The Limits of Casuistry

Author(s): H. Rashdall
Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Jul., 1894), pp. 459-480
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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The Limits of Casuistry.

459

popular instructionand modern culture, and by more and

more imbuing the power it possesses over the minds of the
people withthe moral basis and educativespiritof the Gospel.
GIACOMo BARZELLOTTI.
UNIVERSITY

OF NAPLES.

THE

LIMITS

OF CASUISTRY.*

is a school of moral philosophy which maintains

determiningwhat is the
that there is no way of scientifically
right thing to do. They are not intuitionists;they would
resent the name. Strange to say, they are the very school
whichis mostin the habitof appealing to reason as the source
of moral judgments. The ordinaryintuitionistone knows
h.ow to deal with. He condescends to argue. He tells us
that moral rules are given us by intuition,and he is willing
(though at times somewhatgrudgingly)to tell us what these
intuitionsare. An opponent is then able to argue that the
unconditionalvalidityof these intuitionsdoes not correspond
withthe actual moraljudgments of a reasonable man, or that
in so faras this validityis admissible it can be accounted for
on some more general principle without the assumptionof
isolated and unconnected a priori deliverancesof the moral
consciousness.
But the neo-intuitionalschool representedby Mr. Bradley
appears to maintainthat moral judgments are so absolutely
disconnectedand unaccountable that they do not admit even
of accurate statementor scientificanalysis. There is no way
of moralizingone's conduct except trustingto the spur of the
moment,or (as Mr. Bradley would appear to suggest in his
"Ethical Studies") asking an uneducated woman what she
would advise. The effectof this new departure in ethics
would appear to be to substitutewhat your Presidentt has
called unphilosophicalfor philosophical intuitionism..I call
THERE

* A paper read beforethe CambridgeEthical Society,November6, 1893.

t ProfessorSidgwick.

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460

of Ethics.
International_7ourna/

this a new departurein ethicsbecause it is importantto notice

that it representsa position quite differentfromthat of the
school in which Mr. Bradley at the date of his "Ethical
Studies" would probablyhave sought his Masters. It is needless to say that it finds no support in those great English
writers for whom, on account of their relative theological
orthodoxy,Mr. Bradley would probably feel a double measure of that scorn of which he is so great a master. The older
English Rationalists-Cudworth, Cumberland,and Clarke (at
least the twolast)-hold distinctlythat the moralityof-actions
is to be estimatedby their consequences, though they do not
hold that pleasure and pain are the only consequences to be
taken into consideration. The typical "common-sense" intuitionistReid, though he holds that there are other intuitivelydiscovered duties besides benevolence,yet admits that
in the last resort these weaker intuitionsmust give way to
the supreme duty of promotingthe general good. Kant no
less emphaticallyattemptsto reduce the Moral Law to a single
principle,though it is a principlefromwhich his most fervent
modern admirerswould probablyadmit that it is not really
possible to deduce a single definiteduty. So farfromdisparaging casuistry,Kant positivelyrecommendsexercises in casand discipline. He gives
uistryas a means of moralinstruction
specimens,indeed,of a kind of catechismforthe moralinstrucand formalityof which,
tion of youth,beside the icy frigidity
I am bound to say,the most repellentof theologicalcatechisms
become attractiveand inspiringdocuments. The late Professor Green,while he undoubtedlyrepresentsthe tendencyto
depreciatea scientifictreatmentof the details of conduct,and
to make moral philosophy merelya branch of metaphysics,
does neverthelessassert that the moral quality of an action
depends upon its consequences, though it is only the moral
consequences, or the consequences upon character,that he
will admit to possess any ultimatevalue, pleasure and pain
being treated as mattersof absolute indifference. I look in
vain among the recognized ethical schools for any precedent
forsuch absolute condemnationof casuistry. But here,perhaps, it will be best to let Mr. Bradley speak forhimself.

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The Limits of Casuistry.

46i

" There is anotherfalsescience moreunlovelyin life and more unpleasantin

decay,fromwhichI myselfshould be loathto divide it. Justas logic has been
pervertedinto the art of reasoning,so ethicshas been pervertedintothe artof
morality. They are twin delusionswe shall consign,if we are wise, to a common grave.
a Christianburial. I shouldbe glad to see
" But I would notgrudgecasuistry
it dead and done withon any terms; and then,if all the truthmustbe spoken,
in its later years it has sufferedmuch wrong. That it became odious beyond
is not to be denied; but it ill becomes the
parallel and in parts most filthy,
parentsof a monster,who have begottenit and nourishedit,to cryout when it
follows the laws of its nature. And, if I am to say what I think, I must
expressmyconvictionthat it is not onlythe Catholic priest,but it also is our
utilitarianmoralist,who embracesthe delusionwhichhas borne such a progeny.
If you believe, as our utilitarian
believes, thatthe philosophershould know the
reasonwhyeach actionis to be judged moral or immoral; if you believe thathe
at least should guide his action reflectively
by an ethicalcode, whichprovidesan
universalrule and canon foreverypossible case, and should enlightenhis more
uninitiatedfellows,thenit seems to me youhave wedded themistakefromwhich
has issued. It may be truethatthe officeof professional
thisoffensive
offspring
of offences,
and has joined
confessorhas made necessarya completercodification
doctrinalvagariesto ethical blunders. We may allow thatit was the lust for
whichchoked the last whisperof the unsanctifiedconscience.
spiritualtyranny
to exhaustthe possibilitiesof human
It maybe truethat,in his effort
theoretically
on the morbidsubject
the celibatepriestdweltwith curiousrefinement
depravity,
of sexual transgression. But unless his principleis whollyunsound,I confess
thatI can hardlyfindfaultwith his practice; forif thereis to be an art and a
code of morality,I do not see how we can narrowits scope beforehand. The
fieldis notlimited by our dislikes,and whoeverworksat the disgustingpartsis
surelydeservingnot of blame but of gratitude. Hence if the utilitarianhas
declinedto followthe priest,he has also declined to followhis own principles;
he has stoppedshortnot fromlogical reasonsbut frompsychologicalcauses."*

