FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015

SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA,Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust, incompetence, and gross misconduct of
respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of
MariecrisUmaguing (Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the SangguniangKabataan (SK)
Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 071279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival
Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this, complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De
Vera. On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court
appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more
than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the November 8, 2008
deadline was looming.5Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest.
Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera),
which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and
Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and
Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names.7 The
signing over of Lachicas and Almeras names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De
Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his
own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachicas affidavit was presented to the
MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were
falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with
Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachicas and Almeras affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere
flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed
the election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the MeTC, although
promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to
attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera
explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De
Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for
his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would
in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of
fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive
fees he collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Veras disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against him by complainants. He averred that he
merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that
the signing of Lachicas falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who should be
indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the
aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he
supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing incident,
Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case.18 To add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel,
complainants executed a document entitled Release Waiver & Discharge,19 which, to him, discharges him and his law firm from all
causes of action that complainants may have against him, including the instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the administrative action to be impressed
with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated in the falsification of Lachicas affidavit,
the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to the falsification of Almeras affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately
omitted to comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almeras sister
attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was
present during its signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera was found to be credible as it was
too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the
signing of the affidavits was done on November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed that

Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of advising his clients campaigners Lalong-Isip and
Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the
election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyers first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner.
Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated February 11, 2014, affirming with modification
their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.
The Courts Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the records. However, the Court finds it
apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member
of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyers Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon
admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Lawyers Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of
court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of
law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified
affidavit, i.e.,Almeras affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of
Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioners appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacens credibility
as a witness given that nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that the IBP and its
officers are in the best position to assess the witnesss credibility during disciplinary proceedings, as they similar to trial courts are
given the opportunity to first-hand observe their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the
falsification of Almeras affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Veras comment on the same. In fact, in his
Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by
Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary
public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life,31 and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned
documents, much less of the participation in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere
general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacens positive testimony that he indeed participated in the procurement of her
signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification.
The final lining to it all for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation is that Almeras affidavit was submitted to
the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with
Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted
only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the
authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal
and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation34 or allow his
client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned Release Waiver & Discharge which Atty. De Vera, in
his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the
present case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether,
on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
by submitting a falsified document before a court.
As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the lawyer therein from the practice of
law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to
impose the same here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Veras
acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country
should remain faithful to the Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law
Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up ones misdeeds committed against clients and
the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to
remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law,
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished more
severely.
Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00 which
he admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality
of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of further administrative penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6593

February 4, 2010

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E.
Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church,
Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine
Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that
sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I
ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and
a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among
others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were
married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our
children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia
considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was
not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married
Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his "bad
boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido
met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children
with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel
Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.4 Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not
practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third
marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he
became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the
legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty.
Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as
they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained
this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that
Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her.
Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings6 in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed
against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage
between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents
argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any
immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his
admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to
maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.10 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise
denied this motion.11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and
Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of
Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004.
This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby
DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the
complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No.
XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did
not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under
the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight
of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand,
advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried
to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other
administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its
recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public.15 The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to
practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; 16 effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in
considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a
member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.
Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental
or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.18 Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that
the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even
after admission to the Bar.19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the
Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of
this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or
violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern,
Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated,
Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only
after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits
are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute

the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright
and respectable members of the community.20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the communitys sense of decency.21We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple
marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever
them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this
society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward
respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held
that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good
moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,25 where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the
daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also
declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross
immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest
degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife;
marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia.26 This was a
misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an
open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without taking into
consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his
second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry,
considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord
legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who
at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. RisosVidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal
knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed
against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of
his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his
lawyers oath,28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 all of which
commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this
second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to
nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he
"shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer
shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish
motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be
used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted
relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by
upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.31 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.32 Lawyers are at all times subject to
the watchful public eye and community approbation.33Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this
scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the
circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them
exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no
distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his
marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the
respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of
morality required of them as members of the Bar.35
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.36 To have good moral character, a person must
have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. 37 The requirement
of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to
protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a
married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was
under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during
the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second
marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer,
a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems,
would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the
other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away
from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was
a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from
the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing
his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of
the prism of law.1avvphi1
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt
free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity
of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired
before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage,
contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry
Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage
in Hongkong39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of
bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty.
Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not
appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration
of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to
approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her
actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability
and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty.
Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she
professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not
object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the
dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality.40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the
legal profession.
Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership
in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers.
We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and
as an officer of the Court.42
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern
of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for
the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their
separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her
character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity
of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO,
Complainants,

A.C. No. 6368

Present:

-versus-

ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO,

Respondent.

