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1985), 121; Haussmann, Baron Georges-Eugne, in Encyclopedia Britannica, 5th ed., (1992).
Steven Johnson criticizes other aspects of the change in Interface Culture, 6364.
31. See Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 318.
32. Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile
(New York: Grossman, 1965), xciii.
33. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 Yale Law Journal 1039
(2002).
34. Ibid., 1047.
35. Ibid., 1048.
36. Brin, The Transparent Society, 293.
37. Consider civil rights in the American South. During the legislative hearings on the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, supporters of the bill called before the committee white, southern
employers and business owners whose discrimination against blacks was the prime target of the
legislation. Some of these employers and businessmen supported the bill because business
would improve: The labor pool would increase, causing wages to decrease, and the demand for
services would increaseso long, that is, as whites did not shift their custom. This last point is
what set the stage for business support for the Civil Rights Act. What business leaders feared
was the retaliation of whites against their voluntary efforts to integrate. The Civil Rights Act
changed the context to make discrimination against blacks illegal. The businessman could
thenwithout fear of the retaliation of whiteshire or serve a black because of either his
concern for the status of blacks or his concern to obey the law. By creating this ambiguity, the
law reduced the symbolic costs of hiring blacks. This example demonstrates how law can
change norms without government having control over the norms. In this case, the norm of
accommodating blacks was changed by giving it a second meaningthe norm of simply obeying the law; see Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 96567.
38. Thurgood Marshall, Esq., oral argument on behalf of respondents, Cooper v. Aaron,
358 US 1 (1958) (no. 1), in Fifty-four Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Constitutional Law, edited by Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1975), 533, 713.
39. See, for example, Dyson, Release 2.0: Government can play a divisive role vis--vis
communities. Often, the more government provides, the less community members themselves
contribute (43); in The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions
on Collective Action (University of Chicago Law Review 63 [1996]: 133), Eric A. Posner argues
that government help to a community can undermine the community.
40. R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, Southern California Law Review 78 (2005):
457, 487.
41. Ibid., 474.
42. Ibid., 465.
43. Cass Sunstein points to seatbelt law as a hypothetical of government regulation permit[ing] people to express preferences by using the shield of the law to lessen the risk that private actors will interfere with the expression [through normative censure]; Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, University of Chicago Law Review 53 (1986): 1129, 1145. Alternatively,
seatbelt laws have been used as the factual basis for critiques of norm sponsorship as ineffective
and no substitute for direct regulation; see Robert S. Alder and R. David Pittle, Cajolery or
Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation? Yale Journal on
Regulation 1 (1984): 159, 17178. However, the observations may have been premature. John
C. Wright, commenting on televisions normative content, claims that we have won the battle
on seatbelts, just by a bunch of people getting together and saying, It is indeed macho to put
on a seatbelt. It is macho and it is smart and it is manly and it is also feminine and smart and