Mr. Bradleyis probablyrightin his brilliantattemptto show

that the rules of the syllogismas formulatedby Aristotlefail
to exhaust the possible varietiesof inference. He may even
be rightin maintainingthatany effortat an exhaustiveformulation of the processes of valid inferenceis necessarilyforedoomed to failure. And he is unquestionablyrightin maintainingthat there is no art of correct reasoning,and that we
can give no reason why this inferencefromgiven premisesis
right and that wrong,except that we actuallyjudge it so to
be. But it is obvious thatthis logical positioncannot compel
us to hold that the procedure of the mind injudging of right
* "' Principlesof Logic," pages 247, 248.

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and wrong is equally arbitraryand unaccountable. The comparison betweenlogic and ethics can be at best an illustration,
not an argument. And afterall, is thereany real analogy between the two cases? Though we cannot give any reason
why A. follows from B., while D. does not follow,yet the
mind does actually see a connection between the two ideas
which it pronouncesto be thus connected. There is a movement from one idea to another. That is exactly what we
understandby reasoning. But in the region of morals we
are, it appears, absolutelyforbiddento move fromone idea to
another. Moral judgments, we are explicitly told, are not
discursive; and yet we are also told that moraljudgments are
an affairof the reason. Yet we are, it would seem, forbidden
to argue that if A. is moral,B. must also be moral, unless we
can point out some relevantdifferencebetweenthe two cases.
To take a concrete instance. I might,it would appear, according to Mr. Bradley, reasonablymaintain that to hunt a
tame stag to death with dogs is lawfulsport,while to do the
same thingwitha cat is crueltyto animals. I could not be
convicted of an inconsistency or unreasonableness in so
judging, even though I might be quite unable to specifyany
materialdifferencebetween the two cases. Such, as faras I
can understand,are the consequences of adopting the ethics
of reason.
It would really, I think,be a waste of time to point out
how utterlyinconsistentthis way of thinking is with the
actual procedure of mankind or the actual historyof moral
ideas. As a matterof fact,men endowed with reason have
always reasoned or argued about mattersof conduct,and the
accepted code of right and wrong has been evolved as the
result of such moral reasonings. I do not, of course, maintain that all moral progress can be explained as the resultof
increasingintellectualdiscernmentas to the interdependence
of moral ideas or the applicationto particularcases of principles already admitted. I am not concerned even to argue
that men have consistentlyapplied, or do consistentlyapply,
or ought to apply, chains of reasoning to the wholeof their
conduct. It is enough formy purpose to point out that they

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The Limtitsof Casuistry.

463

do thus apply reasoning to certain spheres and departments

of conduct. For instance,it would, I think,be easy to show
that the growth of humanity,the better treatmentof oppressed classes and oppressed races, the growth of international morality,and the altered position of women have been
largely due to a gradual perception that the reasons which
make it wrong to treatA. in a certain manner must equally
make it wrong to treat B. in that same manner,under the
same circumstances. No doubt at one time people would
have boldly maintained,for instance,that the life and happiness of an Irishman or a negro is of no value in the eye of
reason, of no value in the sight of God or reasonable men,
where the most triflingconvenience of an Englishman was at
stake. There was perhaps a time when high-mindedand
religious men would, withdeliberateassent and fullconsciousness of what they meant,have maintainedsuch propositions.
So long as they did so, of course argument-argument of the
precise kind which I am for the moment contemplatingwould have been useless. But, long afterany such propositions would have been deliberatelyand in cold blood assented
to, men went on acting as if they did accept them,and from
this time forwardthe process of moral development has been
a gradual reasoning out of the logical consequences of an
ethical principlealready admitted. I do not, indeed, maintain
that the causes which have led to this recognitionof logical
consequences have been entirelyand primarilyintellectual.
The obstacles to the intellectualacceptance and application of
unwelcome moral truthmay often have been primarilyemotional, and the forces by which these obstacles have been
overcome may have been emotional also; but still a necessary
and essential part of the process of moral developmenthas
surely been the simple recognitionof logical consequences in
the sphere of conduct.
And ifthat is once admitted,ifinferenceis admittedin matters of conduct as well as in mattersof speculation,it seems
to me that Mr. Bradley's attitude towards casuistry is no
longer defensible. Be the sphere withinwhich argument is
admissible wide or narrow,withinthose limitswe have a casVOL. IV.-No.