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 13, 2012

DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against
respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his
duties and oath as a lawyer.
The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:
That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with the help and in
connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to
defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to
the effect that he would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the
acquaintance of complainants herein and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to
him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of the subject land and further by
means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of
the subject land, who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one
handling William Gatchalians business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and
REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the
complainant[s] to give and deliver the said amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and benefit and despite demand
upon him to return the said amount, he failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a lawyer.[2]
In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated December 7, 1998[3] and June 22, 1999[4] of
the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause for the filing of the criminal information [5] against both
Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging
them with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The respondent was required to file his Comment. [6] On September 24, 2004, the respondent filed an undated Comment, [7] wherein he
denied the allegations against him and averred the following:
2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of
getting from them the amount of [P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn sought the
legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said money from them.
3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and respondent. The arrangement for titling of the
land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.
4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in law practice.[8]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court as it appeared that the respondents undated comment filed with the Court was not verified.[9]
On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1,
2005, within which to comply due to his medical confinement.[10]
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion [11] for extension praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005,
alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. [12] The respondent failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the
respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was then submitted for
report and recommendation.[13]
Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made the following findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help and in connivance and
collusion with a certain Andres Magat (Magat), by using false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally
committed fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda
family of Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the amount of
[P]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the titling of the subject land. Respondent represented himself
to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it has been titled. Respondent and Magat also
represented that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation
they knew to be false, fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give and deliver to them the amount
of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with their obligation to expedite and
cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon them to return
the said amount, they failed and refused to do so.
In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a complaint for Estafa against
the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the
preliminary investigation conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial
for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was
transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7
December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga conducted a reinvestigation of the case. During the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the
amount of [P]200,000.00 because according to him the amount of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by
respondent considering that the said amount was turned over to respondent for expenses incurred in the
documentation prior to the titling of the subject land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for
time to pay back their obligations to the complainants. However, despite extensions of time granted to them,
respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of
compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there
was no reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed against
respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions and appear
on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his
despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.
From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent committed a crime that import deceit
and violation of his attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound
to obey the laws of the land. The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of
dishonesty in violation of the attorneys oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16 April 2004. As provided
for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, A complaint
for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct (Section 1, Rule VIII).[14]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARSfrom receipt hereof
from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. [15]
On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of the amount
of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice with Warning that if he does not return the amount with
in sixty days from receipt of this Order then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year.[16]
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration [17] of the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent
averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from
the alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in convincing
Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with Teresita as
evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement[18] signed by the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the Investigating
Commissioner considered him as in default after having ignored the representative he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005; and
(5) he long restituted the amount of P225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to
Teresitas declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out
the admission made by Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies of
receipts.
In an Order[19] dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
In her Comment,[20] Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative case because they took into
consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the respondents reputation
as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in
order to trace the respondents whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no
restitution of the P200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation[21] stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the
accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.[22]
In a Letter[23] dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the present action as she was already 86
years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case [24] dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another
Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardos restitution of the amount of P200,000.00 so she
can use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.
The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that administrative
cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for.[25]
Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several extensions of time to file the same, the
respondent failed to appear during the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an
officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the courts authority which can not be countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they
are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing,
the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or in their
private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.[26]
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted in his answer that his legal services
were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the
Courts indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the
complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the
money given by the complainants in the amount of P495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[27]
It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having
involved the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of
liability in the administrative case.Conversely, the respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively.[28]
In Yu v. Palaa,[29] the Court held that:
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will
not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission
to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney
is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.[30] (Citations omitted)
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of Estafa for which he was meted the penalty
of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayoras minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondents moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule
138, Section 27 provides that:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment commensurate to all his acts and to accord
the complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount ofP200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita
Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the
additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5581

