later on contested by respondent Remigio Michael to be ante-dated) was
written by petitioner Sr. Bernadette to respondent Remigio Michael, reiterating the
conversation that took place between them the day before the date of the said letter
(April 20, 1998). The letter enumerated the departmental and instructional policies
that respondent Remigio Michael failed to comply with, such as the late
submission of final grades, failure to submit final test questions to the Program
Coordinator, the giving of tests in the essay form instead of the multiple choice
format as mandated by the school and the high number of students with failing
grades in the classes that he handled.
Thereafter, petitioner Sr. Bernadette wrote a letter [11] dated April 30, 1998 to
petitioner Sr. Lilia, endorsing the immediate termination of the teaching services of
the respondent spouses on the following grounds:
When I talked to Mr. Ancheta the second time telling him of the
data I gathered, including the information that statistics permits only 1 to
2% failures, he still refused to budge in to review his grades and his
quality of teaching. He stood firm in his conviction and ground that the
students were to blame for their failures, and reiterated his disagreement
with several school policies (which he violated) contained in his letter
which he had asked his wife to give to the dean's office. Not content on
writing down his personal disagreement on some policies, he also asked
some faculty members to read his letter and put their signatures on it if
they were in favor of one or all of his points.
In other words, said spouses had refused and continue to refuse to
evaluate the students' performance on the bases of an established grading
system to ensure just and fair appraisal (violating par. 1.4, p. 40 of our
Faculty Manual).[12]
Respondent spouses were given an opportunity to comment on the above letterrecommendation of petitioner Sr. Bernadette. [13] On May 4, 1998, respondent
spouses sent their respective comments[14] to petitioner Sr. Lilia. Subsequently, the
respondent spouses received their respective letters of termination [15] on May 14,
1998. Respondent spouses sent a letter[16] for reconsideration to petitioner Sr. Lilia,
but was eventually denied.[17]
Thus, respondent spouses filed a Complaint[18] for illegal dismissal with the
NLRC. On November 20, 2000, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, [19] the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint of illegal dismissal for lack of merit. All
other claims are denied for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
The decision of the Labor Arbiter was appealed to the NLRC, but was affirmed by
the latter on February 28, 2003,[20] disposing the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack
of merit and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, [21] the
respondent spouses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. In its
Decision[22] dated July 8, 2005, the CA granted the petition and reversed the
decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, thus, it ruled:
WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the court resolved to SET ASIDE the decision
dated February 28, 2003 of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission. Private respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, petitioners the following:
a) Separation pay equivalent to one (1) month's pay for
every year of continuous service;
b) Deficiency wages to be computed from the
unexpired portion of petitioners employment contract.
c) Moral damages in the amount of P250,000.00 to
each [of the] petitioners;
d) Exemplary damages also in the amount of P250,000.00
to each [of the] petitioners; and
e) Attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
In its Resolution[23] dated September 29, 2005, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioners herein; hence, the present petition.
The petitioners cited the following arguments:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
SETTING ASIDE THE FINDING IN THE DECISION DATED 20
NOVEMBER 2000 OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER IN
NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-07-06018-98 THAT INDIVIDUAL
CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT OF ATTY. REMIGIO MICHAEL
A. ANCHETA II AND MS. CYNTHIA A. ANCHETA HAD EXPIRED
AT THE END OF SY 1997-1998, I.E., 1 JUNE 1997- 31 MARCH 1998,
probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three
(3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary
and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of
satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9)
consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary
level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis.
that the school is extending to them new contracts for the coming school year, the
letters do not constitute as actual employment contracts but merely offers to teach
on the said school year. The respondent spouses wrote to the president, petitioner
Sr. Lilia:
Respondent Remigio Michael:
Dear Sister,
Peace!
This signifies my intention of renewing my contract of employment with
[SPCQC] for SY 1998-1999.
Thank you.[40]
Respondent Cynthia:
Dear Sister,
I wish to continue teaching in St. Paul College Quezon City for school
year 1998-99.
Thank you very much.[41]
In response to the above, the college dean, petitioner Sr. Bernadette wrote the
respondent spouses letters with the same contents, thus:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of application to teach
during the School year of 1998-1999.
Upon the recommendation of the College Council, I am happy to inform
you that the school is extending to you a new contract for School year
1998-1999.
I wish to take this opportunity to thank you for the service which you
have rendered to our students and to the school during the past School
year 1997-1998. I hope you will again go out of your way and cooperate
in this apostolate that we are doing.
Congratulations and I look forward to a fruitful and harmonious time
with you.[42]
this matter which I will discuss later had not happened, I know that my
attention would never be called to this policy, as what was the case in
the past. I plead to you, Sister, to find out how many of us have not
complied with this policy and how many were actually called their
attention for non-compliance. I do not disagree with the objective of this
policy; I am only shocked to find out that while many are noncompliant, only few are punished. So be it, I apologize for my violation.
[50]
Respondent Remigio Michael was further charged with non-compliance with the
standard format (multiple choice) of final test questions as agreed upon by the
different departments of petitioner school, to which the former replied:
I am not the only one who does not comply with this policy. Many
teachers do not give multiple choice exams at all; others do not give a
pure multiple choice exam. I urge you, Sister, to kindly do the rounds. x
xx
xxxx
Again, I apologize if I did not comply with this policy.[51]
He was also charged with failure to encode modular grade reports as required by
the school. On that charge, respondent Remigio Michael cited a letter dated April
22, 1998 that criticizes the school policy of penalizing the delays in encoding final
grades.
On the charge that he had a high failure rate in his classes, respondent Remigio
Michael claimed that he did not flunk students, but the latter failed. He further
commented that petitioner school did not consciously promote academic
excellence.
Finally, as to the charge that he constantly failed to report for work on time, the
same respondent admitted such tardiness but only with respect to his 7:30 a.m.
classes.
Respondent Remigio Michael's spouse shared the same defenses and admissions as
to the charges against her.
The plain admissions of the charges against them were the considerations taken
into account by the petitioner school in their decision not to renew the respondent
spouses' employment contracts. This is a right of the school that is mandated by
law and jurisprudence. It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of
efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of the Constitution.
[52]
As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at
liberty to set them aside.[53] Schools cannot be required to adopt standards which
barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition.[54] The same academic
freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and
conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations
under the Labor Code.[55] The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by
its management prerogative the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, such as hiring, the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working
methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees,
supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of
workers.[56]
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review dated November 18, 2005 of petitioners
St. Paul College, Quezon City, et al. is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated
July 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated September 29, 2005
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision dated
February 28, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Decision
dated November 20, 2000 of the Labor Arbiter are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.