32

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uistry. People are undoubtedlyusing casuistical arguments

every day, and it is really difficultto see how they could
escape doing so, unless they were to make effortsto derationalize theirconduct as systematicas those which all previous
moralistshave urged themto make towards its rationalization.
Mr. Bradley cannot,of course,mean seriouslyto maintainthat
the politician is no longer to argue in Parliament or on the
platform,the preacher (assuming that Mr. Bradley would tolerate the survival of such an anachronism) to argue in the
pulpit,the school-masterto point out thatsuch and such conduct is wrong because it leads to such and such consequences,
the journalist no longer to urge reasons for or against such
and such a social reform. It would be ludicrous to suppose
that so extremelyacute a thinkeras Mr. Bradley intendsanything so absurd. And yet what else can be meantby these
sweeping diatribesagainst casuistry? Only one thing that I
can see,-that whereas all otherintellectualprocesses are performed best by those who have given special thought and
attentionto the matterin hand, yet in questions of conduct,
study,thought,special preparationand attentionto what has
been thoughtby others on the same subject are wholly out
of place. The man in the streetis here completelyon a level
with the philosopher in his study. It may be urged, no
doubt,that the veryillustrationswe have adopted tend to dispense with the need of our professionalcasuist. There are
already (it may be urged) persons who do make it their business to study what is the rightthingto do; and to such persons men do apply for advice in respectof the particulardepartmentof lifewhich theyhave studied,instead of coming to
the philosopherwho,like the Sophist of old,professesto teach
men about thingsin generalwhile he is himselfdemonstrably
ignorantof everythingin particular. Hence as to our political conduct we listen to the persuasions of the politician or
the political journalist. On questions of health we consult
the physician,on mattersof education the successfulteacher
or the teacherwho has failed and set up as an educationalist,
and so on. Why, it may be said, can we not be satisfiedwith
the instructionsof the people who have made a special study

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The Limits of Casuistry.

465

of the relationbetweenends and means in particulardepartments of conduct,withoutdemandingof any single individual

that he shall profess a science so comprehensiveas that of
ends and means in general,or attemptingourselves to acquire
such a science in addition to the special studies to which we
may be led by professionalduty or privateinclination?
The answer to this objection is twofold: First,all that we
have hithertobeen contemplatingis the study of the relation
between means and ends, or, fromanotherpoint of view, between general principles and their particular applications.
We have assumed that the ends or the general principles
are known and admitted. But then,as we were reminded
in meeting the argument of Mr. Bradley, though no moralist can help admittingthat deductive reasoning has a place
in morals, moralists are not agreed as to what that place
is. Though in some departmentsof life,to some extent or
on some occasions, there is admittedlyroom for the logical
understandingto draw inferencesfromone moral judgment
to another, there is in the estimationof moralists like Mr.
Bradley a point at which such inferencesbecome inadmissible. Hence, even if at this point the man in the street or
the least educated of the female sex is to become our ultimate referee,some systematic study of moral philosophy
would seem to be necessaryto help us to know when to stop
arguing and to fly for refuge to our own instinctiveconscience or (if we have the misfortuneto be educated men) to
that of some less educated adviser. And then again, among
those who do admit that it is not only in some arbitrarily
selected sphere that it is lawful and obligatoryto seek to
rationalizeconduct by tracingthe bearing of means on ends,
neither moral philosophers nor unphilosophical persons are
agreed as to what is or are the end or ends by referenceto
which all actions are to be judged good or bad. And here it
may be objected that I have already proved too much. The
specialists in morals do not agree as to the firstprinciplesof
theirsupposed science. How thenwill a man be in any better
position for the knowledge of such a science or the advice of
one who knows it ? The objection is no doubt fatal to any

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attemptto claim forthejudgment of the professionalmoralist

the respectwhich wise men pay (though even here wise men
have their reserves)to the advice of their physician or their
engineer or their sanitary plumber. But the politicians are
equally littleagreed,and yet wise men do not on that account
condemn study and reflectionin politics. Nor, though few
aestheticcanons of criticismwill command universal acceptance, is thejudgment of the plain man considered altogether
on a level with that of the trainedart critic. And (to come to
my immediatepoint)the firstreason whythereis a demand,or
ought to be a demand,forthe specialistin conduct in general
departmentsin conduct,is
as well as the specialistin different
that the specialist in departmentsof conduct has commonly
givenno thoughtor considerationto the principlesupon which
conduct in general is to be judged. And there do arise constantoccasions upon which moral problemsturnnot upon the
of seeing what is the rightway to promotethe end
difficulty
immediatelyproposed to the specialist in some departmentof
life,but upon the relationwhich theirspecial end has to the
end or ends of human lifein general The soldier will tell us
how to fight,but the question is, "Are we to fightor not?"
Or, if the politician steps in and says, " My science tells me
that the way fora nation to be wealthyis to fight,"the inquiring conscience may raise the question," Ought we to be
wealthy?" The physiciansays, " If you want to be well,go to
the south of France, and give up your work;" but there is
a previous question, " Ought I under these circumstances,
and at such and such a cost, to be well ?" If such questions
arise, be the answer to themwhat it may, be the method of
answering such questions what it may, it is a modest plea to
urge on behalf,I will not yet say of casuistrybut of a practical science of morality,that there is a likelihood of their
being betteransweredby those who have thoughtabout them
than by those who have not. If it is possible to think about
such questions at all, ifthe impulseof the momentor the man
in the streetis not under all circumstancesthe best resource,
there may be such a thing as systematicthoughtabout the
principlesof conduct,and systematicthoughtis science.