January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent
Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of
marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the
sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a
certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his
second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral
and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by
Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file his comment on the
complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was filed against him, he did not
know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this
Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the
criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able
to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B
Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the
same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office
address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to
prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which
triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to
at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the administrative
complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint was furnished to
respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry
Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved to
require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig
probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig
be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the complaint, and required Bansig to
furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was
supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and
willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that
again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held
in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent
at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to
submit the correct and present address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence with the Court No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said
address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at
"Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new
address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for failure to file his comment
on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a
FINE of P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty.
Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's Resolutions dated June 30,
2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER
the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty.
Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The
Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division
of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City
cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a
vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot be found or located and there were no leads
to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as per their records, the
address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any
action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a
period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite
numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his
first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by
the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8,
1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced
by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states
that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen
Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the
latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage
to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage
with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of
their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that
respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified
xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated
Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated
by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In
the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to
have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing
respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not
received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show
cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not
reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could
have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case; accommodating respondent's
endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by
numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's
Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts
of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondents acts were deliberate,
maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions.
Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring
the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied
with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and
willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.1wphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent.
All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing
himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation,
and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where

the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am.
Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during
our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the
COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent
in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important
to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken
up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under
our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many
lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice
of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The
practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State
Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such
a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of
both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also
know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not
[be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in
this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer
skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically,
so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts,
are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decisionmaking.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation.
The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of

advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining
the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the
"big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas
of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities
and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice"
in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvardeducated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience
of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with subnational governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often
with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new
patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management
of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms
of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In

Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible
to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators
in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support,
including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used
to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is
not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade
as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or
will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a
legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction
is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default.
(Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining
their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may
work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when
the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle
which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic
and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry
no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius
and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking
into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a
week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts
of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he
lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help
in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away
from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself
with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any
blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a
false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company,
Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Lukes
Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group,
filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for updating purposes. The GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and
President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution
with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD)
claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board
and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of
the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would
be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI.
She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately
LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her
certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message
and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative
and said that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and
place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarins positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretarys Certificates dated May 16, 20066, May 22,
20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarins signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors and officers of LCI, where she and
Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings,
Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that when
the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the
same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.11 During the mandatory preliminary conference,
however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment. She stated that merely presenting
the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.0214 of the CPR and thus recommended that
she be suspended from the practice of law for three months. It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a
stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the
President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCIs bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin
untrue.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty.
Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be
dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the company. The Secretarys Certificates
with Guarins signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank
accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution16 adopted in toto the CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for
reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as
loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated [t]he
serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the

court in accordance with his oath.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these
are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held
any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is
undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the
same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein.
That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also
note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a
GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the
members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of
such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpins action in submitting a false document we see it fit to increase the recommended
penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176278

June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as
Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
At issue is the power of Congress to limit the Presidents prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite
the constitutional rule limiting Congress role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments confirmation of
nominees.1 However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness,2 we dismiss the
petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be.
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent
Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign
Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him
from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers
and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all
DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA
officials and employees.
In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise
threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension
from the practice of law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that
neither petitioners citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davides appointment because
petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state
or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in
truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question.
On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23s mandated retirement age applies only to career
diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide.
The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness.
First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to citizens
suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.5 Three factors are
relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised the
character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioners allegations comes close to any of these
parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government
personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory
prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career
ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and
personal than petitioners generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.1avvphi1
The same conclusion holds true for petitioners invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers contributions to the states coffers entitle
them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits
respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which
was included in the appropriations for the DFAs total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent
Davides nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer
entitled to draw salary,8 negating petitioners claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds."9
Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him
from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly
legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at
the UN on 1 April 2010.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10135

January 15, 2014

EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable Commissioners, Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron
Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty.
Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73,
Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her
speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya
agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na
ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyakiyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."3
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should prepare and furnish her with their
Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for
their transcript of stenographic notes.4
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73,
Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the latter was assisted by Areola in filing a
Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latters criminal case for rape, which
was pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda retorted that he allowed Areola to file
the motion for him since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated
Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the
Complainant and alleged that the respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty.
Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded Mirador and discredited Areola.5
In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the administrative complaint against her is
a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo City
including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained. These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for
filing various charges against anybody who does not accede to his demand.7 Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but
represented himself to his co-detainees as one.8 She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not
proper.
After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on August 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner
considered the non-appearance as a waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit
their respective position papers.9
On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation.10 The Investigating Commissioner
stated that the Complainant is knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must, however,
be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty.
Mendoza received money from Areolas co-detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated, viz:
There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money from the inmates since the charges are
uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not the proper party to file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by
the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached to prove the said charges. Hence, it is simply
hearsay in nature.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal
"to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating

Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of
the public in the judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) months.13
In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution15 dated November 19, 2011 but the IBP Board of Governors denied her motion in its
Resolution16 dated May 10, 2013. The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence
to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded money from
his co-detainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of
Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is
apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the
Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees to substantiate the matters Areola raised.
Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas statements, especially as regards Atty. Mendozas alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated this complaint when he felt insulted
because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO clients of
Atty. Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is
still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine
laws should be put to good use by cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other
government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on
his criticisms against her. In his Reply19, he made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english20. He also
called the PAO as "Pa-Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While Areola may have been frustrated
with the way the PAO is managing the significant number of cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his
knowledge to work with the PAO instead of maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for compassion so that their motions
would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of Areolas charges against Atty. Mendozathat she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan
lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily
moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of
Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without
pressure or influence from external forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.1wphi1 To that end, his clients
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable
and unethical.23
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as excessive and not commensurate to Atty.
Mendozas infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed
with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang
ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her
remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to
the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors
such as the respondents length of service, the respondents acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age, among other things, have had varying
significance in the Courts determination of the imposable penalty.25 The Court takes note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive in the
present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly
baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendozas own admission. For these reasons, the
Court deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in
violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of theRules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of emancipation patents and transfer certificates of title,
cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of land
derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on
record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of Micael,
Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren received 33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) were issued in their respective names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and
Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainants spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa.
A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the
emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision
was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as Addl Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant, filed a motion for execution with the DARAB,
Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition6 which he signed as
Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela7.
Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the
plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion
because Efren had already been dead9 for more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracols real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre,
who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented affidavits of Efrens widow10 and daughter11 both stating that
Efren never executed a waiver of rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. Both also stated
that they were familiar with Efrens signature. They state that the signature in the waiver was different from his usual signature.
Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and manufactured evidence into the proceedings. Atty. Caracol,
in introducing a document denominated as Waiver of Rights where Efren waived all his rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to
secure the execution of the judgment in one of the cases12 in favor of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case13 for falsification of
public document and use of falsified document against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as additional counsel. He said that he had consulted Atty.
Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights
executed in Ernesto Aguirres favor.
In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty.
Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not present credible evidence to controvert the
allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of the second
motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof of the
authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable for falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X that he was counsel of Efren to
protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty. Caracol be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the penalty to one year suspension from the practice
of law.16 Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but was denied.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since no legal fees are required in administrative
cases.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We adopt the findings of the IBP.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyers appearance on behalf of his client,
hence:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presidingjudge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to
appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the
name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in

court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who
has misbehaved in his official transactions. (Emphases supplied)
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Devt. Co.,21 this Court said that while a lawyer is not required to present proof of his
representation, when a court requires that he show such authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act.
Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of
appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his clients name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on
motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.22
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear in
court without being employed unless by leave of court.23 If an attorney appears on a clients behalf without a retainer or the requisite
authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless
the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.24 If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transaction.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-client relationship terminates upon death
of either client or the lawyer.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB. The records are unclear
at what point his authority to appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa in fact questioned his
authority during the course of the proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his clients passing
and presented authority that he was retained by the clients successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have been
substituted.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza28 where he stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the advice of his counsel, Atty. Isidro
L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he advised his indigent client
to admit a crime the man did no[t] commit. As the ponencia observes, outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no
evidence against him presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have
been implicated.
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his
duties, was apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The defense counsel in this case did not seem to
appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracols liability under the present circumstances, we would like to highlight
the important role of an attorney in our judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an attorneys function it is essential that they
should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyers oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and court processes in the pursuit of
justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial
system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his representation. We also observe that he has
used underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracols blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In
view of his actions of contravening his lawyers oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of one year.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPENDrespondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from
the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9116

March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19, 2009 Resolution1 of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of
Rule 12.03,2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the
June 26, 2011 Resolution7 of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in
Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association
and Ely Mabanag8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their
property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of
Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or
vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street.9 The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and
Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and
hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said
law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577
dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellants brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion
for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six
subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final.
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a
Complaint12 for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in
handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that although his law firm
represented the homeowners association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law
office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings
prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the
handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico
Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.
Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the homeowners association
in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments.
Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the
association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment
case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among
others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association. Thus, he concluded
that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment
complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.
As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on
complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of the baseless complaint for disbarment.
On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.14
On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-1415 adopting the recommendation with
modifications as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents breach of
Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26,
2011.16 The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondents motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed and there
were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.
Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for
violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is
proper.
The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they
were not his clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not
apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct "is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome."17
In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings."
The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury
from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or
failure of proof of the charges.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for Congressional Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellants brief 95 days
after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowners
association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies
with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent
Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed but "due to the
health condition of the undersigned counselhe was not able to finish said Appellants Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier
requested by him."19 Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing
to file the appellants brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule
12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
same Code also states that:
Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyers failure to file brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable
negligence. The Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.1wphi1 (Del Rosario vs. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46
SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to
delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban,
43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion.22 The penalties for a lawyers failure to file a brief or other pleading range from
reprimand,23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases, disbarment.26 In the present case, we find too harsh the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.
Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with
the extent of respondents violation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month
effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines,
and spread on the personal record of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10567, February 25, 2015
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY.
LILY UY- VALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR., * ATTY. RODNEY
K. RUBICA," AND ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009 filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo
(complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon), Philip Z. Dabao
(Atty. Dabao), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T.
Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Pefialosa; collectively,
respondents) of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifically the rule against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz
Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office (law firm), of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr.,
and Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases2 where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the
law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both
parties.3cralawred
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural
Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm,
the same law office which handled complainant's labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case against respondents,
alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR,5 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS
WITH HIS CLIENTS.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.cralawlawlibrary
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela
Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain
"arrangements." According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and
expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing
each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other
lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively. Respondents claim that this has been the practice of
the law firm since its inception. They averred that complainant's labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and
not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty.
Penalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of complainant's labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof.8cralawred
Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant's labor cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13,
2008,9 and that complainant did not have any monthly retainer contract.10 He likewise explained that he did not see the need to discuss
complainant's labor cases with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple,11 and that the latter did not confide any secret
during the time the labor cases were pending that would have been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that
the other lawyers were not aware of the details of complainant's labor cases nor did they know that he was the handling counsel for
complainant even after the said cases were closed and terminated.12cralawred
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on
conflict of interest and recommended that they bereprimanded therefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17,
2010.14cralawred
The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the respondents acting together as a law firm and not
solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Penalosa, having been
retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of
attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client.15cralawred
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty ofreprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors granted in its Resolution18 dated March 23,

2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12, 2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents for violation of the rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the
case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year, being the handling
counsel of complainant's labor cases.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent
provisions of the CPR.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS
WITH HIS CLIENTS.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEYCLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.cralawlawlibrary
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.20cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether
or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy
and good taste.21cralawred
In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP's conclusions that respondents represented conflicting interests and must therefore be held
liable. As the records bear out, respondents' law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted
against him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal
case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm's unethical acceptance of
the criminal case arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all cases
assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential
conflict of interest. As an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding
handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as
respondents' law firm exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its clients' secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure,
eroding in the balance the lawyer-client relationship's primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and confidence. Had such system been
institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela included, would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the
firm to decline FEVE Farms' subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming, herein respondents, as the charged members of the
law firm, ought to be administratively sanctioned. Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should suffer the
greater penalty of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm's deficient organization for which
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such, all of them are meted with the same penalty of reprimand,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the fact that the labor cases against
complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested
by mere expiration of professional employment.22cralawred
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela,
Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said
violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile,
the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents' personal records as
attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Petitioner,

A. C. No. 5355

- versus -

Present:

ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO,

Respondent.

CORONA, CJ,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 13, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Per Curiam:
The Case
This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent
Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.
In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco,[1] dated 30 August 2000, this Court ordered the dismissal from
service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and
accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment
proceedings against him for misconduct as a member of the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the Court.
The Facts
We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136,[2] as follows:
Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Gozun) was in open and adverse possession of
subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His familys house was erected on the land. The house was made
of old vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited the
house and lot from his parents.
The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.
On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-96, stating:
RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga
do hereby consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San Luis,
Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting (sic) as the new site
of the Rural Health Center will rise (sic).
On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct Resolution No. 26-96.
On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis,
Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the petition:
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
THE HONORABLE
JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO
In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition your good office to
render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit:
1. The validity of the attached Resolution.
2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution.