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Second, and the second answer to the objection that casuistry may be left to the professorsof the particularpractical
sciences is this, that,though certain departmentsof life are
treated of by special sciences and their professors,there is a
large neutralzone of conductwhichis entirelyunappropriated.
My duties as a teacher are no doubt dealt with by pedagogy
(though I must confessto never having systematicallystudied
a single workwiththatformidabletitle),my dutiesas a clergyman by pastoral theology, my duties as a wealth-producing
animal by chrematisticsor whateverbe its modernequivalent,
my duties as a citizenby politics; but what of my duties as a
man? To deny that there may be a systematictreatmentof
that subject seems to me to amount to the denial of the
propositionthatone oughtto thinkbeforeone acts. Wherever
it is possible to think,it is possible to think systematically.
And systematicthoughtis science.
There is, then,a science of conduct,and, in a sense, an art
of conduct,even according to those who will not admit that
all actions are to be judged according to theirforeseenconsequences. From this point,however,I shall say no more of
this, to me, unintelligibleview of ethics, and consider the
question of the possibility of a scientificdeterminationof
ethical problems frommy own point of view. It would lead
me too far from my subject were I to attempthere to argue
the question of the ethical criterion; so I must be allowed
merelyto state that I am one of those who do hold thatevery
action is rightor wrongaccording as it tends or does not tend
to produce general well-being,but that I do not assent to the
hedonisticinterpretation
which is usually given to evoaeuovc'a
or
well-beingby avowed Utilitarians. I hold that pleasure is a
part of the supremelydesirable state of consciousness which
the good man seeks to promoteforall mankind,though it is
not the only elementin that supremegood. I hold thatpleasures are not all equally desirable; that some pleasures are intrinsicallybetterthan otherswithoutbeing necessarilygreater
in amount,and (withAristotle) I hold that some pleasures are
bad. I quite recognize that this is a merelypopular way of
statingthe case. In strictnessof speech,pleasure (that is,the

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bare quality of pleasantness or pleasing) cannot differfrom

pleasure except in amount; and when I say that I judge one
pleasure to be betterthan another,though not more intense,I
mean thatit is betterto be pleased or get one's pleasure from
one thing rather than another-e.g., fromknowledge rather
than fromgood dinners,fromsympathyratherthan fromthe
even though it might
spectacle of other people's sufferings,
chance that the sufferingin which I delighted was on the
whole socially beneficial. On the present occasion I shall
of this posionly attemptto deal with one particulardifficulty
tion. To many it will seem that this admission involves the
abandonment of all possibility of scientificallyascertaining
what is the right course of action under particular circumthe arbistances, and plunges us again into the uncertainty,
trary caprice, the subjectivityand individualismof ordinary
intuitionalethics. If thiswere so, I admit the objectionwould
be a formidableone; for I am not one of those who believe
and that (to quote
that moralityis necessarily unreflecting,
once more our great Oxford metaphysician)a man who tries
to be more moral thanhis neighboris in a fairway to become
less so. I believe thatthe science of ethics means the science
of findingout what ought to be done. At the same time it
is clear that there is nothing really scientificin seeking to
make a problem more simple and less complicated than it
really is, or in adopting a doctrineas true simplybecause it is
more easy to formulateand apply than a contrarydoctrine.
The theorythat the planets moved in perfectcircles and that
the moon was a sphere(withits inequalitiesfilledup withcrystal) no doubt saved a lot of trouble; but these theorieshave
not permanentlycommendedthemselvesto the scientificintellect. I desire,therefore,
simplyto ask how farthe admission
(which seems to me to be absolutely and imperativelydemanded by the moral consciousness) that human well-being
does not consist in pleasure alone makes impossible that
scientificdeterminationof conduct which, to many minds,
probably constitutesthe chief attractionof hedonisticutilitarianism.
I do not wish in any way to minimizethe extentto which

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469

the abandonmentof the pleasure-criterion

involvesthe acceptance of intuitionism. The differencebetween my view and
that of ordinaryintuitionismis that the intuitionsof the intuitionist relate to the moralityof particular acts or classes of
acts, while mine referto the moral value of certain ends of
action. Undoubtedlythe judgment that it is betterto know
the truththanto acquiesce in pleasant falsehoodsis an a priori
judgment or intuition. It is incapable of proof. If another
does not see it, I cannot make him see it. I may possibly try
to persuade him that he really does assent to that judgment
and acts upon it, though a mistaken intellectual analysis of
his consciousness may have led him to believe that he does
not. At the same time,though in many cases the denial of
such a proposition may spring froma purely intellectualdifference,I thinkit well to point out that I am not in any way
concerned to maintain that this judgment is actually,even in
some unconscious form,presentto the consciousness of every
individual. Many of the common objections to intuitionism
arise from the mistaken assumption that, if an intuitionis
valid, it must exist in all minds alike. But nobody considers
it necessary to maintain that the aestheticjudgments of the
musician are a delusion, or even that theypossess a merely
subjective validity,because some people cannot distinguish
between " Pop goes the Weasel" and " God save the Queen."
Nor has it ever occurred to any one to deny the truthof the
higher mathematicsbecause there are said to be savages incapable of grasping the idea of ten, and there are certainly
eminent classical scholars who are incapable of understanding the a priori principles upon which depends the proof of
Euclid's fifth
propositionof the firstbook. I admit,then,fully
that the ultimatebasis of a non-hedonisticsystemof ethics is
an intuitionor a series of intuitions,and of intuitionsnot
found in all minds alike. No doubt there is a tendencytowards a coincidence in the intuitionsof humanityat large at
a given stage of ethical development; but it is a mistake,I
think,to ignore the fact that the higher and more delicate
moral intuitionsare actually found only in the higher moral
natures; that they exist in full strengthand complete inde-