3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said Resolution.
These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health
Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is presently being squatted (sic) by a
certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre S. Galang, our Provincial
Legal Officer, and personal request of our Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic)
premises, he continues to defy such notices and request to the detriment of the proposed project.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable consideration and
appropriate action for the sake of public interest.
On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the municipality of
San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of
property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third,
the municipal mayor through an executive order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law
enforcement agency to enforce or implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth,
squatting in government property is considered a nuisance per se. Respondent judge ruled:
With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San
Luis may order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the
eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may be claiming any right under him
from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours).
Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the aforequoted
resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96.
Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief.
On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution.
On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school teachers went to the office of the
respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor
Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi (Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him).
On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house, using
respondent judges resolution and the mayors executive order as basis.
On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator. He averred that respondent judges issuance of the resolution amounts to gross misconduct, gross
inefficiency and incompetence. Complainant Gozun further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent
judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that the respondent judge is in his pocketbecause he (Mayor Bondoc)
has given him (respondent judge) a lot of things (dacal naku a regalo kaya).
On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for its
consideration, recommending that the complaint be given due course.
On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment thereon, within ten (10) days
from notice.
On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and urging that the case be
dismissed.
On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a memorandum,
recommending the dismissal from office of respondent judge.[3]
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136
Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench
The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30 August,
2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution adopting the report and recommendation of the Court Administrator. It
ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction in entertaining a Petition
for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court. [4] The Court also pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition
resulted in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun, thus rendering his family homeless. [5] It described respondents acts as
biased and maleficent and ruled that those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the service,[6] viz:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco,
Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and accumulated leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Judge for
misconduct as a member of the bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.[7]
A.C. No. 5355
Disbarment
On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent. [8] In its Complaint dated 06 November 2000,
docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and

partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that challenged his competence to
remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. [9]
On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment on the Complaint for
Disbarment against him.[10] On 01 June 2001, he filed his Comment on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment, [11] appealing for
understanding and asking that the Court allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when he acted on the Petition
for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal
opinion honestly and in good faith;[12] and that his actions were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive. [13] He
further pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only
means of livelihood to support his family.[14]
On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records of the case.[15]
IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondents participation. On 03 October 2003, the investigating
commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation[16] finding justification for the disbarment of respondent and recommending that
his name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case, there was clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent.[17] She observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as
ignorance of well-established rules and procedures. She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed
against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6) months when he
assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him
for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation
in an entrapment operation.[18]
On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19] of the Report and Recommendation of the IBP. He alleged that
the evidence presented in the proceedings for his dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the disbarment case
against him. Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, he claimed to have been deprived of due
process.[20] In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance from the Complaint the latter had
originally filed against him and contended that the case should have been dismissed.[21] Lastly, respondent averred that he had
endeavored to improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also impressed upon the IBP his effort to
improve on his knowledge of the law by attending Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).[22]
On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration [23] wherein he implored the IBP to take a second
look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact that the former had already
suffered the supreme penalty of dismissal as MTC judge. [24] Respondent also reiterated the grounds already stated in his first Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525, [25]which adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality in favor of a
party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the recommendation to
disbar respondent.
On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of A. C. No. 5355 to this Court, which
noted it on 16 August 2011.[26]
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and inexcusable
ignorance of well-established rules of procedures.

Gross Misconduct
In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr.[27] citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,[28]this Court explained the concept of gross
misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of
justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is
generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis,
Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon
receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter
by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his
mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local governments behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without
denying this fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions were not
attended by malice or bad faith.[29]
We find his statements hard to believe.
The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part. Moreover, the testimonial
evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant
who had an obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga,
showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows:
COMM. SANSANO:
You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor in going to see the respondent?
WITNESS: (Mr. Batu)

I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your Honor. I do not know any instance
that I was with him.
COMM. SANSANO:
But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when you went to see the
respondent also in his office?
WITNESS:
There was no other visit, Your Honor.
COMM. SANSANO:
So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office?
WITNESS:
Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong na mga may kaso.
COMM. SANSANO:
Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina niyang datihan?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor. [30]
The testimony of respondents own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires the observance of judicial independence and its protection from undue
influence, whether from private or from public interests.[31]
In Edao v. Judge Asdala,[32] we explained the rationale behind this imposition:
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which
may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed
essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard
applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2,
specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so
in the view of reasonable observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and
impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have
been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges
must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To further
emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states:
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:
In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator
that judges have been meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby
cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to
observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only act impartially and with
propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to
the process by which the decision is made. As such, judges must ensure that their conduct, both in and out of the
court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge in order to maintain the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.
Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to be impartial in deciding the cases
before them, but also to project the image of impartiality.[33]Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these rules were not
properly observed by respondent as a judge of a first-level court.
Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law
We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this case
without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.
A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt an ordinary person to conclude that
an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch of the court of law
that issued it. It had a docket number and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even states the justiciable question to be
resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though, there was no notice sent to Gozun, the named
respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply
issued a legal opinion, but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence of mandatory processes
such as notice especially to Gozun and hearing. Even this excuse is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal
opinions. Their opinions are always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate
courts, and always in the context of contested proceedings.