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pendencein the fewratherthan in the many,or that the many

really receive them on authorityfromthe few. What we call
the accepted moral standardof a communitymeans the standard prescribedby the clear intuitionsof a fewmorallygifted
natures backed up and supported by the dimmeror derived
intuitionsof the mrore,and the passive acquiescence of the
most. But here I am concernedonly withthe admission that
on a non-hedonisticview of ethics the ultimate ends of conduct rest upon indemonstrableintuitionsor a priori propositions. And at this stage I must say no more in defence
of my position than to remind you that the proposition,
"pleasure is the only good," is unquestionablyin the same
case. With that remark I proceed to ask within what
limitsa non-hedonisticutilitarianismcan admit of a scientific
casuistry?
In the firstplace, I contendthat withina very large area of
conduct the ordinary utilitariancalculus can be applied as
much by the non-hedonisticas by the hedonistic utilitarian.
For, (i) It is admitted that,though pleasure is not the only
good, it is a large partof it; and thatpleasure is in general the
inseparable accompanimentof all those states of conscious
being which the moral reason judges good, e.g., of the pursuit of knowledge,the indulgence of sympathy,the contemplation of beauty,etc.
(2) Those kinds of pleasurewhich to the non-hedonistseem
intrinsicallybetter than otherswill be generallyadmitted to
be also more productiveof pleasure on the whole than those
which he will pronounce lower. The pleasures of benevolence are obviouslymore " felicific"thanthose of cruelty,even
though the latter should in some cases be more intense to
the individual experiencingthem. And it will be generally
admitted that in various indirect ways the communitygets
more benefitfromthe indulgence on the partof individualsin
intellectual and esthetic pleasures than fromthe indulgence
of purely animal appetitesor desires.
(3) Though the non-hedonistwill stronglycontend that a
logical application of the hedonistic test would frequently
arrive at differentresults from his own, yet in practice this

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471

differenceis likely to manifestitselfcomparativelyseldom.

For it is part of the anti-hedonistargumentthat high-minded
hedonists are not logical; that their actual moral code does
not flow logically from their professedprinciples; and that
they mistake a judgment as to the rational value or moral
worthof pleasures fora judgment as to theiractual hedonistic
intensity. Hence in many cases the anti-hedonistand the
hedonistwill practicallyagree as to the end to be pursued,
as to theirtheoreticaldefinitionof the end.
whiletheywill differ
For these reasons therewill, as it seems to me, be a large
area over which the hedonistic method will practicallycoincide withwhat I will ventureto call the idealistic. It is not
possible to indicatewith precision the limitsof this field. I
can best perhaps suggest them by glancing at some of those
departmentsof moralityin which the hedonist and the moral
idealistmust,as it appears to me,diverge mostwidely; though
I hasten to say that even here many hedonistswould wholly
repudiate the consequences that I should draw from their
system. In matters of sexual morality,in the treatmentof
suicide, and of all questions affectingthe value of human life,
and again in respectof the duty of truthfulness,
I formy part
should feel obliged to abandon a utilitariandefence of the
received moral code, if the utilitarianend is to be conceived
of as simple quantitative pleasure. Here, then, I frankly
avow that I forone should distinctlyfall back upon intuitions
otherthan those which the hedonisticutilitariancan recognize.
But let me brieflypoint out some of the differencesbetween
the ordinaryintuitionismand the idealism which admits of
intuitions only as regards ultimate ends. The differences
may perhaps be best indicatedby taking the duty of truthfulness-a dutywhich it is a great mistaketo limitto mere negative veracity. Truthfulnessincludes the dutyof pursuingand
activelypropagatingthe truth,and not merelyof abstaining
fromfalsehood. Thus conceived, the virtue is one which is
oftenmost strikinglyillustratedby those who are most anxious to supply a hedonistic explanation of it. What may
be called the scientific'8o- is one which cannot possibly
be explained, and can with extreme difficulty
be justified,by

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the hedonisticcalculus. It is clearlyimpossible to prove empiricallythat the discoveryof truthalways increases pleasure.
And yet the case of truth-speakinghas always been one of the
great difficultiesof the thorough-goingintuitionist. Every
one in practice admits that there are certain rare and fairly
well recognized rare occasions on which it is right to lie;
while as to the active propagation of truth,nobody but a
madman really does go about proclaiming the truth on all
subjects to all persons on all occasions. Once recognize that
the intuitionsays merely," Truth is a good and intrinsically
valuable thing,"or,to speak more exactly," the consciousness
that knows, reveres,pursues,and wills to make known the
is experitruthpossesses intrinsicvalue,"-and no difficulty
enced in reconcilingthe theorywiththe practiceof good men.
Truth is a good thing; but so is pleasure, and still more emphatically so is humanity. Hence, in a case of collision, I
must choose which is most valuable. I cannot (with Dr.
Martineau) assign to the love of truth a fixed and definite
place in a hierarchyof motivesor ends of action. For we all
in practicejudge that a littletruthmay have to be sacrificed
to much humanity,while it may equally be rightto sacrifice
a littlepleasure in othersand a littlebenevolence in ourselves
to truth.
Estimatingthe bearing of all this upon our immediatesubject, we may, I think,lay down the followingproposition: A
scientifictreatmentof casuistical questions is possible as between persons agreed in their ultimateideal or conceptionof
human good. Where people hold differentconceptions of
human good, therewill be certaindepartmentsof moralityin
which theirresultswill differ,
though therewill remain a part
-on the whole by farthe largerpart-of the whole sphere of
conduct in which no such differenceis practicallylikely to
arise between well-meaningmodern men.
And if any one is inclined to object to what may seem so
large a surrenderto subjective caprice, I should like to emphasize the fact that people's ideals of human life really do
and have differedeven more. So long as that is the
differ,
case, therecan be no advantage eithertheoreticalor practical

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The Limits of Casuistry.