What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent issued, caused the demolition of
the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the property they had been occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun
was deprived of his property without due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that members of the bench and the bar are sworn
to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in its commission. When his liability for his act was invoked,
he casually justifies them as honest mistakes not attended by malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us.
As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of Procedure. This
expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for
public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which they have sworn to be
fearless crusaders.[34]
As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory
relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable
question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts.
Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and
that he as a member of the bar should know.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and promote respect
for the legal processes.[35] Contrary to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be
deprived of a right or property without due process of law.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.[36] In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict
injustice.
Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal profession? We answer in the
affirmative.
In Collantes v. Renomeron,[37] we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent therein as a public official also
constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility
of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the
court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth
and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted
place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking,
a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility
- all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral character.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03,
Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the
practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero,[38] we ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral qualification for
membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic
rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyers oath.
We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525
dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the investigating
commissioner recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant provincial prosecutor in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal as MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and
as acting MCTC judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains that he was deprived of due process by the IBP board of
governors when it approved and adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment; and he prays
for a second look at his case, considering the withdrawal of the Complaint originally filed by Gozun.
In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not available to assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative case. His
remedies from an adverse resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the same defenses against
administrative liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this case.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of complainant unimportant and of little
relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the
court and as participant in the dispensation of justice an issue which the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this
reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the disbarment proceedingsmotu proprio.[39]
Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido,[40] we reiterated the unique characteristic of disbarment proceedings and their purpose in
this wise:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not
apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the
past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of

qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of
a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case originated, respondent is not exonerated.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses:
1.

GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary

2.

INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
RE: SC DECISION DATED A.C. No. 7940
MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455
UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE
RULES OF COURT, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 24, 2012
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a crime involving moral turpitude constitutes
sufficient ground for his disbarment from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts and the Case
In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes
of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas letter to the City
Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.
Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawiganmember of Misamis Occidental,
got a photocopy of Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy OmbudsmanMindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a
copy of what he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the
disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of
public document.[1] On November 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and
sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9
months and 10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties ofprision correccional, and to pay a fine
of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction. [2] Since the Court treated the matter as an
administrative complaint against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.
Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during the administrative proceedings before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632, adopting and
approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be disbarred after conviction by final judgment of
the crime of falsification.
The Courts Ruling
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the defenses he raised before the
Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral to
the IBP was factually infirmed[3] and contained factual exaggerations and patently erroneous observation,[4] and was too adventurous.[5]
To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin
attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of the
falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the
letter.This Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a
forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.[6]

This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[7] the
Court held that in disbarment cases, it is no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has become final. The review
of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as
a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.
This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude.[8] Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.[9]
Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is
imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.[10] Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.[11]
Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although his culpability for falsification
has been indubitably established, he has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.[12]
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold the law.
The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[14]
[13]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his nameREMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7360

July 24,2012

ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has
three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he
previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000;
and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and
recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funas recommendation: first, to a
suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v.
SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan
was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosas manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the
Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a case where he previously appeared
as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from
the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the
accuseds favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position of the private
prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalans request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the
Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as
private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalans
brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated
murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public
prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty.
Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticses
father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000
from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa.
GMA 7s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted
as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosas defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one month and eleven days of prision
correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October
2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accuseds bail. Atty. Silvosa
claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between
himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribios allegations as "self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan]
and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that
"conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved

do [sic] not amount to a crime." He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public
officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty.
Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosas] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing.
The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of
the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in
said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this
instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosas]
vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged
incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a
long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no personal knowledge about the charge of
extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever
involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding
are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and should be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28
October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosas suspension from the practice of law to two years. The
Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its recommendations in the second and third causes of
action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule
2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on
Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funas finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail
Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosas attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims
his participation as public prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his
subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to
take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his
clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings,
or advocating his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as
well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on
good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only
to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorneys intentions were honest and he
acted in good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribios accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by emphasizing the delay in presenting a
complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect
agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funas ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros.
Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by
Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies
against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity
of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome

the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected
of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not
automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of
the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funas ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the
attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and
from which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the
instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was
not presented as a witness in the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a
matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the
Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime,
or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately
commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of
the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the
accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosas representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of
suspension.1wphi1 Atty. Silvosas final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosas conviction of the crime. We are constrained to
impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of
morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a
public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty.
Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED STRICKENfrom the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record

as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.