473

in tryingto persuade them to conceal theirdifferencesby the

adoption of a utilitarianformulawhich really failsto express
their working belief. That I ought to promote my neighbor's good, is a proposition which would be accepted, with
whateverlimitations,with whateverinconsistencies,and with
whatever interpretationof " neighbor," by Aristotle, by a
fourthcenturyFather,by a seventeenthcentury Puritan,by
a modern Christian,and by a modern,let us say, apostle of
culture. Yet by myneighbor'sgood theywould mean totally
things. Aristotle,forinstance,might have held (for
different
anythingthat he says to the contrary,or at least some not
disciple of Aristotle might have held) that it
very unfaithful
was good to be moderatelydrunkon rareand fittingoccasions.
This the Puritan would have condemned, without on that
account thinkingwiththe ChristianFather that it was good to
be habituallyhalf-starved. In his estimateof drunkennessthe
modern Christianwould, as a rule, agree with the Puritan
(though I have known quite serious and orthodox persons
maintain the contrary),while he would fail to appreciatethe
Puritan'scondemnationof the pleasure produced by an acted
play of Shakespeare, and yet would equally failto share Mr.
Oscar Wilde's approval of a state of mind in which a man
effacesfromhis mind all moral distinctionsin pursuitof somethingwhichhe calls artforart's sake. It is possible, of course,
to exhibit these differencesas mere differencesabout the
means to an end about which all are greed. Probablyeach of
these typicalmoralistswould be preparedto contend that his
course of action actually produces most good on the whole,
even in this life,both for himselfand forothers. He might
even be disposed to claim for his ideal a maximum intensity
of pleasure. But he would not do so because he had ascertained by appeal to experience that so it is. If he thinkshis
ideal most conducive to pleasure, it is because he has already
judged his ideal or ztloq, to be intrinsicallythe best. Here,
of course, I am aware that I am sliding into pure dogmatism.
I can only apologize,and will now returnto my subject,pleading that I have afterall been endeavoring to illustratewhat
casuistrycan and what it cannot do.

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And now I must attemptsome answer,hurried and brief

though it must be, to what some will perhaps thinkought to
have been my subject all along-the question,what practical
advantage,upon the view that has been taken as to the theoretical possibility of casuistry,is to be expected from the
study of its principles. The greatest practical advantage is,
I think,this: the study of moral philosophyhelps a man to
clear up his own moral ideal. It can hardlybe expected that
the study of moral theory,or even the elaborate study of detailed moral difficulties,
will make any one much more expert
than the same man would have been if trained by other
studies in choosing the right means towards a given end.
The value of his opinion on such questions will depend (in
what may be called the unappropriativedepartmentsof conduct) upon his naturalgood judgment,upon his general intellectual training,upon his experienceof life,and upon thatdelicacy of moral discriminationwhich depends upon character
rather than upon intellect. In special departmentsof conduct it will, of course, depend upon his knowledge and experience of those special departments. Thus, if I want to know
how to lay out a certain sum in charitableways, I should not
consult the moral philosopheras such, but the East-end clergyman or the politicaleconomistor the charityorganizer. If
I wanted advice as to the moral value of teetotalism,I should
expect more help fromthe doctor,the practicalclergyman,or
the man who has made it his study,than fromthe teacher of
moral philosophywho has spent his lifein a university. But
the differencebetween the moral philosopherand the empirical moralist or the professorof some specialized practical
science is this: that the moral philosopher knows distinctly
what he is aimingat, and the practicalman oftendoes not. It
is not so much that the moral philosopher can answer moral
questions betterthan otherpeople, but that he knows how to
put them better than other people. Take, for instance,the
case of vivisection. As one reads the utterancesof judges,
physiologists,physicians, ecclesiastics, politicians, and journalists upon the question, one is struckby the fact that not
one in fifty
of them seems to knowwhat he is tryingto prove.

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The Limits of Casuistry.

475

The physiologistusually shows that he has not a glimmering

of a notion what a moral question is. He labors to show
that vivisection advances knowledge or saves pain without
seeming to be aware that some people mightquite intelligibly
hold that knowledge ought not to be obtained or pain saved
under such and such circumstances. On the other hand, the
rails at the immoralityof doing evil that
anti-vivisectionist
good may come,withoutasking how on such a principlehe is
to justifya surgical operation or a judicial punishment. In
the presentstateof opinion,moralistsare not likelyto entirely
agree about vivisectionmore thanotherpeople. Even among
moralistsof the same school there is still room fordifferent
applications of accepted principles. But if anybody doubts
whetherthe conscious and deliberateapplication of theoryto
moral questions is capable of enormously reducing the debatable area, he should read the late Mr. Edmund Gurney's
essay on the subject in " Tertium Quid." That very earnest
and independentthinkerargues the question on hedonisticutilitariangrounds; but this is just one of the cases where the
decision is not likely to be very much affectedby the adoption of an idealistic in place of a hedonisticutilitarianism.
I may put what I have been saying in anotherformby saying that the functionof the moral philosopherin the decision
of ethical questions is rather that of the judge than that of
the jury. Consulted as to what a man ought to do under
such and such circumstances,he will not, qua moral philosopher,say, " You should do this or that," but ratherhe will
explain the relevantprinciplesof the Moral Law, apply them
to the factsof the case, and then say, " If you thinkthat this
action will produce such and such results,then do so and so;
if not,don't. If you think,forinstance,thatthese experiments
have such and such a chance of saving pain; if you think
that the pain they may save is mathematicallyequivalent to
what they must cost; ifyou thinkthat the good to humanity
which they may effectis morallymore than equivalent to the
hardeningof the heart which they may possibly bring with
them,then performthese experiments; if not, don't." Such
is the way that the moral philosopherwill sum up the case,

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International7ournaZ of Ethics.

whetherto his own conscience or to somebody else. The

moralphilosopher is the judge, the conscience and judgment
of the individual(whetherthephilosopherhimselfor his client)
are the jury.
I may add one furtherremark. Most of the objections
brought against casuistry,whether in its theological or its
purelyphilosophical form,affectmainlythe scientificconsideration of individual,and especially of abnormal and exceptional,problems in conduct. The most,it seems to me, that
moral philosophy can do forsuch cases is to produce, in conjunction with other studies and influences,a habit of mind
favorable to their reasonable consideration. We may quite
well deprecatethe discussionof such abnormalcases by anticipation; and we may admit that when they do occur in actual
practicea healthy instinctwill decide them betterthan theoretical subtlety. 'Ev Gila'TO' ,Tv xptSic;. But the assailant of
casuistryusually talks as if on the general questions of conduct-on those general questions of which each man has to
settle a good many forhimselfone way or another every day
betweenthe time he gets up in the morningand the time he
goes to bed at night-he talks (I say) as if on such questions
as these therewas a general consensus,at least among sensible
and well-meaningpeople. Such an assumption seems to me
the veryshallowestof delusions. Directlywe leave words and
come to things the consensus disappears. It is merelythe
vagueness of language that seems to sanction its existence.
People are agreed, no doubt, as to the wrongnessof murder.
But that is only because murdermeans killing,except where
killing is justifiable. As to the immoralityof killingin war,or
by means of punishment,or to reduce population,or by way
of cbOayaat(a, there is no consensus at all. No doubt, in these
questions of merely negative moralitythere is a consensus
among the great majority. But come to positive precepts.
There, again, we finda consensus as to copy-book headings,
be honest,be charitable,be temperate."
such as, " Be truthful,
There is a consensus (to borrowa distinctionof your President) as to virtues; there is none as to duties. "Be temperate." Yes. But there are many ways of being temperate.

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The Limits of Casuistry.

477

It is possible to eat and drinkwealth equivalent to one pound,

or even five pounds, a day without positively injuring one's
constitution;and it is possible also to live on one shilling a
day, or with practice on a great deal less. Which course
am I to adopt, my income and position being so and so? I
ought to give money to charity; but how much? I ought to
provide forthe future; but how much? I ought to devote
myselfto my profession; but how much time should I give
to mypupils? I ought to research; but how ought I to divide
my time between research,teaching,and amusement,or more
general social duties? It is no use to say that an exact determinationof such questionsis impossible. There is no consensus as to the barest outline of an answer. It is on these general questions of conduct,which can never be escaped, rather
than in the discussion of abnormal complicationsof individual circumstances,that the practical application of clearly
thoughtout ethical principlesseems likelyto be most fruitful.
Nay, more,I am preparedto contend that the study of the
general principlesof moral philosophy,in theirapplicationto
practicalquestions such as these,is not only essential to intellectual clearness,but that (if conducted under what I may
vaguely call constructiveratherthan destructiveinfluences)it
is likelyto exert a positivelystimulatingand ethical influence.
e etv ;rvc tt'pov j ov'ar ?rx'ec. That is
rpOq Atieto tk ap?-;
quite true; and it is no less true that knowledge puffethup,
but love edifieth. But it is true,also, that more harm is done
from want of thought than want of will. After all, it would
really be strangeif the thinkingabout duty should be found,
as a rule,to have a demoralizingtendency. No doubt moral
philosophywill not make a good man any morethantheology
will make a religious man. But it has usually been considered that a certainamount of religious instructionis helpful
in that direction,when conjoined with that personal influence
by which alone, as your great Cambridge lay theologian has
taught us, virtueis teachable. It is a modest plea to urge that
good effectsmay, likewise,in due subordinationto the living
influenceof personal character,spring fromthe thoughtful
considerationof moral principlescarriedto whateverpoint of

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InternationalYournal of Ethics.

theoreticalabstractionis demanded by the general level of the

individual'seducation and culture.
And what is the practical outcome of all this? Are we all,
it may be said, to become moral philosophers?or are we all to
submitourselves to an ethical director? Want of time must
be my excuse, if my answer degeneratesonce more into dogmatism.
(a) I do thinkthat a certain acquaintance with at least the
non-metaphysicalor less metaphysicalaspects of moral philosophy ought to be looked upon as an essential element in
higher education; and that those in whose education such a
knowledge has not been included may reasonably,if anxious
to do theirduty,be urged to make some such an acquaintance for themselves,-not, indeed,as indispensable to moral
life, but as one among many possible modes of ethical
cultivation. Of course, I am thinking now of persons
otherwise highly educated and of moderately intellectual
habits and capacity. And, by way of illustration,the kind of
books I am thinkingof as suited forpersons of that class, not
otherwise interested in philosophic speculation, are such
works as Lecky's " History of European Morals," Mill's
"Utilitarianism,"John Grote's " Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy,"Butler's " Sermons," Martineau's " Types of
Ethical Theory," and a great work which I need not name in
the presence of its author. And to these I need not, I hope,
in this society,apologize for adding a book which does not
profess to be a philosophical treatise at all, but which,as I
personallycannot help feeling,is even, fromthe strictlyethical point of view, as importantas any of the books I have
mentioned: I mean " Ecce Homo." The works of writers
like Kant and Green one would recommendonly to persons
of a more speculativebent.
(b) Especially may this duty be urged on all whose special
studies or professionaldutiesrequire themto express opinions
upon ethical questions,if not actually to become instructors
in ethics or special departmentsof ethics, such as political economists,or journalists,or writerson politics. I hope I
shall not be accused of taking too Aristoteliana view either

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The Limits of Casuistry.

479

of politics or of education,if I venture to add to these the

practical politicianand the practicalteacher.
(c) There is one remainingclass forwhom the importance
of ethical study should surelyneed no demonstration. Whatever else the Church and the churches may be, it and they
are unquestionably,and above all thingselse, ethical societies.
Whatever else a clergymanmay be, at least he is this,-an
officerand an authorized teacher in a great society for the
promotionof the good of life(To eAd vt). And yet it is, I fear,
a painfuland lamentable fact that some eightyor ninetyper
cent. of the Anglican clergy,and probablythe same mightbe
said of all other religious bodies in this countryexcept the
Unitariansand the Roman Catholics,take holy orderswithout
a single day's instructionin ethical science. Ludicrously inadequate as is the theological equipmentof a large proportion
of our English clergy,they have all read theology forat least
some fewweeks or monthspriorto theirexamination,and the
continuedstudy of theology is frequentlypreached and sometimes practisedas a professionalduty; whereas the presence
of a purelyethical work upon the shelves of a clerical library
may be taken as a tolerably safe indication that the owner
took honors in Litt. Hum. at Oxfordor in the Moral Sciences
Tripos at Cambridge. I need not, perhaps, stop to argue that
therecan be no fruitful
study of ethics on the theological side
without a preparatorytraining in philosophical ethics; nor
may I stay to point out what in my view is the true relation
betweenthe study of moral theology or Christian ethics and
the study of moral philosophy; to the great majorityof our
clergy the one is almost as unknownas the other. And how
barrenmustothertheological studies be iftheydo not lead up
to and include the study of the Christian ideal of life! The
object of ethical studyis (as the late ProfessorGreen used to
say) the clearing up of the moral ideal. Our ideal of what is
the best sort of lifeto be promotedforourselves and forothers
cannot be proved or demonstratedempirically. Yet it is, I
believe, given by reason. If Christianity(in whatever sense
accepted or interpreted)be true,then the ideal revealed by
reason must coincide with the ideal historicallypresentedto
VoiD IV.-No.

33

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InterizationalYournal of Ethics.

us by Christianityin its originaland purest formand handed

down (amid whatever corruptionsand adventitiouselements)
by the ChristianChurch. While undoubtedlyit would be for
the Christianteacher unreal and unnaturalto study or teach
ethics entirelywithout referenceto the formsin which as a
matterof historythe supreme ethical ideal has been, and is
being,graduallyrevealed to man,it is surelyno less one-sided
and no less absurd to attempt to study the historical revelation in total divorce fiom the deliverancesof what theologians
sometimescall mere Natural Reason, though the very use of
such a termmaysuggest how inadequatelysome of them have
grasped that fundamentalprincipleof theirown creed which
declares that the individual conscience of everyhuman being
and the historicpersonalityof Christ are only manifestations
of one and the same Reason, Logos, or Sapientia Dei, the one
though progressive,the other(as some
more or less imperfect,
of us believe) perfectbecause containingin itselfthe germ of
all futureethical development.
H. RASHDALL.
HERTFORDCOLLEGE,OXFORD.
[NOTE.-In the last numberof the INTERNATIONALJOURNALOF ETHICS,
Mr. Bradleyhas published" Some Remarkson Punishment,"whichI did not
see untilthe presentessaywas in type. Had I seen it earlier,I should nothave
attributedto him the view that actions are pronouncedrightor wrongwithout
referenceto social good. I can only plead in extenuationof mymisunderwithMr. BradstandingthatI have found personsmoredecidedlyin sympathy
ley's generalphilosophicalpositionthanmyselfequally unable to put any otber
of Mr.
constructionupon his language thanI have done. But if one difficulty
Bradley's readers is cleared up by his very interesting"cRemarks,"theywill
whichtheyhave feltin underonlyincreasein some mindsthe difficulty
#erlhaps
standinghis diatribesagainst casuistryin the ";Principlesof Logic." If it is
admittedthat actions are rightor wrong according as theypromoteor hinder
a casuistryof some kind seems inevitable.
social good (however interpreted),
Indeed, Mr. Bradley'sarticle seems to me an admirableexampleof the kind of
casuistrywe want; at least it would be so if the conclusionsto whichit points
someof themmightpossiblyproveto me personally)werea
(howeverdistasteful
littlemore clearlyworked out instead of being merelyhinted at. No one will
intodetailsthanhe feelsdisposed
wishto compel Mr. Bradleyto descend further
to do; but if anyone chooses to develop his suggestions,Mr. Bradleycan hardly
blame him; even thoughthe resultingcasuistryshould (like othercasuistries)
turnout to be notaltogetherwithoutits " disgustingparts."-H. R.]

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